Refugee Policy:
Globalization, Radical
Challenge, or State
Control?
TANYABASOK
ost-modernists have argued that the power of the state
has undergone a significant erosion since the early
1970s as a result of two socio-economic and political
trends: first, the globalization of world politics, culture and
economics, and second, the growth and diversification
of
civil society which has challenged the state's hegemonic
power. \ While this argument can be sustained with respect
to a number of economic and political activities formerly
controlled by the state, I would argue that the process of
"destatization" has been extremely uneven. Whereas in some
areas the state has indeed experienced decline, in other areas
it has retained control and in some, it has reasserted itself
with more vigour.
The refugee field is one of the areas in which the state
is exercising ever-increasing control. It is true that Canadian
refugee policy (much like refugee policy in other countries)
has been subjected to pressures emanating both from the
international
humanitarian
community and from domestic
human rights groups. I will argue, however, that neither the
global ethic of humanitarianism
nor the pressure of various
pro-refugee interest and political groups within Canadian
society have had more than a minor impact on Canadian
refugee policies in the last quarter of a century. The Canadian
state retains full control over the population it allows to
cross and remain within its borders. As have other Western
states, the Canadian state has responded to fiscal crisis and
P
Studies in Political Economy 50, Summer 1996
133
Studies in Political Economy
a rising tide of xenophobia by adopting tougher policies
towards refugees in an attempt to maintain its legitimacy
and appease those critics who blame refugees for draining
the Canadian welfare system.
Postmodern Visions of the State The postmodern paradigm
has emerged in part as a reaction against Marxist analysis
of the role of the state in reproducing capitalist hegemony.
For postmodernists,
such analysis is no longer relevant because the state has been "withering away." Under pressure
from a variety of "internationalizing"
processes, the state
has been undermined
from above, while "decentralizing
processes"
have eroded state power from below.? Alain
Touraine, for example, has argued that the national state no
longer delimits a distinct society.' Warren Magnusson and
Rob Walker also observe that:
While Marxists have been arguing about the theory of the state
- speculating about its structural or instrumental character, advancing and challenging theories of state monopoly capital the bourgeoisie itself has been busy articulating new political
institutions. These include the Group of Five and the Group of
Seven, but they also include nakedly capitalist organizations,
like the global exchange markets, international banking consortia, and multi-national
corporations.
These institutions do not
yet make the state obsolescent, but they tend to reduce it to the
status of a local authority.t
Even though Magnusson and Walker may be correct in
pointing out that "the state is losing its capacity to mediate
between global capital and local communities."> one should
not conclude that the state has completely lost its hegemonic
control. David Held points out that despite the fact that the
state's sovereignty has been reduced by the internationalization of production and financial transactions, by the emergence of hegemonic power (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO) and international regimes and organizations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund and the European Community), as well as the development of international law, "it is misleading to simply conclude ... that sovereignty is wholly undermined
in contemporary
circumstances.vv With reference to NATO, he notes, "Membership ...
134
Basok/Refugee Policy
does not annul sovereignty, rather it qualifies sovereignty
for each state in different ways. Aspects of sovereignty are
negotiated and renegotiated through the NATO alliance."?
Moreover, not all states are equally integrated into the world
economy and therefore the impact of globalizing economic
processes may be minimal in some countries.f Held contends
that "despite the fact that states today operate in a world
of international political economy, military alliances, international law and so on, it remains that the modern state is
still able to determine the most fundamental aspect of people's life chances - the question of life and death."?
With respect to the erosion of state control from below,
postmodernists
have presented two images of the relation
between the state and civil society. The first arises from the
neo-pluralist vision of the state as a mediator of various, at
times conflicting, interests articulated by those in civil society. Viewed in this light, the state appears to respond to
the pressures exerted on it by various social movements
which have become more and more assertive and express
"a more open and pluralistic
form of democracy.t'Iv
As
Gramsci argues, however, the state's maintenance of hegemony involves taking systematic account of popular interests
and demands, shifting positions and making compromises
on secondary issues to maintain support and alliances in an
inherently unstable and fragile system of political relations.
In all of this, however, the state does not sacrifice its essential interests, and organizes this support in order to attain
national goals which serve the fundamental long-run interests of the dominant group. I I Numerous analyses of social
movements point out that the state is open to recommendations from more moderate groups while those who present
the most radical challenges to the state or the capitalist system as such are usually ignored.J?
The second postmodernist image of the relation between
civil society and the state places more emphasis on the decentralization of many aspects of state power and the reallocation of decision making to civil society. Some, like Alberto Melucci, argue that the distinction between state and
civil society has been replaced by a more complex situation,
characterized by a "multiplication
and increasing autonomy
135
Studies in Political Economy
of systems of representation and decision making" and that
this process "results in the pluralization of decision-making
centres," allowing for greater popular participation.U
Others concentrate more on the coercive aspects of this
process of decentralization
of power. Bowles and Gintis.!"
for instance, point out that "oppression takes many forms,"
and that the economy and the family in particular are no
less arenas of domination and political contest than is the
state. Thus, civil society itself becomes a locus of coercive
power relations. However, Mooers and Sears point out that
while coercive relations exhibited in civil society do not
originate with the state, they are often supported and reinforced by certain state policies.l>
In sum, the globalization of the world economy, politics,
culture and communication on the one hand, and challenges
from civil society on the other, have to a certain degree
undermined the autonomy of the state. However, this process
has been heterogenous,
weakening the state's position in
some areas while allowing the state to retain its control in
others. In fact, one can argue that in a world in which state
sovereignty has been partially undermined by the mobility
of national capital and pressures from supra-national
institutions and domestic grassroots movements, the state becomes even more intrusive in those areas where its autonomy
has not yet been eroded. While dismantling the barriers that
limit the ability of capital to cross international
borders,
states have erected ever higher walls to prevent the mobility
of labour. I will argue that while the Canadian state does
in fact consult with groups in civil society about refugee
issues, and yields to some pressures emanating from refugee
advocates and critics, the impact of these processes on the
state policy is minimal at best. It is true that there have
been several endeavours to de-centre the Canadian refugee
process. The institutions of private sponsorship and the sanctuary movement can be seen as initiatives undertaken by
civil society groups to offer Canadian asylum to greater numbers of refugees. The creation of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) in 1989 was an attempt by the government
to establish an independent body to adjudicate refugee matters. Yet, as I will demonstrate below, while encouraging
136
Basok/Refugee
Policy
some independent initiatives in the refugee field, the government consistently interferes with both private sponsorship
and the IRB.
"Globalization" and Canadian Refugee Policy The history
of refugee treatment in the 20th century suggests that there
has been a certain degree of "internationalization" of refugee
policy. An international refugee regime dates back to 1921.
Not surprisingly, for the first time the world community became alarmed when large numbers fled post-Revolutionary
Russia seeking asylum. Some welfare agencies approached
the League of Nations with the suggestion that a High Commissioner for Russian Refugees be appointed. The League
agreed and Fridtjof Nansen (whose name the office bore
after his death in 1930) became the first High Commissioner.
In the 1920s the Nansen office expanded its mandate to assist
Greeks, Turks, and Armenians and, in 1933, drafted a Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. In
1938, the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees was
founded at an international conference attended by 32 governments. In 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established to oversee
most of the immediate relief and repatriation operations in
postwar Europe and another institution, the International
Refugee Office (IRO), was set up immediately after World
War II to assist the remaining displaced people in rebuilding
their lives. Finally, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to establish a new agency to succeed the IRO,
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR). The General Assembly Resolution of 1950 made
it possible for the High Commissioner to warn states of danger and to explicitly recommend that governments should
co-operate with the office by admitting refugees to their territory, by concluding agreements for the implementation of
material assistance, and by encouraging the integration of
refugees. 16
The existence of this international refugee regime influences policies adopted by participating sovereign states. As
Guy Goodwin-Gill observes,
137
Studies in Political Economy
states participating
in the international regime of refugee protection have obligations and responsibilities.
These include not
only the specific duties accepted on ratification of conventions
and covenants, but also general responsibilities
towards the system as a whole: ensuring that the criteria of protection are applied, generously and appropriately; ensuring that no other state
bears a disproportionate
share of the charge upon the international community as a whole; engaging with other states in undertakings and arrangements
designed to improve the overall
performance of the system and enhance the refugee's chance of
a lasting solution to their plight.I?
Canada has played an important role in this international
refugee regime. After World War II, Canada accepted the
Chair of the newly formed IRQ. It actively participated in
the resettlement of people displaced by the war, sending
agents to the camps in Europe where some 40,000 displaced
people were selected for resettlement. In 1969 Canada signed
the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees,
thereby submitting itself to the scrutiny of this organization.
Although Canada has admitted refugees on an ad hoc
basis since the nineteenth century, a formal policy was not
established until the 1976 Immigration Act which came into
effect on April 10, 1978. The Act gave explicit recognition
to refugees as a distinct entry class. The concept of refugee
was based on the definition provided by the UN Convention:
persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or
membership in a particular social group. Furthermore, claimants had to be outside the country of their nationality and
unable or (by reason of fear) unwilling to avail themselves
of the protection of that country. Additionally, the Act gave
authority to the Governor-in-Council
to designate a group
of people who do not strictly qualify for Convention refugee
status but who do, nevertheless, fear political, social or religious persecution.
Three sub-groups were classified as
members of this Designated Class: Indochinese refugees,
self-exiled Soviet and Eastern European citizens, and political prisoners. The Act also made provisions for refugees to
be sponsored by groups of no less than five individuals or
by organizations such as churches.
138
Basok/Refugee Policy
The 1976 Immigration Act set up two procedures for admitting refugees. The first involved selection by officials in
countries of first asylum. The second was established for
people who come directly to Canada and claim refugee status
in-land. For the latter, the Act outlined status determination
procedures based on strict Convention criteria to determine
the eligibility of the refugee claims. Some of these procedures were modified in 1989 and further revised in 1993.
Presently, a refugee claim is adjudicated by a panel of two
Immigration and Refugee Board (lRB) members assisted by
a Refugee Hearing Officer (RHO).
There is a UNHCR envoy in Canada who monitors compliance with the international norms concerning refugees.
Other UN Conventions, such as the UN Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, also influence Canada's treatment of persecuted people.If However, participation in the refugee regime
does not imply an open door policy nor an abrogation of
state sovereignty. There exists a fundamental contradiction
within the Immigration Act. On the one hand, its objective
is to fulfil Canada's international obligation to accept genuine refugees, but on the other, the Act sets rigid rules for
getting into Canada.l? This contradiction is not accidental.
For most of their history, nation-states
have preoccupied
themselves with creating entry and exit rules for those they
may accept as members of their "imagined communities.v-?
The emerging consciousness
of national identity which
accompanied the formation of nation-states
following the
French revolution defined some groups of people as belonging to the national state, others as assimilable outsiders and
stilI others as inadmissible.
Until then, the movement of
peoples expelled from or persecuted in some parts of the
world into other regions was relatively uninhibited. But since
the emergence of nation-states, refugees have generally been
viewed as "inimical to the health of the nation - a threat
to its security, cultural cohesion, or way of life."21 In the
latter decades of the 19th century, many Western nations, such
as the United States, Canada, Britain and Germany, imposed
control over population movements. Restrictive
measures
were further tightened during World War I in response to
security concerns, revolutionary
movements, attempts by
139
Studies in Political Economy
elites to enhance national identity and solidarity in the face
of increasing internal and international tensions, and later
in response to economic depression.sThis is not to say
that migration was severely restrained. On the contrary, migratory movements played a significant role in the nationbuilding process of the United States, Canada and Australia.
But states have always played an important role in defining
"ideal citizens," those who would be welcomed, as opposed
to those whose entry was considered "undesirable" because
of their race, cultural characteristics,
morality, political beliefs, or health.23
Today, governments retain a significant degree of autonomy in refugee matters. First, they may choose not to sign
the Protocol and the Convention and thus not be bound by
them. Second, it is possible to sign the 1951 Convention,
created for European refugees, but not the 1967 Protocol
extended to include Third World refugees.P' Thirdly, regulations outlined by the UNHCR Convention and Protocol
apply only to those who are recognized as bona fide refugees.
Governments
may decide to consider certain migrants as
refugees, entitled to receive protection, and others as "economic immigrants" subject to deportation. As Webber points
out,
The convention laid down no procedures for deciding if someone
was a refugee or not. These omissions from the convention the lack of an obligation to admit refugees in the first place,
the strict definition and the. lack of procedures - have been exploited to the full as each European country in turn tries to
deflect refugees from its territory on to someone else's.25
Research on refugee policies throughout the world provides ample evidence of inconsistencies
in state decisions
to grant asylum to one group of migrants but not another.
These decisions result from the interaction of a number of
factors, among which foreign policy concerns play an important role.26 As Loescher contends, "the formulation of
refugee policy involves a complex interplay of domestic
and international factors at the policy-making
level and illustrates the conflict between international
humanitarian
norms and the sometimes narrow self-interest calculations
140
Basok/Refugee Policy
of sovereign nation-states.t'-?
Loescher observes that sudden
massive movements of refugees can adversely affect relationships between nations since "refugees can also be used
and exploited by governments in pursuit of larger geopolitical and ideological objectives" and refugee policy can thus
be used to "embarrass or destabilize enemy govemments.v-f
In sum, international refugee law has allowed national
states enough flexibility to extend generous protection to
some and restrict entry to others. Since international refugee
law and institutions establish no quotas for refugee intake,
when deemed necessary, Western governments can impose
tougher regulations to prevent refugees from crossing their
borders, arguing that most asylum seekers merely seek to
improve their economic circumstances.
And in fact, most
European asylum countries have recently adopted measures
to restrict entry of such migrants.s?
Various measures
adopted by Western governments to ensure that most of the
more than 23 million refugees in the world remain outside
the walls of "fortress Europe" and "fortress North America"
amount to what Anthony Richmond has called "global apartheid" insofar as they are inspired by racist and xenophobic
attitudes and produce racial segregation at the world scale.30
As a member of the Inter-governmental
Consultations on
Asylum, Refugee, and Migration Policies in Europe, North
America and Australia, Canada has attempted to harmonize
its policies with those introduced in Europe and the United
States. At the same time, certain developments unfolding in
Canada in the latter part of the 1980s influenced the specific
policies adopted by the Canadian government. The number
of refugee claimants arriving in Canada grew rapidly from
1980 to 1986 (in 1980 there were 1,600 people claiming
refugee status, while in 1986 8,400 claims were filed). The
status determination procedure was unable to deal with these
claims expeditiously. As a result, by 1986 the backlog in
the refugee system exceeded 23,000 applications. Concerns
about the sheer numbers of those being processed through
the Canadian refugee status determination system were coupled with fear of abuse. This fear was fanned by fraudulent
claims presented by some bogus refugees, especially some
Portuguese and Turkish citizens, assisted by unscrupulous
141
Studies in Political Economy
lawyers, who were trying to use the refugee system in order
to circumvent refugee immigration procedure.3 J
Instead of designing a better determination
procedure
which would allow the expeditious separation of genuine
refugees from the abusers, the government proceeded to restrict the entry of all refugee claimants. Simultaneously, certain measures were adopted to speedily process the backlog
of refugee claimants. Yet neither the new "administrative
review" procedure nor restrictions imposed on entry requirements have produced the desired results. For instance, two
years after a $179-million program to speed the review of
claims was unveiled in 1989, less than half the cases had
been resolved.V
Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, Canada continued revising its policy and procedures with the objective
of curtailing the numbers of refugee claimants allowed to
come and stay in the country. In February 1987, the Canadian
government announced new measures including transit visa
requirements for all the countries for which a visa was required. Additionally, the government proposed two new bills,
Bill C-55 designed to streamline the refugee status determination process, and Bill C-84 which would enable the
government to turn back ships in international waters, suspected of carrying undocumented migrants, without first determining
their passengers'
refugee claims. These bills,
which went into effect in 1989, set up a number of procedures to limit the number of refugees arriving in Canada.
The approved measures included: power given to senior immigration officers to deport some would-be claimants within
72 hours; a screening process by an Immigration and Refugee
Board member assisted by a refugee presenting officer; removal of the right to appeal on merit of the story presented
at the hearing; and the "safe third country" provision which
would allow officials to return without a hearing any claimant who arrived in Canada via a third country where safe
haven could have been sought.V The law, which went into
effect on January I, 1989, also imposed a fine of $5,000 on
airlines if they failed to ensure that their passengers had valid
visas, passports and other travel documents.H By 1992, annual deportations had more than doubled since the 1989 law
142
---.-------------------------
Basok/Refugee Policy
was introduced.I> In 1992 there were 7,138 removals, of
which 4,672 were rejected asylum claimants while the remainder consisted of those who entered Canada illegally or
who overstayed.V These procedures were further revised.
Bill C-86, which came into force in January
1993,
strengthened the power to interdict undocumented travellers.
It granted more enforcement powers and the ability to deport
those found ineligible for refugee status. New search and
seizure powers allowed immigration officers to search people
suspected of hiding travel documents or other materials.J?
On February I, 1993, new immigration rules went into
effect with the adoption of Bill C-46. The new legislation
removed the first inquiry and replaced it with a meeting
with a senior immigration officer. The latter was granted
the right to refuse entry to claimants deemed inadmissible.
Among them were those who had already tried to make a
claim in Canada before and failed, those who had received
refugee status in another country, or those inadmissible for
criminal or security reasons. All claimants were to be fingerprinted; work permits were no longer issued until refugee
status was granted.P The new legislation also set fees that
airlines could be charged for bringing in illegal immigrants.t? By June 1993, the new legislation had also produced a drop of 55 percent in the number of people making
refugee claims in Canada.t" The trend continued throughout
1993.41
Canada's restrictive attitude has revealed itself in other
ways as well. At the 1991 UNHCR meeting in Geneva, Canada objected strongly to international attempts to broaden
the Geneva Convention definition of a refugee and proposed
an international system to "order and control" world refugee
movements.f- While allowing fewer refugees to claim refugee status in-land, Canada has also decreased its overseas
refugee intake. In 1991, only 9,000 and in 1992 only 7,000
of the promised 13,000 were brought to Canada by the government.O According to Jim Versteegh, the federal government's director of refugee programs at the time, Ottawa and
the United Nations no longer believed that the best way of
handling millions of refugees was to settle them in a thirdparty country like Canada.H In 1993, the Conservative quota
143
-----------------------------
-
--
Studies in Political Economy
for refugees was 53,000 (both government and privately
sponsored), but only 24,800 refugees actually came to Canada that year. The Liberal government quota for 1994 was
even lower: only 28,300 refugees.e>
In sum, in spite of its respect for international human
rights codes, Canada, much like other European countries
and the United States, has used several measures to curtail
the influx of refugees.
The Welfare State and Immigration and Refugee Policy
In order to understand how the Canadian state responds to
the various pressures exerted by civil society, it is important
to examine the contradictions
of the welfare state. One of
these contradictions arises because states must both encourage capital accumulation and maintain their own legitimacy.
The state must create and maintain conditions conducive to
the profitable conduct of business (e.g. by investing in physical infrastructure)
while, at the same time, it needs to win
the consent and loyalty of those who are exploited in the
process. It does this by investing in social programs such
as housing, social insurance, education and health care. A
rising need for state expenditure in both areas generates a
fiscal crisis, which until recently was deferred through deficit financing. High deficits and deficit panic have led states
to turn to ways of cutting social expenditures.t''
For many years, the Canadian government has argued that
immigration
is conducive to capital accumulation.
Immigrants provide cheap labour, boost consumption, open new
businesses,
and create employment.
Their presence, it is
maintained, also facilitates international trade. As Brian Mulroney noted in a 1986 speech at the Multiculturalism
Means
Business conference, "Canadians who have cultural links to
other parts of the globe, who have business contacts elsewhere are of the utmost importance to our trade and investment strategy.t''t? Yet, such arguments are most often used
to justify acceptance of only one class of immigrants, those
selected on the basis of their socio-economic
and demographic characteristics.
It is assumed that such immigrants
will contribute to capital accumulation and there is thus little
disagreement
about the benefits (or at least, the potential
144
BasokiRefugee Policy
benefits) for the Canadian economy of allowing this kind
of immigration. Even when some groups question the racial
composition
of the inflow, they accept the general belief
that Canada needs economic immigrants. Thus both the state
and civil society are likely to accept those who arrive in
Canada with skills and/or capital.
Immigrants classed under the other two immigration categories - refugees and those in the "family class" - are
generally viewed as beneficiaries of the humanitarian aspects
of Canadian policy; it is believed that their inclusion does
not serve Canada's economic self-interest. There exists much
debate, both at the grassroots and the government level about
the actual costs and benefits of allowing this kind of immigration. Fear that immigrants admitted under these categories
will add to the state's social expenditures (especially in a
period of deficit reduction) is evident. With respect to family
class immigrants, sponsors are required to sign a document
guaranteeing
financial support for their relatives for ten
years. At times, sponsorship arrangements break down and
family class immigrants end up on welfare assistance. The
degree to which this phenomenon is widespread is not clear,
yet critics of immigration have tended to play up the problem.
Whether refugees constitute a cost or a benefit to the
Canadian state is also unclear. Contrary to the commonly
presented image of refugees as illiterate, those who are selected by the government from overseas, at least, often reveal
socio-economic
and demographic characteristics
which do
not differ considerably from those who are admitted as "economic" immigrants.sf Of course, the government cannot exercise choice with those who claim refugee status in-land.
And the potential for adaptability of these latter is often
questioned.
Even if the economic contribution of refugees is questionable, they can serve the interests of the state in another
way. Until the end of the Cold War, refugees were selected
in order to add ideological legitimacy to the Canadian state.
For years, Canadian refugee policy had an ideological bias in
favour of rightist and against leftist refugees.sf The latter were
often considered politically "undesirable" and were prevented
145
Studies in Political Economy
from immigrating to Canada by visa officers and by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Security
and Intelligence Service. As Reg Whitaker documents, the
RCMP used differential procedures for refugees originating
from different countries. Applications from people fleeing
right-wing dictatorships in countries like Chile or Guatemala
faced long delays and reduced prospects of admission in
comparison with those escaping communist dictatorships in,
say, the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.50 At the time of
the Cold War, most Soviet arrivals were classified as refugees
fleeing from Communist repression, regardless of whether
proof of such repression could be presented or not.>! After
the Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing more than twothirds of the 4,800 Chinese students in Canada were given
permission to stay permanently on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Critics charged that no similar compassion was exercised in the case of residents of Lebanon and
other troubled countries. 52
Massive migration of people from communist countries
to Canada may also have served id.eological purposes by
highlighting the advantages of the capitalist system. Such
migrants were generally enamoured of the "free-market"
economy and could preach the "horrors" of living under communism to the rest of the Canadian population. At the same
time, those fleeing from right-wing dictatorships were carefully screened and admitted in much smaller numbers; this
way the potential damage of allowing in left-wing critics of
Western imperialism,
who might also have something to
preach to the Canadian populace, were minimized. By admitting refugees from a particular country, the Canadian government also made a statement about the government of the
originating
country, portraying it as a violator of human
rights. Again, this could be viewed as a public condemnation
of the political regime of the ideological
adversary, one
which could enhance the legitimacy of Canada's political
system. Thus even while the state's legitimacy might be undermined by fiscal crisis, it could be boosted slightly by
importing those people who would become the government's
ideological supporters.
146
Basok/Refugee Policy
However, the end of the Cold War and the creation of
the "New World Order" have blurred the distinctions between
left-wing and right-wing refugees. The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, accompanied by the eruption
of mass-scale-ethnic
conflicts, as well as a certain degree
of democratization
in some Latin American countries formerly controlled by right-wing military regimes, have diminished the ideological polarization of refugees. Most who
arrive in Canada today are victims of violence inflicted by
ethnic rivals and not of political repression. Refugees can
no longer be considered ideological allies of the government
in the same way they once were and whatever purchase such
ideological aims might have earned them has now been cancelled. Refugees are now uniformly portrayed as a burden
which the state, involved in cutting back social programs,
can no longer afford. Thus, pro-refugee voices are less likely
to find sympathy in the government, while those opposed
to refugees are most likely to sing in harmony with the state.
Lopsided "Liberal Democracy" The anti-immigrant camp
is composed of various groups, the most vocal of whom are
the White Supremacist organizations, who have always presented strong opposition to those immigrants and refugees
who, according
to them, "pollute"
the White Canadian
"race."53 Although White Supremacist
organizations
find
themselves on the political fringe in Canada, some of their
concerns resonate among the general population, which, in
times of economic crisis, becomes increasingly less tolerant
of foreigners, especially the most visible ones. Some recent
Liberal government initiatives to promote more European
immigration, 54 while consistent with pre-1960 racist trends
in Canadian immigration policy, can also be attributed in
part to the growing general concern that most of today's
immigrants arrive from Asia and the Caribbean.V
The anti-immigrant camp also embraces those, like members of the Reform Party, The Economic Council of Canada,
and others, who argue that immigration should be curtailed,
at least temporarily, in order to avoid tensions in a society
which is already strained by the rapid pace of the immigration
influx. 56 They are joined by individual academics, journalists
147
Studies in Political Economy
and other analysts who express their opposition to increasing
or even sustaining immigration levels in the mass media. 57
They argue first, that money is not spent wisely to reach
those refugees who are truly in need; it costs Canada
$50,00058 to process and take care of each refugee claimant,
whereas the UN only spends $40 per person, per year to
care for refugees in refugee camps in countries of first asylum. Second, the abuse of Western asylum systems draws
money and attention away from efforts to resolve the situations that create refugees in the first place. Third, Canada
admits refugees who are illiterate in their own languages
and who have no marketable skills, without being able to
offer them adequate training programs to prepare them for
the labour market. 59 Fourth, schools, health-care services
and welfare rolls are burdened with growing numbers of
unskilled refugees; they contribute to overcrowding in cities
like Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.s''
The swelling of anti-immigrant
sentiment,
however,
merely coincides with the government's own decision to curtail the number of refugees allowed to enter and remain in
the country. "Family class" immigration, for instance, has
been singled out for criticism because such immigrants are
believed to have low potential for integration.v! The government has introduced a number of changes in its policy,
including:
1. Changing the definition of family by creating a new,
limited category for parents, grandparents and siblings;
2. Giving priority to some of those in the family class
who are young, speak English or French or are well educated;
3. Prohibiting sponsors who are on welfare;
4. Changing the proportion of the family class from nearly
half to 33 or 40 percent of total immigration levels.62
The reduction in the numbers allowed in under the supposedly humanitarian categories, i.e. refugees and family class
immigrants, is merely one among many attempts made by
the state to decrease the cost associated with immigration
and refugee decision-making
policies.
With respect to "non-white" refugees, the xenophobic sentiments voiced today are actually in line with established
148
Basok/Refugee Policy
Canadian traditions. For instance, with respect to Central
American refugees, the 1985 Annual Report to Parliament on
Future Immigration Levels states that "resettlement
outside
the area is the most practical option for a relatively small
number of persons," while "repatriation or local resettlement
is preferable.r's-' Similarly in the case of Africa, the report
maintains that "temporary asylum pending repatriation"
is
the best option for refugees in that part of world.P" To support policies regarding Africa and Central America, the reports make reference to international agencies assisting refugees. The 1981 Annual Report claims that "the traditional
African preference, as articulated by the Organization for
African Unity, is for voluntary repatriation or local resettlement."65 With respect to Central America, the 1982 Annual
Report makes a reference to the "UNHCR's judgement that
a combination of resettlement in the region and eventual
repatriation represent the most desirable solution."66
In other words, the state chooses to grant legitimacy to
those voices that reinforce
the position it has already
adopted. To silence its critics, the government acquiesces
in the myth that refugees abuse the Canadian system and
drain its resources. In fact, the Canadian government (both
at the federal and provincial levels) has even contributed to
anti-refugee hysteria.
In 1987, anti-refugee hysteria was precipitated in the wake
of the illegal arrival of a boat with 155 Tamils aboard in
Newfoundland
in August of 1986, and another with 173
Sikhs in Nova Scotia in July 1987. After the Sikhs landed
in Nova Scotia and declared themselves refugees, the Conservative government insisted that "abuse of the system had
to stop. "67 Junior Immigration
Minister
Gerry Weiner
claimed in the Senate that Canada was under "an assault on
a world-wide scale by those desperate for a better life and
greater economic opportunity."68 At the same time, Joe Bissett, Executive Director for Immigration with Employment
and Immigration Canada, insisted that seventy percent of
people arriving at Canada's border and airports claiming to
be refugees were phoney and that they came through organized rackets.v? The Immigration Minister at the time, Benoit
Bouchard stated "I just hope that the senators will understand
149
Studies in Political Economy
that it's what Canadians want ... Canadians want to control
the abusers. "70
In 1993, Somali refugees came under attack because of
their presumed involvement in welfare fraud. In January,
1993 a five-month investigation project was set up by the
Ontario government
called Welfare and Refugee Fraud
(WARP). The investigation team produced a racist document,
damaging to the reputation of the Somali refugees in which
all of them were painted as international conspirators
attempting to exploit the Canadian welfare system in order to
buy arms to be sent back to Somalia."! The document, which
was used by the Leader of the Opposition at Queen's Park,
Lyn McLeod, and which was leaked to the public, stated:
It is important to understand, and I can not stress this point
enough, that the Somali refugee movement is an organized movement that is clan driven and financially motivated. It is international in nature and it is in spite of what anyone else may
say, ... importing refugees to systematically pillage our vulnerable and exposed social welfare systems in an attempt to raise
funds to support clan interests in the struggle for power in Somalia.72
In these cases, the state was able to pose as saviour of the
Canadian population by creating a panic around "bogus refugees," "queue-jumpers"
and "welfare abusers."
In other words, the position adopted by the Canadian state
and some politicians does not differ from those who want
to see less and different family class immigrants and refugees
admitted to the country. The real test of Canadian "liberal
democracy" becomes the degree to which the state responds
to some objections raised by the pro-refugee lobby. It seems
that pro-immigration
interest groups have been instrumental
in certain policy decisions. Their lobbying and assistance
upon arrival played a significant role in the admission of
Ukrainian Displaced Persons immediately after World War
II, Chileans in the 1970s, Indochinese refugees at the end
of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, and others. In
1967 Canada removed "country preference" from its list and
opened its doors to immigrants coming from all over the
world. Since then the non-European population has steadily
150
BasokJRefugee Policy
grown in Canada.T' After the first waves of immigrants settled in Canada they lobbied the government to bring their
relatives and compatriots. Thus diversified immigration policy and the "family class" have become important components of the immigration flow to Canada.H However, I will
argue below that in spite of great efforts on the part of proimmigration activists, their voices are frequently ignored by
the Canadian state.
Every year the federal government invites various interest
groups (e.g. ethnic communities, NGOs, church organizations) to consult with it on immigration
levels. Representatives of these organizations are asked to submit recommendations.
However, as Simmons and Keohane/> have
argued, these recommendations
rarely make a difference in
the intake levels the government sets. Simmons and Keohane
present an insightful analysis of one annual Immigration consultation, and hearings concerning two refugee Bills: Bill
C-55 and Bill C-84. They argue that the bureaucrats and
Members of the Parliament retain control over the consultation process by establishing the parameters of communication. They determine when, where, and who will participate,
they set up the agenda and the format of the communication,
and even when some concerns expressed by the pro-immigration lobby reach the ears of the policy-makers, these are
often ignored.
Aside from formal hearings and consultations,
human
rights activists attempt to exert pressure on the Canadian
authorities by organizing rallies, demonstrations
and public
education programs and through the mass media. But these
rarely produce significant results. Among the Canadian prorefugee lobby groups are the Canadian Council for Refugees
(an umbrella organization representing 130 churches and nonprofit organizations),
Ontario Sanctuary Coalition, InterChurch Committee
on Refugees,
Canadian
Council of
Churches, Amnesty International, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) and others. Although
their efforts were truly impressive, these organizations failed
to produce any significant changes in the legislation which
went into effect in 1989 and in 1993.
151
Studies in Political Economy
Before the proposed bills C-55 and C-84 were approved
by the Senate, advocacy groups complained that they violated
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 1951 UN Convention
on Refugees and most other international conventions.If
Because the 1989 law did not allow for appeal on points of
merit of one's story, just on points of law, the Canadian
Council of Churches argued that this made the law unconstitutional, insisting that "the risk of life or to liberty, which
is implicit in the (deportation) of a refugee if there is a
mistake, warrants an appeal as a part of fundamental justice."?? The clause which brought the heaviest criticism from
refugee advocates was the "safe third country provision"
which would allow the government to deport refugees to
other countries through which they travelled en route to Canada and where they could have claimed asylum.Zf Similarly,
the screening process, first proposed in 1987, was heavily
criticized for subjecting those seeking sanctuary to an adversarial court-type hearing in which the burden of proof
was placed on them. Yet, the 1989 legislation included all
these provisions criticised by refugee advocates.
The 1993 legislation also generated much criticism. When
it was first introduced, refugee advocates, immigration lawyers and human rights groups attacked the new laws as heartless.79 They criticized the fingerprinting provisions, calling
them "odious."80 The Canadian Council for Refugees insisted that the new legislation would prevent legitimate refugees from coming to Canada and would make it easier to
evict them once they arrived.U The Council also expressed
its "gravest concern" over giving immigration officers at
border points more authority to determine who is a genuine
refugee.V This last concern was supported by the Canadian
Jewish Congress which argued that "these unprecedented
wide powers ought not to be given to an enforcement officer,
especially without the benefit of a hearing with counsel and
in the absence of a meaningful review."83 The Canadian Labour Congress also joined forces with refugee advocate
groups in opposing the proposed new refugee legislation.
Its president, Bob White, argued that such sweeping legislation gives Canadians the message that refugees are a cause
of unemployment. 84 David Matas labelled the provision that
152
Basok/Refugee Policy
stripped refugee claimants of their right to work "cruel and
harsh." 85 Yet, these objections amounted to nothing and the legislation went into effect on February I, 1993, as originally
designed. On other occasions, efforts made by refugee advocates have been similarly futile. Whereas they had demanded that the refugee quota be increased to 97,000 in
1994 to make up to the target shortfall from 1991 to 1993,86
the Liberal Government slashed its quota to 28,300.
Yet, to argue that the voices emerging from civil society
are completely ignored would be erroneous. On occasion,
the Canadian government has yielded to the pressures coming from particular interest groups. The government does
engage in policy discussions with various representatives to
assess the possible damage some of its decisions may cause
as opposed to the possible support they will get.87 The campaign by the National Action Committee on the Status of
Women against deportation of women facing gender-based
violence'f has produced some positive results.S? On March
9, 1993, the IRB issued Guidelines on Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution providing
substantive legal and procedural guidance in analyzing gender-related issues in refugee claims submitted by women.P"
At times, advocacy on behalf of individual refugees ordered
deported''! has reversed the government's
decisions. Even
though the "safe third country" provision remained in the
1989 legislation, it was never implemented. The screening
process was finally abandoned in 1993, although the decision
was based not on the criticisms expressed by pro-refugee
lobbyists but on the fact that it was too costly and inefficient.P?
However, it is important to set the parameters for the
government's
openness to various pressures. With respect
to the "safe third country" provision, at the end of 1989
Barbara McDougall,
then Employment
and Immigration
Minister, said that she would not rule out its eventual imposition.F' Thus, even though she conceded to the original
criticism of advocacy groups, the Immigration
Minister
maintained control by reserving the right to use the clause.P''
Another interesting example was the discussion of amnesty of 100,000 refugee claimants already in the backlog
153
Studies in Political Economy
by 1989. Although several refugee lawyers insisted that general amnesty was the only way of saving taxpayers' money
while easing the suffering of numerous refugee claimants,
McDougall insisted that it was "out of the question." At the
same time, Immigration Canada relaxed some rules. Personal
interviews were replaced by "paper screening" for many
refugees whose countries of origin were notorious for violation of human rights.P> Thus again, while implementing
what amounted to a de facto amnesty, McDougall maintained
her original position in principle. In other words, while lending an ear to some criticisms and yielding to some nonthreatening demands, the state remains in full control of its
policy.
De-Centring
the State It can be argued that the Canadian
state has become de-centred in the field of refugee issues
in three ways: through the program of private sponsorship,
through the sanctuary movement, and by virtue of creating
an independent body in charge of determining refugee status
in-land. While the first two are mechanisms to increase the
inflow and retention of refugees in Canada, the latter was
created as a neutral mechanism for claim adjudication. I will
argue, however, that neither of the three institutions are truly
independent of state regulation.
The Immigration Act has set up procedures for private
sponsorship by groups of no less than five individuals or
organizations who agree to provide support for the refugees
they bring for one year. As many as 27.4 percent of the
144,702 refugees admitted to Canada between 1980 and 1987
were privately sponsored.
The private sponsorship
campaigns played an especially crucial role in the Indochinese
and Polish refugee movements to Canada.Pv Yet lately it has
experienced a serious decline. In part the decline can be
attributed to fatigue on the part of the sponsors who found
the strain of housing and assisting refugees more difficult
than they originally anticipated. But the problem also lies
in how the government processes applications for private
sponsorship. The program is not independent of government
control; it applies only to those recognized as "Convention"
refugees by the Canadian visa officers abroad. Applicants
154
Basok/Refugee Policy
also have to pass medical, criminal and security clearances
and demonstrate some capacity to establish themselves successfully. In 1992, the Canadian Council for Refugees, which
had established a task force on private sponsorship and produced a 165-page report, warned that the program was "in
a state of virtual collapse." The report noted that long delays
in sponsorship are endemic and that among Canadian immigration and refugee officials there was widespread ignorance of the refugee definition and of human rights in refugee
home countries. Refugee determinations were confused with
settlement determinations.
Furthermore, it pointed out that
there was a breakdown in communication between visa offices and sponsors.P?
Another way in which civil society has tried to "de-centre" the refugee process is through the Sanctuary movement.
Churches throughout the United States, Europe and Canada
have offered to hide refugees who have received deportation
orders or who would be in danger of being deported. But
it is important to point out that this institution does not
exist independently of the state but in defiance of the state.
In a number of cases, Sanctuary movement members in the
United States were jailed98 and in Canada they provide but
a temporary shelter to individual refugees while continuing
to pressure the government to reverse the deportation order.
While the first two institutions - private sponsorship
and the Sanctuary movement - have been initiated to increase the number of refugees who can come or stay in Canada, the IRB has often functioned as a gate-keeper since its
creation in 1989, in spite of its mandate of neutrality. IRB
members render their decisions on the basis of many factors,
including how well the claimant testifies and how well
his/her counsel prepares documents to back up the claim.
At the same time, the will oflmmigration
and Refugee Board
members to believe the claimant's story and accept the presented documentation as valid and trustworthy play an important role.
The 1990s witnessed a steady decline in the refugee acceptance rate at the IRB: it went from 70.3 percent in 1990,
to 64 percent in 1991, 57 percent in 1992, and 52 percent
in 1993.99 On the surface, this decline appears to have little
ISS
Studies in Political Economy
to do with government policy and can only be attributed to
individual decisions taken by IRB members. One Vancouver
immigration lawyer argued that board members had become
more cynical. According to him, in Vancouver board members "operate from the presumption that people are not telling the truth ... They think everyone is lying."IOO The National Network of Centres Working with Torture Survivors
accused IRB of being "ill-willed,"
claiming
that they
wrongly rejected hundreds of asylum seekers.U'! In January
of 1994 an Osgoode Hall law professor James Hathaway
released a report which concluded that a number of IRB
members were hostile to asylum seekers.102 Hathaway attributes the aggressive and adversarial position taken by
board members to the failure of immigration officials to
screen refugee claimants properly, leaving it to the discretion
of IRB members to weed out phoney refugees.lvUnder
these circumstances,
they tend to mistrust most. Thus, decisions to reject an increasing number of claimants can be
attributed to the attitudes of IRB members but not to any
specific policy initiative on the part of the state. In fact,
inconsistencies
in acceptance rates among various Canadian
provinces and among individual members 'v" point to a lack
of any national policy in this regard. British Columbia's
acceptance rate for refugee claims was well below the national rate. I 05 Vancouver lawyer Phil Rankin characterized
refugee hearing officers there as bloodhounds. I06 Four of
BC's board members had especially low rates of acceptance
of refugees. I 07
Yet, the Immigration and Refugee Board is not completely
free of government interference. Its members are appointed
by a committee at the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration (formerly Employment and Immigration). Many board
members selected in 1989 and in the early 1990s were political appointees; a number of faithful servants of the Progressive Conservative party, such as ex-MPs, ex-candidates,
and others with political connections filled their ranks.108
Matas observed that because refugee board members are political appointees, they tend to reflect the government's position. "They are all Tory appointees and the Tory political
156
--------------------------
--
Basok/Refugee Policy
agenda is to be tough on refugees," he claimed in an interview with the Toronto Star.l09
In 1988, a number of immigration lawyers accused the
then IRB head Gordon Fairweather of "pursuing actively
and aggressively the government policy" in his public statements. They also accused him of conflict of interest because
he sat on a committee advising the Immigration Minister of
the time, Barbara McDougall, on the countries to which it
would be safe to return refugees. Fairweather dismissed the
criticism and refused to resign. I I 0 In 1993, members of the
refugee board argued that the decline in the numbers of approved claims reflected changing world circumstances.
Yet
critics attributed the lower acceptance rate to political pressure to reduce the number of refugees allowed into Canada
during tough economic times. I I I
The position adopted by the Liberal Immigration Minister,
Sergio Marchi, is not markedly different from that established earlier by his Conservative predecessors. In the early
stages, Marchi, who had been a long-time immigration critic
of the Conservative government, demonstrated more sympathy and openness to refugees. His first political appointment was that of the former director of the Canadian arm
of Amnesty International and the Canadian Council for Refugees, Michael Schelew, who became the board's deputy chair
in December of 1993. During the September 1994 round of
appointments to the board, Marchi selected many with backgrounds in the area of human rights or multiculturalism.
Even though he avoided appointing those with ties to the
Liberal Party, he failed to distance his office from the selection process and thus, according to some critics, undermined the credibility of the board.l l- And that gave an excuse to many, such as the Reform Party's immigration critic,
Art Hanger, to accuse Marchi of contributing to the "immigration industry." 113
However, the conservative critics did not need to worry
for long. Many conservative members of the board were
also reappointed in September and by October the two sides
clashed. The board's co-chair, Michael Schelew, who for
many years had fought for the rights of refugees, was accused
by five board members and two refugee hearing officers of
157
Studies in Political Economy
interfering in the rulings of other members in his effort to
boost acceptance rates for refugee claimants. I 14 By November, this conflict developed into a power struggle between
Michael Schelew and the board's Chair, Nurjehan Mawani,
and their respective supporters, resulting in Schelew's resignation.U> It is noteworthy that Marchi did not interfere.
Thus, just as Marchi's own position has become more restrictive in immigration and refugee matters, the board that
he appointed has also resurrected some of the conservatism
of the previous years.
The refugee determination process is influenced by the
state in yet another way. IRB members are assisted by a
Refugee Hearing Officer (RHO), a Ministry of Employment
and Immigration appointee, who is expected to remain neutral. Yet, the report prepared by James Hathaway, cited
above, points out the adversarial role RHOs take at the hearings. They often wrongly take on the role of prosecutors
when claimants appear before the board. Even though they
are supposed to be impartial, they often cross-examine claimants in a "pernicious" way.116 Furthermore, an RHO presents
a file of documents on the situation in the country/region
of origin of the claimant. Some of these documents are provided by employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who
are placed either in the claimant's country of origin or in a
neighbouring country. These reports do not necessarily present an objective picture of the political situation of that
country, but an evaluation by particular field officers, coloured by the official Canadian stand towards the government
of this country. Consequently,
decisions rendered by IRB
members often reflect official Canadian statements concerning the governments of the countries of origin of refugee
claimants.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the refugee process
is not entirely in the hands of the independent board. The
Immigration minister is granted a discretionary power to allow anybody into the country on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Rejected refugee claimants can pay $450
to apply for such a consideration and to have their cases reviewed
to ensure they are not at risk if deported. However, only a few
of them succeed at reversing the original deportation order.
158
Basok/Refugee
Policy
Between February 1 and November 30, 1993, only six of
the 3,278 rejected cases were allowed to stay in Canada on
the grounds that deporting them would put them at risk.U?
Conclusions
I have argued that the role of the state in defining refugee matters has not diminished. Instead, the state
has become more interventionist
and restrictive in defining
the rights of people to move across international borders.
Canadian adherence to norms and guidelines set out by the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees and its active
role in assisting displaced people throughout the world have
contributed to an image of Canada as a humanitarian country
and a good member of an international community. Yet, Canada's membership in the international humanitarian refugee
regime has not precluded it from restricting entry to masses
of refugees or at least to those classified as less desirable.
Nor have pro-refugee groups in civil society had much
influence on state policy. At a time when governments
throughout the world have become preoccupied with cutting
social expenditures, people in those immigrant classes not
selected for strictly economic reasons are often portrayed
as a social burden and their numbers have been significantly
reduced. At these times, anti-immigrant voices reinforce the
government's
intent to reduce the numbers of those in the
"non-productive"
classes of immigrants - refugees and family members. Xenophobic attitudes expressed by the general
population and some organized far right groups have found
sympathetic ears in the Canadian government, notorious for
its history of racist policies. At the same time, the government becomes less likely to pay attention to the pro-immigration lobby.
Finally, the refugee selection process has not become decentred in Canada. Neither the private sponsorship program
nor the Immigration and Refugee Board have become independent of government control and interference. Nor has the
Sanctuary movement been successful in making it possible
for greater numbers of refugees to stay in Canada.
In sum, the Canadian state has remained in full control
of the immigration selection process. It has attempted to boost
that part of the immigration inflow expected to contribute to
159
Studies
in Political
Economy
capital accumulation and reduce significantly the numbers
of those who are assumed to incur some social cost. The
refugee and immigration field is one of the areas in which
the state has assumed not less but more control. Other areas,
in which the role of the state has not diminished in spite
of globalization trends and pressures from "civil society,"
call into question the conclusions of postmodernists that the
state is "withering away." Such arguments have to be seriously re-examined if we are to come to a better appreciation
of the role of the state in the context of the current crisis.
Notes
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
160
Stuart Hall, "Brave New World," Marxism Today 24/9 (October 1988);
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism. Property, Community and the Contradictions
of Modern Social Thought
(New York: Basic Books, 1987); Warren Magnusson,
"Decentring
the State, or Looking for Politics" in William Carroll (ed.), Organizing
Dissent. Contemporary
Social Movements
in Theory and Practice
(Toronto: Garamond
Press, 1992), pp. 69-80; Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985); Alain Touraine, Return
of the Actor: Social Theory in Postindustrial
Society (Minneapolis:
University of Manitoba Press, 1988).
Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 300-313.
Touraine, Return of the Actor, p. 33
Warren Magnusson and Rob Walker, "De-Centring the State: Political
Theory and Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy 26 (1988), p. 53.
Ibid., p. 53.
D. Held, "Farewell Nation-State,"
Marxism Today (December 1988).
Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 16.
David Slater, "Social Movements and a Recasting of the Political"
in D. Slater (ed.), New Social Movements
and the State in Latin
America (Amsterdam:
CEDLA, 1985), p. 6.
Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State. Marxist Theories and Methods (New
York: New York University Press, 1982), p. 148
William Carroll (ed.), Organizing
Dissent. Contemporary
Social
Movements in Theory and Practice (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1992).
Alberto Melucci, "Social Movements and the Democratization
of Everyday Life" in John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State (London:
Verso, 1988), p. 257.
Bowles and Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism, p. 8.
BasoklRefugee Policy
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Colin Mooers and Alan Sears, "The 'New Social Movements'
and
the Withering Away of State Theory" in Carroll (ed.), Organizing
Dissent, p. 57.
Yefime Zarjevski, A Future Preserved. International Assistance to Refugees (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), pp. 5-13; Aristide R. Zolberg,
A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence (New York, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 20-27.
Guy Goodwin-Gill,
"Refugee Determination.
What's Next?" Refuge
11/2 (1992), pp. 6-7.
When Bernard Valcourt endorsed the decision of the Immigration
and Refugee Board to issue guidelines on gender persecution,
he
claimed he had Canada's international
standing in human rights in
mind. See Andrew Cardozo, "Refuge for abused women," Toronto
Star February 17, 1993, p. A19.
Allan Thompson,
"New rules for refugees in effect today," The
Toronto Star February I, 1993, p. AS.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
Michael Marrus, "Introduction"
in Anna C., Bramwell (ed.), Refugees
in the Age of Total War (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 1-3.
J. L. Elliott and A. Fleras, "Immigration
and the Canadian Ethnic
Mosaic" in Peter S. Li (ed.), Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada
(Toronto:
Oxford University
Press, 1990); Zolberg,
Suhrke and
Aguayo, Escape from Violence, p. 18.
Alan Sears, "Immigration
Controls as Social Policy: The Case of
Canadian Medical Inspection 1900-1920," Studies in Political Economy 33 (Fall 1990), pp. 91-112.
This in fact, was Italy's case until 1989. See Frances Webber, "From
ethnocentrism
to Euro-racism,"
Race and Class 32/3 (1991), p. 14.
Ibid.
The significance
of foreign policy concerns in determining
refugee
pol icies has been recognized by a number of researchers.
See, for
example: G. Loescher "Introduction.
Refugee Issues in International
Relations" in G. Loescher and L. Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); M. Weiner,
"On International Migration and International Relations," Population
and Development Review 11/3 (1985); A. R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke and
S. Aguayo, "International
Factors in the Formation of Refugee Movement," International
Migration Review 20/2 (1986), pp. 151-69.
Loescher, "Introduction ... "
Ibid., pp. 11-12.
Robert Miles, Racism after "Race Relations" (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993); Tony Bunyan, "Towards an authoritarian
European
State," Race and Class 32/3 (1991), pp. 19-27; Webber, "From ethnocentrism to Euro-racism,"
pp. 11-17.
Anthony H. Richmond, Global Apartheid. Refugees, Racism. and the
New World Order (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Victor
Malarek , Haven s Gate: Canada s Immigration
Fiasco
(Toronto: MacMillan,
1987), pp. 104-135.
Christie Mcl.aren, "Refugee backlog plan in a mess," The Globe and
Mail February 23, 1991.
161
----------------------------------------
---
Studies in Political Economy
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
162
Joan Bryden, "Critics growing to accept refugee system despite its
faults," The Montreal Gazette December 29, 1989, p. B I.
The Montreal Gazette January 16, 1989, p. A3.
The Vancouver Sun April 8, 1992, p. AS.
Richmond, Global Apartheid, p. 140.
Ibid., p. 140.
The issue of the right of refugees to work has generated a lively
debate in Canada. On the one hand, when refugees are not allowed
to work, they are forced to become welfare recipients. On the other
hand, some argue that when allowed to work, they steal jobs from
other Canadians. While Don Voretz, an economics professor at Simon
Fraser University, argued that these fears are exaggerated,
he did
predict that refugees would displace Canadians in entry-level jobs
such as those in the construction and service industries. See Calgary
Herald January 27, 1994, p. II. Others have argued that it is unlikely
that refugees would steal jobs from 1.5 million Canadians already
unemployed. They point out that if refugee claimants and Canadian
citizens of equal qualifications
apply for the same job, employers
would automatically
pick the Canadian merely because her or his
status in Canada is certain. See Toronto Star January 27, 1994, p.
A22. The controversy explains why in late 1992 the Tory government
barred refugee claimants from getting work permits but the Liberal
government
allowed 14,000 refugee claimants to work while they
awaited
decisions
on their cases in January
1994. See Allan
Thompson, "Refugee Claimants now allowed to work," Toronto Star
January 25, 1994, p. A2.
Moira Farrow, "Refugees find Canada's door not as open," Vancouver
Sun March 8, 1994, p. B4; Allan Thompson, "New rules for refugees
in effect today," Toronto Star February I, 1993, p. AS.
Chronicle-Herald
June 16, 1993.
Winnipeg Free Press November 21, 1993, p. A3.
lain Hunter, "Canada proposes 'order and control' refugee system,"
Vancouver Sun October 8, 1991, p. A3; Estanislao Oziewicz, "Canada
resists redefining refugees," Globe and Mail October 8, 1991.
Joan Bryden, "Refugee quotas cut," Montreal Gazette December 5,
1992, p. A II.
George Nikides, "Canada quietly closes doors on refugees as number
of admissions slashed in half," Winnipeg Free Press November 18,
1991, p. AI.
Dianne Rinehart, "Ottawa offers I% solution," Winnipeg Free Press
February 3, 1994.
James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Claus Offe, Contradictions
oj the Welfare State
(Cambridge:
MIT Press 1984).
Elliott and Fleras, "Immigration
and the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic,"
p. 67
Tanya Basok and Alan B. Simmons, "Refugees in Canada: A Review
of the Politics of Refugee Selection" in Vaughan Robinson (ed.), The
Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Experience (Macmillan Press,
1992), pp. 132-57.
Gerald E.Dirks,
"A Policy Within a Policy: The Identification
and
Admission of Refugees to Canada," Canadian Journal oj Political
Basok/Refugee Policy
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
Science 17/2 (1984), pp. 279-307; Gerald E. Dirks, "Canadian Refugee Policy: Humanitarian
and Political Determinants"
in Elizabeth
Ferris, ed. Refugees and World Politics (New York: Praeger, 1985);
Gerald E. Dirks, "World Refugees: The Canadian Response," Behind
the Headlines 4515 (1988); Rhoda Howard, "Contemporary
Canadian
Refugee Policy: A Critical Assessment,"
Canadian Public Policy 6/2
(1980), pp. 359-72; Basok and Simmons "Refugees in Canada"; Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Immigration,
Refugees and Foreign Policy,"
International
Organization 38/3 (1984), pp. 429-50.
Reg Whitaker, Double Standard. The Secret History of Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987).
Tanya Basok, "Canadian Policy Toward Soviet Immigrants: the End
of the Refugee Program?" in Tanya Basok and R. Brym (eds.), Soviet
Jewish Emigration
and Resettlement
(Toronto: York Lanes Press,
1992), pp. 141-58.
Montreal Gazette August 17, 1989.
See, for instance, Jutice Hunter, "Nee-Nazis support interning of refugees," Vancouver Sun February 17, 1989.
See Lila Sarick, "Immigration
from Europe a priority, Marchi says,"
Globe and Mail September 13, 1994, p. A4.
Lila Sarick, "Family immigration
faces change," Globe and Mail
October 24, 1994, pp. A I, A2.
Christie McLaren, "'We've lost control of our border,' critics say,"
Globe and Mail February 27, 1991, p. A4.
See, for instance, Sandro Contenta, "Canadian dream sours for immigrants," Toronto Star January 22, 1994, pp. AI, A8.
Adelman calculates that the status determination
process costs (including adjudication,
federal court costs, and deportation)
for the
Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission and other departments are over $200,000,000.
Howard Adelman "Refugee Determination," Refuge 11/2 (1992), pp. 8-18.
Joan Bryden, "Ottawa to let in more refugees," Montreal Gazette
February 3, 1994, pp. AI, A2; Daniel Stoffman, "The high costs of
our refugee system," Toronto Star September 21, 1992, p. A19.
Joan Bryden, "Ottawa to let in more refugees," Montreal Gazette
February 3, 1994, pp. A I, A2; Christie McLaren, "'We've lost control
of our border,' critics say," Globe and Mail February 27, 1991, p.
A4.
Lila Sarick, "Marchi's Immigration Shift Criticized," Globe and Mail
September 14, 1994, p. A2.
Lila Sarick, "Family immigration
faces change," Globe and Mail
October 24, 1994, pp. A I, A2.
Canada, Employment and Immigration,
1985 Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Service, 1985), p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
Canada, Employment and Immigration,
1981 Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration
Levels (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Service, 1981), p. 21.
Canada, Employment and Immigration,
1982 Annual Report to Parliament 0/1 Future Immigration Levels (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Service, 1982), p. 37.
163
Studies
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
164
in Political
Economy
Janet Steffenhagen, "Tough new laws to tighten refugee system,"
Halifax Herald December 30, 1988, pp. 1-2.
Victor Malarek, "Doors of hope slam in refugees' faces," Globe and
Mail February 13, 1988, pp. 01, 03.
Jes Odam, "Most 'refugees' bogus, expert says," Vancouver Sun February 13, 1988, p. A8.
Joan Bryden, "Commons approves bill aimed at bogus refugees,"
Montreal Gazette February 4, 1988, p. A8.
Allan Thompson, "'No evidence' Somalis practice welfare fraud,"
The Toronto Star November 6, 1993, p. A17.
This quote is from one of several documents and letters headed Employment and Immigration Canada, "Intelligence - St. Lawrence
Area," 15 September 1992. The document itself appears to date from
1993 and is titled "The Somali Refugee Movement to Canada, 1993."
The author's name has been blacked out. It is interesting that, in the
first six months of 1993, of 1559 Somali claimants 1516 were recognized as Convention refugees.
Jean L. Elliott and Augie Fleras, Unequal Relations. An Introduction
to Race and Ethnic Dynamics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall,
Canada, 1991), p. 58.
Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration. Canada and Australia
Compared (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press,
1989), p. 86.
Alan B. Simmons and Keiran Keohane, Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy: State Strategies and the Quest for Legitimacy (Toronto:
York University, 1990), mimeo.
Richard Cleroux, "Refugee bill protest gathers momentum," Globe
and Mail June 8, 1988, p. A8.
Paul Watson, "Churches launch court challenge of new refugee rules,"
Toronto Star January 4, 1989, p. A I. No international rule mandates
such an appeal, though in 1977 the UNHCR Executive Committee
recommended that rejected applicants be accorded an administrative
or judicial opportunity "to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the
decision." See Guy Goodwin-Gill, "Refugee Determination," p. 6.
Lome Waldman, "Ottawa risks collapse of entire refugee system,"
Toronto Star March 13, 1990, p. AI7.
Jacquie Miller, "Government wants to end 'asylum shopping' by refugees," Vancouver Sun December 15, 1992, p. A6.
Geoffrey York, "Valcourt firm on immigrant restrictions," Globe and
Mail July 28, 1992, p. A4.
Geoffrey York, "Bill threatens refugees' rights, churches say," Globe
and Mail July 31, 1992, p. A4.
Calgary Herald July 30, 1992, p. A II.
Canadian Jewish News September 29, 1993, p. 15.
Winnipeg Free Press June 18, 1992, p. A IO.
Winnipeg Free Press February 17, 1993, p. A2.
Dianne Rinehart, "Ottawa offers I % solution," Winnipeg Free Press
February 3, 1994; Dianne Rinehart, "Canada called on to take more
refugees," Calgary Herald January 15, 1994, p. A7.
Alan B. Simmons and Keiran Keohane, Shifts in Canadian Immigration Policy.
BasokiRefugee Policy
88.
89.
90.
91.
Also, Sue Montgomery, "Guidelines
not heeded - critics," Calgary
Herald March 26, 1993; Calgary Herald March 5, 1993, p. A 16.
Estanislao Oziewicz, "Why a change of heart does not change policy,"
The Globe and Mail February 5, 1993, p. A 13.
Judith Ramirez, "The Canadian
Guidelines
On Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related
Persecution,"
Refuge 14/7 (1994),
pp.33-7.
Debbie Parkes, "Amnesty concerned about disappearing
deportees,"
Montreal Gazette August 6, 1989; Lome Waldman, "Flaws in new
refugee law are starting to show," Toronto Star March 23, 1989, p.
A31.
92.
93.
The Vancouver Sun February 20, 1992, p. A6.
Joan Bryden, "Critics growing to accept refugee system despite its
faults," The Montreal Gazette December 29, 1989, p. B I.
94.
According to Goodwin-Gill
the "safe third country" provision has
never been enforced because it represented
a "unilateral
basis for
disposing of those deemed to be some other country's responsibility"
in the absence of agreements among states on this issue. See Goodwin-Gill, "Refugee Determination,"
p. 7.
95.
Christie McLaren, "Refugee backlog plan in a mess," Globe and
Mail February 23, 1991.
96.
As many as 62.9 percent of 9,625 Laotian, 35.7 percent of 51,345
Vietnamese, 29.5 percent of 12,375 Kampucheans
and 27.9 percent
of 24,717 Polish refugees were privately sponsored between 1980-88.
See Basok and Simmons, "Refugees in Canada".
97.
John Deverell, "Refugee system found 'in virtual collapse',"
Toronto
Star September 4, 1992, p. A8; Estanislao Oziewicz, "Refugee sponsor system 'failing',"
Globe and Mail September 4, 1992.
98.
Richard Gwyn, "Traditional
doors close for refugees in the West,"
Toronto Star January 21, 1989.
99.
Moira Farrow, "Refugees find Canada's door not as open," Vancouver
Sun March 8, 1994, p. B4; Allan Thompson, "Refugee screen will
be tighter, minister says," Toronto Star January 27, 1994, p. A9.
100. Gay Abbate, "Approvals of refugee claims drop below 50% in 1993,"
Globe and Mail December II, 1993.
101. Alexander Norris, "Marchi defends Canada's protection of torture
victims," Montreal Gazette February 23, 1994.
102. Alexander Norris, "Review of asylum seekers' cases possible," Montreal Gazette February 5, 1994, p. A I O.
103. Allan Thompson,
"Refugee screen will be tighter, minister says,"
Toronto Star January 27, 1994, p. A9.
104. Tanya Basok, "Canadian Refugee Policy and Practice Towards Refugees from the Commonwealth
of Independent
States," Refuge 12/4
(1992), pp. 11-16.
105. Craig Mcinnes, "B.C. more likely to reject refugee claims," Globe
and Mail May 15, 1993, p. A 7.
106. Moira Farrow, "Refugee claimants fare poorly here," Vancouver Sun
May 18, 1993, pp. AI, A2.
107. Vancouver Sun September 10, 1993.
108. Lome Waldman, "Refugee board takes chances with lives," Toronto
Star June 22, 1990, p. A27; Paul Watson, "Snoozing official adds to
165
Studies in Political Economy
109.
110.
III.
112.
113.
114.
lIS.
116.
117.
166
woe of refugees," Toronto Star March 22, 1992, p. A I; Halifax Chronicle February 22, 1992, p. C 1.
AlIan Thompson, "Canada accepted fewerrefugees
in '92 board report
shows," Toronto Star February 16, 1993, p. A2.
Joan Bryden, "Refugee tribunal chairman accused government bias,"
Vancouver Sun December 14, 1988, p. A17.
Montreal Gazette May 29, 1993, p. A 12.
Lila Sarick, "57 people appointed to immigration board," Globe and
Mail September 3, 1994, p.A4.
Ibid.
Edward Greenspon, "Inquiry planned into IRB dispute," Globe and
Mail November 18, 1994, pp. A I, A4.
Lila Sarick, "IRB fight could be fatal, observers say," Globe and
Mail November 18, 1994, p. AS.
Montreal Gazette February I, 1994. In fact, in response to the criticisms formulated by James Hathaway, the Department of Immigration
issued guidelines designed to ensure that hearing officers are impartial
in presenting
evidence and questioning
claimants. See Globe and
Mail September 12, 1994, p. AS. The degree to which these guidelines
are enforced is as yet unclear.
Alexander Norris, "Second hearing urged for asylum seekers," Montreal Gazette January 12, 1994.