Assessing the promise for democratic deepening: the effects of participatory
processes on Spanish civil society and its interaction with local authorities?
Laurence Bherer*, José Luis Fernández-Martínez**, †, Patricia García Espín**, ‡, &
Manuel Jiménez Sánchez §
The authors have contributed equally to this article -the order of authors is alphabetical
*
Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada, **IESA-CSIC, Córdoba, Spain,
†
Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain, ‡Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona,
Barcelona, Spain, §Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, Spain.
DRAFT VERSION. ENGLISH UNCORRECTED. PLEASE, DO NOT QUOTE.
Abstract:
Participatory processes implemented around the world in the last twenty years do not
lead to critical political and social transformation, as it was expected in the initial
project of participatory democracy. However, this kind of innovation has continued to
proliferate. In this context, we need to look more closely to the political effects of
participatory processes to understand their influence in deepening or not democracy.
Based on six Spanish cases, this study analyses four categories of potentially change
(inclusiveness, transparency, autonomy and collaboration) coming from participatory
tools in the relationship between civil society and local authorities. The results show a
limited capacity of transformation because of instrumentalization tendencies of political
promoters and the distrust coming from social actors.
Key words: participatory democracy, political participation, consequences of
participation, civil society, democracy, empowerment
Acknowledgments: This work is part of the research project: ‘Cherry-picking: the
results of participatory processes’ (https://cherrypickingproject.wordpress.com) funded
by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Grant CSO2012-31832. We
thank the rest of the research team members: Pau Alarcón, Joan Font, Carol Galais,
Fabiola Mota, Sara Pasadas, Carlos Ricos and Graham Smith.
Correspondence Address: Manuel Jiménez Sánchez, Departamento de Sociología,
Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Ctra. de Utrera Km.1, Sevilla, 41013, Spain. Email:
[email protected]
1
Introduction
The implementation of participatory processes (PPs) since the 1960s comes from a
radical project of citizen empowerment. Participatory democracy has been originally
understood as a transformative project: the idea was to introduce more egalitarian
relationships between citizens and state. For forty years now, there is in fact a lot of
hopes associated to ‘the virtues of non-hierarchical and participatory decision making’
(Polletta, 2014). However, the intense proliferation of PPs around the world gives a
least idealistic portrait of participatory democracy (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Even
when exemplary PPs are put in place, political inequalities persist: lobbying and
privilege access to power is still an actual political standard, some minorities and
disadvantaged citizen continue to not be fully recognized, etc. In some cases, PPs can
even reinforced patterns of interactions based on the exclusion, co-optation or
instrumentalization of social actors. In this context, disappointment becomes more and
more sensitive when we speak about participatory innovation.
Having said that, it would be unfair to say that PPs have no positive impacts.
There are a lot of studies which show that PPs allow settling a situation of conflict,
raising the transparency of an administration, or opens the political scene to new actors,
etc. These potential changes are not important as the hopes expected in the initial
participatory project, they represent nowadays some interesting small transformations
that can improve the democratic context. Citizens have gained some influence via these
PPs but it doesn’t lead to the eradication of hierarchical and non-egalitarian politics. In
fact, PPs belong less and less to a radical project of political emancipation but rather to
a reformist approach of decision-making process. PPs do not lead to a global
transformation of the political dynamic. Their effects are in fact incremental and
contextual.
This perspective is truly less appealing. However, because they continue to
proliferate in a lot of organizations, we cannot just be disillusioned. We need to look
more closely to their potential effects by isolating and defining each impact. This would
lead to a better portrait of their role and to understand why PPs continue to be requested
and implemented by a diversity of actors, despite the fact that PPs do not seem to meet
the expectations of the participatory democracy project.
In this paper, we propose to adopt such approach by studying the degree of
change coming from participatory tools in the relationship between civil society and
local authorities. We know that PPs are regarded as tools for the strengthening of the
associative configuration of civil society, the empowerment of social groups as political
actors, and the establishment of patterns of interaction with the state based on autonomy
and democracy (Fung, 2009). They are seen as an opportunity to change the power
relations between civil society and authorities, redistributing power among them, and
subverting dominant client patterns in favour of democratic modes. Other analysis as
the one from Baiocchi et al. (2011), have looked how PPs impact the civil society in its
internal organization. In this paper, we instead put the focus on an aspect dealing with
the external relationships of the civil society, which is how PPs transform the
interaction between local state and civil society. In some aspects, the internal and the
2
external effects are connected: when civil society change its relationship with a so
powerful actor as the state (even local), it would also transform its internal organization.
However, because we believe that PP studies need to look the dynamic of microimpacts, the focus is on interactions between civil society and state is enough.
More specifically, we explore how and to what extent PPs democratize the
patterns of interaction between social groups and authorities by looking four dimensions
of the civil society-public authorities interactions: (one) inclusiveness of policy arena;
(two) the institutionalization of transparency practices; (three) the degree of social
actors’ autonomy and the horizontal multilateral interaction -vs. political co-optation
and opaque politics; and, (four) the prevalence of collaboration dynamics -instead of
conflictive ones. Our analysis incorporates all of them in a framework which allows us
to look in detail different aspects of the interactions between local state and civil
society.
The first section develops these four hypotheses. Second, we present the
research design strategy based on cross-case analysis of six PPs put in place at the local
level in Spain. Our cases include two kinds of PP (participatory budgeting and
permanent advisory councils). The six cases were chosen because they meet minimal
standards to be sure they can have impact: duration in time, space for intense
interactions, minimal deliberation process and influence on decision-making. In the
fourth section, we present and compare the evidences obtained in our analysis. We will
see that our cases display a story of limited political change. On one side, those cases
that revealed as potential democratic enhancers experienced strong resistances and, as a
consequence, were short-lived. On the other side, those cases that endure over time were
limited in their political scope.
Participatory Processes Modifying the Patterns of Interaction between Civil
Society-Public Authorities.
A central concern in the justifications of PPs is the transformation of civil society and
authorities’ relationships, the structure of power and the logics of interaction (Fung,
2003; Fung & Wright, 2001, 2003; Abers, 2003; Baiocchi et al., 2011). In order to
empirically grasp such a shift in power relations (García Espín & Jiménez-Sánchez, in
preparation), we focus on four series of micro-effects regarding the nature of policy
networks and the decision-making processes that remain after PPs. By establishing this
framework of four kinds of impact, we follow the relational approach proposed by
Baiocchi et al. (2008, 2011) to study the civil society-state relationship. A relational
perspective tries to make explicit the ways in which civil society interacts with the local
state. We are specifically interested by the effects of PPs on the formal (effects one and
two) and the informal interaction (effects three and four). For each category, we present
the positive (deepening democracy) and the negative impact of PPs (reinforcing patterns
of exclusion, co-optation or instrumentalization, which are reducing the autonomy of
social actors).
The first effect refers to the structural variation in the number of actors
configuring the policy network (Dowding, 1995; Atkinson & Coleman, 1992) as a
3
consequence of new access opportunities (or barriers) derived from the PPs (effect 1 in
table 1). PPs may lead to the incorporation or maintenance of previously excluded
social actors into the policy network (Wampler, 2007; Hernández-Medina, 2010). But
PPs can also activate closure mechanisms, reducing the number of voices accessing the
policy arena or precluding them in marginal positions. Participants’ selection biased by
political affinities indicates that instrumentalization practices are at stake (Navarro,
1999). More precisely, three questions are addressed: do the PPs favour the entrance of
new social actors, previously organised or not as political actors, into local policy
networks? Does it promote greater diversity of social actors (increasing societal
pluralism)? And, is it perceived as a new (meaningful political opportunity) by social
actors, entailing for instance, an intensification or extension of contacts?
A second effect is related to the institutionalization of transparent practices and
interactions. When new rules are broadly endorsed by the (new) constellation of actors,
new norms of interaction might be institutionalized as those related to transparent
politics (opposed to opaque politics). For instance, changes in the flux of information
prompted by the formalization and publicity of new procedures interaction may reduce
the exercise of discretionary power (by authorities and social actors) and increase the
influence capacity of the powerless ones. As a side effect, decreases in the selectivity of
actors and in the discretionary functioning with authorities may lead to greater
responsiveness (when more requests, in fair competition, reach the policy arena)
(Kuklinsky & Stanga, 1979). A second indicator of transparency is the degree of
publicity of the policy events. It is possible that, after the implementation of the PPs,
transparency get contagious in other policy processes, so, the available information
about what issues, the adoption (or not) of proposals and when they are implemented
increases. This is critical for the public monitoring of decision-making and authorities’
accountability: societal accountability (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014).
The literature also envisages PPs as prompting processes of power redistribution
among actors (Abers, 1998, 2007; Fagotto & Fung, 2006, 2009). For example, a PP
starts a process of sharing decision-making in a specific policy arena and this sharing
predisposition can be reproduced in the future and in other arenas. This third effect is
decisive to grasp any transformation from established patterns, like from those based on
clientelism towards democratic modes of interaction (Abers, 1998; Montambeault,
2011). In consolidated democracies, clientelism at the local level can be seen as a form
of collective pork-barrel allocations (Ferejohn, 1974), not necessarily associated to
political corruption, but undermining the democratic quality of decision-making. Power
shifts coming from PPs may enhance the social actors’ capacity to advance their own
interests and goals in contexts of meaningful decision-making (Baiocchi et al., 2011).
But they can also lead to (or reinforce) situations of political co-optation (Selznick,
1948). Under this mode of interaction, social organizations may be autonomous
internally but still depends on client relationships (Baiocchi, 2008). This happens when
the interaction entails the alignment of the social groups’ interests and aims with those
of the most powerful or hegemonic actors (normally, political parties in government).
Similarly, some actors (usually public authorities) can use the participation of others for
their own purposes (Baker, 1999). Hence, PPs can reinforce (or cover existing) clientpatterns, not only when they bias the access of a diversity of voices (to those more
kindred) (Navarro, 1999), but also when they alter or filter those voices (attuning them
4
to the dominant interests) (Parkinson, 2004). In short, we should look in our cases
whether PPs entail a refinement or adjustment of clientelistic patterns or, on the
contrary, if they contribute to undermine them, by democratizing the civil society and
local authorities’ patterns of interactions.
Lastly, a fourth property of our concern is the degree of conflict as opposed to
consensus and cooperative interactions. Changes in the constellation of participants, in
the level of publicity, and in the distribution of power, may alter the patterns of
interaction also in terms of level of conflict. PPs can bring cooperation to previous
conflictual contexts or, the other way around, they can induce conflict as established
actors (either social or public authorities) resist or boycott the institutionalization of new
actors and practices (Sintomer & Ganuza, 2011; Ganuza, Nez & Morales, 2014).
Momentary increases in the level of conflict may signalise the activation of the,
previously mentioned, mechanisms of power redistribution; but, if it is not addressed, it
may lead to a stalemate and, eventually, to a rollback.
5
Table 1. Participatory processes as modifiers of established patterns of
interactiona
Effects
Indicators
Explanatory mechanisms
(Empirical manifestations)
Inclusiveness of policy Mechanisms of change:
(1)
arena
- Structural openings- closings in the
Openess vs.
policy network
closure of the
Intensification
and -Actors’ perception of meaningful
policy arena
extension of contacts.
political opportunities
(2)
Transparency
vs. opacity
Variations in the degree of Mechanisms of institutionalization:
formalization
- Internalization of (new) democratic
principles
and
rules
guiding
Variations in the degree of interaction.
policy events publicity
(3)
concerning Mechanism of change:
Variations in Gains/losses
- Structural redistribution of power
Autonomy vs. political autonomy
Co-optation
(4)
Cooperation
vs. Conflict
a.
Variations in the patterns of
cooperation/conflict
Mechanisms of change:
- Perception opportunities / threats
Mechanism of institutionalization:
- Normative commitments (new
norms)
Notes: Author´s own elaboration, García Espín & Jiménez Sánchez (in preparation).
In order to empirically grasp the production of those effects and their democratizing
consequences we developed a research strategy based on a purposive selection of six
PPs that were implemented in Spain during the last decade.
Methods and Data
Diverse and average cases
Case-studies are the best way to identify the effects of PPs while understanding the
explanatory mechanism and the transformation processes associated to them. Previous
research on this topic has also followed case-studies approaches, but most of the times,
they have focused on most influential, best practices or exemplar cases (Fung, 2009).
Some recent studies have compared the impacts of similar institutional devices (e.g.
participatory budgeting: Sintomer & Ganuza, 2011; Baiocchi et al., 2011); but no
studies have considered various types of participatory devices and their effect
production in comparative terms.
In contrast, our case-study strategy pursued typical or normal cases (as opposed
to exemplar ones) and it included a variety of participatory devices.1 It followed a
6
purposive case selection, based on the intensity of cases.2 Rather strict conditions were
included to choose cases that were “producers” of significant changes: PPs had to be
durable in time and leading to intense interactions.3 they had to include settings for the
occurrence of deliberation (Cohen, 1989) and they had some influence in the formulation of
policy proposals. Thus, (3) participatory budgeting and (3) permanent advisory councils
were chosen. They can be considered as typical permanent devices in the Spanish
context (Font, Della Porta and Sintomer, 2014). The six cases are located in six different
cities of three Spanish regions (Andalusia, Catalonia and Madrid): one participatory
budget and one advisory council in each of the regions. The participatory traditions of
each of these regions offer also a minimum of diversity within the Spanish context.
Our cases: key notes on the participatory processes
The three Participatory Budgeting cases were initiated by the impulse of local
Councilors within a general movement of extension of this device in the second half of
the 2000’s and within leftist governments.4 They were all implemented under coalition
governments between the main party (Socialist Party) and the minority party (Left
Party), however, while the PBs of Madrid (PB-Madrid)5 and Catalonia (PB-Catalonia)
were supported by core departments controlled by the majority party in power, the PB
of Andalusia (PB- Andalusia) was promoted and supported mainly by the peripheral,
less powerful Participation Department hold by the minority party in the coalition. This
difference in the degree of institutional support is key to understand the difficulties of
the case in Andalusia despite the ambitious institutional design. The case of Madrid (PB
Madrid) lasted for 6 years (5 editions), it was suppressed in 2011 (after the victory of
the conservative Popular Party in the municipal election); it has been restored in 2015
again by the Socialist Party. The PBs in Catalonia and Andalusia were suppressed in
2011 by the new local governments (a left coalition, in the former case, and a new
conservative majority, in the second).
PBs are well represented through the cases from Madrid and Andalusia, which
included an intensive-participatory sketch for open proposal-making, assembly-based
deliberations at different levels, and community engagement for lay citizens (and,
informally, representatives of social groups). The case of Catalonia was a more limited
model of proposals-making in the budget of investments on public works, but it
managed to have a high diffusion and voting rates; in this case of PB, deliberations were
restricted to territorial roundtables at the district level, members of associations and
random-selected citizens.
The AC analysed had different origins. The AC of Catalonia was a personal
initiative of the major (Socialist Party) that got familiar with this model of advisory
council formed by associations and other social figures in Barcelona (it was called the
‘Council of the Wise’ model). The AC of Madrid was originally a council formed by
representatives of associations whose main function was to carry out participatory
budgeting on public works with an exclusive associative character; but it stopped
because of the financial crisis and it became a simple associations’ advisory council.
Both, the ACs of Madrid and Catalonia showed moderated and low intensity in
interactions (2 to 5 meetings in the first case, one to three meetings, in the second), and
7
their role was informative and weakly advisory around a broad spectrum of local issues.
Actually, if one sees their minutes, rather diverse topics (water management, cultural
activities or specific problems of neighbourhoods) emerge in scene, due to the fuzzy
definition of objectives. On the other hand, the AC of Andalusia had a participatory
origin because the associations themselves were who claimed the need of a local forum
to meet each other in 2007. To create it, the municipal officers developed a participatory
process for one year. In contrast to the former ACs, the Andalusian case resulted to be
more intense and focused in a specific area (volunteering policy) with clearly defined
goals and frequent meetings.
Case construction and analysis
These six cases were empirically constructed through desk research (internal rules,
minutes, marketing brochures, local media, etc.) and 51 semi-structured interviews
recorded and transcribed. To ensure a dialogic approach to construct the cases, we
selected informants with different positions in the PP, having a direct knowledge of the
process and its impacts: political authorities (7), administrative staff (11), political
opposition (7), and members of social groups -participants and non-participants (22)
and external observers (4).6 As our analytical approach was mainly theory driven, a
rather structured script was previously tested through an exploratory phase to see how
well it worked with informants.7 After the fieldwork, resultant interviews were highly
organized around the capacity of effect production of the PPs. The processes behind
effects on civil society had to be captured inductively through the analysis of the field
data and the context of cases. Coding process and cross-case analysis (CCA) were
assisted by the software NVIVO®.8 The CCA logic (Miles & Huberman, 1994) is
suitable for in-depth research of a dependent variable as the change in the interaction of
administration and civil society while introducing variation in the contexts (PPs). The
main aim was not only to confirm the (positive or negative) transformations; but also to
show how participatory devices activate different pathways of transformation. The
results show ‘plausible’ pathways by which the changes in civil society get outlined.
8
Results: democratizing effects and patterns of change.
Case studies were analysed following the just mentioned twofold purpose. Firstly, we
focus on tracking the micro-processes which delivered the effects in the context of
cases. Secondly, following a rather confirmatory logic, we proceed by comparing,
across the cases, the four types of effects.
Incipient changes in the local networks.
The most immediate effect expected when introducing new mechanisms for citizen
participation has to do with the constellation of participants and the intensification of
contacts between local authorities and the citizenry. The cases of participatory
budgeting resulted to be more inclusive of new actors, potentially promoting the
plurality of local politics. The three participatory budgeting incorporated new
(previously uncoordinated) social groups as political actors. In the case of PB
Andalusia, for example, the fact that all residents were called to participate and to make
proposals allowed that an informal collective of irregular immigrants living in a
detention centre could make their own proposals (they proposed a project of Time
Banking to exchange services with neighbours), supported by external facilitators and
an advocacy group. In the case of PB Madrid, an informal group of young skaters
presented a proposal for the construction of a skate park and they succeed. Similarly, in
the PB Catalonia and Andalusia, another skaters group got organized to present a skatepark proposal and they won it.
A second type of incorporations was also identified in the cases of participatory
budgeting. It concerns the involvement of existing organizations. For example, in the
PB Andalusia, some peripheral neighbourhood associations take the advantage to access
to decision-making and boost historical needs of their communities.9 In this cases,
previously excluded social actors perceived the process as a meaningful opportunity,
incentivising them to participate.
In regards to public officers, PPs entailed the new establishment or the
intensification of already existing interactions between authorities and social groups.
For example, some associative representatives highlight the renovated opportunities to
meet public officers and foster the relationship with them. In the PBs in Madrid and
Andalusia, members of associations illustrate how the participation of certain local
officers, that usually remain away from the public interaction, as those working in the
infrastructure department, did not only participated in the assemblies, but also kept open
to further contacts beyond the process.10
The AC of Andalusia also incorporated associations which were previously out
of the welfare and volunteering’s institutional network. That was the case, for example,
of neighbours associations, leisure or union groups. Actually, in one of the Council’s
renewal (every four years), 19 associations requested their admission. The attraction
effect was less significant, if any, in the rest of the councils; these processes did not alter
substantially the constellation of social actors engaged and, consequently, they did not
increase the plurality and inclusiveness of the policy networks.
9
However, councils favoured the intensification of relationships between already
known (and interrelated) actors. For example, the Volunteers Council (AC Andalusia),
where the same number of public officials (political and technical personnel) sits
together with civil society actors, facilitated an intense and solid network of
relationships between participants, till the point of the co-production of activities and
campaigns.11 Meaningful and continuous relationships were maintained over time. The
other two councils, which are less empowered, less issue-focused and they just meet a
media of three times per year, also promoted contacts between actors; but in a weaker
way. As a representative of a neighbourhood association, in the case of the Madrid AC,
argued: ‘Obviously, it is going to establish ties, you have the Treasury Councilor’s
phone number and then, you can call him… what I mean, you have a more human
relationship’.Similarly, a member of a sector association –in the case of the AC of
Catalonia- stated the following: ‘Having more contact… sure, there are more ties…
Meeting each other, being able to speak on equal terms… “Listen, if you have any
problem, come to see me… The doors were open”.
Thus, while participatory budgeting opened the networks to new actors
(potentially increasing the plurality of institutional relationships), councils produced
higher density in contacts (incorporating new actors only in the AC Andalusia). The
attraction appeal that PPs produced (either for new actors or for new encounters) rests
on their capacity to create and maintain the perception of new political opportunities.
In sum, the acclaimed outcome of increasing plurality (more interests in the
policy network which becomes more representative) departed from actual micro
practices of inclusion of excluded actors in the policy networks (at least, for a brief
period), and the personal ties and mutual knowledge among the representatives of
associations and the local authorities. However, as we will see in the next sections, the
effects on the configuration of local networks appear associated to other effects
concerning the democratic quality of interactions. In fact, this effect in terms of
inclusiveness seems to be the basis for further effects influencing the modes of
interaction.
Changes in the fluxes of information: from particularistic to societal accountability
Participatory devices may incorporate new social actors and increase the personal
contact among them, but they may preserve or reinforced the traditional modes of
interaction based on bilateral (and asymmetrical) relationships, beyond the PP. In those
scenarios, decisions are conditioned to electoral support (characteristic of autonomous
clientelism, Baiocchi et al., 2011) and, hence, PPs may not break the dominant cooptation practices for the future.
Comparative analysis of cases points out to the diverse capacity of the PPs to
change the fluxes of information, as a key factor influencing the patterns of interaction.
In terms transparency, the AC of Andalusia and the PB of Catalonia diverged from the
rest. Here we explore, first, what particular micro-processes of change are activated in
both cases, despite being different devices, and, second, what consequences these
changes in the fluxes of information had in terms of democratization. While in the rest
of the cases, the traditional fluxes of information tended to remain unaltered, in those
10
two cases the PPs involved changes in the traditional top-down and bilateral pattern
towards a two-ways and open multilateral exchanges characteristic of situations of
greater transparency. Both cases show the potential capacity of PPs to promote forms of
(open) societal accountability instead of particularistic forms.
The AC of Madrid illustrates the traditional mode of communication where the
flows of information are (1) bi-lateral and flowing mainly from authorities to social
organizations, where (2) the access to information is usually prompted by the requests
of social actors while public authorities retain the control over its disclosure and (3)
social actors demands tend to be particularistic (confined to the more or less narrow
interests, when information about a particular project or topic is demanded). The narrow
and self-interested motivation of these petitions of information is reflected in the
following fragment of an interview with a male representative of an opposition political
party (Socialist Party) in the AC of Madrid,12 ‘They [social groups’ participants] tap on
their topics of interests; as they openly justify their presence [in the advisory council]
because of that, “I am here to ask: what about my staff?”
Also, the asymmetric nature of these exchanges is manifested in the following
statement in which a participant and leader of a neighborhood association positively
valued the opportunity to translate queries about diverse issues from the neighbor’s
fellows:
And so, as a representative of my neighborhood, I translate to the
authorities the questions that I collected ‘here and there’, but when topics of
more relevance are at stake, they [authorities] are the one posing them,
informing us and asking our opinion on some particular points. (AC
Madrid, man, representative of a neighborhood association)
Hence, to a great extent, information disclosure still depends on the particular will
(or proactive attitude) on the part of the social actors (acting as social brokers) but
where the authorities keep the final decision on disclosure. Additionally, social groups
tend to demand information about issues of their particular interest. In the best cases,
this may increase social actors’ capacity to pursue surveillance functions over
authorities. However, this type of flows of information remains under the logic of
particularistic accountability.13
In comparison, the AC of Andalusia illustrates a potential change in the fluxes of
information, towards more transparency. Here, in a context of greater authority of the
device (but limited to that policy area), social actors acquire greater capacity to control
the council’s agenda and, as a consequence, the PP has fostered a new dynamic of
multilateral exchange of information. An example of this effect was mentioned by a
female municipal staff on participation in the AC of Andalusia: ‘along these last years,
the truth is that they got a work dynamic more transparent and consensual, that maybe,
it didn´t exist before’.When we asked the former councillor of participation and member
of an opposition political party (Socialist Party), she fully concurred with that vision:
I think, the fact that we attempted that everything was done together;
including transparency in each of the processes carried out and do it
11
together, from the initial design until its implementation, evaluation… I
think that trust may be increased.
Here we can detect a sort of transit towards more transparent politics; however, it
also illustrates the limitations of this type of devices. The disclosure of information
remained within the limits of the social actors belonging to the network of volunteering
and sectorial associations (that tend to perceive it as an organizational resource), with
limited echo among the public at large and, hence, with a limited (although positive)
impact in terms of societal accountability.
These limitations are not faced in the participatory budgeting cases, where we
find evidences on how far the participatory reform might entail steps forwards in the
modification of the fluxes of information and reducing opacity in the interaction
between authorities and civil society. The main reason is that participatory budgeting
entails explicit rules concerning the publicity of the policy process and events. Here,
relevant information is opened by default (not on demand-bases) with fewer restrictions.
Obviously, the opportunities for societal monitoring increase. 14
For example, the PB of Andalusia included a comprehensive policy procedure from the
initial self-regulation to the evaluation of the process’ results. All phases were open to
participation. However, most of interviewees pointed to a parallel bilateral channel with
local authorities, undermining the potential effect of the new device. Before the PB
Andalusia, the ‘face-to-face’ meeting between the powerful presidents of neighborhood
associations and the local politicians was the usual mode of communication and
information exchange, which was less accessible for small, critical and unorganized
groups. So much that bilateral communication persisted and, when the PB Andalusia
was suppressed in 2011, the new local government restored a basic logic of bilateral
relationships (in the form of Participation Councilor’s ‘visits’ to associations) as the
main communicative channel. As an informed observer of the process highlights:
I think they [neighborhood associations’ leaders] got more in the vis-à-vis
with the current politicians. They didn´t understand that the participatory
budgeting did not consist only in getting a park for children; it was a
process with assemblies, voting, formulation of proposals… the process, as
a whole, was very important because you was politically engaging. Then, I
think that for them the vis-à-vis was better. (PB Andalusia, woman, external
observer)
In this case, bilateral exchanges of information were the prevalent mode of
communication between the most powerful social agents and local authorities, and they
continued.
The PB in Madrid did not include an initial previous process of self-regulation
(like in PB Andalusia); however, it established clear procedures of policy-making based
on territorial roundtables and city councils which monitored the whole process. A basic
tool of visibility consisted on a website in which the policy proposals’ evolution can be
tracked from the starting-point, the technical validation, the voting and the final
implementation. For one of the facilitators, ‘publicity’ implied ‘an engagement [of
associations] in the game of participation, without the need of going to the [local
12
politicians’] offices’, meaning that this new open procedure implied the
institutionalization of a different communicative channel (based on grassroots public
assemblies and public proposal-making), in opposition to previous opaque procedures,
symbolized by the private encounter of associative leaders with party representatives.
According to interviews, this horizontal (multilateral) flux of information became
respected and highly valued even for local authorities:
A negative thing, especially at the beginning, was the reluctances even by
councilors of the same parties […] Reluctances can´t be showed but, at the
beginning, the councilor of the neighborhood didn´t believe so much in
these…[processes]. Because he believed more in ‘the neighbor came to me
[the councilor of the neighborhood] and he told me whatever he wants and I
do it, you know?’ This is the way how it was done before, ‘the neighbor
came to me’… There was not a process… and it was according to that
interview with the neighbor. Thus, if a neighbor didn´t go there to talk with
the councilor, it wasn´t done. […] [After the PB] Every political party, all
of them are changing their perception, so, the point is that the neighbors
propose the things. It is not that someone comes here and proposes a
solution for everything. The things come from the bottom to up. (PB Madrid,
man, member of social group)
Bottom-up channels of information continued at work after the completion of the
participatory rounds. This not only increased the opportunities for social accountability
of local authorities and administration, it also favours changes in the traditional
channels of demand-making, as we show in the next section.
The anfractuous patterns towards voice
The introduction of PPs responded to the idea of expanding citizen’s opportunities to
have a voice in local politics and not only to change the information fluxes. Hence,
democratize the mode through which demands are elaborated and reach decision
making processes is a relevant part of the process of change. The PB of Andalusia and
Madrid meant further progresses in that direction. In both cases, we have identified
changes in the fluxes of information (more transparent politics). This was followed by
the subsequent activation of forms of social accountability.
In the Volunteers Council in Andalusia, the voice of social groups became
guaranteed and, actually, it managed to be the leading force driving the design and
implementation of the volunteerism policy in the city. As the representative of an
association illustrates:
Nowadays we cannot come here to say: ‘We want this. So, what is the City
Hall going to give me?’[Client-mode] No, we want to do this, so, we must
agree between us [social groups]. Ok. Then, in what aspects is the City Hall
able to collaborate? Collaborate, it means no money at all. The City Hall is
going to put the stereo. [Association´s name] is going to bring whatever and
[another association´s name] brings something else… (AC Andalusia,
woman, member of a participant social group)
13
This dynamic shows cooperation or co- production practices (sharing resources
and decision-making) where all actors are sitting almost at the same level of
responsibility, with a relevant leadership of welfare entities: ‘the city hall collaborates;
but the activities are implemented by us [Welfare] entities’ (AC Andalusia, woman,
member of social group). A member of the municipal staff calls it “harmony” as a
“working style” different from other city councils. Cooperation, here, is based on the
autonomy of the institution to arrange, consensually, its own activities and agenda.
However, this dynamic is limited the policy of volunteering, a non-central area in the
local administration.
The Madrid PB reflects also this consolidation of a social ‘voice’, the
reinforcement among public authorities of the need to take into account citizens and/or
social actors’ direct demands in order to draw up their agenda (the mechanisms of
internalization and commitment towards the new processes in table 1). Changes in the
practices of agenda building are reported by the representatives of social groups:
Now, the perception is that the things have to be built together and from the
bottom. It has to be a [bottom] demand; it cannot be, as it happens in our
neighbor cities, which a swimming pool is built because it is the Mayor’s
whim. (PB Madrid, man, member of a social group)
In this PB, the changes in the flux of information (bottom-up) triggered a change
in the traditional (opaque and vertical) practices of decision-making. The following two
fragments illustrate the previous situation and the new dynamics:
Here initially, for example, the district councilors did not believe much in
these [participatory] processes (...) [Typically] a councilor was used to a
practice in which the neighbors knock on his office doors as a condition for
addressing an issue. It was on the bases of those personal appointments that
many problems reached the authorities and many decisions were made. If
nobody showed up by his office to expose a problem or demand a solution,
that problem will probably remain out of his agenda… (PB Madrid, man,
member of a social group)
Of course, the participatory budgeting produced a good deal of proposals
that were not approved, lots of proposals (..), and, during the last two years
some political representatives [district councilors] realized that those
proposals were worthy of being considered and incorporated them into their
agenda. They realized that demands coming from the participatory process
offered a good map of the citizens’ needs... and so, proposals that were not
voted enough in the assemblies were rescued and implemented by other
means. (PB Madrid, man, public participation professional)
A similar process occurred at the time of writing electoral manifestos: political
parties started to search in the participatory budgeting’s proposals to build their
programs. Then, as the PB of Madrid illustrated, PPs undermine the traditional
“opaque” and vertical practices of determining the political agenda at the district level.
As the above cases show, they also entailed moving the locus of demands’ making out
14
from the opaque ‘politicians’ offices’ towards more transparent, bottom-up and
multilateral public scenarios.
The resilence of clientelism: between adaptation and conflict.
However, the institutionalization of new transparent, bottom-up and multilateral
channels can find the burden of previous modes of interaction based on clienteles,
bilateral communication and opaque politics. Those patterns are characterized by
bilateral and asymmetric exchanges, in which parties and political leaders dominate the
game.
Indeed, our results reveal the pervasive capacity of clientelism to assimilate
participatory processes even when they do not respond in their origins to its political
logic. The only cases where this pattern of adjustment to clientelism is not detected, the
PB of Andalusia, the process conflicted dominant practices and, as has been mentioned,
the processes could not carry on and failure (it was suppressed in 2011). In other cases,
as the PB Madrid and the AC of Andalusia, we have seen how, despite the presence of
these client practices, the PPs were successful establishing, at least temporarily, a
democratic mode of interaction, undermining clientelism. In this section we follow how
PPs, sometimes, promote this process of adjustment to client patterns.
For example, in the AC of Catalonia, all interviewed actors pointed to a pattern of
continuity. A representative of a social group explained how the City Council “opened
the doors” of the City Hall, because the exchange of personal contacts facilitated future
collaborations, though it existed before. This maintenance-function performed by the
Council was identified by other participants as the reproduction of client-modes of
interaction. Practices as the political framing of that participatory context (the top-down
way how participants, debate topics and appointments were decided) made that the
Council was perceived as the confirmation of the previous network of relationships,
which implied a dominant role for the party governing over decades. This performative
role was accounted by the most varied informants, for example, a member of a
neighborhood association stated that: ‘The proposals [in the Council] are always given
by… It is our fault [alluding to social groups’ lack of initiative] because we consent it,
we only work driven by the Administration’. In this same line, a public participation
professional pointed that: ‘We are not talking about clientelism, not at all…But, what
are the issues discussed in the Council? Issues which are already recoiled by the City
Hall, topics which are already proposed [in the government agenda]’
Though this last actor do not openly talk about clientelism (it can be highly
pejorative), there are direct allusions to concrete practices of political co-optation,
meaning that the local government frames the Council (issues, participants and dates)
according to its own political interests. Thus, the Council had the effect of maintaining
the previous patterns of interaction which were based on submissive collaboration,
where the local government dominates the game by framing the relationship, and social
groups do not take the initiative.
Beyond practices of framing and co-optation, PPs can also promote dynamics of
pork barrel politics (client exchange) as a consequence of intended strategies, or due to
political inertias (path dependency). Even in those cases where there is an increase in
15
the public flow of information and the bottom-up demands, as in the cases of
participatory budgeting, we find a variety of practices which are perceived as
clientelistic. For example, in the case of PB Madrid, where public assemblies and
bottom-up procedures gained legitimacy, for some social groups, there were parallel
client practices. These practices were related to the self-selection of participants
(according to the incumbent party), and to the self-interested way of demands making.
The representative of a social group pointed to how participants in the assemblies ‘only
defended their own projects’, as if citizens hold a client culture which the PB was
reinforcing, making individuals compete for resources. Pork-barrel politics, in this case,
is seen as a new type of self-interested demanding versus more collective and
community-oriented demands.
Beyond these new-client practices, other PPs touch the core of client systems of
interaction. As they are based on opaqueness and bilateral exchanges, when PPs bring
more transparent interactions, some actors can resist and enter into conflict as resistance
to change. For example, the case of PB Andalusia shows how the most powerful
neighborhood associations decided to self-exclude from the policy network, boycott the
PB and open conflict with the Area of Participation. The Federation of Neighbors’
Associations publicly rejected the PB and exited as a protest against the frame of
participation. The organization wanted to be recognized as more representative than any
individual citizens, as illustrates the leader of an association: ‘It [the PB] had to take in
account, above all, who was represented there, I mean, it is not the same [not as
representative] someone who represents four people, that someone who represents 20
people…’According to him, the representative role of neighborhood associations had
not been properly recognized and included into the procedure, as they traditionally had
assumed a central place in local politics. They required that the leaders of these
associations were recognized in the process as social mediators (the informal role they
had developed previously). As they did not manage to get it, they entered into public
conflict. According to a representative of another social group, the reason behind was
the challenge to their previous status as social mediators. Thus, the conflict posed by
neighborhood associations can be interpreted as resistance to change in their roles:
[The most powerful neighborhood associations] saw it [PB] as a threat
because, traditionally, they had been participating through the presidents
and the representatives of their associations which normally meet
[privately] with the current councilor, demanding things, and obtaining
them (or not) according to their previous behavior… (PB Andalusia,
woman, external observer).
These practices of social mediation, based on bilateral, informal and opaque
encounters between associational and political leaders were challenged by the PB and,
hence, conflict and resistance to change appear from those who were used to these
practices. Obviously, when powerful actors (such as these neighbors associations)
decide to oppose the new open, transparent and multilateral channels, these new
procedures hardly get to institutionalize. The PB Andalusia was stopped in 2011 by the
new right-wing local government.
16
The frustrated institutionalization of democratic (transparent, multilateral and
open channels) can be also observed in the PB of Catalonia. The selective
implementation of proposals provoked hard conflicts between some social groups and
the local authorities, damaging the credibility of the new democratic procedure. After
the process, there was an institutional practice of cherry-picking of proposals (Font et
al., 2013), which ended with the administrative neglect and transformation of some of
the PB proposals. Conflict broke as a reaction against the failures in the implementation
phase which was perceived, by some social actors, as unequal public treatment. A group
of young skaters was one the most affected. They won the construction of a skate-park
after a strong effort composing (technically) their proposal, presenting it publically, and
winning the voting in several districts. But the proposal was not implemented, and this
opened a media conflict between the young skaters and the City Hall. Four years later,
the skaters’ speaker stated that ‘the only solution would be to sue them [to the courts]’,
the mayor office argued that the crisis context has casted other social priorities.
However, other PB proposals made by other –more powerful- associations had been
implemented (selective implementation), and this was interpreted as public favorable
treatment to previous clients.15 For some actors, the PB’s final implementation of
proposals reflected the traditional privileged treatment of some associations, according
to the political affinities of the city’s leading party.
Discussion and conclusion
Overall, the general narrative of the six cases is one of continuity and reproduction of
well-established (often client-based) patterns of interaction. In other words, we are
facing the reforms’ failure and non-fulfilment of the democratic promises formulated by
PPs. But, before this finale, our cases unfold along diverse trajectories of partial,
inchoate effects which allow us to grasp the transformative potential and the processes
through which they could have crystallized. Using the analogy of the high striker
funfairs’ attraction, none of our PPs hit ‘the system’ hard enough to raise the lever up to
ringing the bell (success). However, each PPs’ stroke rose the puck up to different
heights in the tower, turning on, for a time, diverse lights, before descending more or
less rapidly to the base (to a non-very different situation to the initial state of affairs).
Table 2 provides a general picture on how disruptive was the implementation of
each participatory device. The ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Limited’ values are based on the overall
interpretation of the information provided by the diverse informants in each case. 16 The
white and shade of greys colours of each cell refer the positive, middle or negative of
that effect. Those colours remind us the lights turning on and off in the tower of the
high-striker (i.e., the more white ‘lights’ are activated the stronger the hit, or the more
disruptive the case).
17
Table 2. The effects in the civil society and authorities’ relationships
Advisory councils
Effects
Participatory budgeting
Transforming capacity of PP
AC Cat
Does the PP attract new social actors?
(potential for the self-organization of civil
society)
(1)
Does the PP open the selectivity criteria of local
Selectivity of the
politics arenas? (greater pluralism)
policy arena
Is the PP perceived, among most of the
participants (social actors) as a new and
meaningful political opportunity?
Does the PP change the direction of flow of
information from bilateral top-down towards
(2)
Transparency two-ways multilateral?
vs.
Does the PP favor the publicity of decisionopacity
making process, and hence, societal
accountability?
Does the PP refined or adjusted clientelistic
(3)
patterns in terms of autonomous clientelism?
Autonomy
vs.
Does the PP undermine clientelism? (towards
Co-optation
democratic interaction pattern)
Does the PP generate new patterns of
cooperation in the local political network?
(4)
Cooperation
vs.
Does the PP generate resistances, such as exists
Conflict
and boycotts?
Trajectory of the PP (duration)
AC Mad AC And PB Cat
PB And
PB Mad
No
No
No
Limited
Yes
Yes
No
No
Limited
No
Yes
Limited
No
Limited
Limited
Limited
Yes
Yes
Limited
Limited
Yes
Limited
Limited
Yes
No
No
Yes
Limited
Limited
Yes
Yes
Yes
Limited
Yes
No
Limited
No
No
Limited
No
Limited
Limited
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Limited
No
20062011
from
opposition
(opp).
parties
2002today
No
2007today
Yes
from
traditionall
y excluded
social
groups
from
established
social
actors,
opp.
parties
from opp.
parties &
leftist
social
groups
20082011
20082010
20042010
As expected, whites and light-grey cells are more frequent in participatory
budgeting than in advisory councils, particularly in main stream PB Madrid and PB
Andalusia. Both show their capacity to potentially transform local politics and
undermine clientelism. Advisory councils are less disruptive, mainly because of the
higher selectivity of the processes (only a selection of social groups engage in these
participatory contexts). However, modest increases in access to the political arena, as in
the AC Andalusia, can be associated with changes in the patterns of interaction.17
Hence, new access opportunities seems a condition to further micro-transformation
processes; but, as the AC Madrid and the AC Catalonia show, the increase of contacts
among social groups may not always be associated to other effects of democratic
deepening, but a modest increase in the information exchange. This can affect local
politics, actually, by reinforcing dominant client patterns. In fact, most of the cases
adapted to and reinforced client- practices, though, interestingly, in two cases, AC
Andalusia and the PB Madrid, we find also alternative patterns, undermining
clientelism.
18
Table 2 also shows that processes always experience resistances, either from
insiders (well established social actors) or from outsiders (peripheral actors). In some
cases, we find dominant social actors resisting as they perceive new participatory
devices as threats. This clearly occurred in the PB Andalusia: at the beginning of the
process, social sectors which were previously un-organized were included but
resistances eventually contributed to the failure of the process. We also find resistances
from other flanks, for example, opposition parties and leftist social groups in the PB
Madrid, as they perceived participatory devices as mechanisms to adjust or extent
clientelistic networks.
Overall, our cases display a story of limited and micro political change. On one
side, those cases that revealed as potential democratic enhancers (mostly participatory
budgets) experienced strong resistances and, as a consequence, were short-lived. On the
other side, those cases that endure over time (two of the advisory councils), either were
limited in their political scope (AC Andalusia) or showed limited transforming capacity
(AC Madrid) and, in the best of the cases, can be considered as improving patterns of
autonomous clientelism. The more disrupting the PP, greater the resistances are.
However, resistances did not hinge their roots, in all the instances, on the established
institutions, since PPs were also contested from the civil society. Different PPs promote
different micro-processes of transformation; similarly, different types of social actors
promote (or oppose) differently to changes in the patterns of interaction.
The variety of processes and developments, allows us not only to confirm the
limited democratic transformative capacity of the most ordinary PPs but also to
recognise their potentiality, through the disclosure of processes. Two processes seem of
particular relevance. The first is associated to the increase of pluralism: associated to
the capacity of participatory devices to transform the configuration of local political
networks by reducing the selectivity of entrance and strengthening the sociability
(the contacts) among social actors. As far as PPs promoted and are perceived as
meaningful opportunities, previously non-mobilised social groups (and/or previously
excluded social actors) may enter the arena of institutional politics bringing new issues
and increasing pluralism. The second change is connected to the activation of forms of
societal accountability (as oppose to particular accountability). At least as importantly
as the incorporation of new actors and the establishment of meaningful contacts are the
modifications in the nature of the information flows. The generation of dynamics of
bi-directional and multilateral flows of information is clearly connected to the degree of
information disclosure foster by the PP. As in the AC Andalusia and, more broadly, in
the PB Madrid is shown, transparency along the processes at different stages, not only
promoted societal accountability, but it also activated sustainable modes of
authorities’ response to public demands, alternative to those based on clientelism.
However, for this general transformation movement to occur, PPs have to
surmount critical resistances and inertias. They have to avoid, on the one hand, the
instrumentalization tendencies of political promoters and on the other the resistances
and distrust of established actors and opposition groups. Otherwise, as already
mentioned, they either perish (as our PB cases and many other experiences in Spain) or
endure reinforcing autonomous clientelism.
19
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22
Annex I. Features of the Cases
Participatory Process
City and Period
Who participates?
Selection of participants
How to participate?
Intensity, duration, decision-making and bodies
To what extent?
Policy stages
PB-Andalusia
100.000 inhabit. Aprox.
Participatory Budgeting
2008-2010 (2ed.)
Open to all citizens (over the age of 14)
Self-selected citizens
Self-selected organizations (participation as individuals)
Number: 100-200 participants
Intense interaction / short period of time
Aggregation (final voting), bargaining and deliberation
Bodies: Assemblies on regulation, motion groups, zone
assemblies, city councils
PB-Madrid
150.000 inhabit. Aprox.
Participatory Budgeting
2004 -2010 (5ed.)
Open to all citizens (over the age of 14) and associations;
Public administrators and workers as facilitators.
Number: from 1004 (2004) to 3939 (2010) participants
PB-Catalonia
200.000 inhabit. Aprox.
Participated Budget
2008-2011 (1ed. in this
multiyear format)
AC-Andalusia
200.000 inhabit. Aprox.
Volunteering Council
2007 - Today
Open to all citizens
Associations and stakeholders
Citizens randomly chosen
Public officers
Number: 7640 (voters)
Mayor, councilors, political parties and trade unions Citizens
randomly chosen (n=2)
Representatives of neighborhood associations and other
associations
Experts (university and institutions)
Number: 19-35 participants
Mayor, councilor of participation and political parties;
Representatives of neighbors’ associations (n=3); and others
associations (n=14)
Number: 13-19 participants.
Intense interaction / extended over years
Aggregation (final voting), bargaining, deliberation and
virtual participation
Bodies: territorial roundtables, zone assemblies, council
and coordinating commission
Intense interaction/ short period of time (1 year)
Deliberation (prioritization), aggregation (final voting),
virtual participation and follow-up
Bodies: territorial roundtables, and city council
Moderate interaction / extended over years
Several meetings per year
Combination of bargaining and deliberation
Predominance of consensus logic
Bodies: council and punctual commissions
Direct authority (decision) over the allocation of
resources (concrete proposals).
Proposition,
decision-making,
control,
implementation and evaluation
Low rate of implementation
Estimated 230.000 euros in 2009
Direct authority (decision) over the allocation of
resources (concrete proposals).
Proposition, decision-making, programming,
implementation and follow-up
1,2 mill in 2004, 3 mill in 2010
Direct authority (decision) over allocation of
resources (concrete proposals)
Proposition, prioritization of proposals, decisionmaking and follow-up
Investments budget (4 mill in 2009)
Advisory function (recommendations on
volunteerism) and direct power (co-decision
strategies, campaigns).
Diagnosis, programming, decision-making,
implementation and evaluation
Moderate interaction / extender over years
Between 2 – 5 meeting per year
Bodies: councils and commissions
Advisory function (formulate proposals on a broad
variety of issues) and deliver recommendations to
the government bodies such as the plenary
Low interaction/ extended over years
One meeting per year and two special processes (more
intense) on city trade and culture
Information exchange, deliberation and brainstorming
Bodies: council and commissions
Advisory function (formulate proposals on a broad
variety of issues) and deliver recommendations to
the government bodies such as the plenary
AC-Madrid
45.000 inhabit. Aprox.
Advisory Associations
Council
2002 - today
AC-Catalonia
45.000 inhabit. Aprox.
City Council
2006 -2011
Mayor, Participation Councilor, political parties and trade
unions; Citizens randomly chosen (n=10); Representatives of
neighbors’ associations (n=5); other associations
(n=10);representatives sectorial councils; VIP chosen by
major (n=5)
Number: 40-50 participants
23
Notes
1 The sampling frame, from which our case studies were selected, is MECPALO Database on local
participatory mechanisms in Southern Europe (see Galais et al., 2012).
2 ‘An intensity sample consists of information-rich cases that manifest the phenomenon of interest
intensely (but not extremely). Extreme or deviant cases may be so unusual as to distort the manifestation
of the phenomenon of interest’ (Patton, M. 1990:171).
3 We excluded non-permanent designs (e.g. deliberative surveys) and focus instead on permanent devices
as advisory councils and participatory budgeting (with at least two rounds of participation).
4 Further information about context is included in the Annex.
5 A basic nomenclature has been established for cases to respect anonymity: PB Andalusia corresponds to
a mid-size city in Andalusia, PB Madrid and PB-Catalonia for the cases selected in those regions. For
advisory councils (ACs) the logic is similar. None of the PPs happened in the capital cities of Andalusia,
Madrid or Catalonia, but in mid-size cities which are depicted later on.
6 We conducted about 9 interviews (45-60’ each). The profiles were (selected for their ability to give
precise information of the PP): representatives (reps.) of a recently-constituted social group; reps. of a
non-participant social group; reps. members of a preexisting social group; member of a non-participant
social group; public participation professionals (PPP); administration staff/public officers (in the specific
policy area); political authorities (party promoter); political authorities (in that specific policy area); party
opposition representatives; and external observers (e.g.an academic, a journalist or a socially engaged
person).
7 The results of the exploratory phase are based on expert academic and practitioner interviews and group
interviews (see Jiménez Sánchez & García Espín, 2015).
8 Inter-personal reliability test was done among the researchers who coded the interviews. A first case
was code by all the coders and, after, the inter-personal reliability was checked. The disagreements were
analysed and decisions were made on the specific definitions of codes and examples were included in the
definitions. After that, the rest of cases were coded.
9 The fact that there were prioritization criteria of ‘social justice’ and “historic claim” for proposals made
peripheral neighborhood associations especially well situated to place their proposals.
10 Administration officers also find a political opportunity to find solutions to longstanding problems. An
observer of the PB Madrid narrated how the local administration also took the PP as an opportunity to
solve longstanding and stuck demands as an exercise of ‘administrative activism’:
‘The [Public] Administration rather than prioritize new issues, I would say that it was generated an
“administrative activism” to solve problems which did not find a solution since a long time ago’ (PB
Madrid, man, external observer).
11 Actually, the equal number of both administrative or authorities and social groups is a requirement set
in the Volunteering Andalusian Law. This point is one of the most criticised by political authorities and
administrative personnel because it means that somehow you are forcing administrative officers to attend
the Council though they do not feel interested at all.
12 These self-interested demands of information do not follow any clear path towards policy-making.
They are a public “voicing” of particular demands. After being voiced in the advisory council, these
petitions may acquire more visibility or more legitimacy, as “publicly” certified, but they do not change
the flux of information, but reinforce the pre-existing (bilateral) patterns of communication.
13 Further, in the cases of the advisory councils, the provision of information does not guarantee publicity
and disposal to large audiences.
14 The information is however circumscribed to those specific issues and proposals that are subject of
decision in the process. A similar constraint is found in the AC of Andalusia, where the flux of
information remained bounded to issues within the voluntary policy topic.
15 As a public officer explained: ‘If in a neighborhood [the process] has results but not in the mine, that
creates a perception that the City Hall must have a more equal treatment…’
16 Once the coding process was finished, the two researchers who carried out the fieldwork displayed the
results (interviews’ quotes) for each one of the codes. Three researchers read these results and answered
individually a set of questions (see table 2) on the occurrence or not, including an intermediate option
(limited), of changes towards the effects that drove our enquiry into the cases. One of these three
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researchers compared the answers and those aspects in which there was not an initial agreement were
debated until consensus.
17 As mentioned, the origin of the AC was a participatory processes that entailed the incorporation of
previously excluded actors.
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