COLLECTIVE REMEMBRANCE AND NATIONAL ORIENTATIONS (PATRIOTISM,
NATIONALISM): AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON IN FIVE CENTRAL
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Christoph Reinprecht
Institute of Sociology
University of Vienna
Alserstrasse 33
1080 Vienna
[email protected]
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble 2001
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1. Introduction
Historical ideologies play an important role for national orientations. In this connection only
few empirical research is done. The paper will focus on the question, whether and to what
degree historical references and images of history (taboos and myth, crucial events of nation
building) are connected with and play a role for patriotic and nationalistic sentiments. This
question will be discussed on the basis of the results of representative surveys in five Central
European countries: Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria. The research
was carried out in 1996 (Weiss/ Reinprecht 1998). Among others the surveys include batteries
of questions designed to measure national identity orientations, attitudes toward immigrants,
anti-Semitism and the treatment of the Holocaust (all countries) and the communist regime
(except Austria).
The paper will discuss two aspects: Firstly, it will be shown that the evaluation of historical
experiences and the collective remembrance are an important element of national identity in
all five countries. Secondly, it will be argued that collective remembrance has to be seen as a
context related aspect of national identity: The specific context has an impact on the meaning
of the indicators by which collective memory respectively evaluation of the past was
measured in our research. That means, that questions concerning historical background
requires a specification of items on national level. For our comparison now we will use
identical items as items specific for the four central East European countries. The paper
should be a basis for discussion about the relevance of cultural context in cross-national
comparison.
2. Collective remembrance and national sentiments
Since the 1980s, historical topics have become crucial focal points of political discussion in
many European countries. This not only refers to the 1989 breakdown of state socialism in
East-Central Europe, which was accompanied by such activities as the rewriting of textbooks,
destroying of monuments and changing of street names, and where each individual had to
come to terms with his/her involvement in the old regime. At the same time, East and West
European countries were affected by a process of historical reevaluation concerning the
memory of World War II. In this context, the American historian Tony Judt observed “that in
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postcommunist Europe the past is not only another country but a whole archipelago of
vulnerable historical territories” (Judt 1993, 103). The collective memory works here as a
reservoir of ideologies, historical myths and images, which became an issue of political
conflict.
Sociological literature points out that the function of collective memory is not to remember
what really has happened in history, but to create a “feeling that the collective has its own
history” (Billig 1990, 61). This aspect plays an important role in the process of nation
building (Anderson 1988; Hobsbawm 1991; Smith 1991). Hall states the ”narration of the
nation” as constitutive for national identity, and the collective memory as a stock of different
stories about a nation’s history. The practice of collective remembrance is seen as basically
for the construction of collective identity (Hall 1994, 202).
This functioning of collective memory can be observed in all five countries in which our
research was carried out. In Austria, the reevaluation of the past is focused on the country’s
role during the Nazi regime. After World War II Austria denied any responsibility for the
crimes committed under the Nazis even many Austrians had supported the regime and had
been involved in the annihilation of the Jews. In the last decades (since the so called
“Waldheim affaire”) the officially supported system of excluding and tabooing the NS past
went out of control. The evaluation of the Nazi-regime returned into the public discourse and
has also attracted the attention of historians and social scientists (vgl. Mitten 1992; Ziegler/
Kannonier-Finster 1993; Bischof/ Pelinka 1997).
Until 1989, in Hungary, Poland, The Czech Republic and Slovakia the remembrance of the
involvement into the Holocaust was suppressed by the official ideology of anti-fascism. In the
context of the system change this issue returned into the public debate. On the other hand, the
public discourse was dominated by the communist experience. The countries developed
different strategies regarding the institutionalized forms of policy of the past, and a novel
topography of collective memory has been generated by policies of symbolism. Such
reevaluations of the past made up a component of collective identification policies in the
postcommunist societies as well as reorientations on a individual level (vgl. Król 1991;
Reinprecht 1996).
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To sum it up it can be said that in Austria as well as in the central East European countries
historical topics are of high relevance in public discourse, and historical arguments play an
important role in the construction of collective identity. For example, it can be assumed that in
Austria the collective identity is highly dependent on the evaluation of the experience of
national socialism (is this experience accepted as a part of the own history or excluded from
it?); in the same way, in central East European countries historical arguments concerning the
experience of communism can be expected as an important factor in the process of national
self-definition. Therefore, in all five countries it is assumed that the evaluation of historical
experiences is strongly connected with national sentiments.
3. Evaluation of historical experiences
In order to measure the countries self-images of history, our investigation applied a
questionnaire that included a list of statements regarding different aspects of national history.
Table 1 shows a selection of five statements with equal or similar content for all five
countries. Three of these questions are formulated in the specific context of the
postcommunist countries and refer to the evaluation of the communist past, while in Austria
the same question refers to the national socialist past. The following statements express this
aspects: “Crimes committed by the Red Army (in Austria: under the Nazi regime) are being
exaggerated”; “I understand the fact that a large part of the population came to an
arrangement with the Communist (in Austria: Nazi regime)”. “Communist crimes (in Austria:
Nazi crimes) should no longer be dealt with”. The common statements for all fiver countries
are the following: "Not only Germans were responsible for the Jewish fate but (respondent’s
citizenship) as well"; "Western democracies are in historical debt to (respondent’s
citizenship)". The item concerning the responsibility for the Holocaust refers to the fact that in
all five countries this topic is crucial for the national consciousness. The item about the role of
the Western democracies reflects one of the most prominent historical myth in Central Europe
(including Austria) (Bibó 1992).
The results show a complex picture. The statement that not only Germans were responsible
for the Jewish fate during the Nazi regime is accepted by a large majority in Austria (80%)
and Hungary (63%), whereas in Poland (23%) und the Czech Republic (27%) only a minority
supports this item. Slovakia (45%) takes a middle position. For Austria the result shows a
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generalized self-critical attitude which has become a norm in the political discourse after the
so called “Waldheim affaire” (1986), which as a consequence leaded to an extensive national
debate (in politics, sciences and in the public). In contrary, the results in Poland reflect the
official system of denying any historical guilt concerning the persecution of the Jews; as we
see today this issue is actualized in the present days. In Hungary the “Jewish question” was a
continuous debate since the World War II.
The statement “the crimes committed by the Red Army are being exaggerated” stimulated in
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia rather similar responses. In these countries less people share
this opinion, while in the Czech Republic more people think that the crimes are being
exaggerated. In Austria we find a large proportion (45%) who believe that the crimes of the
Nazis are being exaggerated. The understanding for the “fact that a large part of the
population came to an arrangement with the Communists” is supported in Czech Republic and
Slovakia by a majority of nearly 70%. This is in contrast to Poland, where about one third of
the population shares this opinion; this reflects the deeply rooted anti-communistic traditions
among the Poles. In Austria, where the question refers to collaboration with the Nazi regime,
a high percentage of the population (61%) show an understanding that so many Austrians had
supported the Nazi regime. Not surprisingly, in Austria two third of the population say, that
crimes committed under the Nazi regime should not be investigated. Among the four central
East European countries the Hungarians display a rather non-critical attitude (towards the
crimes of communism) in contrast to the Poles where only a minority support this view.
Concerning the myth of a historical debt of the Western democracies – which is common for
all five countries - it is notable that in Austria 43% of the respondents believe in this myth
(which is connected with the "Anschluss" 1938). With the exception of Slovakia this myth is
strongly anchored in the collective memory of the central East European countries.
4. Historical remembrance in the context of democratic and nationalistic attitudes
Our results make it reasonable to postulate that the assessments of crucial historical events are
connected with emotional ties towards one’s nation: Historical ideologies should be a relevant
part of national sentiments and/or “nationalistic” attitudes, whereas democratic orientations
can initially be suggested to be supportive of a critical inquiry into the past. In this connection
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the rejection of joint responsibility for the Jewish fate as well as the concept of a “final
striking line” (crimes should not be dealt with) and the idea that the Western democracies are
in historical debt to one’s country will be correlated with nationalistic attitudes and antiSemitism. On the other hand, the rejection of nationalistic attachment or a strong orientation
to democratic values are argued to be the prerequisites for critical assessment.
To address these questions, the above mentioned three items (rejection of joint responsibility
for the Jewish fate, crimes should not be dealt with, Western democracies are in historical
debt) were put in a correlation analysis with scales measuring nationalism, patriotism, antiSemitism and democratic rights.
In the following nationalism involves an idealized and uncritical overestimation of one's own
nation (Weiss/ Reinprecht 1998) and includes the three statements: ”Because of our
considerable historical experience, we should have to a higher degree an influence in
international relations”, “If our neighbors of the former Eastern bloc accepted more of what
we do here, they would be better off", “The big western-European countries like France or
England could learn something from us and shouldn’t feel so big even if they are
economically superior”. The patriotism scale was designed to catch the emotional attachment
of the respondent to his nation and includes the statements: “I love (respondent’s country)”,
“To be an (respondent’s citizenship) is an important part of my identity”, “Although at times I
may not agree with the government, my commitment to (respondent’s country) always
remains string”, “I am proud to be a citizen (respondent’s country)”.1
Democratic attitudes were expressed to oppose authoritarian and repressive measures on the
part of the government, by referring to freedom of press, to strike and demonstrate, as well as
the right to establish political opposition. Anti-Semitism was measured with the statements
that are common in international comparisons (also rated as to degrees of agreement or
disagreement), e.g. "Jews are too influential today in our country"; "Jews rule the
international political arena (world affairs)"; “Crimes against Jews are exaggerated”;
"Removing the Jews from Austria also had positive effects" (for the concepts of antiSemitism, cf. Weiss 2000).
1
Answers being recorded on a 5-point scale; the stimulus for the scale emanated from a study carried out in the
United States by Kostermann and Feshbach (1989).
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The assumed relationships emerge in the correlation matrix in table 2, showing that only in
Austria the three items are significantly related with the four attitude scales: Positively with
nationalism, patriotism and anti-Semitism, negatively with democratic orientations. This
results reflects the fact that all of the three items are related to the period of World War II.
Together they represent a mystifying perspective on history which is based on the exclusion
of the historical experience of national socialism. This rejection of historical involvement into
the national socialist past is more strongly connected with nationalistic feelings, but
nevertheless they are a part of patriotic feelings too. As expected, the non-critical attitude
correlates negatively with democratic orientations.
In Slovakia the rejection of joint responsibility for the Jewish fate correlates with all four
attitude scales (similar to Austria). In Hungary the analysis shows a strong correlation with
anti-Semitism and a weaker one with nationalism. In Poland the rejection of historical guilt is
correlated with patriotism. It seems that this (non-expected) reaction of the Poles indicates the
deeply rooted anti-Semitism – to confess historical guilt contradicts the positive effect (love)
towards the country. In the Czech Republic the analysis show no significant results.
Our results confirm the historical myth about the role of Western democracies as a relevant
element of historical resentment in Poland, the Czech Republic and especially in Hungary.
This correspondents with the analyses of the Hungarian historian István Bibó who described
this attitude as an expression of the “misery of the East European” political culture (Bibó
1992).
With regard to the opinion that “communist crimes should no longer de dealt with” we find
the interesting result that it is negatively correlated with nationalism in Hungary and with
nationalism and patriotism in the Czech Republic. In these two countries, those who share
stronger national feelings reject the idea that crimes committed under the communist regime
should no longer be dealt with. That reflects the specific circumstance of the process of renationalizing: Especially in the Czech Republic the attachment toward the nation is negatively
connected with the idea of a final line under communism. In Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
the support for a “final striking line” is connected with low democratic values.
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5. Do historical ideologies affect nationalism and patriotism?
Further analyses emphasize the significance of historical ideologies with respect to national
and patriotic feelings (cf. table 3). In general we can say, that the non-critical attitude to the
collective past reveals higher scores on nationalism; this is the case in Hungary, Czech
Republic and Austria. In Poland the effects on nationalism and patriotism are nearly the same,
in Slovakia they are little higher on patriotism.
We find the best explanation (21% of variance of nationalism, 10% of patriotism) in Austria.
Although sociodemographic variables (age, education) have an high impact, the respondent’s
national and patriotic feelings are positively affected by the non-critical attitude toward the
past. The nationalistic sentiments are influenced by the refusal of historical responsibility;
patriotism is affected by the agreement of the ”final striking line”; this suggests that the
Austrian patriots refuse to see the Nazi past as a part of Austrian history.
In the central East European countries the rejection of joint responsibility for the expulsion
and assassination of the Jews during the NS-period has positive effects on nationalistic
feelings in Hungary, on nationalism and patriotism in Slovakia and on patriotism in Poland.
This Polish patriotism is distinct from patriotic response in the other four countries (in Poland
the rejection of responsibility for the Jewish fate during World War II correlates with
patriotism and not with nationalism, as it is the case in the other countries).
The myth of a historical guilt of the Western democracies has in Hungary a positive effect on
nationalistic and patriotic feelings. The findings confirm again that this historical resentment
is a key issue of national ties in Hungary. In Poland and the Czech Republic this dimension
does not affect patriotism but nationalism.
The idea that communist crimes should no longer be dealt with has only in the Czech
Republic an effect on the nationalistic attitude: Those who want to draw a final line under the
communist history are less nationalistic.
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6. Summary
Country specific factors play a crucial role in interpreting the findings of our research. The
analyses show strong effects of historical ideologies in Austria (concerning the historical
memory of the Third Reich) as well as in Hungary (especially in relation to the historical
myth of the Western countries’ role) and in Slovakia (in relation to the experience of the
persecution of the Jews). In Poland there is a positive effect of the rejection of historical guilt
on patriotism, in the Czech Republic a negative influence of final stroke thesis on the
nationalistic orientation.
The comparison between Austria and the four postcommunist countries makes it clear that the
remembrance of the national socialist past and the communist past is related to very different
settings. In today’s Austria the collective remembrance of the NS regime plays an important
role in public discourse and is also an issue of political conflict, but at the same time it has
become in the last years more and more a part of the historical consciousness. In central East
European countries the remembrance of the communist regime - at least at the time the survey
was carried out – is still present in the people’s everyday life. The past is easily recalled by
actual situations. The memories do not evoke primarily the “dark chapter” of Stalinism but the
real socialist decades of the seventies and eighties, which are sometimes, in the context of the
economic and political changes, seen from a nostalgic view. In contrary, the questions about
the responsibility for the fate of the Jews and the myth about the role of Western democracies
are an essential part of the common Central European historical memory. Our results
demonstrate that these historical issues effect nationalism as well as patriotism in all five
countries, yet in somewhat differing ways.
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Literaturhinweise
Anderson, Benedict (1988): Die Erfindung der Nation. Frankfurt/M.: Campus.
Bibó, István (1992): Die Misere der osteuropäischen Kleinstaaterei. Frankfurt/M.: Neue
Kritik.
Billig, Michael: Collective Memory, Ideology and the British Royal Family. S. 60-80 in:
David Middleton, Derek Edwards (Hg.), Collective Remembering. London: Sage.
Bischof, Günter, Pelinka, Anton (Hg.) (1997): Austrian Historical Memory and National
Identity (Contemporary Austrian Studies 5), New Brunswick: Transaction.
Heinreich, Horst-Alfred (2000): Kulturelles Gedächtnis und kollektive Erinnerungen als
Mikro-Makro-Modell. S. 75-102 in: Ulrich Druwe, Steffen Kühnel, Volker Kunz (Hg.),
Kontext, Akteur und strategische Interaktion. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Hall, Stuart (1994): Rassismus und kulturelle Identität. Ausgewählte Schriften 2. Berlin:
Argument.
Hobsbawm, Eric (1991): Nationen und Nationalismus. Mythos und Realität seit 1780.
Frankfurt/M.: Campus.
Judt, Tony (1992): The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe.
Deadlaus, 4: 83-118.
Kostermann, R., Feshbach, Seymour (1989): Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic
Attitudes. In: Political Psychology, 10: 257-273.
Król, Martin (1991): Revoltuion, Restauration, Amnesie. Über das Gedächtnis in der
postkommunistischen Zeit. Transit, 2: 27 –35.
Olick, Jeffrey, H./ Levy, Daniel (1997): Collective Memory and Cultural Constraint:
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62: 921-936.
Reinprecht, Christoph (1996): Nostalgie und Amnesie. Bewertungen von Vergangenheit in
Ungarn und der Tschechischen Republik. Wien: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik.
Smith, Anthony D. (1991): National Identity. London: Penguin.
Weiss, Hilde (2000): Alte und neue Minderheiten. Zum Einstellungswandel in Österreich
(1984-1998). In: SWS-Rundschau, vol. 40, 1: 25-42.
Weiss Hilde/ Reinprecht, Christoph (1998): Demokratischer Patriotismus und ethnischer
Nationalismus in Ost-Mitteleuropa? Empirische Analysen zur nationalen Identität in Ungarn,
Tschechien, Slowakei und Polen. Vienna: Böhlau.
Ziegler, Meinrad/ Kannonier-Finster, Waltraud (1993): Österreichisches Gedächtnis. Über
Erinnern und Vergessen der NS-Vergangenheit. Wien: Böhlau.
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Table 1:
Evaluation of historical experience
(acceptance in percent)
Hungary
(n=1048)
Poland
(n=1057)
Czech Republic
(n=978)
Slovakia
(n=1117)
Austria
(n=1774)
Not only Germans were responsible for the Jewish fate but …
(respondent’s citizenship) … as well
63
23
27
45
80
Crimes committed by the Red Army are being exaggerated (in
Austria: under the Nazi regime)
35
32
45
39
45
Communist crimes should no longer be dealt with (in Austria: Nazi
crimes)
68
35
52
57
70
I understand the fact that large parts of the population came to an
arrangement with the communist regime (in Austria: Nazi regime)
56
37
68
66
61
Western democracies are in historical debt to … (respondent’s
citizenship)
66
64
62
38
43
*
Item
*
dichotomous construction of variables
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Table 2:
Correlations*: historical ideologies (items) with nationalism, patriotism, anti-Semitism, and democratic rights
Hungary
(n=1048)
Poland
(n=1057)
Czech Republic
(n=978)
Slovakia
(n=1117)
Austria
(n=1774)
.18**
.15**
.21**
.08**
.18**
.21**
-.11**
-.21**
Rejection of joint responsibility for the
Jewish fate
Nationalism (high)
.10**
Patriotism (high)
Anti-Semitism (high)
.10**
.24**
Democratic rights (high)
Communist crimes should no longer be
dealt with (in Austria: Nazi crimes)
Nationalism (high)
-.08*
Patriotism (high)
Anti-Semitism (high)
-.07*
-.07*
Democratic rights (high)
-.10**
-.09**
Nationalism (high)
.18**
.09**
Patriotism (high)
.15**
Anti-Semitism (high)
.16**
-.11**
.23**
-.08*
.11**
.07*
.26**
-.06*
-.10**
Western states are in historical debt to …
(respondent’s citizenship)
Democratic rights (high)
.17**
.09**
.11**
.07*
.11**
.12**
.14**
-.09*
-.06*
13
* p <.05; ** p < .01
Table 3:
Regression: Sociodemographic variables and historical ideologies on nationalism and patriotism
Hungary
(n=1048)
Poland
(n=1057)
Czech Republic
(n=978)
Slovakia
(n=1117)
Austria
(n=1774)
nationalism patriotism nationalism patriotism nationalism patriotism nationalism patriotism nationalism patriotism
Age (high)
.07
Education (high)
-.09
.13
political attitude (right)
rejection of joint responsibility for
the jewish fate
.14
.08
.07
.16
.07
.12
.11
.14
.15
.13
.10
Communist crimes should no
longer be dealt with (in Austria:
Nazi crimes)
.15
.17
.13
.09
r2
.05
.04
.04
.21
-.29
-.16
.08
.19
.21
-.07
Western states are in historical
debt to … (respondent’s
citizenship)
.16
.11
.15
.08
.04
.04
.06
.06
.03
.06
.07
.21
.10