W. Wilson Goode: The Black Mayor as Urban Entrepreneur
Author(s): John F. Bauman
Source: The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 141-158
Published by: Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Inc.
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W. WILSON GOODE:THE BLACK
MAYOR AS URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
By
John F. Bauman*
Philadelphia'sblack communitytook root two centuriesago in the late 18th century when the city harboredone of young America'slargest free black populations.
Yet, it was not until 1983, after Los Angeles, Detroit, Newark, and Chicago,that
Philadelphiaelected a black mayor, W. Wilson Goode. Goode'smayoralty,19831990 [a year and a half of his second term remainas this is written]began auspiciously;it shortlybogged down in controversy.The PhiladelphiaInquirerin January 1990 questionedwhetheranotherblack candidatecould win the city's mayoralty, "not after Wilson Goode."1The ecstasy and any of Goode'spolitical career
must be understoodnot only withinthe contextof the historyof Philadelphia'slarge
and economicallyoppressedblack communitythat came of age politically in the
the postwartrans1980s, but also within the frameworkof urbanpostindustrialism,
formationof Philadelphiafrom a centerof manufacturingto a centerof information
processingand corporatemanagement.a
Mayor Goode confrontedthe enormous,schizophrenetictask of trying to operate
effectivelyin both worlds.Yet, he was much more comfortablein the worldof postindustrialeconomicsthan the worldof politics.Unlike Chicago'sHaroldWashington or Los Angeles's Thomas Bradley,Goode won the Philadelphiamayor'soffice
not as a seasonedpoliticiangroomedin precinctand ward level politics, but as a
a modernurbanentrepreneur.In Philadelphiathe black expemanager-technocrat,
rience had by 1980 producedactive black neighborhoodpoliticianssuch as John
Street, CharlesBowser,and LucienBlackwell,and a coterieof strongreligiousleaders active politically,but few politiciansof the Washingtonor Bradleystripeable to
use the establishedpolitical machineryto forge effectivepoliticalcoalitions.3
Goode'sroute to the mayor'sofficestartedwith the bonanzaof communityaction
programscreated under PresidentLyndon Baines Johnson'sGreat Society. Those
programsenabledbrightcollege educatedblackssuch as WilsonGoodeto engagein
that is communityorganizingto secure federal housing
political entrepreneurship,
and other urban developmentfunds for neighborhoodbetterment.When in the
1980s Philadelphia'sblack populationreached "critical mass" politically, Goode
stood at the thresholdnot as a politician,but as a shrewdmanager-entrepreneur,
a
technocrat,highly adept at leveragingpublic and privatedollarson behalf of community growth. Goode'scommunityaction credentialsappealedto the large black
skills appealedto the city's white business
community;his manager-entrepreneurial
establishment.4Goode,therefore,fit the moldof the modernmayoras "development
* John F. Baumanis Professorof Historyat CaliforniaUniversityof Pennsylvania
142
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
officer",to use David Goldfield'swords,whose main job was to orchestratecentral
city growth in a multi-centeredurban region.5However,as this chapter explains,
the black mayoras urbanentrepreneurconfronteda peculiarlyenigmaticchallenge
- to promoteeconomicdevelopmentgoals while livingup to the popularimage of the
black mayoras naturallysensitiveto urbansocial problems,in Goode'swordsto the
"humandimension." Meeting both the economicdevelopmentand the social needs
of the ethnicallydiverseand raciallypolarizedmetropolishas historicallychallenged
and confoundedurbanpoliticalleaders.As this study demonstrates,it was particularly onerousfor a black mayor lacking adequatepolitical resources.
Philadelphia in 1983
In 1983, the year Willie Wilson Goode was elected the 126th and first black
mayor of the city, Philadelphia,like other rust belt cities, was still enduringthe
agonizing transformationfrom industrialismto postindustrialism.Economically,it
barely resembledthe place where almost forty years earlierjubilant Philadelphians
celebratedthe end of World War II. The QuakerCity at that time boasteda sizable, albeit aging, manufacturingbase, including Disston Saw, Stetson Hat, the
BromleyCarpet Mills, and ContinentalCan. By 1983, most of that manufacturing
base had disappeared.Between1947 and 1970 the centralcities of America'sthirtythree most populousmetropolitanareas lost 80,000 manufacturingjobs. Duringthe
1970s Philadelphiaalone lost 150,000 manufacturingjobs. Manufacturingjobs declined 47 percent in the center city and Northern Libertieswhere once garment
mills, leather, food processing,and metal manufactoriesflourished.The trend continuedthroughoutthe 1970s. Althoughthe city then still had a largerproportionof
its workersin manufacturing(28.1 percent)than did the nation as a whole, a decade later in 1980 the proportionhad droppedto under21 percent,a full percentage
point below the nationalaverageof 22 percent.7
Ratherthan a manufacturingcenter,Philadelphiain 1983 portrayeditself as "an
intensedynamicmarketplacefor people,goods,services,ideas, information,and real
estate."The city believedthat it was "uniquelypoisedwithinthe regionto capturea
large share of the growthin the serviceeconomy."8When plannersand politicians
spokeof the city as a dynamicmarketplace,they meant the downtownthat by 1983
had already emerged as a place of modern office buildingsand hotels sharing a
common streetscape with gracious 18th and 19th century townhousesnow frequentlyconvertedinto fine restaurants,antiqueshops, and clothingboutiques.Gallery I and Gallery II, a glamorouscenter-cityshoppingmall, stretchedthree blocks
along east MarketStreet. Plans were unfoldingto transformMarketStreet west of
City Hall into a canyon of office towers rivalingNew York City.
However,not everythingabout Philadelphiain 1983 glitteredlike the downtown.
Typicalof the postindustrialcity, Philadelphiamirroredthe dichotomybetweenthe
urbanworldof fabulouswealth and anotherof grindingpoverty.Against the panoramaof shimmeringglass officetowers,high class restaurants,and half-milliondollar townhousesstood molderingslum neighborhoodswhereislandsof publichousing
eruptedout of an urbansea of deterioratedoften abandonedrow housing.Many of
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
143
the city's poorest black families lived in these aging neighborhoodsof north and
west Philadelphia.
A partialexplanationof Philadelphia'sneighborhooddeclinecould be foundin its
changingdemographicprofile.As the city's manufacturingbase erodedin the postwar years, 1950 - 1980, its populationdeclined 19 percentfrom over 2 million in
1950 to 1.68 millionin 1980. The populationthat remainedwas older(25 percentof
the city's householdswere headed by a personover age 65), blacker(39 percent),
and poorer (20.1 percent of personsbelow the povertyline in 1980, comparedto
15.4 percentin 1970.)9
Wilson Goode'selection in 1983 as the city's first black mayor followedalmost
inexorablyfrom this changingpostwardemography.The great migrationof blacks
to the city that beganduringWorldWar I acceleratedduringand after WorldWar
II. A combinationof declining Europeanimmigration,white suburbanization,the
modernizationof Southernagriculture,and continuedheavy black citywardmigration created a deepeningpatternof black ghettoizationin northernindustrialcities
such as Philadelphia.Philadelphia'sblack populationrose astronomically.Between
1950 and 1970 the city's non-whitepopulationrose 74 percent from 376,041 to
653,791. Althoughthe city's blackpopulationincreasedmoregraduallyin the 1970s
- up only 14,913 - the white populationdeclined 295,633. By 1980 blacks represented 37.9 percentof the city's population.10
None of the luster of the city's renewingdowntownspilled over into the aging
neighborhoodsthat surroundedthe CentralBusinessDistrict(CBD). The proportion
of Philadelphiafamilies in these graying areas living below the poverty line increased from 11.2 percent in 1970 to almost 17 percent in 1980. Nationally the
number of families living in poverty actually droppedslightly during the decade
from 10.7 percentof the populationto 9 percent."
Povertyin Wilson Goode'sPhiladelphiaoverwhelminglyconcentratedin the allblack neighborhoodsof North and West Philadelphiawherefrom 1940 to 1980 the
black proportionof North Philadelphiaincreasedfrom 37 percentto over 75 percent. In North Philadelphianeighborhoodssuch as East and West Poplar,which
were 94-96 percentblack, in 1980 unemploymentexceeded 15 percent,medianincomes rangedfrom $4,300 to $6,300, and over 20 percentof the populationlived in
poverty.Recently, Universityof Chicago sociologistWilliam Julius Wilson traced
the roots of extreme urban povertynot only to such historicforces as racism, but
also to black joblessnesscaused in large part by major structuralchanges in the
urban economy that significantlydiminishedthe demand for low and marginally
skilled labor and to the correspondingproliferationof the female-headedfamily.
The numberof Philadelphiahouseholdsheaded by females rose 41 percentin the
1970s to account for one out of every five city householdsby 1980; however,that
year overa thirdof the householdsin blackNorth Philadelphiawere female-headed.
Women headed over 25 percentof the families in West Philadelphia.12
Many of the problemsand issues that confrontedPhiladelphianeighborhoodsin
1983 and shapedthe firstadministrationof WilsonGoodeemergedfromthis dichotomy of wealth and poverty,of white versusblack, of scintillatingdowntownversus
deterioratinginner city neighborhoods.A Citizens Survey of 7,800 Philadelphia
householdspublishedby the city PlanningCommissionin 1980 underscoredthe so-
144
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
cial divisions. The survey found race to be "an important determinant influencing
attitudes ... toward many issues and problems." Generally, Philadelphians listed
crime/vandalism, unemployment, and high taxes as the leading problems facing the
city. However, unemployment and abandoned/run down housing most concerned
blacks, while whites listed taxes, crime, and poor public transportation as the most
serious problems. City-wide, 82 percent of the respondents felt safe in their neighborhoods by day; less than 47 percent believed they were safe at night. Blacks as
well as whites favored solutions such as gang control, improved police protection,
repair of vacant housing, and youth employment services. This dichotomy had equal
significance in 1983 as part of Philadelphia's dual personality. On the one hand, as
has been shown, Philadelphia bore the vestiges of the old industrialism, a large
black, Hispanic and Asian population, extensive regions of poverty, and an aging,
crumbing infrastructure. On the other hand, the city's downtown of still vital banks
and offices, theaters, and historically preserved neighborhoods indicated that it was
advancing toward its goal of being a regional corporate center and the hub of information processing and service delivery in the Delaware Valley. Philadelphia businessmen begged for a political climate free of interracial and interethnic conflict, a
climate, that in the fashion of cities such as Baltimore, Boston, and Atlanta, welcomed large-scale office development and economic growth. Business executives reasoned too that the city's sizeable black population made a black mayor inevitable. In
Wilson Goode the city's business elites espied the black leader who could transcend
discord and move Philadelphia into its "World Class Future."13
Blacks and Politics in Philadelphia
Since the 19th century in Philadelphia a few black politicians had served as clients of white bosses. In the 1920s black politicians such as Ed Henry kept the city's
black vote in line for Boss William S. Vare's powerful Republican machine. However, black political consciousness began building in Philadelphia after the mid
1930s. During the Great Depression and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal, Philadelphia's economically stricken black community increasingly mobilized
behind Democratic political leaders such as Crystal Bird Fauset and organizations
such as the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People
(NAACP) and the National Negro Congress to oppose job discrimination and press
for decent relief and public housing. In 1936, taking the advice of the black editor
of the Pittsburgh Courier, Robert L. Vann, Philadelphia blacks turned Lincoln's
picture to the wall and voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt. However, until 1951
many blacks, particularly those residing in the city's poorest wards, continued to
vote for the Republican machine in local elections.14
After World War II Philadelphia blacks, led by the NAACP and the Urban
League, continued to fight for equal employment opportunity and against housing
and other forms of discrimination. Although during and after World War II blacks
moved into the ranks of the city's manufacturing labor force, the erosion of the
city's industrial base undermined opportunity there. The city's liberal, pro-development, Democratic reform administrations of Joseph Clark (1952-1956) and Rich-
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
145
ardson Dilworth (1957-1961), while committed to improving intergroup relations,
emphasized urban renewal policies that abetted the rise of the second ghetto.16 As
Eugene Ericksen and William Yancey have observed, black families moved into the
city's old, nonindustrial, streetcar suburbs left undefended by white ethnics.16These
were neighborhoods barred from investment by Federal Housing Administration
redlining policy and likely targets for renewal. Moreover, recent studies have shown
that by the mid-1950s these urban renewal and public housing policies had galvanized white working class opposition to black residential advancement, therefore,
hardening ghetto lines. By 1960 the tide of wartime and postwar black migration,
the changing regional economy, and the adverse effect of urban renewal and public
housing policies, concentrated black poverty in the growing black belts of north and
west Philadelphia.17
Not only was the new black ghetto poor, it was powerless. Although blacks represented a key constituency of the Democratic machine that replaced the Republican
organization in 1951, they were not incorporated into the party either through patronage or through the slating of black candidates. James Tate, the President of
City Council who succeeded Dilworth as Mayor in 1961 and served two terms,
1962-1972, symbolized the ascendancy of the city's Irish, and alienated both white
liberals and blacks. Likewise, Frank Rizzo (1972-1979) bore the standard for the
city's large Italian neighborhoods fearful of black encroachment.18
However, as John Allswang has observed, history undermined the foundation of
the traditional political machine. In Philadelphia the effect of both an expanded
civil service and the racial and ethnic tensions of the 1960s and 1970s combined to
erode the strength of party machinery. While blacks remained Democratically aligned, the church more than the party structure seemed to nourish black political
aspirations and leaders. The ethnographer Arthur Huff Fauset emphasized the political importance of black religion in his 1944 Black Gods of the Metropolis. After
World War II black clergy such as Leon Sullivan, Joshua Licorish, and William
Gray, Sr. were prominent figures in the struggle for black economic and civil rights
in Philadelphia.19
In July, 1964, seething frustration and rising black anger exploded in three days
of rioting in North Philadelphia. The 1964 riot sharpened black political consciousness and catalyzed among black Philadelphians the spirit of militance captured in
the popular slogan "Black Power." Girded by black pride and energized by black
power, Philadelphia blacks demanded a stronger voice in community affairs, better
housing conditions, tenant rights, and participation in urban renewal decision making. The new activism produced a spate of organizations in the black community
and a political base for the rise of young black politicians. In North Philadelphia the
North City Congress became a political force; meanwhile, in West Philadelphia, a
neighborhood organization such as the Paschall Betterment League was headed in
1966 by a young black housing activist named Wilson Goode.20
This black militance of the 1960s produced strident voices in the black community such as Cecil Moore's, but not increased political leverage in City Hall. Although by 1983 blacks comprised 39 percent of Philadelphia's population, they had
made only halting progress toward consolidating a political base and translating it
into concrete political gains. In any case, by 1983 the black population was strong
146
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
enough numerically to demand a prominent political role in the city. It was that
year that William Green, Jr., under pressure from a rival candidate, promised to
appoint Wilson Goode to the post of Managing Director. It was the highest position
to be held by a black in the history of Philadelphia city government.2
W. Wilson Goode
Wilson Goode's emergence on the Philadelphia political scene fit neatly into the
history of black politics in Philadelphia. He rose to political prominence out of the
tumult of the 1960s and the Great Society community-building effort that followed.
A Baptist elder who thought seriously about a career in the ministry, Goode had a
natural bridge to the black church. He also emerged at the moment when Philadelphia machine politics seemed exhausted when, appropriately, the son of one of Philadelphia's premier Irish politicos, William Green, Jr., dismayed by his inability to
control an unruly City Council, declined a second term and chose his managing
director, Wilson Goode, as his successor.
Described in 1984 as a "powerful looking, thick-set politician, who seemed to
have been born wearing a dark business suit, and possessed of an upper body that
could almost be overdeveloped, and arms and legs that pump like pistons,"22Wilson
Goode's rise to political stardom in Philadelphia resembled the mythological odysseys of poor boy protagonists in Horatio Alger novels. Born in 1938 on a tenant
farm in Seaboard, North Carolina, Goode was the son of a sharecropper who moved
often to escape oppressive landlords. Goode recalled living with his mother, father,
and four brothers and sisters in a shabby farmhouse, heated only by a pot belly
stove and illuminated by kerosene lamps. When Wilson was 15, his father moved
the family north to a row house in southwestern Philadelphia. His father took a job
in a paper box factory, his mother worked in a laundry. "The quality of our life
didn't improve much," observed Goode, "we traded in the farm for a piece of
sidewalk."28
An honors student at Philadelphia's John Bartram High School, Goode worked
for a year before attending Morgan State University in Baltimore where he studied
history. After graduating in 1961, he considered accepting a fellowship for graduate
study at the University of Wisconsin. However, Goode's marriage in 1960 to the
former Velma Helen Williams and the birth of their first child influenced his decision to spend two years in the army. A member of the Reserve Officers Training
Corps while at Morgan State, Goode entered the Army as a First Lieutenant in the
Military Police. According to Mike Mallowe, Goode apparently enjoyed the regimen of military life. More importantly, according to Mallowe, the Army experience
strengthened Goode's self-confidence and prepared him for a career in big city
government.24
Finishing his tour in the military, Goode returned to Philadelphia where he
worked briefly as a manager for a building maintenance firm, then as an insurance
adjuster, before taking a job in 1967 with the Philadelphia Council for Community
Development (PCCD), a Great Society, non-profit, anti-poverty agency. Goode took
the executive directorship in 1971 when the PCCD was about to lose its funding; he
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
147
securedFord Foundationmoneyand redirectedthe agency towardprovidingtechnical assistance to neighborhoodgroups seeking federal housing money. During the
ten years that Goode directedthe PCCD, 1969-1979,he helped secure for the city
about $60 millionin federal grants, which aided the constructionand improvement
of over 2,000 units of housing.For many of the same years he also servedas President of the Paschall BettermentLeague (PBL), a neighborhood-based
agency promoting neighborhoodquality. Meanwhile, Goode engaged in part-time graduate
study in public administrationat the Universityof Pennsylvania'sWhartonSchool,
where in 1968 he earned his Master'sDegree in Public Administration.2
His graduatestudies and his accomplishmentswith both the PCCD and the PBL
earned Goode solid credentialsas an expert on urban affairs. He was also able to
build his reputationas both an efficientmanagerand a strongadvocatefor community action and neighborhoodimprovement.Goode'scommunityworkalso involved
quietingracial tensionsand promotingsocialjustice. In 1966 he was instrumentalin
diffusing racial violence at the John Bartram High School, and a year later he
forced MayorTate to abide by the minorityhousingprovisionsof the federalurban
renewal law. At Tate's Blue Ribbon Committeehearingsinto the effectivenessof
the PhiladelphiaAntipovertyAction Committee,Goode gave impressivetestimony
on the failureof the antipovertyact to have a sufficientimpacton poorblack families in the city. He called for strengtheningand broadeningPAAC, making it a
more effective voice helping empowerpoor people.'Although middle class, Goode
continuedto live in the black West PhiladelphiaPaschall neighborhoodwhere his
parentshad moved the family in 1953 and where in 1967 he and his wife Velma
had bought a house. There he became very active as a deacon of Paschall'sFirst
Baptist Church.26
Goode'sstature as an intelligent,forceful, yet mainstream,spokesmanfor community bettermentin Philadelphiarose steadily throughoutthe 1970s. He obtained
membershipand boardposts in numerousprominentcity organizationssuch as the
HousingAssociationof the DelawareValley, the YMCA, the NAACP, the Fellowship Commission,and the City BicentennialCommission.27
His non-militant,entrepreneurialapproachto racial bettermentwas rewardedin
the 1970s when he movedfrom community-levelto statewideprominence.In 1977
GovernorMilton Shapp appointedGoode to the Public Utility Commission(PUC).
After only 22 months on the commissionhe was elected chairman.As chairman,
stated Goode, his challenge"was to make the PUC a reputableagency, where the
consumerwill have input."To accomplishthat he invitedconsumersto town meetings held aroundthe state. It was, however,an eventful tenure. Goodejoined the
PUC amidst the nationalenergy crisis triggeredby the harsh winterof 1976-1977.
Fuel shortagesforcedschool and plant closingsnationwide,producingthe layoffsof
1.6 million workers. Two years later the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting
Countries(OPEC) suddenlyescalated crude oil prices, causing mile-long waiting
lines at gas pumps. Then in March, 1979, the large Pennsylvanianuclear power
facility locatedat Three Mile Islandin the SusquehannaRiverValley failed, releasing a cloud of radioactivegas. Goodeheaded the investigationof the TMI incident
and used the occasion to flay the utilities industryfor lack of imaginationabout
energysafety and conservation."My impressionof the utilities,"chargedGoode,"is
148
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
that they are too often content with just doing enough to keep the [PU] Commission
from insisting upon more," Goode, therefore, linked his name not with the improvement of black neighborhoods, but, as the champion of lower utility bills, a battler
for the conservation of and efficient use of scarce energy resources.28
William Green took office as mayor of Philadelphia in January of 1980, inheriting
from his predecessor, Frank Rizzo, a bloated municipal payroll, mountainous city
debts, and a black community broiling at eight years of insensitive, if not oppressive,
city government.2 By appointing Wilson Goode as his Managing Director, Green
not only assuaged the black community, but he entrusted the politically delicate but necessary - job of slashing the city payroll and restructuring the city budget to
an economy-minded, black bureaucrat. Goode performed magnificently as Managing Director, making the job front page news. Indeed, the press adored the
workaholic Goode, touting him as a "true professional," and "one of the best things
about the Green administration."80In the name of honest government and efficiency
Goode fired superfluous city officials, laid off 994 police and firemen, reduced the
size of the city automobile fleet, shredded city credit cards, installed performance
budgeting in city offices, and lectured city department heads about management by
objectives. In his first year Goode trimmed the city payroll by 5.3 million dollars
and cut a potential $140 million deficit to $9.3 million. In the following year, under
Goode Philadelphia showed a $30 million surplus.38
He fared less well with his plan for achieving energy savings by converting city
trash into steam and by weatherizing public buildings. Nor did the ex-houser Goode
forge a solution to what he called "the city's greatest crisis," housing. His "creative"
housing program to use rehabilitation dollars to increase the supply of low-rent units
failed to outpace the loss of inexpensive shelter to abandonment and demolition.32
Nevertheless, Goode's accomplishments as the hard driving 95-hour a week, managing director of Philadelphia were sufficiently impressive to win him widespread recognition. "Is This the Way to Run a City?," Black Enterprise inquired rhetorically
before rapturously praising Goode's management of Philadelphia. Both the New
York Times and the Philadelphia Inquirer exalted Goode as a "new style," budgetminded, liberal Democrat. The city's business community was especially
impressed.33
Goode's First Mayoralty
In November, 1982, Mayor "Bill" Green, an anti-machine Democrat tired of battling City Council, announced his intention not to run for re-election. Inspired by
Harold Washington's victory in the 1982 Chicago mayoral contest, and by his own
popularity as managing director, Goode entered the mayoral primary. Goode's opponent in the spring primary was ex-mayor Frank Rizzo, attempting a political comeback. Rizzo bet his political fortune on parlaying an anticipated 8 percent share of
the black vote with a solid core of white support. He failed. Goode built a primary
victory by sweeping 95 percent of the black vote, and winning a 22 percent share of
the white ballots.34
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
149
In Novemberthe 45-year old Democrat,Goode, faced a three way race against
the 40-year old Republicanex-chairmanof the PhiladelphiaStock Exchange,John
ThomasLeonard.From
Egan, and a 37-yearold, ex-Democrat-turned-Independent,
the start Goode led the race. While his opponentschargedeach other with sabotaging the other's candidacy,the unscathedGoode claimed the political high ground
and ran a dignified,non-acrimonious,non-racialcampaignto assure white liberals
and the city's businesscommunitythat he was as mainstreamas his pin stripesuits
and WhartonSchool educationsaid that he was. Nothing about Goode'scampaign
resembledthe roughand tumbleracial slugfest that HaroldWashingtonhad fought
to capturethe mayor'sofficein Chicago.Goode,in fact, judiciouslyavoidedthe race
issue, spurningall help offeredby the city's black activist leaders.35
Goode campaignedas an urban entrepreneur,not a politician.To achieve his
numberone goal of restoringthe urbanjob base by stimulatingeconomicgrowth,
Goode promisedto create a roundtablecomprisedof economic,business,labor,and
neighborhoodleadersand to aggressivelymarketPhiladelphiaas a place to do business. Accordingly,he pledgedquick action on the constructionof the long debated
downtownconventioncenter. Rebuildingthe urban economy,reformingthe city's
tax structure,and makinggovernmentmore cost effectivealso highlightedhis platform.Goodepromisedto install zero-basedbudgeting,create a Departmentof Commerce, and resolveat long last the impasseblockingcable televisionin the city. He
also announcedplans to improveneighborhoodservices,to attack the city housing
problem,especiallyhomelessness,and to cure the plagueof abandonedhousing- all
promisesmeant to appeal to his largest constituency,the black community.3
Although as a candidate Goode cultivatedthe image of the non-political,costcuttingmanager,unlikeHaroldWashington,he chose to run with - not against- the
crumblingpolitical machine. Early in his campaignhe stated that he intendedto
honorthe rule of patronage.In one of his first acts as a candidateGoode consolidated his politicalsupportby winningthe backingof 67 of the city's 69 ward leaders and by successfullycourtingthe backingof the city's labor unions. Rizzo even
gave Goode his blessing.37
And on election day so did most of Philadelphia.Goode'svigorouscampaigning,
especiallyin the largely Jewish neighborhoodsof the city's Northeast,paid off. His
expectedlyheavy supportfrom the black neighborhoodsof North and West Philadelphiamaterialized.On November8, buttressedby a heavyvoter turnoutin a city
whereDemocraticvotersoutnumberRepublican4 to 1, Goodegarnered55 percent
of the city vote. Egan got only 37 percentwhile Leonardtrailedwith just 8 percent.
Goode carriedalmost half of the Jewish vote and nearly a quarterof those voters
who had supportedRizzo in the primary.Consistentwith his campaign,Goodeproclaimedhis victorya triumphfor the city and for.pluralism."All of us," said Goode
in his victorynight statement,"fromall neighborhoods,fromall walksof life, white,
black,Asian, Hispanic,all of us workingtogethercan solve the problemsfacing our
city. 38
150
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
Goode in the Mayor's Office
Upon taking office in January, 1984, Goode outlined an ambitious 81-point
agenda that mirroredboth his entrepreneurialambitionsand his concern for the
social and physical bettermentof city neighborhoods.In line with his technocratic
thinking,he proposedreorganizingthe parkingand redevelopmentauthorities,negotiating a cost-savingcontract with the city's uniformedemployees,unsnarlingthe
administrativered tape preventingcable televisionin the city, buildingthe convention center and a trash-to-steamplant, and creatinga climate favorableto business.
But Goodealso called for plans to help the homeless,findjobs for ghetto teenagers,
and improvecity neighborhoods.39
His first year seeminglyvindicatedthe effectivenessof his no-nonsense,managerial style. He successfullyreorganizedthe parkingand urban renewal authorities
and forcedthe housingauthorityto providetwenty-fourhour serviceon requestsby
tenants for repairsin public housing projects.In what Mike Malloweof Philadelphia Magazine labeled a "brilliantmove,"Goode resolvedthe cable televisionand
conventioncenter impasseby foisting the decisionupon City Council.In late 1984
Goodenot only saved the PhiladelphiaEagles footballteam from movingto another
city, but also presidedover the ribboncutting for the downtowncommutertunnel
that finallyestablisheda rail connectionbetweenthe city's "mainline"westernsuburbs and the growingsuburbancommunitiesnorthof the city. Apparently,only the
defeat of his trash-to-steamplant scheme by outragedSouth Philadelphians,who
objectedto its location in their backyard,preventedGoode from having a perfect
season.40
Goode introducedto city governmenta novel, some called it refreshing,management style. (It was a style that ultimatelynearlydestroyedhim politically.)Rather
than leaningupon the adviceof key advisors,Goodesoliciteda wide range of opinions on policy issues from, among others, friends,experts,businessmen,and neighborhoodgroups.Once havingassembleda diversityof opinionson policy,the mayor
withdrewto the sanctuaryof his office to make his decisionin lonely isolation.41
For many in city planning,especiallythose interestedin makingcenter city the
rival of Boston and Baltimore,Goode'smanagementstyle seemed liberating.Barbara Kaplan,the executivedirectorof the PhiladelphiaPlanningCommission,observedthat Goodeencouragedlong-rangeplanning,not only by invitingplannersto
give him their best ideas, but also by boldly inserting himself into the planning
process.Goode, she argued,exhibited"a planningframe of mind"not seen in the
city since the balmydays of MayorJosephClark.And like Clarkand Dilworth,the
Goodearticulatedan expansivevisionof the downtownas a thriving
entrepreneurial
service-orientedhub of the Philadelphiametropolitanregion.It was a vision shared
by his businessman-ally,developerWillardRouse III. Goode chargedthe planning
commissionto producea plan for center city developmentand attended all three
town meetingson the subjectthat the commissionheld in 1987. The final plan completedin late 1987 affirmedGoode'splan to expandgreatlythe service,information
processing,and office functionsof the downtown.More importantly,it sanctioned
Rouse'salreadyapproved60-storyOne LibertyPlace towerby identifyingroomfor
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50 million additional square feet of office space. Goode had actively defended
Rouse's proposal to erect a modern office tower, which in defiance of city tradition
exceeded the height of the William Penn statue atop City Hall. Other central city
projects encouraged by Goode included the convention center, a $500 million International Terminal at the airport, Mellon Bank's impeccable restoration of the Lit
Brother's Department Store building, and the multi-million dollar city waterfront
development at Penn's Landing.42
But Goode's effort to infuse Philadelphia's downtown with the economic vitality
and pizzazz rivaling Baltimore and Boston did not foreclose attention to the city's
flagging neighborhoods. In tandem with his long-range plans for the center city, the
mayor commanded a study of North Philadelphia. Like the planning for center city,
the North Philadelphia effort involved numerous town meetings with neighborhood
groups and interested City Councilmen such as John Street often chaired by the
mayor and held at 7:00 Saturday morning. Not published until late 1987, the North
Philadelphia Plan dealt with every facet of life in the deeply blighted region. Among
the subjects intensively examined in the plan were teenage pregnancies, literacy, job
opportunity, crime, and housing.43
However, entrepreneurial mayors and planning departments have historically
been more successful orchestrating physical renewal than social rehabilitation. And
while hope existed that a booming central city would produce social and economic
gains for the city's low-income populations, poverty and squalor persisted. At the
same time Goode strove to demolish 21,000 of the city's abandoned houses, and over
8,000 homeless bedded down atop steam vents, on mission cots, or in city jails or
shelters. In September, 1984, the courts received testimony on whether city shelters
could serve as a legal address for voting purposes. Solutions to the city's horrendous
housing problem clearly eluded the administration, leaving Goode to applaud "Main
Line" charity drives to supply "blankets to the poor."44
In May 1985 a housing-related issue exploded into violence, shattering the credibility of the Goode administration. Long before Goode took office, Philadelphia's
abundance of vacant and abandoned housing enticed squatting and the emergence
of groups proposing radical, antiestablishmentarian solutions to the plight of the
city's truly disadvantaged black population. In 1978 one such group, called MOVE
(not an acronym - it apparently stood for nothing) a small, but militant, inner-city
sect, led by John Africa, who promulgated a back-to-nature philosophy, occupied a
house in the city's Powelton area. The ensuing violent standoff between MOVE and
both the police and fire fighters resulted in the death of a police officer.
In 1982 John Africa moved with his clan into his sister's West Philadelphia house
at 6221 Osage Avenue. The house sat amid a quiet, middle class black neighborhood. Although at first the MOVE family lived peaceably with their neighbors, very
shortly the police received complaints about noise and the horrible stench of garbage
and excrement emanating from the house. Conditions worsened by June, 1984 when
MOVE erected a loudspeaker atop the house and began haranguing the neighborhood with obscenities and violent rantings. As early as August, 1984, the police
tactical squad commenced plotting a strategy to force MOVE out of the house.46
MOVE tested Goode's decision making style, which while apparently effective for
city planning purposes, proved disastrous in dealing with an entrenched and deter-
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JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
mined radical sect barricadedin a West Philadelphiarow house. Accordingto his
later testimony,Goode initially saw MOVE as a problemfor his police chief and
managingdirector,not himself.He knewvery little, if anything,aboutspecificplans
for police action against the group. During the weeks precedingthe May 18 police
assault on MOVE's Osage Avenue bastion,John Africa and his clan made life increasinglymore unbearablefor the middle class West Philadelphianeighborhood.
Fear of a confrontationimmobilizedGoode. Although his versionof the events of
May, 1985 clashedwith that of his Police Commissioner,GregorSambour,and his
Managing Director, Leo A. Brooks, facts assembled substantiatedthat notwithstandingthe seriouspoliticaland racial issues at stake in the confrontation,Goode
did not knowthat the police plannedto use a helicopterto dropan incendiarydevice
on the roof of MOVE'sfortifiedOsage Avenueheadquarters.Goodeadmittedlyhad
disassociatedhimself from the decision making process. The tactical decision to
dropthe bomb left eleven peopledead and sixty-onehomeson Osage Avenuesmoldering ruins.4
Once touted as the manager-saviorof Philadelphiaand brieflycourtedby 1984
DemocraticPresidentialCandidate,Walter Mondale,WilsonGoode'scredibilitylay
in tatters in the fall of 1985. Once his staunchestsupporter,in Octoberthe Philadelphia Inquirereditorializedthat "by unveilinga choreographyof disaster,"the
MOVE affair had "slid open the windowof incompetence"on the Goode administration.47By OctoberGoodenot only faced the scathingreportof his self-appointed
MOVE Commission,chairedby PSFS head M. Todd Cooke,which brandedGoode
"grosslynegligent" in his handling of the MOVE affair, but federal prosecutors
investigating corruption in the Philadelphia police force handed down 26
indictments.
With Goodemiredin politicalquicksand,politicalcolumnistMike Mallowewrote
the administration'sepitaph."At this juncture,"wroteMallowe,"the thoughtmight
be a little premature,the idea of resignationmight be crossingGoode'smind with
increasingfrequency.Richard Nixon did it because he had no choice. Goode still
has options,but they are beginningto fall away like so many autumnleaves."48
Indeed,Mallowe'sepitaphwas premature.Goodeseemedundauntedby the complaintsof his critics. In March 1986 he publiclyand tearfullymournedthe terrible
loss of life and propertyresultingfrom the MOVE debacle and confessedthat he
had been remiss in delegatingsuch awesomedecision making responsibilityto his
subordinates.He also promisedto have the sixty-onedestroyedhouses rebuilt and
the burned-outresidentsmovedin by winter.49However,this chapterin the MOVE
affair also provednightmarish.Goodechose a contractorto rebuildthe Osage Avenue homes with an embarrassinglycheckeredbackground.The city ultimatelydeclared him in default and selected a secondcontractor.It was not until July, 1986
that any familiesreturnedto Osage Avenue.Originallyestimatedat $110,000 each,
the final cost of each of the sixty-onenewly built homes exceeded$135,000.50
As families began movinginto their new homes on Osage Avenue, Goode faced
yet another crisis. On July 1, 1986 the city's 15,000 uniformedand 13,200 nonuniformedworkerswalkedoff the job. Goodegrudginglyconcededsome groundon
wage demandsbut steadfastlyrefusedto have the city straitjacketedon contracting
out services,and he demandedthe right to audit union health and welfare books
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
153
priorto orderingany back paymentsto the fund.61Trash rottedon city sidewalks,
public librariesand museumswere closed, and despite the hot July sun, recreation
centers and city pools stayed locked. But, to the applauseof the Philadelphia Inquirerand most city residents,Goodedefiantlystood his ground.He identifiedcityownedvacant lots and other areas where residentscould dump their trash;to help
city people escape the swelteringheat, he orderedcity fire hydrantsadaptedwith
sprinklers;and he used managementpersonnelto staff the critical water and sewer
departments.Only the doors of the city museums and libraries remained fully
locked. Ultimately, the union capitulated,accepting a modest wage increase and
surrenderingon the city's right to audit its health and welfare books.62
Goode'shandlingof the non-uniformedworkersstrike restoredsome of his credibility lost in the MOVE crisis. By December,1987, Goodehad weatheredthe political stormenoughto be firmlyin the race for a secondterm. In fact, a monthearlier
he receivedthe unanimousendorsementof the city's most prominentelected black
officialsincludingU.S. RepresentativeWilliamGray, City CouncilPresidentJoseph
Coleman,and councilmenJohn Street, Lucien Blackwell,and John White, a group
collectivelycalled the "Big Six."63Businessand civic leaders moved back into the
Goodefold, pointingout that Goodehad at last put MOVE behindhim. In addition,
they cited Goode'seffectivehandlingof the municipalworker'sstrike.Moreover,the
State Legislaturehad finally approvedfunds for the city's $468 million convention
center. Furthermore,the city's economy,stalledunderGreen,generated33,000 new
jobs under Goode. A half dozen new office towers, includingRouse's One Liberty
Place, recast the urbanskyline.Despitecity plannerEdmundBacon'sstrenuousobjections,the Rouse towerbrokethe informalban on structuresexceedingthe height
of the William Penn statue atop city hall tower.64
Ironically, political entrepreneurGoode's achievements notwithstanding,the
MOVE affair left his liberal credentialsin disreputeas he plannedhis reelection
campaign.The MOVE debacle forced him to lean more heavilyon the black vote,
and therefore,the importanceof the black leadershipendorsement.His black support, plus his downtownbusinessalliance,enabledhim to overcomea primarychallenge from PhiladelphiaDistrict Attorney EdwardRendell. Although Rendell was
endorsedby the Inquirerand secured89 percentof the white vote, he lost to Goode
in the May 1987 primary.Analysts attributedthe loss to the lowest white voter
turnoutin sixteen years.55
The November 1987 mayoralelection pitted Wilson Goode against his long-time
FrankRizzo. Both candidatesattempted
nemesis,the Democrat-turned-Republican,
to sidestep the issue of race. Goode directedthe voter'sattentionto his $4 billion
dollarachievementsin downtowndevelopmentand talkedabout clean streets,while
Rizzo hammeredaway at Goode'sresponsibilityfor the MOVE tragedy.Goodealso
resurrectedRizzo's mayoral record, lambastingthe ex-mayorfor police brutality
and racial insensitivity.None of these tactics seemed to excite voter interestin the
campaign.An independentpoll of 600 white Philadelphiansfoundthat fully 38 percent of those surveyedviewed themselves as voting against rather than for the
candidates.66
From the moment the political battle lines were drawn, Rizzo versus Goode,
many railedagainstthe choice.The race was assailedas "a turnoff,"as offering"no
154
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
choice,"as featuringa "blunderingblackversusa blunderingwhite."67Votersmust
choose "between two evils," between "Godzilla and Mothra," complainedPaul
Maryniakof the Philadelphia Daily News. Only belatedly the Philadelphia Inquirer endorsedWilson Goode, quoting in its defense the words EdwardRendell
used in finally coming out for Goode. "His disappointingrecord paled," said
Rendell, "in comparisonto the chaos, division,politicaldictatorship,and fiscal insanity that typifiedeight years of city governmentunder FrankRizzo."68
On November2 Goodewon his secondterm as mayorof Philadelphia,but by less
than 2 percentagepoints.In the end race emergedas the key factordespiteMOVE.
Blacks overwhelminglyvoted for Goode;whites for Rizzo.59
Goode had enteredthe Philadelphiamayor'sofficein 1983 as a manager-technocrat capableof transcendingthe issue of race despitethe city's embeddedethnic and
racial divisions;however,it was a solidly racial vote that returnedhim to office in
November 1987. And, although his January 1990 inauguraladdress conjuredup
Penn'sQuakerimage of a city that worksfor all of its people,the specterof MOVE
hauntedGoode'srhetoric.For example,Goode acknowledgedRouse'sOne Liberty
Center and the strength of Center City economicdevelopmentonly to exhort his
audiencethat "economicgrowthis more than officetowers,ports,expressways,airports and skyscrapers ....
As we boast about breaking through the skyline," in-
toned Goode, "too many have stood in the soup line." Goode dedicatedhis second
administrationto "breakingthe cycle of hopelessness,to provid[ing]self worthand
self sufficiencyand to restor[ing]family stability."60
Two years later Democraticpoliticiansin Philadelphiaspeculatedthat "a black
candidatecan't win in Philadelphia,not after Wilson Goode."A poll revealedthat
66 percentof Philadelphiansviewed him unfavorably.Disaffectedblacks remained
in the city and in the party.Whites left the city or becameRepublicans.Therewere
201,000 fewer registeredDemocratsin 1990 than in 1983. Many white Democratic
strategistsbelievedthat race had become the most importantissue in city politics
and that white working-classvoterssaw the party as black - that is, concernedonly
about the problemsof the black poor, not the white middle class.61
Therefore,despite his entrepreneurialcredentialsand dispassionatemanagement
style, Goode had failed to transcendthe race issue and broadenhis political base.
His administrationflounderedmost conspicuouslyin resolvingthe historic tension
betweenfosteringeconomicgrowthand servinghumanneeds for health, safety, and
welfare. The glass towers and posh malls bedeckingGoode's glittering downtown
left unbridgedthe wideningsocial chasm separatingthe rich city from the poor;nor
did skyscrapersserve to bind togetherthe raciallyand ethnicallyfragmentedparts
Since the 19th centuryas
of the city, a goal Goodehad set for his administration.62
SeymourMandelbaummade clear in his study of Boss Tweed'sNew York, urban
politiciansaided by the political machine had functionedto interconnectthe fragmented metropolis.Goode inheritedpolitical machineryin shambles.Rather than
forge a new political coalition of blacks, Hispanics,and the new army of service
busiworkers,the non-politicalGoode aligned himself with the downtown-oriented
ness and professionalcommunitythat had orchestratedPhiladelphia'sfirst renais3ance in the 1950s. These were the people who had applaudedand encouraged
Goodewhile he was Green'sManagingDirector;they urged him to run for mayor,
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
155
and as an urbanentrepreneurGoode felt a kinshipwith them. In the end, however,
as the MOVE incidentillustrated,Goode'sentrepreneurialand technocraticskills,
while attractiveto the downtownbusinesscommunity,proveda feeble substitutefor
politicaltools in negotiatingthe difficultsocial terrainof the postindustrialcity. For
example, they offered no insight into the problemof the urban underclass.Tragically, Goode nearedthe end of his administrationviewedas the woundedhead of a
black party.The reconstructionof politicsin Philadelphia,the creationof new political coalitions able to govern the postindustrial city, awaited a future
administration.63
NOTES
See "Black Party Image Splits Democrats,"PhiladelphiaInquirer,January 14, 1990; and Gary
Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge,
1988);see also, W. E. BurghardtDuBois'sclassic, The PhiladelphiaNegro:A Social Study (New York,
1967).
2
3
John P. Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton, New Jersey, 1983).
CarolosMujnoz,Jr. and CharlesHenry,"RainbowCoalitionsin FourBig Cities:San Antonio,Denver, Chicago,and Philadelphia,"Policy Studies (Summer1986), pp. 598-602;this study uses the term
in the sense that it is usedby John Mollenkopfin The ContestedCity. The urban
"UrbanEntrepreneur"
as mayoremerged,peoplesuch as DavidLawrenceof Pittsburgh,JosephClarkof Philadelentrepreneur
phia, John Collinsof Boston,saw themselvesas developmentcoordinatorsorchestratingfederaland private investmentin the city. They also helped build a strong Democraticcoalitionaroundthe urban
growththeme.
4 On the Great Society and blacks see BernardJ. Friedenand MarshallKaplan, The Politics of
Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Sharing (Cambridge, 1975); also Mollenkopf, The
Contested City, pp. 87-138; and William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the
Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago, 1987), pp. 130-131.
5 See David Goldfield's
chapter"The Futureof the Urban Region,"in Daniel Schaffer,ed., Two
Centuriesof AmericanPlanning(Baltimore,1988), pp. 315-16. Goldfieldhere clearlyportraysthe modern mayoras an urbanentrepreneur.
6 "Goode Takes Oath for Second Term," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1990.
On manufacturingeconomyof Philadelphia,see Philip Scrantonand Walter Licht, WorkSites:
Industrial Philadelphia, 1890-1950 (Philadelphia, 1987); Franklin Survey Company, Street and Business Occupation Atlas of Philadelphia and Suburban Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1946); Philadelphia
City Planning Commission (PCPC), Economy of Center City: Working Paper (Philadelphia, 1985),
foundin TempleUrban Archives,TempleUniversity,Philadelphia[HereinafterTUA].
8
9
John H. Mollenkopf, The Contested City.
PCPC, Economic and Social Indicators for Philadelphia Census Tracts, 1980: Technical Informa-
tion Paper, in TUA; William Robbins,"Study of PopulationFinds Older, PoorerPhiladelphia,"New
York Times, August 7, 1983.
10 On wartimeand
postwarmigrationand the emergenceof a secondghetto, see John F. Bauman,
"BlacksversusEthnicsin RenewingNorth Philadelphia,1940-1960,"paperdeliveredat AnnualMeeting
of the Organizationof AmericanHistorians,Washington,D.C., 1990;and PCPC,Householdand Hous-
ing Characteristics of Philadelphia, 1980: Technical Information Paper, in TUA; also John F. Bauman,
Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974, (Philadelphia, 1987),
pp. 84-89.
" PCPC, Economic and Social Indicators for Philadelphia, TUA.
12 John F. Bauman,EdwardK. Muller,and NormanHummon,"PublicHousing,Isolation,and the
UrbanUnderclass:Philadelphia'sRichardAllen Homes, 1941-1965,"Journalof UrbanHistory (Forth-
coming); William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged; PCPC, Households and Housing Characteristics of Philadelphia, 1980. Technical Information Paper, in TUA.
156
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
13
PCPC, Citizen Survey. City of Philadelphia, Technical Information Paper, 1980, in TUA; Goldfield, "The Future of the Metropolitan Region," p. 315.
'4 Charles A. Ekstrom, "The Electoral Politics of Reform and Machine: The Political Behavior of
Philadelphia's Black Wards, 1943-1969," and Oscar Glantz, "Recent Negro Ballots in Philadelphia,"
both in Mirian Ershkowitz and Joseph Zikmundt, eds., Black Politics in Philadelphia (New York,
1973); and Vincent P. Franklin, "Voice of the Black Community: The Philadelphia Tribune, 19121941," in Pennsylvania History (October 1984), pp. 261-279.
'1 Bauman, Muller, Hummon, "Public Housing, Isolation, and the Urban Underclass;" and Bauman,
"Blacks Versus Ethnics in Renewing North Philadelphia."
16 Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge,
1983); Bauran, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal.
17 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal; and Eugene
Ericksen and William Yancey, "Work and Residence in Industrial Philadelphia," Journal of Urban History (February 1969), pp. 147-183; Kenneth Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity and Real Estate Appraisal: The
HOLC and the FHA," Journal of Urban History (August 1989), pp. 419-453.
18 See Munoz and Henry, "Rainbow Coalitions," pp. 600-601; on ethnicity and political fragmentation, see Ericksen and Yancey, "Work and Residence in Industrial Philadelphia," and Peter O. Muller,
Kenneth C. Meyer, and Roman Cybriwsky, Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages
(Cambridge, 1976).
'9 John Allswang, Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters; Munoz and Henry, "Rainbow Coalitions,"
600; Arthur Huff Fauset, Black Gods of the Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults in the Urban North
(Philadelphia, 1971).
20 Lenore Berson, Case Study of a Riot: The Philadelphia Story (New York, 1971); Philadelphia
Bulletin, August 14, 1969; Jane Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church, Service," Philadelphia Bulletin,
December 5, 1979.
21 Joe
Davidson, "Is this Any Way to Run a City?," Black Enterprise, February 1982.
22
Mike Mallowe, "The No-Frills Mayor," Philadelphia Magazine, December 1984.
23
Thad Martin, "Mayor Goode," Ebony (May 1984); Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor," pp. 169-170;
Gunter David and David Runker, "Wilson Goode: Compassion for the Underdog," Philadelphia Bulletin, December 14, 1979.
24 Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church, Service"; Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" Roger Cohn, "Wilson Goode Has Something to Prove," in Today Magazine, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1982.
25 Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" David and Runker, "Compassion for the Underdog;" Cohn, "Wilson
Goode Has Something to Prove."
26 "Poverty Program Misses Whites, PAAC Panel Told," Philadelphia Bulletin, July 5, 1967; Ibid,
August 14, 1969, June 14, 1967, October 15, 1968; Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church and Service."
Goode's residence in a socio-economically mixed neighborhood was typical in a city where residential
barriers to black movement remained in place; for an examination of the consequences of that pattern,
see Douglas S. Massey, Gretchen A. Condran and Nancy A. Denton, "The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being," Social Forces (September 1987), pp. 29-55.
27
"Biographical Sketch of W. Wilson Goode, 12/5/79," mimeographed, in TUA; also Philadelphia
Bulletin, November 21, 1970, October 24, 1970, April 4, 1970.
28 Quote on utilities from,
Philadelphia Bulletin, October 24, 1979; "Mayor Goode," Ebony (May
1984); Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church and Service."
29 On Rizzo, see Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, The Cop Who Would be King: Mayor Frank
Rizzo (Boston, 1977).
30 David and Runker, "Wilson Goode: Compassion for the Underdog;" Claude Lewis, "Mayor Picked
a Couple of True Professionals," Philadelphia Bulletin, January 18, 1981; Cohn, "Wilson Goode has
Something to Prove."
31
Philadelphia Bulletin, February 19, 1980, January 9, 1981; "Green Team Gets Good Grade for 1st
Term," Ibid., January 27, 1981; Ibid., February 3, 1981; Joe Davidson, "Mayor Green's 81 Budget: A $1
Million Surplus," Ibid., March 23, 1981; Ibid., April 22, 1981.
32 Joe Davidson,
"Philadelphia Aids Few in Crisis on Housing For Poor," Philadelphia Bulletin, May
21, 1981; Thomas Hine, "Housing Situation Dismal Goode and Urban Experts Tell Conference," Ibid.,
November 1, 1981; Joe Davidson, "Philadelphia Unveils Housing Plan," Ibid., March 1, 1981; "8000
URBAN ENTREPRENEUR
157
Homeless in Philadelphia Plan to Use Shelters as Voting Address," New York Times, September 11,
1984.
33 Davidson, "Is This
Any Way to Run a City;" "At the Helm of the City," Black Enterprise, February 14, 1983, p. 13; "Philadelphia Is 'on the Move,' Mayor Says of First Year," New York Times,
January 7, 1985.
34
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; John Anderson and Hillary Hevenor, Burning Down the
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York, 1987), pp. 62-67.
36
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; "At the Helm of the City," Black Enterprise, February
1984, p. 13; "Black Mayors," Ebony (August 1984), p. 86.
36 New York Times, November 10, 1983.
37
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; New York Times, November 6, 10, 1983.
38
Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983.
39 Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1984; New York Times, January 5, 1984.
40
William Robbin, "Philadelphia is 'On the Move': Mayor Goode in His First Year," New York
Times, January 7, 1985.
41
Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" Mike Mallowe, "The Friends of Wilson Goode," Philadelphia Magazine, October 1985, pp. 127-128.
42
Telephone Interview with Barbara Kaplan, Executive Director of Philadelphia Planning Commission," December 8, 1987; Telephone Interview with Richard Tyler, Historic Preservation Officer, Philadelphia Planning Commission, December 2, 1987; Martin, "Wilson Goode," Ebony Vol. 39, May 1984,
45; Vernon Loeb, "Skyline Carries Stamp of Both Candidates," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27,
1987.
43
PCPC, Plan for North Philadelphia (1987), TUA.
44
Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor," p. 239.
46 Note that in the wake of the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode convened a panel to hold hearings on
the events leading up to the decision to drop the bomb on the Osage Avenue house. The extensive transcripts generated by the MOVE hearings have been deposited at the Temple University Archives, Temple
University, Philadelphia. See "Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission," and "Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission: Report of Commissioner
Charles W. Bowser," and "Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Bruce W. Kauffmann," all in Temple
Law Quarterly (1986), pp. 339-3417; See also, Larry Eichel, "D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985; "Philadelphia Moves On," Black Enterprise, August 1985, p. 19;
and Anderson and Hevenor, Burning Down the House.
46 Eichel, "D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details;" Jonathan Rubenstein, "There Are More Questions for
Mayor Goode" and David Zuccino, "Goode is Contradicted on Picking Siege Team," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985; Ibid., October 24, 1985.
47
On unveiling of incompetence, see Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 1985; also "Philadelphia
Moves On," Black Enterprise, August 1985, p. 19.
48 See Mike Mallowe, "The November of His Years," Philadelphia Magazine (November 1985), pp.
31-32; also "Time to Clear Up," The Economist, October 5, 1985, p. 27; Wallace K. Stevens, "Mayor
Goode's Once-Solid Path Turns Rocky in Philadelphia," New York Times, October 23, 1985.
49 William K. Stevens, "Philadelphia Mayor Apologizes for Confrontation with Radicals," New York
Times, March 10, 1986.
50
"New Homes Arise," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 1985; "At Last a Family Comes Back,"
Ibid., July 19, 1986; "Mayor Condemned," The Economist, March 15, 1986, p. 24.
6' "City Employees Walk off Job," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 1, 1986; "Goode Should Stand His
Ground," Ibid., July 2, 1986; Ibid., July 19, 1986.
52
Philadelphia Inquirer, July 20-21, 1986.
63 "Goode Gets Key Support,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 21, 1986.
4 Russell Cooke, "Goode: A Year of Recovery," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 4, 1987.
66 Philadelphia Inquirer, October 20, 1986, October 27, 1987.
66 H. G. Bissinger, "A Rizzo Strategy," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 3, 1987; Tom Infield, "Both
Men are Buoyant After Mayor Debate," Ibid., October 8, 1987; "Rizzo-Goode Call one Another Liars,"
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 13, 1987; Albert Neri, "Can Goode Survive Move Disaster," Ibid.,
October 29, 1987; "Voters Guide," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27, 1987, 4P.
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JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY
67 Paul Maryniak, "Choosing Between Two Blundering Idiots," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 17,
1987; William K. Stevens, "In Goode-Rizzo Contest, Voters Count Flaws," New York Times, October
18, 1987.
58 Maryniak, "Choosing Between Two Blundering Idiots," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 17, 1987;
Rendell quoted by Stevens in "Goode-Rizzo Contest," New York Times, October 18, 1987; "Voters
Guide," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 25, 1987.
56 Matthew Purdy, "A New Kind of Black Politician," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 20, 1987;
Tom Infield, "Goode Relentlessly Pursues Crucial White Vote," Ibid., October 3, 1987.
60 "Goode Takes Oath for Second Time,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1988.
61 Dick
Polman, "Black Party Image Splits Democrats," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 1990.
62 The
dichotomy between the economic development goal of urban planning and public administration and social objectives is the theme of Daniel Schaffer's edited volume, Two Centuries of American
Planning.
63 See Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New York (New York, 1965); and Polman, "Black
Party Image Splits Democrats."