Competing models of peacekeeping.
The role of the EU and China in Africa
Daniela Sicurelli,
Paper prepared for the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics
Porto, Portugal -- 23-26th June 2010
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is the most relevant partner of the UN and of African
regional organizations in peacekeeping operations in the African continent. Since 2003,
it has carried out Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS) operations in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Chad, Central Africa Republic, Somalia and
Guinea. It is a key supporter of the African Union (AU)’s security policy, providing
funding for peace and development initiatives through the African Peace Facility. The
European Commission and the EU member states are notably the major donors in
Africa, where they provide more than half of the total international official aid. They
also are key partners of the international financial institutions in the promotion of good
governance, human rights and democracy in the continent. At the same time, though,
the EU is increasingly facing competition for influence on Africa, coming from East.
China is the major actor in Africa that may be listed in the group of “emerging donors”.
It has also become an actor in peace operations in Africa, participating in UN missions.
As of May 2007, 1800 Chinese troops were participating in peacekeeping operations in
Africa in Liberia, Sudan and the Democratic republic of Congo. Moreover in the last
decade China has increased its diplomatic presence in Africa, increasing its political
dialogue with African states and regional organizations.
Despite these similarities, the two actors are promoting alternative models of
peacekeeping in Africa. While the European model is based on the promotion of
sovereignty pooling and on the idea that human rights and good governance are
preconditions for peace, the Chinese model is based on the principle of equality among
sovereign states and on the idea that economic development is a precondition for peace.
European leaders tend to underline their ability to export the EU’s model of
peacekeeping through integration beyond its borders. At the same time, Chinese leaders
are increasingly committed to show the soft power of China on developing countries. In
other words, the two actors are competing to attract support of African leaders. This
paper investigates on the way representatives of African regional organizations and of
African states react to EU and Chinese peacekeeping policies. It investigates on the way
the norms promoted by the EU and China are interpreted and re-elaborated in the
African context.
To this purpose, I analyze the constitutive norms of African regional
organizations and investigate on the way official documents and speeches of regional
and government leaders respond to the constitutive norms of European and Chinese
foreign policies. Given the variability of political regimes of different African states and
of their role in local and regional conflicts, I also take into account the positions of
selected governments towards external peacekeepers. In so doing I try to capture the
variable interpretations that Africa leaders provide to the same norms. Another caveat
concerns the fact that declarations of government leaders and regional organizations
tend to follow diplomatic rules and to be filtered by political and interest-based
considerations, which reduces their potential as indicators of normative impact.
Nevertheless, given the plurality of actors involved in peace operations in Africa, which
reduces their dependency on a single donor and trade partner, local political leaders
appear increasingly prone to express their reactions, both positive and negative, to
external actors intervening in their domestic politics.
The first part of the article draws the theoretical framework of the paper, by
making reference to literature on norm diffusion and normative impact. The second part
presents the competing models of peacekeeping pushed forwards by the EU and China.
The third part analyzes the norms concerning peacekeeping that have been formalized in
the documents of African regional organizations. Finally, the fourth part presents the
way African regional organizations and governments react to European and Chinese
norms.
Norm diffusion and local contexts
Katzenstein et al. (1996, 54) proposed a definition of norms that has been widely
used in literature on International relations. They define norms as “collective
expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity”. Wiener (2008) elaborates on
this definition and points to three types of norms, namely fundamental norms (such as
sovereignty, citizenship and democracy), organizing principles (such as proportionality,
responsibility and accountability) and standardised procedures (such as electoral rules
and decision-making procedures). She argues that norm diffusion does not necessarily
trigger homogeneity. On the contrary, social norms exist in so far as they are contested.
Norms have a dual quality, namely stability and flexibility. Norms are stable, since they
contribute to structuring actors behaviour. At the same time, they are flexible, since
actors may interpret them differently. The co-existence of different interpretations of the
same norm may trigger contestation of its validity.
Building upon this literature, Sandholtz and Stiles (2009) provide a typology of
fundamental norms which distinguishes two major set of norms, namely sovereignty
norms (i.e. strengthening the state monopoly on force, expanding the exclusive internal
jurisdiction and consolidating sovereign equality) and liberal norms (including human
rights promotion, humanitarian intervention and the right to democracy) (see Table 1).
According to the authors, norms go through cycles of change, which comprise different
stages, namely their origin, evolution and crisis. The crisis of norms tends to lead to the
creation of new norms. Sovereignty norms emerged earlier than liberal norms. The two
normative sets have developed autonomously, but they colluded in the second half of
the 20th century. More specifically, the end of the Cold War has been a relevant trigger
for the international diffusion of liberal norms. Nevertheless the tension between the
two types of norms is still high, especially in specific countries.
Relevant questions for scholars of norm diffusion concern the impact of norms,
the conditions that make the process successful and the way they change while
travelling from one context to another. Norm diffusion is not an automatic process of
norm export. Norm receivers may endorse new norms, filter them and adjust them to the
local normative context or reject them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). In the first case,
norm promotion leads to socialization of norm receivers, who end up internalizing new
norms and conform to them “in a routinized, non-reflexive manner” (Knight, 2003, 2).
The second case, though, is the most frequent one. In that event norm receivers may
endorse only norms that appear congruent with their own principles, practices and
strategic interests. They may even reformulate the new norms in the light of their local
normative context (Acharya, 2004). In the third case norm diffusion ends, and might
even even reach the opposite result, namely strengthening local norms.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 153) investigate on the conditions that lead to
effective norm diffusion. According to the authors, “organizations tend to model
themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more
legitimate or successful”. Normative transfer takes place when the promoted norms fit
with the local normative context. That is the condition of “normative resonance”
(Manners, 2002, 245). Norm receivers may apply a cultural filter to the new norms.
Actors may even manipulate norms in order to make them fit with the new context
(Risse, 2000). Norm promoters usually try to persuade recipients of the appropriateness
and effectiveness of new norms to address specific problems. Another condition for
effective norm diffusion is that norms positively contribute to the reputation of norm
receivers. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 906) “expect states that are insecure about
their international status or reputation to embrace new international norms most eagerly
and thoroughly”.
The role of Europe and China as actors involved in norm diffusion has attracted
the attention of several scholars of international relations. Studies on the role of the EU
in as a norm exporter have proliferated since the early 2000s. Several scholars have
defined the very identity of the EU as a norm promoter, a “normative power” (Manners,
2002), a “normative actor” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006 and Tocci, 2008) and a
“normative hegemon” (Haukkala, 2008). From this perspective, the EU can be
considered as a norm promoter either by virtue, as a successful example of regional
integration and a potential model for other attempts of integration, or by necessity, given
its lack of more traditional tools of foreign policy.
As a matter of fact, the EU has been involved in norm promotion in various
geographical areas, from its neighbourhood to far away regions, including Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa. EU-Africa relations may be considered a particularly fertile
context for norm diffusion, due to the dense network of relations between them, in
terms of trade, aid and diplomatic relations, and to the asymmetric nature of their power
relations. Africa is the continent with the higher concentration of states whose economy
is highly dependent upon external aid, which contributes to concentrating bargaining
power in the hand of the major donor. For all these reasons, EU-Africa relations could
be considered an appropriate context for effective norm promotion. At the same time,
though, the colonial history that ties Europe and Africa and the dependency relationship
of many African states on external aid may have the opposite result, namely raising
contestation among African leaders. Besides, given the growing role of other actors in
Africa, and primarily China, one might expect that Europe faces an increasing number
of competitors in its attempt to promote norms in the continent.
The role of China as a norm promoter has been ignored for a long time, but it
has been recently acknowledged among international scholars and actors. Womack
(2008) argues that Chinese foreign policy towards specific regions of the world, such as
ASEAN, has a relevant normative element. Other studies have investigated the process
of norm promotion that involves Chinese authorities far beyond the Chinese borders.
The Chinese government itself represents China as a model of development, national
emancipation and stability and engages in the promotion of its own model to Africa
(Hofmann et al, 2007). Even Western governments seem to share this Chinese selfrepresentation. According to Barton (2009, 12), “the fact that the West has so sharply
criticised China’s role in Africa, may provide the greatest indication, thus far, that they
recognise China as a normative power” (Barton, 2009, 12).
Chinese and European models of peacekeeping
While European peacekeeping policies may be considered close to the “liberal”
model1, following the Sandholtz and Stiles’ (2009) definition, China’s Africa policy is
much more oriented towards the defence of the national sovereignty of its interlocutors,
including African states, even though it is increasingly including liberal elements in its
normative foreign policy. Comparison between the roles of these actors in Africa and
that of another relevant external actor, namely the US, helps capturing the specific
features of the Chinese and European approaches. Figure 1 synthesizes the different
approaches of the EU, China and the US towards peacekeeping norms.
Chinese foreign policy is centred upon the principle of non-interference.
According to Barton (2009, 14), “it goes against China’s foreign policy principles to
interfere in the domestic affairs of a fellow country. In relation to the EU, China wishes
to fully respect the national sovereignty of a fellow country, so as to inadvertently
protect its own national sovereignty, from other prying nations”. This principle affects
the relationship between the economic and political dimensions in Chinese foreign
policy. According to Barton, China “attempts to clearly differentiate business from
politics, with virtually no insistence upon the second”. Under this respect Chinese
1
The definition of European peacekeeping policy as “liberal” refers to the principles and norms promoted
by the EU and to the multilateral approach to peacekeeping, but does not exclude that the member states
take self-interested decisions that might harm the interests of African states. For an analysis of the
interests of European states guiding EU’s Africa policy, see Farrell (2005).
Africa policy differs from that of the US and the EU, who engage in trade and financial
sanctions against governments that do not fulfil specific human rights standards.
Womack (2008, 271) confirms this view and considers the example of China’s relations
with ASEAN, where the former supports the regional integration process of South East
Asian sovereign countries. According to the author, the Chinese support for ASEAN
should not be considered as a way to promote practices of sovereignty pooling. On the
contrary, Chinese normative foreign policy towards ASEAN appears oriented towards
the “mutual respect” for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Referring to the same case,
Tocci and Manners (2008, 301) specify that China applies the norm of “reciprocity even
in situations of asymmetric power”.
A similar description holds in the case of Chinese peacekeeping policy towards
Africa. The Chinese government is increasingly involved in UN peacekeeping
operations in Africa, and has provided financial and military support to governments
and regional organizations involved in the peace process. Recent examples of this
commitment include financial aid to the AU mission in Sudan (2006) and in Somalia
(2009) and election monitoring in the first Sudanese multiparty elections held in 2010.
China has also supported regional efforts in the promotion of human rights in Africa,
such as New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Taylor, 2010).
Nevertheless Chinese support for the peace process and human rights promotion is
conditional upon the respect for the sovereignty of African states. The basic assumption
is that “treating each other as equal is crucial for ensuring mutual trust”, as Chinese
president Hu Jintao stated at the Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa
cooperation in 2006 (China-Africa Forum, 2006). The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Wang Yi at the Open Debate of the Security Council on the Relationship between the
UN and Regional Organizations stated that “Both China and Africa follow the principle
of mutual respect, treating each other as equals, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation
in forging a new type of strategic partnership and carrying out cooperation that serves
the interests of China and African countries and peoples” (Permanent Mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the UN, 2008). Even in the relationship between China
and the AU Hu Jintao remarked the Chinese commitment to the respect and defence of
the sovereignty of African states, arguing that “China firmly supported the efforts of
African countries, the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations to safeguard
state sovereignty and independently resolve African issues” (People’s Daily Online,
2009).
The Chinese approach to sovereignty appears especially visible in conflict
situations. In the specific case of Sudan, the Chinese Special Representative on Africa
explained that “We cannot resolve an issue in a sovereign country without the
collaboration of that country. The basic position of China on the Darfur issue is as
follows: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sudan should be respected; the issue
should be solved politically through dialogue and consultations on equal footings”
(Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco, 2007). As
Alden and Huges (2009) comment, the Chinese policy towards African countries
follows what Alexander Wendt would call a “culture of anarchy”. Nevertheless this
approach is not based on self-interested exploitation of developing countries. It is rather
based on the principles of mutual benefit, non-interference and non-conditionality.
The justification behind this approach is provided by Hu Jintao, with his view of
the close interaction between Chinese “harmonic” domestic politics and international
relations. The Chinese president has expressed for the first time its interest in
committing to build a “harmonious word” precisely in the context of China-Africa
relations, in the Asia-Africa summit which took place on April 2005 in Jakarta (Alden
and Hughes, 2009). Ambassador Zhang Keyuan specified that China “promotes the
building of a harmonious world with durable peace and common prosperity”. According
to the Ambassador, the definition of harmony in the international relations means that
“all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal and must respect one
another and treat one another with equality.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China, 2010). By stressing its interest in an harmonic world, the
Chinese government frames its relations with developing countries in an equal
partnership discourse, stressing the difference between China and “neo-colonial”
powers. Chinese refusal to impose financial and diplomatic sanctions and arms
embargoes to governments considered responsible for massive human rights violations
can be read under this perspective. The Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu
Guijin, explained this approach arguing “We don’t believe in embargoes. That just
means that the people suffer. From a practical consideration, embargoes and sanctions
can’t solve problems, just like armed invasion cannot solve problems” (UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006). More recently, Guijin commented that
“We don’t attach political conditions. We have to realize the political and economic
environments are not ideal. But we don’t have to wait for everything to be satisfactory
or human rights to be perfect” (Morris, 2008). Alden and Hughes (2009) identify
meaningful differences between the rhetoric and the practice of Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese Africa policy is not completely conditionality-free. For instance, China
demands African states to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan before receiving
Chinese investments. Nevertheless, as the authors argue, this type of conditionality has
rarely been implemented.
China has notably attracted criticism in the international community and among
NGOs for its refusal to impose sanctions to Al Bashir’s Sudanese government and
Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments and trade policy
appear separated from peace and human rights considerations. The Chinese government
has recently started to pay attention to these criticisms. Since 2007 it has actively
contributed to the international efforts to bring peace to Darfur, trying to persuade the
Sudanese government to accept foreign troops (Brautigam, 2009). More recently, a
senior Chinese diplomat claimed that Beijing is slowing its investments in Zimbabwe
(Chimora, 2010). So far, though, the Chinese government keeps refusing to join
international sanctions against these countries. The Chinese government opted for
abstention on a resolution imposing sanctions to Sudan (2004) and vetoed several
resolutions of the UN Security Council concerning African governments.
The focus of the Chinese government on the respect for national sovereignty of
African states is also evident in reluctance to promoting international law as an
instrument of conflict resolution. China did not ratify the Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The role of the ICC is particularly relevant in the
African context, since so far the Court has opened investigations concerning only
African countries (Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central
African Republic, Sudan and Kenya).
In contrast to Chinese foreign policy, US policy towards African conflicts
emerges for its focus on human rights and on the responsibility to protect. The US
government has imposed tough sanctions to African governments involved in human
rights violations especially since the early 1990s. In the case of Sudan, for instance, the
G.H.W. Bush administration imposed financial sanctions to the government of Sudan
since the coup d’état of 1989, which marked the beginning of the Al Bahsir’s era. The
Clinton, G.W. Bush and Obama administrations confirmed and further strengthened the
sanctions regime towards the government of Sudan. Moreover, since the end of the Cold
War, the US has exerted its leverage on the World Bank for international aid and loans
programs conditional upon the promotion of democracy and good governance in Africa.
At the same time, US foreign policy towards Africa shares the Chinese
lukewarm approach to international criminal law. Not only did the US refuse to ratify
the Rome Treaty establishing the ICC. It even devised the instrument of bilateral
immunity agreements. According to this instrument, adopted by the Bush administration
and still enforced, states joining bilateral immunity agreements commit not to challenge
US nationals in the ICC, and get the same treatment by the US. This proposal resembles
the mutual respect approach of Chinese foreign policy, promising the defence of
national sovereignty of other states while upholding, at the same time, its own
autonomy. Nevertheless, the US approach towards the ICC is more nuanced than that of
China. In the case of Sudan, the US ambassador to the UN appointed in January 2009,
Susan Rice, argued that the US “supports the ICC's actions to hold accountable those
responsible for the heinous crimes in Darfur” (Reynolds, 2009). Nevertheless, the US
State Department’s ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues stated that the hypothesis
of ratifying the Rome statute is still far away. In June 2010 he acknowledged that
“We’re nowhere near that point,” and specified that the Obama administration is
“looking for ways to support this court constructively” as one of the Rome Statute’s
observer nations (Kaufman, 2010).
European policies towards Africa share with the US the focus on human rights,
good governance and democracy promotion. Like the US, European foreign policy
decisions are clearly influenced by the World Bank approach to development
cooperation. The Joint declaration of the Council, the Commission and the EP (2006) on
the European consensus on Development clearly mirrors the World Bank philosophy. In
this framework, the EU has implemented arms embargos, financial sanctions and travel
restrictions to several African governments since the ‘90s (see Sicurelli, 2010).
Moreover it sponsored several UN resolutions in the field of human rights concerning
African countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan,
Zimbabwe (Smith, 2006).
What distinguishes EU’s policies towards Africa both from Chinese and
American policies is the European support for the norm of pooled sovereignty as a
peacekeeping tool. As a matter of fact the EU is a key supporter of AU security
operations and of international law as an instrument to address human rights. Since
2004 it has implemented the African Peace Facility, namely a financial instrument in
support of peace and development initiatives of the AU. Moreover, it backed AU peace
operations with ESDP missions in the cases of Sudan and Somalia and established
cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organizations (RECs) on the following fields:

Trilateral AU-RECs-EU Roadmap on the full operationalisation of APSA;

Progress towards the operationalisation ofthe African Standby Force;

EU support to coherent AU-RECs agenda on African training centres;

Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System;

Additional financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations;

Establishment of an AU strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons;

EU support for the first Panafrican initiative on the control of illicit arms
trafficking (Africa-EU partnership, 2010).
Dialogue in these fields has become institutionalized in the Africa-EU
partnership on peace and security. Besides, the EC is the major donor to security
operations carried out by IGAD and by ECOWAS (Klingebiel et al., 2008). Finally, it
gives its active support for the establishment of NEPAD, especially for the promotion of
governance issues at the regional level (Taylor, 2010).
In 2001 Romano Prodi, at that time President of the European Commission,
remarked the European support for the African regional security architecture by
sponsoring the European model of peacekeeping. According to Prodi, “By making a
success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a
method of peace” (Prodi, 2001). The idea that the AU should follow the example of its
European counterpart is also event in the “EU Strategy for Africa” (2005), written by
the European Commission, which points at a parallel evolution of “One Europe” and
“One Africa”.
The European support for shared sovereignty is also evident in its approach to
international law and, more specifically, towards the ICC. The EU is a firm promoter of
the role of the Court in Africa and engaged in the attempt to persuade African leaders to
ratify the Rome statute establishing the ICC (Scheipers and Sicurelli, 2008). European
authorities explain this approach by remarking the effectiveness of the EU model of
peacekeeping. According to the former High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana,
the EU pushes for sovereignty sharing as a model of peacekeeping, as a result of its own
experience of integration. According to Solana, due to “our tradition of shared
sovereignty, the belief in collective action comes naturally to Europeans. More than
forty years of experience has taught us that multilateral solutions are an alternative to
war and that sovereignty shared is sovereignty revitalized” (EU, 2002). Similarly, the
European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs distinguished the EU from
the US for the greater emphasis the former puts on international law. According to the
Commissioner, “our friends outside Europe, such as the US, do not find it easy to
understand the complexities of our system, balancing shared sovereignty with national
competence. A very good recent example of this was the way in which the US
approached the issue of the ICC” (EU, 2003).
Parallel to European peace operations, EU member states keep carrying out
bilateral development programs with African countries. Former colonial ties are still
relevant factors influencing aid flows from European and African countries. This is
evident especially in the case of France and the UK. Nevertheless the French and British
governments are increasingly opting for a multilateral framework, as a way to legitimize
their intervention in Africa. An emblematic example of this trend is the decision of
Sarkozy government to Europeanize the French initiative RECAMP, by sponsoring the
EURO RECAMP program, aimed at training AU leaders to establish a continental
decision-making plan for crisis management. Moreover, the French government has
played a crucial role in the ESDP operations targeting French speaking African
countries.
On the basis of this analysis one may conclude that the European and the
Chinese approaches are located on the opposite poles of a continuum between the
support of shared sovereignty and the defence of national sovereignty, while the US
approach to African conflict management is located in-between, even though closer to
the liberal pole. If the role of the EU in Africa is the expression of European “postWestphalian” foreign policy (Manners, 2002, 240), the Chinese approach to
peacekeeping in Africa may be labelled with Ginsburg’s concept of “Eastphalia”
(Gibsburg, 2010).
African regional organizations and peacekeeping norms
African security organizations have different approaches to sovereignty and to
external intervention in the field of peacekeeping and human rights promotion. The AU
appears more open to the liberal norms of the responsibility to protect and sovereignty
sharing then sub-regional organizations. Nevertheless even the AU has a rather different
approach to peacekeeping from that of the EU.
The security architecture of sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), is
clearly intergovernmental and built upon the principle of national sovereignty.
According to Tavares (2009, 36), ECOWAS set the stage for the responsibility to
protect in the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence (1981), but in practice “the
principles of sovereignty have always prevailed and the Protocol was to a large extent a
dead letter”. The Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security (2001) authorizes intervention in internal disputes that
“threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster” and in cases of “serious and massive
violations of human rights and the rule of law” (art.25). Nevertheless the lack of
operational capacity of the organization sets an obstacle to the implementation of these
instruments. As far as IGAD is concerned, conflict prevention, management and
resolution and humanitarian affairs are among the priority areas of the organization. All
IGAD did in the case of Darfur, though, was warning the Sudanese government against
a humanitarian crisis and opening dialogue with external actors, such as the EU, on the
need of the ICC to indict Al Bashir (IGAD, 2009). Similarly, SADC is a weak
organization in terms of peacekeeping capabilities, “serving mostly as an umbrella for
member states to advance their interests or legitimize their actions” (Tavares, 2009, 64).
Defence of the national sovereignty of its members was a key constitutive norm
of the predecessor of the AU, the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The approach
of the AU towards sovereignty in the field of conflict resolution represents a step
forwards from that of sub-regional organizations in the direction of liberal norms. The
AU Constitutive Act (2001) confirms the need to stress the principle of “noninterference by any Member States in the internal affairs of another” (article 4).
However, article 4 also recognizes the “right of the Union to intervene in a Member
State in pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity”. The AU may impose
sanctions on an African government if two thirds of the states approve it. Moreover, in
contrast to the OAU, article 4 of the AU Constitutive act includes “Condemnation and
rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments” and “the right of Member States
to request interventions from the Union in order to restore peace and security”.
The definition of “good governance” provided by AU institutions is rather
limited if compared to that proposed by the World Bank and adopted by the EU and the
US. On the occasion of a US-AU high level meeting, the Chairperson of the
Commission of the African Union, Jean Ping, stated that the AU promotes “best
practices in critical areas such as good governance, democracy, and respect for the rule
of law”. In order to specify the Commission’s approach to good governance, though,
Jean Ping only provides an example concerning the extreme case of intervention against
coup d’etats: “the African Union has been intervening in cases of crisis or coup d’état,
such as in Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger most recently. (…) This is to
show the African Union’s commitment, in the event of an unconstitutional change of
government, as opposed to what happens elsewhere in the world, such as in Honduras,
Thailand or Fiji and Kyrgyzstan” (AU, 2010a).
According to AU leaders an international force should intervene in cases of
grave violations of human rights. In 2005 Alpha O. Konaré, the first Chairperson of the
AU Commission (16 September 2003 – 1 February 2008) claimed that the AU should
“take timely action, based on the principle of non-indifference” in the cases of “the use
child soldiers, violence against women, particularly rape, and ritual crimes”, (AU,
2005). Two years later, the African Commission on Human People’s Rights issued a
resolution on “Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa”, which stressed
that “recent past, the international community has not responded quickly enough to
situations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity [and is deeply
concerned at] the continued slow response to the allegations of genocide and crime
against humanity”. That said, the case of Darfur shows how the interpretation of the
Responsibility to Protect provided by the AU differs from that of the EU. The scope of
the AU peace operation in Sudan (2004) was limited, both due to its lack of operational
capabilities and to its reluctance to violate Sudan’s sovereignty. Its mandate specified
that the protection of civilians was ultimately responsibility of the government of Sudan
(Klingebiel, et al., 2008).
Despite the fact that the AU formalized the need to intervene in cases of
violation of human rights, African states provided different interpretations of the way
human rights standards should be achieved. On February 2009 an officer of the AU
representation in New York observed that different views of human rights and good
governance coexist among African states. The officer said that the majority of the AU
member states have not ratified the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance (January 2007) because they consider the values inspiring the Charter as
values “imported” from the West2. On February 2010, the resistance of these states to
ratifying the Charter appeared clearly evident at the Assembly of the AU Heads of State
and Government. The Assembly “strongly underscored the importance of signing and
ratification by Member States which have not already done so, of the AU Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Good Governance as well as on good neighbourliness and
non-subversion” (AU Echo, 2010).
According to Williams (2009), speeches of leaders of African governments
during the UN World Summit in 2005 are emblematic of the tension between the ways
different African states view the principle of the responsibility to protect. In that venue,
the President of Rwanda expressed its support for the principle. South African President
Thabo Mbeki took a more cautious stance, noticing that there is no “security consensus”
among African countries on the nature of security threats and of what an African
security system would look like. In the case of Darfur, while the AU did not define the
crisis with the label of genocide and proposed military intervention only under consent
of the government of Sudan, the Presidents of Ghana and Senegal expressed their
2
Interview with an officer of the permanent observer mission of the AU at the UN, New York,
February 2009
support for the report of the head of the UN mission to Sudan calling for international
intervention in the country (Williams, 2009).
Open criticisms to the concepts of humanitarian intervention and responsibility
to protect obviously came from the Presidents of Zimbabwe and Sudan. The latter
raised the problem of the “double standard” that takes place at the Security Council.
According to Al Bashir, the conflict of Sudan is raising much more concern among
Western leaders than other conflicts such as that between Israel and Palestine (Williams,
2009).
The institutional structure and the legal documents of the AU show that African
states are more prone to sovereignty sharing than they used to be under the OAU. At the
same time, though, African leaders appear reluctant to surrendering sovereignty in the
field of human rights and conflict management. For these reasons, the AU can be
considered a fertile ground for the liberal norms sponsored by the EU, but, at the same
time, open to Chinese sponsored norms. In order to evaluate the impact of European and
Chinese norms on African peacekeeping one has to look at the way African regional
organizations view their international partners.
The impact of European and Chinese norms in Africa
African leaders notably perceive the EU as a model of integration. As a matter
of fact the AU institutional system and its security architecture are inspired on the
European example. Nevertheless reactions of African governments to European norms
and to the way the EU promotes them are not always enthusiastic. The AU’s
interpretation of liberal norms differs from that proposed by the EU. Besides, the
Chinese model of peacekeeping appears increasingly attractive for African governments
and regional organizations.
The structure of the AU institutions clearly recalls the European model. In the
field of human rights the African Court of Human rights is the counterpart to the
European Court of Human Rights. While, on the European side, the European Court of
Human Rights has developed a close relationship with the European Court of Justice, on
the African side in 2004 the African Court of Human rights has been merged with the
African Court of Justice. The creation of the Common African Defence and Security
Policy (CADSP) is another indicator of the attractiveness of the European model on
Africa, since it is meant to recall the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.
Moreover, the AU has repeatedly expressed support for the EU as a partner in the field
of conflict resolution. The two organizations signed several joint papers on peace and
conflict resolution. In June 2010, for instance, the African Commission and the
European Commission drafted a joint document where they agreed on the need to
further “enhance the Africa-EU political dialogue and cooperation on governance and
human rights” (African Commission and European Commission, 2010).
At the same time, African leaders have filtered EU norms and read them under
the light of local political culture. They endorsed the idea of pooled sovereignty, but
gave a minimal interpretation to this concept. On the one hand the EU proved effective
in influencing the discourse of AU leaders. The document of the AU Commission on
“Mission and Vision of the African Union” (2004) stated that the AU is more
supranational than its predecessor. The document used the language of EU leaders,
depicting the AU as a hybrid organization, combining intergovernmental and
supranational norms. The report stresses the intergovernmental nature of the AU,
arguing, on the contrary, that the AU makes the “community and inter-governmental
approach possible” (AU, 2004). The EU emerged as a model for the AU especially in
the field of peacekeeping. In 2007, Maxwell M. Mkwezalamba, Commissioner for
Economic Affairs at the AU Commission, stressed that “In view of the significant
progress made by the European Union (EU)” in addressing the issues of conflict
management and good governance “the AU stands to draw valuable lessons from the
European experience” (Mkwezalamba 2007).
On the other hand the African institutional system is more intergovernmental than
the EU. The European Commission is a supranational institution, independent on the
governments of the EU member states. The AU Commission, on the contrary, is merely
defined as the “Secretariat of the Union” in the AU Constitutive act (art. 1) (Sturman,
2007). The AU Constitutive Act introduced the power of regional institutions to
intervene in cases of human rights abuses, but only in grave circumstances. The Act
stressed “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good
governance” (art.4), but it does not impose democratic rules as a condition for
membership, in contrast to the EU Treaties. The African Charter on Democracy,
Elections and Government is just an exhortative report rather than a binding document.
The approach of African leaders towards the ICC represents another departure
from the European approach to sovereignty sharing. A recent communiqué of the AU
reacting to the indictment of Al Bashir claimed that “The African Union has always
emphasized its commitment to justice and its total rejection of impunity, in line with the
relevant provisions of its Constitutive Act. At the same time, the AU reiterates that the
search for justice should be pursued in a manner not detrimental to the search for
peace”. The President of Sudan lamented that “the latest decision by the ICC runs in the
opposite direction” (AU, 2010b). Not only does the leader of Sudan express this
approach to the ICC. At its 14th summit, the AU itself called for a revision of the Rome
Statute establishing the ICC and for establishing “immunities of officials whose states
are not parties to the Rome Statute”, such as for instance Sudan. It called for an
amendment of art. 13 of the Statute, which set the legal basis for Al Bashir’s indictment.
Moreover, it stated that “there has been blatant abuse of the Principle of Universal
Jurisdiction particularly by some non-African States”, thereby further confirming its
opposition to international criminal law (AU, 2010c). As Williams (2007, 277) argues,
in Darfur “the AU continued to respect Sudan’s sovereignty”.
Even more specifically, African states expressed their opposition against the
way European countries use the ICC. A joint report written by EU and AU’s experts on
the principle of universal jurisdiction points at the fact “that the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by European states is politically selective against them. This raises a
concern over double standards”. Furthermore, the report states that “Indictments issued
by European states against officials of African states have the effect of subjecting the
latter to the jurisdiction of European states, contrary to the sovereign equality and
independence of states. For African states, this evokes memories of colonialism”. For
these reasons, rather than promoting international criminal law, African governments
call for support for building their national legal capacity to combat genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and torture (Council of the EU, 2009). The difference
between the AU and EU’s approaches towards the ICC can also be captured by taking
into account that, by June 2008, only 12 African states had refused to sign the bilateral
immunity agreements (BIAs) proposed by the US. The proliferation of bilateral
immunity agreements with the US has triggered criticism in the EU, which tried to
propose alternative deals to uphold the jurisdiction of the ICC (see Scheipers and
Sicurelli, 2008).
Similarly, in the case of Zimbabwe, EU diplomatic sanctions have raised broad
criticism in the AU. The controversy between the two regional organizations emerged in
the context of the EU-AU summit, scheduled for December 2007, in Lisbon. On the eve
of the summit, the EU member states discussed on the opportunity to open the summit
to President Mugabe, the British government lead the front of the opponents to
Mugabe’s participation in the Summit, arguing that admitting him would be a violation
to the diplomatic sanctions the EU had imposed to the country. President of the AU
Commission, Alpha Ouman Konare reacted negatively to this type of debate by arguing
that: “What we would like is the summit between the EU and Africa, a very important
and historic summit, to concentrate on the documents which are to be approved and not
on President Robert Mugabe. […] There are problems of governance, but Africans
themselves have to sort these out, to tackle them head on. Otherwise we won’t be able
to get beyond our difficulties” (Doyle 2007). At the 14th AU Summit, the Assembly of
member states “invited all the Member States of the AU and the international
community to give priority to the immediate and permanent lifting of the international
sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe” (AU, 2010c). These statements show that AU leaders
share with the EU a concern for human rights violations, but do not consider them a
priority for the inter-regional summit and do not see European intervention in this field
appropriate. In other words, African leaders appear to support European foreign policy
especially when it respects local ownership. The AU’s request for European funds for
an African lead Peace Facility in 2004 is a further confirmation of the need of African
leaders to own the peace process.
According to Williams (2007), the different approaches of the EU and of the AU
member states towards sovereignty have an ironic element. European states, where the
norm of Westphalian sovereignty had originated, have become increasingly prone to
sovereignty pooling, while in Africa, where European colonizers had introduced the
concept of national sovereignty in a coercive way, state governments have become
particularly reluctant to surrender national sovereignty. The end of colonization of
Africa has triggered regionalist and anti-imperialist movements. At the same time,
according to Mazrui & Ostergard (2002: 19), since the end of European colonial history,
“African leaders have defended the question of borders and territorial integrity and
discouraged challenges to them”. The weak and internally divided African states left by
European colonization are particularly sensitive to the defence of national autonomy
from external pressures (Sturman, 2007). As Williams (2007, 254) effectively notices,
these “quasi-states prioritize regime security rather than liberal international politics”.
In this context, China seems to provide a plausible alternative to the European
model. The first obvious indicator of Chinese attraction for the AU concerns the warm
welcome of its member states for China as a trade partner and as promoter of
investments, due to its growing interest on Africa. More then a partner, the Chinese
government is considered a “friend” (AU, 2007). The Director of Economic Affairs of
the African Union Commission, N’Guettia Kouassi (2010, 3-5) synthesized the role of
China in Africa saying that it is “slowly but surely becoming a key player in Africa. it is
dong so through making huge investments in infrastructure, providing financial
assistance without any conditions, providing political support in international forums
and flooding the African market with Chinese products”. In contrast, the official
stresses that “cooperation with Europe (…) has not so far enabled Africa to taste
development and control its destiny so as to co-participate in the management of world
affairs”. The AU official continues by saying that “Today, China appears to be the great
friend of Africa and seems to understand the continent better”.
In the field of conflict management, the support of African political leaders to
the Chinese approach is even more evident. The Chairperson of the AU Commission,
Alpha Oumar Konaré (2003-2008) thanked the Chinese government for its continued
support to the AU in its peacekeeping efforts in Darfur (AUC News, 2006). Similarly,
in the case of Somalia, the new Chairperson of the AU Commission Jean Ping said that
the institution is grateful to the Chinese contribution in terms of equipment and funds to
support African peacekeeping efforts. By echoing an historical failure of the US
humanitarian operation in Somalia, he remarked that the Chinese involvement would
contribute to “restoring hopes in Somalia” (AU, 2008).
Alden (2008) shows the difference between the ways African governments
react to Chinese foreign policy and argues that what explains this difference is the
political regime of single countries. According to the author, countries where elites have
exclusive control over access to resources tend to seek personal relations with Chinese
officials, while countries where rule of law is better enforced put more emphasis on the
need for China to meet legal requirements. Zimbabwe ranks among the African regimes
with the lowest scores in terms of human rights and good governance. Not surprisingly,
the President of Zimbabwe, Mugabe, clearly expressed his support for Chinese policy of
non interference, as his declaration on April 2006 shows: “We are returning to the days
when our greatest friends were the Chinese. We look again to the East, where the sun
rises, and no longer to the West, where it sets” (Alden, 2008). Mugabe reiterated its
support for the Chinese model at the 4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on ChinaAfrica Co-operation (FOCAC) in 2009, while he held the Chair of COMESA. He
observed that “During the past 60 years, China has achieved phenomenal economic
growth and development purely from its own efforts, with out having to the
colonization and economic plunder of other nations. Its economic miracle is indeed a
source of pride and inspiration to all of us”. In the specific field of the conflict between
different political factions with Zimbabwe, Mugabe remarked that “It was here at Sharm
El Sheikh that African leaders rejected external pressure to abandon Zimbabwe and
chose instead to create conditions for reconciliation among Zimbabwe's main political
parties through a SADC-facilitated process – a position we are grateful was supported
by the Chinese government” (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 2009a).
In the group of weak democracies, Alden locates Nigeria. The state plays a key
role in conflict resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa and is one of the African states
contributing most to UN operations. The former President of the country expressed
large support for China’s role in African peacekeeping. Olesengun Obasanjo claimed
that “The 21st century is the century for China to lead the world. And when you are
leading the world, we want to be close behind you. When you are going to the moon,
we don’t want to left behind” (Alden, 2008). Ethiopia, another example of weak
democracy, seems to be another relevant supporter of the Chinese political role in
Africa and more and more critical of the role of the EU. According to Meles Zenawi,
Prime Minister of Ethiopia, “it would be wrong for people in the West to assume that
they can buy good governance in Africa” (…) “Good governance can only come from
inside; it cannot be imposed from outside. That was always an illusion. What the
Chinese have done is explode that illusion. It does not in any way endanger the reforms
of good governance and democracy in Africa because only those that were home-grown
ever had a chance for success” (Wallis, 2006). Like Nigeria and Ethiopia, Liberia is a
“partly free” country according to Freedom House data related to 2010. Also the
President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf expressed support for the Chinese approach
based on “South-South cooperation”. According to the President, “Liberia counts China
as a friend and strategic partner and will continue to strengthen our relationship through
bilateral and multilateral programs which encompass mutual benefits and respect”
(Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, 2009b).
Despite Alden (2008)’s observation, China appears a preferential partner even
in the case of South Africa, which is a democracy, an emerging economy and a key
actor in African conflict management. South Africa is member of the BASIC group, led
by China, of emerging economies allied in the international climate and security policy
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China). At the fourth Ministerial Conference of
FOCAC in November 2009, the South African Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, expressed “the appreciation of my
delegation for the new measures that were announced this morning by the Premier of
the peoples Republic of China, Mr Wen Jiabao. This is further evidence of Chinese
commitment to this relationship. South Africa would like to take this opportunity to
further recommit herself in deepening the Sino-Africa relationship”. The Minister
specified the relevance of the Chinese model for South Africa arguing that “We need to
learn from best practices of Africa's and China's partnerships in order to ensure that the
FOCAC is a shining example for other partnerships to follow” (AU, 2009). In 2006
Jacob Zuma, the current President of South Africa and, at that time, deputy president of
the African National Congress, confirmed this view, representing China as a successful
model of development and criticizing the lack of consistency in European external
relations. According to Zuma, “Africa suffered under European dominance for centuries
(…) and the conditions imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund have made people in many parts of Africa even poorer than they already were.
Now China comes along, a huge, growing economic power that has hardly ever
interfered in Africa. There is not a single country in the world that is not interested in
doing business with China at the moment, including Germany. And no one is seriously
concerned about human rights. But Africans are criticized for wanting to do business
with China” (Puhl and Thielke, 2006). Finally, Chinese foreign policy finds support in
the two countries that have been generally considered emblematic of the success of the
World Bank neoliberal policy. At the fourth Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, Vice
President of Ghana, expressed its appreciation of “China's role in promoting regional
integration, especially in the field of maintenance of peace and security” (Forum on
China-Africa Co-operation, 2009c). The website of the embassy of Uganda in China
stresses the strong communality of values and principles of Uganda and China in the
field of conflict resolution. It states that “The Uganda-China political cooperation
hinges on: shared political history, common revolutionary leadership, political
exchanges, bilateral consultations and common positions in the international fora and
U.N. systems, and a shared vision of peace, cooperation, development and friendship
for mutual benefit” (Uganda Embassy in China, 2010). In sum, while the so called
pariah African states provide unconditional support to Chinese foreign policy,
democratic states that have been traditionally considered a confirmation of the success
of the liberal model to development appear increasingly attracted by the alternative
model offered by China.
Conclusions
The institutional structure of the AU and the discourse of its representatives
show that the EU appears successful model of integration and of peacekeeping among
AU leaders. More precisely, European norms have been elaborated and adjusted to the
African institutional and political framework. That said, the EU is all but an uncontrasted player in Africa. China is emerging as a competing norm promoter on
African states and regional organizations, which provides the latter with an alternative
model of peacekeeping.
The major differences between the European and Chinese approaches to conflict
resolution concern their attitudes towards national sovereignty and governance. The
rhetoric of leaders of African regional organizations is telling of the fact that Chinese
norms find greater resonance than European ones among African leaders. The AU has
endorsed European norms concerning regional integration and has adopted an
institutional structure which strongly resembles that of the EU. At the same time,
though, the interpretations of EU sponsored norms provided by African states and
regional institutions, such as shared sovereignty and good governance, differ from the
definitions provided by the European promoters. On the one hand, African states
provide a minimal definition of sovereignty sharing and keep defending the autonomy
of nation states from external interference. On the other hand, the definition of good
governance provided by the AU mirrors the diversified structure of African political
regimes and the diffusion of neo-patrimonial regimes, as Taylor (2010) suggests. The
support of African governments to Chinese-sponsored norms is clearly higher. It is
more clear-cut in the least liberal governments but it is more and more spread among
more democratic ones.
The Director of Economic Affairs of the AU Commission, René N’Guettia
Kouassi, (2010, 3) has gone so far to invite the EU to learn from China. He wonders
whether “Chinese pragmatism” may “lead the European Union to reformulate its
cooperation policy with Africa”. And comments that “if the pragmatism of China, the
new great friend of Africa, can encourage Europe to revisit its cooperation policy with
Africa with the aim of achieving the real development of the continent, the entire
population of Africa would rejoice and would be grateful yet again to China”
(N’Guettia Kouassi, 2010, 7). These words are telling of the threatening effect of the
Chinese model of peacekeeping for the European hegemony on the African continent.
European institutions are aware of this threat. As a matter of fact, in June 2007 the
European Commission organized a conference titled “Partners in Competition? The EU,
Africa and China”. In order to foster cooperation, EU institutions have actively
sponsored regular dialogue between European and Chinese senior officials on Africa
and invited China to participate as an observer in the EU-Africa summit (2007).
Chinese support for NEPAD and its engagement in election observation in
Sudan may be considered as timid steps in the direction of the smoothening of its realist
stance in reaction to the pressures coming from international organizations, while the
EU Strategy for Africa (2005) has adopted the rhetoric of partnership, equality and local
ownership to address criticisms of neo-colonialism. Still, the clash between the Chinese
and European Africa policies is visible, and the African continent is more then ever an
arena for the competition between the two alternative models of peacekeeping. Table 1) Alternative approaches to peacekeeping
Norms
Defence of national
Liberal norms
sovereignty
Principles
- Equality between
-
Human rights,
sovereign states.
-
Responsibility
- Principle of non
interference.
to Protect
-
-
Sovereignty
sharing.
-
Multilateralism
Right to
and
democracy
international
law.
Soure: My elaboration from Sandholtz and Stiles, 2009
Figure 1) EU, US and China’s normative foreign policies towards Africa
Pooled
sovereignty
EU
US
China
National
sovereignty
Social, political,
economic rights
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