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"power vacuum."14With these developments,they speculated, Japan is
once againpresentedwith an opportunity to expandits influencein its own
"backyard." As Lukin commented:
The presentactivizationof Japan's Pacificpolicyis of essentialsignificanceforthefurtherevolutionof the situationin the PacificOceanbasin.
... In the early1970sit becameclearthat Japan,the economicgiant,
althoughit remainscautiousandhesitant,andmaintainsa carefulwatch
on its "seniorpartner,"is,nonetheless,
definitelyandpersistently
seeking
its own,specifically
politicalcourse,one that would reflectthe greatly
increasedcapabilitiesfor Japan'seconomicand other influencesin the
internationalarenaand, aboveall,in the traditionalzoneofJapaneseforeignpolicyactivity-the Pacificregion.15
It does not require much "reading between the lines" to decipher how
the Sovietsperceivedthe strategyorientations of the United States and its
partners in Asia, nor is it hard to detect that the Sovietssized up the situation with an astuteeye to the effectthat any changesmay haveon their own
global interests.16
2. SOVIET APPROACH TO ASIA
What, then, was the Soviet approach to Asia and the Pacific, and what
impact did it have on the region?
To begin with, the Sovietsdid their best to drive home their contention
that their country is not only a European power but also an Asian power.
Once the Soviet Union gained rough parity with the United States in
strategic nuclear weapons at the threshold of the 1970s,17it laid claim to
being a superpowerwith global reach and, hence, global rights.18This attitude was reflected in the speech,already quoted above, made by General
SecretaryL. I. Brezhnevin 1970: "No matters of any major importance in
the world today can be determined without our participation or without
regard to our economicand military power."19Consciousof its global sta-
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tus as a military superpower, the USSR believed that it deserved acceptance as a significant force in Asia, a claim voiced by all its commentators
on the region,20who reiterated Lenin's view that "geographically, economically and historically,Russia belongs not only to Europe but also to
Asia."21Furthermore, although the exact date cannot be pinpointed, in
the earlyor mid-1970s, the USSR began to define itself as an Asia-Pacific
power, not simplyas an Asian power. This point was brought home clearly
to the late Miyoshi Osamu, professor of Kyoto Sangyo University, at the
Japan-Sovietconferenceof securityspecialistsheld in Kyoto in 1976,when
the Soviet representativedeclared that the USSR was a "Pacificpower."22
To demonstratethis point, for example,the Sovietspresided over the 14th
Pacific ScienceCongress at Khabarovskin the summer of 1979.
Beyond this general claim, the Soviet Union appeared to have several
political objectives in Asia and Pacific. It consistently sought to weaken
and, if possible, to eliminate U.S. political and military influence in the
region. It attempted to isolate the PRC, and particularly to prevent it
from entering into an anti-Soviet military alliancewith the United States
and Japan. It apparently wished to preservethe status quo on the Korean
peninsula and made every effort to defend the territorial status quo
regarding its borders with the PRC and Japan.23At the same time, it
tried hard to coaxJapan into cooperation, both politicaland economic.
To consolidate these claims and objectives, since the early 1970s, the
Soviet Union has begun to take concrete actions in the Asia-Pacific
region. One example is Brezhnev's bold proposal, made first in June
196924 and again in March 1972,25 to create an Asian Collective
Security System. Although, in theory, this system was designed to promote friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Asian countries,
most observerssuspected that the Soviets envisagedsome sort of military
alliance aimed at isolating the PRC and undermining the Western position in Asia. Receivedcoolly in Asia from the outset, even after ten years
the plan did not win acceptance, and it passed "quietly into oblivion."26
Japan, potentially the most important member of the proposed organization, displayed no interest in this proposal. (For more details, see
chapter 9.)
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Another manifestation of the new attention that the Soviets were
devoting to the Asia-Pacificarea was its plan27to build a second transSiberian railroad, the Baikal-AmurMainline (BAM),28with the intention
of expanding the country eastward, which had been the czar's goal in
constructing the first railroad there. Naturally, the Soviet Union under
Brezhnevwanted Japan's cooperation in executingthe project, but it was
unsuccessfulin obtaining it to the desired degree.29As a result, construction of the BAM fell behind schedule, and the projected completion date
was postponed from 1982 to 1985, although there was still no assurance
that the railwaywould be finished even by the new deadline.30
The third important indication of the USSR's interest in the AsiaPacific region is the massive military buildup it undertook there in the
mid-1970s and the early 1980s. There is evidencethat the Soviets' strategic concerns about the region have increased. A joint command headquarters was reestablished at Chita for the four military districts of
Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaikal and the Far East, as well as for the
units stationed in Mongolia and part of the Pacific Fleet.31Moreover, a
very high-ranking military leader of Soviet ground forces, Army General
Vladimir L. Govorov, former commander of the Moscow military district, was assigned command of these new headquarters of the Far
Eastern Troops. These steps confirm beyond any doubt that the Kremlin
had turned its interest toward the Far East and the Pacific region, including Japan. The Soviet Pacific Fleet became the largest in the Soviet Navy,
surpassing the other three fleets (the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, and
the Black Sea Fleet). It included about one-third of all Sovietsubmarines
and about one-third of all Soviet surface-combatships, notably the Kievclass anti-submarine warfare aircraft carrier Minsk and the amphibious
assault transport dock vesselIvan Rogov. Approximatelyone-third of the
Soviet Union's arsenal of SS-20 mobile medium-range missiles are targeted on the PRC, Japan and South Korea. Moreover, there were reports
that the Kremlin was making preparations that could lead to the virtual
doubling of the number of its SS-20s targeted on Asia.32The Soviet
Union also deployed Backfirebombers (about 70 in 1983) in the Soviet
Far East. The newlyestablishedmilitaryheadquarters on Sakhalin, which
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directs the troops stationed on the disputed Northern Territories and
controls approximately 100 new military aircraft, including MiG-23
fighters, authorized frequent missileexercisesin the Sea of Japan. Such a
move may indicate a new Soviet strategic approach to the region.33
Finally, Soviet ground troops moved in large numbers (ten thousand
men, almost the size of one Soviet division) onto three of the disputed
islands: Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan.
3. UNSUCCESSFUL OUTCOME: ITS REASONS
We havepresented above a broad outline of Sovietintentions and policies.
There is one important addendum: while the Sovietspublicly expressed
these goals,few were realized.This disparity betweenpolicy objectivesand
their achievementis nowheremore apparent than in the Asia-Pacificregion.
To put it more bluntly, a considerablenumber of Sovietpoliciesin the region met with no success.The followingis a description of some of these
unsuccessfulSovietpolicies,and some reasonsare given for their failure.
Without doubt, the greatest failure in Moscow's policies in the Asia
and Pacificregion is its inability to bring about any significantheadwayin
improvingits relationshipwith the PRC. Mao Zedong's death (1976) did
not result in any breakthroughsin resolvingthe long-standingSino-Soviet
feud. There were even developmentsto the contrary:the deteriorationof bilateral relations; the signing of the SinoJapanese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship (August 1978); the normalization of Sino-American relations
(January 1979); and the Chinese unilateral termination (in April 1979) of
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance
(1950). We must be wary, on the other hand, of becomingprisonersof the
myth of eternal Sino-Soviet conflict,as we were for quite some time blind
believersin a perpetualMoscow-Beijingalliance.34
As LeonidGudoshnikov,
deputy director and China specialist at the Institute of the Far Eastern
Studies (IDV), the Soviet Academyof Sciences,said during an interview
with the Kyodo News Servicein February 1979: "The state relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC will unmistakenly be improved.