THE CLIENTELISTIC PARTY: A Modified Version of a Catch-all
Party in the Czech Republic?
Michal Klima
Abstract
Is it feasible to identify a new sub-category of political party within a broader type of catch-all party in
the Czech Republic? It is clear from political science literature that political parties are not static
entities. Similar to other political institutions, they tend to transform with time, in response to changes
in their surrounding environment. If the economic, social, cultural and political parameters in society
are to substantially change, it is possible to deduce a change in the role of a political party and its
internal organisational structure. The transition from totalitarian to democratic societies in Central,
and partially in Eastern Europe, presents a process so unique that one may legitimately question if
this has not resulted in a serious modification of the “catch-all party” type.
In the region of Central Europe, Czechoslovakia – and after 1993 the Czech Republic – presents a
special case, where during political and economic transformation next to general features, specific
factors were also enforced, which eventually influenced the set-up and formation of parties in their
early stages. It is left to consideration and further scrutiny to decide whether the unrepeatable
environment of the Czech-Moravian melting pot, characterised by the political culture of nonideological and unscrupulous pragmatism, has not cultivated the “clientelistic form”of political party.
This sub-category may epitomise one of the developing potentials within the scope of a wider concept
of the catch-all party.
Adaptation is the basic precondition of evolution. In this context, political science
studies the developmental stages of political parties. Generally, the following
developmental typology of stages is accepted: elite parties (19th century); mass
parties (1880-1960); catch-all parties (after 1945).
Elite parties (Weber, 1946)1 represent the early stage in the development of political
parties. They are the product of social relations in the 19th century, when the feudal
order gave way to the beginnings of industrial society. Mass parties (Duverger, 1954)2
correspond most with industrial society, which saw the introduction of universal
suffrage and by the existence of sharp socio-political cleavages. Finally, there are
catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966),3 which form during the transition from an
industrial to a post-industrial society.
These individual types of political parties differ in terms of their relationship to civil
society and to the state. Clearly, each of these developmental types of political party
are polar categories that in the given reality of one country or another can assume
various transitional states or can co-exist at the same time.
The political-science discourse surrounding political parties in the Czech Republic at
the start of the 21st century generally concurs that the Czech Republic has a standard
and stable party system that is fully comparable to those present in advanced Western
1
Weber, M.: ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in Gerth H. H. – Mills, C. W. (eds.): From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology, Oxford University Press, 1946.
2
Duverger, M.: Political Parties, Methuen, London 1964.
3
Kirchheimer, O.: ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in La Palombara, J. –
Weiner, M. (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1966, p.
177-200.
1
democracies and as such is one that many in other post-communist countries might
envy. Five main parties have been represented in the lower chamber of Parliament
with almost no major fluctuations for over a decade. There is one large party on the
right, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), and one large party on the left, the Czech
Social Democratic Party (CSSD), and in between there is the smaller Christian
Democratic Party (KDU-CSL) and the small liberal or environmentally oriented
parties. In addition there is the Communist Party (KSCM), representing the extreme
left.
However, behind the facade of would-be stability and standardisation in the sense of
advanced democracies, there are deeper and more fundamental processes that do not
testify to the good quality of democracy in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, the
current situation is alarming.
In an increasingly individualistic and atomised society, Czech political parties are the
rare hierarchically organised structures that can function like ‘little armies’. Under
certain circumstances they can assume authoritarian traits or they act like an octopus
of corruption that penetrates every part of the social order. Particularly exposed to this
kind of threat are states in which a political culture where social ties, cohesion,
solidarity are diminishing along with a fragile institutional division of power, and a
weak civil society. Without these constraining and balancing factors, parties can
behave as though they are out of control. The post-communist context, especially in
the Czech Republic, is fertile ground for cultivating such clientelistic, aggressive, and
pragmatic party groupings.
Owing to the privileged position parties have in relation to the division of labour,
since they are in charge of decision making institutions, they decide not only whom to
appoint to posts in these institutions but also, directly or indirectly, about the
distribution of public funds. Among other things, party elites approve budgets, laws,
and bye-laws, award public tenders and grants, execute privatisations, sell land and
property, and determine rent policies and prices. Hence political parties, given their
influence, decide on the allocation of resources and riches into the hands of
individuals and groups. The influence of parties determines which individuals and
groups are entrusted with considerable amounts of wealth. It was through a symbiosis
of the worlds of politics and business by means of lobbyist ties that political parties in
post-communist countries successfully adapted to the circumstances of the economic
transition. Under certain favourable circumstances, political parties can transform
themselves into privileged firms operating in a more or less hidden politico-economic
market. Political parties then become business subjects in sui generis respectively
clientelistic organisations.
This essay will examine whether it is possible to identify the combination of general
and specific variables in the Central and Eastern European space and particularly in
the Czech Republic which would justify the conclusion that a new kind of political
party has emerged. In other words, it will be considered whether a unique social
framework has taken shape for political parties to operate, one that is substantially
different from the situation in advanced Western democracies. The essay will list
some negative examples of political party conduct that in sum could support a
hypothesis about the formation of a new kind of ‘clientelistic parties’ within the wider
concept of the catch-all party.
2
1. The Formation of the Party System in the Czech Republic – More than just
an Economic Transformation
The standing of political parties and politics in the Czech Republic today has much to
do with how its democratic party system was founded and evolved, or in other words,
with how politics were done before and after 1989. The inception and formation of
political parties after 1989 were significantly influenced by two interconnected factors
that, for logical reasons, do not exist in Western Europe: discontinuity and the postcommunist context. Although it possible to see some form of continuity in the
Communist Party (KSCM) and the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-CSL), in the
sense of their party programmes and voter support, all the other parties emerged from
nothing.
To some degree or another all the parties in government and even in Parliament on the
whole played some role in the political and economic transformation and thus in the
course of democratisation and the transition to a market economy. However, the
problem is how the economic transformation, how privatisation, proceeded. During
the vast transfer of state property into private ownership there were numerous cases of
unexplained bankruptcies, asset stripping, and other forms of economic crime, which
occurred on a mass scale. The state’s debt consolidation agency was then left with the
task of assuming responsibility for milliards of Crowns of bad debts.
The entire economic transformation, which was based on a privatisation process on an
unprecedented scale, proceeded alongside the formation and functioning of the three
main political parties: the right-wing Civic Democrats (ODS), the left-wing Social
Democrats (CSSD), and the broad coalition party, the Christian Democrats (KDUCSL). The unique transfer of vast state property into private ownership mainly left its
mark on party elites. The post-communist 1990s were truly unique in terms of party
formation. In this regard, Marek Dalik, the closet advisor to the former prime
minister, Mirek Topolanek and ‘grey eminence’ of Czech politics, remarked: ‘… in
this country a generation has become cemented in politics that did not grow up in a
good environment in terms of education, opportunities for self-fulfilment, and the
overall level of culture. So it was easy to get into politics in the 1990s, but it has now
already begun to get harder and harder. But at the same time I can see a huge lack of
interest in entering Czech politics. Good-quality people are bothered by the low,
uncultivated environment.’4 In this interview he then went on to say that two worlds –
politics on the one hand and business people or rather crooks on the other – have
become intertwined. And he adds that the difference from politics in Europe or
elsewhere in the world is that ‘the majority of people who are in Czech politics would
be unable or at least would have a hard time making a living in another field. That’s
the main reason why they’re in politics and why they want to remain there at any
price.’5
x
x
x
Negative phenomena like clientelism, corruption, and the alienation of political elites
from citizens are not the result of just a single factor, in this case the economic
4
An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Patek - priloha Lidovych
novin, 11.7.2008, p. 8.
5
Ibid.
3
transformation. These phenomena have deep and complex causes that are directly
linked to the parameters of post-communist Czech society and the mutation of
political parties into clientelistic organisations.
Where do the ideologically impoverished political pragmatism and purely
technocratic approach to power that generate clientelism, corruption, and ultimately
political alienation draw their strength and energy in Czech society? The sources or
factors are the following:
1) The fall of communism and the breakdown of the rigid and all-embracing
system of the communist worldview reinforced a tendency towards deideologization and pragmatism.
2) The post-totalitarian economic transformation signified the transfer of vast
state property into private hands. While some small errors or losses were to be
expected, not corruption and asset stripping on such a vast scope.
3) The post-communist political culture inherited a weak civic sector and servile
behaviour on the part of citizens towards those in power.
These three factors are present to varying degree in other post-totalitarian states in
Central Europe. However, there are three other facts that are essentially specific to the
Czech Republic:
1) The normalisation of the Husak era in the 1970s and the 1980s, which marked
the final stage of the so called real socialism6 in Czechoslovakia, anticipated
the political culture of the post-totalitarian period. In the Husak era of mass
distrust in the political regime, ‘sponging off the state’ became a considerably
widespread phenomenon, aptly characterized by a familiar saying from that
time: ‘who doesn’t rob the state robs his family’.
2) Another particularity is the anti-Catholic tradition, anti-church sentiment, and
prevailing atheism in society. The value orientations of citizens are less bound
up in the rules of Christianity. Instead, they are dominated by boundless
individualism and pragmatism. The country’s political culture is thus strongly
pragmatic.
3) And finally, it is possible to note a weakening sense of patriotism and less
nationalism. After Czechoslovakia divided into two separate states, namely:
the Czech and the Slovak republics in 1993, the majority of Czech citizens
became disillusioned, because up until that time they had identified with the
unified state. Moreover, the successor state, the Czech Republic, essentially
became an ethnically homogeneous territory, so politically significant
conflicts with the Slovaks and even the Hungarian minority vanished.
The last three factors show that in the Czech Republic, unlike in Slovakia (the
Hungarian minority) and Hungary (Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia)
and in Poland (with a persistent animosity towards the authoritarian Russian
superpower), religious and ethnic cleavages have ceased to be a driving force in
politics. There are thus no strong group identities or major political conflicts in the
Czech Republic with the exception of the traditional left/right cleavage. There are
some advantages to this, as politics is not overly conflicting or polarised. However the
6
The term normalisation refers to the period after the Soviet invasion in 1968, when the secretary
general G. Husak ascended to power by leading the the Communist party and consequently the
restoration of the original old totalitarian order followed. The period of normalisation is often referred
to as real socialism (realny socialismus).
4
pragmatic political culture helps shape a conception of politics as a utilitarian or even
an exploitative pursuit. It is no accident that in such an environment those who try to
promote the moral dimensions of politics are mocked as advocates of ‘false truth and
love’7. A political culture based on boundless pragmatism creates an environment in
which the conduct of the main players in the political game exhibits a weaker level of
ideological grounding and a high potential for corruption.
2. The Quantity and Quality of Party Scandals in the Czech Republic
Politics in the Czech Republic, like in other democracies, largely constitutes the
continuation of economic interests. What in Czech politics could be identified rather
new and particularly alarming is the frequency of political affairs and cases of
corruption and the escalating level of political rudeness, arrogance, and cynicism. Top
politicians across the party spectrum do not seem at all troubled by various affairs, but
paradoxically they try to profit from them in the sense that regardless of the issue
what matters is to be at the centre of the media’s attention.
Below is a list of the unusually large number of affairs that occurred in top politics
and were the focus of media attention within a period of just two months in November
and December 2007:
1) In November, the prime minister and the head of ODS - the largest party in
government, Mirek Topolanek,8 returned from an official trip to Bulgaria with
a detour to Innsbruck. He stopped off there for the private purpose of doing
some skiing in the Alps. The unofficial flight detour cost Czech taxpayers an
additional 150 000 CZK. The prime minister explained his stopover in
Innsbruck as necessary in order to meet with the Czech ambassador to Austria.
It should be noted that the prime minister made three trips like this in 2007.9
2) The former prime minister and at this time the main opposition figure, Jiri
Paroubek, head of CSSD, was caught travelling along the motorway at the
extremely high speed of 200 km an hour, well in excess of the official speed
limit of 110 km/h. Such action would have put any ordinary citizen at risk of
losing their license for a year and receiving a fine of up to 10 000 CZK. This
‘special citizen / top politician’ gave the excuse that he knew nothing about
what was happening as he slept through the trip; it was allegedly the fault of
his driver.10
3) The unofficial 2007 champion with the most inadequately explained political
affairs, the head of the Christian Democratic Party and the temporarily
7
After the Velvet Revolution in 1989 the former Czech president Vaclav Havel used the term “laska a
pravda vitezi nad lzi a nenavisti„ i.e.“The truth and love will always beat the lies and hatred „.
8
In May 2009 the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber of Parliament) gave a vote of no
confidence in the government and Mirek Topolanek ceased to be the chair of the government.
9
In April 2007 the prime minister went to Innsbruck in Austria while making an official trip to
Sweden. In October 2007 he stopped in the Italian town of Bologna during an official trip to France.
For more see Machalkova, J. – Reichl, J.: ‘Tajna operace Innsbruck’, Lidove noviny, 21.11.2007, and
Machalkova, J.: ‘Tajemny Topolankuv vylet’, Lidove noviny 20.11.2007, p. 1, 4.
10
Svobodova, I.: ‘Audi s sefem CSSD porusovalo predpisy: vysoka rychlost + dvojita plna cara’,
Mlada fronta Dnes 19.11.2007, p. A1; Svobodova, I.: ‘Pozor z cesty. Jede zenich Paroubek’, Mlada
fronta Dnes 19.11.2007, p. A3, and also Svobodova, I. – Janousek, A.: ‘Jiri Paroubek jezdici a spici’,
Mlada fronta Dnes 20.11.2007, p. A3.
5
resigned deputy prime minister Jiri Cunek, who announced his intention to
rejoin the government with the full support of the top figures in his party, one
that bears the word ‘Christian’ in its name.11
4) The media discovered that Pavel Bem, the deputy chair of the ODS and the
mayor of Prague, was renting a villa for half of the given market price in the
respective locality. The villa is owned by his friend – a developer whose
business is dependent on decisions made by the city council authorities.12
5) It came to light that Bohuslav Sobotka, the former minister of finance and
currently the deputy chair of CSSD - the largest opposition party, excused a
certain businessman from paying income tax and fines owed in the amount 26
million CZK. This is something that can only be done in extremely
exceptional circumstances. He made this decision just before the government
that he was a part of, left office (in August 2006); this tax break was granted to
a hotel operator who is a friend of Jiri Paroubek, the former prime minister.13
6) The media made the scandalous discovery that the uncrowned head of the
Czech underworld, Frantisek Mrazek (who was murdered in January 2006),
had contacts at every level of politics: the Office of the Government, the
Chamber of Deputies, the Ministry of the Interior, the National Security
Authority, and among top opposition politicians.14
If these scandals are just the tip of the iceberg, then, in a figurative sense, there are
many more peaks in the Czech mountain range of political-corruption affairs and
scandals. The following two affairs are among them: the scandal surrounding the exprime minister Stanislav Gross, and the shocking way in which the Presidential
elections proceeded. In 2005 Gross resigned from the post of prime minister when he
was unable to explain where he obtained the money he used to purchase a flat. In
2007 shares in an energy company were bought and subsequently sold under obscure
circumstances at a profit of eighty million crowns.15 Just to illustrate the atmosphere
at the time, the wife of this ex-prime minister was a partner in a business with a
11
First, J. Cunek never gave a satisfactory explanation for how he was able to deposit 3.5 million CZK
in the bank when, according to his recorded income, his family could never have afforded to save that
much. Second, he never explained how it was that he was saving millions but at the same time
collecting social state benefits. Third, it is not clear where half a million CZK from an alleged bribery
affair came from. More than a hundred articles have been published on Cunek’s affairs. Here it is
enough to cite just the following two: Capova, J.: ‘Cunek nevysvetlil zdaleka vse’, Lidove noviny
6.12.2007, p. 3; Kopecky, J.: ‘Nevysvetlil uspory, miri do vlady’ Mlada fronta Dnes 5.12.2007, p. A2.
12
For more, see: Sťastny, O.: ‘Vila pro Bema. Zn.: za polovic’, Mlada fronta Dnes 21.11.2007, p. A3.
13
Malecky, J.: ‘Zalobci proveruji Sobotku’, Lidove noviny 12.12.2007, p. 2. See also Mates, J.:
‘Paroubkuv hotelier neplatil dan’, Mlada fronta Dnes 3.12.2007, p. A2.
14
Jaroslav Kmenta described these connections in a series of articles that were published in November
and December 2007 in Mlada fronta Dnes. All the facts are summarized in: Kmenta, J. (2007): Kmotr
Mrazek, Mlada fronta Dnes, Prague 2007.
15
It remains unexplained why Gross’s friend sold the former prime minister shares in a prospering
company at well below market price. Gross bought them for twenty million Crowns, and then almost
immediately sold them for five times the price, that is, for 100 million Crowns. It is also unclear where
Gross, an articled clerk, acquired the initial ten million in capital. See, for example, the article ‘Hidden
Bay. Tady bydli Gross’, Mlada fronta Dnes 14.4.2008, p. A1, A3. For more, see Kubatova, Z. –
Havligerova, J.: ‘Grossova investice je podezrele dobry byznys’, Hospodarske noviny 27.-30.
September 2007, p. 3; and also the article: Komarek, M.: ‘Trapna volba? Nikoliv. Odpovidajici’,
Mlada fronta Dnes 12.2.2008.
6
woman who also owned a brothel. Later, information surfaced that Ms. Gross also
purchased a flat in Florida for 12 million CZK.16
Another affair was the “wild” Presidential elections held in February 2008, on which
occasion high-ranking politicians made it apparent that, in high-stakes political
games, they were willing to use any means to achieve their ends, including extortion.
Some electors, members of Parliament, received threatening text messages, and others
were sent bullets or gunpowder in the mail.
x
x
x
As mentioned above, the extent of the corruption and clientelistic affairs and scandals
assumes incredible proportions. These affairs affect not just top political circles but
every level of the organizational hierarchy of the relevant political parties. The
reputable daily newspapers refer to them at length almost every day. The reports read
like a newspaper crime segment. Yet it is not clear whether anyone is still interested
in these affairs and whether they are ever investigated.
The reality is that the quality of the political sphere is a reflection of the overall
quality of society. If the wild Presidential elections drew attention to the phenomenon
of the undermining of an open and fair political contest by means of extortion and
corruption, then this is a phenomenon that can be observed in other areas of social
relations, too. Is extortion not a regular occurrence in the economic sphere, too?
A study that the Czech Chamber of Commerce conducted among four hundred Czech
businesses arrived at some negative findings. An absolute majority of the respondents
described extortion as a serious problem, and a full 23 percent of respondents
indicated having directly experienced extortion, and another 30 percent of
respondents indicated that they were aware of cases of extortion in their surroundings.
In addition, 15 percent of the ‘affected’ businesses identified the source of the
extortion as political pressure or even politicians directly. Extortion obviously forms a
significant part of the competitive environment of the economy.17
In 2004 the biggest football bribery scandal in Czech history struck the country´s
most popular sport. In total, 5 clubs, 9 officials, 14 referees, and 5 delegates were
punished. Nevertheless, the football union did not show any interest in dealing
properly with these affairs. One of the top football officials, J. Kubicek, wrote: ‘All of
us who work in football have encountered a bribable referee, delegate, or official.
Who here is a saint in a group where everyone knows each other?’18
Acts of extortion, corruption, and clientelism are based on a lack of respect for the
rules of the political, economic, and sports competitions in an effort to gain
illegitimate advantages. This may seem trivial, but it is no accident that Czechs
16
The flat, 180 m2 in size, was purchased at Hidden Bay residence in Miami. Details, including
photographs, see ‘Hidden Bay. Tady bydli Gross’, Mlada fronta DNES 14.4.2008, p. A1, A3.
17
Lunakova, Z. – Beranek, J.: ‘Vydirani v byznysu? V Cesku bezna vec.’, Hospodarske noviny
4.12.2007, p. 1, 17.
18
Saiver, F.: ‘Afera po roce: fotbal amnestuje’, Mlada fronta DNES, 28.4.2005, p. 5. See also
Blazkova, J. – Chudara, J. – Saiver, F.: ‘Policie nasla 175 000 Kc. Uplatek?’, Mlada fronta DNES,
3.5.2008, p. 8; Palicka, J. – Chudara, J.: ‘Synot ze dna na spicku. A zpet? SKANDAL ROKU: korupce
se vali fotbalovou ligou’, Mlada fronta DNES, 6.5.2004, p. 6.
7
abroad rank among the worst drivers. Not because they are technically inept, but
because they do not respect traffic regulations.19
x
x
x
Some might say of the various affairs and scandals in the Czech Republic that this is
nothing new under the sun. Corruption and scandals are common phenomena in every
democracy, including advanced ones. Nevertheless, in the Czech environment, the
quantity of these scandals is on the rise to the extent that they affect not just the top
political echelons but also the party elite at the regional and communal levels. The
quantity of affairs is such that it is possible to speak about a new quality of corruption
potential in Czech politics. This quality is becoming a systemic property seriously
influencing how the entire political and economic systems work.
Political elites in the Czech Republic are not punished for corruption or scandals and
the cases often just fade away. This is the direct result of breaching the division of
power, where the elites secure impunity for themselves by intervening in the work of
the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and that of the courts. In many respects, the
Czech party system resembles the situation in Italy during the 1990s before the crisis
of political parties and the political system there, resulting from the pervasive
corruption of political elites. A similarity to the state of the party system in Belgium
was noted by a Czech news correspondent in Brussels, L. Tvaruzkova. She wrote that
in the 1990s some politicians in Belgium were implicated as key figures in some dirty
business that led to a number of ‘shootings, suicides, and the sentencing of some
politicians behind bars. Here, too, it at one time cost twice as much as elsewhere in
Europe to build a motorway, and military contracts in the millions were awarded in
almost the ‘Czech way”. It is no coincidence that in Flemish politicians are referred to
as zakkenvullers, loosely translated that means ‘fillers of their own pockets’. That
phrase resonates very familiarly in the Czech Republic.
Unlike Belgium, where political parties returned a portion of the illegally obtained
money and ‘dozens of politicians ended up with a criminal record and were banned
from political activity’,20 in the Czech Republic corruption remains enshrined in the
system.
An accompaniment to all this is that the public is swamped with scandals of
corruption and clientelism, and as the number of scandals grows, so too does the
public’s weariness of and apathy towards them. V.Vlk, a lawyer, has written about the
‘inflated number of prosecutions to no effect’.21 Not only is it that political scandals
are never subsequently resolved in some way and the public loses trust in the
institutional redress mechanisms, but more than a few of them drag on so long that
political scientists and journalists cannot keep track of them.
19
Petrik, I.: ‘Radary meri kvuli ridicum. A ne obecni kase.’, Lidove noviny, 16.7.2008, p. 1,8.
Tvaruzkova, L.: ‘Po usi v Bruselu’, Hospodarske noviny, 21.7.2008, p. 2.
21
Vlk, V.: ‘Justice ma v ocich verejnosti…’, Lidove noviny, 8.8.2008, p. 1,8.
20
8
3. Clientelism and the Clientelistic Party - Main Characteristics
This part will summarize the main features of clientelism and its agents in the political
sphere, i.e. clientelistic parties. Clientelism is a system of continuously expanding and
relatively hidden ties and contacts between, mainly, the worlds of politics and
business, the purpose of which is the maximization of gains through the concentration
of power and wealth. Clientelistic parties play the role of gearshifts, strategically
located in the power sphere so that they can use their influence to successfully execute
a whole range of transactions and mutual exchanges of services. Here the end justifies
the means. Clientelistic parties achieve their aims with the help of a vast arsenal of
nonstandard and hidden means. Dishonest practices are the norm.
Clientelistically established parties lie at the heart of a complex clientelistic system
around which clusters of connected businesses gravitate in orbit. Parties are utterly
irreplaceable in their pivotal role of clientelism. The hierarchical and disciplined
nature of their organizational networks, spread out relatively evenly throughout the
country, predisposes them to this role.
Clientelistic parties – in the interest of attaining and defending the maximisation of
their gains – ensure that their repertoire includes pursuits aimed at restricting or
stamping out all that is independent of their influence. The aim being to eliminate
whatever might stand in the way of their uncontrolled accumulation of wealth. They
also seek to secure impunity for themselves from prosecution for their actions and at
making it possible to level false accusations against the biggest critics of their
conduct.
Explicitly, a clientelistic party is a special type of party within the broader ‘catch-all’
type of party. The primary focus of a clientelistic party as a whole and of its
individual components on the communal, regional, and state levels is immediate
economic profit. To this effect, it seeks clients among similarly strong business
entities, offering them the use of their influence, i.e. the use of their representative
mandates and executive positions in important decision-making institutions and
bodies.
This relationship is reciprocal. Powerful economic players approach political parties
just as they would their clients and offer them extraordinary awards in exchange for
services or for securing them exclusive conditions on the business market.
Clientelistic parties cater to their clients, and in turn allow themselves to be catered to
as clients. A ‘client-client’ relationship thus takes shape between them.
Their main clients are economic subjects, which are the source of the initial impulse
for contact as they seek political decisions that are to their advantage. The person they
contact could be a politician-party member or even a public servant, who does not
usually act alone, as he or she is appointed within the wider clientelistic strategy.
It could be thus said that the approach here is similar to when a person seeks to order
a utility from someone who is a skilled worker or service person. Just as people look
for their own plumber, lawyer, or psychologist, in this case they look for their own
politician (or public servant). The ‘right one’ can be found at the communal,
9
regional,22 or national level, or at every level of politics at once. Rough estimates by
Transparency International stating that around 70 percent of public contracts awarded
in the Czech Republic are to some extent manipulated, suggest that this approach pays
off.23
As parties have gradually become clientelistic, their party structures are being
increasingly influenced in recent years by a new factor, which is the intentional
recruitment of some of their member base from the ranks of employees of local
private businesses. Some businesses dependent on municipal or city contracts instruct
their employees and, indirectly, their relatives to join a particular party. They pay their
membership fees, and they provide refreshments, like beer and snacks, at party
meetings. Not surprisingly, these kinds of members are not usually interested in the
party programme or statutes, do not know who the party leaders are, and do not
actually even vote for ‘their’ party. Their ‘party task’ is to supply the ‘voting
machinery’ that will back a desired politician. These new voting majorities alter the
power relations inside the party and secure the election of those politicians preferred
by their employer company. This enables business to have an influence, for example,
on the appointment of councillors and mayors, regional candidates, and even the
election of deputy chairs at party congresses. This happened at the ODS party
congress in 2008,24 but similar practices have also been witnessed in the Social
Democratic Party and the Green Party.
Speculative recruitment from the ranks of local private businesses is a phenomenon
that in a sense leads to the partial privatisation of the district and regional branches of
the party. This occurs when politicians accept offers from businesses to sponsor them
or, newly, to supply them with a voting majority at party meetings. Businesses ‘raise’
their own politicians and can even control the party in a given area. In return business
representatives receive services in the form of public contracts and valuable
information. Clearly, in this kind of party environment, it is not about the clash of
ideas but about immediate profit and power. The main party players are
representatives of business interest groups that are usually regional in scope.
Clientelism also essentially reveals itself to be non-partisan in nature, showing a
tendency forge links even between parties regardless of their political or ideological
differences. The epitome of this kind of inter-party co-existence in the Czech
Republic occurred in 1998-2002 with the ‘opposition’ or ‘cartel’ agreement” between
the left-wing CSSD and the right-wing ODS, which ensured the formation and
functioning of the government for the whole four-year term. It is not without interest
22
According to a study by Transparency International, most of the public contract deals that are not
transparent are made in the towns and cities. This is one of the reasons why the Ministry of the Interior
prepared a new legal amendment designed to prevent a small group of city or town councillors from
making decisions in closed-door meetings about leasing lucrative buildings or selling property. The
amendment was supposed to make the political decision-making process transparent and limit
corruption and conflicts of interest by giving representatives at public meetings the authority to make
decisions in these matters. All bids would have to be made public, say, on the Internet and reasons
would have to be given for the final decision. However, mayors and regional commissioners opposed
the law and in the end none of this will be enacted. For more, see Blazek, V.: ‘Zakon proti korupci
radnich bude mirnejsi’, Hospodarske noviny, 7.-9.3.2008, p. 2.
23
David Ondracek of Transparency International drew attention to this fact; see Blazek, V.: ‘Urady
objevily korupci. A slibily, ze nebude’, Hospodarske noviny 21.1.2008, p. 3.
24
Kaiserova, Z.: ‘ODS nabira lidi, kteri ji ani nevoli’, Mlada fronta Dnes, 17.4.2009, p. A3.
10
that clientelists of every party place particular value on agreements being kept. This is
apparent in comments by M. Dalik, a top lobbyist and close colleague of the rightwing former Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek about the well-known left-wing
lobbyist M. Slouf. ‘I’m an anti-communist, and I’ll never let the communists forget
what they did with this country. Nevertheless, in my view Mr. Slouf is someone …
who keeps his word and who can be trusted.’25
x
x
x
The clientelistic behaviour of party elites is not a coincidental phenomenon that
affects just coincidental individuals. On the contrary, it is a systemic sign of how
political parties function in a given society that is in a specific stage of development.
The clientelistic party system unmistakably succeeds at grinding up almost everyone,
even the initially most enthusiastic reformers, into a more or less homogeneous mass.
An example here is the career path of Pavel Bem, deputy chair of the largest rightwing party, ODS, and also Mayor of Prague. In the beginning, many people had great
hope that he would become a leader who would declare war on clientelististic and
corrupt conduct. The subsequent disappointment in him is aptly expressed by J. Plesl,
a journalist, who refers to him as a ‘former city liberal’ and especially upbraids him
for allowing himself to be ‘ground up by all the Prague lobbyists, who are only
interested in the billions in the city budget. Today he can serve as a warning example
of what politics can do to a person’.26
The clientelistic system does not of course just mould individuals and their behaviour.
As already noted, the contagion of clientelism mainly spreads between parties. It
generates advantages all around – both for individuals and for parties as a whole. The
advantages are twofold: first, better conditions for success in the power game, and
second, above-average enrichment. In the case of individuals, anyone who can secure
both kinds of profits for his/her party colleagues will have better political career
prospects. Whoever cannot do this and instead hopes to practise ‘clean politics’
usually has no chance of successfully competing with the others and becoming the
‘pack leader’. In the worst case, the latter type of individual could wind up falsely
accused of something and expelled from politics. With regard to parties as a whole, a
prerequisite of success and of being able to obtain and hold onto a share of influence
in executive power at the national, regional, and communal levels is being able to
maintain special ties with the right, powerful economic player. It is not just at the
national level of government that the ability to recruit complicit people from the ranks
of the administration, the media, the police, the public prosecutor’s office, and the
judiciary is valued.
x
x
x
A clientelistic type of party spawns a mutually clientelistic relationship between the
worlds of politics and business. The basic function of a political party in a democracy,
which is to represent the main social groups reflecting relevant cleavages in society,
thus fades into the background. This is accompanied by a corresponding process
wherein political and ideological expressions of these divisions are rendered marginal
25
An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Lidove noviny - priloha
Patek, 11.7.2008, p. 8.
26
Plesl, J.: ‘Chce to konkurenci’, Lidove noviny, 2.7.2008, p. 2.
11
or even insignificant. These then come across like a populist show in the pre-election
carnival.
It is interesting that the reciprocal ‘client-client’ relationship between politics and
business can even take on the form where the relevant figures switch sides or the two
sides can be united in one individual. On the one hand, business representatives
usually try to seek the favour of politicians, but occasionally they will even join a
party directly and promote their narrow economic interests from within it. On the
other hand, politicians usually offer businesses their services on the hidden economicpolitical market, but they can also move directly into the world of business. This
occurs in two ways. If they remain in politics, they can sit on the boards of various
state, semi-state, and city businesses. If for some reason they are forced out of
politics, then an ‘unemployed politician’ may be provided with a social safety net in
the form of a job or sinecures or both by a business with clientelistic obligations. A
classic example is the fate of the former prime minister, Stanislav Gross, who, after
the affair over his flat, resigned from all important functions and then within a
relatively short time remarkably came into fabulous wealth. The journalist M. Weiss
notes that it is no accident that the public do not trust politicians and suspect that the
differences of opinion they profess on the ‘left versus right is for them just a matter of
their career outlook at that moment and they are in politics only to collect contacts
that they profit from later in business.’27
Clientelistic parties acquire parasitic features, and that gives rise to degenerative
processes within the party. Generally, parties cease to respect the rules of the game. If
the rules do not suit them, then they regularly try to get around, break, or do away
with them. For example, everyone knows what rules apply for awarding public
tenders. But everyone also knows that there has perhaps never been a case where a
public tender was awarded under fair and square and transparent terms. Clientelistic
parties by their nature destroy the rules of open competition in the economic market
and that distorts and inhibits economic performance.
Clientelistic parties by their nature hence also deform democracy. They can eat away
at the quality of democracy or they can even pose a direct threat to democracy itself.
The reason is their aggressive action and interventionism aimed at restricting or
destroying the mechanism of checks and balances that exists in the division of power.
Clientelistic parties inappropriately interfere in the work of the police, the public
prosecutor, and the judiciary, and consequently they have a tendency to weaken the
independence of these institutions. They only begrudgingly respect the Constitutional
Court. They usually ignore the findings of audits by the Supreme Audit Office. They
subject critical journalists to harsh verbal attacks. They try to stifle critical voices
coming from civic associations combating corruption or even run down their
employees publicly in the press. For example, the Ministry of Finance targeted
Transparency International with an unusually high number of audits. And because the
end justifies the means, clientelistic parties mine the personal contacts they have from
the former totalitarian or the current intelligence services. They are not even averse to
using bribery or collaborating with the criminal underworld, as is revealed in a recent
publication by the journalist J. Kmenta.
27
Weiss, M.: ‘Peklo uprimnosti’, Lidove noviny, 23.8.2008, p. 2.
12
4. The Clientelist Party – One Form of the Catch-all Party
Where does the clientelisitc party fit in the developmental typology of political
parties? In political science it is argued that after the Second World War, during the
transition from industrial to post-industrial society, there was an increasing tendency
for the ‘mass’ type of party (Duverger, 1954) to transform into a ‘catch-all’ party
(Kirchheimer, 1966). Later, at a conference in Manchester, England, in 1995, P. Mair
and R. Katz presented their concept of a new type of party. They called it a ‘cartel’
party,28 which in the new conditions of post-industrial society would replace the
‘catch-all’ party.
Although opinions varied on whether or not a cartel party is a separate developmental
type of party, from a Czech perspective during the late 1990’s, it then seemed that it
was a new and developmentally higher type of political party. This opinion was
based, among other things, on experiences from the Czech Republic in 1998-2002,
when the two largest parliamentary parties from opposite ends of the ideological
spectrum signed an agreement on cooperation. The parties’ objective in signing the
agreement was to ensure the approval and survival of the government. Such a nonstandard alliance of left-wing CSSD and right-wing ODS was a step towards the
cartelization of the political space and in many respects resembles the description of
cartel parties.
Nevertheless, in the context of further development and with the benefit of time, it is
today more feasible to be inclined towards the opinion that it is not possible to regard
a cartel party as a new and separate type of party in the development of the party
system that would replace the catch-all party. The cartel party thus appears to be one
potential form of catch-all party that tends to take shape in the specific circumstances
of the simultaneous occurrence of two phenomena: 1) overabundant interconnections
between parliamentary parties and the state, and 2) excessive cooperation between
these parties respectively. Similarly, the clientelistic party can also be classified
within the wider category of the ‘catch-all’ party as potentially being its next
developmental stage. It also forms under the specific aforementioned circumstances.
In other words, a catch-all party can assume multiple forms, depending on the specific
conditions in a given country or group of countries within a given region. The
countries in such a group are often territorially close, such as the states in the
countries of Central, Eastern, and even Western Europe. Different political, economic,
and cultural-historical processes occur in different European regions and to one
degree or another have a modifying effect that influences the kind of catch-all party
that emerges. It is important to point out that just because a country is part of a
particular region does not mean that the conditions in that society cannot be more like
those in a country in another region. For example, the Italian party system could
perhaps fall into the same clientelistic category as the countries of Central Europe.
The Dutch political scientist R. Koole, criticising the concept of the cartel party, also
pointed out that party formation depends on the specific conditions in a given country
and in a given region of Europe. The relationship between parties and the state is
28
Mair. P. – Katz, R.: ‘The Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics, 1995, 1.
13
influenced by numerous variables, among them a country’s overall historical
development, the development of the party system, and the way in which the media
and the electoral system are organised. Political parties, for example, in countries that
have had a dictatorship (Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) can assume specific
features.29 But it is equally possible to identify the common and the specific
conditions that shaped party formation in countries in the post-communist region.
Within this large group of states it is also of course possible to distinguish the regions
of Central Europe or the post-Soviet Baltic States. And obviously each particular
country has more specific features of its own. And according to this logic it is possible
to submit the hypothesis that all post-communist countries possess strong clientelist
features, and the Czech Republic, owing to its specific features (discussed above),
possesses a model type of clientelistic party.
The post-communist environment became the ideal setting for the emergence of the
form of clientelistic parties. The following phenomena and processes can be seen as
the main reasons for this:
1) The prevailing initial discontinuity of parties and the new emergence of
political parties as such within the context of the democratisation after 1989; a
lower party membership base, and parties that are shallowly rooted in society;
2) The formation of parties in the conditions of an economic transformation
based on the mass transfer of state property into the hands of private owners;
3) An under-developed civil society.
The second cause has already been discussed above. With regard to this first of the
three, it is worth somewhat elaborating the arguments behind that point here. The first
part of the statement, ‘the prevailing initial discontinuity of parties’, refers to the fact
that the end of the totalitarian system also marked the end of the era of rule by the
communist single state-party (which was complemented by smaller satellite parties in
certain countries). The start of the democratisation period also signalled the start of a
process in which dozens of new parties emerged and took shape. This signified major
discontinuity with the preceding period, as most parties that emerged were new, with
no previous history, and the old ones experienced qualitative changes. The fact that
the Communist Party continued to exist in the Czech Republic, the Christian
Democrats underwent reform, and the Social Democrats tried to pick up after a fortyyear break does not contradict the validity of the overwhelming discontinuity
phenomenon prevailing in the Czech party system.
That brings us to the second part of the statement in the first point: ‘the small party
membership bases and the shallow roots of parties in society’. The small number of
members and shallow roots of parties are the result of the discontinuity and general
newness of parties. P. Mair and I. Biezen found small membership bases to be a
general feature of political parties in post-communist Central Europe.30 For example,
in the Czech Republic, both of the two largest parliamentary parties, CSSD and ODS,
emerged and each of them till date number only around twenty to thirty thousand
party members. This means that the two largest government parties have very small
29
Koole, R.: ‘Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel: A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party’, Conference in
Manchester, 1995.
30
Mair, P. – Biezen, I.: Party Membership in Twenty Democracies 1980-2000, Party Politics, Vol. 7,
January 2001, No. 1, pp. 5-21.
14
membership bases in the towns and regions. Each of these parties is in fact run by just
several dozen or at most a hundred members, who occupy key positions in the
communal, regional, and eventually the national level or key functions as
representatives, councillors, mayors, and high-ranking public officials. In this narrow
group of individuals everyone usually knows everything about one another, and this
binds them together in the sense that they are able to keep each other in check.31 They
tend to use their powerful positions of power not to promote ideas but rather to assert
their narrow group interests. As the Czech lobbyist M. Dalik says: ‘There are several
layers to politics and some are visible and some are not’.32 What is visible, or rather
audible, is the vocal articulation of ideas, which actually play second fiddle and are of
secondary importance in the Czech political game. What should remain concealed are
the clientelistic practices exercised for the benefit of the narrow group of party elites.
However, this certainly does not mean that the ideological ‘baggage’ of a party is
irrelevant. Parliamentary parties still have ideological conferences and various thinktanks, and ideas and ideologies still have a mobilising function inside the party and a
mobilising function on the outside against their ideological opponents.
In sum, the following phenomena and activities are typical of clientelistic parties:
1) The unusual quantity and quality of corruption affairs and clientelistic
practices;
2) The exercise of political influence becomes a business; parties tend to reconceive themselves as privileged firms operating in a covert politicaleconomic market;
3) The parasitic mode of existence and functioning of parties: the clientelistic
function becomes the main function of a party and manifests itself in the
‘client-client’ relationship between the sphere of party politics and the sphere
of business;
4) Partial ‘privatisation’ of local, district, and regional branches of the parties as
the outcome of the targeted recruitment of part of the membership base from
the ranks of employees of local private businesses;
5) The basic function of parties - i.e. their representative function of significant
social groups (cleavages) - fades into the background;
6) The political ideology of parties becomes marginal or even insignificant
(usually articulated on a formal, ritual level);
7) Standard government parties have the strongest tendency to become
clientelistic;
8) The “contagion of clientalism” spreads on an intra-party level (within the
party structures) as well as on an inter-party level (from one party to another);
9) The interconnection of clientelistic networks on an inter-party basis;
31
It is certainly no accident that unverified reports that Pavel Bem, deputy prime minister of the ruling
ODS and Mayor of Prague, is under investigation in relation to the privatisation of Ruzyne Airport
surfaced in a number of newspapers at the same time. However, the police’s corruption division denied
information about an investigation. Subsequently Bem called on some journalists to not allow
themselves to be ‘drawn into the unfair games of various groups of influence and interests’. It was
known that at the time Bem was a critic of ODS chair and at the time prime minister, M. Topolanek,
and also a rival within ODS of the then interior minister I. Langer, under whose authority the police
fall. For more see ‘Policie: Pavla Bema nevysetrujeme’, Lidove noviny 28.8.2008, p. 4; ‘Policie:
Primatora Bema nevysetrujeme’, Mlada fronta DNES, p. A2; ‘Bema nevysetrujeme tvrdi policie’,
Hospodarske noviny, 28.8.2008, p. 2.
32
An interview with Marek Dalik – see Plavcova, A.: ‘Jiste pane premiere’, Lidove noviny – priloha
Patek, 11.7.2008, p. 8.
15
10) Clientelistic activities distort the legal environment in the sense that it
becomes difficult to enforce the law;
11) There is a tendency to restrict all that is independent (not only verbal assaults
on the independent media and civic associations and organisations);
12) There is a tendency to undermine the principle of the separation of power
between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches and to
undermine the system of checks and balances;
13) There is a tendency to undermine the rules of fair and open competition in
politics and economics.
From the above it is apparent that ‘cartel’ and ‘clientelistic’ parties are just two
variants or sorts of party within the wider category of the ‘catch-all’ party. However,
it is important to note that both forms of party, cartel and clientelistic, represent nonstandard mutations of the catch-all party that occur in negative circumstances. They
are in fact deformations of the standard catch-all party.
Here mention should be made of the general characteristics of the standard model of
the catch-all party according to O. Kirchheimer. In his 1966 essay ‘The
Transformation of Party Systems in Western Europe’, he identified five typical signs
of a catch-all party: 1) the party’s ‘ideological baggage’ is substantially reduced; 2)
party leadership assumes a greater role; 3) the role of individual party members is
reduced; 4) less emphasis is placed on the party’s traditional interests; 5) there is a
tendency to try to secure access to various interest groups.33
It could be said that these five characteristics are the common denominator, the
essence, of all forms of catch-all party, despite the fact that the degree to which each
characteristic is present varies individually. The standard form of catch-all party
contains more or less all of the above-mentioned characteristics and is not dominated
by distorted clientelistic or cartel practices, or they occur only marginally. If
clientelistic, cartel, or other distorted practices are dominant, it is possible to speak of
a non-standard catch-all party.
In this respect it is also possible to include among non-standard catch-all parties the
oligarchic party observed in the Ukraine. This party variant forms in the
circumstances of a society that is having difficulty democratising, either because there
is the tradition of democracy in the country is entirely absent or because democracy
has existed for too short a time. The new, powerful business-oligarchs become the
main political players and directly found their own political parties.
If we look at the situation in the Ukraine after the 2007 elections, we find that politics
there are essentially the extension of a process in which the elites parcel out the
country’s wealth. Political parties are then the direct tools of business clans.34 The
Ukrainian Parliament is dominated by new entrepreneurs –nouveaux riches– who
divide up the sphere of influence in the economy and the media among themselves.
Although the Ukrainian prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, is viewed as pro-Western
33
Kirchheimer, O. ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party System’, in La Palombara, J. –
Weiner, M. (1966) (eds.): Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton University Press, p.
177-200. See also Klima, M. (1998): Volby a politicke strany v modernich demokraciich, Prague,
Radix, p. 48.
34
Masa, P.: ‘Juscenkova zrada’, Lidove noviny, 8 October 2007, p. 10.
16
and pro-democratic, in reality she is a very controversial politician. She is considered
to be the wealthiest woman in Ukraine – an oligarch. She acquired her wealth while
Table: Standard and Non-Standard Forms of the Catch-all Party
Forms of
catch-all party
BASIC
(minimum)
Standard/
Non-standard
Standard
Social circumstances
(period)
- After 1945
- Advanced democracies in
transition from an industrial
to a post-industrial societies
CARTEL
Non-standard
- After 1970
- Mainly identified in
advanced democracies
CLIENTELISTIC
Non-standard
- After 1989
- Democratisation
- Mass privatisation
- Under-developed civil
society
- Most parties are new
- (three additional factors in
the Czech Republic – see
the text above)
OLIGARCHIC
Non-standard
- After 1991
- The absence of democratic
traditions
- Oligarchs parcelled out the
country’s wealth
HYBRIDS
Standard
- After 1945
17
Main characteristics
- Substantially reduced
ideological ‘baggage’
- A greater role played by
party leadership
- A smaller role for
individual party members
- Less emphasis on the
party’s traditional narrow
interests
- Attempts to secure
access to various interest
groups
- Can include some
marginal negative
characteristics typical for
non-standard forms
- Excessive close links
between parliamentary
parties and the state
- Non-standard
cooperation between these
parties
- (for other characteristics,
see above – Basic form)
- The unusual quantity
and quality of clientelistic
practices and corruption
- A ‘client-client’
relationship between
parties and business
- The partial
‘privatisation’ of local,
district, and regional
branches of the party
- (for other characteristics
see above – Basic form)
- Oligarchs find and
control their own parties
- Protection of the
economic and other
interests of the oligarchs
- Basic minimum plus a
mix of other forms
Region or
country
Western
Europe,
USA, other
advanced
democracies
Scandinavia,
parts of
Western
Europe
(Germany,
Austria)
Central
Europe
(Czech
Republic),
Italy
Ukraine
Most
countries
with
advanced
democracies
she was President of United Energy Systems in Ukraine and later when she was
Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy.35
The cartel party, clientelistic party, and oligarchic party are all non-standard and thus
distorted forms of the catch-all party. Given that they are mutations of the catch-all
party, it will come as no surprise that all three forms contain some negative
phenomena in common. Nevertheless, they should still be distinguished from each
other because, as the table shows, they emerged in somewhat different social and
historical circumstances and quite different characteristics are emphasized within each
of them.
Metamorphoses and partial mutations to the catch-all party occur and vanish in
relation to the specific environment and time. The above-discussed forms of catch-all
party, whether standard or non-standard, are ideal types and therefore purely
theoretical categories. In the complex realities of various societies such crystal-clear
variants are found only rarely. Not uncommonly, a catch-all party can suddenly
exhibit features that are inherent to more of its forms at once. Thus in reality it is
mainly possible to encounter its various transitional stages, respectively its hybrid
forms.
5. The Mutations of a Catch-all Party and the Reduced Quality of Democracy
The standard and non-standard concepts of the ‘catch-all’ party reflect different levels
of democracy. Logically, a democratic environment of higher quality produces a
higher-quality ‘catch-all’ party. And conversely, a lower-quality democracy
engenders the clientelistic, cartel, or oligarchic mutation of this type of party.
From this it can be inferred that if there are clientelistic parties in the Czech Republic
the quality of its democracy is not high. This claim is echoed in the conclusions of the
sociologist Marek Skovajsa, who over time compared findings from three
independent sources: The Economist,36 Freedom House,37 and Transparency
International. In comparisons like The Economist’s Democracy Index or Freedom
House’s Freedom in the World reports the Czech Republic comes across as a
contradictory democracy. On the one hand, while it satisfies very well the minimum
criteria of a democracy such as fair elections, political pluralism, freedom of the press,
and the observance of human rights, on the other hand, there are serious weaknesses
‘in the attitudes of citizens towards politics, in the public’s participation in political
life, and especially in the behaviour of individuals and institutions in the spheres of
political, administrative, and economic power’.38 The high level of corruption is
generally considered to be a serious problem.
35
In 1996-1997 she was President of United Energy Systems in Ukraine. In 1999-2001 she was Deputy
Prime Minister for fuel and energy. For more see Prochazkova, P.: ‘Skorotriumf odepisovane Julie’,
Lidove noviny, 2 October 2007. For more on the political situation and the party system in Ukraine, see
Klima, M.: ‘Cesko a rozdelena Ukrajina’, Hospodarske noviny, 10. 12. 2007, p. 12.
36
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf
37
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
38
Skovajsa, M.: ‘Jak si vlastne stoji ceska demokracie’, Lidove noviny – Orientace, 12.7.2008, p. 21.
18
The consultancy firm Ernst & Young conducted a study among top managers in
Czech firms on the subject of enforcement of the law in business, also produced
negative findings. Although two-fifths of Czech managers believe that enforcement of
the law is improving, a full 82% consider it inadequate. This is an alarming situation.
While in the Czech Republic only 6% of managers speak favourably about
enforcement of the law, the figure in advanced markets is 85% and in developing
markets it is 36%.39 Clearly, in an environment where the police and the courts do not
provide firms with adequate protection from corruption, corrupt conduct grows. Some
firms are restricted in their access to certain markets, their costs go up, and people in
leadership positions can be at risk of being penalised. In other words, firms that do not
accept the rules of corruption may have difficulty obtaining clients and contracts and
ultimately even difficulty surviving or developing. As Ernst & Young also show,
while internal company codes or regulations aimed at minimising corruption mainly
exist in Czech branches of foreign firms, ‘in the vast majority of Czech firms no such
rules exist’.40
The Czech Republic thus exhibits ‘the adjunct signs of insufficient democracy’.41
From an institutional perspective it adequately provides only the minimum framework
of democracy. But in terms of the content and conduct of the relevant actors, there are
serious failures in the political system and the overall quality of democracy is
consequently reduced.
Conclusion
A specific type of party has thus been cultivated in the unique environment of the
Czech Republic: the ‘clientelistic’ party. What elsewhere develops naturally over
many decades or perhaps even centuries occurred there within the space of the first
ten to fifteen years after the fall of communism. This refers to the process whereby
private property is accumulated and concentrated in the hands of new owners.
Simultaneously what was originally a strongly egalitarian society began to stratify.
Among others, wealthy, middle, and poorer classes began to emerge. Within a short
historical interval it was decided a generation in advance where every individual and
his/her family rank in the social hierarchy. It was a period of extraordinary golddigging – a kind of Czech Klondike era – which was mainly directed by the
governmental parties. And naturally their core ranks were not comprised solely of
philanthropists and saints. On the contrary. In the eyes of many rank and especially
elite party members the mass transfer of property represented a unique opportunity to
improve their material position and obtain wealth beyond the limits of their wages. It
is therefore no coincidence that the principles of the rule of law were violated and
clientelism and corruption flourished everywhere.
There was no substantial change in this even after the economic transition reached
completion. There remained a legacy of clientelistic-corruption networks and within
them the special Czech kind of clientelistic party. Such hypertrophied and arrogant
39
Advanced or older markets are those in countries like Austria, Germany, The Netherlands,
Switzerland, and developing or new markets include those in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Russia. For more see Maly, O.: ‘Manazeri: Korupce jen kvete’, Lidove noviny, 30.5.2008, p. 14.
40
Ibid.
41
Skovajsa, M.: ‘Jak si vlastne stoji ceska demokracie’, Lidove noviny – Orientace, 12.7.2008, p. 21.
19
party structures do not vanish but adapt and reproduce in altered circumstances. While
the rise and development of this system in the 1990s fed off the process of mass
privatization, in the next decade, when not much remained to privatize, political
parasitism focuses on milking ‘tithes’ from taxpayer-funded public resources.
On the backs of the first generation of politicians, mid-level and high-ranking party
positions came to be occupied by people whom we could call the second, emerging
generation of politicians. The first generation produced the leaders who, alongside
rapacious and clientelistic practices, also espoused more refined ideas and ideologies.
However, the second, younger generation, many of whom came along too late to
make money off the economic transition, is comprised of people who are more like
‘politician-entrepreneurs’, who are absolutely ideologically barren. They have a very
clear and simple eye on the prize in the sense of unscrupulous dog-eat-dog approach
to politics. On the whole, politics in the Czech Republic seems to be an even more
vulgar and more expediently practised craft than before.
Instead of representing the interests of civil society political parties behave
increasingly like representatives of the interests of privileged firms. In this sense they
are becoming a kind of intermediary firm that makes above-average profits on the
covert political-economic market.
If political parties are coming to represent increasingly allied business subjects, it can
be deduced that not only is the representative function of political parties undergoing
serious modification but so is the very nature of democracy. Democracy can then be
defined as government by relevant parties and privileged firms that co-exist in
symbiosis and together sponge off public resources provided by taxpayers. This
situation can generally be described as clientelistic democracy.
In the debate about clientelistic democracy the political scientist J. Mlejnek reflected
that the influence of lobbyist groups on politics is so improper and dominant that, in
his view, the significance of elections is decreasing. He writes: ‘The influence of
various economic-lobbyistic groups in the background of politics, which are generally
not far from organized crime, is growing and is so great that it gradually makes less
sense to vote. The ‘arms of various octopi’ are trying to ‘influence the election results
in their favour’.42
To criticize just politicians and their party organizations means only to touch the
surface of the problem. They get their behavioural limits from their surroundings. It is
the social environment that produces politicians in the form of clientelistic and corrupt
clones. Complicit in the reproduction of these clones is everyone who directly
partakes in their activities and even the passive majority that looks on or takes no
interest in public affairs. Therefore, criticism of partyism cannot be interpreted as
anything else but criticism of the state of society. In this sense, politicians are envoys
of the worst in us. Unless the atmosphere in society undergoes a substantial change,
no improvement in public affairs can be expected.
To summarize, at first glance it might appear that the situation in the Czech Republic
in terms of the distribution of political parties along left-right scale is relatively
42
Mlejnek, Josef jr.: ‘Palermo a klid’, Lidove noviny, 13.10.2008, p. 10.
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standard and stable. Nevertheless, the extent of clientelistic and almost mafia-like
practices in Czech politics and in the economy can be regarded as alarming. To
understand the state of political parties and events in the party and by extension the
entire political system a traditional analysis of the standard cleavages in society is not
enough. There can be many other variables concealed behind the veil of ‘cleavages’
that have a significant influence on the party system.
Therefore, it is necessary to focus attention and examine other sources than just purely
political science literature. ‘Compulsory reading’ to understand the party system
should include the findings of the Supreme Audit Office, reports of the Security
Information Service, studies from the Czech Chamber of Commerce, analyses of anticorruption and anti-clientelistic civic associations and organisations like Transparency
International or Regeneration,43 articles by investigative journalists in the daily
newspapers (Hospodarske noviny, Mlada fronta DNES, etc.) and in weekly magazines
(Respekt, Reflex, Tyden, Ekonom, etc.), interviews with lobbyists, politicians, and
their assistants, and finally the book by the journalist; J. Kmenta: Mrazek, The
Godfather (Kmotr Mrazek), which reveals the links between politics and the mafia.44
43
44
http://www.oziveni.cz/
Kmenta, J. (2007): Kmotr Mrazek, Mlada fronta Dnes, Prague 2007.
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