Venezuela Analysis
Analysis on situation in Venezuela, August 2016.
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Introduction
On December 6th, 2015, Venezuela saw sweeping
changes to its parliament following elections. The parliamentary elections, which were hotly contested between
pro-regime “Chavista” delegates in favor of retaining
the policies of current president Nicolás Maduro and opposition politicians proffering themselves as the necessary actors to introduce sweeping reform intended to
curb endemic issues of corruption, poverty, and crime in
Venezuela. President Maduro, a protegé of Hugo Chavéz,
came to power after being picked by Chavez to succeed
him after the ruler’s death from cancer ended his fourteen-year rule before going on to be elected after a term
as interim President in April 2013. Whereas Chavéz was
wildly popular with poor and working class Venezuelans
for his introduction of expanded social welfare programs
funded by the country’s oil wealth (32% of Venezuelans
live under the poverty line), Maduro has overseen a
drastic decrease in popularity after food and electricity
shortages have caused daily life to come to a grinding
halt for many citizens as people are forced to wait for
hours in line for basic necessities and have seen their
work weeks cut to four days. Inflation in the country is
drastic, and as a result many citizens turn to the black
market to procure basic supplies, and plummeting oil
prices have led to a contraction in the country’s coffers
and a 6000% increase in petrol prices for Venezuelans.
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The December 2015 elections, which drew a 74% turnout, resulted in a drastic change to the make-up of the
Venezuelan parliament. The ruling Chavista PSUV (Socialist Party of Venezuela) was defeated by the opposition MUD (Democratic Unity Roundtable), with the latter
winning a supermajority of 109 to 55 seats. The MUD is
an electoral coalition of parties ranging from left to center right created to form a united opposition to the ruling
Chavez regime and the successive Maduro regime. The
election resulted in the first parliamentary session since
Chavéz came to power in 1999 that PSUV do not hold
the majority of seats. Venezuelan society features high
levels of economic inequality between social classes and
the resulting politics have traditionally been quite polarized. Generally speaking, the poor and working classes
dependably support Chavista candidates and policies,
while middle and upper class Venezuelans are in favor
of opposition parties. As the December parliamentary
elections suggest, however, the gap between ideologies
in social classes is closing as Chavista policies fail to sufficiently negate the realities of inflation and food shortages.
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a. Political Situation
Maduro’s government, from its ideology to its policies,
structure and practices, is largely a product of Hugo
Chavez’s 14-year rule of Venezuela. Therefore, one must
look at Venezuela under Chavez to understand the current situation in the country.
Chavez, a military leader in the Venezuelan army, successfully led a military coup in 1998, was popularly
voted in as Venezuela’s president and commissioned a
new constitution to be drafted under the ideals of the
Bolivarian Revolution. The new government was to be
ruled by a “servant leader” who listens to the people,
or pueblo, according to Chavez. It was inspired by the
revolutionary, Simon Bolivar, the legendary South American leader who threw off the Spanish colonizers in the
1800s. Chavez established laws and practices that were
largely popular to the poor masses, especially when oil
prices were up and the economy was booming, but was
divisive as Chavez’s rhetoric became increasingly leftist. In 2002, Chavez was overthrown for a week by the
opposition in a coup, but soon regained power. Upon his
return, Chavez began to consolidate more power under
his regime as he announced a new move to 21st Century
Socialism. The regime became increasingly undemocratic, gaining control over major economic and political
institutions with amendments to the constitution made
by the new PSUV party-controlled National Assembly and
Judiciary.
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Chavez maintained his popularity during this time,
largely due to the oil boom since 2003, which funded his
various misiones, chavista social programs, as well as
accruing massive loans from overseas. However, after
Chavez’s re-election in 2012, public support for the regime began to falter. The price of oil was in decline, forcing the end of Chavez’s various social programs, inflation
was rising, and supplies were becoming scarce. Additionally, crime had been on the rise since Chavez had gained
power, with rates reaching the second highest in the
Americas by 2012.
Before he passed away from cancer in 2013, Chavez
named his vice president Nicolas Maduro as his successor and Maduro has since remained loyal to the chavista
legacy. However, whereas Chavez had managed to
maintain power despite much opposition because of a
relatively booming economy and a persona that inspired
the support of the masses, Maduro lacks both the charisma necessary to spark the same connection, and with
a rapidly deteriorating economy, not to mention soaring
crime rates and rapid unemployment, public approval for
the president and his regime has seriously deteriorated.
In reaction, Maduro has adhered to Chavez’s traditional
tactics of fear mongering, calling for the power to decree
in a state of emergency, and mobilizing the forces under his control to prop up his government and suppress
growing anti-governmental sentiment.
PRESIDENT
Under the 1999 constitution, the presidency, in coalition
with the vice president and council of ministers, forms
the executive branch. The president is popularly elected
for 6-year terms, and, since 2009, may run for an unlimited number of terms. During his 14-year rule, Chavez
collected much power under the presidency, powers
which Maduro has inherited. As head of the ruling PSUV
party, Maduro has control of both the National Assembly and Judiciary. In addition, Maduro is Commander in
Chief of the armed forces, which has been greatly useful
in enforcing laws and policies of the president. Maduro
as president also serves as the main foreign minister,
giving him the power to make deals with leaders of
states such as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran,
among others, and to declare Venezuela’s foreign policy
goals. Maduro also has the power to declare a state of
emergency, which usually is followed by being granted
by the Assembly power to decree via the Enabling Law.
Maduro has used this method twice, once during the
2014 protests and again in 2015 when the US placed
sanctions on Venezuelan officials accused of violating
human rights during the 2014 crackdown on antigovern5
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ment protests. In March 2016, Maduro enacted a state
of “economic emergency” in response to increasing food
shortages and huge energy deficits, once again granting himself sweeping powers despite objections from the
opposition-held parliament.
Maduro has inherited major socioeconomic and political
problems from Chavez’s rule, which have only worsened
since 2013. In addition, while Maduro largely owes his
initial presidential victory in the 2013 special elections to
Chavez’s endorsement, Maduro only beat the opposition
by 1.6 percentage points, amid cries of fraud from those
opposed to the regime. Since then, Maduro’s popularity has significantly worsened as he reacts to crises in
the traditional chavista fashion, using the military to
encroach on civilian life and suppress anti-government
demonstrations, creating policies supported by the judiciary that allow the state to collect more power, and
making unsubstantiated claims of US-backed coups and
assassination attempts in hopes of unifying the people
under his regime through fear of Venezuela’s traditional
enemy. Maduro’s tactics have only increased anti-government sentiment, however, and as the regime becomes more authoritarian, Maduro faces major criticism
from the opposition, the international community and
even his own coalition government.
NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
The National Assembly, created under the 1999 constitution, is a unicameral parliament made up of 165 deputies.
The parliament, although intended to be representative
of the people, has become increasingly polarized, with
those in favor of the regime and those opposed largely
gathering into two major camps. The 2014 anti-government protests were a massive growth point for the
opposition, which was able to carry on the momentum of
the unrest into the December elections. The opposition
Democratic Unity coalition (MUD), despite being made
up of parties from across the political spectrum - including the left - is accused of being a right-wing movement
by supporters of the PSUV (the party of Chavez and
Maduro) for promoting policies intended to stimulate
business.
The MUD has put forward an “Amnesty Law” intended
to free political prisoners detained due to dissent of the
government. Leopoldo Lopez is the most prominent of
these political prisoners, having been locked up in 2014
on a 14-year charge after accusations of incitement to
violence during anti-government protests in which 403
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people were killed (extensive documentation by human rights groups have maintained that the majority
of the killings were committed by the security forces of
the Maduro regime). Despite the passing of the law in
the assembly, López remains imprisoned - the Supreme
Court has intervened along every step of the opposition’s
efforts to enforce amnesty for political prisoners. The
retention of the policy and the failure to uphold the amnesty law has served to criminalize legitimate criticism
of the regime, in an attempt to create an atmosphere of
fear and paranoia intended to silence potential dissent.
The United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the
party of the regime, was created by Chavez in 2006. It
is made up of most major parties in support of the regime, including Chavez’s own Fifth Republic Movement.
The party supports chavismo policies, and by extension
Maduro. As the majority in the Assembly, it controls the
legislature and provides Maduro with whatever he calls
for, as long as it supports the regime. However, the party
is suffering from Maduro’s rapidly decreasing popularity,
losing the 2012 majority of votes (although maintaining a majority of seats due to a “reversal bonus” from a
2009 electoral law). Additionally, tensions within the party have been building as the opposition grows and Maduro grows increasingly desperate to maintain his hold
on power. In June 2014 former ministers of the regime
criticized Maduro, his incompetence and his increasingly
authoritarian hold on the country, in a public letter, exhibiting the growing cracks in loyalty of the coalition.
The Democratic Unity Table (MUD) is the main party of
the opposition. After they failed to instill change by boycotting the 2006 parliamentary elections, the opposition
parties formed their own coalition, MUD, in hopes that
it would allow them greater sway in winning votes and
power. The party has been relatively successful since,
planning out their tactics and strategies, and formulating clear and visible campaigns. Their rise in popularity
has also been a product of general discontent on the
part of the voters, as the current regime fails to provide
basic goods and services and increasingly uses suppressive and violent tactics to address dissent. The opposition party won the majority of seats in the December 6
parliamentary elections, winning 109 seats and beating
PSUV which only achieved 55 seats. While this is a victory for the opposition, Venezuela continues to face an
uphill battle with the struggle of severe shortages only
worsening.
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JUDICIARY
The judiciary was intended in the 1999 constitution to
be a separate branch of government, providing a legal
check to the executive and legislative branches. However, in 2004 Chavez saw that an amendment to be made
that added 12 seats to the Supreme Court and granted
the Assembly appointment power of the justices. The
court was then packed with justices loyal to the regime, and since then the judiciary has been seen as no
longer an independent and unbiased institution. Evidence of this has been documented. A report made by
four attorneys in 2014 revealed that over 10 years and
45,474 sentencings, the judiciary has ruled in favor of
the government every time. The judiciary has also been
known to check its own justices, as most visibly exhibited by the case of former Judge María Lourdes Afiuni
who followed Venezuelan law and international advice
in pardoning an opposition member. She subsequently
found herself in 2009 being tried on corruption charges, thrown in prison where she was allegedly tortured,
placed under house arrest until 2013, and is currently
barred from her profession, cannot leave the country,
and cannot access her bank account or her social networks. Finally, the judiciary has recently played a role in
charging major opposition leaders with inciting violence
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during the anti-government protests in 2014, on September 10 of this year sentencing the popular leader,
Leopoldo López, to nearly 14 years in military prison.
Additionally, the justices have supported Maduro and the
Assembly in light of last year’s elections by indicting and
banning other key opposition leaders from running in the
December 6 parliamentary elections.
Maduro’s control over a corrupt judiciary was most recently exposed in the media in October 2015 when one
of the lead prosecutors in Leopoldo Lopez’s case, Franklin Nieves, came forward, admitting to Lopez’s innocence
and apologizing for his role in the opposition leader’s
sentencing. The prosecutor’s confession has proved the
opposition’s suspicions that Lopez’s arrest last year was
politically motivated. Mr. Nieves and his family have
escaped to Miami and are currently seeking asylum. On
July 22nd of this year, a video of Nieves was posted on
Twitter showing him pleading with his judicial colleagues
in Venezuela to revert Lopez’s sentencing calling it “a
farce.” He calls upon the court to cancel Lopez’s sentence in order to be at peace “with our consciences, our
families and our country.”
The judiciary branch, governed by the Supreme Court, is
notoriously pro-regime. It has been successful in negating measures taken by the majority opposition parliament that are unfavorable to the Maduro regime, such
as the overruling of parliament’s objection to Maduro’s
declaration of an “economic emergency” in order to
grant himself greater powers - affirming the executive’s
ability to act without approval of congress. Critics of the
regime assert that the Court frequently works outside
of the frameworks and boundaries of the constitution in
order to back Chavista policies and politicians. The “Amnesty Law” intended to free political prisoners from the
opposition imprisoned for protesting the regime, which
passed in the newly-constituted parliament, was rejected by the Supreme Court - thus cementing an already
known fact that the judiciary branch acts unilaterally in
favor of the interests of the Maduro regime.
In the time running up to the election, the Supreme
Court engaged in electoral suppression. Several candidates running for the opposition were banned from doing
so, and even elected officials (three opposition legislators and one pro-government lawmaker) were prevented
from taking office after the December elections after the
Supreme Court intervened on an account of alleged voting irregularities.
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MANIPULATING
ELECTIONS TO SUPPORT
THE REGIME
Venezuela’s hybrid political model is an electoral authoritarian regime, in that the authoritarian government is
propped up through the use democratic habits, particularly voting. Venezuela’s departure from democracy since
1998 has largely been aided through voting. Chavez was
voted into office via popular election in 1999, and the
number of elections since then has become increasingly
frequent. However, as Chavez and now Maduro continue
to consolidate power, elections have become heavily
weighted in the regime’s favor. The electoral process
has become increasingly unfair, as the regime uses its
control over the major economic institutions, media,
resources, and funding to create large, visible campaigns
for candidates of the ruling coalition. Conversely, this
proves to be a major hurdle for the opposition, who do
not have these public resources at their disposal and
who also suffer governmental discrimination, as was
seen with the recent banning of major leaders from running in the parliamentary elections. Therefore, although
elections have become more frequent, they have also
become less fair and have contributed to further legitimization of the regime and its actions.
A SEMBLANCE OF
DEMOCRACY DESPITE
FAULTY ELECTION
PRACTICES
Elections have become increasingly undemocratic, contributing to the violation of human, civil and political
rights of the electorate as well as the opposition candidates. Reports have shown that, instead of contributing
to a transitional process towards democracy, elections
have aided the regime in plunging further into the abyss
of authoritarianism. Freedom House has released reports
on the rule of law in Venezuela, dropping the country
from its list of “electoral democracies” since 2009 after
300 candidates from the opposition were banned from
running for offices. In another report in 2014, Freedom
House stated that Venezuela has also deteriorated in its
respect of political and civil rights, dropping it from 2.5
in 1998 to 5 in 2014 (on a scale of 1-7, one being most
free). In the run up to the December 6th elections, repression of the opposition happened on a systemic scale,
with many vocal dissenters being legally barred from
running for office, and imprisonment of those charged
with “inciting violence” for protesting.
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INCREASING
POLARIZATION AND
CONSOLIDATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES
The opposition, recognizing the ineffectiveness of their
boycott in 2006, has since embraced the use of the electoral process to gain power. Although heavily in favor of
the ruling coalition, voting remains the most democratic
avenue of change in Venezuela. In order to become a
contender, however, the opposition has had to band together, forming MUD. MUD has gained increasing electoral success, and major wins have forced the regime
to accommodate the opposition. However, the regime
continues to simply change the rules when MUD gains
a win in order to keep real power away from opposition
leaders.
The creation of a more powerful opposition has led to
a largely 2-party system in government, polarizing the
government into two camps. Although a good electoral
strategy, this has created an ideological problem, as
the opposition chooses to run on platforms of economic
liberalization and streamlining the process to business
development, while the citizens really wish to see normality restored through policies that will stop the supply
and food shortages, decrease the crime rates and increase employment.
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Economic situation
OIL INDUSTRY
Nationalized and established as the main source of
revenue for the Venezuelan economy by Chavez, the oil
industry had enabled the regime to fund popular social
welfare programs that endeared Chavez to the people.
However, because oil exports have become Venezuela’s
main source of trade (amounting to around 95% of export earnings and 25% of GDP), Venezuela’s economy
is extremely volatile, entirely dependent on the global
price of oil. The drastic state of Venezuela’s economy
today is testament to this, as its industry and trade
dropped severely with the global price of oil. With the
industry in crisis, massive orders to fill and debts to pay,
Maduro has been on a global campaign to ask for loans
from its allies in China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia in
order to stay solvent. In addition, with the help of Russia, Venezuela has called for a conference between OPEC
and non-OPEC members to discuss raising the base price
of oil, which dropped from $105 per barrel in June 2014
to $50 per barrel in October 2015. Maduro has called for
the price to be raised to $88 per barrel, the amount Venezuela needs in order to service its debts past 2015. The
price of a barrel of crude oil today is $42. As the nationalized oil industry is the source of Venezuela’s monetary
power, this economic blow has not only severely incapacitated the ruling coalition’s ability properly provide for
itself and stakeholders, but shortages and inflation have
caused massive discontent from the citizens. 2016 saw a
6,000% in oil costs, with petrol gone from having been
virtually free for Venezuelans to people actually paying
for gas and seeing the subsequent restriction of movement of the price hike.
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ECONOMIC CRISIS
The shortage of food and goods in Venezuela has
reached the level of national crisis. It is not uncommon
for people to stand in line for hours to buy basic staples
like bread and beans, and a scarcer good like chicken,
for example, could see queues lasting nine or ten hours
on the rare occasions when it is available. Soviet-era
communist jokes have seen a transcontinental resurgence in Venezuela with quips about the shortages and
unbearable queues becoming a common form of commentary on the economic situation (An old man walks
into a grocery store in Caracas. After waiting patiently in
line, he asks the shopkeeper for a container of cooking
oil, a jug of milk and, a quarter kilo of coffee. The clerk
apologizes, saying that all three items are out of stock,
and the disappointed patron walks off. Overhearing this
exchange, the next person in line remarks to the proprietor: “Cooking oil? Milk? That stupid old man, he must
be crazy.” The storekeeper considers this a moment and
responds: “Yes, but what a remarkable memory!”)
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As a result of the shortage crisis, Venezuela has seen
the emergence of a thriving black market economy and
smuggling. Inflation is astronomical, which means that
the bolivar, the Venezuelan currency, has decreasingly
weak purchasing power. Food staples are price controlled
in Venezuela, but because shortages are so drastic, people seek out non price-controlled alternatives which can
go for substantially higher. These days, price-controlled
chicken goes for 65 bolivars a pound. Chicken on the
black market can go for as high as 1,300 bolivars. People can usually only buy the same item twice a week - a
system designed to function as rationing, but that goes
virtually unchecked due to the black market trade.
As shortages and inflation increase, the power of the
Venezuelan economy decreases. The economy shrank by
5.7 percent in 2015, while inflation concurrently went up
to 81 percent. The last inflation calculations in December
2015 showed the inflation rate being 181 percent.The
dire economic situation contributes to crime and general
social malaise, fueling unrest. In the midst of the economic crisis, Maduro granted himself sweeping powers
in the declaration of an “economic emergency”, which
allows him to intervene in private businesses and limit
access to currency. The opposition’s intent to reverse the
declaration was over turned by the Venezuelan Supreme
Court.
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MACROECONOMICS
Venezuela’s macroeconomic policy was already poor
when the price of oil plummeted in 2014. The economy
has become increasingly reliant on the oil industry during Chavez’s rule, accounting for roughly 95% of Venezuela’s exports. In addition, the production of oil had
been in decline since the oil boom, making the economy
reliant more specifically on the price of oil. Due to the
focus on the oil industry, the country has neglected investment in other industries, choosing to import other
resources and goods. The rigid exchange rate policy and
failure to accrue more than $7 billion more in foreign exchange reserves during the oil boom further exacerbated
the energy crisis, as it left no room for adjustment and
rates were widely overestimated to begin with. Finally,
an increase in domestic consumption of oil and smuggling reduced Venezuela’s oil surplus and by extension
exports.
Chavez had also increased consumption and borrowing during his rule, leaving Venezuela in debt which has
since risen sharply to an estimated $142 billion (64% of
GDP) in 2015. Now that the country is in crisis, Venezuela is predicted to default on its loans, as it may only be
able to continue to finance them (with roughly $11billion more loans from countries like China and Russia)
through the end of 2015. There is also a chance that
hyperinflation may occur next year. Additionally, this
prediction is making it much harder to attract investors
during a time when Venezuela’s economy needs it the
most. 2016 has seen the progression of Venezuela into
full blown economic criss. In the meantime, Venezuela
has been struggling to pay its loans by cutting around
30% of imports, which has led to the rapid precipitation of food, supplies and medicinal shortages. Jamaica,
which has been indebted to Venezuela since 2006 due to
oil trade, has agreed to pay its debt back in food, medication and fertilizers which citizens are in dire need of.
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MICROECONOMICS
The resulting situation on the ground is dire. According
to recent polls, 59.6% of those asked described their
personal and family economic situation as negative, with
66.4% saying the situation has gotten worse since last
year and 53% believe the situation will only get worse in
the next six months. The people’s lack of hope and approval are a reflection of the impact the economic crisis
has had on the ground.
The shortages, especially food shortages, are so drastic that it has surpassed the issue of rampant crime as
the topic of most concern to the Venezuelan people. In
fact, the lack of food is so great that 1 in 3 households
in Venezuela do not eat three times a day. Additionally,
only 33.7% of those asked have hope that the shortages with decrease. As the shortages continue to worsen, public discontent with the government rises as it is
perceived as responsible for the economic crisis and has
done little to solve the situation.
In addition to food and supply shortages, the inflation
rate of the Bolivar has hit triple-digit levels. The currency, however, is not only inflated, but increasingly unstable, as exchange rates vary from 800 bolivars per USD
on the black market, while the official rate is reported to
be 9.95 bolivars per dollar. The largest bill, a 100 Bolivar
bank note, is now worth less than 10 U.S cents.
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As people struggle to find and afford food and supplies
to survive, they are further impeded by a growing unemployment rate as the local, and especially private,
economy crashes down around them. Through June and
July of 2016, over 200,000 Venezuelans crossed the
border into Columbia in order to purchase basic supplies. Border controls had been especially lax allowing
for this rare migration to happen in an attempt to soothe
the Venezuelan population. While this gave some people
the opportunity to alleviate their situation, it only lasted
a short period of time and the internal situation continues to worsen, leaving people helpless and hopeless. In
August 2016, Venezuela and Colombia have come to an
agreement to officially reopen their borders after a year
of tense relations and tight border patrols. Both governments claim they will adjust their attitudes as time
goes on and they can see results of the decision - but
for now, the border is to be gradually reopened, allowing
struggling Venezuelans to cross over and buy the necessities they lack.
BRAIN DRAIN
A result of economic crisis, rampant unemployment,
uncontrolled crime and governmental crackdown is an
overbearing sense of lost opportunity among the country’s educated. Many students and professors, hoping
for a chance to make a living and freeing governmental
persecution for their critical beliefs, has led to a massive
brain drain.
As is common in suppressive regimes, Venezuela has
seen a steady outflow of some of its most educated
since Chavez came into power. Many of these emigrants
are young and educated, often escaping repression or
discrimination in Venezuela. Additionally, as the situation
in Venezuela has deteriorated with increasing rapidity,
the rate at which people are leaving has increased in the
past three years. It is estimated that roughly 1.5 million
Venezuelans, or 6% of the population, live abroad, many
settling in countries in Central or North America and
Europe. Many of these emigrants form a large number
of the most educated of Venezuelans. Around 90 percent
of those who leave have at least a Bachelor’s degree, 46
percent hold a Masters and 12 percent have a PhD.
The situation is worrying, to put it directly. Venezuela is
bleeding human capital at a time when that is the very
thing the country will need to recover.
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The rise of crime
CRIME
Since Chavez came into power in 1999, crime rates have
steadily risen. It has gotten so bad, that Gallup named
Venezuela as the most insecure nation in the world
in 2013. The rise has largely been attributed to other
countries like Colombia by the Venezuelan government,
but the majority of the population is aware of the stark
rise in homegrown crime. In response, first Chavez and
now Maduro have pledged to address the rise in crime,
creating special task forces such as Chavez’s Bolivarian
Military Police in 2009 and Maduro’s 2013 crackdown on
trafficking with his Plan Patria Segura. However, the issue has become so dire, especially violent crime in the
barrios or slums of Caracas, that crime is normally the
main topic of concern among Venezuelan citizens.
PETTY CRIME
Although not the most discussed area of the crime situation, petty crime like theft and burglaries have been on
the rise. A 2014 Gallup poll revealed that only 19 percent of Venezuelans felt safe walking home at night. This
is largely attributed to the growing economic divide due
to fiscal mismanagement under Chavez and now Maduro’s regimes. Additionally, the recent severe economic
downturn and supply shortages have largely contributed
as well, with robbery becoming so prevalent that videos
of people looting stores has become a regular occurrence.
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ILLEGAL TRADE
The area of crime largely attributed to Colombian cartels, the trafficking of drugs, humans and oil among
other commodities has become ingrained in the Venezuelan system. Due to its location and relatively good
infrastructure, Venezuela has become a major trafficking
channel for smugglers and organized crime. In addition,
the underfunding of Venezuelan security forces have
made them susceptible to bribery and even active participants in the trafficking. Additionally, government crackdowns on trafficking and the ongoing economic plunge in
Venezuela have led to more citizen involvement in illegal
trade. According to the 2010 UN World Drug Report,
Venezuela has the fourth highest level of drug seizures,
a testament to the prevalence of the trade. The economic crisis, which has only worsened in 2016, has seen the
presence of a booming black market and the proliferation of smuggling.
VIOLENT CRIME
Crime levels have continued at a tremendous level with
little discernible change under the new parliamentary
leadership. In a new and particularly heinous case, 21
gold miners were disappeared and murdered in March
2016, with locals and family members placing the blame
on gang violence.
The most worrisome area to locals in regard to crime
in Venezuela is the growing rates of violent crimes and
murders taking place. An NGO, Venezuelan Violence
Observatory (OVV), released a report that showed an
increase in homicide rate from 25 per 100,000 in 1999
to 79 per 100,000 in 2013, second only to Honduras in
the region. Additionally, the OVV placed the capital Caracas at 82 per 100,000 in 2014, the highest murder rate
in all of Latin America. The homicide rate has increased
so starkly, many are calling it an “epidemic.” The actual
numbers of murders keep varying depending on the
organization investigating and publishing the figures.
Some claim there are 58 homicides per 100,000 people
in Caracas while others claim there are 119 per 100,000.
In comparison, the United States’ rates lies at about four
homicides per 100,000. Many people blame Maduro and
his dysfunctional government for the rise in crime, which
further emboldens the opposition.
The regime has responded by scapegoating Colombia for
this as well. Maduro was recently filmed blaming Colombian “paramilitaries” for the high murder rates in his
weekly television address. Additionally, a great deal of
censorship has been going on, where the few who go to
the police to report a murder are told to stay away from
the media in exchange for a timely investigation into
their case.
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CORRUPTION
Many crimes that do occur never even get reported, as
people do not trust the police and have no faith in the
efficiency of the judicial system, and for good reason.
Venezuela has been consistently listed since 1995 as one
of the most corrupt countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. In the most recent 2014 report, Venezuela was ranked 161 out of 175
countries, where 1 is least corrupt, and 175 is the most.
Additionally, Transparency’s Global Corruption Barometer
revealed that the police is the institution most widely
regarded by citizens as being highly corrupt at 83% of
respondents. These numbers reflect the fears of citizens
who are afraid of reporting crimes to the police, who are
often known to be involved in crime themselves.
STATE CRIME
Venezuela regularly acts in contempt of international
law in its violent repression of dissenters and its human
rights violations. For the past decade, Venezuela has
refused entry to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights as well as UN rapporteurs. In 2012, Venezuela withdrew from the American Convention on Human
Rights, intending to deny protections under the agreement to opposition of the regime.
Hundreds of low-income and immigrant individuals
have been killed in raids by the police and military in
poor neighborhoods, and the same forces have carried
out mass detentions and internment. According to Human Rights Watch, “security forces detained more than
14,000 people temporarily between July 2015 and January 2016, during the operations, to “verify” whether they
were wanted for crimes, but fewer than 100 were ultimately charged with any offense.” The raids have resulted in the deportation of at least 22,000 asylum-seeking
Columbians.
20
CANVAS
International perception and intervention
REGIONALLY
Since the spirit of the Bolivarian Revolution overtook the
South American countries, there has been a close alliance among the regimes against the capitalist west, and
especially the US. A major alliance founded by Venezuela
and Cuba on a united desire to create trade agreements
among the Bolivarian South American states is ALBA.
The alliance provides a major support to one another’s
regimes, and thus has failed to significantly criticize Venezuela’s ruling coalition. However, a crack in the armor
may have been shown when a public letter signed by 21
former leaders of South American and Spanish states,
was published, condemning Venezuela’s violation of prisoners’ rights to due process, and calling for the release
of several political prisoners, the most notable being
Leopoldo López. ALBA does not seem ready to do much
more to critique Maduro’s regime.
21
CANVAS
CUBA
Castro’s Communist Cuba has notably been the model
to which Chavez aspired and Maduro claims to aim for
as well. However, with Venezuela’s crashing oil industry,
Cuba has felt pressured to find new strategic alliances
and trading partners. Under such economic pressure,
Cuba has entered into talks with the US, the regional
power traditionally seen by both Cuba and Venezuela
as their ideological enemy. Therefore, the appearance
of warming relations between the US and Cuba is worrisome for Venezuela, as Cuba has been its strongest
regional ally since Chavez came into power. Without
Cuba’s ideological support, Venezuela’s ruling coalition
will become significantly weakened, especially if it loses
Cuba as a trading partner. Cuba and the US have now
officially resumed diplomatic relations.
COLOMBIA AND GUYANA
Amid a strong anti-governmental sentiment and PSUV’s
loss of its hold on the Assembly, Maduro has been reigniting old fights with neighboring Colombia and Guyana.
Maduro has been blaming much of the smuggling and
crime on Colombian cartels sneaking through the borders between the two countries. He earlier this year
used these issues to justify a state of emergency in
much of the northern parts of Venezuela, which has allowed the military to be deployed to control protests in
those regions. In addition, the state of emergency justified his request to the Assembly to be given the power
to decree, which was granted and will last until the end
of December. Recently, Maduro has called for tightened
border controls along the Colombian border as well as
the deportation of over 1,700 Colombians who are allegedly connected to Colombian smuggling rings. Since
then, however, relations have eased up a bit, with ambassadors being sent to one another’s country’s capital
22
CANVAS
city, easing border measures and even allowing some
deported Colombians back into Venezuela. This may be
partly due to the public outcry as allegations of mistreatment of Colombians by Venezuelan guards have been
made. Over the summer of 2016, Venezuela has further
relaxed its border restrictions with Columbia allowing
people to cross over into the neighboring country in
order to buy basic necessities lacking inside Venezuela.
Over 200,000 people came from across the country to
desperately attempt to acquire food, medications and
basic supplies at normal prices. And now, since August
2016, Venezuela has agreed with Colombia to completely reopen its borders. This goes to show that Maduro’s
government continues to fail its people and the situation
is not getting any better, even though the crossing of the
border allowed for temporary alleviation.
In regard to Guyana, Maduro is exploiting the old border dispute between the two countries, possibly in an
attempt to divert the attention away from the worsening socioeconomic situation in the country. The dispute
is over the area of the Essequibo River, which makes up
40% of Guyana’s territory and to which Venezuela lays
claim. After recalling each other’s ambassadors, the two
countries have since agreed to UN mediation. In July of
2016, Guyana ordered the deportation of 14 Venezuelans who had previously crossed the border illegally in
order to acquire food. The Guyanese Ministry of State
however, has issued a statement saying it is willing to
help any Venezuelan citizen entering Guyana legally
looking for basic necessities. Only illegal aliens are to be
denied aid.
23
CANVAS
GLOBALLY
In light of the current economic crisis in Venezuela, Maduro has found his government
in growing debt. In order to settle payments and keep the government running, Maduro has embarked on a global campaign to seek more financial support from his allies.
Those closest to the regime are China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Since 2007 China has given Venezuela $50 billion in aid in an oil-for-payment debt
settlement plan. Since Venezuela’s further economic descent, China has offered more
aid, most recently last September lending Maduro an additional $5 million to boost
Venezuela’s oil industry. Although China’s own financial minister has advised against
continuing to support Venezuela, the country is China’s main source of influence in
the region, and it looks as though China will continue to financially prop up Maduro’s
regime, if somewhat reluctantly.
Since Chavez came to power in 1999, relations between Venezuela and Russia have
grown, primarily due to Venezuela’s purchase of military supplies from Russia. As a
fellow oil supplier, Russia has been supportive to Maduro’s recent call for talks between OPEC and non-OPEC members to discuss raising the global base price for oil.
Other allies to Maduro’s campaign for talks on oil prices are the oil giants and antiWest allies, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both have met with Maduro, pledging their support
to his regime.
24
CANVAS
THE UNITED STATES
Maduro has carried on the traditional chavista position of
the US as the enemy capitalist and oppressive government from which the Venezuelan people must be protected. As his authority weakens and the regime destabilizes, Maduro has increased his public denunciation of
the US. He has recently claimed to have discovered new
US backed plots of coups and assassination attempts.
This is a familiar tactic, often used by Chavez in the past
to unite the Venezuelans under an imminent fear of US
encroachment. However, it seems that the tactic may
have become over-used, as a recent poll revealed only
15 percent of Venezuelans polled even believed these
claims were well founded. Additionally, Maduro declared
a state of emergency last March after Obama placed
travel sanctions on several PSUV officials. Finally, Maduro has rejected any US intervention via the Carter Center in monitoring the upcoming December 6 elections.
Recent events have further strained relations between
the two countries. On Wednesday November 11 2015, it
was announced that the US had two nephews of Maduro’s First Lady arrested in Haiti and brought to the US to
stand trial on drug charges. The men were reported to
be arranging a shipment of 800kg of cocaine into the US
to be sold in New York. Maduro has responded by indirectly condemning the US for intervening in Venezuelan
affairs.
Additionally, in response to a recent charge made by the
Organization of American States that Venezuela’s election process and environment was unjust, the regime
accused the OAS of basically being a puppet of the US.
The CNE has also rejected a previous OAS request to
send a group to observe the elections.
25
CANVAS
Military situation
The military has become increasingly linked to the government ever since Chavez led a military coup against
the old regime in 1998. Since then, the military has
been at the regime’s side, despite Chavez’s fear of another military coup. In 2014, Maduro deepened the bond
between military and the regime by effectively making
the military a political party. This enabled them to more
effectively counter the opposition protests with pro-government protests of their own. In addition, the responsibility to curb the anti-government protests have become
increasingly in the hands of pro-government militias,
who are much more violent than the traditional armed
forces who are trained to handle protests and riots. This
has led to increased physical violence and intolerance
against opposition protestors. Additionally, Maduro has
been using the armed forces more and more in addressing other societal issues, especially the food and supply
shortages. Soldiers now guard the entrances of stores
at which long lines of Venezuelans are cued to receive
rations. Essentially, Maduro’s increased use of military
means to handle societal problems is turning Venezuela
into something disturbingly similar to a police state.
26
CANVAS
Pillars of support
PILLARS OF THE REGIME
THE LEGACY OF
CHAVISMO
Chavez’s legacy, although widely divisive, is remembered
with relative fondness by a large portion of the Venezuelan citizenry. Much like in other areas of the world, like
Serbia with Marshall Tito or Cuba with Hugo Chavez,
what people remember is the ideology that Chavez held.
This ideology, speaking about the “pueblo” or the people
ruling themselves through the guidance of a “servant
ruler”, it what many remember Chavez to be practicing.
With his memory his only presence, people take that
romantic notion of what he believed and attach many
of the faults to the current regime. Because the current regime claims to adhere closely to Chavismo, it has
managed to hold onto enough popular support to stay in
power. However, Maduro’s hardline policies and military
favoritism in a time of deepening socioeconomic distress
seems to have severely weakened this pillar. Many people no longer feel loyal to the regime, and enough have
become disenchanted by the government’s actions that
its ideology no longer applies.
27
CANVAS
ARMED FORCES
Chavez, a former army general and coup-maker,
strengthened the ties between the military and the
regime. After the short coup in 2002, Chavez began to
instigate new policies, consolidating more power around
himself. Part of these policies was to ensure military
loyalty. Under Chavez, frequent change of positions in
the military prevented close ties among potential military dissidents from being maintained. Additionally,
Chavez used his close relationship with Cuba, allowing
Cuban military into Venezuelan ranks, allegedly to act
as spies for the regime. Since Chavez’s death, Maduro
has chosen to align himself even more closely with the
military pragmatists, evidenced by their increased presence in government positions. Additionally, while most of
the country experiences supply shortages, members of
the armed forces continue to enjoy subsidized housing,
loans, and basic goods. This action has simultaneously
ensured military loyalty and decreased Maduro’s popular support, thereby forcing the regime to become more
repressive.
MADURO’S POLITICAL
PARTY
The PSUV party, Chavez’s coalition party, was created
in 2006 as one of Chavez’s acts to consolidate power. It
consists of several parties traditionally in favor of the regime, including Chavez’s own Fifth Republic Movement.
Although still very powerful and loyal to the regime,
cracks have begun to show in the ranks since Chavez’s
death in 2013. Some are not as confident in Maduro’s
ability to lead, as evidenced in a public letter written by
former ministers, criticizing Maduro. Additionally, as the
crises in Venezuela continue to deepen and public support for the government wanes, disagreement on how to
address the situation has occurred among the coalition.
The two main camps are the military pragmatists and
the populist idealists.
28
CANVAS
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The judiciary, although officially a branch uncontrolled
by the other branches of government, has not been free
since Chavez had an amendment passed in 2004, packing the Supreme Court with chavistas by adding 12 seats
and giving the PSUV-controlled parliament the power to
appoint. Evidence of this has been given in a 2014 report, which showed that in the 45,474 cases ruled on by
the courts, the government won them all. The judiciary,
a branch intended to rule on constitutionality of laws,
props up the regime by ruling in favor of every law the
regime’s officials create. This allows the regime to do
virtually whatever it deems necessary to remain power,
without fear of being accused of illegal activity. The refusal of the Supreme Court to grant amnesty to critics
of the regime imprisoned for speaking out is one of the
main ways in which the judiciary illegally supports the
regime through its own convoluted and fabricated rule of
law.
THE NATIONAL
ELECTORAL CYCLE (CNE)
Much like the judiciary, the CNE is supposed to act as an
independent branch of the government. In reality, the
CNE’s officials are chavistas nominated by the president
and elected by the PSUV-dominated National Assembly.
The CNE is responsible for overseeing all national elections and ensuring that they are transparent and fair.
However, as the CNE is loyal to the regime, their legitimacy is highly suspect, calling into question the fairness
and transparency of national elections.
The CNE’s ties to the regime has allowed the ruling PSUV
elites to manipulate elections, commit election fraud
such as electoral irregularities, governmental interference and voter manipulation. The control the ruling elite
holds on the electoral system has proved to be a major hurdle to opposition candidates as they struggle to
qualify in elections, gain media attention and are intimidated by the regime.
Additionally, the CNE, being tied to the ruling coalition,
can provide the government with information meant to
be confidential, such as names of those who voted for
opposition candidates. This enables the government to
discriminate against those who are opposed to the regime, blocking them from jobs and social groups.
29
CANVAS
NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY
The oil and natural gas industry, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), nationalized in 1976 and politicized
under Chavez in 2006, has become the major source of
income to the Venezuelan economy. This was a result
of Chavez’s trade agreements with major oil importers
such as China and the US. The large oil supply unique
to Venezuela in South America has been a major source
of wealth for much of Chavez’s regime. As long as oil
is in high demand, the revenue made from the nationalized industry have thickly lined the pockets of the
government. This has allowed the government to carry
its widely popular social programmes, or misiones, to
maintain public support, as well as fund large, visible
campaigns and sponsor local pro-government industries.
However, as the global price of oil plummets to an alltime low, the government’s main source of funding has
been dramatically cut, forcing Chavez and now Maduro
to cut the popular social programmes and destabilizing
the government as it struggles to maintain social and
economic order. As a result, public approval has plummeted as the government fails to provide basic goods
and services while simultaneously encroaching militarily
into the lives of Venezuelan citizens.
30
CANVAS
DIVIDED PILLARS
EDUCATION
The education system set up under Chavez’s government is intended to instill socialist values in the next
generation. In primary and secondary schools, the collection of schoolbooks used are very much tools of the
regime. The books use propaganda to instill a sense of
loyalty and approval in the regime in the impressionable
Venezuelan children.
In 2003, Chavez instituted a reform of Venezuelan
higher education through the creation of the Bolivarian
University of Venezuela. This was a part of a program to
make higher education accessible to the poor. The result
is that the poor masses get taught in a university highly
loyal and monitored by the regime, thus acting as an
ideological control over the more educated and politically active university student population. However, as
the socioeconomic situation worsens, more and more
professors and student have turned toward the political
opposition, undermining the culture of chavismo in the
universities.
31
CANVAS
MEDIA
The visual media in Venezuela is mostly in support of
Maduro’s regime. The only free anti-government TV
network is attacked by the regime. State Media is a key
propaganda tool for the regime, as it is in most autocratic regimes. It’s large amount of funding allows it
greatest reach in Venezuela, which makes it the most
likely stations to get viewed by the more isolated rural
Venezuelans.
Private media, especially on television, has been significantly altered by the regime. Those programs that have
spouted anti-government sentiments find themselves
systematically repressed by the regime. RCTV, a major
private television news station, had its license revoked
by the government in 2007. In 2013, the other main opposition channel, Globovision, was forcibly bought out by
people loyal to the regime. Additionally, the government
has established several alternative TV and radio stations,
and has funded community stations loyal to chavismo.
These government actions have effectively warned the
remaining private media stations, who have since avoided criticizing the regime and have given little media coverage of the opposition. In 2013, Freedom House rated
Venezuela as having an unfree media.
32
CANVAS
POSSIBLE ALLIES
OPPOSITION LEADERS
After virtually abandoning unsuccessful tactics of armed
insurrection and violent protests, and abstaining from
the 2006 elections, the opposition has revitalized its
movement. It has chosen to go the electoral route, to
gain power, as it is still the most democratic way of doing so in Venezuela. In order to present themselves as a
competitive candidate to the ruling coalition, the opposition groups have mostly united to form the MUD party.
As a group, they have worked to form a unified platform
and strategy, gradually winning more offices, especially
on the municipality level, as they become increasingly
popular and the government declines in that respect.
The opposition has employed these extremely successful
tactics in taking over parliament with a “super majority”
of the seats being taken by MUD representatives. This is
the single most disruptive event towards the regime in
recent years, demonstrating that the majority of Venezuelans were disillusioned enough with the regime to
vote them out of office in massive numbers.
33
CANVAS
However, although the opposition has used grassroots
campaigning to gain the support of the poor in the past,
they seem to be losing their sense of what the poor
majority wants. This was evidenced most visibly in the
2014 protests, where the largely student-based middle
class population marched, with virtually no representation of the majority class in Venezuela, the poor. This
was because the opposition has chosen to advocate for
changes unfamiliar and of less concern to the poor than
more pressing issues like supply shortages, unemployment and rampant violent crime. However, the structure
of the opposition and methodology is well developed,
and would be instrumental in disrupting the regime, especially if they were to realign their goals with the poor
in mind.
STUDENTS
AND PROFESSORS
When Chavez took control over the schools with its creation of Bolivarian universities, the anti-chavista student
population was left behind. This group then took full
control of the student movement. Additionally, the regimes failure to correctly handle initial demands made
by the students showed a lack of governmental support
for autonomy at the universities, which served to further
politicize the student movement. The student movement
has become a surprisingly powerful force since they
organized their first major protests in reaction to the
government’s revocation of a major television stations
broadcasting license in 2007. The student movement
was primary group involved in the 2014 anti-government
protests, and, although they have been suppressed, remain a vocal force against the regime.
34
CANVAS
Potential Outcomes
With the opposition now in power in the national assembly, it remains to be seen the
ways in which Maduro will continue to crack down on dissent.
AN INCREASE IN
DEMOCRACY
Former presidential candidate Henrique Capriles has advocated for a referendum that would allow Venezuelans
to vote on the possibility of calling for an early presidential election. To accomplish this legally, the opposition
would need to obtain four million signatures within a
designated amount of time. However, even if the opposition were able to do so, regime intervention seems
highly likely. The National Electoral Council, who would
be in charge of the process, is lead and managed under
near total PSUV control. In what is widely seen as retaliation to Capriles’ recommendation, the government has
called for an investigation of him and his state government on corruption charges.
On the level of a bottom-up approach, opposition leaders like María Corina Machado have advocated for popular protest and resistance as the best way to topple the
Maduro government. This would require more than just
street protests and would need to be an all-encompassing effort from all sectors of society.
35
CANVAS
MADURO CONTINUES
TO ASSERT POWER,
VIOLATING THE LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Maduro has always stuck to chavismo tactics: allowing
elections BUT use of military, fear tactics, using judiciary
to ban opposition leaders from running, trying to distract
by picking fights with neighbors, refusing to allow outside organization to monitor elections, declaring a state
of emergency and being granted the power to decree.
This is an extremely likely turn of events, and we can
see how this is playing out now in 2016 in the aftermath
of the elections: the opposition took control of the assembly, but are undermined constantly by other branches of the government in their attempts to create change
(laws rejected by the judiciary, Maduro granting himself
sweeping powers despite parliamentary rejection, the
continuation of raids and crime by police and military,
the failure of the government to release political prisoners and attempts to imprison more critics of the regime,
etc)
36
CANVAS
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Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Candidates Barred Arbitrarily.” Human Rights Watch.
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Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Critics Under Threat.” Human Rights Watch. (6 Aug.
2015). https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/06/venezuela-critics-under-threat
Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Human Rights before the United Nations Human
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org/news/2015/06/29/venezuela-human-rights-united-nations-human-rightscommittee
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40
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Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2015: Venezuela.” Human Rights Watch. (2015).
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Human Rights Watch. “Venezuela: Police Raids Hit Poor Areas.” Human Rights Watch.
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In Sight Crime. “Venezuela: Profile.” In Sight Crime. Accessed 28 Sept. 2015. http://
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International Crisis Group. “Venezuela: Unnatural Disaster.” Crisis Group Latin American
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James Pagano. “The World Is Watching Caracas.” Foreign Policy. (2 Oct. 2015). http://
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Jan Sonnenschein. "Latin America Scores Lowest on Security.” Gallup. Gallup. (19 Aug.
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José Á. Cornett. “Exporting Talent: The VES Project and the STEM emigration from
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Juan Cristóbal Nagel. “Venezuela’s Military Is a Political Party.” Foreign Policy. (27 June
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41
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Juan Cristóbal Nagel. “Venezuela’s Opposition Has Two Big Problems.” Foreign Policy.
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Julia S. Cobb & Carlos G. Rawlins. “Economic crisis, political strife drive Venezuela
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“Justice decayed.” The Economist. (29 Aug. 2015). http://www.economist.com/news/
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Kirk
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Marcel Ventura. “Venezuela’s Agony: Weak President, Strong Generals, Riots and
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Nathan Crooks & Eduardo Thomson. “Ravaged by Oil’s Collapse, Venezuela Now Has a
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Nicole Gaouette. “Obama Charm Drive Targets Venezuela After Iran, Cuba.” Bloomberg.
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42
CANVAS
"On borrowed time; Venezuela." The Economist. 29 Nov. 2014: 31(US). Academic
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Reuters. “Venezuela: 4 Bodies Found In Case of 21 Gold Miners Missing in Jungle.”
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to tackle crisis.” The Guardian (18 February 2016). http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2016/feb/18/venezuela-president-raises-fuel-price-by-1300-and-devaluesbolivar-to-tackle-crisis
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Ted Piccone & Harold Trikunas. “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the
End?” Brookings. (June 2014). http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas/cubavenezuelaalliance-piccone-trinkunas.pdf
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“Venezuela country profile – Overview.” BBC. (11 March 2015). http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-latin-america-19649648
“Venezuelan President Maduro says $88 oil price needed.” BBC. (21 Oct. 2015). http://
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“Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro given power to rule by decree.” The Guardian.
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“Venezuela’s President Signals He Won’t Allow Election Monitoring.” Bloomberg. (28
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43
CANVAS
“Venezuela to allow return of deported Colombians.” BBC. (29 Sept. 2015). http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34389806
“Why China is lending $5 billion to struggling Venezuela.” The Economist. (2 Sept.
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William Neuman. “9 Opposition Candidates Barred From Venezuela’s December Ballot.”
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William Neuman. “Opposition in Venezuela is Unsettled by Leader’s Sentence.”
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com/2015/09/12/world/americas/opposition-in-venezuela-is-unsettled-by-leaderssentence.html?action=click&contentCollection=Opinion&module=RelatedCoverage
&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article&mtrref=undefined&gwh=B3072CF140EC472D
90FAEA5299597983&gwt=pay
“Franklin Nieves pidió a los fiscales de la Corte de Apelaciones anular juicio de Leopoldo
Lopez.” El Nacional Web. (22 July 2016) http://www.el-nacional.com/politica/
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2016) Vice News https://news.vice.com/article/jamaica-is-paying-its-oil-debts-tovenezuela-with-food
Andrew V. Pestano. “Guyana to deport 14 Venezuelans for illegally entering in search
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Ioan Grillo and Jorge Benezra. “Venezuela’s Murder Epidemic Rages on Amid State
of Emergency.” Time (20 May 2016) http://time.com/4341450/venezuela-state-ofemergency-murder-caracas/
“A Day Out at the Black Market in Venezuela.” PanamPost (3 April 2016) https://
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