Article • DOI: 10.1515/njmr-2016-0012 NJMR • 6(2) • 2016 • 124-131
THE ALOOF ELECTION MANIFESTO
Radical Political Right in Finland in the Borderlines
of Neoliberalism and Cultural Nativism
Abstract
The rise of the populist radical political right is one of the significant phenomena
in recent European party politics. In this article, I examine the ideology of the
radical right in Finland by analysing the Aloof Election Manifesto, an election
platform published by radical wing of the Finns Party for national parliament
elections 2011. The analysis shows that the ideology challenges traditional
notions of nationalism. It combines cultural nativism, secularism and economic
neoliberalism to the fear of Islam and multiculturalism.
Tapio Nykänen*
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland
Keywords
Nationalism • immigration • radical right • multiculturalism • islamophobia
Received 6 February 2015; Accepted 16 March 2016
In this article, I examine the ideology of the anti-immigrant wing of the
Finns Party, a populist and nationalist political party that represents
one of the most visible changes on the Finnish political landscape in
recent years. For 16 years, the party was a small one, its support being
three to four percent1. This changed drastically in 2011, when the
party received 19.1 percent of the votes in the national parliamentary
elections and secured 39 seats of 200 in Parliament, 15 percentage
points and 34 seats more than in the previous parliamentary elections
in 2007. It was the largest increase in a single party’s support
between parliamentary elections in Finnish political history since
the Second World War (Borg 2012). The Finns Party became part
of the government for the first time after the parliamentary elections
in 2015, in which it received 17.7 percent of the votes and 38 seats.
Currently, the party holds four ministerial posts.
I concentrate on one particular text, a platform that 13 candidates
of the party wrote for the 2011 national elections. The platform, the
Aloof Election Manifesto (hereinafter AM) is a short text, comprising
1842 words in 12 short sections. The text presents arguments and
demands for a new, strict immigration policy. The authors of the text
represent the most visible ‘immigration critics’, a radical, relatively
independent though informal political fraction inside the more
moderate mother party, the Finns Party (Mudde 2014). Eight of
them have a background in the nationalist, radical right organisation
Suomen Sisu, which was founded in the 1990s on the ideology of
the European fascist ‘Third Position’. Six of the 13 writers of the
manifesto were elected to Parliament in 2011 (Koivulaakso, Brunila
& Andersson 2012).
It is typical of contemporary populism that it contains diverse
ideological features. As Niko Pyrhönen puts it, populism is very
much a moving target: it is a strategic action field rather than a clear
ideology (Pyrhönen 2015: 11; also Zúquete 2008; Laclau 2005: 73,
129‒132). My overall aim is to show that this applies to the AM, which
indeed combines diverse ideas and beliefs from different ideological
traditions. The AM represents a particular case within neo-populism,
however, as it concentrates solely on opposing immigration from the
Third World. Accordingly, one of the specific aims of my article is
to show how different ideological features are used to support this
goal in the case of the AM. By doing so, I contribute to the European
debate on the nature and development of parties that represent or
are close to neo-populism or that more openly embrace the new
radical right.
While the ideas that are represented in the AM can be found
in other texts written by its authors, as a political speech act the
AM is unique. It is the first and, to date, the only paper in which the
‘immigration critics’ of the Finns Party present their fundamental
ideas as an existing, relatively unanimous political group. In fact,
one intention of the AM was to construct a reality in which the
fundamental ideas of the anti-immigrant political right in Finland
would be supported not only by single nonconformists, but also by a
plausible, ‘responsible’ and ‘truly democratic’ (see Canovan 1999, 2)
political movement.
Furthermore, the AM was important for the electoral success of
the Finns Party in 2011 in general. The party adopted many of the core
ideas of the manifesto into its main election platform (Koivulaakso,
Brunila & Andersson 2012). These ideas were welcomed by the
voters: the second most popular reason for voting for the Finns Party
was a desire to tighten the country’s immigration policy [the most
important reason was a desire to bring about a change in what was
seen as a self-sufficient party system (Borg 2012, 208)]. Immigration
politics were important, especially for the permanent supporters of
the party (Borg 2012, 208).
As noted above, my focus is the AM. Additionally, I refer to other
writings of the authors of the AM to clarify some claims that are
presented in the manifesto. Some of the authors (especially MEP
* E-mail: [email protected]
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Jussi Halla-Aho, Finnish MP Olli Immonen and former Finnish MP
James Hirvisaari) have been very active in social media both before
and after the release of the AM. I use texts that they have written in
that context as secondary sources.
In order to show what kind of (partly implicit) political categories
authors of the AM construct, I make use of discourse analysis. By
discourse I refer to a structure of cultural and social rules that shape
the possibilities for understanding and action (Ó Tuathail & Agnew
1992: 90; Foucault 2007). Discourses reflect and construct the power
relations between actors and ideas. Often discursive power is not
explicit or openly visible. It exerts its influence through categorising,
normalisation and self-control (Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992: 90;
Foucault 2009: 5; Foucault 1980: 272).
Furthermore, like Finnish scholar Sami Moisio, I draw a distinction
between rhetoric and discourse when studying political speech.
While discourse is a broad structure of understanding, rhetoric is
intentional action designed to achieve certain goals that often run
contrary to the goals of one’s political enemy (Moisio 2003, 69).
Rhetoric does not have limitless possibilities: it is directed and limited
by discursive obstacles and frames. Nevertheless, skilful rhetoric
can affect discourses, transform them and slowly even create them.
A discursive change is always a significant conceptual change that
signals transformations in power relations.
The AM was a rhetorical operation in the longer term reshaping
of discourses about immigration, Islam, the Finnish nation and the
welfare state (see Puuronen 2014; Pyrhönen 2015; Koivulaakso,
Brunila & Andersson 2012). In what follows, I will analyse the text in
more detail and determine what kind of political move it actually was.
I ask, what kinds of ideological discourses are the AM related to and
what kinds did it further construct?
Finnish anti-immigration politics has been examined in several
empirical studies (see e.g. Horsti & Nikunen 2013; Keskinen 2013;
Mäkinen 2013; Pyrhönen 2014, 2015). The approach taken in the
present article perhaps comes closest to that used by Pyrhönen,
who made a detailed study of ‘welfare nationalism’ in the antiimmigration politics of Finland. I will further the discussion about the
role of different ideological perspectives that seem to be present in
established anti-immigration politics as they appear in the AM.
Ideologies of the populist radical right
The rise of the European Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties and
ideologies has been the topic of several comprehensive articles and
books (see e.g. Tebble, A.J. 2006; Kestilä 2006; Joppke, C. 2007;
Mudde 2007; Zúquete 2008; Art 2007; Zaslove 2009; Bornschier
2010; Triadafilopoulos, T. 2011; Paloheimo 2012; Koivulaakso, Brunila
& Andersson 2012; Bale 2012; Jungar & Jupskås 2014; Pyrhönen
2015). My particular focus is the ideology of the ‘immigration critics’
in Finland. To this end, I use a theoretical framework based primarily
on the ideas of two notable researchers who have contributed to the
topic. The first is Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2007: 2011), whose work
has been influential and who is familiar to most of the scholars that
work in the field. The second is Adam James Tebble (2008), whose
notions of new wave nationalism offer a slightly different perspective.
Mudde and Tebble focus on different parts of the new nationalism, or
the new radical right, and thus complement each other.
According to Mudde, ‘[t]he key feature of the populist radical right
ideology is nativism: an ideology, which holds that states should be
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’)
and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally
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threatening to the nation-state’s homogeneity’ (Mudde 2010; 2007:
19). Historically, the idea of nativism is linked to the idea that holds
‘that each nation should have its own state and, although this is often
left implicit, each state should have its own, single nation’ (Mudde
2010). Nationalism, however, does not require or automatically
lead to nativism. Nativism is associated with certain ethnic groups,
‘natives’, whereas nationalism can be constructed without referring to
ethnic groups. Nationalism can, for example, be associated with the
more abstract value of national culture and ‘values’ such as freedom,
equality and democracy, or even with a certain territory (Mudde
2010).
The second salient feature that figures in Mudde’s definition of
the PRR ideology is authoritarianism, the belief in a firmly ordered
society that is based on national traditions and conservative values
(Mudde 2007; 2010). Authoritarianism can refer to hostility towards
the democratic system as such, but this is not necessarily the case.
The radical right within a party system is mostly engaged with
democratic rules and concentrates on specific political problems such
as immigration or corruption of the ‘old’ parties. Authoritarianism often
involves an emphasised trust in the strong rule of the state. As Laura
Mackenzie states, ‘[w]ithin an authoritarian democracy, the rights of
the people are protected by a strong, competent state upholding the
law. Personal freedoms and liberties might be curtailed, but such is
the price a nation must pay to protect its citizens’ (Mackenzie 2013).
Unlike nativism, authoritarianism is not exclusive to the PRR
ideology, but typical of several kinds of conservatism. Authoritarianism
is important for both secular and religious thinking (Mudde 2010). In
the case of the Finns Party, this point is important: the party has openly
religious actors such as chairman Timo Soini, who is a Catholic and,
for example, opposes same sex-marriage and is openly pro-Israel
for religious reasons (see Soini 2.8.2014), while most of the radicals
in the party openly espouses a secular and anti-religious (especially
anti-Islamic) ideology. Authoritarianism can hence be seen as one of
the core values that is shared widely in the Finns Party, by radicals
and moderates alike.
The third feature in Mudde’s definition is populism. In short,
populism holds that society is divided into two homogeneous
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt
elite’ (Mudde 2010). According to populists, politics should be an
expression of the ‘general will’ of the people, populus (Mudde 2004;
Mudde 2007; Mackenzie 2013). ‘The people’ know what is best for
them and if politics follows the will of the people, the world will be a
better place. Institutional constraints such as protection of minorities,
are undemocratic and should be rejected (Mudde 2010). Populist
language often has features that come close to religious speech:
the people are presented as a homogenous moral entity and the
purpose of democracy is to bring a ‘secular redemption’, a better
world (Canovan 1999). Here, one sees similarities with the most
extreme ‘political religions’ such as totalitarianism (see Burleigh
2001). However, populist parties are mostly engaged with the rules of
the democratic system and do not pursue rule over the whole society
or state.
The analysis of Adam James Tebble is not focussed solely on the
new radical right, but also on the phenomenon he calls ‘new wave
nationalism’, even though many of Tebble’s examples refer to the
statements of European PRR parties and politicians (Tebble 2006).
According to Tebble, there are two notions of nationalism that are
usually present in (academic) discussions. The first is a nationalism
that seeks to defend either ‘social democratic or some other set of
values’ (Tebble 2006, 464). The second ‘is more conservative in its
outlook and sees national identity as a good in itself and one that is
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in need of preserving regardless of the kind of political culture that the
national identity underpins’ (Tebble 2006, 464).
A third nationalist perspective differs from the traditional liberal
and conservative understandings (Tebble 2006, 465). In Tebble’s
view, this ‘new wave’ nationalism is more in tune with contemporary
nationalist sentiment than the two traditional ones and thus plays
a much more significant role in shaping the political reality. According
to Tebble, ‘new wave nationalism appeals to progressive values
yet also contains conservative aspects that claim that those values
are constitutive of our identities and, as such, are non-negotiable’
(Tebble 2006, 464). These fundamental values include, for example,
(secular) democracy, freedom of choice and equality of individuals.
New wave nationalism typically promotes assimilation of immigrants
and opposes multiculturalism (which it sees as a ‘new racism’ that
threatens the democracy and rights of the majorities) and differencebased politics. What is peculiar to new wave nationalism is that it often
employs the cultural and political language of the political left and
uses it for its own purposes. As Tebble puts it, ‘[w]hat is particularly
noteworthy about new wave nationalism is that not only can culture
be invoked by the right, but that right-wing cultural policies can be
justified in terms of arguments normally considered the preserve of
the left’ (Tebble 2006, 482). In other words, new wave nationalism
appeals to notions such as democracy, equity and cultural survival
in its critiques of both multiculturalism and immigration (Tebble 2006,
482).
One of the most important aspects of new wave nationalism is its
open claim that for democracy one actually needs occasional policies
of exclusion ‘with respect to immigrants whose cultural backgrounds
are deemed incompatible with, or even hostile towards, those of the
host community’ (Tebble 2006, 484). Liberal democratic values such
as individual freedom of choice and the equality of all citizens are so
important that one should not tolerate religious or cultural practices
that threaten them in any way. Furthermore, one should protect the
Western national cultures in order to ensure their survival.
The Aloof Election Manifesto: Introduction
As the name indicates, the Aloof Election Manifesto is a political
manifesto designed to promote a certain ideology and practical
political choices based on it. As such, the text constructs a world
where there are clear, recognised opponents. It begins with a
definition of the first of these, the ‘old parties’. The authors admit
that in addition to the Finns Party, the ‘old parties’ have recently
accepted the ‘fact’ that there are problems in Finnish immigration
policy. However, according to the manifesto, these very same parties
denied the existence of any problems for two decades; instead,
they ‘praised’ immigration without any criticism (AM, section 1). This
rhetorical move portrays other Finnish parties in an unreliable light:
Why should anybody trust them if they are, in fact, responsible for
a long-term immigration policy that is the cause of the problems
that Finland is currently facing? This statement is typical of neopopulist language, insinuating that established power is corrupt and
untrustworthy and that only populist politicians hold the truth or are
genuinely democratic (Canovan 1999).
The authors of the AM define their enemies as other parties and
‘bad’ immigration policy. They do not, however, mention immigrants
as their enemies. In other contexts, the authors emphasise that
they oppose Finland’s immigration policy and, especially the effect
of Islam on Finland, not immigrants as individuals (Jussi Halla-aho
9.10.2008). This is a formula consistent with the manifesto in general.
The authors emphasise the rights of individuals and state explicitly
that (religious) groups should not have such rights. Yet, they value
the rights of Western society, a position that I will analyse more later
on.
The writers separate themselves from their enemies, especially
other parties, in another respect that focusses on the content of
the immigration policy. They point out that while the old parties
no longer deny that there are problems in immigration policy and
multiculturalism, the parties still believe that these problems can
be solved through the social integration of immigrants. The authors
of the manifesto disagree. They believe that the main problem is
(‘humanitarian’) immigration (from the Third World) itself. In their
view, problems related to immigration cannot be solved by investing
money in social integration. They argue that if this were possible,
then the problems should have been solved already. Moreover, the
authors question how Finland could succeed in something that all
other Western European countries have failed to accomplish (AM,
section 1).
The authors admit that it is possible to control the negative effects
of immigration through ‘financial investments’, but assert that is
not a legitimate solution since it leads to the ‘unequal treatment’ of
demographic groups (AM, section 1). This is a very typical populist
demand: democracy should signify the fulfilment of the will of the
majority, whose ‘common sense’ is able to make the world better
(Mudde 2010; Mackenzie 2013). Minorities are allowed to practice their
customs and beliefs, but they should not be supported in doing so.
The introduction of the manifesto is short, but presents many
core ideas of the radicals of the Finns Party. The text makes at
least three fundamental claims: (1) Immigration, especially from
the Third World, is a problem rather than opportunity. This implies
that there must be something problematic with either the culture or
nature of the immigrants themselves and, at the same time, that
there is something positive in the culture of the natives. (2) Equality
should not mean positive discrimination in favour of minorities; such
‘unequal treatment’ of demographic groups would be both unjust
and dangerous. As the manifesto later clarifies, the only exception
is the Finnish majority; it has every right to maintain its institutions
and practices (see also Pyrhönen 2015, 9). (3) In light of the first two
claims, the manifesto goes on to assert that (3) the dominating status
of the majority and existing Finnish culture should not be disrupted or
undermined in any way.
Against Multiculturalism
After the short introduction, the AM concentrates on the problems
of multiculturalism and puts forward more detailed demands for the
immigration policy. The title of the second section is ‘Repudiating
Multiculturalism’. In the beginning, the authors demand that
Finland needs to give up the recent multiculturalist state-ideology,
which is copied from Western Europe, especially Sweden, and
praises and supports disparity. (AM, section 2; all translations
by T.N.)
According to the authors, the state should guarantee everybody the
freedom to maintain their own culture, language, identity and religious
conviction, but it should not be the ‘financier’ of minority identities.
Satisfaction of the religious and cultural needs of immigrants is not
amongst the core functions of the Finnish state, which is ‘financed by
taxpayers’ (AM, section 2).
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The authors go on to claim that to opting out of multiculturalism
means that Finland should not tolerate violations of the individual
rights of the immigrants. ‘Rights of the group’ are no excuses to
mistreat women and children. The ‘ritual mutilation’ of genitals should
be unequivocally prohibited by law, and society needs to fight against
a lifestyle whereby migrant women stay home instead of being active
in the labour market. Forced marriages and polygamy should be
fought with determination, and individual freedom of religion should
be guaranteed for minorities as well as for others (AM, section 2).
The authors continue by demanding that no new minority
languages should be taught in Finnish schools. Rather, all immigrants
need to learn Finnish and the financial support they receive from
the state should be based on their success in language studies. In
general, immigrant groups need to acculturate to Finnish public life,
administration practices and working life. It is very important that they
not benefit from any forms of positive discrimination. On this point,
the authors claim:
Finland should be an equal society, where equality means
equality of opportunity, not equality of outcomes. It is not equality
if everyone reaches the finish line at the same time, but rather if
everyone can start from the same line, at the same time. No kinds
of ethnic quotas or positive discrimination should be allowed, for
example, in recruiting public employees. (AM, section 2)
This section is very important and illuminating for the manifesto as a
whole and the ideology of its authors. Many other sections in the text
contain detailed lists of political actions that support the demands put
forward here. They also contain some unique demands and premises
- which I analyse below - but the core ideas of the manifesto are
already presented by this point.
First, multiculturalism is truly an enemy to the authors of the
manifesto; in fact, opposition to it can be considered the fourth
(4) principal claim of the manifesto. The authors do not see any
significant varieties or positive possibilities within multiculturalism; it is
simply an unfair ideology that leads to unwanted outcomes. Some of
these consequences are described in the manifesto. Multiculturalism
is associated with unequal treatment of immigrant women and
violations of several individual rights. Moreover, multiculturalism is
too expensive for Finnish society as public services already have
scanty resources.
The authors of the manifesto have clarified their opposition
to multiculturalism elsewhere. Jussi Halla-aho, Olli Immonen
and James Hirvisaari have claimed that multiculturalism leads to
societal problems such as crime (especially rape) and eventually
to serious conflicts between ethnic groups (Jussi Halla-aho
6.5.2008; James Hirvisaari 19.1.2010; Olli Immonen 28.10.2013).
Furthermore, multiculturalism leads to an unwanted cultural and
religious transformation: Christianity, in its true form, is being lost;
it is transforming into Chrislam, a syncretic religion that combines
features of Christianity and Islam (Olli Immonen 9.1.2014). Ultimately,
through demographic transition, multicultural politics will transform
Western secular and Christian societies into Islamic societies where
Sharia law is the legal norm (Olli Immonen 28.10.2013).
One should note that Islam is mentioned explicitly in the AM only
once (according the authors, Muslim doctors and nurses should not
be allowed to refuse to treat the opposite sex). Additionally, citizens
of Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan - all typical representatives of the
‘Islamic countries’ in Finnish political parlance - are mentioned as
examples of those who can use family reunification in a way that
the authors regard as problematic. It seems that authors do not
want to represent themselves solely as adversaries of a particular
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religious group, but as advocates of individual rights and freedom.
However this may be, there is no doubt that, for the authors, the
principal problem associated with multiculturalism is indeed the
Muslim immigration: they make this extremely clear in several
texts and public speeches both before and after release of the AM
(see Pyrhönen 2015; Koivulaakso, Brunila & Andersson 2012, Jussi
Halla-aho: Scripta).
Second, forced marriages, polygamy and ritual mutilation are
represented as something that we can expect from immigrants. The
authors do not specify the particular national, religious or ethnic
groups. Violations of physical and mental integrity are simply things
that belong to immigrants’ culture. This explains to some extent at
least why the authors of the AM view foreign (non-Western) cultures
as problematic. Immigrants seem to embody a figure of primitive
humans with primitive practices.
Third, the second section further clarifies the discourse, which
maintains that rights and responsibilities belong to individuals, not
to ethnic or religious groups. The only group that has specific rights
is the Finnish majority, which is represented as a homogeneous
group of ‘taxpayers’. In the second last section - which demands
that Finland should stop paying annual development aid financed by
taxes - the image of the faceless taxpayer is slightly clarified. Finns
are ‘client-owners’ of the Finnish state, a metaphor that identifies the
state with a co-operative shop or corporation (Perelman 1996: 135–
137). A state should operate (primarily or exclusively) for its ‘owners’’
benefit and according to the authors, aid for developing countries
does not serve this purpose. Here, the section highlights at least two
interesting features: First, paying taxes is something that has a great
positive value and second, the state can reasonably be compared to
a trusteeship or corporation.
The rest of the AM, before the conclusion, contains more detailed
demands regarding how Finnish immigration policy should be
practiced in the future. I will present the rest of the sections briefly and
analyse some of the themes, which further illuminate the discourses
constructed in the text.
The manifesto continues by demanding drastic changes in
Finnish policy and practices pertaining to asylum seekers. The text
creates a discourse in which asylum seekers have - almost without
exception - no legitimate reason to apply for asylum:
An extremely small proportion of the asylum seekers who arrive
in Finland will be granted asylum. This is because an extremely
small proportion are refugees as described in international
conventions, whose protection Finland is legally bound. Most
of the asylum seekers are on the move because of financial
reasons or the general circumstances in their country of origin.
(AM, section 3)
This so-called ‘social migration’ (AM, section 12) is very problematic
in the eyes of the authors. It is ‘very expensive’ and it creates ghettos
and social tensions. The authors do not mention any potential general
positive consequences such as long-term benefits to the economy. In
their rhetoric, asylum seekers are simply a threat to our (the Finnish
people’s) welfare.
The authors go on to list actions that could reduce the
attractiveness of Finland in the eyes of migrants. For example,
the reuniting of family members should be linked to the residing
immigrants’ ability to take care of their family members themselves
without social aid (AM, section 7). The number of refugees accepted
into the country should be tied to the general financial development
of the country (AM, section 4). Newcomers should be selected from
‘national and religious’ groups that have integrated well in Finland
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before. The birth of ghettos in the cities should be prevented.
Continuous troubles in European suburbs show what lies ahead for
Finland if immigrants are allowed to form enclaves without any real
connections to the rest of society (AM, section 5). Immigrants should
be given accommodation where it is cheapest to arrange, which often
is not in the cities.
There should be limits on the social aid available to immigrants:
an acceptable maximum for receiving aid could be 1 year (AM,
section 6). Another possibility is to give up social aid and replace
it with a cheap loan. Immigrants who are guilty of serious crimes
should be deported immediately (AM, section 8). If immigrants visit
their home countries for a vacation or if they take part in war, they
should also be deported. If newcomers lie to Finnish officials, they
should be deported as well. Citizenship is a reward that should only
be given to those who have earned it (AM, section 9). In a nutshell,
to get Finnish citizenship, an immigrant should have to learn Finnish,
not be dependent on social aid and not have a serious crime history.
Citizenship should first be conditional and it could be revocable if the
requirements are no longer fulfilled. The ‘real costs’ of immigration
should be evaluated by a special truth commission (AM, section 10).
Moreover, Finland should discontinue its current aid to developing
countries (AM, section 11). If any such aid is given, it should be
collected voluntarily from citizens. The authors maintain that Finland
should not be a ‘global ethical actor’:
In our view, Finland as a state should not present itself as a
global ethical actor. The State of Finland is primarily a trusteeship
to serve its client-owners, the citizens who pay taxes. One of its
core functions is to guarantee the conditions for the welfare of
Finns. (AM, section 11)
In the concluding section, the authors reiterate that Finland has neither
the money nor responsibility to act as a global ‘social services office’
(AM, section 12). The government should be strict with immigration
that has negative effects on Finnish society, while, at the same time,
Finland should be open to immigration that has neutral or positive
effects on society. Immigrants who integrate themselves and earn
their living are welcome in the country. Finally, the authors claim that
‘ordinary immigrants’ value the same things that ‘ordinary Finns’ do:
moderate taxes, good education, a peaceful society and everyday
safety (AM, section 12). ‘Bad immigration’ chips away the foundation
of these values. The more open-handedly Finland treats ‘social
immigrants’, the less it can compete for ‘good and skilful’ immigrants.
This short section is very important for my research questions in that
it sums up the rest of the key claims of the manifesto: (5) Finland
is not a ‘global ethical actor’ or a ‘social services office’, but rather
an economic mechanism that should benefit its ‘owners’, that is,
taxpayers. (6) The biggest problem is the ‘social immigration’ that
brings immigrants to Finland who are opposite to or the antithesis
of ‘good and skilful’ immigrants who contribute positively to society.
In this discourse, asylum seekers clearly pose a threat to Finnish
welfare; they are not represented as people who need help or are
on the move with legitimate motives, but as people who come just to
get free benefits.
The discourses of nation, individual and money
Next, I will take a look at how well the ideology that is present in the AM
fits in with Mudde’s and Pebbles’ general categories and definitions.
I first sketch the discourses that seem to form the foundation of the
ideology espoused by the authors of the Aloof Election Manifesto. I
have reconstructed the discourses based on the claims enumerated
above and in the blog entries and other texts of the manifesto’s
authors.
I describe the discourses through their core claims. Discourses
are, by definition, more general ways of understanding, which means
that it is not possible to describe them exhaustively in one or two
sentences. However, discourses do consist of non-negotiable and
fundamental principles that limit the rhetoric inside the discourse.
a) Discourse of national values. Cultures and nation-states,
especially European ones, are valuable as such and need to be
protected.
b) Discourse of evil Islam. Islam is one, fundamentally problematic
culture. There is no meaningful heterogeneity inside Islam.
c) Discourse of rights as an individual property. Rights are
something that are associated with the individual. Hence,
religious or ethnic communities are not subjects with rights, only
individuals are. Individuals are equal.
d) Discourse of national self-determination. The community of the
Finnish majority, white, ‘original’ Finns, has the right to choose
whom it accepts to join itself; accordingly, some (political)
communities have legitimate rights while others do not.
e) Discourse of national economic selfishness as a reasonable
action. The state is a corporation or trusteeship of its owners,
that is, its citizens who pay taxes, and it has no duty to help
citizens of other states. Citizenship itself should be a reward:
until they show that they are worthy, immigrants should be no
more than modern metics with limited political rights.
f) Discourse of good and bad immigrants. In the world, there are
‘good’ people and their antitheses. Finland should pick those
who are ‘good’ and ‘ordinary’ instead of others. Asylum seekers
are not good.
g) Discourse of political unreliability. The old parties (old power)
are not trustworthy: they have not even revealed the real costs
of immigration.
According to Cas Mudde, the ideology of the new radical right is typically
nativist, populist and authoritarian. How well does the AM fit in here?
The manifesto seems to best fulfil Mudde’s first and most important
definition. There is a clear tone of ethno-nationalism in which Finnish
and Western culture, in general, is superior compared to the cultures of
immigrants. Cultural relativism is not acceptable or justified.
The second definition is also fulfilled. The style of the text is
populist in that it is meant to appeal to ordinary Finnish people. The
old parties are not trustworthy; what they say is just political rhetoric.
However, the populist tone in the AM is not as dominating as it is,
for example, in the speeches of the Finns Party Chairman, Timo
Soini, who, by his own definition, is first and foremost a populist
(Soini 4.6.2010). Maybe populism per se is not the most important
issue for the authors of the AM: It seems to be more like a tool to
achieve nativist political goals.
The authoritarianism in the AM seems to be of the kind that Laura
Mackenzie (2013) calls ‘democratic authoritarianism’. This refers to
the idea that the rules defined in democratic process are superior to
other kinds of rules, especially religious ones in this case. In contrast,
the authors of the AM emphasise the freedom of the individual. It
seems that the ideology of the anti-immigrant wing in the Finns
Party is only partially authoritarian; it also has a strong (neo)liberal
emphasis, which makes it more complex.
The last point is, I believe, very important. According to Tebble,
one of the most characteristic features of new wave nationalism is its
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128
ability to surprise and challenge the old categories of political Right
and Left. New wave nationalism has conservative and exclusive
elements, but it also values the rights of the individual in liberal terms
(see also Triadafilopoulos 2011). This feature is clearly visible in
the AM, which repeatedly emphasises that the rights of individuals
should not be violated regardless of what the religious or communal
reasons are.
The AM clearly represents new wave nationalism in other respects
as well. It opposes multiculturalism in the name of individual equality
and promotes national assimilation. It also constantly emphasises
that the rights of the majorities - the Finnish majority - should be
protected. Interestingly, the text mentions democracy explicitly only
once - the authors demand that financial support for developing
countries must be tied to their achievements in promoting democracy
(AM, section 11).
There are features in the paper that neither Mudde nor Tebble
really focus on (even though both are well aware of them). The first
is the evil nature of Islam. Even though Islam is mentioned explicitly
only once, the most problematic immigration is clearly seen as
coming from Islamic countries. This notion is amplified in the other
texts written by the authors. In their blog entries, the opposition
to multiculturalism seems to be based primarily on the idea that it
actually only promotes the cause of Islam. Islam here could be seen
merely as an example of the non-democratic ideology that new wave
nationalism opposes. However, it is also possible to see Islam and
non-democratic ideology as synonymous, as no other examples of
such an ideology are mentioned.
Another important point is that the AM speaks a great deal about
economic matters. Actually, the consequences of multiculturalism
and immigration are most often portrayed in economic terms. For
instance, ‘social immigration’ (AM, section 12) is considered an abuse
of the Finnish welfare system and is seen as an enormous problem.
According to the manifesto, Finland does not need immigrants who
are looking only for economic benefits; instead, the country should
aim to attract ‘good’ immigrants who will benefit it. In addition, the
AM expresses clear welfare chauvinism: The state is owned by its
citizens and it should economically benefit them only, not others
(see Pyrhönen 2013; 2015). Immigrants need to prove themselves
worthy of social aid by acculturating into Finnish society. Even the
unreliability of the old parties is described in economic terms: there is
a need for a truth commission tasked with investigating the real costs
of immigration, which implies that those in power have not revealed
this figure to the people.
Conclusion
Reading and analysing the AM in light of the theories by Cas
Mudde and Adam James Tebble reinforces the impression that
the ideologies represented by PRR parties are not straightforward.
First, the nationalism the AM represents is indeed different than
more traditional - liberal/social-democrat and conservative - notions
of nationalism. It promotes the discourses of a liberal individualism
and an extensive Western nation-state. At the same time, it has
‘democratic authoritarian’ features and is ready to exclude practices
and groups that it feels are threats to the traditional Finnish lifestyle.
In addition, it has a clear enemy in the religion of Islam and Islamic
culture, which it portrays as a fundamentally homogenous and
problematic totality. Importantly, the authors of the AM seem to
understand religion solely as an individual choice. This means that
communal dimensions of religion are not recognised as meaningful in
129
a positive sense, no matter how essential they may be for members
of the religious communities (see Bhargava 2010).
The significance of economic matters for PRR ideologies remains
an interesting and partly unclear question in light of the AM. It has been
claimed that contemporary far right parties emphasise socio-cultural
issues and are involved mostly in identity politics. Economic issues
are secondary for both the parties and their voters (Mudde 2014). In
times of economic crisis, far right parties have little to offer and their
voters will either not vote or will look for a party with more plausible
economic competence (Mudde 2014). However, the AM clearly
emphasises economic considerations. Discourse that separates
good immigrants from bad immigrants is strongly connected to the
economic matters, as is the discourse that emphasises Finland’s
right to be selfish and use tax money solely to benefit its ‘owners’.
The unreliability of old parties is portrayed in economic terms. How
should this be understood?
One way to approach the problem is to take a look at the
political context of the AM, the Euro crisis. In Finland, the crisis
harmed exports, created unemployment and affected the general
atmosphere amongst voters. As the discussion surrounding the
elections in 2011 in Finland clearly showed, for many, it was very
difficult to understand why Finland should support Greece when its
own economy had serious problems. Even more importantly, Greeks
and other ‘southerners’ were often portrayed as ‘lazy’ in contrast
to hard-working and reliable Finns. This discourse created a fertile
ground for the claims presented in the AM: immigrants from the south
are mostly after ‘our money’.
Previous research shows that especially this kind of economic
rationale has been important to the Finnish anti-immigrant movement
at the grass-roots level (Mäkinen 2013). In the internet discussions
that Katariina Mäkinen analyses, the value of immigrants was
measured especially in light of their ability to bring added value to
the Finnish economy (Mäkinen 2013). Similarly, Niko Pyrhönen’s
research shows that an economic rationale has been at the very
heart of anti-immigration discussions in Finland, the sentiment being
‘The welfare belongs to us, and immigrants pose a fundamental
threat to that welfare’ (Pyrhönen 2013; 2015).
Hence, while it is possible that people seek options with more
plausible economic competence in times of economic crisis that are
harmful enough, it is at least as obvious that representatives of new
wave nationalism employ economic talk for their political purposes.
Possible economic harm is a concrete pivot in the wider discourse
where bad people are coming to take what belongs to us (see also
Skey 2010; 2012).
Another slightly different example of the complicated relationship
of economic matters and new wave nationalism can be found in the
AM. If the state is reduced to a trusteeship or a corporation, its value
should logically be estimated at least primarily in economic rather
than political terms. The state works well if it creates material wealth
for its ‘owners’. This, in turn, indicates that the state is not founded on
things such as power, identities or feelings, but on cold, calculating
rationality. In other words, the state becomes depoliticised.
However, at the same time, ‘natural differences’ between nations
and cultures, ‘ethnopluralism’ and ethno-nationalism, have been things
that advocates of the new wave nationalism - including the authors of
the AM - have systematically praised, in particular (Koivulaakso, Brunila
& Andersson 2012: 50; Mudde 2007: 19; Pyrhönen 2015, 1; see also
Suomen Sisu: Periaatteet). According to this discourse, all nations are
natural, ‘organic’ and unique entities and, as such, worth protecting.
In other words, relatively homogeneous nations, and maybe also the
nation-states based on them, have a metaphysical value per se.
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When one combines the cold rationality of the AM with these
religious-like beliefs in national homogeneity and cultural superiority,
the ideology starts to become reminiscent of traditional, conservative
nationalism (see Tebble 2006). Such a combination of stone-cold
rationality and religious-like sentiment is perhaps even more familiar
from twentieth century totalitarianism (see Burleigh 2011; Arendt
1963; 2013). However, it would be going too far to claim that new wave
nationalism is simply an ideological descendant of totalitarianism. As
Tebble and McKenzie point out, and the AM shows, new nationalism
is not usually even openly authoritarian in a traditional sense. On
the contrary, politicians from the new radical right often represent
themselves as advocates of democracy (what ‘democracy’ in this
discourse means is, of course, another question). However, this
may be, it is clear that new wave nationalism is indeed a mixture of
multiple ideological features and discourses. It is a combination of
traditional nationalist sentiment and neoliberal individualism2, modern
secularism, fear or suspicions of Islam and chauvinism that defends
the (Nordic) welfare state. This indicates, in turn, that new wave
nationalism has many alternative directions to follow in the future.
This means that in the future, we need research on international
politics, but perhaps even more research on local political and social
developments to see how the discourses develop.
Tapio Nykänen is a university lecturer in political science in the
University of Lapland. His research interests consist of religion
and politics, Laestadianism, multiculturalism, development of Arctic
regions, indigenous politics and reindeer herding.
Notes
1.
2.
The predecessor of the Finns Party was the agrarian populist
Finnish Rural Party, where influential Chairman of the Finns
Party Timo Soini spent his political youth. The Finnish Rural
Party was discontinued in 1995. Subsequently, its central actors
founded the Finns Party (which until 2013 was known as the
True Finns).
See also Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos’ concept ”Schmittian
liberalism” (Triadafilopoulos 2011).
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