THE RUSI JOURNAL IRAQNOPHOBIA THE DANGERS OF FORGETTING OPERATION TELIC Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 Geraint Hughes ƐƚŚĞƚĞŶƚŚĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌLJŽĨƚŚĞh^Ͳh<ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶŽĨ/ƌĂƋĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ͕ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĮŶĚŝŶŐƐ of the Chilcot Inquiry yet to be published, public debate is likely to focus once again on ƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽůŝƟĐĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŐŽƚŽǁĂƌ͘,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ŵĂŶLJĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ will overshadow the most important lessons for the UK: those that can be drawn from ƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ/ƌĂƋ͕ŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶϮϬϬϯĂŶĚ ϮϬϬϳ͘'ĞƌĂŝŶƚ,ƵŐŚĞƐŽīĞƌƐĂƟŵĞůLJƌĞŵŝŶĚĞƌǁŚLJKƉĞƌĂƟŽŶTelicŵƵƐƚŶŽƚďĞĨŽƌŐŽƩĞŶ͕ ƐƵƌǀĞLJŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚĞdžƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŇŝĐƚŝŶ/ƌĂƋĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƟĐĂů͕ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĂŶĚ military levels. M arch 2013 marks the tenth anniversary of the ŶŐůŽͲŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ /ƌĂƋ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵĞŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌLJ͕ ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶTelic;DĂƌĐŚϮϬϬϯʹ:ƵůLJϮϬϭϭͿ͘ dŚĞ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ĂƩĞŶƟŽŶ ƉĂŝĚ ƚŽ /ƌĂƋ ŶŽǁ͕ ŽŶůLJ ũƵƐƚ ŽǀĞƌ Ă LJĞĂƌ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĮŶĂů ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůŽĨƚŚĞůĂƐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐƌŝƟƐŚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚďLJƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ƵŶŽĸĐŝĂůŶŝĐŬŶĂŵĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ͕ ͚KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Relic’. Media interest in the Chilcot Inquiry has faded, as the group has withdrawn to collate the evidence it has heard, and press reports revolve around the moral aspects of the Iraq tĂƌ;ƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌůLJƚŚĞƐƚĂůĞĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĞƐ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƟŵĂĐLJ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞͲǁĂƌ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽŶ /ƌĂƋ͛Ɛ ĂůůĞŐĞĚ tD programmes) rather than the strategic ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƟĐĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶŇŝĐƚŝƚƐĞůĨ͕ ŶŽƚĂďůLJƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛ƐŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ/ƌĂƋŝŶϮϬϬϯʹϬϵ͘1 It is no surprise that former Labour ĂďŝŶĞƚ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƟǀĞ frontbenchers have backtracked from their support for the Iraq War.2 From the ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ͛ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƟǀĞ͕ƚŚĞŚŝĞĨƐŽĨ^ƚĂī ĂƌĞ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƟŶŐ ƚŚĞ ϮϬϭϬ Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), and there is an understandable requirement within the MoD to ƉƌŝŽƌŝƟƐĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂī ǁŽƌŬ ŽŶ Afghanistan; yet there is clearly a degree ŽĨŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ /ƌĂƋ ĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ͕ ŶŽƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ůŽƐƐ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ ĂƐƌĂ ŝŶ ϮϬϬϱʹϬϳ͘ The army has conducted internal studies ŽŶ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Telic,3 whilst academics, ũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŽĸĐĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĐƌŝƟƋƵĞƐŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ Iraq.4 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ƐƟůů Ă ĚĂŶŐĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ Ă ĐŽŵďŝŶĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ĐŽǁĂƌĚŝĐĞ͕ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ͚/ƌĂƋŶŽƉŚŽďŝĂ͛ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞĨĂĚŝŶŐŽĨŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůŵĞŵŽƌLJ͕ďŽƚŚ in Whitehall and the armed forces, that the lessons of Telic may eventually be ĨŽƌŐŽƩĞŶ͘ dŚĞ /ƌĂƋ tĂƌ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛Ɛ ĮƌƐƚŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĨĂŝůƵƌĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů from Aden and South Arabia in December 1967.5 /Ĩ ĚĞĨĞĂƚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĚĞĮŶĞĚ ĂƐ ͚ƚŚĞ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƚŚĞ ŽďũĞĐƟǀĞƐ ĨŽƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ͛ ʹ ĂŶĚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂŝŵƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ͕ĮƌƐƚ͕ƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƚͲǁĂƌ ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ ŽĨ /ƌĂƋ ĂŶĚ͕ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ͕ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ h^ ʹ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ƋƵĞƐƟŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ Telic ĮƚƐ ƚŚĞĚĞĮŶŝƟŽŶŽĨĂĚĞĨĞĂƚ͘dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƚŽ ΞZh^/:KhZE>DZϮϬϭϮsK>͘ϭϱϳEK͘ϲƉƉ͘ϱϰʹϲϬ denigrate the courage and commitment of the thousands of soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen who served in Iraq, and far less that of the 179 men and women who died while deployed on ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌLJ͘6 Instead, the veterans of Telic deserve to have a proper ĂĐĐŽƵŶƟŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ŝƚƐ ŝŶŝƟĂƟŽŶƚŽŝƚƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ͖ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŝĚĞŶƟĨLJŝŶŐƐĐĂƉĞŐŽĂƚƐ͕ďƵƚƐŽ ƚŚĂƚƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶŶĂƟŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐLJĐĂŶ draw valid lessons that can be used as ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŶĞdžƚƟŵĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛ƐĐŝǀŝůĂŶĚ military leadership has to make choices about whether or not to take the country to war. dŚĞWŽůŝƟĐĂů>ĞǀĞů /ƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƟǀĞ ǁŝůů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŽƌŐĞ t ƵƐŚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƟŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĞĂƌůLJ ϮϬϬϮ to overthrow Saddam Hussein and implement regime change in Iraq, and the ŇĂǁĞĚƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽƐƚͲǁĂƌ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶǁĂƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĂƚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƟŽŶ͘ WƌŝŵĂƌLJ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚLJ for the Iraqi debacle therefore rests with President George W Bush and his ŶĂƟŽŶĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJ ƚĞĂŵ͖ ŶŽƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ĨŽƌ Ă ƉŽůŝĐLJͲŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ideological myopia with a complete ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƟĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐŽŶĚŝƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ /ƌĂƋ͕ ĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĞĚ ďLJ DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2012.750887 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 Mk7 Lynx helicopters from 3 Reg Army Air Corps, 16 Assault Brigade on a combat patrol over Basra, Iraq. Courtesy of AP Photo. ƚŚĞ ďŝƩĞƌ ĨĞƵĚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ^ƚĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ Defense Departments, which hamstrung ĐŽͲŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐLJͲŵĂŬŝŶŐƵŶƟůŝƚƐŵĂŝŶ ƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ͕ŽŶĂůĚZƵŵƐĨĞůĚ͕ƌĞƟƌĞĚŝŶ November 2006. These were all factors which were beyond the control of the ƌŝƟƐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͘7 The veterans of Telic deserve a proper ĂĐĐŽƵŶƟŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ zĞƚƚŚĞůĂŝƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽďĞ ŚĞůĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ďŽƚŚ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ĐŽůůĞĐƟǀĞ ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌ/ƌĂƋŝƌĞĂůŝƟĞƐĂŶĚĨŽƌŝƚƐ ŽǁŶƉŽŽƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƟŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ƉŽƐĞĚďLJƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶĚƵƟĞƐ͘ The historian Charles Tripp recalled that he and other academic specialists in /ƌĂƋ͛ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌLJĂŶĚƉŽůŝƟĐƐƚƌŝĞĚƚŽĂĚǀŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶͲWƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ dŽŶLJ ůĂŝƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƟĂů ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƟŽŶƐ ŽĨ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ͕ ŶŽƚĂďůLJ ƚŚĞ ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ŽĨ internal civil strife and insurgent violence ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĐŽĂůŝƟŽŶƚƌŽŽƉƐ͕ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂŵĞĞƟŶŐ at 10 Downing Street in October 2002, but that their warnings were ignored. This ĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƉŽůŝĐLJͲŵĂŬŝŶŐǁĂƐ ƌĞŇĞĐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ͕ ƚŚĞ &ŽƌĞŝŐŶKĸĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞDŽƚŽĂŶƟĐŝƉĂƚĞ a prolonged engagement in Iraq.8 /ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŶĂŢǀĞƚŽĞdžƉĞĐƚƉŽůŝĐLJͲ makers to have acquired a complete ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƌĂLJ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĂǁĂŝƟŶŐ ƌŝƟƐŚĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŝŶĂƐƌĂ͕ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞdžŝƚLJŽĨƚƌŝďĂůƉŽůŝƟĐƐŽƌƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůƌLJ between the Fodila ĂŶĚ KD^ ;KĸĐĞ ŽĨ DŽƋƚĂĚĂ ůͲ^ĂĚƌͿ ŐƌŽƵƉƐ͘9 zĞƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂƐƚŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐ͕ĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐ and senior commanders presumed that ƚŚĞ ůĞŶŐƚŚ ŽĨ Ă ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ ŝŶ Iraq would be measured in months, rather than years, and clearly a conspiracy of ŽƉƟŵŝƐŵĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽďĞŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůŝŬĞůLJ consequences of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. Thirty years of totalitarianism; the economic collapse caused by two wars against Iran and Kuwait and the ƐĂŶĐƟŽŶƐ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ͖ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ŵĞŶƟŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐƚĂƌŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ŚŽƐƟůŝƟĞƐ ĂƌŽƵƐĞĚďLJĂ͛ĂƚŚŝƐƚŵŝƐƌƵůĞ͗ĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ factors were likely to make Telic a more prolonged campaign than the Blair ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚtŚŝƚĞŚĂůůŽĸĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞ prepared to recognise.10 The Strategic Level /Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĂŌĞƌŵĂƚŚ ŽĨ ϵͬϭϭ͕ ƚŚĞ >ĂďŽƵƌ government took the strategic decision ƚŽ ĂƐƐŝƐƚ ƚŚĞ h^ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ ƐŽͲĐĂůůĞĚ ͚tĂƌ ŽŶ dĞƌƌŽƌ͛ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ůͲYĂ͛ŝĚĂ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ĂůůŝĞƐ͕ ŽƉƟŶŐŝŶƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞh^ͲůĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞdĂůŝďĂŶƌĞŐŝŵĞŝŶ Afghanistan from October 2001. One of ƚŚĞŬĞLJƚĞŶĞƚƐŽĨƌŝƟƐŚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ŝƐƚŚĂƚ͕ĂƐǁŝƚŚŽǀĞƌĂůůŶĂƟŽŶĂůƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJ͕ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͛Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚLJ ƚŽ ĚĞĐŝĚĞŽŶĂƐƉĞĐŝĮĐŽďũĞĐƟǀĞĂŶĚƚŽƵƐĞ ŝƚĂƐŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƟŽŶŽĨ policy.11hƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ͕ƌŝƟƐŚƉŽůŝĐLJ ĂŌĞƌϵͬϭϭƐŚŽƵůĚŝĚĞĂůůLJŚĂǀĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ ďŽƚŚƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĞīŽƌƚƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚůͲYĂ͛ŝĚĂ and its ideology and on the challenges of rebuilding Afghanistan and reversing its decline into state failure. It is therefore apparent that regime change in Iraq was at best a diversion, and at worst an impediment to the key ŽďũĞĐƟǀĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ tĂƌ ŽŶ dĞƌƌŽƌ͘ ǀĞŶ before March 2003, it was clear that ƚŚĞ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ /ƌĂƋ ŚĂĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƟĂů ƚŽ ŽƵƚƌĂŐĞ DƵƐůŝŵ opinion around the world, thereby ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐůͲYĂ͛ŝĚĂ͛ƐŶĂƌƌĂƟǀĞŽĨ/ƐůĂŵŝĐ ǀŝĐƟŵŚŽŽĚ ĂŶĚ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ͘ /ƚ was also likely to endanger key alliances (notably within NATO, and also between the West and states such as Pakistan ĂŶĚŐLJƉƚͿĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů ĐŽͲŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ ŝŶ ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ůͲYĂ͛ŝĚĂ͘ DŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ĂĐƟŽŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ /ƌĂƋ ʹ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ĐĂƐƵĂůƟĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ĞŶƐƵĞ ʹ 55 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 Iraqnophobia were also likely to enrage a number of ƌŝƟƐŚDƵƐůŝŵƐ͕ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞ;ůŝŬĞ the 7/7 bombers) to turn to terrorism. 'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚLJ͛Ɛ ƉƌĞͲǁĂƌ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ Iraqi WMD did not suggest that Iraq was an imminent threat, it was a secondary issue which should not have been treated as a policy priority, and which should have been recognised as a strategic ůŝĂďŝůŝƚLJ͘dŚĞ/ƌĂƋtĂƌƚŚƵƐĐŽŶĮƌŵƐƚŚĞ ĂĚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚǁĂŐŝŶŐƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƟǀĞǁĂƌŝƐĂƐ ƐƚƵƉŝĚĂƐĐŽŵŵŝƫŶŐƐƵŝĐŝĚĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞLJŽƵ are afraid to die.12 ^ĞŶŝŽƌh^ŽĸĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞ infuriated by the loss of control over Basra There are sensible grounds for emphasising the importance of the alliance with the US, not only for the centrality of intelligence and military ĐŽͲŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƚŽƌŝƟƐŚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ͕ ďƵƚ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ƐĞƌǀĞƐ ĂƐ Ă ƉŽƚĞŶƟĂů security guarantor should the UK ever face a threat similar to that of the Cold tĂƌͲĞƌĂ ^ŽǀŝĞƚ hŶŝŽŶ͘ zĞƚ ƚŽ ƋƵŽƚĞ Ă ĮĐƟƟŽƵƐ ^/^ ŽĸĐĞƌ ŝŶ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ĂǀŝĚ /ŐŶĂƟƵƐ͛ŶŽǀĞůƐ͕͚ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƟŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŝƐŶ͛ƚ Ă ƐƵŝĐŝĚĞ ƉĂĐƚ͛͘13 Blair erroneously ƉƌĞƐƵŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĐƟǀĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ/ƌĂƋŝ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵǁĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƟĂůƚŽ ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƟŽŶŽĨĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƟĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ US, yet his predecessors had repeatedly shown that military dependence on ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĂƵƚŽŵĂƟĐĂůůLJ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƵŶƐƟŶƟŶŐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ h^ ƉŽůŝĐLJ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͗ ,ĂƌŽůĚ tŝůƐŽŶ͛Ɛ ƌĞĨƵƐĂů ƚŽ ƐĞŶĚ ƌŝƟƐŚ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ƚŽ sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ;ϭϵϲϰʹ ϳϬͿ ĂŶĚ DĂƌŐĂƌĞƚ dŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ͛Ɛ ĐƌŝƟĐŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞŶĂĚĂ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ ŽĨ ϭϵϴϯ ƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŐůŽͲŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ĐŽƵůĚ ƐƵƌǀŝǀĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚ ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ foreign policy.14&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ͕KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Telic actually undermined American ƉĞƌĐĞƉƟŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ as an ally, and especially as a military ally. ^ĞŶŝŽƌh^ŽĸĐŝĂůƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĨƵƌŝĂƚĞĚďLJƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJ͛ƐůŽƐƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌĂƐƌĂ͖ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĂů ǁŝƚŚ DŽƋƚĂĚĂ ůͲ^ĂĚƌ͛Ɛ DĂŚĚŝ ƌŵLJ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶĂďůĞĚ ƌŝƟƐŚ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ƚŽ withdraw from Basra Palace in September ϮϬϬϳ͖ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ h<͛Ɛ ŝŶĂĐƟŽŶ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ /ƌĂƋŝ ĂƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ŽīĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƌĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĞ © RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2012 ĐŝƚLJ͕ŝŶKƉĞƌĂƟŽŶŚĂƌŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ<ŶŝŐŚƚƐ͕ in March 2008.15 tŝƚŚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƉŽƐƚͲǁĂƌ ƉŽůŝĐLJ͕ ƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚǁĞƌĞƚŽĂĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĚĞŐƌĞĞ constrained by decisions made by US ŽĸĐŝĂůƐŝŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕ĂŶĚĂŐŚĚĂĚ (notably the controversial decisions on ĚĞͲĂ͛ĂƚŚŝĮĐĂƟŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶ of the Iraqi military) and especially by ƚŚĞ ĚLJƐĨƵŶĐƟŽŶĂů ŽĂůŝƟŽŶ WƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů ƵƚŚŽƌŝƚLJ ;WͿ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĮƌƐƚ LJĞĂƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ͘16 The head of the CPA, Paul Bremer, lacked the temperament to listen to his own subordinates or US military ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ͕ ĂŶĚ ƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůLJ ƌŝƟƐŚ concerns over CPA policy remained ƵŶŚĞĞĚĞĚ ďLJ h^ ŽĸĐŝĂůƐ ŝŶ ĂŐŚĚĂĚ͘17 dŚĞ ůĂƩĞƌ ƉŚĂƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ /ƌĂƋ ǁĞƌĞ also hampered by the intense rivalry ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞŵŝĞƌ EƵƌŝ ůͲDĂůŝŬŝ͕ who was elected in May 2006, and the provincial leadership in Basra, which was governed by the Fodila party.18 zĞƚ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŶĂƟŽŶĂů ƉŽůŝĐLJͲŵĂŬŝŶŐ on Iraq was incoherent, and as the ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞ ǁĂƐ conspicuously absent. If there was Ă ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ĐŽŵŵŝƩĞĞ ŽŶ /ƌĂƋ͕ ŝƚƐ ĞdžŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞďĞƐƚͲŬĞƉƚ secrets of recent history. The inadequacy ŽĨƉŽůŝƟĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉǁĂƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďLJ ƚŚĞ:ĂŵŝĂƚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚŽĨϭϵʹϮϬ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ϮϬϬϱ͕ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌŝƟƐŚ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ƐƚŽƌŵĞĚ Ă ĂƐƌĂ ƉŽůŝĐĞ ƐƚĂƟŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞƐĐƵĞ ƚǁŽ ƵŶĚĞƌĐŽǀĞƌƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŚĞůĚĐĂƉƟǀĞďLJƌŽŐƵĞ /ƌĂƋŝƉŽůŝĐĞŵĞŶ͕ĐůĂƐŚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĂƩĞƌ in the process. During this serious crisis, ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ĚŝƌĞĐƟŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŵĞ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶͲĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌLJ͕ :ŽŚŶ ZĞŝĚ͗ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ͕ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ hostages was actually undertaken on ƚŚĞďƌŝŐĂĚĞĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ͛ƐŝŶŝƟĂƟǀĞ͘dŚĞ :ĂŵŝĂƚĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƟŽŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŚŽǁ ĨƌĂŐŝůĞƚŚĞh<͛ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ /ƌĂƋǁĂƐ͕ŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚǁŽLJĞĂƌƐĂŌĞƌƚŚĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ͛ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ͕ĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚ have acted as a spur for Blair and his ministers to redress the policy vacuum surrounding Telic. Instead of making Ă ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ ĞīŽƌƚ ƚŽ ƌĞǀĞƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƟŶŐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJƐŝƚƵĂƟŽŶ͕ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ the Labour government instead looked for the earliest available opportunity to draw forces down and withdraw.19 The unwillingness of both the Blair ĂŶĚ ƌŽǁŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ Ă Įƌŵ grip of policy compounded the confused ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĂůĐŽͲŽƌĚŝŶĂƟŽŶ ŝŶ tŚŝƚĞŚĂůů͘ dŚĞ ƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ southeastern Iraq required the Foreign KĸĐĞ͕ DŽ ĂŶĚ ĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ;Ĩ/Ϳ ƚŽ ĐŽͲŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ͖ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ Ă ůŝŶŬ between the Cabinet and the senior ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶŽĸĐŝĂůƐŝŶĂƐƌĂŝƚƐĞůĨ͖ ĂŶĚĂůƐŽƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĮŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽƐƚƐ ŽĨ͚ƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƟŽŶ͛;ĂŵŽƵŶƟŶŐƚŽĂƚŽƚĂůŽĨ άϵ͘Ϯϰ ďŝůůŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƟƌĞ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ20) ǁĞƌĞĞdžƉĞŶĚĞĚĂƐĞĸĐŝĞŶƚůLJĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͘ KŶĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĐŽƵŶƚƐ͕ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚŽĸĐŝĂůƐ in Whitehall failed to provide this crucial ůĞǀĞůŽĨƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐĚŝƌĞĐƟŽŶĂŶĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂů ŽďũĞĐƟǀĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŵĞƚ ǁŝƚŚ the required resources. One symptom of this problem was demonstrated ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ůĂŝƌ͛Ɛ ǀŝƐŝƚ ƚŽ ĂƐƌĂ ŝŶ :ĂŶƵĂƌLJ 2005, during which he was challenged by Major General Jonathon Riley, the ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌ ŽĨ ƌŝƟƐŚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĂƚƌĞ͕ over the lack of funds and equipment with which to train the new Iraqi army: ͚zŽƵ ƚĞůů ŵĞ /ƌĂƋ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐLJŽĨLJŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ͕ƚŚĞŶ ǁŚLJ ĚŽ / ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ͍͛21 ƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ůĞǀĞů͕ ƚŚĞ ͚ƐƉŝŶ͛ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƌƌĂƟǀĞ ƚŽŽŬ ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶĐĞ ŽǀĞƌ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJ͘ĂƐƌĂ͛ƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƟǀĞƋƵŝĞƐĐĞŶĐĞ prior to September 2005 was treated ĂƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŌĞƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ claims became increasingly untenable, the Labour government emphasised a troop withdrawal in order to pacify backbenchers and public opinion. The ƉƌŽƚĞĐƟŽŶ ŽĨ /ƌĂƋŝ ĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ŵŝůŝƟĂ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞʹŽƌ͕ŝŶĚĞĞĚ͕ƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚLJƚŚĂƚ ůŽĐĂů ŵŝůŝƟĂƐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ >ĂďŽƵƌ͛Ɛ ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ďLJ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƩĂĐŬƐ ŽŶ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ʹ ǁĞƌĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌLJĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ͘22 dŚĞDŝůŝƚĂƌLJĂŶĚKƉĞƌĂƟŽŶĂů>ĞǀĞů dŚĞ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵƌ ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ /ƌĂƋ ;ůͲDƵƚŚĂŶŶĂ͕ Śŝ YĂƌ͕ DĂLJƐĂŶ ĂŶĚ ůͲĂƐƌĂŚͿ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ĞdžĐůƵƐŝǀĞůLJ Ă ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ͕ ĂŶĚ DƵůƟŶĂƟŽŶĂů ŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ^ŽƵƚŚ ĂƐƚ ;DE^Ϳ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚƌŽŽƉ ĐŽŶƟŶŐĞŶƚƐ from Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia, Romania, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Japan. These forces had Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 Geraint Hughes ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŶĂƟŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ͕ which cut across those of MNDSE: for ĞdžĂŵƉůĞ͕ /ƚĂůŝĂŶ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ Śŝ YĂƌ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ďLJ ^ŝůǀŝŽ ĞƌůƵƐĐŽŶŝ͛Ɛ government, which was determined to ŬĞĞƉŝƚƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĐĂƐƵĂůƟĞƐƚŽĂŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ͘ Furthermore, due to the changing ĐŽĂůŝƟŽŶ ĚLJŶĂŵŝĐƐ͕ ƵŶƟů ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ϮϬϬϮ ĐŽĂůŝƟŽŶ ǁĂƌͲƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ǁĂƐ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƟŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƟƐŚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ would invade from Turkey, rather than Kuwait, so military commanders had a ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƟǀĞůLJ ƐŚŽƌƚ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ ƟŵĞ ƚŽ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĨŽƌŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƐŽƵƚŚĞƌŶƌĂƚŚĞƌ than northern Iraq. 23 /ŶϮϬϬϳ͕ƌŝƚĂŝŶŚĂĚĂ ŵĞƌĞϰ͕ϬϬϬƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶ southeastern Iraq KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Telic was also constrained by ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞĚƵĐƟŽŶ ŽĨ ͚ƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ͛͘ ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶŝƟĂů ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ of Iraq in March and April 2003, Britain ĚĞƉůŽLJĞĚ ϰϲ͕ϬϬϬ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ʹ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ 1st Armoured Division and 3 Commando ƌŝŐĂĚĞ͕ďƵƚďLJ:ƵůLJϮϬϬϯƚŚĂƚĮŐƵƌĞŚĂĚ been reduced to 9,000. The campaign began well with the capture of Basra ŽŶ ϲʹϴ Ɖƌŝů ϮϬϬϯ͕ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ƐŬŝůĨƵůůLJ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ͕ ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ ĨĞǁ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ĂŶĚ/ƌĂƋŝĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶĐĂƐƵĂůƟĞƐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ͕24 LJĞƚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ ƉŚĂƐĞ͕ DE^ůŽƐƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ/ƌĂƋ͛ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚĐŝƚLJ ƚŽĂŶĂƌƌĂLJŽĨŵŝůŝƟĂƐ͕ĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚ them the Mahdi Army loyal to Moqtada ůͲ^ĂĚƌ͘&ŽƵƌLJĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚŚĂĚ a mere 4,000 troops in southeastern /ƌĂƋ͕ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞƐĐĂůĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĞĚ ĂŶLJ h^ͲƐƚLJůĞ ƚƌŽŽƉ͚ƐƵƌŐĞ͛ƚŽĐŽŶƚĞŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞDĂŚĚŝ ƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ͘ ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƵŵŵĞƌ ŽĨ ϮϬϬϰ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚŚĂĚƚŚƌĞĞďĂƩĂůŝŽŶƐŝŶ ĂƐƌĂ;ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďLJĂĂŶŝƐŚďĂƩůĞ group) to police 1 million people. At the ƟŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůĨƌŽŵ ĂƐƌĂWĂůĂĐĞƚŚƌĞĞLJĞĂƌƐůĂƚĞƌ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚ ŚĂĚŽŶůLJŽŶĞďĂƩĂůŝŽŶŽĨϱϬϬƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐŝŶ the city. This was a hopelessly inadequate force, and MNDSE lacked the capacity to recover control of Basra, as US forces did in Fallujah in 2004 and Baghdad in 2007.25 dŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ͕ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ͕ ĨŽƵƌ ƐƉĞĐŝĮĐ ŇĂǁƐŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͛ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ in Iraq that cannot be blamed on the ƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐ͘dŚĞĮƌƐƚʹǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ͕ ƐƉĞĐŝĮĐĂůůLJ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƟŽŶ ƚŽ ,ĞůŵĂŶĚ ʹ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝĞĨƐŽĨ^ƚĂīƚŽĂĚŽƉƚ ŽǀĞƌͲĂŵďŝƟŽƵƐ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ be matched by the forces available. ƌŝƚĂŝŶ͛Ɛ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚLJ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ Ă ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶnjŽŶĞŝŶƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ/ƌĂƋǁĂƐ already evident by the spring of 2006, LJĞƚ ZĞŝĚ ǁĂƐ ĂƐƐƵƌĞĚ ďLJ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶͲĐŚŝĞĨ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĞŶĐĞ ^ƚĂī͕ ŝƌ ŚŝĞĨ DĂƌƐŚĂů ^ŝƌ :ŽĐŬ ^ƟƌƌƵƉ͕ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ could sustain an escalated commitment in Afghanistan concurrently with Telic.26 >ŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƵƐƚƌŽͲ,ƵŶŐĂƌŝĂŶƐ Ă ĐĞŶƚƵƌLJ ĂŐŽ͕ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚLJ ŚĂƐ Ă habit of taking on military missions that ŝƚƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĐĂŶŶŽƚĨƵůĮů͕ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞŶƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨƌŽŵĂŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĂůůLJʹŝŶ this case, the Americans. Whilst other h^ ĂůůŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ ƌĞĂĚLJ ƚŽ ƐĞŶĚ Ă ďĂƩĂůŝŽŶͲ ƐŝnjĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞĂďĂƩĂůŝŽŶ͛Ɛ ƚĂƐŬƐ͕ƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĚĞƉůŽLJƐĨŽƌĐĞƐ on missions that would stretch larger ĨŽƌŵĂƟŽŶƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚ͘ DĂLJƐĂŶ ǁĂƐ garrisoned by an Iraqi Army Corps during ƚŚĞ Ă͛ĂƚŚŝƐƚ ĞƌĂ͕ ďƵƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ƐƵŵŵĞƌ of 2003 to April 2007, this notoriously unruly province was policed by only ŽŶĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ďĂƩůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ Ăƚ ĂŶLJ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƟŵĞ͘27 /Ĩ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŽŶĞ ƐƉĞĐŝĮĐ ůĞƐƐŽŶ ƚŽ ůĞĂƌŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh<͛ƐƚƌĂǀĂŝůƐĚƵƌŝŶŐďŽƚŚ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐTelic and ,ĞƌƌŝĐŬ, it is that the ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĐŚŝĞĨƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂůŝƐƟĐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ assessments as to whether proposed military commitments can be met with the troops and resources at hand. The ŽƉƉŽƐŝƟŽŶ ďLJ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶͲŚŝĞĨƐ ŽĨ ^ƚĂī ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ ŝŶ ZŚŽĚĞƐŝĂ ŝŶ ϭϵϲϰʹϲϱ demonstrates that similar decisions can be made within the remit of both professional conduct and the accepted ƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨĐŝǀŝůͲŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJƌĞůĂƟŽŶƐ͘28 The second problem was that the ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƟĞƐ ŝŶ ĂƐƌĂ ƌĂŶ DE^ ĂƐ ŝĨ ŝƚ ǁĞƌĞ ĂŶ ĞŶƟƚLJ independent of Iraq as a whole, this being ƌĞŇĞĐƚĞĚ ďLJ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ďŽƚŚ ƚŽ keep the overall US military commanders ŝŶ ĂŐŚĚĂĚ ĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĞĚ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚŝƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ southeastern Iraq and also to ensure that MNDSE operated as part of the wider ĐŽĂůŝƟŽŶ ĞīŽƌƚ ƚŽ ƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌLJ͘ Two examples involved the botched ǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ĨƌŽŵ ůͲŵĂƌĂŚ ŝŶ ƵŐƵƐƚ ϮϬϬϲʹĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂƌŵLJďĂƐĞƐŽƵƚŚ ŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚLJǁĂƐůŽŽƚĞĚĂŌĞƌƚŚĞĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ŽĨƌŝƟƐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐʹĂŶĚƚŚĞůŽƐƐŽĨĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ /ƌĂŶŝĂŶ ďŽƌĚĞƌ͕ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƉĂƚƌŽů ƚŚĞ ĨƌŽŶƟĞƌ͘ /Ŷ ďŽƚŚ ĐĂƐĞƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ůĞŌ ǁŝƚŚ Ă sense that their allies had not only kept ƚŚĞŵƵŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŶƟŽŶƐ͕ but had also ceded control over Maysan province to the Mahdi Army and its Iranian sponsors.29 dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐƐƌĞŇĞĐƚĞĚ ĂƐĞůĞĐƟǀĞ understanding of its own history dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚŇĂǁƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽĂŶŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂů complacency within the army in ƉĂƌƟĐƵůĂƌŽǀĞƌŝƚƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƉƌŽĮĐŝĞŶĐLJŝŶ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌͲ insurgency (COIN) and peace support ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ͘ džƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽĐŽŶĮƌŵ;ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨŽŶĞ ƵŶŶĂŵĞĚƌŝƟƐŚŽĸĐĞƌŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶEdK ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌzƵŐŽƐůĂǀŝĂͿƚŚĂƚ ͚ǁĞ ŬŶŽǁ ǁŚĂƚ ƚŽ ĚŽ͘ tĞ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĞdžƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ͘dŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐĚŽŶ͛ƚ͛͘&ŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞ͚ŽƚŚĞƌƐ͛ǁĞƌĞƚŚĞh^ĂƌŵĞĚ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ͕ ĚĞƌŝĚĞĚ ďLJ ƌŝƟƐŚ ĐƌŝƟĐƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚϮϬϬϯʹϬϱĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌůĂĐŬŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ƐĞŶƐŝƟǀŝƚLJ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌ ďĞŝŶŐ ĞdžĐĞƐƐŝǀĞůLJ ͚ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌͲŚĂƉƉLJ͛ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐ ǁŝƚŚ Iraqi civilians.30 ^ƵĐŚ ĐƌŝƟĐŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ h^ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŝŶ /ƌĂƋ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ĞŶƟƌĞůLJ ƵŶũƵƐƟĮĞĚ͕ďƵƚƚŚĞLJĚŝĚŶŽƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ŽĨ ĮŐŚƟŶŐ ŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ ;ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ůͲŶďĂƌͿ ǁŚĞƌĞ the previous regime and radical Sunni Islamist groups had stronger support than in the Shia South. Indeed, when the 1st ĂƩĂůŝŽŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬ tĂƚĐŚ ďĂƩůĞ ŐƌŽƵƉ ǁĂƐ ĚĞƉůŽLJĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ͚^ƵŶŶŝ dƌŝĂŶŐůĞ͛ ŝŶ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ϮϬϬϰ͕ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ ƌĂĐŬĞŶ, its soldiers soon realised that service in MNDSE had not really prepared them for the insurgent threat they faced further north.31 /ĨƚŚĞh^ĂƌŵLJ͛ƐůĂĐŬŽĨƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƟŽŶ ĨŽƌK/EŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞ/ƌĂƋtĂƌ ƌĞƐƚĞĚŽŶŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůĂŵŶĞƐŝĂĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ sŝĞƚŶĂŵ͕ŝƚƐƌŝƟƐŚĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ͛ƐĨĂŝůŝŶŐƐ ǁĞƌĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ Ă ƐĞůĞĐƟǀĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŝŐŚůLJ distorted understanding of its own 57 Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 Iraqnophobia corporate history. A careful analysis of ƚŚĞ h<͛Ɛ ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ŝŶ K/E ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ ŽĸĐŝĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůLJ ͚ŐŽŽĚ͛ ;ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ professional achievement or ethical conduct) at this form of warfare. The ĂƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ K/E ǁĂƐ ǀĞƌLJ ŵƵĐŚ ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŝƚƐ ǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ʹ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƟŶŐ ŽŶ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ Malaya and ignoring defeats such as ĚĞŶ ʹ ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ĂůƐŽ ĮůƚĞƌĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞůĨͲƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ŵLJƚŚƐ ŽĨ ͚ŚĞĂƌƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŵŝŶĚƐ͛ ĂŶĚ ͚ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ĨŽƌĐĞ͛͘ dŽ ƚĂŬĞ ŽŶĞ ĞdžĂŵƉůĞ͕ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵLJ͛Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ of Northern Ireland overlooked the period during the early 1970s when its ĚƌĂĐŽŶŝĂŶ ƚĂĐƟĐƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ ĂƚŚŽůŝĐ ƉŽƉƵůĂƟŽŶ ĨƵĞůůĞĚ ƚŚĞ WƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶĂů /Z͛Ɛ insurgency, and when it was obliged to send thousands of troops into Belfast and Londonderry during 1972 to recover ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨďŽƚŚĐŝƟĞƐ͘ƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨƚŚŝƐďŝĂƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚ ƌŵLJ͛ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƌLJ͕ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĂŶĚŵĞĚŝĂ commentary in the early years of the ŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ĂŶ ĂďƐƵƌĚ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶƚŚĞ͚ƐŽŌƉŽƐƚƵƌĞ͛ŽĨƌŝƟƐŚƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶ southern Iraq, as if the mere fact that personnel were patrolling in headdress and exchanging pleasantries in Arabic with the locals was enough to keep the area under the control of MNDSE ƉĂĐŝĮĞĚ͘dŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƟŽŶŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJŝŶ Basra and Maysan from 2005 onwards ʹ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ ͚ƐƵƌŐĞ͛ŝŶϮϬϬϳʹϬϴʹĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ͚ŵŝŶŝŵƵŵ ĨŽƌĐĞ͛ ǁŽƵůĚ ŽŶůLJ ǁŽƌŬ ǁŝƚŚ an overwhelming military presence, and ƚŚĂƚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůůLJƐĞŶƐŝƟǀĞƚĂĐƟĐƐĐŽƵůĚŽŶůLJ ƐƵĐĐĞĞĚŝĨŽŶĞŚĂĚĂƐƵĸĐŝĞŶƚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ soldiers to dominate the ground.32 ͚DŝŶŝŵƵŵĨŽƌĐĞ͛ǁŽƵůĚ ŽŶůLJǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚĂŶ ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ presence This failure was compounded by a fourth ŇĂǁ͗ ŶĂŵĞůLJ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚLJ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƟĞƐ ŝŶ ƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚĞƌŶ /ƌĂƋ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŝŶ ĞīĞĐƟǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůŝĂďůĞ ůŽĐĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ĂŌĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨĂůůŽĨƚŚĞĂ͛ĂƚŚƌĞŐŝŵĞ͘^ĞĐƵƌŝƚLJͲƐĞĐƚŽƌ ƌĞĨŽƌŵŝŶĂƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝƐ ĂĐŽŵƉůĞdžƚĂƐŬ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞW͛ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŽĨ © RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2012 ĚĞͲĂ͛ĂƚŚŝĮĐĂƟŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞͲŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐĂƟŽŶ ŝŶŝƟĂůůLJ ŚĂŵƉĞƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚ͘ zĞƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƟŶŐƚŚĞŶĞǁ/ƌĂƋŝ WŽůŝĐĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ;/W^Ϳ͕ƌŝƟƐŚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĞƌƐ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ƋƵĂŶƟƚLJ ŽǀĞƌ ƋƵĂůŝƚLJ͕ ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂǀLJ ŝŶĮůƚƌĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /W^ŶŽƚŽŶůLJďLJŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶͲ backed Mahdi Army, but also by organised criminals such as those involved with ƚŚĞ ͚^ĞƌŝŽƵƐ ƌŝŵĞƐ hŶŝƚ͛ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ :ĂŵŝĂƚ ƐƚĂƟŽŶ ;ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐŚŽƐĞ ƚŽ ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶǀĞƐƟŐĂƚĞ ƐĂŝĚ ĨĞůŽŶŝĞƐͿ͘ DE^ ŵĂĚĞ Ă ďĞůĂƚĞĚ ĞīŽƌƚ ƚŽ ĐůĞĂŶ ƵƉ ƚŚĞ /W^ ǁŝƚŚ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Sinbad, between September 2006 and February 2007, in ǁŚŝĐŚϭ͕ϬϬϬƌŝƟƐŚĂŶĚϮ͕ϯϬϬ/ƌĂƋŝƚƌŽŽƉƐ ƌĂŝĚĞĚĂƐƌĂƉŽůŝĐĞƐƚĂƟŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƌƌĞƐƚĞĚ ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŐĂŶŐƐƚĞƌƐ͘zĞƚ ͚^ƉŝŶďĂĚ͛ ŽŶůLJ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝůLJ ĂůůĞǀŝĂƚĞĚ the loss of control over the city and the ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐĂƟŽŶŽĨŝƚƐĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐďLJƚŚĞŵŝůŝƟĂƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůůLJ ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚ ƉŽůŝĐĞ͘33 /ŶĚĞĞĚ͕ WƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ EƵƌŝ ůͲDĂůŝŬŝ͛Ɛ ŽǁŶĚŝƐŐƵƐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚǁĂƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ when he ordered loyal Iraqi military units ƚŽƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚLJŝŶKƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Charge of the Knights, between March and May 2008, he sought assistance from the US and not the UK. As such, one should be mindful not only of the damage ĚŽŶĞƚŽƚŚĞh<͛ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJƌĞƉƵƚĂƟŽŶĂƐĂ result of its defeat in Basra, but also of ƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŵŝůŝƟĂƐĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐĞ death squads from torturing and killing untold numbers of Baswaris during the h<͛ƐďŽƚĐŚĞĚŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚLJ͘34 Conclusion ŽůŝŶ ^ 'ƌĂLJ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ͚ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŽͲŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚLJ ŝƐ ĚŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽƌĞŐĂƌĚŚŝƐƚŽƌLJĂƐĂŶLJƚŚŝŶŐ other than an agreeable diversion from ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ŵĂƩĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝĐLJ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ͕͛35 and one appropriate response to the Chilcot Inquiry would be ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ DŽ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƟŽŶ ŽĨĂŶŽĸĐŝĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌLJ͕ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝŶĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ƚŽŝƚƐƚǁŽͲǀŽůƵŵĞƐƚƵĚLJŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂůŬůĂŶĚƐ War published in 2006.36 Otherwise, the experience of Iraq may either be ĞŶƟƌĞůLJĨŽƌŐŽƩĞŶŽƌĂĚŝƐƚŽƌƚĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ͚KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Relic͛ ŵĂLJ ĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌ Ă ͚ƐƚĂďͲŝŶͲƚŚĞͲďĂĐŬ͛ ŵLJƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞŶĂďůĞƐ senior military commanders to blame ƚŚĞƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐĞŶƟƌĞůLJĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞ͘zĞƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƐƵĐĐƵŵď ƚŽ ͚/ƌĂƋŶŽƉŚŽďŝĂ͕͛ ŝƚŝƐǀŝƚĂůƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƟǀĞ role that ministers, civil servants and military chiefs played in this defeat, and ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞƐƐŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚ experience of the Iraq War that cut across all levels of warfare. dŚĞĮƌƐƚůĞƐƐŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚǁĂƌƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ƉŽůŝƟĐĂůƵŶŝƚLJĂŶĚŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƟŽŶ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ŶĂƟŽŶĂů ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐLJ work. Telic was compromised because ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ĚŽŵĞƐƟĐĂůůLJ ĚŝǀŝƐŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ůĂĐŬĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů ůĞŐŝƟŵĂĐLJ͘ dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ƐŽďĞƌ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƟŽŶ ŽĨ ƌŝƟƐŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƟĞƐ͕ĂŶĚĂŶĞŶĚƚŽ ƚŚĞƐLJƐƚĞŵŽĨ͚ŝŶƐƟƚƵƟŽŶĂůŝƐĞĚĞƐĐĂƉŝƐŵ͛ that has characterised UK defence policy.37>ĂďŽƵƌƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ǁĂƐ Ă ŵŝŶŝͲƐƵƉĞƌƉŽǁĞƌ͕ ǁŚŝůƐƚ army generals saw their force as a more ĐŽŵƉĂĐƚ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h^ ƌŵLJ͘ zĞƚ͕ despite the fact that Iraq and Afghanistan ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚƚŚĞƌŝƟƐŚĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌ ůŝŵŝƚƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ϮϬϭϬ ^^Z ƐƟůů ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ h<͛Ɛ ƐĞůĨͲĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ƉƌŝŵĂƌLJ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ĞdžƉĞĚŝƟŽŶĂƌLJ ǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ͕ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ĂůƐŽ ůŝƐƟŶŐĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĐƵƚƐƚŚĂƚƌĞĚƵĐĞƐƌŝƟƐŚ capability to project military power ĞīĞĐƟǀĞůLJ͘38 The sense of embarrassment ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚƐƵīĞƌ ĨƌŽŵĂĚŵŝƫŶŐƚŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶĐĂŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌ be able to undertake more than a token ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶ ďĞLJŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ EdK ĂƌĞĂ ;ĞǀĞŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂh^ͲůĞĚĐŽĂůŝƟŽŶͿǁŽƵůĚ be nothing compared to the obloquy that would arise from a major military ŚƵŵŝůŝĂƟŽŶ͘ ŝĞŶ ŝĞŶ WŚƵ ŝŶ ϭϵϱϰ ĂŶĚ Grozny in 1995 provide clear warnings ĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚĐĂŶŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽƉŽƐƚͲŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů powers that do not acknowledge the gulf ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĂŵďŝƟŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĂĐƚƵĂů strength. The third lesson is that successful ͚ĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĐĞ͛ ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ͕ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ Sierra Leone in 2000, and Libya in 2011, ĂƌĞƌĂƌĞ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶĂŶĚ ƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚŽĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶƐƵƐƵĂůůLJŝŶǀŽůǀĞ a prolonged commitment of troops.39 ǀĞŶŝŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶƐ such as Bosnia and Kosovo, in 1995 and ϭϵϵϵ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƟǀĞůLJ͕ ƚŚŽƵƐĂŶĚƐ ŽĨ EdK ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ ĚƵƟĞƐĨŽƌĂƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚƉĞƌŝŽĚ͘/ŶďŽƚŚŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞĐĂƐĞƐƌŝƟƐŚĂŶĚĂůůŝĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐĨĂĐĞĚ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƐŝŐŶŝĮĐĂŶƚ ĂƌŵĞĚ ŝŶĚŝŐĞŶŽƵƐ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƟŽŶ ŶŽƌ Ă ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐ ƐƉŽŝůĞƌ͕ such as Iran, which could wage a proxy war by arming and funding insurgent and ŵŝůŝƟĂŐƌŽƵƉƐ͘40 Geraint Hughes Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 dŚĞ ĨŽƵƌƚŚ ĂŶĚ ĮŶĂů ůĞƐƐŽŶ ŝƐ ĂŶ ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŽŶĞ͘ dĂĐƟĐĂů ƉƌŽĮĐŝĞŶĐLJ ŝƐ pointless without overall strategic ĚŝƌĞĐƟŽŶ͕ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶĚƉŽƐƚͲĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƌŝƟƐŚ ƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ĚƵƌŝŶŐ KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶ Telic ƌĞŇĞĐƚƐ ŽŶůLJ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ŐĂůůĂŶƚƌLJĂŶĚƚĂĐƟĐĂůƐŬŝůůŽŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨ ƐƉĞĐŝĮĐƵŶŝƚƐ͘^ƚƌĂƚĞŐLJƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐĂƌĞĂůŝƐƟĐ ĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂů ŽĨ ďŽƚŚ ŽďũĞĐƟǀĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĐŽͲŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŽĨƵůĮůƚŚĞŵ͕ĂŶĚ ŝĨƚŚĞůĂƩĞƌĂƌĞůĂĐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ need to be revised. The progression of Telic demonstrates what happens when ƉŽůŝƟĐŝĂŶƐ ĐŽŵŵŝƚ Ă ĐŽƵŶƚƌLJ ƚŽ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJ ŽƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ŽǀĞƌͲĂŵďŝƟŽƵƐ͕ and when generals, admirals and air marshals fail to advise them that the mission they are expected to undertake is unsustainable.41 ƌ'ĞƌĂŝŶƚ,ƵŐŚĞƐŝƐĂƐĞŶŝŽƌůĞĐƚƵƌĞƌĂƚ ƚŚĞĞĨĞŶĐĞ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ͕<ŝŶŐ͛Ɛ ŽůůĞŐĞ>ŽŶĚŽŶ͕ǁŚŽĂůƐŽƚĞĂĐŚĞƐĂƚƚŚĞ :ŽŝŶƚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŽŵŵĂŶĚĂŶĚ^ƚĂī ŽůůĞŐĞ͕^ŚƌŝǀĞŶŚĂŵ͕h<͘,ĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞdĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƌŵLJŝŶ/ƌĂƋ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĂLJĂŶĚEŽǀĞŵďĞƌϮϬϬϰ͘ dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐŐƌĂƚĞĨƵůĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƐĞƌǀŝŶŐĂŶĚĨŽƌŵĞƌ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞh<ĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐ͘dŚĞ ĂŶĂůLJƐŝƐ͕ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ĞdžƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŽƌŝŵƉůŝĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌƟĐůĞĂƌĞ those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the :^^͕ƚŚĞĞĨĞŶĐĞĐĂĚĞŵLJ͕ƚŚĞDŽ ŽƌĂŶLJŽƚŚĞƌh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐLJ͘ Notes 1 2 Fraser Nelson, ‘As Basra Slid towards ,Ğůů͕ůĂŝƌ>ŽŽŬĞĚƚŚĞKƚŚĞƌtĂLJ͕͛ Spectator, 30 January 2010. The Chilcot /ŶƋƵŝƌLJ͛ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚ ĂƚфŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝƌĂƋŝŶƋƵŝƌLJ͘ŽƌŐ͘ƵŬͬх͕ accessed 9 November 2012. BBC News͕͚^ƚƌĂǁ^ĂLJƐ/ƌĂƋ͞DŽƐƚ ŝĸĐƵůƚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ͟ŝŶŚŝƐůŝĨĞ͕͛Ϯϭ:ĂŶƵĂƌLJ ϮϬϭϬ͖KůŝǀĞƌ<ŝŶŐ͕͚ĂŵĞƌŽŶ͛Ɛ&ůŝƉͲŇŽƉ :ŝďĞ&ůŽƉƐ͕͛'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ, 8 February 2006. ϯ DŽ͕ϳϭϴϭϲ͕͚KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋ͗Ŷ ŶĂůLJƐŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ>ĂŶĚWĞƌƐƉĞĐƟǀĞ͕͛ 2003; MoD, AC71844, ‘Stability KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋ;KWd>/ϮͲϱͿ͗Ŷ ŶĂůLJƐŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ>ĂŶĚWĞƌƐƉĞĐƟǀĞ͕͛ ϮϬϬϲ͖DŽ͕ϳϭϵϯϳ͕͚KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶ /ƌĂƋ:ĂŶƵĂƌLJϮϬϬϱʹDĂLJϮϬϬϵ͗dŚĞ>ĂŶĚ WĞƌƐƉĞĐƟǀĞ͕͛ϮϬϭϬ͘ 4 5 Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: The ƌŝƟƐŚŝŶ/ƌĂƋϮϬϬϯʹϵ(London: Random House, 2011); Frank Ledwidge, >ŽƐŝŶŐ ^ŵĂůůtĂƌƐ͗ƌŝƟƐŚDŝůŝƚĂƌLJ&ĂŝůƵƌĞŝŶ Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: zĂůĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚLJWƌĞƐƐ͕ϮϬϭϭͿ͖ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ North, DŝŶŝƐƚƌLJŽĨĞĨĞĂƚ͗dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚ tĂƌŝŶ/ƌĂƋϮϬϬϯʹϮϬϬϵ (London: ŽŶƟŶƵƵŵWƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϵͿ͘ Jonathan Walker, Aden Insurgency: The ^ĂǀĂŐĞtĂƌŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚƌĂďŝĂϭϵϲϮʹϲϳ (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005). ϲ &ŽƌĂƉŽƌƚƌĂLJĂůŽĨƌŝƟƐŚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĂƚǁĂƌ͕ see Richard Holmes, Dusty Warriors: Modern Soldiers at War (London: HarperCollins, 2007). A minority of ƌŝƟƐŚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĚŝĚĐŽŵŵŝƚĂďƵƐĞƐ͕ not least with the Camp Breadbasket scandal and the murder of Baha Mousa. ^ĞĞĂǀŝĚĞŶĞƐƚ͕͚>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƟĐ State and COIN: The Case of Britain, ŽƌtŚLJƚƌŽĐŝƟĞƐĂŶ^Ɵůů,ĂƉƉĞŶ͕͛ Civil Wars (Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012), ƉƉ͘Ϯϵʹϰϴ͘ ϳ EŝĐŚŽůĂƐtĂƩ͕͚ůĂŝƌ<ŶĞǁh^,ĂĚEŽ WŽƐƚͲǁĂƌWůĂŶĨŽƌ/ƌĂƋ͕͛KďƐĞƌǀĞƌ, 17 June 2007. ϴ /ĂŶůĂĐŬ͕͚zŽƵ'ŽƚZŝĚŽĨKŶĞ^ĂĚĚĂŵ ĂŶĚ>ĞŌhƐǁŝƚŚϱϬ͕͛'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ, 21 September 2007; Thomas Waldman, ͚ƌŝƟƐŚ͞WŽƐƚͲŽŶŇŝĐƚ͟KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐ in Iraq: Into the Heart of Strategic ĂƌŬŶĞƐƐ͕͛Civil Wars (Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007), p. 65. ϵ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůƌŝƐŝƐ'ƌŽƵƉ͕͚tŚĞƌĞŝƐ /ƌĂƋ,ĞĂĚŝŶŐ͍>ĞƐƐŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĂƐƌĂ͕͛ Middle Eastern Report No. 67, 25 June 2007. 10 BBC News͕͚EŽWůĂŶ͕EŽWĞĂĐĞ͕͛ broadcast on 28 and 29 October 2007; ƚĞƐƟŵŽŶLJŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌDŝŬĞ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ to the Chilcot Inquiry, 28 July 2010, pp. ϮϲʹϮϳ͕фŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝƌĂƋŝŶƋƵŝƌLJ͘ŽƌŐ͘ƵŬͬ ŵĞĚŝĂͬϰϵϯϴϬͬϮϬϭϬϬϳϮϴͲũĂĐŬƐŽŶͲĮŶĂů͘ pdf>, accessed 9 November 2012. ϭϭ DŽ͕:tWϬͲϬϭ͕͚ƌŝƟƐŚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ͕͛ ϮϬϬϭ͕Ɖ͘ϯͲϮ͘ ϭϮ dŚŝƐĂĚĂŐĞŝƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚKƩŽǀŽŶ Bismarck, and is quoted in Gordon A Craig, dŚĞWŽůŝƟĐƐŽĨƚŚĞWƌƵƐƐŝĂŶƌŵLJ ϭϲϰϬʹϭϵϰϱ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 208; see also Robin Butler, >ŽƌĚƵƚůĞƌ͛ƐZĞƉŽƌƚ͗ƐƉŝŽŶĂŐĞ and the Iraq War (London: Tim Coates, 2004); Robert Fry, ‘A Strategic Own 'ŽĂů͍͕͛Prospect Magazine (Vol. 193, April 2012). ϭϯ ĂǀŝĚ/ŐŶĂƟƵƐ͕dŚĞ/ŶĐƌĞŵĞŶƚ (London: Quercus, 2010), p. 354. ϭϰ :ŽŚŶtzŽƵŶŐ͕dŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ϭϵϲϰʹϳϬ͕sŽů͘Ϯ͕/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂůWŽůŝĐLJ (Manchester: University of Manchester WƌĞƐƐ͕ϮϬϬϯͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϲϵʹϳϮ͕ϳϱʹϴϮ͖,ƵŐŽ zŽƵŶŐ͕KŶĞŽĨhƐ͕ŝŽŐƌĂƉŚLJŽĨ Margaret Thatcher (London: Macmillan, ϭϵϴϵͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϯϰϱʹϱϬ͘ 15 Patrick Porter, ‘Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the ^ƉĞĐŝĂůZĞůĂƟŽŶƐŚŝƉ͕͛/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů īĂŝƌƐ (Vol. 86, No. 2, 2010), ƉƉ͘ϯϱϱʹϳϲ͘ŝŶŐtĞƐƚ͕The Strongest dƌŝďĞ͗tĂƌ͕WŽůŝƟĐƐ͕ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĚŐĂŵĞ in Iraq;Ez͗ZĂŶĚŽŵ,ŽƵƐĞϮϬϬϵͿ͕ ƉƉ͘ϯϱϭʹϱϱ͖EŽƌƚŚ͕Ministry of Defeat, ƉƉ͘Ϯϳʹϯϯ͕ϯϵʹϰϰ͘ 16 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, /ŵƉĞƌŝĂů>ŝĨĞ ŝŶƚŚĞŵĞƌĂůĚŝƚLJ͗/ŶƐŝĚĞĂŐŚĚĂĚ͛Ɛ 'ƌĞĞŶŽŶĞ(London: Bloomsbury WƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ͕ϮϬϬϴͿ͖,ŝůĂƌLJ^LJŶŶŽƩ͕Bad ĂLJƐŝŶĂƐƌĂ͗DLJdƵƌďƵůĞŶƚdŝŵĞĂƐ Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008); Patrick Wintour, ‘Hoon Admits Fatal Errors in Planning for WŽƐƚǁĂƌ/ƌĂƋ͕͛'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ 2 May 2007. 17 Rory Stewart, KĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶĂů,ĂnjĂƌĚƐ͗DLJ dŝŵĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐŝŶ/ƌĂƋ (London: Picador, 2006), p. 119. ϭϴ 'ůĞŶZĂŶŐǁĂůĂ͕͚ŽƵŶƚĞƌͲ/ŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐLJ ĂŵŝĚ&ƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƟŽŶ͗dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚŝŶ ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĂƋ͕͛Journal of Strategic Studies (Vol. 32, No. 3, 2009), ƉƉ͘ϰϵϱʹϱϭϯ͘ ϭϵ dŚŽŵĂƐ,ĂƌĚŝŶŐ͕͚ƌŝƟƐŚŽƵůĚYƵŝƚ/ƌĂƋ ^ŽŽŶĞƌƚŚĂŶdžƉĞĐƚĞĚ͕͛ĂŝůLJdĞůĞŐƌĂƉŚ͕ 59 Iraqnophobia 13 June 2007; Tony Skinner, ‘Denmark ĂŶĚh<WůĂŶƵƚƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋ͕͛Jane’s Defence Review, 28 February 2007; Fairweather, A War of Choice͕ƉƉ͘ϮϬϴʹϮϮ͘ Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 05:11 09 December 2013 20 BBC News͕͚/ƌĂƋtĂƌŝŶ&ŝŐƵƌĞƐ͕͛ 14 December 2011. 21 Warren Chin, ‘Why Did It All Go Wrong? ZĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƌŝƟƐŚŽƵŶƚĞƌŝŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐLJŝŶ /ƌĂƋ͕͛Strategic Studies Quarterly (Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 2008), p. 125. Waldman, ͚ƌŝƟƐŚ͞WŽƐƚͲŽŶŇŝĐƚ͟KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶƐŝŶ /ƌĂƋ͕͛Ɖ͘ϳϬ͘DĂƌŬƚŚĞƌŝŶŐƚŽŶ͕Revolt on the Tigris: The Sadr Uprising and the 'ŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐŽĨ/ƌĂƋ(London: C Hurst and Co Publishers, 2005), p. 9; Fairweather, A War of Choice͕ƉƉ͘ϭϳϱʹϳϲ͘ 22 Sunday Telegraph, ‘Troops May Start Coming Home in Months, Says Brown in /ƌĂƋ͕͛ϭϵEŽǀĞŵďĞƌϮϬϬϲ͖&ĂŝƌǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ͕A War of Choice͕ƉƉ͘ϯϬϯʹϬϰ͘ 23 Stewart, KĐĐƵƉĂƟŽŶĂů,ĂnjĂƌĚƐ, ƉƉ͘ϯϳϬʹϰϬϬ͖tŝůůŝĂŵƐŽŶDƵƌƌĂLJĂŶĚ Robert H Scales, Jr, The Iraq War: A DŝůŝƚĂƌLJ,ŝƐƚŽƌLJ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 68. 24 Alice E Hills, ‘Basra and the Referent WŽŝŶƚƐŽĨdǁŽĨŽůĚtĂƌ͕͛^ŵĂůůtĂƌƐĂŶĚ Insurgencies (Vol. 14, No. 3, 2003), ƉƉ͘Ϯϯʹϰϰ͘ Ϯϱ :ĂŵĞƐ<tŝƚŚĞƌ͕͚ĂƐƌĂ͛ƐŶŽƚĞůĨĂƐƚ͗ƚŚĞ ƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJ͕͞^ŵĂůůtĂƌƐ͕͟ĂŶĚ/ƌĂƋ͕͛ ^ŵĂůůtĂƌƐĂŶĚ/ŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ(Vol. 20, EŽ͘ϯʹϰ͕ϮϬϬϵͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϲϮϰʹϮϱ͖/ĂŶdŚŽŵĂƐ͕ ͚WŽŝŶƟŶŐƚŚĞtĂLJKƵƚ͗dŚĞhƟůŝƚLJŽĨ &ŽƌĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƌĂEĂƌƌĂƟǀĞ:ĂŶƵĂƌLJʹ ƵŐƵƐƚϮϬϬϳ͕͛ƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJZĞǀŝĞǁ ;sŽů͘ϭϰϴ͕ϮϬϬϵʹϭϬͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϴʹϭϮ͘ Ϯϲ ^ŚĞƌĂƌĚŽǁƉĞƌͲŽůĞƐ͕ĂďůĞƐĨƌŽŵ Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ (London: ,ĂƌƉĞƌŽůůŝŶƐ͕ϮϬϭϮͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϲʹϳ͕ϵϯ͖ ƚĞƐƟŵŽŶLJŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌDŝŬĞ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶƚŽ ƚŚĞŚŝůĐŽƚ/ŶƋƵŝƌLJ͕ƉƉ͘ϴʹϭϭ͕Ɖ͘ϯϬ͕ϰϳ͖ ƚĞƐƟŵŽŶLJŽĨƌ:ŽŚŶZĞŝĚ͕DWƚŽ the Chilcot Inquiry, 3 February 2010, ƉƉ͘ϱϴʹϱϵ͕фŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝƌĂƋŝŶƋƵŝƌLJ͘ ŽƌŐ͘ƵŬͬŵĞĚŝĂͬϰϱϬϭϭͬϮϬϭϬϬϮϬϯĂŵͲ ƌĞŝĚͲĮŶĂů͘ƉĚĨх͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚϵEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ 2012. © RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2012 Ϯϳ &ŽƌƚŚĞĚĞƉůŽLJŵĞŶƚŽĨƉƌĞͲǁĂƌ/ƌĂƋŝ forces, see 'ůŽďĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚLJ͘ŽƌŐ͕͚ϭŽƌƉƐ͕͛ фŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŐůŽďĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚLJ͘ŽƌŐͬ military/world/iraq/1corps.htm>, accessed 9 November 2012. Ledwidge, >ŽƐŝŶŐ^ŵĂůůtĂƌƐ͕ƉƉ͘ϱϴʹϱϵ͕ϭϮϵʹϯϭ͘ The Habsburg analogy is taken from a ĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƟŽŶǁŝƚŚWĂƚƌŝĐŬWŽƌƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ University of Reading. 28 David French, ƌŵLJ͕ŵƉŝƌĞ͕ĂŶĚŽůĚ tĂƌ͘dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJĂŶĚDŝůŝƚĂƌLJ WŽůŝĐLJ͕ϭϵϰϱʹϭϵϳϭ (Oxford: Oxford hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚLJWƌĞƐƐ͕ϮϬϭϮͿ͕ƉƉ͘Ϯϴϱʹϴϳ͘ Policy, Policy Focus Paper No. 66, February 2007. 34 Anthony King, ‘Colonel Iron and ƚŚĞŚĂƌŐĞŽĨƚŚĞ<ŶŝŐŚƚƐ͕͛Prospect Magazine (Vol. 156, March 2009); Adam ,ŽůůŽǁĂLJ͕DW͕͚dŚĞ&ĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƟƐŚ WŽůŝƟĐĂůĂŶĚDŝůŝƚĂƌLJ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝŶ/ƌĂƋ͕͛ ĞĨĞŶĐĞǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐ͘ĐŽ͘ƵŬ, 29 December 2009, <ŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚƐ͘ ĐŽ͘ƵŬͬĂƌƟĐůĞƐͲĂŶĚͲĂŶĂůLJƐŝƐͬƚŚĞͲ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞͲŽĨͲďƌŝƟƐŚͲƉŽůŝƟĐĂůͲĂŶĚͲŵŝůŝƚĂƌLJͲ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉͲŝŶͲŝƌĂƋ>, accessed 9 November 2012. Ϯϵ dĞƐƟŵŽŶLJŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌDŝŬĞ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ to the Chilcot Inquiry, p. 50; Thomas Ricks, dŚĞ'ĂŵďůĞ͗'ĞŶĞƌĂůWĞƚƌĂĞƵƐ ĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶƚŽůĚ^ƚŽƌLJŽĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ^ƵƌŐĞŝŶ/ƌĂƋ͕ϮϬϬϲʹϮϬϬϴ (London: Allen >ĂŶĞ͕ϮϬϬϵͿ͕ƉƉ͘Ϯϳϳʹϳϴ͖&ĂŝƌǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ͕A War of Choice͕ƉƉ͘ϮϳϭʹϳϮ͕Ϯϵϭ͘ 35 Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006), p. 374. ϯϬ dĞƐƟŵŽŶLJŽĨ'ĞŶĞƌĂů^ŝƌZŝĐŚĂƌĚ ĂŶŶĂƩƚŽƚŚĞŚŝůĐŽƚ/ŶƋƵŝƌLJ͕Ϯϴ:ƵůLJ ϮϬϭϬ͕фŚƩƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ŝƌĂƋŝŶƋƵŝƌLJ͘ŽƌŐ͘ƵŬͬ ŵĞĚŝĂͬϱϯϮϭϴͬĂŶŶĂƩйϮϬϮϬϭϬͲϬϳͲ ϮϴйϮϬ^ϭ͘ƉĚĨх͕ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚϵEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ 2012; Daily Telegraph͕͚dƌŝŐŐĞƌͲŚĂƉƉLJh^ dƌŽŽƉƐ͚tŝůů<ĞĞƉhƐŝŶ/ƌĂƋĨŽƌzĞĂƌƐ͕͛ 16 May 2005; Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge;EĞǁ,ĂǀĞŶ͕d͗zĂůĞ University Press, 2000), p. 288. 37 This is a phrase used by Norman Stone ǁŝƚŚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƵƐƚƌŽͲ,ƵŶŐĂƌŝĂŶ ƉŽůŝĐLJͲŵĂŬŝŶŐŝŶEŽƌŵĂŶ^ƚŽŶĞ͕The ĂƐƚĞƌŶ&ƌŽŶƚϭϵϭϰʹϭϵϭϳ(London: Penguin, 1998), p. 71. ϯϭ WĞƚĞƌZDĂŶƐŽŽƌ͕͚dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ>ĞƐƐŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ƌĂƋtĂƌ͕͛ƌŝƟƐŚ ƌŵLJZĞǀŝĞǁ (Vol. 147, Summer 2009), ƉƉ͘ϭϭʹϭϱ͖ĂŶŝĞůDĂƌƐƚŽŶ͕͚͞^ŵƵŐĂŶĚ ŽŵƉůĂĐĞŶƚ͍͟KƉĞƌĂƟŽŶdĞůŝĐ͗dŚĞEĞĞĚ ĨŽƌƌŝƟĐĂůŶĂůLJƐŝƐ͕͛ƌŝƟƐŚƌŵLJZĞǀŝĞǁ ;sŽů͘ϭϰϳ͕^ƵŵŵĞƌϮϬϬϵͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϭϲʹϮϯ͘ 32 David French, dŚĞƌŝƟƐŚtĂLJŝŶ ŽƵŶƚĞƌͲ/ŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐLJϭϵϰϱʹϭϵϲϳ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Thomas Hennessey,dŚĞǀŽůƵƟŽŶŽĨƚŚĞdƌŽƵďůĞƐ ϭϵϳϬʹϳϮ (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007). ϯϯ ZĂŶŐǁĂůĂ͕͚ŽƵŶƚĞƌͲ/ŶƐƵƌŐĞŶĐLJĂŵŝĚ &ƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƟŽŶ͕͛ƉƉ͘ϱϬϳʹϭϬ͖tŝƚŚĞƌ͕ ͚ĂƐƌĂ͛ƐEŽƚĞůĨĂƐƚ͕͛ƉƉ͘ϲϮϰʹϮϱ͖ Michael Knights and Ed Williams, ‘The Calm Before the Storm: The ƌŝƟƐŚdžƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĂƋ͕͛ tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ/ŶƐƟƚƵƚĞĨŽƌEĞĂƌĂƐƚ 36 Lawrence Freedman, dŚĞKĸĐŝĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌLJ ŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂůŬůĂŶĚƐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). 38 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), ŵϳϵϰϴ;>ŽŶĚŽŶ͗dŚĞ^ƚĂƟŽŶĞƌLJKĸĐĞ͕ 2010). 39 Andrew Dorman, Blair’s Successful War: ƌŝƟƐŚDŝůŝƚĂƌLJ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶŝŶ^ŝĞƌƌĂ >ĞŽŶĞ (Farnham: Ashgate Press, 2011); Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen (eds), ͚^ŚŽƌƚtĂƌ͕>ŽŶŐ^ŚĂĚŽǁ͗dŚĞWŽůŝƟĐĂů and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya ĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ͕͛Zh^/tŚŝƚĞŚĂůůZĞƉŽƌƚϭͲϭϮ͕ March 2012. 40 Dana H Allin, EdK͛ƐĂůŬĂŶ /ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƟŽŶƐ, Adelphi Paper No. 347 ;>ŽŶĚŽŶ͗/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƟŽŶĂů/ŶƐƟƚƵƚĞŽĨ Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2002); 'ĂŝƚŚďĚƵůͲŚĂĚ͕͚͞tĞůĐŽŵĞƚŽ dĞŚƌĂŶ͟ʹ,Žǁ/ƌĂŶdŽŽŬŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨ ĂƐƌĂ͕͛'ƵĂƌĚŝĂŶ, 19 May 2007. 41 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐLJ͕͛Survival (Vol. 47, No. 3, 2005), ƉƉ͘ϯϯʹϱϰ͖,Ğǁ^ƚƌĂĐŚĂŶ͕͚dŚĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ 'ĂƉŝŶƌŝƟƐŚĞĨĞŶĐĞWŽůŝĐLJ͕͛Survival ;sŽů͘ϱϭ͕EŽ͘ϰ͕ϮϬϬϵͿ͕ƉƉ͘ϰϵʹϳϬ͘
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