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Canada and the World
Prime Minister Trudeau presents Chinese President Xi Jinping with one of the last two medallions of Norman Bethune, from the same set of medals
his father brought to China in 1973, one of which he presented to Mao Tse-tung himself. Adam Scotti photo
A New Chapter in CanadaChina Relations
Robin V. Sears
Among its other highlights, the first year of the new
Trudeau government has altered the Canada-China
bilateral narrative. From the somewhat rocky visit of
Foreign Minister Wang Yi in June to Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau’s rock-star reception in Beijing three
months later, the release of Kevin Garratt in September
and the subsequent visit of Premier Li Keqiang later that
month, it’s been an eventful run. Veteran political strategist and policy hand Robin Sears was part of the Canada-China Business Council delegation during Trudeau’s
visit to China, and shares his take on the relationship.
I
n the Trudeau team’s luggage, on
the prime minister’s first official
trip to China, were two modest little
medallions in aging boxes. If you were
told that they were to be his personal
gifts to China’s leaders, you might have
been persuaded that Justin Trudeau was
really not ready for prime time.
You would have been wrong.
That they were the only two left in the
world was part of their magic. More
powerful was their status as icons of
more than 150 years of history between
Canada and China. Canadian mis-
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46
sionaries were building schools and
hospitals in rural China before Confederation. Canadian business connections with China in banking and
insurance are almost as venerable.
The medallions Trudeau handed to
both Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and
President Xi Jinping were from the
same set that his father had brought
on his first official visit 43 years ago.
They depict in simple bas-relief the
role that Canadian physician Norman Bethune played as the Chinese
Revolution’s military field doctor.
Among some Canadian editorial
writers and columnists, it has become
fashionable to sneer at the emotional power claimed for the “legend of
Norman Bethune,” claiming it is irrelevant to today’s leaders. They
betray their ignorance of Chinese
culture and especially Chinese Communist Party history. It was Mao Tsetung himself who elevated Bethune
to sainted status shortly after the Canadian’s death in 1939. Deng Xiaoping revived it 50 years later.
B
ethune’s status today rests on
three pillars. He was one of
literally only a handful of
Westerners who died working on
behalf of the Chinese revolution.
He was a Communist who served
tirelessly in a combat field hospital
during some of the most fateful campaigns of the early years of the civil
war, following the Japanese invasion. He died as a result of infections
he left poorly tended, determined to
continue to treat the PLA wounded.
It was a mark of Trudeau’s astute feel for the power
of history and relationships in China that he had
seized on this small iconic gift. He judged well that its power
in symbolizing his nation’s and his family’s long journey with
China would be far more meaningful and evocative to
Chinese leaders than something flashier.
ships in China that he had seized on
this small iconic gift. He judged well
that its power in symbolizing his nation’s and his family’s long journey
with China would be far more meaningful and evocative to Chinese leaders than something flashier.
Part of the kudos go to Manulife,
whose history in China goes back to
the 19th century. The PMO reached
out to Canadian organizations with
deep roots in China, seeking their
counsel about appropriate gift possibilities some weeks before the visit.
They asked Manulife’s Peter Wilkinson if he had any ideas. He turned to
some of his firm’s old China hands
who remembered the set of medallions they had commissioned for
Pierre Trudeau’s first official China
trip. A hunt in Manulife cupboards
turned up the only two remaining
that had not been given away. The
PMO seized on the appeal of the
humble medallions immediately, but
kept their existence quiet.
A few years ago, members of a highlevel Canadian delegation to Beijing
were stunned when their senior party
host, in his goodbye speech at the
end of the visit, revealed emotionally
that he still read a few paragraphs of
Mao’s famous essay, “In Memory of
Norman Bethune” most nights, to his
eight- year-old daughter at bedtime.
In Asian cultures—and especially in
Chinese Communist Party culture—
Bethune’s credentials as a selfless loyalist and martyr do not fade.
The Chinese leadership signaled that
Canada was out of the doghouse, after a decade of chill, by moving the
welcome dinner in Beijing from the
Great Hall of the People—a vast and
rather ordinary collection of banquet
halls—that most foreign visitors are
treated to. The new venue was across
Tiananmen Square in one of the imperial dining rooms of the Forbidden
City. This sprawling web of palaces
has some areas open to the public,
but much remains off-limits. None
of the Canadian China hands could
remember a first-time foreign leader
being honoured with such a prestigious venue.
It was a mark of Trudeau’s astute feel
for the power of history and relation-
Trudeau rose in the small dining
room in front of Premier Li Keqiang
Policy
and a small number of invited senior leaders, and gave a short speech
of thanks saying how honoured he
was to be there. He handed over one
small box containing a medallion to
Premier Li and another to President
Xi at their meeting the following
day. He told each leader that theirs
was one of only two left. He then
added that his father, on his first
official visit, had presented the first
one to Mao himself.
P
erhaps it is in emulation of the
American public slanging of
China which is a mark of the
fourth year of every presidential cycle
that Canadian media, and sadly too
many of our politicians of all stripes,
think they should once again pose
the question, “Should we risk having
a bigger relationship with China?” If
they were to analyze American economic, diplomatic, and even military behaviour—and not merely the
regular eruption of jingoistic partisan
rhetoric—they would note that their
work on the relationship never ends.
China is close to the top of the American foreign policy, trade policy and
strategic concern, always. Quiet, highlevel dialogue between peers unfolds
constantly. In recent years, we have
been far more unprofessional and inconsistent in managing the Canada/
China relationship—to our cost.
China is now our second largest trading partner. China, no longer Canada,
is the United States’ most important
economic partner. Canada is close
to slipping to third behind Mexico
as a US trading partner. China will
soon be the world’s largest economy
and our economic relationships are
still thinner and weaker than several
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Prime Minister Trudeau and his wife Sophie with their daughter Ella-Grace on the Huangpu River Boat in Shanghai. Adam Scotti photo
much smaller and less-advanced nations. Yes, we need a China strategy;
and no, it is not a simplistic up or
down choice between human rights
and trade.
Former senior Foreign Affairs official
and ambassador to China, David Mulroney, pleads the importance of the
case for a serious, detailed, consistent
China strategy. Sadly, he says—being critical of himself and his former
colleagues—the federal government’s
approach to a new more serious China strategy has too often been to take
out the old list of issues and projects
and shuffle the order a little.
Too many of the “human rights
first and always” advocates are in
the same class as those who declare
we must only sell Canadian defence
products to those nations that promise never to use them. The Chinese
rights record is not improving fast
enough by our standards. That is has
improved dramatically in the past 25
years is not an achievement we often
credit in public or private. That we
cheerfully ignore the rights records
of many Asian, African and Middle
Eastern despots in most of our public
discourse with them does not go unnoticed in Beijing.
approach in dealing with a sensitive
and easily offended rising power:
you save your starkest language for
private conversation and respect the
crucial Chinese imperative of maintaining face—or lian—with more respectful tones in public.
Too many of the
“human rights first
and always” advocates are in
the same class as those who
declare we must only sell
Canadian defence products
to those nations that promise
never to use them.
Trudeau was attacked by some in the
media for not even mentioning the
Canadian Christian missionary Kevin
Garratt, languishing in a Chinese prison, in speeches in China. He did not
take the bait. Trudeau knew that the
right messages had been conveyed to
the right senior Chinese leaders and
was wisely patient. Days after his
visit, Garratt was released. It certainly
wasn’t done because Trudeau’s carefully balanced approach had failed.
So Trudeau’s visit was framed on
strengthening and reviving ties, not
debating whether we needed them.
He returned to the time-honoured
On another front, about which he
was attacked vigorously from pro
and anti-engagement critics, was the
debate over a free trade agreement.
One former Harper PMO official even
publicly declared that opening such
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48
discussions would be a “security risk”
to Canada. He knows well how silly
such a claim is in reality, but obviously thinks it hits the right buttons with
the Conservative base. Meanwhile,
some in the business community attacked Trudeau for not committing
to full negotiations today.
Another senior think tank writer
claimed that investment by SOEs in
the oil and gas sector was an even
greater security risk—something the
Canadian intelligence community
would snicker at, recognizing that it is
a little hard to steal a mine, a pipeline
or a drilling rig. Our security experts
do raise concerns about technology
investment, as does every advanced
economy, given its importance and
vulnerability—as, indeed, do the Chinese about foreign investors in that
sector in China.
O
n free trade, Trudeau took
the sensible first step of com
mitting officials to “setting
the table” for a future negotiation.
Every serious trade agreement—not
the trivial ones that the Harper government negotiated with small partners in Central America and elsewhere—goes through exactly this
sequence. Private discussions and
consultations by each side with their
stakeholders, joint discussions with
the prospective partner about what
the major obstacles will be, followed
by briefing to senior political leadership about how and when to take
the process to the level of formal negotiation—or not.
‘under the influence’ of the American
government. Would you block their
investments?” To the Chinese, the
insult was even more offensive than
they acknowledged publicly, because
they knew that it would not be equally applied. They knew that a Norwegian SOE would not face the same
threshold tests as a Chinese player.
The Trudeau officials hinted in private briefings that they were considering how to walk back the Harper
legacy on Chinese investment, but
a decision and announcement are
probably not imminent.
Perhaps the greatest surprise Trudeau
delivered to Canadian China-watchers was the length, scale and rich content of the visit. As late as July, Global
Affairs Canada officials were refusing
to confirm that the prime minister
would do more than attend the G20
conference in Hangzhou. No Team
Canada-style business delegation
was being assembled. It was not even
clear if the PM would visit Beijing, as
that would imply an official visit.
Nervous pro-engagement China
watchers knew that there was considerable resistance in some parts of
the Trudeau cabinet to warming the
atmosphere in Canada-China relations. There was a sense among them
that Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion had bungled the visit of
Chinese Foreign minister Wang Yi a
few months earlier.
On SOE investment, the Harper government’s overreach would have
been laughable if it were not so
harmful. Some trade experts say its
final amended set of regulations
would probably not pass a WTO challenge. The Tory hardheads absurdly
stretched the definition of an SOE to
include those corporations that could
be proven to be significantly “under
the influence of a state government.”
Those determined to push the China
relationship back on track, including
some of Canada’s pioneers in creating the first breakthrough nearly
half a century earlier, pleaded with
the PMO to give a clear signal about
the visit and soon. There was enormous relief when the news of a serious high-level delegation—including
Finance Minister Bill Morneau and
International Trade Minister Chrystia
Freeland—with an eight-day schedule for an official visit to several cities, became known.
As one enraged Chinese diplomat
said in private, “General Motors is
Freeland was given the honour of introducing the Prime Minister to the
Policy
Shanghai gala. Curiously, Dion had
chosen to leave town, that afternoon.
In a reprise of his mishandling of the
foreign minister’s visit this spring,
he publicly contradicted Prime Minister Trudeau only hours after the
close of the reciprocal visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Canada,
two weeks later, insisting no discussion on extradition negotiations had
taken place.
His testy exchange with reporters on
the subject may have been a product
of the low profile he was given on
the Li visit. He was rarely seen during the array of announcements and
warm speeches. It was a visit that signaled clearly that Trudeau and the
Chinese premier had already formed
a mutual respect and shared political
understanding.
Chinese leaders are not known for
their oratory, given to woodenly reciting turgid texts. Premier Li gave a
lively 15-minute speech to the Montreal business audience, without text
or teleprompter. He warmly endorsed
the long history of Canada-China relations and clearly enjoyed his introduction to the Montreal Canadiens at
the Bell Centre, where he had donned
a team jersey and stick handled the
puck at a centre ice faceoff with
Trudeau to the delight of assembled
media and players.
It was the punchline to one of the
more fascinating months in the
nearly 50-year relationship launched
by Trudeau’s father and Chou Enlai.
Long-time Canada China hands were
left shaking their heads at this sudden
and dramatic shift only months after
the end of a long chilly decade.
Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears, a
principal of Earnscliffe Strategy Group,
is a former delegate-general of Ontario
in Hong Kong, where he was Ontario’s
chief trade diplomat in Asia, managing
a network of seven offices.
[email protected]