86
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
between regional groups was typical of the country's piecemeal development. 43
In the 1960s missionaries would use Chimbu to help 'civilise' the more recently
contacted Southern Highlanders, allowing Chimbu themselves an opportunity
to feel superior to these 'primitives'. 44
The nature of their wartime experience and its aftermath - the recruitment
of many more thousands of Chimbu into the Highlands Labour Scheme ­
guaranteed that most would return to their own land to become independent
farmers, thus determining the character of the province until the present. De­
spite pressure to do so the Australian government refused to alienate large tracts
of land in the central Highlands following the war.45 Virtually no land was
alienated in Chimbu because of its dense population, leaving its citizens in a good
position to benefit from the growth of the coffee industry in the 1960s.
It was mostly home-grown 'kanaka coffee' which paid for the following gen­
erations' education. Grandchildren of the carriers now work as medical practi­
tioners, pilots, high school teachers, army officers, bureaucrats and small
businessmen in Papua New Guinea's urban centres. The building of the High­
lands highway, whose foundations in Chimbu and the eastern Highlands were
laid during the Second World War, greatly accelerated this process of modern­
isation.
ABSTRACT
At least 4,000 Chimbu civilians were recruited during the Highlands Campaign between May and
August 1943. Domestic press coverage emphasised the role ofstretcher-bearers at Kokoda, deflect­
ing public attention from the widespread use of indigenous labour for road and airstrip building
and the carrying of materiel in other parts of PNG. A high proportion of Chimbu were recruited
forcibly by the Native Constabulary. Witnesses recorded an inadequate diet and harsh conditions
for the labourers. Village life was substantially disrupted, both through the absence ofyoung males
for traditional tasks and the introduction of dysentery. In their absence Christian missionaries
were unable to intervene on their behalf. The long-term effects included the introduction of
malaria to the PNG Highlands and the desire oflabourers to return to their own land, eventually to
grow coffee. Widespread recruitment introduced labourers to the exigencies of modem warfare
and the efficacy ofadvanced technology. The operation laid the foundations for the building of the
Highlands highway and the gradual modernisatiun of the region.
43 For an example of a more worldly New Guinean's view of the Highlanders in the 1930s see Paliau Maloat,
'Histori bHong mi taim mi bon na I kamap tede', in Marion Ward (ed.), The politiCS o{Melanesia (Canberra and
Port MOI"esby 1970), 144-60: 'Wok bilong mitupela Mr I Murphy I hia i bilong 01 pipal bilong bush we 01 ino bin
lukim 01 waitman na solowara yet. 01 dispela man hia 01 i bHong fait na kilim narapela man taso!. 01 ino gat tm
pies bilong 01' (p. 146).
_
" A strong pejorative in PNG
15 See L E. Read. 'Settlement in the Highlands of New Guinea', CA42, Dept of Territories, 1941-51. Cor­
respondence Files, Multi-Number Series, 1918-60. 'Papua and New Guinea Land and Property Acquisition
etc.', 1952-53, Canberra, Australian Archives. CSR 1518. An edited version of this article appeared in the Sydney
MQrning Herald, 28 Aug. 1952.
COMMENT
Japan and War Reparations in Micronesia
of its administration of a substantial part of Micronesia in the period 1914­
1944, there are two constrasting feelings towards Japan among the island peoples con­
cerned.1 One is a pro:Japanese sentiment generated by japan's Japanisation policy
toward the islanders. 2 It is claimed that Micronesians have a very favourable feeling
toward Japan's rule compared to sentiments held by people in areas fonnerly colonised
by that country in Southeast Asia. But anti:Japanese feeling also exists among Micro­
nesians. This negative sentiment derives from the cruel treatment inflicted on islanders
by theJapanese military during the Pacific War and the feeling ofvictimisation, that they
were sacrificed by Japan and the United States because the islands were merely a
Japanese territorial holding. One reason the islanders cannot forget these experiences is
that the question of war damages inflicted on life and property have not been mutually
resolved between Japan and Micronesia. The war reparations problem is a powerful
element in the ambivalence of the Micronesian people toward the Japanese people. A
solution ofthe reparations problem would not merely provide emotional satisfaction but
could also be an opportunity for rapprochement.
In the Southeast Asian countries, where the war reparations issue has apparently been
largely cleared up, the relationship with Japan has become complex and diversified
because oftheir past experiences. 3 In the formerJapanese colonies or countries occupied
by Japan which also experienced European colonial rule, there have been examples of
racial prejudice toward the Japanese compared to Europeans. Furthermore, anti­
Japanese feeling developed in response to the way Japanese business interests expanded
AS A RESULT
For the purposes of this paper, the westem Pacific Island area known as Micronesia. formerly the Tmst
Territory of the Pacific Islands (TIP!), consists of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States
of Micronesia made up of four states - Chuuk (formerly Tmk), Pohnpei (formerly Ponape), Yap. Kosrae
(formerly Kusaie), the Republic of Palau, all sovereign states in free association with the United States, and
the Commonwealth of the Northem Mariana Islands (Saipan, Tinian and Rota), a U.S. commonwealth. Prior to
the Pacific War, Japan occupied tlus area as a !'esult of World War I. The League of Nations assigned Japan
the administration of the islands as a Class C Mandate, a designation given because they were geographically
isolated and reg-arded as economically and socially underdeveloped, unable to stand alone in the modem
world. Japan's SO-year mle comprised the naval occupation, 1914-20; the joint naval·dvilian period, 1920-22,
the full civilian govemment of Nan'yocho, 1922-1943, and the Nan'yocho administration under the direction
of Vice Admiral Hosogaya, 1943 to war's end. AlthoughJapan announced its intention to withdraw from the
League of Nations in 1933, it continued to submit annual reports on the mandate until 1938 on the basis that its
intention did not change Japan's status as a mandatory power. After its official withdrawal in 1935, neither the
Council nor the Mandate Commision of the League made any definitive statement aboutJapan's position or its
mandated islands.
? Wakako Higuchi, 'japan's assimilation policy during the Mandate period. 1914-1945, unpub. paper,
Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1994.
The following payments have been made by Japan: War Reparations
to Burma, $US200m, 16 Apr.
1955-15 Apr. 1965, by the Peace Treaty and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1954; South Vietnam, $US39m.
12Jan. 1960-11 Jan. 1965, War Reparations Treaty, 1959; Indonesia, $US223.1 m, 15 Apr. 1958-14 Apr. 1970,
Peace Treaty and War Reparations Agreement, 1958; Philippines, $US550m, 23 July 1956-22 July 1976, War
Reparations 1956. Semi-War Reparations Laos, $US2.8m, 23 Jan. 19.59-22Jan. 1965, Economic Cooperation
Treaty, 1958; Kampuchea, SUS4.5m, 6 July 1959- 7 July 1966, Economic Cooperation Treaty, 1959; Thailand,
$US26.7m, 9 May 1962-8 May 1970, Special Yen Treaty, 1955; Singapore, $USB.16m, 7 May 1968-31 Mar.
1972, Blood Debt Agreement, 1967; Malaysia, SUSS. 16m, 7 May 1968-6 May 1972, Blood Debt Agreement.
1967; Burma, $USI40m, 16 Apr. 1965-15 Apr. 1977,-; South Korea, SUS300m, 18 Dec. 1965-17 Dec. 1975,
Basic Agreement, 1965; Micronesia, SUS5.84m, 27 May 1972-15 Oct. 1976, Agreement between Japan...,
1969. YomiuTi Shinhun, 20 July 1976, l,'.4; Chugoku Kenkyujo, Chugoku Kenkyu eeppo (Tokyo), Apr. 1993, p.14. It
should also be noted that the People s Republic of China, Cambodia, and Laos withdrew their right to register
war damage claims with Japan.
87
Thf jOlJrl/ol fJ/l'rW/I{
30:1119951.
88
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
and created friction between the local people and Japanese employees. At present,
aggressive Japanese political involvement in local governmental affairs resulting from
economic expansion plans is also a source of tension in these countries.
WhenJapanese think of their future relationships with Micronesia, the unresolved war
reparations problem is not only a past obligation but also a contentious contemporary
issue. At the present time the states of the former United Nations sanctioned TIUst
Territory of the Pacific Islands
the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of Palau (ROP) - are, for the first time,
sovereign entities and have official diplomatic relations with the Japanese government.
This allows Micronesian countries to negotiate directly on the war reparations issue. This
paper will explore the issue of war reparations in Micronesia: the historical background,
the legal arguments, and the prospects for future negotiations.
In spite ofrepeated claims for war reparations from Micronesians since 1950, the issue
was not considered by the United States administration until the TIUsteeship Council
and the United Nations visiting mission compelled the United States on several occasions
to accelerate examination of the claims issue. After I 7 years ofslow moving negotiations
withJapan, the 'Agreement BetweenJapan and the United States ofAmerica Concerning
the TIUst Territory of the Pacific Islands' was finally concluded in 1969. Under this
agreement,Japan made available in grants, called ex gratia, to the United States L8 billion
yen, computed at $US5 million, for the purchase in Japan by the United States of
Japanese products and services. The United States also granted $US5 million for the
welfare of the Micronesian people. The total amount was placed in the Micronesian
Claims Fund as established under the Micronesian Claims Act of 197 I for the payment of
war damage claims. The products Japan provided until 1975 were multi-purpose ships
and engine parts - 30% of money spent; tuna boats - 21%; ambulance vehicles and
tIUcks - II %; ship repair se;:vices
9%; other items and services _ 29%.4
In order to provide $USI0 million ex gratia grants by both countries for loss of life,
physical injury, and property damage directly resulting from the hostilities between
Japan and the U.S. between 7 December 1941 and the dates of the securing of the various
islands of Micronesia by U.S. armed forces (Title I), and to implement the payment of
$US20 million by the United States which compensated Micronesians for injury, death,
or damage to personal property during the years of U.S. administration, 1944-51 (Title
the United States established the Micronesian Claims Commission (MCC). The MCC accepted individual claims under both Title I and Title II from Micronesians during the period October 1972 to October 1973. As of31 December 1973, over 11,000 Title I claims (excluding late filings) were received. This total exceeded the number antici­
6
pated. The number of claims made, and amounts claimed and awarded by the MCC under Title I, are as follows:
Amounts Claimed and Awards Made by the MCC (rounded to nearest $USl,OOO)
Amount
Amount
Percentage
Number of
Claimed
Awarded
Awarded
Claims made
Marianas
Truk
Palau
$31,210,000
$2,355,601,000
$47,673,000
$3,865,885
$13,547,810
$5,756,346
12.39%
0.58%
12.07%
1,279 (includes Guam)
3,753
1,836
'Gaimusho Joho Bunkakyoku' of the Govemment ofJapan, Kiji Shiryo (JO) K-230, 27 Oct. 1976.
Micronesian Claims Act of 1971, found in Foreign Claim.. Settlement Commission ofthe United State" Including a
Report of the Micronesian Claim, Commis'ion, A nnual Report to the CongressJor the PeriodJanuary I-December 31, 1973,
U.S. Govemment Printing Office, pp. 53-51.
" Micronesian Claims Commission, 'Final Report', 1972-76, p. 40.
!>
89
JAPAN AND WAR REPARATIONS
Yap
Ponape
Marshalls
Others
TOTAL:
$18,822,000
$15,950,000
$83,299,000
$658,000
$2,553,213,000
$3,332,179
$1,699,973
$6,147,416
$34,349,509
17.70%
10.66%
7.38%
1,154
1,423
1,700
11,145
Source: Micronesian Claims Commission, Final Report, 1972-76, pp 42, 48-9.
As the figures above show, the amount Micronesians claimed reached more than 250
times that which Japan and the United States made as ex gratia payments. In the case of
TIUk, only 0.58% of the claims were awarded. Yap received the maximum proportion
awarded, 17.7% of its total claim of$USI8,822,000. Many of the claims that were denied
lacked sufficient information and evidence. The Commission pointed out that in some
cases the same claim had been submitted by two or more individuals and the terms had
obviously been exaggerated. 1 Assuming that most of the claims are valid, what Micro­
nesians request in reparations from the Japanese and United States governments today
is, roughly, the difference between the Micronesians' claims and MCC's awards. The
principal complaint concerns the payment which is still to be made on the unsettled
portion, some 84%, ofthe claims recognised as valid by the MCC for damages inflicted on
persons and property,S The difficulty in properly filing claims was caused by the lack of
proper instruction and infrastIUcture: poor communications and transportation, lack of
a common language, and varying customs both within an island group and between
groups. On Kwajelein, one very large claim was filed by the local traditional leader on
behalf of all the inhabitants for major damage done to the reef. 9 Another significant
problem was that MCC's awards did not include inflation. The loss of real property was
valued at only $US50 per acre per year. Uncompensated labour was, if it was in the usual
occupation and the individual was living at home, set at $10 per month. If the individual
was separated from his family and kept under guard, the compensation was set at $ I 5
per month. Death of a labourer was set at $500 to $5,000 depending on the age of the
deceased.
In the same year, 1969, when the Agreement was signed between Japan and the
United States, the first round of status negotiations began. The Congress of Micronesia
presented to the United States negotiators a list of 11 topics it wished to discuss. One of
those was that the United States would agree to an early settlement of war damage
claims. After the MCC's judgement of claims, Micronesian demands for compensation
for unsatisfied claims increased throughout the 1970s when the principle of Micronesian
self-determination evolved. The islanders began claiming more actively as individuals,
rather than through diplomatic channels or agencies. Further these claims were made to
Japan rather than the U.S. With Japan's rapid post-war growth and status as a world
econOInic power, interest in seeking reparations increased. The Japanese government
has received numerous requests since the early 1970s for war reparation payments from
the various Micronesian entities which had been underJapanese IUle for all or part of the
period from 1914 to 1944. For example, Kejjo Bien, a member of the Republic of the
Marshall Islands Nitijela (parliament), requested Japanese Diet members who attended
the biannual Asia Pacific Parliamentarians Union (APPU) meeting on Guam in 1992 and
theJapanese Consulate-General on Guam to remove unexploded bombs in the Marshall
1 United Nations, 'Report of the UN. Visiling Mission to the TIPL 1976', New York, Trusteeship Council
official records, 43rd session Uune-July 1976) Supplement No.3, p. 82.
8 Ibid., 80.
9 Micronesian Oaims Commission, 'Final Report', 1972-76, p. 40.
90
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
Islands, or provide for the expenses of such removaL Bien also requested in 1993 that
Japan provide compensation for the deaths ofMarshallese civilians, especially the people
of MiJi who were executed in 1945 by Japanese military personnel. 10 The Japanese
government responded that a provision in the Japanese Constitution prohibited the
dispatch ofJapanese defence forces overseas for the purpose of removing unexploded
bombs. l l Yet theJapanese Constitution does not clearly describe the overseas role of the
Japanese defence force. In fact, theJapanese government sent a force to the Persian Gulf
to clear the sea lanes of mines in 1993, the same year as Bien's request. Furthennore,
japan's service in removing mines is categorised as 'other work' and is therefore per­
mitted under the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Chapter 5, Article 14(a)-1, of the Treaty
establishes the foundation for war claims thus:
Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers, so desiting, whose present
tenitories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged byJapan, with a view to assisting to
compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available
the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied
Powers in question.
Regarding the execution of Marshallese islanders toward the end of the Pacific War,
Senator Bien's claim described how four Marshallese deserters on Mili island, in the face
of the enemy, were executed in early April 1945, and 13 Jaluit islanders were killed on
suspicion of being spies in mid-April 1945. These acts were judged war crimes by a
military commission which sat on Guam from 1945 to 1949. The Japanese military
officials found guilty of the executions in the Marshalls were sentenced to life in prison in
1947. 12 Responding to Bien's claims concerning executions, the Japanese government
simply presented its view to Senator Bien, stating 'the issue has been settled completely
and finally by means of the "Agreement Between Japan and the United States of Amer­
ica Concerning the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" '.13 Bien repeatedly wrote and
sent facsimile messages to the Embassy ofJapan in the Marshalls to infonn the govern­
ment that he was seeking assistance from the Committee on Human Rights of the United
Nations. 1~ Since Bien's request was not sent through a channel of the RMI government,
Japan's response never went beyond a personal letter to him as an individual.
The Old People Square Level & Justice Organisation on Pohnpei (formerly Ponape)
(O.P.S.L. &j.O.O.P.), a civilian organisation supported by the Pohnpei State Legislature,
has requested the Japanese government annually since 1988 to make immediate pay­
ment on 'long overdue war claims'.15 According to their documents, the overdue
payments have reached $9,265,559,478 as of 1993, as compared with $105,067,311
originally reported. The rationale for these numbers has not been made clear by O.P.S.L.
& j.O.O.P. except that 35% is added for Japanese armed forces' condemnation of prop­
erty of Pohnpei and Kosrae citizens, 10% payment for obstruction of peace and liberty,
and payment to each head person for executive membership status and operation
Letter, Kejjo Bien, Senator of the Nitijda, Republic of the Marshall Islands, to Embassy of Japan,
Republic of the Marshalllsiands, 20 Jan. 1993. Republic of the Marshall Islands, Embassy ofJapan (hereinafter
Ejl.
II Mitsuo Watanabe, Counsellor, Embassy ofjapan in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, to Kejjo Bien,
Senator of the Nitijela, Republic of the Marshall Islands, R Jan. 1993, Ej.
1" Kuniyasu Saka, Senso Saiban Nan')o Gunto Beigun Hotei (Tokyo 1967), 81-91.
Mitsuo Watanabe, Counsellor, Embassy ofjapan in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, to Kejjo Bien,
Senator of the Nitijeia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 8 jan. 1993, Ej.
14 Kejjo Bien to Embassy of japan, Republic of the Marshall Islands, 29 Sept. 1994, Ej.
15 The O.P.S.L. & j.O.O.P.'s c1aun originally included Kosrae State, FSM. The O.P.S.L. & j.O.O.P.K. (Kos·
rae) was renamed dropping the 'K' after the group made its initial claim of $105,067,31 I which included
damage claims for Pohnpei and Kosrae.
JAPAN AND WAR REPARATIONS
91
expenses. Japan has not yet responded to the claims made by the O.P.S.L. &
lO.O.P.
Daniel Lopes, a Pohnpei, called Japan to account by protesting in front of the Foreign
Ministry in Tokyo in June 1973. His father, Palestine, was drafted in July 1942 as a
member of a 20 man 'Pohnpei Kesshitai', the forlorn hope corps or Giyugun (volunteer
corps). of the 20 men in this group, 17 died, including Palestine, during war labour
activities in Buna, New Guinea. 16 The Kesshitai>s actual activities were to penetrate the
ranks of the indigenes and prepare an 'induction operation' to support theJapanese rear
guard. 17 Though Lopes submitted a power of attorney statement from the other sur­
vivors, their statements and the eye witness testimony of a fonner director of the
Pohnpei branch, Nan'yocho (the South Sea Bureau), Kaneto Tsukahara, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs responded clearly, 'such demands were resolved by the "Agreement'''
(the 'Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands') in 1969.
With reference to Palau, four members of the House of Delegates Special Committee
on Claims, Trade, and Relations with Fonner Colonisers visited the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Tokyo, in September 1991. They requested the Japanese government to recog­
nise the validity of three war reparations claims from former Palauan soldiers (actually
war activity labourers): 1) to provide guaranteed support payments for the Palauan
fellow soldiers association; 2) to provide travel expenses for these fonner soldiers to visit
their battlefields in New Guinea and Indonesia; 3) to support the Palauans in gathering
the bones of their fallen comrades now buried in Indonesia.
In addition to the 20 Pohnpei people mentioned above, Palauans were also drafted
through the Palau branch of the Nan'yocho as Kaigun Kensetsu Butai (the navy construc­
tion corps), Shigen Chosa-tai (the resource survey corps), and Teishintai (the first and
second volunteer corps). They were sent to New Guinea and its neighbourhood in 1942
and 1943. No documents exist describing the Palauans' wartime contributions though 14
out of 30 Teishintai members were killed or missing during the war in 1943. 18 The
Japanese government responded to the Palauans that the Agreement of 1969 concluded
all claims. Japan further stated that the Indonesian government has not allowed requests
for human remains collection efforts since 1976. Japan's position was that since Palau
remained a part of the Trust Territory, the Japanese government properly consulted the
U. S. Department of State concerning the Palauan request. In response, the United States
infonnedJapan that it should not give an official response to the Government of Palau.
Further, the U.S. Department ofInterior, the direct administrator of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands at the time, cautioned Palau about attempting to 'engage in diplo­
matic activities with respect to Japan as if Palau were an independent country', and
informed Palau that it might exert its right to stop such action by the Palau National
Congress. [9 Palau could not penetrate this wall of politics and Japan did not give a clear
response to the Palau request. However, the issue of the right to negotiate has changed
over time. Given that the Palauan people approved the Compact of Free Association in
It is said that they died in Rabaul too. Tetsuo Maeda, 'Micronesian Repon', MinzoRu Bunka (Tokyo), 9:2 097S), 66. 18 Wakako Higuchi, 'Micronesians and the Pacific War: The Palauans', in Dirk Ballendorf, Donald Shuster and Wakako Higuchi, An Oral Historiography of thejapane,e Administration tn Palau, Final Report Submitted to the
japan Foundation international Project Support Program (Guam 1986). Article 4 of the Mandate for the German Po,­
smion; in the Pacific Ocean Lying North of the Ef(lUltor states 'the military training of the natives otherwise than for
the purpose of internal police and the local defense of the territory, shall be prohibited'. The involvement of
Micronesians in japan's war activities in the Pacific and New Guinea went beyond 'training'.
19 Pers. camm., anon., Palau, Feb. 1994.
16
I)
92
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
1993 and proclaimed independence in free association with the U.S. in October 1994, the
right to conduct diplomatic negotiations is an authority the Republic ofPalau now enjoys
as a sovereign state.
In recent years, the Palau National Congress passed a resolution to seek support from
the U.S. Department of State in petitioning Japan for compensation due to the relatives
of Palauan war victims. The Congress also passed a resolution to have the Japanese
government compensate former Palauan civilian employees of the pre-war and wartime
Japanese governing authority.20 These resolutions were sent to the Japanese govern­
ment. On 15 September 1994, the 50th anniversary commemoration of the Battle of
Peleliu, some Palauans made requests to Japan for war reparations. 21
The Japanese government responded to Micronesian claims in two ways. One is the
position that Micronesians had no right to carry out diplomatic negotiations. That right
resided with the U.S. Consequently, Japan refused to negotiate with any of the Micro­
nesian island jurisdictions. To date, no official government to government approaches to
Japan have been made by any of the Micronesian governments since freely associated
state status and sovereignty were achieved.
japan's second response is to refer to the 1969 Agreement which is based on the 1951
Treaty of Peace with Japan. This Treaty was signed toward the end of the U.S. occu­
pation against the background of the Korean War. By means of the Treaty, Japan
recovered its national sovereignty and could join the United Nations, thus acquiring full
citizenship in the international community of nations again. At the same time, the issue
ofJapanese war reparations was considered to be a closed one lmder international law as
far as 45 Allied Powers including the United States were concerned. The Agreement,
which supposedly settled the claims fully and finally, defines in its preamble the relation­
ship between the Treaty of Peace and the Agreement:
Desirous of concluding a special arrangement, as envisaged in Article 4(a) of the Treaty of
Peace with Japan, concerning the disposition of property ofJapan and its nationals in the
Trust Telritory and their claims, including debts, against the Administering Authority of the
Trust Territory and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of the
Administering Authority and residents of the Trust Territory, and of their claims, including
debts, against Japan and its nationals.
The preamble further states that Japan and the United States are
desirous of expressing their common sympathy for the suffering caused by the hostilities of
the Second World War to the inhabitants of the Pacific Islands ... and desirous of making an
ex gratia contribution to the welfare of the inhabitants of the Trust TeIritory ...
The Agreement, strictly speaking, does not provide compensation for Micronesian
war damages because the victims did not participate in the negotiations nor sign the
Agreement. Further, the notion of 'sympathy' replaced the more important concept of
'apology' in the Agreement. The two warring countries, Japan and the United States,
unilaterally announced the conclusion of war reparations negotiations. This behaviour
contradicts the ethics of international relations of the 20th century.
Accordingly, what does the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the 1969 Agreement
provide and what rationale supports the Japanese government's position? There are
~o Olbiil Era Kelulau (Palau National Congress), Senate Joint Resolution, No. 3-173, 14th Regular Session,
Apr. 1992, and Senate Joint Resolution, No. 3-192, 15th Regular Session,July 1992.
"' Ucheliei Malsol to Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister, Japan, 22 Sept. 1994, and Toshiwo Kyota to
Renzo Jzawa, Consul General, Consulate ofJapan, Guam, 12 Sept. 1994. Koror, Republic of Palau, Olbiil Era
Kelulau, 96940.
JAPAN AND WAR REPARATIONS
93
some serious questions regarding the Treaty of Peace and the Agreement. First, can the
Treaty ofPeace which was signed by 45 Allied Powers be applied to Micronesia? When it
was signed, Micronesia had already been placed under the United Nations international
trusteeship system and was not one ofsignatory countries. Given this non-self-governing,
dependency status, there are no grounds for applying the Treaty to Micronesia. The
Treaty of Peace, Chapter II, Article 2(d}, states
renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate
and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947,
extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
Therefore, the administering authority of Micronesia, the United States, and one of
the Allied Powers, might be able to apply the Treaty to Micronesia, in this case, according
to Chapter V, Article 14, the reparations provision: Japan should pay reparations to the
Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war'. Interpreting this
clause widely, Micronesia could be paid by Japan as a dependency of one of the Allied
Powers. Yet the Agreement's main purpose was in fact a political one: to help to regulate
relations between Japan and the United States, and to arrive at a solution concerning
losses ofJapanese property in Micronesia as a result of war.
The second question is: does Japan have a right to request compensation for its
property from Micronesia, or its administering authority, the United States, even though
one of the major purposes of the Agreement was to offset Japan's right for such com­
pensation and, also, to offset the right of Micronesia or the United States to request
reparations for war damages? In the Treaty of Peace, Chapter II, Article 2(d), Japan
agreed to renounce all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations
Mandate System. Therefore it can be argued that after signing the Treaty in 1951 Japan
had no right to make claims with respect to its property left in Micronesia. As a result, the
Agreement itself might become null because it is a special arrangement concerning the
measure ofJapanese property in Micronesia as the Treaty, Chapter II, Article 4(a) itself
states.
When we think of the war reparations issue vis-a.-vis Micronesia and attempt to answer
these questions, it is necessary to establish some basic propositions before we interpret
and apply the Treaty of Peace to Micronesia. These propositions, I believe, are required
in order to clarify the relationship between the legal status of Micronesia under the
Japanese Mandate and compensation from the Japanese govemment. Because this re­
lationship was not clear, confusion abounds in the Japanese government's position. To
consider Micronesia's status during the period ofJapanese rule, especially the Mandate
period, will bring the war reparations issue back to its starting point. This will clarifY two
fundamental points: the right of Micronesians to request war damage reparations from
Japan and Japan's duty to pay Micronesian claims. Consequently, the third question we
can ask concerns how the relationship between a League of Nations Class C mandated
territory and its mandatory power, Japan, is defined. In other words, did Micronesians
have the same legal status as Japanese people, or were Micronesians simply people in
Japan's occupied area as the result of World War I? The validity of individual Micro­
nesian war claims will depend on the interpretation of and answers to these ques­
tions.
Regarding the Mandate System, the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22,
states that Micronesia 'can be governed as an integral portion of its Uapan's 1 territory'.
When this Covenant was enacted, controversies arose inJapan regarding the implemen­
tation of this clause. Finally, the Japanese government interpreted this clause, contrary
94
JAPAN AND WAR RF.PARATIONS
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
to scholarly opinion, in such a way that the status of the mandated islands was different
from that ofotherJapanese colonies, e.g. Taiwan or Korea. 22 Furthermore, Japan did not
promulgate the Imperial Constitution in its Mandate. The actual administration was
conducted by way of the Japanese Emperor's supreme authority. This system of rule
continued from 1922, the beginning of mandatory status, until Japan, as a result of the
25
Pacific War, ceased to exercise any authority in the Micronesian islands. Concerning
this legal but ambiguous relationship between Micronesia andJapan during the Mandate
period, the Japanese government announced its view in 1959 that the Micronesian
people had 'almost the same status as Japanese nationals'.24 The Japanese government,
eventually, expanded the interpretation of Micronesia's legal status under the Man­
date.
Micronesia was considered comparable to Okinawa where, as a result of its occu­
pation, the United States had all administrative, legislative, and judicial authorities under
the United Nations trusteeship system, thus totally displacingJapan's sovereignty. Given
this arrangement, the Okinawan people could not claim damages against the Japanese
government, nor apply Chapter II, Article 4(a), of the Treaty of Peace. With the simi­
larity of status as trust territories, the Japanese government concluded that Micro­
nesians, like Okinawans, could not register claims with the government for loss of
individual life and property. With this major premise, Japan also stated, therefore, that
Micronesians had no right to make claims against Japan according to the Treaty ofPeace
with Japan, Chapter V, Article 14. 25 Japan stated that Micronesians had a right to make
claims to the administering authority for compensation for wartime losses of national
bonds and postal savings. But theJapanese government holds the view that it shall be the
subject of a special arrangement within Chapter II, Article 4(a), of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan. 26 There is a contradictory viewpoint with respect to application of Article
4(a). This article is, essentially, a provision concerning the Japanese government's
national assets left overseas as a result of the war. Then the government declared that
there existed a relationship between Micronesian war claims and Japan's right to make
claims for property reimbursement. 'Japan has determined that these accounts can off­
set each other. Therefore, Japan does not need to respond to Micronesian war claims
petitions.'~7 This position was taken without showing the numerical calculations for the
offset arrangement. Japan's unilateral insistence on the offset arrangement in Micro­
nesia was done without considering that 'Japan recognised the validity of dispositions of
property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the
United States Military Government' in Micronesia. n This statement also considers
Micronesian war claims as equal to Japanese claims on the United States, the adminis­
tering authority in Micronesia. The Japanese government concluded that the right of
Micronesians to claim compensation for losses of national bonds and postal savings, a
right due as a member of a Japanese nation, is also completely closed.
n Government ofJapan. Ministry ofForeigrl Affairs, lnin Tochiryo Nan'yo Gunto Gaichi HoseishiZenpen (Tokyo
1972). 68.
23 United States of America, Department of State, Annual Report: Trust Territory of the Paafic lslantb 1974,
'Trusteeship Agreement for the Umted States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Preamble'.
2' Asahi Shinbun Chohan, 23 May 1959, p. 4.
Ibid. 26 Ibid. ?7 Ibid. 28 Kisaburo Yokota and Yuichi Takano (eds), Kohusaijoyakushu, 'Treaty of Peace with Japan', Chapter II,
Article 4(b) Yuhikaku (Tokyo 1979), 376-7.
95
The Japanese government erected another barrier to Micronesian claim rights which
were provided by having the same status as individuals in Japan: refusal to accept appli­
cations for claims on unpaid salary, 'Onkyuu Hoo', made possible by the Public Officials
Retention Act, and 'Semhobyosha Senbot.lusha hoku Too Engo Hoo', one of the support laws
for mourners and members of the civilian components who went to war. Article I of the
support law (Senshobyo.lha Senbotsusha hoku Too Engo Hoo) defines the concept of com­
pensation: 'the purpose of enforcement [of the law 1is to support the people, according
to the principle of state compensation, who were military personnel or members of
civilian components, and their war bereaved'. The Japanese government limited the
eligibility of people who could apply for claims under these laws to Japanese individuals
in the Japanese nations. Non-:Japanese people in the former Japanese colonies who had
the status of Japanese nationals could not apply for benefits under the laws. This is
discrimination on the basis of nationality. These individuals lost Japanese national status
because the Japanese government renounced its claim to these territories as a condition
of the 1951 Treaty of Peace.
In the case ofmany Taiwanese. whose country became a Japanese territory after 1895,
more than 210,000 were drafted as civilian components in their capacity as members ofa
Japanese nation. It is claimed that 30,000 of them died a glorious death on the fields of
battle. With respect to their war claims, including requests according to the Support Law,
the Tokyo District Court delivered a judgement in favour of the government in 1982. The
court decided that there were no legal provisions to compensate foreigners who lost
Japanese citizenship. Since the issue is one of applying or not applying the law. that
authority, it was judged, resides with Japan's National Diet as opposed to the executive.
Individuals in the former Micronesian war service labour units that saw military action
will be subject to the same judgement as the Taiwanese. The rationale for this is that
Micronesians lost 'almost the same status as Japanese nationals' with the termination of
the Mandate.
At present, Japan has not provided any further legal explanation for its denial of
Micronesian claims given its understanding of the Treaty of Peace and the Agreement.
Yet the Japanese government stated it has a high moral responsibility but not a legal
responsibility for bringing some closure to the issue. This means thatJapan has neglected
its duty to seek the understanding of the Micronesian people as one of its moral
responsibilities.
The 1969 Agreement makes a re-opening of negotiations on war claims issues with the
Japanese government problematical. The possibility ofre-opening negotiations creates a
difficult circumstance: the apparent solution of war reparations through a signed agree­
ment and the delivery of economic co-operation and assistance by the Government of
Japan in the post-war period would become anomalous if not null. The Japanese govern­
ment sees its co-operation and assistance to Micronesia as a means for establishing a
future-oriented relationship which includes the burying of the past. 29 There are no pre­
vious examples of international agreements being nullified.
However, by 1994 more than 30 lawsuits had been filed against the Japanese govern­
ment by countries which had earlier apparently considered war reparations solved by
the Treaty of Peace. Suits from Korea and Taiwan concern reparations payments to
individuals who were members of former civilian components that went to war. Suits
have been filed by former military comfort women, not only women in Korea but
women in China and several Southeast Asian countries as well as by women now residing
29
Interview with Takashi Matsumura, Consul, Consulate-General ofJapan, Guam, 28 Dec. 1994.
96
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
in the former Allied Powers, like the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. 30 Regarding
requests from overseas countries, the Japanese government has attempted to resolve
only special cases like that of the comfort women by using ambiguous expressions such
as a 'measured substitute for compensation'. The government attempts to avoid the
generalisation of any reparations issue because it is afraid of the expansion of the subject
of compensation from military comfort women to compulsory labour, military cur­
rency, cruel treatment of prisoners ofwar, etc. In Micronesia there are a few special cases
which might qualify for a 'measured substitute for compensation'. As the Tokyo District
Court stated in the case of the former Taiwanese soldiers' claims, it might be able to open
the way for negotiations withJapan's National Diet by clarifying the legal contradictions
and confusions of the past. Given this possibility, Micronesians would focus on the
notion that compensation is an issue for legislators. In any case, the following points will
be central for such negotiations with Japan:
1. the special character of Micronesia, the so called status of the islanders being under
the Emperor's supreme governing power;
2. the fact that Micronesians held 'almost the same status' as individual citizens of the
Japanese nations, Taiwan and Korea;
3. the fact that Micronesia has never negotiated a reparations agreement with Japan
because of its former dependency status (the Taiwanese case may be instructive and
could provide grounds for argument in court);
4. the question of whether the Support Law was based on the duty of theJapanese state
to make compensation or was simply one of lawmaking policy;
5. whether the Japanese Constitution, Article 29-3, the protection of individual prop­
erty, can be a reason for valid claims by Micronesians; and
6. whether the provision of the Support Law, which is not applied to foreigners, violates
provisions in the Japanese Constitution regarding equality under the law.
The solution of the war reparations problem has two dimensions: Japan's reluctance
to redress the past, and recognition that progress on the reparations issue will be the
starting point for the establishment offuture friendship between a damaged country and
the damaging country. Which points Japan emphasises will differ according to its atti­
tude and policies toward the reparations issue. However, when considering the inhu­
mane character of war, the moral responsibility to victims ought to be given a high
priority. The Human Rights Subcommittee of the United Nations has stated, 'the human
rights people lost and the right of their property must be recovered individually and the
responsibility must be unprescribed'.31 The Treaty of Peace with Japan, Article 14(a),
also gives importance to Japan's responsibility for the damage and suffering caused by its
forces, stating that Japan 'should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage
and suffering caused by it during the war'. Moral responsibility should be taken not only
for material but for psychological damages as well. The means for exhibiting moral
responsibility can be by official apology, monetary compensation, and attention to
historical accuracy. Regarding these points, there remain various problems in the way
Japan has expressed or not expressed its moral responsibility for wartime damages.
30 In Nov. 1994, the Committee for the Former Military Comfort Women ofIapan's majority party agreed
to pay mimaikin, i.e., a temporary gift of money to each comfort woman as a tolen ofjapan's sympathy. The
fund for payment will be created by donations from private corporations, labour unions and individual
Japanese citizens. In opposition to this plan of the majority party, the International Committee for Jurists, a
non.governmental organisation, made the following recommendation to Japan: that Japan has full legal
responsibility for solution of the comfort women problem and that Japan should pay $40,000 per victim as a
temporary measure until complete recovery of damages is made. Asahi Shinbun Chokan, 4 Sept. 1994, p. 3.
31 Asahi Shinbun Chohan, 14 Nov. 1993, p. 2.
JAPAN AND WAR REPARATIONS
97
The issue ofJapan's responsibility for war reparations has always generated discussion
within Japan as when the Treaty of Peace was signed in the 1950s, when diplomatic
relations between China and Japan were re-established as a result of the China:Japan
Joint Declaration in 1972, when government authorised textbooks became a contro­
versial issue, when the judgements of the Far East War Criminal Court were reviewed in
the early 1980s, and, most recently, with the Korean comfort women's complaints. 32
However, the reason that the war reparations issue has not been solved relates to the
Japanese government's diplomatic manoeuvring as displayed in the Agreement, its con­
servatism, and the complicated feelings of the generation of people who experienced
war.
According to a public-opinion poll in Japan, the younger generation supports a com­
prehensive solution to Japan's war reparations problems. On the other hand, men now
over 50 years of age and women now over 60 the so-called war generation - over­
whelmingly support the position that Japan need not respond to war reparations issues.
Rather, they emphasise the damages to the Japanese side. On the question of whether
the Japanese government should respond to war damage claims made by foreign coun­
tries, 50% of the Japanese nation favour such a response, while 37% oppose it. Con­
cerning former Japanese soldiers who were stationed in Japan's colonies, 74% of the
Japanese people support their right to apply for pensions but 15% oppose such a
grant. 33
There is still a profound problem in Japan with respect to the issue of internal war
reparations. This concerns the ethical question of the fundamental value of human life
with respect to the Japanese who were drafted by a summons to active service and then
killed in battle. However, once there is historical evidence ofJapan's oppressive colonial
rule and wartime wrongs and crimes, it is clear, in human terms, that victims, regardless
of citizenship, have a basic right to request and receive war reparations. The Japanese
Diet as representative of the Japanese people should officially present its apology and
reflect on its past. At the 50th anniversary ofjapan's surrender in 1995, the country will
reach a critical point of trust in the eyes of the international community of nations.
Concerning Micronesia, there is no expiration date for japan's responsibility for rep­
arations. Japan needs to amend its long standing bias ofattaching no importance to small
countries vis-a-vis large, established countries, and assume both moral and financial
responsibility for the war damages it inflicted on the Marshall Islands, the FSM and
Palau, which have become sovereign states recently. Japan also needs to respond appro­
priately to claims which may be made in the future from the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands through the United States. In regard to war claim payments
for Micronesia, the Japanese government often mentions its Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) programme as a substitute means for reparations. 34 The total amount
32 The China·Japan Joint Declaration of 1972 states that because of japan's profound reflection on its
'aggression' toward China during the Japan.China War, 1937-45, the Chinese government would relinquish its
claims to war reparations. In lapan all textbooks used in its elementary, middle high, and high schools shall be
examined by the Ministry ot Education. Since the mid· I 950s this ~licy showed the tendency for political
rightism. In 1982, China and Korea claimed that historical descriptions in Japanese social studies textbooks
were not accurate, especially regarding Japan's aggressive expansion into Asia during the 1930s and after.
33 Asahi Shin bun ChQkan, 7 Nov. 1993, p. II.
34 Mitsuo Watanabe, Counsellor, Embassy ofJapan in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, to Kejjo Bien,
Senator ofthe Nitijela, Republic ofthe Marshall Islands, 8Jan. 1993, EJ. Watanabe wrote, 'Regarding its actions
during the last war that inflicted unbearable suffering upon the people of the Asian Pacific region, including
your country, ...Japan is resolved never again to repeat such a tragedy ... With this reflection, Japan has been
making international contributions to the best of its ability, including ever increasing economic cooperation.
You will recall thatJapan has been making every possible effort to promote friendly relations with the Marshall
Islands and that Japan's aid to your country m the past years totalled over $US20 million'.
98
JOURNAL OF PACIFIC HISTORY
granted by ODA as of 1991 was 749 million yen ($US7.49 million) for the FSM, and 375
million yen ($US3. 75 million) for the RMI. ODA assistance for Palau in 1992 stood at 373
million yen ($US3. 73 million). An additional sum of 3.8 billion yen ($US38 million) was
given as direct grant assistance and technical assistance. When we consider imports and
exports in both countries, to be sure, Japan's ODA has an important role to play in
strengthening the Micronesian economy.35 The generosity ofJapan's ODA is admirable
but it cannot be interpreted as a substitute for war reparations unless that is publicly
stated and accompanied by a sincere apology. The current ODA attitude can be a means
for coming to tenns with the original ambivalence for Japan of the war reparations issue
and it will lay the ground forJapan to regain a sense of international trust. WhenJapan's
compensation is given with deep sincerity and contributes effectively to Micronesian
development, then the claims against Japan will have been met in tenns ofan atonement
for the material and emotional suffering caused by Japan during its wartime activities.
W AKAKO HlGUCHI
With respect to Japan's ODA grants, Japan's impact on the economies of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands and Federated States of Micronesia is shown in the J 989 trade figures. RMJ imported SH.4m worth and
exported S2.3m, giving a trade balance of -$42.2m; FSM imported $72.7m, exported $ 7.lm, giving a trade
balance of -S65.6m. Federated States of Micronesia, Marshalllsiands StatlStieal Abstract 1989190, and Trade
Bullelill, October 1989.
B5
The New Zealand Journal ofHistory
Editors: Judith Binney and M.P.K.. Sorrenson
Vol. 28, No.2, October, 1994 contains:
John E. Martin
The Removal of Compulsory Arbitration and the Depression of
the 1930s
Anna Greell
The Unimportance of Arbitration?
The New Zealand Waterfront 1915-1951
Kerry Taylor
'Our Motto, No Compromise': The Ideological Origins and
Foundation of the Communist Party of New Zealand
Pat Walsh
An 'unholy alliance': The 1968 Nil Wage Order
Peter Franks
The Employment Contracts Act and the Demise of the New
Zealand Clerical Workers Union
The New Zealand Journal of History is published twice yearly, in April and October, by
The University of Auckland.
Subscription rates for 1995, payable in advance, post free: Domestic $24.00 Overseas
$NZ35.00 Back numbers available: $8.00 (incl. GST) per issue in New Zealand and
$NZIO.OO overseas.
Subscriptions and all business correspondence should be addressed to the Business
Manager, New Zealand Journal of History,. History Department, The University of
Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand.
NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
Hinduism Under Indenture: Totaram Sanadhya's
Account of Fiji * WHAT FOLLOWS IS extracts from a remarkable
text by a remarkable individual, providing a
rare contemporary description of and commentary on the first attempts to resuscitate
religious and cultural life in Fiji's early Indian community. The site of the investigation is
Fiji at the tum of this century, but the story that Totaram Sanadhya tells here will res­
onate in the early histories of Indian indentured communities elsewhere as well. Cast
adrift from their familiar cultural moorings, trapped in indenture, illiterate and poor,
they struggled against great odds to preserve fragments of their ancestral culture in alien
surroundings for reassurance, comfort, security, memory. Their decision to preserve
their culture was an act of defiance and resistance.
The project of cultural rejuvenation was fraught with problems. For one, as Totaram
tells us, there were few teachers and religious books in Fiji. For another, many of the
early priests were fraudulent men who preyed on the gullibility of their followers and,
when caught, absconded to India or simply disappeared from sight. And then there were
Christian missions which worked tirelessly but unsuccessfully to convert the Hindus and
Muslims to their faith. Why these missions failed becomes clear in Totaram's encounter
with the Rev. J. W. Burton, a Methodist missionary for whom Totaram had genuine
affection but whose creed he refused to embrace. Nor was the chaotic social environ­
ment of indenture conducive to religious instruction. The colonial government's indif­
ference to the cultural needs of the migrants contributed its share to the problem. But the
real culprits in Totaram's account are the Hindu holy men whose habits ranged from
fleecing their disciples to seducing their wives.
For the first time, we now know precisely the kinds of books which circulated in Fiji's
Indian community in the late 19th and early 20th century. These range from simple
instructional texts on astrology and witchcraft and manuals on how to conduct marriage
ceremonies to ballads, enchanting tales of ghosts and goblins, and poems and stories of
romance, heroism and adventure. Much of this escapist literature that provided a relief
from the distress and despair of indenture was popular throughout North India, from
where the bulk of the migrants had come. J This literature circulates in the Indo-Gangetic
plains even today. The books were not read individually - there were just a handful of
copies available and literate people were few in number - but recited at social gath­
erings in the evenings, at weekends, on holidays, and at festive occassions such as
marriages. Together with prayer meetings, and such festivals as Ramlila and Tazia, these
readings countered the fissiparous tendencies of indenture and its aftennath, and served
to forge a sense of community.
Many of the sects that Totaram describes have declined in importance or disappeared
altogether. But the centres of prayer and fellowship that they established had their uses.
Most importantly, many of them later provided the nucleus of the first elementary
schools in the Indian community. These rudimentary structures, often nothing more
than grass huts on the outskirts of the Indian settlements, played a crucial role in eduWe thank Arvind Kalia, Mary Varghese, Deryck Scarr and the Editorial Board of this journal for their
advice and encouragement.
1 See Brij V. La\. Girmitiyas: The Origins rif the Fiji Indians (Canberra 1983).
99
Thej.ufIlai ofPa"fic lfisl"'Y, 30,1 (1995).