It is instructive to begiriWith.<sb.rÍ1.é
preliminary rem.arks toidentify'thé
background ·of the folloWing work.
This paper is written in the context of
the "Exploratory workshop about Is­
lam} human rights and secular values
in Europe" held in Istanbul in Novem­
ber 2010. Islam was intended as the
main topic} the theme which all pre­
sentations were to address. However}
this paper Will not study the so-called
"Islamic question" by assessing the
latest legal developments of freedom
of religion for Muslims communities,
nor Will it analyze the recent case law
regarding religious rninorities. Rather,
it will examine the framework and the
context from wruch most religious
Muslirns claims arise.
.Religlous
Pluralism
in liberal
Democracies
Towards an Inclusive
Citizenship
Eugenia Relaño
Pastor
This framework is two-fold: one, a
multicultural and multireligious soci­
ety wherein the duty of state authori­
ties to legislate for the· general good
inevitably produces coñflicts with
285
EUGENIA RELANO PASTOR
286
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
individual beliefs¡ and two, a principIe -of neutrality which
lies on an ideological and cultural meaning of sectilarization.
A common denominator of Western European countries is
their tendency to consider the sacred as rnisplaced within the
civic context.' The idea that religion cannot playa role in the
general weH-being of societies is co~on throughout Eu-­
rope. However, Islam's arrival has reopened a case previously
considered "c1osed", that ofthe relationship between the State
and religions, as it has also called into question the neutral
and secular role ofthe State.
In considering this issue, it is important to note the exis­
tence of non-Muslim religious groups who also call into ques­
tion mainstream secu1arism. In Germany¡ for example, there
has been considerable debate over Christian values in the
public sphere, whlle in Italy the display of the crucifix in the
c1assroom has sparked frequent controversy. However, the
máin streams ofEuropean public culture are highIy secu1arized,
tending to ignore religious dimensions meaningful to some
segments within the society. The consequence of such a tradi­
tion ofsecularism is that various manifestations ofIslam within
Europe are perceived as troublesome. Ongoing controversy re­
lated to the wearing of a hijab, frequent outeries over magazine
cartoons, radical preaching in mosques, the demand for sepa­
rate Muslim religious education, the use and growth of sharia
courts, and more recent1y, the Swiss initiative to prohibit the
construction ofminarets, all shed light on the tension between
Islarnic c1aims and European conceptions of secu1arism.2
Throughout Europe, the presence of Islam continues to
call into question the norms ofthe dominant culture. The new
visibility of established Muslim minoritie-s alongside continu-
l'
ing immigration has brought new cultural and religious is­
sues to the fore: How should European society deal with "the
Islarnic question" when Islam is so different to the norms of
secular countries? How can religious diversity be accommo­
dated? Should current laws be adapted, or instead should new
arrivals to Europe be made to comply with existing laws? In
short, what solutions are possible when religious beliefs and
convictions are in conflict with common societal norms?
Should a new, and stricter, secular public sphere be built, to
prevent such requests being made by Muslims?
AH European countries, in one way or another, are faced
with these questions, questions which often drive individu­
als and groups to emotional reactions ranging from fear to
introspection, or to populist ideologies which manipulate
such emotions for their own purposes. One might therefore
be tempted to address such emotionalism and its results by
noting, on one hand, increasing "anti-immigrant" public sen­
timent, specifically "Islamophobia"3, and on the other hand,
increasingly restrictive approaches to religious freedom as has
been seen in France over the presence of religious symbols in
schools, for example, and in Switzerland with the governmen­
tal initiative to prohibit rninarets. Therefore, a low threshold
for acceptance of Muslim religious practice within European
public space, combined with hostility towards a religion taken
more seriously than what the secular non-churchgoing citi­
zens call "cultural Christianity'~ is beyond doubt. 4 As Joppke
has noted the c1ash between liberal states and the infiux of
immigrant populations with traditional beliefs must lead to
conilict and, by default as it were, the exc1usi()n of Muslims
in Europe. s Liberalism itselfbecomes an identity for modern
~
287
288
I
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
secular peopleJ with the liberal and civic integration present­
ed in termsof inflexible cultural-national frames reproducing
hierarchies of good culture versus bad cultureJ good religion
versus bad religion. UnfortunatelYJ European societies like to
present themselves as cornmunities based on a good citizen­
shipJ as opposed to Islam or to other strong religious feelings. 6
In this presentation I will point out how the claims of citi­
zens who hold a religious conception of the goodJ one which
deviates from the secular mainstream conceptionJ challenge
liberal definitions of citizenshipJ thereby advocating for a so­
called multicultural citizenship. At the same time I will high­
light the need to recognize and integrate religious pluralism
through reasonable accornmodations. AlthoughJ in the strict
senseJ reasonable accommodation is the management of ex­
ceptions on a case-by-case basisJ first developed in Canada
and USAJ and increasingly an important point of reference
for European systems.7
B. MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP
Traditionally citizenship has been defined as the legal status of
membership in a political community. Citizenship means cer­
tain equality with regard to the rights and duties of members
within that community. As a legal statusJ citizenship implies
a unique and reciprocal relationship between the individual
and the political community. Citizenship is the foundation of
the nation-state8J with nationality the cement of citizenship.9
As Shachar points outJ citizenship is in shortJ "nothing less
than the right to have rights':lO Liberal citizenshiprefers tó
the link between the individual and the State. Modern states
determine who is entitled to citizenshipJ prioritizing an in-
I
dividual either as an holder of rightsJ or as a member of the
political cornmunity (the civic-republican model)o However
this definition of citizenship possesses a certain "blindness to
differences': ]ustice may also require the recognition of tradi­
tions and specific ways of life wholly unique to members of
non-dominant cultural minorities. 11 Recently the European
concept of citizenship finds itself challenged by increased
global immigration which is not a specific type of diversity,
separate from other types of diversity (linguisticJ religious
J
national) but an example of multiple diversities.12
Traditionally, classicalliberalism has understood cultural di­
versity as private spaces (separated from public spaces)Jwhere­
in the majority rulesJ and has responded to the idea of cultural
diversity from the position that the state is culturally neutral
and people are free to act as they like so long as it is done within
the private sphere 13 • Cultural diversity then becomes an exten­
sion of the principIes of secularismJ yet secularism as such has
been highly contested byMuslims communities living in liberal
democracies. HenceJ the secularism ofliberal democratic states
can no longer simply be taken for granted. 14
Multicultural policies regarding cultural diversity are con­
cerned with the power ofthe state or major social groups over
identity groups 15 'This concern derives from a philosophical
position that stresses the role of culture in constituting "a
person's understanding ofwho they areJ of their fundamental
defining characteristics as a human being':16 Culture is a fun­
damental part of us and as such cultural diversity cannot be
restricted to the private sphere. 17 The management of cultural
diversity has been tackled by different thesis about how to deal
with the social realities ofmulticulturalism. Sorne identify po­
289
It is instructive to begiriWith.<sb.rÍ1.é
preliminary rem.arks toidentify'thé
background ·of the folloWing work.
This paper is written in the context of
the "Exploratory workshop about Is­
lam} human rights and secular values
in Europe" held in Istanbul in Novem­
ber 2010. Islam was intended as the
main topic} the theme which all pre­
sentations were to address. However}
this paper Will not study the so-called
"Islamic question" by assessing the
latest legal developments of freedom
of religion for Muslims communities,
nor Will it analyze the recent case law
regarding religious rninorities. Rather,
it will examine the framework and the
context from wruch most religious
Muslirns claims arise.
.Religlous
Pluralism
in liberal
Democracies
Towards an Inclusive
Citizenship
Eugenia Relaño
Pastor
This framework is two-fold: one, a
multicultural and multireligious soci­
ety wherein the duty of state authori­
ties to legislate for the· general good
inevitably produces coñflicts with
285
EUGENIA RELANO PASTOR
286
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
individual beliefs¡ and two, a principIe -of neutrality which
lies on an ideological and cultural meaning of sectilarization.
A common denominator of Western European countries is
their tendency to consider the sacred as rnisplaced within the
civic context.' The idea that religion cannot playa role in the
general weH-being of societies is co~on throughout Eu-­
rope. However, Islam's arrival has reopened a case previously
considered "c1osed", that ofthe relationship between the State
and religions, as it has also called into question the neutral
and secular role ofthe State.
In considering this issue, it is important to note the exis­
tence of non-Muslim religious groups who also call into ques­
tion mainstream secu1arism. In Germany¡ for example, there
has been considerable debate over Christian values in the
public sphere, whlle in Italy the display of the crucifix in the
c1assroom has sparked frequent controversy. However, the
máin streams ofEuropean public culture are highIy secu1arized,
tending to ignore religious dimensions meaningful to some
segments within the society. The consequence of such a tradi­
tion ofsecularism is that various manifestations ofIslam within
Europe are perceived as troublesome. Ongoing controversy re­
lated to the wearing of a hijab, frequent outeries over magazine
cartoons, radical preaching in mosques, the demand for sepa­
rate Muslim religious education, the use and growth of sharia
courts, and more recent1y, the Swiss initiative to prohibit the
construction ofminarets, all shed light on the tension between
Islarnic c1aims and European conceptions of secu1arism.2
Throughout Europe, the presence of Islam continues to
call into question the norms ofthe dominant culture. The new
visibility of established Muslim minoritie-s alongside continu-
l'
ing immigration has brought new cultural and religious is­
sues to the fore: How should European society deal with "the
Islarnic question" when Islam is so different to the norms of
secular countries? How can religious diversity be accommo­
dated? Should current laws be adapted, or instead should new
arrivals to Europe be made to comply with existing laws? In
short, what solutions are possible when religious beliefs and
convictions are in conflict with common societal norms?
Should a new, and stricter, secular public sphere be built, to
prevent such requests being made by Muslims?
AH European countries, in one way or another, are faced
with these questions, questions which often drive individu­
als and groups to emotional reactions ranging from fear to
introspection, or to populist ideologies which manipulate
such emotions for their own purposes. One might therefore
be tempted to address such emotionalism and its results by
noting, on one hand, increasing "anti-immigrant" public sen­
timent, specifically "Islamophobia"3, and on the other hand,
increasingly restrictive approaches to religious freedom as has
been seen in France over the presence of religious symbols in
schools, for example, and in Switzerland with the governmen­
tal initiative to prohibit rninarets. Therefore, a low threshold
for acceptance of Muslim religious practice within European
public space, combined with hostility towards a religion taken
more seriously than what the secular non-churchgoing citi­
zens call "cultural Christianity'~ is beyond doubt. 4 As Joppke
has noted the c1ash between liberal states and the infiux of
immigrant populations with traditional beliefs must lead to
conilict and, by default as it were, the exc1usi()n of Muslims
in Europe. s Liberalism itselfbecomes an identity for modern
~
287
288
I
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
secular peopleJ with the liberal and civic integration present­
ed in termsof inflexible cultural-national frames reproducing
hierarchies of good culture versus bad cultureJ good religion
versus bad religion. UnfortunatelYJ European societies like to
present themselves as cornmunities based on a good citizen­
shipJ as opposed to Islam or to other strong religious feelings. 6
In this presentation I will point out how the claims of citi­
zens who hold a religious conception of the goodJ one which
deviates from the secular mainstream conceptionJ challenge
liberal definitions of citizenshipJ thereby advocating for a so­
called multicultural citizenship. At the same time I will high­
light the need to recognize and integrate religious pluralism
through reasonable accornmodations. AlthoughJ in the strict
senseJ reasonable accommodation is the management of ex­
ceptions on a case-by-case basisJ first developed in Canada
and USAJ and increasingly an important point of reference
for European systems.7
B. MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP
Traditionally citizenship has been defined as the legal status of
membership in a political community. Citizenship means cer­
tain equality with regard to the rights and duties of members
within that community. As a legal statusJ citizenship implies
a unique and reciprocal relationship between the individual
and the political community. Citizenship is the foundation of
the nation-state8J with nationality the cement of citizenship.9
As Shachar points outJ citizenship is in shortJ "nothing less
than the right to have rights':lO Liberal citizenshiprefers tó
the link between the individual and the State. Modern states
determine who is entitled to citizenshipJ prioritizing an in-
I
dividual either as an holder of rightsJ or as a member of the
political cornmunity (the civic-republican model)o However
this definition of citizenship possesses a certain "blindness to
differences': ]ustice may also require the recognition of tradi­
tions and specific ways of life wholly unique to members of
non-dominant cultural minorities. 11 Recently the European
concept of citizenship finds itself challenged by increased
global immigration which is not a specific type of diversity,
separate from other types of diversity (linguisticJ religious
J
national) but an example of multiple diversities.12
Traditionally, classicalliberalism has understood cultural di­
versity as private spaces (separated from public spaces)Jwhere­
in the majority rulesJ and has responded to the idea of cultural
diversity from the position that the state is culturally neutral
and people are free to act as they like so long as it is done within
the private sphere 13 • Cultural diversity then becomes an exten­
sion of the principIes of secularismJ yet secularism as such has
been highly contested byMuslims communities living in liberal
democracies. HenceJ the secularism ofliberal democratic states
can no longer simply be taken for granted. 14
Multicultural policies regarding cultural diversity are con­
cerned with the power ofthe state or major social groups over
identity groups 15 'This concern derives from a philosophical
position that stresses the role of culture in constituting "a
person's understanding ofwho they areJ of their fundamental
defining characteristics as a human being':16 Culture is a fun­
damental part of us and as such cultural diversity cannot be
restricted to the private sphere. 17 The management of cultural
diversity has been tackled by different thesis about how to deal
with the social realities ofmulticulturalism. Sorne identify po­
289
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
290
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRAClES
arrd that such diversity must be understood as the key to col­
lective identity made from a wide concept of culture linked
with languages, religions, ethnic differenees, etc. AH these
elements deserve an effective presence in the public square
and, henee, the heightened importance of these factors to the
design of a new framework for an inclusive and multicultural
citizenship. Sínce the law, as a cultural phenomenon, tends to
reflect the cultural attitude ofthe majority,2S the management
of diversity today requires that certain concepts be reviewed,
among them the concept of citizenship, as well as a redefini­
tion of the means by which laws are produced. 26
litical multiculturalism as a outgrowth of liberalism, as does
Kymlicka. He holds that membership in an identity group
combined with active participation in its cultural expressions
can provide individuals with "acontext of choice and a seeure
sense of identity and belonging".18 Others explore this con­
eept within eommunitarianism like Ch. Taylor;19 while oth­
ers look for an answer in the democracy theories, like L M.
Young?O and still others point out the need to transcend liber­
alism and redefine old concepts like ethnicity or citizenship,
such aS is the case with B. Parekh.21 Yet all are in agreement on
the need to depart from a "blindness to difference" ideal and
to claim for the reeognition of identity groups as deserving of
It is also important to criticise the ideological premises that
underline a non-pluralistic vision of a multireligious and mul­
tieultural citizenship. These positions against diversity can be
surnmarised around four arguments widespread in European
society, along with the legal reasonings from case law. 27
special or "differentiated rights"?2
Following the advent of various multicultural poliey de­
velopments in Burope, the USA and Canada during the23 1990
s, today multiculturalism is pereeived te be in erisis . 1he
crisis of multiculturalism in Burope has driven its societies to
search for better integration allowing for the accommodation
of diverse people and beliefs within a cohesive society, and for
a return to the importance of an assimilative civic integration
based on citizenship. Citizenship has beeome a reward for
those who do not pose a threat to the wider society beeause
their way of life or their beliefs have integrated sufficientIy?4
Unforturíately, eonsidering citizenship as a reward excludes
those who are very different from mainstream society. 1here­
fore it is now imperative to demand a new definition of citi­
(1) Our way is right. 1his assumption relies on the belief
that European politieal, social and cultural assumptions are
correct or legitimate. 1his means that our ethical canons are
the correct ones, and those of other identities are incorreet or
at least less correct than ours.
(2) Our way is better: European economie progress justi­
fies this conviction. Our way seems to be more attractive and
more moderno 1his is why others want to come and live and
work and study in our society. 1his lead us to think that we are
in a superior position, possessing greater rights, often ending
with a paternalistic attitude towards those who are different.
1his argument played an important_role in the legal reasoning
of European Court's decision, Sahin v. Turkey/8 regarding the
zenship, an inclusive and plural one.
In the past, to translate inclusive citizenship into a specifie
normative model, we needed to higblight that diversity is the
basis from whieh to start to build up the normative model,
,,""'-.eL
291
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
290
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRAClES
arrd that such diversity must be understood as the key to col­
lective identity made from a wide concept of culture linked
with languages, religions, ethnic differenees, etc. AH these
elements deserve an effective presence in the public square
and, henee, the heightened importance of these factors to the
design of a new framework for an inclusive and multicultural
citizenship. Sínce the law, as a cultural phenomenon, tends to
reflect the cultural attitude ofthe majority,2S the management
of diversity today requires that certain concepts be reviewed,
among them the concept of citizenship, as well as a redefini­
tion of the means by which laws are produced. 26
litical multiculturalism as a outgrowth of liberalism, as does
Kymlicka. He holds that membership in an identity group
combined with active participation in its cultural expressions
can provide individuals with "acontext of choice and a seeure
sense of identity and belonging".18 Others explore this con­
eept within eommunitarianism like Ch. Taylor;19 while oth­
ers look for an answer in the democracy theories, like L M.
Young?O and still others point out the need to transcend liber­
alism and redefine old concepts like ethnicity or citizenship,
such aS is the case with B. Parekh.21 Yet all are in agreement on
the need to depart from a "blindness to difference" ideal and
to claim for the reeognition of identity groups as deserving of
It is also important to criticise the ideological premises that
underline a non-pluralistic vision of a multireligious and mul­
tieultural citizenship. These positions against diversity can be
surnmarised around four arguments widespread in European
society, along with the legal reasonings from case law. 27
special or "differentiated rights"?2
Following the advent of various multicultural poliey de­
velopments in Burope, the USA and Canada during the23 1990
s, today multiculturalism is pereeived te be in erisis . 1he
crisis of multiculturalism in Burope has driven its societies to
search for better integration allowing for the accommodation
of diverse people and beliefs within a cohesive society, and for
a return to the importance of an assimilative civic integration
based on citizenship. Citizenship has beeome a reward for
those who do not pose a threat to the wider society beeause
their way of life or their beliefs have integrated sufficientIy?4
Unforturíately, eonsidering citizenship as a reward excludes
those who are very different from mainstream society. 1here­
fore it is now imperative to demand a new definition of citi­
(1) Our way is right. 1his assumption relies on the belief
that European politieal, social and cultural assumptions are
correct or legitimate. 1his means that our ethical canons are
the correct ones, and those of other identities are incorreet or
at least less correct than ours.
(2) Our way is better: European economie progress justi­
fies this conviction. Our way seems to be more attractive and
more moderno 1his is why others want to come and live and
work and study in our society. 1his lead us to think that we are
in a superior position, possessing greater rights, often ending
with a paternalistic attitude towards those who are different.
1his argument played an important_role in the legal reasoning
of European Court's decision, Sahin v. Turkey/8 regarding the
zenship, an inclusive and plural one.
In the past, to translate inclusive citizenship into a specifie
normative model, we needed to higblight that diversity is the
basis from whieh to start to build up the normative model,
,,""'-.eL
291
EUGENIA RELAÑü PASTOR
292
\
RELlGIOUS PWRALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
ban of headscarves in educational institutions. The Grand Cham­
ber focused on the gender issues involved and it stated that gen­
der equality is a "key principle .., underlying the Convention" and
is also a "principle implicit in the values underlying the Turkish
Constitution"29. It considered the impact that wearing the heads­
carf has on women in Turkey who choose not to wear it. Recogniz­
ing that the Turkish Constitutional Court had stated that wear­
ing headscarves had "taken on political significan ce in Turkey
in recent years JJ30 the ECHR found that imposing limitations on
freedom in this way may be "regarded as meeting a pressing social
need: the protection of the rights and freedo ms of others' and the
maintenance ofpublic order"31.
(3) We were here first: 1his means that there are original
owners ofthe community in contrast to foreigne~s, those who
arrived later, and as such are only potentially allowed to be­
come part of the community. '!herefore historical or collec­
tive legitimacy stands out, with the past legitimizing the de­
cisions of the societal majority. What is particularly relevant
hereis the initial value system which informed the foundation
of the country state, and whether it is possible for a given mi­
nority to comform to such historical values. 1his has been the
main argument ofthe Italian governmet in the recent ECHRs
decision, Lautsi v. Italy32 about the display of the crucifix in
the schools. '!he crucifix supposedly expresses the religious
origin of the constitutional values of tolerance, reciprocal
respect, human dignity and fundamental rights. '!he cruci­
fix evokes the harmony of these values with the doctrine of
Christianity, and therefore, when it is displayed in a school, it
has the function of reminding schoo1children ofthe tra~scen­
dent foundation óf such principIes, which shape the secular
character of the State. 1herefore the Christian signs are ad­
missible because they represent "western culture':
(4) Ihere are more 01 us: Tbis argument is based on the
strength of numerical superiOlity within the framework of a le­
gitimate formal democracy. Certain identity, cultural or religious
priorities last or triumph over others because they have been de­
cided by a majority ofthe population. Democracy is understood
as a numerica1 game, largely excluding minorities from the con­
struction ofthe public space. Tbis argument can be noted in the
two cases mentioned aboye. While the Islamic symbols are in­
terpreted according to majoritarian cultural parameters, difficult
to reconcile withWestern values, a secular version ofthe crucifix
represents the majoritarian common public values.
Taking into account the aboye considerations and argu­
ments, its helpful to outline what could be a path towards a
new paradigm guaranteeing the protection of a multi-identity
and multi-religious society. In order to achieve such a new
society, public space must be open to diverse identies as it
must avoid specific elements, whether cultural or religious,
with which to identify itself. Of course, this does not mean
the complete elimination of culture or identity elements from
policr¡ either within institutions or in the public sphere. On
the contrary¡ such a path aims to stimulate the development of
more possible identities. Since state neutrality is impossible
with respect to cultural or religious identity, it would seek to
promote within the public arena the greatest level of diversity
compatible with a harmonious coexistence. 33 .
Inclusive and multicultural citizenship means that each
person can exert their human rights through their own iden­
tity, irrespective ofwhether they are in a majority or a minor­
293
~
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
294
\
"LlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRAClES
ity. lnterpretation of the category of human rights must be
compatible with the idea ofplural citizenship. And probably
it would also require a revision on the part of the interpret­
ers of rights, i.e., legislators and courts, as both-reproduce the
majority point of view, thereby imposing an identity-based
reading ofhuman rights which is in opposition to the natural
diversity of contemporary societies.
Putting such premises into practice implies a reinterpreta­
tion and extension of the cultural and religious elements of
recognised civil rights.lt also demands a broad interpretation
offreedom of religion which makes possible the development
of diverse religious values within the public square. Thus the
State should treat without discrimination the religious rights
of new citizens or citizens belonging to rninorities, exten­
sively reinterpreting concepts like religious observance in
public, the multi-religious charaeter of public aets, religious
education, religious holidays, requirements of security, etc.
By incorporating inclusiveness and plurality into a reading of
rights, a more open society, one in which different values are
equally recognized, could be constructed.
C. RELlG\ON IN THE LEGAL SPHERE OF A LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
1. Normative Religious Pluralism
Any country in the Western world during the early twenty­
first century includes among its residents believers from a
variety of different faiths: Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Mos­
34
lems, Buddhists and Hindus, among others. Additionally,
there are further divisions between theists and atheists, and
among a variety of secular concepts ofthe good and the right.
Such pluralism has been an enduring characteristic ofWest­
ern culture since the wars of religion of the sixteenth century.
And this fact is not just an accident ofhistory, it is the result of
the division among religions, and between religious and secu­
lar worldviews. 35
'
During the modern era, no society permitting freedom of
conscience and expression determined a single comprehen­
sive concept of the good. Instead, modernity is character­
ized by disagreements about ultimate questions ofvalue, and
therefore by religious division. A modern liberal society that
values and encourages autonomy will probably be pluralistic,
giving its citizens a range ofoptions. 'Iherefore, religious diver­
sity is the normal condition of a free and democratic society,
and religious pluralism has both a descriptive and a normative
meaning. 36 By saying a descriptive meaning} we mean religious
pluralism is a state of affairs ,existing in human cornmunities
made up of people with different backgrounds, beliefs, reli­
gions and ways of expressing their convictions. By saying a
normative meaning, we mean normative religious pluralism, a
description of the situation in which much ofthe human race
now lives. In normative religious pluralism religious diversity
is encouraged and protected by social practices and by law.
Traditionally, democracy walked hand in hand with reli­
gious pluralism and religious freedom. Liberal states managed
the plurality arising from the exercise of freedom through
privatization of differences, in the interest of preserving so­
cial harmony (pluralism was understood as descriptive plu­
295
296
I
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
ralism). In contrast¡ normative religioús pluralism develops
when religions recognize a stable and ordered government
as the source of important human goods¡ and when govern­
ments¡ in turn¡ also recognize that they are not the only source
ofhuman goodS.37 When religion rejects the goods that gov­
ernment provides¡ sectarian or religious fundamentalism may
follow. When government attempts to determine all human
goods¡ secularism or totalitarianism may follow. In contrast¡
religious pluralism becomes normative when religion is either
supported by political pluralism¡ or finds its own religious rea­
38
sons to advocate for political pluralism . Religious pluralism
possesses both institutional and cognitive implications. Insti­
tutionally it means that something like a religious market is
established¡ with religious institutions competing for the al­
legiance of their clientele/ 9 with this competition becorning
more intense under a regime of religious liberty.
Such a public marketplace forces religious institutions to
find new ways to re-establish their authority¡ largely by means
of persuasion. The cogllÍtive implications means that religious
pluralism has a strong impact on the subjective consciousness
ofindividuals. This can be stated in one sentence: religion loses
its taken-for-granted status in consciousness. Historically reli­
gion was part ofwhat was taken for granted¡ with most individ­
uals living in a homogeneous environment. Pluralism under­
mines this sort of homogeneity¡ as individuals are confronted
with others who do not take for granted that which previously
was both tradition and the norm within the community.40
Normative religious pluralism is _upheld by most modern
democracies¡ despite differences in their religious histories
41
and in the legal status they provide to religious institutions.
There are modern democracies with normative religious plu­
ralism¡ where religion has an important and visible place in
public life¡ such as in the United States or France. In such so­
cieties religion plays an important social role but the public
square maintains a more strictly secular appearance. In oth­
ers¡ like Great Britain¡ the public presence of an established
church is maintained within a society which also protects the
freedom to practice other religions. Normative religious plu­
ralism will not be'the same in Pakistan or Turkey as normative
religious pluralism is consideted in Great Britain. It will not
even be the same in Great Britain and the United States. 42
There are three main¡ complementary theories to explain
the increase in normative religious pluralism:
a)
Ihe Desecularization theory: The secularization theory
proposes that people in modern societies are generally
more accepting of all religious positions because they
are generally less committed to any particular one of
them. The idea of secularization has a long history in
the social sciences with many thinkers arguing that re­
ligiosity has been declining throughout Western societ­
ies.43 Since the Enlightenment it was held that theologi­
eal superstitions¡ symbolic liturgical rituals and saered
practices were products of the past¡ to be outgrown in
the modern era. The death ofreligion was apparently the
conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most
of the twentieth century. However during the past de­
cade this thesis of the steady death of religion has come
under growing criticismo There are multiple indicators
of religious health today¡ ranging from the continued
popularity of churchgoing in the United States to the
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EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
REUGIOUS PlURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRAClES
emergence ofNew Age Spirituality in Western Europe)
from the growth of fundamentalist movements and re­
ligious parties in the Muslim world to the evangelical
revival in Latin America. As Peter Berger) a outstanding
advocator of secularization) said: "The world today) with
sorne exceptions) is as furiously religious as it ever was)
and in sorne place more than ever"44.
However) evidence indicates that the overall trend in the
Dnited States and Western Europe remains one of an in­
creasing secularization ofbeliefs and practices) although
in Eastern Europe religious commitment at present ap­
45
pears to be growing rather than receding. As a restilt)
sociologists and social phi1osophers alike are reconsid­
eringsecularization as a universal pattern of social de­
velopment. 46
b)
A second theory is a more historical explanation. That is)
normative religious pluralism as the outcome of specific
developments in specific religious communities) rather
than as the result of the process of secularization. Nor­
mative religious pluralism results from a democratiza­
tion of religious life that places religion in the hands of
lay people rather than in the hands of elites. There is an
increasing diversity within religious groups at the same
time that religious groups are claiming for themselves
space in public life. Normative religious pluralism does
require a certain level of mutual respect between believ­
ers of different religions. American ~perience often
serves as a paradigm.47 Many religious leaders began
to connect the flourishing of American churches to the
growing democratic spirit among the people. The in-
c)
creasing number of new immigrants from other parts
of Europe found this freedom served the needs of their
religious communities) and democratic ideas offreedom
and equality seemed to provide the conditions under
which all religions·could flourish. 48
International Human Rights Law and International Reli­
gious Freedom: Following the Peace of Westphalia) no
longer did the law governing religiously-based) homog­
enous Christian nomos) which received its validity from
God as mediated by the right) ecclesiastic and secular
authorities) claim universal jurisdiction. It now regulat­
ed the relationship between European territorial states)
realizing a sharp separation between secular and Church
jurisdiction. As Peter Danchin states) "This) 1 suggest)
had two interrelated jurisgenerative dimensions one as
between European states inter se (Le.) as between the
newly recognized political subjects ofthe former unified
Christian nomos)) and the other as between European
states taken as a whole and non-European peoples and
territory (Le.) as between European states separated as
political subjects but united by their background iden­
tity and culture and those peoples and territories lying
outside ofWestern Christendom)':49
Culturally) both European and religiously Christian back­
ground conditions underlay and made possible the Enlighten­
ment idea of a "universal" rational consensus on cross-cultural
moral judgments and principIes ofinternational justice. In this
respect) modern "internationallaw" constitutes the projection
of the -doctrines and norms of the jus publicum europaeum into
a wider globalizing world ofboth non-European and late mod­
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RELlGIOUS PLURALlSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
ern societies in which there exists á deeper pluralism of ways
oflife and diversity of values and beliefs.50 It is worthwhile to
point out that during the Enlightenment there were already
struggles between Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment
thinkers over how to understand the connectionbetween hu­
man nature and religious and cultural diversity. Dissenting
thinkers during this period stated that differences in social
practices and cultural nonns are often incornmensurable and
that there are no apriori universal standards that can be used to
rank them. 1herefore, after the Peace ofWestphalia two com­
peting narratives carne to the forefront: one, the Enlighten­
ment, committed to individual freedom and moral autonomy,
and the other narrative, expressingthe counter-Enlightenment
concern for collective cultural and religious diversity.51
1he result is that today international human rights law on
freedom of religion and belief reflects the tension between
these two "liberal" and "cornmunitarian" strands of doctrinal
history: orte narrative expressing the Enlightenment commit­
ment to individual freedom and moral autonomy, the other
narrative expressing the counter-Enlightenment concern for
collective cultural and religious diversity.S2 In this respect,
internationallaw has both an individualistic approach to the
question of religious freedom and, at the same time, contains
norms protecting the right of peoples to self-determination
and the rights of religious, linguistic and cultural minorities,
rights based on claims for the protection of a different identity
from the mainstream society.
1hese collective rights- are the legacy of the inter-war pe­
riod rninorities system instituted under the League ofNations
I
and reflect the long history in Burope of struggles for politi­
cal freedom and recognition between various religiously- and
culturally-situated national majorities and minorities. 53 It was
only in the post-Second WorId War era, following the colIapse
of the League of Nations, that the idea of "group-diíferenti­
ated" rights lost support to an aImost exclusive focus on the
rights of the individual (The 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights). However, later on, the two Human Rights
Covenants in 1976 included coIlective rights protections in
the form of Articles 1 and 27 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)54.
Finally¡ it is important to point out emerging International
laws on diversity. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity¡ 2001, affirms that respect for the diversity
of cultures, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation is one of the
goals óf the international community. Article 1 stresses that
cultural diversity is the common heritage ofhumanity¡ while
Article 2 states that "cultural pluralism gives policy expression
to the reality of cultural diversity which is indissociable from
a democratic framework':
2. Religion and C1assical Liberalism
In the context of contemporary debate about diversity; values
and religion, classical liberalism has much to say about reli­
ss
gion. Just as there are many religion,s, there is no one view of
liberalismo We consider liberalism to be a doctrine ofindividual
rights and limited governrnent, with liberalism characterized by
the rule ofIaw¡ and liberal citizens having equalliberty; that is to
say¡ every citizen being equal to every other citizen. Liberalism
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RELlGIOUS PLURAUSM IN LIBERAL DEMOCRAClES
EUGENIA RELAÑO PASTOR
places autonomy at the center and that means that all should
be able to choose to live a life in a community offaith. 56 Rere,
perhaps, it is worth taking a moment to explain briefly the lib­
eral tradition's view toward religion. 1will examineJohn Locke,
Stuart Mili andJohn Dewey¡ all ofwhom took religion seriously
and harboured hopes of convincing their feliow citizens to al­
ter their religious views. All three hoped to make religion more
open, more based on reason than on revelation, thereby per­
suading people to move toward more liberal religions.
do, but it does not teli them what to do. He wanted people to .
discuss, to debate, to cooperate with one another and to feel
comfortable dissenting from the views of others. 59 Though
Mili doesn't want to dismiss the idea of religion, his wish was
to create a religion that had spirituality without Christian
negativity. He claimed a kind of morality for ali humanity, a
Religion of Humanity.60 This Religion doesnt ask people to
believe the unbelievable, it asks people to act out of their best
motive, not out ofself-ínterest.
a) John Locke
e) John Dewey
Locke argued for tolerance of those with different religious
beliefs, but he also argued against atheists and Catholics.57
Without a belief in the afterlife, without afear of God, people
will act in their self interest. People need a good incentive
to act moraliy (the promise of heaven) because people who
cannot be trusted to act morally have no place in the com­
monwealth. This is why atheists are not to be tolerated, as
they cannot be trusted to fulfi.ll their obligations in society. It
is not only individuals who should treat each other well, but
churches, too. Churches should be messengers of love, not
hate, and tolerance should be extended to non-Christians as
long as they believe in God. For Locke it is crucial that there is
power to punish citizens for acting immorally.58
b) John Stuart Mili
While God played an important role in Locke's political
theory¡ Mill questioned the idea that belief in God and the
afterlife must underpin morality. Mili complained that Chris­
tianity contains a negative morality: it telis people whatnot to
In the early twentieth century¡ Dewey called for a religion that
had little to do with traditional religions (like Mill), calling
instead for a religion humanism, as religious humanism would
encourage a religious quality oflife, a coliective faith that can
become religious in quality. Dewey believed that atheism
leaves humans isolated. He wanted people to have faith in
their ability to solve problems coliectively.61
Putting aside the question of the kind of belief in God
these. liberals had, what is important to emphasize is that
these liberals (except Locke) thought that over time people
would lose their attachment to God and would embrace a re­
ligion centered around humanity. They had a liberal agenda to
turn people toward more liberal religions, envisioneda future
world without the religiousIy conservative, and thought that
religion should be a private affair, best left at home.
However, it is a matter of fact that religious peopIe often
want to bring their religious views into public settings, like
public schools and public debates. Many liberals would en­
303