TEIXIDOR Marine
Supervisor: Per Jansson
911010-T062
Master Thesis in International and European Relations
French Legitimizations and Motives for the Military
Interventions and for the Renewed Interest in
Sub-Saharan Africa
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Abbreviations
AQIM: Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
CAR: Central African Republic
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EU: European Union
ICC: International Criminal Court
MISCA: African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJWA: Movement of Unity and Jihad in Western Africa
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN: United Nations
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Acknowledgement
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Per Jansson for the time he spent
reading and helping me improving this master thesis. I also would like to express to him
all my gratitude for his precious advices and guidance.
Then, I would like to thank my friends here in Linköping that helped, and motivated me
during the writing process of this thesis. A special thanks to Simon Persson that has
always encouraged me throughout all these months.
Finally, I would like to dedicate this research paper to my mom, my family, and friends
back in France that have been so supportive during all my studies. I also would like to
express them all my gratitude for having believed in me, and encouraged me to follow
the path I wanted to.
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to discover the French legitimizations and motives for its two
last military interventions in Mali and Central African Republic, and for the French
renewed interest in Africa. The focus will be put on the justifications given by the
Hollande administration. We will also point out what we believe are the motives that
played a role in the decision process, but that France does not want to recognize. In
order to write the analysis of this thesis, different theories will be used. Historical
institutionalism, liberalism, and realism will be helpful in order to understand, and to
explain the decisions taken by the French government concerning the French foreign
policy toward Africa.
Key Words: Sub-Saharan Africa, France, military interventions, legitimization, renewed
interest, motives, Responsibility to Protect, philanthropy, self-interests, and French
foreign policy toward Africa.
Word count: 23 092 words*
*Excluding: footnotes, references, table of contents, and bibliography.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT..................................................................................................................... 5
1.1.
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.
Background ........................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.3.
Explanations of the Two African Conflicts .............................................................................................. 12
CHAPTER 2: THEORIES ................................................................................................................ 16
2.1.
Institutionalism ................................................................................................................................................ 17
2.2.
Liberalism ........................................................................................................................................................... 20
2.3.
Realism ................................................................................................................................................................ 23
2.4.
Concepts of Legitimacy and Motives ......................................................................................................... 26
2.5.
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................... 28
3.1. Qualitative or Quantitative Analysis? .............................................................................................................. 28
3.2. Historical Institutionalism Method ................................................................................................................... 29
3.3. Empirical Materials ................................................................................................................................................. 32
3.4. Limitations of the Method .................................................................................................................................... 33
3.5. Research Design ....................................................................................................................................................... 33
CHAPTER 4: THE RISKY INTERVENTION IN MALI .............................................................. 34
4.1. The French Legitimization for the Serval Operation .................................................................................. 34
4.2. France’s Other Motives for Intervening .......................................................................................................... 46
4.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 50
CHAPTER 5: THE INTERVENTION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC.................. 50
5.1. The French Legitimization for the Intervention in Central African Republic ................................... 51
5.2. The Unmentioned Reasons for an Intervention in the Center of Africa .............................................. 55
5.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 59
CHAPTER 6: THE FRENCH RENEWED INTEREST FOR AFRICA ....................................... 59
6.1. Renewed Interest Demonstrated Through Interventions ........................................................................ 60
6.2. New Opportunities for France in Africa .......................................................................................................... 62
6.3. The French Values, the French Culture, and the French Prestige .......................................................... 64
6.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................. 69
CHAPTER 7: FINAL CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 69
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................... 72
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Chapter 1: Context
1.1.
Introduction
On the 5th of December 2013, the French President François Hollande announced his
intent to send troops to Central African Republic (CAR) to contain the widespread
violence in the country due to tribal hatred. Roughly one year before, on the 11th of
January 2013, the French head of the state declared the deployment of armed forces on
the Malian territory with the purpose to stop the acts of terrorist groups present in the
North of the country. These two interventions could have been surprising regarding the
past of France as colonial power and its current situation. Indeed, the country
encounters some major financial and economic difficulties. The government is imposing
the heaviest cut ever on the budgetary expenses1, and it is forecast to close 24 000 posts
between 2015 and 2019 in the French sector of defense2. It could have led us to think
that France would have tried avoiding taking part in African conflicts as much as
possible. However, throughout the years since the decolonization, the French state, also
called the Hexagon, has proven its willingness to keep a continuity of its exterior
military actions. In fact, in the 1990s, France was facing criticisms from all parts, and had
to change rapidly its foreign policy concerning Africa. This post-cold war period marked
the beginning of the French disengagement, and what could be called the French
disinterest for Africa. Following the Rwandan’s scandal in 1994, the country showed
‘less readiness to intervene military on the African continent’3. France has preferred to
redirect its attention and assistance to the ex-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’
countries (USSR). At that time, the construction of a strong, and more integrated
European Union (EU) was ongoing, and France did not want to be pushed aside by the
other nations. In 2002, only a few years after numerous failures in sub-Saharan Africa,
and a major shift in the French African foreign policy, whereas no one was expecting it
the administration of Jacques Chirac decided to intervene in Ivory Coast. This operation
has demonstrated that the desire of disengagement and normalization of the FrancoAfrican relations were not so strong. Notwithstanding, as the French actions in Africa
Tertrais, B. (2013) Leading on the Cheap? French Security Policy in Austerity. The Washington Quarterly.
36 (3), 47-61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.825549 [Accessed: 20 February 2014], p. 56.
2 Watanabe, L. (2013) France’s new Strategy: The White Paper. CSS, 139, 1-4.
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-139-EN.pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2014], p.3.
3 Chafer, T. (2001) French African Policy in Historical Perspective, Journal of Contemporary African Studies,
19 (2), 165-182. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02589000120066443#.UzvXT_l_ui0
[Accessed: 24 March 2014], p.175.
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were poorly considered, the Presidents that have succeeded to Jacques Chirac gave lots
of importance pointing out how their African foreign policies were different from the
previous ones, and how strong the break was with the previous practices. Unfortunately,
the reality differed from what was officially said. Even if Africa was not anymore one of
the major concerns in France; the nation quickly forgot its attempt of disengagement
and normalization that have been initiated in the 1990s. Progressively, France started
again to intervene in sub-Saharan Africa, predominantly in the countries where the
nation had most of its interests. Since then, the metropolis shows huge difficulty to draw
away, and to leave African countries solving their problems by themselves. At the same
time, France does not fully assume its behavior, and tries to break off its image of
gendarme (policeman) of Africa. The country understood that the ‘indulgence’ granted
by the international community during the Cold War period is more or less over. The
French actions are henceforth watched. Operations in Africa have to be justified, and
France has to give proofs of its good faith to avoid criticisms and repercussions on the
country. At this point we can wonder why France keeps intervening, and what are its
reasons? This research project will try to find out what are the French motives given by
the Hollande administration for these interventions in Africa. We will also try to point
out the elements that all together constitute what we believe are the unsaid motives that
the French government is reluctant to divulge. We already imagine that these motives
are likely to be mixed oscillating between self-interests and philanthropy. The other
major intent of this thesis will be to focus on analyzing and explaining why France after
a period of disinterest toward Africa expresses a renewed concern. Derived from these
two points we will try to answer the two following research questions:
1. Why does France have a renewed interest for Africa?
2. How does France legitimize its military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa?
1.1.1. Aims and Relevance of this Study
The motivation that lies behind this thesis is the will to study the relations between
France and its ex-Francophone colonies in sub-Saharan Africa by examining the shift in
the French African foreign policy. This thesis has the intent to look for how France
legitimizes its actions in Africa and which kind of legitimization is being used. We will
analyze the motives given by the government but we will also point out the ones that we
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believe have not been admitted by France. Here, we have to make clear that this paper
will be an interpretation of what we found in our research. In any case, we are not
pretending holding the absolute truth because we cannot know what is in others’ minds.
Thereafter, we will also try to determine to which extent the reasons for the
interventions are drawn by philanthropic motives and to which extent they are driven
by self-interests. This research project aims to assess and understand the behavior of
the ex-empire toward sub-Saharan countries. We estimate it is important to know and
understand what France is currently doing, and planning in this part of the world. After
all, the nation is member of the EU, and so it has values, rights, and obligations to
respect.
1.1.2. Structure of the Thesis
This thesis will be divided in 7 chapters. The first part will be dedicated to the
introduction, background and an explanation will be provided for the two African
conflicts in which France is involved. The second part will focus on the different theories
that will be used to write the research project that is to say historical institutionalism,
liberalism and realism but also on the definition of the concepts of legitimacy and
motives. The third part will describe the methods used to form and structure the study.
The fourth part will be devoted to the analysis of the legitimization given by France for
its implication in the Malian conflict, and it will also stress on the unmentioned reasons
of this intervention. The fifth part will point out the justifications for the French
operation in CAR, and it will try to identify and interpret what we suppose are the
underlying motives for the deployment of the French troops there. The sixth part will
address an explanation about why France has a renewed interest for Africa. The last part
will be reserved to the conclusion, and it will include and present the final result of this
research project.
1.1.3. Limitations of the Study
This paper only studies the legitimizations of the interventions and the causes of the
renewed interest granted to Africa. It will not, in any case, aim to determine and assess
the legality, which has been proven, of the French operations in Africa. This thesis does
not seek to examine if the choice made by the French government when sending troops
to Mali and CAR was good or not for the country. The study also does not intent to
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generalize or judge the French relations with its ex-colonies in sub-Saharan Africa.
Moreover, we believe it is important to stress again, that this thesis is an interpretation
of the data and empirical materials we thought was relevant to the topic; we do not
pretend having the absolute truth about the French behavior.
1.2.
Background
The French decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa has been relatively smooth and quick.
It took roots in the mid-30s, when the Front Populaire administration (French left wing
party) recognized that the French ‘old-style imperialism, based on exploitation, was
unsustainable in long term, and that there was a need for a new type of relationship’4
with the African countries. But, the decolonization really began in 1956 with the
implementation of the Loi-cadre Defferre that allowed the creation of posts of ministers
for the African councilors of the French government, and increased their rights of
decision in the colonies5. The process ended up in 1960 with the full independence
granted to all sub-Saharan countries. Africa’s decolonization has been considered as
successful by France due to its peaceful and democratic character6.
In comparison, the decolonization process in Algeria and Indochina has been extremely
violent, long, and costly. Those failures are greatly due to the fact the independence for
these nations was not wanted and was not accepted by the French population, and by
the French administration. It was particularly the case for Algeria which was considered
as a part of France, and not only as a colony. For Paris it was clear that bloodshed should
be avoided in Africa because the policy makers wished to keep close links with African
countries. So to make the French population understand their actions, the President De
Gaulle and his ministers had the idea to switch their discourses. From the mission of
civilization which was their main argument they changed their discourses to promoting
the African development through partnership and cooperation7.
Chafer, French African Policy in Historical Perspective, p. 168.
Keese, A. (2007) First Lessons in Neo-Colonialism: The Personalisation of Relations between African
Politicians and French Officials in sub-Saharan Africa, 1956-66. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 35 (4). DOI: 10.1080/03086530701667559 [Accessed: 2 February 2014], p.3.
6 Chafer, T. (2002) The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization. Berg:
Bloomsbury Academic, p.4.
7 Ibid., p.229.
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The delivered message has been understood, and the independence had been signed
with all the sub-Saharan African countries, and coming with it financial, technical
assistance, and defense cooperation agreements8. These different accords had been
made in order to ensure the survival of the new states because they were ‘politically and
economically weak’9. In accordance with the defense cooperation agreements signed
between the ex-African colonies and the Hexagon, authorization had been given for the
French troops to station in Africa even once the transition of powers was done10. Thanks
to these accords, France succeeded to keep strong influence over Francophone Africa,
and to create what has been called Françafrique, which refers to the special corrupted
and self-interested relations between France and sub-Saharan Africa. The other cause
why Paris has been able to preserve its powers is because of the persons France
supported to be part of the governments of the new independent states. The leaders
placed at the heads of the African countries were issued from the African elites that
were used to the French culture, and used to collaborate with the French officials11. In
fact, several of them had been deputies in the French national assembly during the
colonization period12. Most of the Africans that have been co-opted and assisted by
France to govern the ex-colonies became dictators, and were highly corrupted. In
exchange for its help France received lots of valuable goods such as oil and uranium13.
These Franco-African partnerships were important for both sides. For the African side,
the leaders needed ‘to consolidate their authority in a difficult economic and political
environment’14. For the French nation, the country had the necessity to protect its
interests in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, France found there interesting resources such as
raw materials, gold, and uranium, plus a huge market in demand of basic goods15. During
all the period that lasted the Cold War, France continued to exert its power over
Francophone Africa. Not only for what the continent could economically bring to the
Ibid., p.70.
Chafer, French African Policy in Historical Perspective, p.168.
10 Meredith, M. (2011) The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence. Oxford: Simon &
Schuster, p.176.
11 Ibid., p.147.
12 Chafer, French African Policy in Historical Perspective, p.167.
13 Glaser, A. (2014) La Françafrique n'est pas morte, elle est devenue l'Africa France. Atlantico, 21
February. http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/francafrique-est-pas-morte-elle-est-devenue-africafrance-antoine-glaser-988588.html [Accessed: 24 March 2014].
14 Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, p.229.
15 Shaun, G. (2000) The French Military in Africa: Past and Present. African Affairs, 99 (396), 435-448. DOI:
10.1093/afraf/99.396.435 [Accessed: 26 January 2014], p.436.
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‘empire’ but also because of what the close relations with Africa were giving to the
country that is to say prestige and status. Moreover, these relations had also a major
importance due to the influence it granted to the metropolis in the world. As a
consequence of this influence, around twenty African countries were following the vote
of France when the international community had to make a decision16. The continuity of
the French policy regarding Africa has been made possible because France ‘was able to
present itself the guarantor of the Western interests in Africa, preserving’17 the
continent from the influence of the USSR.
At the end of the 1960s, and during the 1970s, France deepened, and broadened its
relations with the new independent African states, including in its defense and military
cooperation agreements Belgium’s ex-colonies: Rwanda, Zaire and Burundi18. Until the
1990s, Paris dealt with impunity with the corrupt regimes of the French-speaking
African countries.
In the 1990s, the expansion of the French pré-carré (sphere of influence) on Africa has
been stopped, due to an urgent need for the nation to reassess its foreign policy. Some
events have forced Paris to undergo necessary changes. One of the key factors has been
the genocide in Rwanda. France had been accused to have a responsibility in the ethnic
cleansing of the Tutsis by the Hutus19. The actions of the country in sub-Saharan Africa
were less and less approved by the international arena and by the European Economic
Community. The French government of Jacques Chirac decided to implement a new
French foreign policy concerning Africa.
The first element of this new policy has been to repatriate the majority of French
soldiers present on the African ground, and most of the military bases in Francophone
Africa have been closed. The second element was that the country would from this point
forward support United Nations (UN) mandates with the French troops, and would
follow UN’s decisions concerning operations in Africa. These two parts of the new policy
Utley, R. (2002) Not to do less but to do better…: French military policy in Africa. International Affairs,
78 (1), 129–146. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2346.00242 [Accessed: 24 January 2014].
17 Chafer, French African Policy in Historical Perspective, p.173.
18 Shaun, p.437.
19 Wheeler, N.J. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp.231-233.
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were a strong signal as the military presence was the most overt aspect of the favored
links between France and Africa. The third element concerned the reduction by the
French government of the bilateral aid granted to the sub-Saharan countries preferring
to join multilateral projects to develop the continent. The Fourth element lies in the
devaluation of the Franc CFA (which is the common currency of the fourteen ex-French
colonies in Africa) by 50%20. The fifth element of this shift was the adoption of the
‘Abidjan Doctrine’ that requires from the recipients good governance, democracy, and
the respect of human rights to receive funds. This new policy had been shaped taking
into account the European integration and the cooperation with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) that did not allow France to maintain an independent line
for its foreign policy21. At that time, the elements given led us to think that France was
heading toward a normalization of its relations with the Francophone African nations. In
addition, the ex-colonial empire could not respect all its bilateral military and defense
agreements with all its African partners that were engaged in any form of conflict. Paris
was obliged to abandon its role of gendarme of Africa.
This foreign policy of disengagement toward the ex-French colonies has been followed,
and taken back in the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy when he was elected in 2007. He
claimed he wanted a real break and shift concerning Françafrique. Nonetheless, only few
things have been done, and no major change occurred in comparison with the previous
foreign policies22. In 2012, the newly elected French President, François Hollande, in a
desire to mark the difference with its predecessors declared in Dakar in Senegal ‘the end
of Françafrique’. Less than one year after its saluted speech, the head of the French state
announced on the 11th of January 2013 the French military intervention in Mali. Few
months later, the French President communicated France will send troops to CAR.
Chafer, French African Policy in Historical Perspective, p. 174.
Chafer, T. (2002) Franco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional? African Affairs, 101 (404), 343363. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/101.404.343 [Accessed: 16 February 2014], pp.7-8.
22 Darracq, V. and Melly, P. (2013) A New Way to Engage? French Policy in Africa from Sarkozy to
Hollande. Chatham House. http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/191453 [Accessed:
5 February 2014].
20
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1.3.
Explanations of the Two African Conflicts
In order to answer the research questions of this thesis, we think, it is important to
know more about the confrontations in Mali and CAR, and to explain the causes of the
violence in these two countries.
1.3.1. The War in Mali: The Reasons of the Conflict
Mali is an ex-French colony that is situated on the Western side of the Sahel with
common border with Algeria, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea. The
population in Mali is 90% Muslims23 but is ethnically very diverse. The ethnic divisions
and high rivalry tribes, between the Tuaregs (Arabs) in the North and the sub-Saharan
Africans in the South are due to ‘the arbitrary boundaries and cultural differences
created and imposed upon these peoples by the colonial masters’24. Since the
independence of the country in 1960, many Tuareg rebellions have occurred, in 19631964, 1990-1994, 2006-2008, and in 201225.
The crisis started in January 2012 when a group of secular insurgents, the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), claimed the independence of the
Northern part of Mali, called Azawad, for its population, the Tuaregs.
The MNLA
supported by a group of Islamist Tuaregs named Ansar Dine, and by foreign Islamist
groups such as: the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement of Unity and
Jihad in Western Africa (MUJWA) began to fight against the government to obtain the
North of Mali. In March 2012, a coup was organized by mutinous officers of the Malian
army against the President Amadou Touamani Touré accused of mishandling the conflict
with the rebels. The soldiers led by the Captain Amadou Sanogo promised the end of the
rebellion and suspended the constitution. Following the putsch, the soldiers acquired
the power but they have not been able to pacify the situation. The MNLA, Ansar Dine,
Wing, S. (2013) Making sense of Mali: The Real Stakes of the War Rocking West Africa. Foreign Affairs,
20 June. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138767/susanna-wing/making-sense-of-mali
[Accessed: 16 February 2014].
24 Alemazung, J.A. (2010) Post-Colonial Colonialism: An Analysis of International Factors and Actors
Marring African Socio-Economic and Political Development, Journal of Pan African Studies, 3 (10), 62-84.
http://www.jpanafrican.com/docs/vol3no10/3.10Post-Colonial.pdf [Accessed: 15 January 2014].
25 France, La Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Armées (2013) Rapport d’information: sur
l’opération Serval au Mali. Paris, N°1288. http://www.infosdefense.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/i1288.pdf [Accessed: 12 March 2014], p.18.
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and the AQIM seized the Northern part of Mali, and its three biggest cities: Kindal, Gao,
and Timbuktu.
The African Union and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
condemned the coup, and demanded from the community of nations to not recognize
the military junta. On the 12th of April 2012, the mutinous soldiers pushed by the
international community handed the powers and the country to an interim government
headed by the President Dioncounda Traoré26.
In June 2012, the MNLA declared its withdrawal from the alliance with the AQIM and
Ansar Dine with the goal to remain secular. Few days after the announcement, the first
conflicts between the MNLA and the two other groups broke out. The AQIM threw out
the Tuaregs from the big cities of Azawad. Ansar Dine announced, at the end of June
2012, the group was in possession of the whole Northern Mali. They started
implementing the Islamic law: the Sharia. The objective was no longer to create an
independent country for the Tuaregs but to make Mali an Islamist state27. The UN
Security Council waited until the 12th of October 2012 to approve a resolution for the
launch of a military intervention in Mali led by The ECOWAS and the African Union. In
December 2012, the deployment in Mali had been authorized for a period of one year.
Unfortunately, ECOWAS’ forces were not expected to intervene before September
201328.
In early January 2013, Ansar Dine took the control of Konna in the Center of Mali from
the Malian army’s control, and the rebels were heading toward the capital: Bamako. The
President of Mali officially requested the support of France to counter the insurgents.
The socialist President, François Hollande, announced, on the 11th of January 2013, the
French deployment in Mali. French troops have immediately been sent on the Malian
Francis, D.J. (2013) The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali.
Norwegian peacebuilding resource.
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/f18726c3338e39049bd4d5
54d4a22c36.pdf [Accessed: 5 February 2014].
27 Manfreda, P. (n.d) Reasons for French Intervention in Mali: Al Qaeda Expands to Africa.
http://middleeast.about.com/od/terrorism/tp/Reasons-For-French-Intervention-In-Mali.htm [Accessed:
16 February 2014].
28 Timeline Mali (n.d) Chatham House. http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/africa/current
projects/mali-timeline [Accessed: 17 February 2014].
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territory. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Laurent Fabius, disclosed that Nigeria,
Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, and Chad will also provide troops. Mid-January 2013,
the UN Security Council communicated ‘its unanimous support for France’s intervention
and call[ed] for France to be supported by a West African force as soon as possible’29.
1.3.2. Central African Republic: Explanations of the Confrontation
CAR is situated in the Center of Africa, and is bordered by Chad, Sudan, South Sudan,
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and by Cameroon. The African nation
is populated by 4, 7 millions of inhabitants which are composed by numerous different
ethnic groups whose 40% are Protestants, 28% are Catholics, 8% are Muslims, and 24%
are Animists30. CAR suffers from chronic instability since its independence, on the 13th of
August 1960. Indeed, so far, the African country has only been ruled by ‘presidents’ who
took the power by force.
In December 2012, a coalition of rebel Muslim groups called Seleka began to seize cities
in the Center and in the North of the country. The groups of insurgents ‘claim[ed] that
Bozizé administration has failed to uphold the terms of peace deals signed in 2007,
2008, and 2011, under which former combatants were to be given economic
opportunities, including jobs and compensation’31. As the state could not stop the
Selekas, the President requested the help and assistance of France and of the United
States to maintain his government32. Unfortunately, the two countries refused. France
explained that the French soldiers present in CAR will not intervene, and they will only
protect French diplomats and French assets33.
The CAR’s government finally reached an agreement in January 2013 with the militia.
However, this accord had been quickly broken by the rebels. On the 24th of March 2014,
the armed group took the capital Bangui, and the power. Michel Djotodia issued from the
Seleka group took over the presidency of the country whereas President François Bozizé
Ibid.
France, Diplomatie (n.d) Géographie et Histoire. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossierspays/republique-centrafricaine/presentation-de-la-republique-1271/article/geographie-et-histoire-8497
[Accessed: 12 March 2014].
31 Vines, A. (2012) Crisis in the Central African Republic. Chathman House.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/188227 [Accessed: 13 March 2014].
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
29
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already fled from CAR. After the news of Bozizé’s departure has been widespread,
scenes of violence have been witnessed in Bangui34. The insurgents started to attack the
Christian community, looting, and burning down houses, raping and killing the
population.
The Christians organized themselves in order to stop the rebels’ exactions and acts of
violence. They created a militia called the Anti-Balaka which means the ‘against swords’.
This group of civilians took the decision to attack, and kill the Muslim population35 who
was not responsible and related to the crimes committed by the Selekas. Hypotheses
have been launched to understand this outburst of aversion between the two religious
communities that have always lived together. Notably, it has been suggested that the
situation could be the result of a manipulation by some dishonest persons to
appropriate a rich area full of resources such as diamonds or uranium36.
The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs warned the international
community in November 2013 of the risk of genocide due to the extreme violence in
CAR. The organization reported that around 2.6 million of people were in need of
humanitarian assistance37. On the 5th of December 2013, following the authorization
from the UN council, the French President announced the deployment of the French
armed forces in CAR, in cooperation with the African-led International Support Mission
Shoichet, C.E., Yan, H. and Karikari-Apau, N. (2013) Central African Republic president flees capital amid
violence, official says. CNN, 25 March. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/24/world/africa/central-africanrepublic-unrest/index.html [Accessed: 11 March 2014].
35 Smith, D. (2014) Christian threats force Muslim convoy to turn back in CAR exodus, The Guardian, 14
February. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/14/muslim-convoy-central-african-republicexodus [Accessed: 16 March 2014].
36 Gerald, J.B. (2014) Central African Republic: Foreign Intervention, Manipulation of a Resource Rich Area
and Genocide, Global Research, 20 January. http://www.globalresearch.ca/central-african-republicforeign-intervention-manipulation-of-a-resource-rich-area-and-genocide/5365486 [Accessed: 14 March
2014].
37 Ibid.
34
15
to CAR called MISCA38. The main purpose of this operation in this African nation was to
quell the violence which is still raging in the country between Christians and Muslims39.
The UN Security Council finally authorized unanimously on the 10th of April 2014, the
establishment of a peacekeeping mission (12 000 peacekeepers) in CAR. This mission
has been allowed due to the extremely preoccupying situation in this country, and with
the final goal to stop the slaughters of innocent civilians. Ban Ki-Moon, the secretary
general of the UN40 explained that ‘the new mission will take over the responsibilities of
the MISCA […] from 15 September 2014’41.
Chapter 2: Theories
The analysis will be conducted with a branch of Institutionalism, Realism, and
Liberalism. This precise choice has been made for what these disciplines will bring to
this research project. All this paper will be written thanks to institutionalism because
history is necessary for the comprehension of the French involvement in Africa. It will be
useful to discern the important elements that will be resorted to write the analysis.
Institutionalism will be the framework for the entire paper. In order to explain the
reasons why France took some decisions or made some choices realism and liberalism
will be utilized. These two theories will contribute to the understanding of the French
motives and reasons to act. On one hand, we will see that some choices have been taken
because of the French philanthropy concerning the African countries in distress. On the
other hand, we will see that some decisions have been driven by the desire to protect
the French assets in sub-Sahara Africa. The two disciplines are essential to balance the
framework of this paper. Actually, the French actions and intentions cannot all be
categorized as the result of self-interests or as the result of pure philanthropy. As a
Hollande, F. (2013) RCA - Déclaration du président de la République. Paris, 5 December 2013.
http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exlphp/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_
internet___recherche_avancee/home.html&VUE=mae_internet___recherche_avancee&NOM=cadic__anony
me&FROM_LOGIN=1 [Accessed: 4 March 2014].
39 CAR: Security Council authorizes MISCA and France’s troops, but still no UN peacekeeping mission (2013).
http://www.fidh.org/en/africa/central-african-republic/14348-car-security-council-authorizes-miscaand-france-s-troops-but-still-no-un [Accessed: 15 March 2014].
40 UN officials urge collective action to save Central African Republic from current nightmare (2014).
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47186&Cr=central+african+republic&Cr1=#.UySo3vl
5Oi0 [Accessed: 15 March 2014].
41 Security Council establishes UN peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic (2014). United
Nations Centre. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47541#.U2DDB_l_ui0 [Accessed: 30
April 2014].
38
16
consequence, we should not adopt a Manichaean vision when analyzing these two
military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, it should also be discussed in this
part of the thesis the definitions of the concepts of legitimization and motives. Indeed,
these two concepts will be applied and discussed throughout the entire thesis, so it is
important to have a clear idea of what they mean and how we can recognize them.
2.1.
Institutionalism
Institutionalism is a theory that places ‘a special emphasis on the role institutions play in
structuring behavior’42. The study of how institutions influence political behavior is as
old as the study of politics itself. Institutions are defined as rules. It can concern formal
rules and organizations or it can be informal rules and norms43. Institutionalism is
composed by many sub-categories but the main important are: rational institutionalism,
sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism ones. These three subcategories share the same understanding on the fact that institutions are rules that
structure behavior. However, the views diverge in ‘the nature of the beings whose
actions or behavior is being structured’44.
In rational institutionalism, institutions are important because they determine the
behavior of the human beings. The individuals follow the rules because they are rational,
and by doing so they increase their personal gains45. For the sociological
institutionalists, the individuals are not as much rational and self-centered as the
rational institutionalists might think. For them, humans follow the logic of
appropriateness. They wonder what they should do, and the institutions are present to
establish norms that govern their everyday life46.
Historical Institutionalism is a ‘new’ theory in the sense that it has appeared in the
1990s. The theory aims to explain the real world events of international politics by using
Steinmo, S. (2008) Historical Institutionalism. In: Della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (eds.). Approaches and
methodologies in the social sciences: a pluralist perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 118138, p.123.
43 Ibid., pp.123-124.
44 Ibid., p.126.
45 Ibid., p.126.
46 Ibid., p.126.
42
17
history. It also informs how the institutions influence a political outcome, and this is why
we will use this sub-category to write our research paper.
2.1.1. Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism will be useful to our topic in the sense that it will contribute
to find an explanation, and to draw an interpretation of the French motives for the two
last military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa by using historical events as a
framework. Thanks to this discipline we will also be able to see to what extent the past
has an influence and shapes the decisions that are taken at the moment. Historical
institutionalism will allow us to understand why France has a renewed interest for its
ex- African colonies after a long period of disengagement.
The historical institutionalism deals both with how the behavior of individuals is shaped
by the rules of the society, and how the decisions are led by self-interested concerns47.
This theory will highlight the elements of the French arrangement that show that
intervening in the West and in the Center of Africa is the result of self-interest, but has
also other roots. In fact, the influence of norms and rules such as helping an ally and the
Responsibility to Protect had been primordial in the decision process.
History matters in political sciences when it comes to analyze current events because
political events, actors, and expectations are all linked to the agreements and actions
that have been decided, and that happened in the past. Past political events have an
impact on the decisions that are taken in the present. As an example, we can take the
French decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. The way the different French governments
dealt with the post-colonial era matters, and has an effect on the settlements that are
decided at the moment. The political events from the past will be useful in this analysis
because it will help us in our understanding of the choices the French policy makers
made when they came to the conclusion that the deployment of the French troops in
Africa was necessary.
The expectations for the future are determined by the actions from the past. The French
expectations for the future concerning the interventions in Africa are determined by
47
Ibid., p.126.
18
what happened in the past. In most of the ex-African colonies that encountered conflicts,
France went to rescue them. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, most of the missions
organized on the African ground have failed. The Francophone Africa was, and is still
expecting support from Paris when the situation turns into conflict because the French
government has always been present to try to solve internal and external African
problems. As a result, for the cases of Mali and CAR, France could not imagine, not
intervening regarding the common past it shares with these two ex-colonies. The nation
also took into account other elements such as the official request of the Malian and CAR
Presidents and all the French interests at stake in this region of the world.
2.1.2. Path Dependence
In historical institutionalism, we can find a branch called path dependence. Path
dependence describes ‘how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is
limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may
no longer be relevant’48. This theory will be valuable in the sense that it will contribute
to make clear why the French government drew the conclusions that interventions in
sub-Saharan Africa were necessary even though the last military operations on the
continent failed, and lots of critics arose about the French neo-colonial behavior within
the international community49. This framework will provide us the opportunity to
identify the necessary conditions for the past choices and outcomes to influence the
present50. Path dependence aims to illustrate ‘that current and future states, actions, or
decisions depend on the path of previous states, actions, or decisions’51. In history, pathdependent processes can be divided in two: critical junctures and reactive sequences. In
this thesis, only the critical juncture will be employed. ‘Junctures are ‘critical’ because
Praeger, D. (2007) Our Love Of Sewers: A Lesson in Path Dependence.
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/06/15/346883/-Our-Love-Of-Sewers-A-Lesson-in-PathDependence# [Accessed: 5 February 2014].
49 Griffin, C. (2007) French Military Interventions in Africa: Realism vs. Ideology in French Defense Policy
and Grand Strategy. PhD, University of California.
http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/8/6/2/p178629_index.html
[Accessed: 4 April 2014], p.2.
50 Page, S.E. (2006) Path dependence. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1, 87–115.
http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/571/571readings/Page.pdf [Accessed: 5 February 2014], p.87.
51 Ibid., p.88.
48
19
they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very
difficult to alter’52.
To summarize, the theory of historical institutionalism focuses on the fact that elements
that form the world are all interdependent and interrelated: political events, actors,
behavior, rules, context, and expectations. We should take this fact into account while
trying to find the French motives for military interventions and renewed interest in
Africa.
2.2.
Liberalism
The foundations of contemporary liberalism came into existence during the Age of
Enlightenment in the 18th. Liberalism aids the comprehension in the foreign policy by
highlighting ‘how individuals and the ideas and ideals they espouse (such as human
rights, liberty and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political
institutions (democracy representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations’53.
There are three different kinds of liberal thought that explicate the different features of
liberalism: the First Image belongs to Locke. His vision emphasizes that importance
should be given to the protection of human beings’ lives, liberty, and private property.
The Second Image is commercial-related. Free trade has benefic effects toward the
relations between countries, and has a pacifying factor. By trading together countries
create common personal interests. Nations will prefer trying to avoid wars, and trying to
solve conflicts in another way in order to protect their common interests. The Third
Image is Kantian54. For Kant peace will be reached once three criteria will be met. First,
the presence of a representative republican government is essential. Second, the
principle of non-discriminatory right should be respected, and lastly, social and
economic interdependence should be set up.
Capoccia, G. & Kelemen, R.D. (2008) The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, narrative, and
Counterfactuals in historical institutionalism. World politics.
http://ecohist.history.ox.ac.uk/readings/critical-junctures.pdf [Accessed: 7 February 2014], p.1.
53 Doyle, M.W. (2008) Liberalism and foreign policy. In: Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (eds.). Foreign
Policy: Theories.Actors.Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 50-70, p.50.
54 Ibid., p.59.
52
20
2.2.1. Characteristics of Liberalism
Liberal philosophers established necessary conditions for a world of peace. They came
to the conclusion that a global peace could be achieved by the settlement of a
democracy, and by the settlement of the free trade in the whole community of nations55.
Liberalism focuses on the importance of the freedom of the individuals, and this freedom
will allow the breeding of rights and institutions.
The effect of liberalism on foreign relations between the liberal states is characterized
by the absence of wars between them for about 200 years 56. This is due to the reciprocal
recognition for the rules of law, human rights, and institutions. Unfortunately, this state
of peace does not exist between liberal and non-liberal nations. Nonetheless, Rawls
clarifies that democratic countries are also ‘less likely to engage in war with non-liberal
outlaw states, except on grounds of legitimate self-defense or in the defense of their
legitimate allies, or intervention in severe cases to protect human rights57’. In this day
and age countries cannot protect their citizens anymore against the world economy, but
they have the duty to ensure the protection of their populations by fighting against the
threats such as terrorism and transnational crimes58.
Liberalism makes possible the establishment of international legal institutions such as
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the development of international law. It is a
huge advance and a major shift for the community of nations. In fact, the principle of
non-intervention in a foreign country’ affairs inherited from the Westphalian system is
now challenged by another principle called the Responsibility to Protect which places
the respect of human rights first. This new trend can be seen through the possibility of
appraisal by ICC for foreign officials recognized guilty of war crimes, and crimes against
humanity in their countries59. However, it is a difficult task for liberals ‘who support
both the sovereign rights of independent states and the right of external intervention in
Burchill, S. (2005) Liberalism. In: Burchill, S. and Linklater, A. (eds.). Theories of International Relations,
3rd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 55-83, p.58.
56 Doyle, pp.51-52.
57 Burchill, p.58.
58 Ibid., p.80.
59 Ibid., p.69.
55
21
cases where there is an acute humanitarian crisis’60 to find a middle ground within the
international law.
2.2.2. Liberalism in the Research Project
In this thesis, liberalism will contribute to prop up and reinforce the French arguments,
and justifications given to the international arena for the operations in Mali and CAR. It
will also aim to highlight the philanthropic aspect of the French interventions, and to
determine to which extent these actions are driven by the simply desire to help. The
theory will also contribute to the understanding, and the explanation of why the
metropolis has a renewed interest for its ex-colonies by pointing out the importance to
widespread the French philanthropic values, and ethical principles that aim to protect
peace, democracy, and the respect of human rights. As France has been for long time a
colonial power, we also have to take into account its paternalistic behavior toward
Africa, which is inherited from the colonial time, to explain some of its decisions.
Liberalism is a discipline which concentrates on the importance of ‘the rule of law,
individual rights and equality before the law, and representative government based on
popular consent’61. Notwithstanding, generally liberals have problems to find a
consensus about foreign interventions. Indeed, some scholars support military
interventions which aim to foster democracy like Paine who is in favor of intervening in
foreign countries in order to spread the democracy62. Some others such as Kant firmly
disagree with any kind of foreign interventions.
Basic moral presumption on liberal though is that a state should not be subject to
foreign intervention63. Notwithstanding, in case of serious violation of human rights
such war crimes or crimes against humanity by a country to its population, democratic
states have the duty to intervene to protect the population. Henceforth, involvement in
another country should be regulated by international law, and should be supported by
Ibid., pp.69-70.
Ibid., p.80.
62 Walker, T.C. (2008) Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention.
International Studies Quarterly, 52 (3), 449-468. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00510.x [Accessed: 5
March 2014], p.450.
63 Doyle, p.67.
60
61
22
the international community in order to be considered as legal. The two African
countries where France is intervening are both failed states that are unable to protect
their populations and their interests. Both of these nations formally requested the
French assistance in the process of conflict resolution, and the international arena
welcomed the French initiative.
Hence, we can say that the core values of liberalism lie in the ‘separate peace’ of the
liberal nations, the promotion of human rights, and in the trade’s importance between
countries to achieve peace. Liberalism is able to explain the French interventions, and
renewed interest in Africa especially by the desire of a liberal country to promote its
values, and foster peace and democracy.
2.3.
Realism
Political realism comes from the German concept of ‘Realpolitik [which] is the oldest and
the most frequently adopted theory of international relations’64. Realism has the intent
of ‘ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason’65. In the analysis of
foreign policy, the theory examines the past political decisions and events, and uses
them to foresee their consequences.
There are many theoretical schools within realism: classical realism, defensive realism,
offensive realism and neoclassical realism. These schools represent the development of
the realist thought that can be seen as a series of refinements, amendments,
qualifications, and extensions of the basic argument66. We are also able to find theories
within realism such as balance of threat, hegemonic stability theory, and power
transition theory. These are important in order to figure out the constraints and
incentives that shape foreign policies67.
Donnelly, J. (2005) Realism. In: Burchill, S. and Linklater, A. (eds.). Theories of International Relations, 3rd
edn. New York: Macmillan Palgrave, 29-54, p.29.
65 Morgenthau, H.J. (1978) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 5 Edn. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 4-15.
66 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008) Realism and foreign policy. In: Smith, S., Hadfield, A. and Dunne, T. (eds.).
Foreign Policy: Theories.Actors.Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32-48, p.34.
67 Ibid., p.34.
64
23
2.3.1. Defining Realism
We have to acknowledge that realism is a framework that is based on three main
assumptions: groupism, egoism, and power-centrism in order to study politics.
Groupism is defined by the fact that individuals need each other, and need to cooperate
in order to survive. To do so they organize themselves in groups. The interactions
between the different groups might be peaceful and constructive, but they also can
generate conflicts. Egoism describes the human being as selfish by nature. ‘Self-interest
ultimately drives political behavior. Ultimate trade-offs between collective and selfinterest must be confronted, egoism tends to trump altruism’68. Moral concerns will only
be taken care of if self-interests are at stake. Power-centrism is the result of groupism
and egoism in the context of anarchy. ‘Key to politics in an area is the interaction
between social and material power, an interaction that unfolds in the shadow of the
potential use of material force to coerce’69.
Anarchy referred to the absence of government or global power, and this absence
shapes the nature of international politics and the individuals’ behavior. Scope condition
(anarchy) is not an assumption that defined realism as many realists and critics of
realism have claimed70. ‘Realists do not assume that interstate interaction will be
contentious’71. Realism only possesses some theories that will explain in which
conditions the relations between the nations may become contentious. As realism is a
theoretical account of how the world operates, it is also possible to use it to describe
peaceful situations and outcomes72.
2.3.2. The Elements of Realism Related to the Topic
The use of this theory will target to explain that other motives may exist than the ones
France gave to justify the two military interventions in Africa. Actually, the French
government legitimizes the Serval and the Sangaris operations mainly by invoking the
Responsibility to Protect. The realist thought points out the fact that generally states do
not intervene without any interest at stake. So, realism will help us in our intent to
Ibid., p.32.
Ibid., p.32.
70 Ibid., p36.
71 Ibid., p.37.
72 Donnelly, p.36.
68
69
24
discern the reasons why the Hexagon adopts an interventionist behavior toward the
Francophone African countries. This theory will also confer to us the necessary tools to
try identifying and assessing the realists causes of the French the renewed interest in its
ex-African colonies.
After the 2nd World War France lost its position on the international arena. The country
tried to keep its influence and status with the power exerted in Francophone Africa. In
the 1990s, France had to change its foreign policy, and consequently it provoked a
modification, and deterioration in its relations with African countries. Moreover, in the
past years many emerging states such as China and India have invested a lot in subSaharan Africa, creating at the same time a tight relationship with these African
countries. Emerging nations have shown a particular interest in the Sahel region, and
the metropolis did not appreciate this interest given to what it considers as its sphere of
influence. France encounters difficulties at the European level.
Indeed, due to its
economic problems the French nation has less and less influence in the EU and Germany
has more and more. France would like to restore the balance of power, and ‘realist
thinking also emphasizes that declining power can use force to try to rescue its
position’73. This thought could give us a piece of explanation for the two operations
launched on the African Continent. Indeed, one of the motives for the ex-colonial power
to send soldiers to Africa could be that France hopes to gain back its influence and
power.
This hypothesis could be supported by the statement made by Wheeler who claims that
‘states selectively apply humanitarian intervention because they have no business
risking their soldiers’ lives or those of their non-military personal to save strangers’74.
The French head of state, François Hollande, affirms France has no special interest in
this region. Furthermore, the government declared that the reasons for these
interventions are only linked to the desire to stop the terrorist threat which is wide
spreading to the world, and to protect the suffering populations. Nonetheless, those
declarations could be contradicted by Morgenthau who ‘maintains that universal moral
73
74
Wohlforth, p.41.
Wheeler, p.29.
25
principles cannot be applied to the actions of states’75. In other words, Paris does not
want to admit, and recognize all its intentions and reasons to go to Africa.
The French government does not want the international arena to believe that these
interventions are only interferences in Africa’s affairs. Besides, France is really cautious
in its way to legitimize its missions because the policy makers are aware of the critics
rising from the international community questioning the explanations given by the
French administration. Therefore, the government communicates a lot about the legality
of the Serval and Sangaris operations. The time where France could intervene in the
Francophone Africa without explaining itself is now over. At the moment, ‘the order in
the European Union is based on the institutions’76, and the nation has to respect it in
order to avoid any sanctions.
In sum, realism points out that states’ actions are led by their self-interests. That is why,
unless there is the emergence of a central power that will ensure that the common rights
and duties are respected by the different members of the community, the relations
between nations will be source of conflicts. In the French case, it highlights the fact that
France does not only want to intervene because of moral concerns but also in order to
protect its interests.
2.4.
Concepts of Legitimacy and Motives
As we will employ all throughout this thesis the concepts of legitimacy, and motives it is
necessary to define, explain, and limit them.
2.4.1. Concept of Legitimacy
‘The concept of legitimacy tells us the basic meaning of the term legitimate and tells us
what we say about, e.g., a social rule or a political decision when we call it legitimate’77.
Defining legitimacy is a complex process due to the multitude of definitions that are
available. For some, legitimacy corresponds to the submission of the rule of law; for
Morgenthau, pp. 4-15.
Wohlforth, p.45.
77 Hinsch, W. (2008) Legitimacy and Justice: A conceptual and functional clarification. In: J. Kühnelt (ed.).
Political Legitimization without Morality, Berlin: Springer, p.39.
75
76
26
others, it is the pursuit of some values78. The philosopher Max Weber describes that
being legitimate corresponds to ‘a norm, a decision, or institutional arrangement that
receives voluntary support that is to say approval of the ones that live within this
community’79. What he meant by the approval, in this precise case, is ‘the sincere
recognition of a norm or decision as providing an appropriate standard of conduct’80.
Legitimacy is a major advantage for governments but it is also important for the
populations. Indeed, it allows people follow the norms and principles of their groups
because they think they are right and not because they are afraid of sanctions, if they do
not respect and comply with them81.
The French legitimization is the process by which France is looking for making its
actions and behaviors acceptable by the community of nations. This legitimization will
be supported by justifications which can be defined as ‘acceptable reasons for doing
something’82.The French legitimization for the two military interventions rests on the
consent of the populations of Mali and CAR, but also on the one of the community of
nations. They altogether agree with the decisions taken by the French nation; it means
they are compatible with the international rules, and so it gives legitimacy to France.
Permission for these operations has been made possible because of the honorable
motives France gave to justify its actions. So, legitimization in this thesis refers to the
pursuit of liberal values and principles by France. The French Legitimization also
includes the respect granted to the international laws, but also to the consent given by
the population of the two colonies, and the one granted by the international arena.
2.4.2. Concept of Motives
The French legitimization is supported by motives. Motives, as the concept of legitimacy,
have many definitions. C. Wright Mills made reference to motives in 1940 as:
Ibid.
Ibid., p.40.
80 Ibid., p40.
81 Stillman, P.G. (1976) Concept of legitimacy, Polity. Polity, 7 (1), 32-56.
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3234268?uid=3738984&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103721478441
[Accessed: 25 April 2014], p.43.
82 Encyclopaedia Britannica (n.d). http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justification [Accessed:
20 May 2014].
78
79
27
‘anticipated situational consequences of questioned conduct’83. For Weber, motives can
be defined ‘as a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor of himself or to
the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question84’. The term motive
corresponds to the reason why an actor adopts a specific behavior. Differently, from a
justification that has to be acceptable, motive is just the actual explanation of a course of
actions85. In sum, discovering motive means understanding the place in which the act in
question occupies in a means-end chain86. French motives for interventions in Africa
have to be place in the historical, cultural, and institutional contexts in order to be
understood. Motives are the results of these three contexts, and are what constitute the
explanations for the French behavior in Africa.
2.5.
Conclusion
In short, historical institutionalism will assist us grasping how the past impacts on
French current actions. The realist theory will give us the opportunity to look beyond
what is officially said, and to analyze to what extent self-interests have dictated the
behaviors of the decision makers. Liberalism will be useful in our attempt to know to
what extent values and norms have influenced the decisions that led to the French
military deployments.
Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design
In this research project qualitative research method and historical institutionalism
analysis will be utilized. We will also employ the process tracing method in order to
identify the path dependence and the critical junctures.
3.1. Qualitative or Quantitative Analysis?
In this thesis, the qualitative (interpretive) research, which is an explanatory method,
has been chosen to conduct the analysis of this paper.
Campbell,C. (1996) On the concept of motive in sociology. Sociology, 30 (1). 101-114. DOI:
10.1177/0038038596030001007 [Accessed: 29 April 2014], p. 101.
84 Ibid., p.103.
85 Ibid., p.103.
86 Ibid., p.103.
83
28
Qualitative analysis is composed by a set of interpretive measures whose aim is to make
the world understandable87. Contrary to the qualitative research, the quantitative
research strives for quantifying the problem by using numerical data analysis. ‘It avails
to quantify attitudes, opinions, behaviors, and generalize results from a larger sample
population’88. Qualitative research contributes to uncover the underlying reasons,
opinions and motivations89. It gives an overview of the problem. This research method
will assist us in the discovery of the French motives for the two last interventions in
Africa. Qualitative data collection adopts different methods. Notes, interviews, focus
groups, or observations are some of the methods commonly used. The quantitative data
collection has many methods which include interviews, various forms of surveys
interviews, longitudinal studies, online polls, and systematic observations90.
Findings in the qualitative method are not conclusive neither are the recommendations,
and generalizations cannot be made from the results of the study concerning the subject
of interest91. The goal of the qualitative research is to provide an understanding that
could be useful for future decisions to take whereas in the quantitative research findings
are employed to recommend what should be done. The qualitative research method will
assist in the resolution of the research questions by trying to interpret the different
actions and decisions ‘in terms of the meaning people bring to them’92.
3.2. Historical Institutionalism Method
In this part of the thesis, we will explain how relevant historical institutionalism, path
dependence, critical junctures, and the tracing possess method are in order to help us in
the writing of our interpretative analysis.
History matters because there is an
appreciation that contemporary relations can only be
formed by knowledge about long-term and short-term
Ibid., p.28.
Wyse, S.E. (n.d) What is the Difference between Qualitative Research and Quantitative Research?
http://www.snapsurveys.com/blog/what-is-the-difference-between-qualitative-research-andquantitative-research/ [Accessed: 10 March 2014].
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (eds.) (2008) Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: a
pluralist perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.28.
87
88
29
antecedents that generated them. This assumption means
accepting that contemporary conditions are inherited from
the past, constraining and enabling the actions of people in
the present day93.
That is why we should take this method while interpreting, and analyzing the reasons
for the French military deployments in Africa, and in order to know to which extent the
past influenced them.
In historical institutionalism the strategy of research is composed by three features.
Firstly, the historical institutionalists address real-world questions. Secondly, they trace
processes throughout the years, and finally, they analyze contexts94. The goal of this
method is to explicate ‘variations in important or surprising pattern, events, or
arrangements – rather than accounting for human behavior without regard to context or
modeling very general processes presumed to apply at all times and places’95. By
analyzing the French foreign policy and the French behavior since the decolonization
toward sub-Saharan countries we have been able to discover its modifications over time,
to explain them, and finally to see in what it has resulted. Historical institutionalism
traces social processes to discover the social causation of what happened. Most of the
time those processes contain historical components96. This method will not just make us
look at the past but it will encourage us to look at the processes over time to get
answers.
3.2.1. Path Dependence and Critical Junctures
In this paper, tracing process will contribute to distinguish path dependence mechanism
and critical junctures. First, we should remind of what path dependence involves and
what the characteristics of critical junctures are. We have to acknowledge that ‘path
Lawson, G. (2006) The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations. International Studies
Review, 8 (3), 397–423. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00600.x/abstract
[Accessed: 19 March 2014] p.403.
94 Pierson, P. and Skocpol, T. (2002) Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science. Political
science: The state of the discipline.
http://www.laisumedu.org/DESIN_Ibarra/Usuarios/Pierson%20y%20SkocpolHistorical%20Institutionalism.pdf [Accessed: 19 March 2014], p.17.
95 Ibid., p.4.
96 Ibid., p.6.
93
30
dependence is a crucial casual mechanism for historical institutionalism, and critical
junctures constitute the starting points for many path-dependent processes’97. Once
actors engage themselves in a path, it is hard to reverse it because ‘critical junctures
trigger a path-dependence process that constrains future choices’98. In our study, the
path dependence refers to the fact that France shows tremendous difficulties to stop
intervening in Africa.
Critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which
the structural influences on political action are significantly
relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main
consequences the range of plausible choices open to
powerful political actors expands substantially and the
consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interests
are potentially much more momentous99.
Critical junctures represent choices that have been made whereas the actors had others
alternatives. They are often associated with periods of change even if it is not systematic.
The analyses of the critical junctures have to be done as the ‘analysis of decision-making
under conditions of uncertainty’100. This thesis gives us the opportunity to look closer at
the French foreign policy in order to find, and point out the critical junctures that
engender the path dependence in which France is stuck. In this research paper, we
found two critical junctures thanks to the process tracing method. One of these critical
junctures has been followed by a period of change whereas the other has carried France
off in a period of continuity in its path dependence.
3.2.2. Process Tracing Method
Process tracing can be defined as contributing ‘decisively both to describing political and
social phenomena and to evaluating casual claims’101. Precise description is essential to
Capoccia and Kelemen, p.342.
Ibid.,p.348.
99 Ibid., p.343.
100 Ibid., p.356.
101 Collier, D. (2011) Understanding Process Tracing. Political Science and Politics, 44 (4) 823-30.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=5821E4BA091112C6E55EF9A4C687D7
6E.journals?fromPage=online&aid=8407185 [Accessed: 18 March 2014], p.823.
97
98
31
the process tracing method. Indeed, it ‘analyzes trajectories of change and causation, but
the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not
adequately described’102. It also aims to ‘explain the outcomes of interest by going back
in time and identifying the key events, processes, or decisions that link the hypothesized
cause or causes with the outcomes’103. The process tracing method will contribute to the
analysis of path dependence, and critical junctures by identifying and explaining them.
This method will also target to make clear, and to highlight the periods of change and
continuity in the French institutions that led to create the situation in which the nation is
now. By using this method that is to say, by analyzing past events that relate to the
decisions concerning the two military interventions in Africa, we have been able to
identify two critical junctures, and the path dependence in which France is embedded.
To conclude, we can say that the methods that will be employed in this thesis will aim to
find out, and express the reasons why France is locked in a schema where the country
has to intervene in the ex-African colonies (when they are engaged in a conflict) even
when it does not have any obvious reasons to do so.
3.3. Empirical Materials
To write this research paper, books about the theories of international relations and
about methodologies have been used. Books dedicated to the post-colonial period in the
African countries have also helped to carry out the analysis. Official declarations made
by the French President, and interviews of the French ministers concerning the military
actions and the French renewed interest in Africa have been utilized. Online debates
gathering French and African intellectuals talking about the two military interventions
have been precious for the drafting of this manuscript. In order to write the analysis, lots
of articles from different journals, some specialized on Africa, others on foreign policies
have been very helpful. Finally, the French and international newspapers that have
brought different and interesting perspectives in the way to deal with the management
of to the two conflicts in Africa have helped a lot.
Ibid.
Falleti, T.G. (2006) Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics:
Something Old, Something New. Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the
American Political Science Association, 17 (1). http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/~falleti/Falleti-CPAPSANewsletter06-TGPT.pdf [Accessed: 6 March 2014], p.5.
102
103
32
3.4. Limitations of the Method
The method used has some limits that we have to acknowledge. Indeed, when using
historical institutionalism, the description of past events is really important. The
analysis has to be narrative, and a bad description of the facts could undermine the
results that would be found104. Moreover, some critics have been made about historical
institutionalism; it is said that examples and comparisons that have been chosen cannot
give a general knowledge because they have not been randomly selected105. Indeed,
some scholars are also concerned that historical institutionalists, while choosing cases
for the analysis, will privilege the ones ‘where a phenomenon of interest has occurred,
while ignoring the instances where it has not occurred’106.
In order to avoid these drawbacks that could deteriorate the analysis’ quality, we
decided to study the two last military interventions in Africa and not specific ones from
the past. The aim of this thesis is to interpret the decisions currently made by the
metropolis, and so to understand the new French foreign policy in Africa. This is why it
is important to analyze the most recent military operations.
Concerning the importance of the good description, we have included in this research
project a precise background and chronologic explanations of the two military
confrontations in Africa. These elements that constitute the context of our paper have
been carefully written with the aim to mention every important fact that led in some
way to the situation that we encounter at the moment.
3.5. Research Design
This research paper will be an interpretation of the French legitimization and motives
given to explicate the two military deployments, and the renewed interest in Africa. The
analysis will be conducted with different theories and methods. Indeed, historical
institutionalism will be employed in this thesis as a theory and as a method. It will aim to
find out the sociological processes involved in the military interventions, and to answer
the research questions. Historical facts are important for the study of our topic that is
why the analysis will be narrative. However, our aim is not to ‘tell a story’ about France
since the independence of its African colonies. This thesis will be an analysis and
Collier, p.823.
Pierson and Skopcol, p.17.
106 Ibid.
104
105
33
interpretation of what is at this moment the French foreign policy in order to answer
our two research questions. In the seven chapters that composed this paper, two main
themes will be taken up. First, the study of the French legitimization for the two military
operations in the two ex-French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, and secondly the
motives of this renewed interest for Africa after a long period of disinterest. The analysis
of this paper will also be written with the help of liberalism and realism. Liberalism will
particularly be used to point out the importance of values, principles, and duties in the
decision process. Realism will stress on the significance of self-interests in the French
actions, and this discipline will assist us challenging the liberals’ point of view. All
through this thesis, elements of the three different theories will be utilized because
states actions are complex, and more than one lens is needed to get satisfactory answers
to our questions.
Chapter 4: The Risky Intervention in Mali
Humanitarian interventions have always been controversial. Some scholars argue that in
no case a state should interfere in another state’s affairs under the pretext of protecting
individuals. Some others prop up that it is a duty for liberal nations to stop human
rights’ depreciations by using force. That is why François Hollande and his government
emphasized and pointed out the legitimatization of the military action since the
announcement of the French participation in Mali’s conflict. This chapter will be
dedicated to the identification, and our interpretation of the different elements that led
the Hexagon to intervene in its ex-colony. Firstly, we will focus on the official
justification given by the Hollande administration. Secondly, we will stress on the other
motives that have not been divulged by the French officials concerning the deployment
of armed troops on the ground of this African country. We will also throughout this part
of the thesis tries to see if this military deployment is placed in the continuity of the
previous foreign policy toward Africa, or on the contrary is inscribed in change and
modernity.
4.1. The French Legitimization for the Serval Operation
Since the beginning of the mission, the French decision makers insisted on the fact that
the final goal of the Serval Operation was to prepare the deployment of African
intervention forces to allow Mali to recover its territorial integrity in conformity with
34
the decision of the Security Council of the UN107. It also aims to organize a democratic
presidential election in the Western African country. The government keeps repeating
what the goals of the Serval operation are, and emphasizing the fact that the presence on
the Malian ground will be temporary. They do that in order to differentiate this action
from some that also were planned to last only few months but lasted for years, such as
the Chadian intervention that is still not over after 25 years of French military
presence108. These declarations are made on a regular basis and target to avoid any
criticism or suspicion about France wanting to ‘occupy’ its ex-colony. There is a real
desire from Paris to demonstrate to the international community that France broke off
with its old habits, and now respects the new foreign policy that has been implemented
in the mid-1990s.
4.1.1. The French Justifications
As we mentioned earlier in this paper, foreign interventions which the goal is to save
civilians are always subject to controversy. To prevent any polemic, France took the
decision to immediately explicate the deployment in Mali in the speech of the President
by giving three main arguments. The first reason why the Hexagon intervenes is because
the country just wants to protect the Malian population said the President. Secondly, he
reminded that this African nation is an old friend of France, and lastly François Hollande
explained that the deployment is completely legal. Paris firmly refutes the fact that this
operation would be anything else than what has been said: a mission dedicated to assist
a country in distress. The head of the French state declared that ‘this is not about us
conquering territory or boosting our influence, or serving some form of trade or
economic interest. That era is over’109. In addition, the different members of the
government repeat regularly to the media that this intervention is purely altruistic, and
not based on France’s interests. This insistence from the French authorities to claim
their legitimacy to act is related to the fear to see this military mission being associated
Hollande, F. (2013) Mali - Déclaration du président de la République, M. François Hollande, à l'issue du
Conseil restreint de défense. Paris, 12 January 2013. http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exlphp/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___recherche_avancee/home.h
tml&VUE=mae_internet___recherche_avancee&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN [Accessed: 15
February 2014].
108 Tertrais, p.54.
109 Mali Crisis: Allies 'Must Do More' to Aid France and Mali in War on Islamists (2013)
International Business Times. 20 January. DOI: 425909.20130120 [Accessed: 6 March 2014].
107
35
with the behavior held during the previous interventions in Africa that caused lots of
problems to the nation.
Since, the independence of the African colonies in the 1960s, and until the mid-1990s
France used systematically force in order to stop the turmoil in the different African
nations. During this period, Paris launched approximately one operation every year on
the African ground110. In many cases, these operations targeted to support, and to
maintain the corrupt governments in place or to protect French interests. In the 1990s,
after many fiascos, disastrous failures, and especially after the end of the Cold War, The
Chirac administration that just won the elections could have taken another decision but
came down to make reforms about the French African foreign policy. This period was a
period of change but also a critical juncture for the metropolis. Many options were
available for France. The first one was to not change anything, but the French knew
something needed to be done. The second option the government had was to change its
foreign policy toward Africa but only in the field of security. The third option was the
disengagement from many areas where France and the ex-colonies had cooperation
agreements. Finally, the last one was to quickly disengage from all sectors where France
was implicated in the Francophone African countries.
The third option has been chosen by Chirac, and at that moment, the path in which
France was embedded for decades had been broken. Several measures have been taken
such as the limitation of the cost and, the limitation of the numbers of interventions.
Moreover, the Cooperation Ministry that was the major channel of the favored links
between France and Africa has been integrated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs111. It
modified the functioning of the relations between the metropolis and the Francophone
African countries a lot. All the reforms implemented were aiming to make the FranceAfrica relationship more transparent, and to rehabilitate the image of the metropolis
that has been tarnished by many African scandals such as the Rwandan genocide or the
‘Angolagate’. In addition, French members of the government also decided that it was
Gueye, A. (2013) Gabon to Mali: History of French Military Interventions in Africa. Global Voices.
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/01/18/gabon-to-mali-history-of-french-military-interventions-inafrica/ [Accessed: 2 April 2014].
111 Moncrieff, R. (2012) French Africa policy: Sarkozy's legacy, and prospects for a Hollande Presidency.
South African Journal of International Affairs, 19 (3), 359-380. DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2012.741104
[Accessed: 12 April 2014], p.361.
110
36
important to change the legitimization given for the French actions. In fact, the
Presidents of the 5th Republic that have preceded Jacques Chirac, utilized as a
justification for the deployments in Africa that France had to respect its military and
defense cooperation agreements, and had to protect the French nationals on the African
ground112. After the shift in the foreign policy these justifications were not considered as
politically correct anymore. This is why the defense of civilians has been used, and is still
used today113.
Nonetheless, the detractors argue that the French administration gives the motives of
saving lives, and peacekeeping action as alibis whereas it just wants to intervene in the
Western African country to preserve its interests. When France divulged its intention to
go back to an African country to protect the population, many voices rose to affirm and
they still affirm that this justification is a lie. Many people in Africa also do not
understand how the international community of nations do not protest, and did not do
anything to stop it114.
4.1.2. Responsibility to Protect
The first element of the legitimization focuses on the protection of civilians. France
wants to protect the Malian population but also the French and European individuals
present on the territory. The metropolis applies a principle that is quite new within the
international politics: the Responsibility to Protect. Since its emergence after the 2nd
World War, France has always been a fervent supporter of this principle.
Responsibility to Protect is a principle that grants the
international community a right to intervene forcefully
when governments systematically violate human rights and
equally important because the principle sets out to
Bell, D.A. (2014) Double Entendre. Foreign Affairs.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140649/david-a-bell/double-entendre [Accessed: 11 April
2014].
113 Willsher, K. (2011) Sarkozy's micro-managed intervention in Ivory Coast could win votes. The
Guardian, 11 April. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/sarkozy-ivory-coast-vote-winner
[Accessed: 29 March 2014].
114 Gueye.
112
37
institutionalize a list of state obligations that go beyond the
protection of fundamental rights115.
However, the Responsibility to Protect has been subject of numerous debates within the
community of nations. Indeed, we can find two principles in international law that are
contradictory concerning this new concept. Both of them are ‘enshrined in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights of the UN Charter, on one hand the prohibition of the use
of force (Article 2(4)), and on the other hand the protection of human rights (Article
1(3))’116.
4.1.2.1. Protection of the Malian Population
The Responsibility to Protect is derived from the idea that the legitimacy of states
depend on their ability and willingness to respect human rights117. Mali has failed to
protect its population when the Malian army and the government have been unable to
halt the turmoil in the Azawad region of the country that has led to flout the human
rights of the population. Regarding these facts and according to the principles of this
concept, the Responsibility to Protect can be utilized at least to give some legitimacy to
the liberal countries that desire to intervene in order to protect another state’s
population.
Sadly, the government of Mali mishandled the situation in the North. As a matter of fact,
for a few years the Northern part has been transformed into a place of all kinds of
trafficking such as drugs, arms, human beings, stolen cards, and so on: a lawless enclave.
This is the result of years of neglecting of the region by the Malian state. The cities in the
North almost received no assistance from the government. That is why it has been easy
for the terrorist groups to take roots there, and to control rapidly the area118.
Håkansson, P. (2011) United Nations Reformed: Responsibility, Protection and the Standing of States.
Linköping: Linköping University, p.62.
116 Francioni, F. and Bakker, C. (2013) Responsibility to protect, Humanitarian intervention and Human
rights: Lessons from Libya to Mali. http://www.transworld-fp7.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/TW_WP_15.pdf [Accessed: 29 March 2014], p. 15.
117 Ibid.
118 War crimes in North Mali (2012). http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/mali592ang.pdf [Accessed: 5 March
2014], p.4.
115
38
These rebel groups have committed numerous atrocious crimes against the Malian
population such as rapes, summary executions, child-soldiers, forced amputations,
arbitrary detentions, massive displacement of the population, and pillaging119. Ansar
Dine and the different Islamist groups that have occupied the Northern territories of
Mali imposed a fundamentalist interpretation of the Sharia (the Islamic law) which led
the population to adapt to this new way of life. The persons that refused to comply with
this new law, and the ones that infringed it have been severely punished in virtue of the
Sharia120.
The acts committed by these insurgent groups broke numerous articles of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights121. Ms. Fatou Bensouda, the prosecutor of the ICC opened
on the 16th of January 2013 an ‘investigation into alleged crimes committed on the
territory of Mali since January 2012’122. The Prosecutor Bensouda affirmed that the
population has been living with fear and under coercion due to the presence of terrorists
groups on the Malian territory. The different rebel groups are accused to have inflicted
terrible suffer to civilians. The prosecutor will analyze if ‘some of these deeds of
brutality and destruction may constitute war crimes as defined by the Rome Statute’123.
The fact that these acts are now being studied by the ICC shows the seriousness of the
case. Regarding this context and the dramatic situation for the Malian population, the
French involvement is easily understandable and justifiable according to the principles
of the Responsibility to Protect. Democratic countries have the duty to assist and help
other countries that are unable to protect their own populations against internal or
external threats. France is a democratic state but is also a state to which the
Responsibility to Protect civilians is really important, and that already has demonstrated
it many times now. It is in the French tradition to intervene when another friend nation
such as Mali, which is in a worrisome situation, needs assistance. That is why, with the
aim to re-establish a safe environment for the population of this African country, the
French nation made the decision to deploy its troops there.
Ibid.
Ibid.
121 United Nations (1948) The Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
122 The International Criminal Court (2011) ICC-OTP-20130116-PR869, Statement.
123 Ibid.
119
120
39
4.1.2.2. Aim to Protect French and European Civilians
In their speeches, François Hollande and Laurent Fabius emphasized the fact that it is a
duty for France to protect the French nationals, but also Europeans on the Malian
territory. This desire is completely legit because a nation has also the duty to protect its
expatriates against the dangers that are threatening them124. There are on the Malian
ground around 6000 French nationals and 1000 Europeans125. Staying there for them is
particularly dangerous due to the terrorists that are looking for westerners with the
final goal to take them as hostages. In the different official declarations given about Mali,
it has been mentioned many times the importance to protect the French population.
Actually, we can count two French hostages in the Sahel region, and three others have
been recently killed by the rebels126. Even if the primary goal of this mission is not to
save the hostages that are situated in the North, it has been said it was a key
consideration, and that ‘disrupting the local thriving business of hostage-taking was at
least on the agenda’127. It has also been pointed out the importance for the Hollande
administration to slow down the hostages-business because 90 percent of the revenues
of the terrorist group AQMI come from hostage-taking128. By reducing their incomes,
they are preventing them to organize new assaults.
This argument to legitimize the French actions is far from being new, it has been used
many times throughout the 5th French Republic to justify interventions abroad, it just
makes us wonder if the François Hollande‘ s new African foreign policy is not in reality
inscribed in the continuity more than in the change. Moreover, even if we recognize the
importance to protect the French nationals on a foreign territory, we also estimate that
this justification would not be sufficient to intervene military if given alone.
4.1.2.3. A Fight against Terrorism
In the frame of the Responsibility to Protect, Paris has considered the conflict in Mali as
a threat for the Sahel region called the ‘arc of instability’, but also as a threat for Europe,
Tetrais, p.54.
Fabius, L. (2013) Mali – Press conference given by M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Paris,
14 January 2013. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali-224/events-2627/article/malipress-conference-given-by [Accessed: 13 February 2014].
126 Information written the 4th of March 2014.
127 Tetrais, p.53.
128 Ibid., p.54.
124
125
40
and as a threat for the world. Indeed, this armed confrontation is not considered as an
internal conflict because the North of Mali has mostly been taken by foreign jihadists
that wanted to create an Islamic Mali. The main majority of these terrorists are not
Malian, and they come from the neighboring countries such as Algeria, Chad or Libya.
They arrived in Mali after the fall of Kaddafi in Libya129, and they thought they would be
able to seize the Azawad region due to the lack of the state’s presence in the Azawad
Region. International community, especially the other African countries feared that if
nothing was done to stop them, the armed groups would achieve their goals in this
country and they would have tried to widespread their influences and power to the
neighboring countries.
The role of a liberal community is to protect the other members of this group.
Otherwise, it could engender the fall of many democratic states in favor of authoritarian
regimes. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister declared about the Malian conflict
that ‘this is a global threat and it will require a global response’130. Indeed, this
confrontation is not considered as an internal problem, but as a global one. That is the
reason why some European countries together with the United States decided to bring
their help to France and to the African countries in this battle against terrorism.
Nonetheless, we notice that these nations do not consider this armed clash as a major
threat for their own countries as France does. Even if the metropolis tried its best to
involve more the other Western powers in this battle, by invoking the fact that the fight
against terrorism is a noble cause, it did not really work. The metropolis is the only
Western country that has sent soldiers to Africa. The other nations gave material,
technical and financial support for the Serval operation131, and ‘the EU launched a
training mission for Malian armed forces, called EUTM Mali’132. Calling for help is really
new for France when it comes to its ex-colonies, and it demonstrates its efforts to keep
this operation transparent. In fact, in the past the metropolis got used to act by itself
Dowd, C. and Raleigh, C. (2014) The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the
Sahel. African Affairs, 112 (448), 498–509. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adt039 [Accessed: 25 February 2014],
p.506.
130 Ibid., p. 499.
131 Council of the European Union (2013) Conclusions du Conseil relatives au Mali, 3236ème session du
Conseil affaires étrangères. Luxembourg.
132 European Union (n.d) External Action, Security and Defence.
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/missiondescription/index_en.htm [Accessed: 12 May 2014].
129
41
wanting no interference in its sphere of influence. This idea of multilateralism in the
African interventions has been introduced during Sarkozy’s term which aimed to share
the burden, but also to make the military deployments more transparent133.
So, in order to explain the high implication of France in this battle against terrorism
regarding the ‘weaker’ implication of the other Western countries, the Minister of
Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, declared that there is ‘a terrorist state developing on
Europe’s doorstep134’. He pointed out ‘that due to the tight connection between West
and North Africa, the creation of an Al Qaeda state in the region would directly threaten
France’s security135’. The Hexagon called the attention to the fact that it has tied for long
time now close relations, in many areas, with states in the North Africa such as Morocco,
Tunisia or Algeria. He also reminded their geographic proximity to France. This last
aspect has heavily been relayed by the French press resulting in the desire and the
support of the French population for this intervention.
Once again, the members of the government have highlighted that it is a duty for France
to protect its own citizens from a terrorist threat within its borders. The government
emphasized that it felt this Malian conflict was a direct danger for the country and for
the French population. It was for this reason and for few others that the nation judged
that a military intervention was necessary. Otherwise, it has been argued that the global
threat that represents these Islamist fighters has been exaggerated. Actually, the
jihadists in Mali had a much more localized agenda than what has been argued by the
community of nations. No empirical elements have been found supporting the
hypothesis of these specific groups being present at a transnational level. In fact, the
nature of this menace in the Western African country is really diversified: ‘groups are
structurally, politically, and empirically different, and each is located within discrete
national contexts and struggles’136. In this context, it could be possible that this conflict
in Mali might not be as threatening for France as the Hollande administration believes.
Moncrieff, p.368.
Bresler, I. (2013) Mali: Why France is fighting for West Africa.
http://www.theforeignreport.com/2013/02/06/mali-why-france-is-fighting-for-west-africa/ [Accessed:
31 March 2014].
135 Ibid.
136 Dowd and Raleigh, pp.508-509.
133
134
42
4.1.3. The French Duty toward Mali
As mentioned by the President François Hollande in his speech of the 11th of January
2013, Mali is an old friend and maintains particular links with France since its
independence in 1960. But the most important element here is that France has a debt
toward this African country. Actually, François Hollande pointed out the fact that during
the 1st World War Mali sent troops in the trenches to support the French Army. During
the 2nd World War the Western African country aided to liberate France from the
German occupation. The ex-colony has been a faithful ally that has always followed and
backed France up. In addition, the French nation is still having a really paternalistic
behavior with its ex-colonies as if they still were under its protection. France believes it
is a part of its mission to help the Francophone African states to solve their conflicts.
And, we have to highlight that this behavior is completely suitable and acceptable for the
ex-colonies. Indeed, this French intervention was not only expected by Mali but also by
numerous francophone African nations. Especially, the neighboring nations which were
worried about possible repercussions and propagation of this fight and hostilities in
their own states. Not only Mali, but most of ex- African colonies have also kept close
links with France. The relationship between France and Africa does not only rely on
military cooperation as we could think. The Hexagon has with many African countries
several cooperation agreements in different areas. These accords are the symbol of the
huge implication of France in African countries’ affairs.
Another fact to take into account is that France possesses a big African population
within its territory. Before the announcement of François Hollande concerning the
military intervention in Mali, several African Diasporas have protested asking the
French government to act in order to stop the violence there. African populations as well
as French nationals got used to see France playing the role of gendarme, the role of the
big brother of Africa137. They are expecting the metropolis to act, and in case the country
takes time to intervene, they send France back to the fact that the French nation has a
duty toward this Continent. The African populations estimate that this mission in Mali is
Beardsley, E. (2013) Why French Troops Are Intervening In Africa — Again.
http://www.npr.org/2013/12/15/251171604/once-again-french-troops-intervene-in-africa [Accessed:
12 March 2014].
137
43
normal in regard to what France did to their nations. This fact brings even more
legitimacy to the French government in its intervention.
The French population in general supports this operation if it aims to save lives: ‘if it is
about economic interests, I am against going in, but if it is to bring peace and limit the
risks of terrorism, I am all for it’138 answered a French national to the question of a
journalist asking about the Serval operation. The French grant a big importance to the
French values, principles, and to the French tradition concerning the respect of the
human rights. And the government knows it. Every time there is an intervention abroad,
the President gains in popularity. The population agrees with what they see as a just
cause, and to what could bring to the nation grandeur (greatness) and prestige as we
will see in the sixth chapter.
For all these reasons, France could not, and did not want to refuse to give assistance to
Mali. It would have been a too strong sign sent to sub-Saharan Africa. It could have
marked the end of a long cooperation, and that was what France was the most afraid of.
In fact, the French nation but also the African countries are stuck in a path dependence
that is hard to reverse. Even if it might be better for Mali and for France that the African
Union, and African troops take the lead of the Serval mission to stabilize the country, the
ex-colonies really wanted France to get involved. The African continent needs France
but France also needs Africa. African countries have always had a big importance to the
metropolis, and it is still the case today for political and economic reasons.
4.1.4. The Legality of the Serval Operation
The Minister of Foreign Affairs gave three explanations concerning the legality of the
mission in Western Africa. First, he reminded that the President of Mali, Dioncounda
Traoré, requested the help of France in order to halt the Islamists in their progression
toward the cities in Southern Mali and toward the capital, Bamako. Secondly, Laurent
Fabius pointed out that the intervention was in accordance with the Article 51 of the
Charter of the UN that claims:
138
Ibid.
44
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security 139.
Lastly, the UN Security Council approved the French intentions, and authorized the
military deployment as it is mentioned in the Resolution number 2085 (UNSC
Resolution 2085)140. This decision has been welcomed by the whole community of
nations with the exception of Algeria that showed at the start of the operation its doubts
about the successful resolution of Mali’s troubles by the French military intervention but
finally rallied to the cause141.
The French officials insisted a lot on these three points, reminding the legality of the
action at each declaration they made on the Malian war. This fact is quite new for
France. Actually, the European nation intervened a lot without the consent of the
international community. Even though the Chirac administration implemented a reform
that aimed at complying with the UN decisions concerning military interventions, this
rule has not always been respected even by his government that intervened in Ivory
Coast in 2002 without the consent of the UN Security Council. Now, the Hexagon wants
to show its good will and its respect of international laws by obtaining authorization
from the UN Security Council before to send its armed forces abroad. Indeed, the legality
of the intervention is very important. Any humanitarian intervention needs to be
approved by the international instances, by the community of nations, and to be
United Nations (1945) Charter: Article 51. San Francisco.
United Nations, Security Council (2012) Resolution 2085. New York.
141 Kal (2013) Early Perspectives from Algeria on Northern Mali and French Intervention. Jadaliyya, 23
January. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9712/early-perspectives-from-algeria-on-northernmali-a [Accessed: 2 April 2014].
139
140
45
conformed to international law. Any infringement of the common rules would
undermine the philanthropic character of the intervention. France does not want to
answer any accusations concerning this delicate African mission because it is trying to
gain back influence and importance on the international arena. Any problems about this
operation would undermine its chances to success in its project. On the contrary, a
successful mission of humanitarian assistance would really be profitable as we will see
later in the chapter about the French renewed interest for Africa.
4.2. France’s Other Motives for Intervening
After analyzing the French legitimization for the Malian’s operation, we will point out
some aspects and details of this mission that have not been tackled by France when it
explained why the country was intervening. Indeed, France assumed openly its duty
toward Mali by giving diverse justifications; but Paris does not want to recognize its part
of responsibility in what is happening now in this Western African country. It also does
not want to recognize the importance that plays its interests in the Sahel region in the
decision process of the intervention.
4.2.1. Consequences of the Colonization
When France decided to colonize African territories, it created the borders of the
countries, which we know now, without taking into account the different ethnic tribes
living within these nations. The French policy makers made these choices being aware of
what could happen. Actually, by putting together rival ethnic tribes in the same country,
conflicts have been concentrated amongst the population preventing civilians to rebel
against the French hegemony142. As a consequence, lots of clashes broke out throughout
the years, during the colonization period, and even once the independence had been
granted. For example, many crises within Mali occurred between Tuaregs and SubSaharan Africans due to how borders had been defined by the French. From the 1960s to
the 1990s, France has been very present in its ex-colonies in order to maintain the
situation but also for other reasons.
142
Alemazung, p.65.
46
All these conflicts have indirectly been caused by the ex-empire. Bloodsheds have been
avoided after the independence thanks to defense cooperation agreement signed
between the metropolis and its ex-colonies. These accords have been a way to keep
control over Africa. The Hexagon did not leave the African countries become
autonomous by always going to rescue them, and without encouraging the formation of
efficient African armies.
Today, the cooperation agreements inherited from the post-colonial period are not into
force anymore, they have been cancelled after the crisis in the 1990s. However, France
even without these agreements still keeps a strong influence over the Francophone
African countries due to the fact that other accords have been signed in many areas such
as education, administration of the governments, security, and lots of bilateral aids are
still granted. The European nation does not want to recognize that these numerous
arrangements with the African states make them dependent on France in many ways.
The Hollande administration does not foresee to change it, and even offered to the
African Union to train its troops. Nothing has been really done to encourage the excolonies to tackle their problems without external help. This system of agreements has
been made to ensure that the French interests are protected as we will see later in this
chapter.
4.2.2. Long Support Granted to a Corrupt Regime
Another fact of great importance in the Mali case is that from 1968 until 1991, the
country supported the dictator Moussa Traoré that overthrew by a putsch the legitimate
President Modibo Keïta. And, Paris does not want the international community to
remember it. Even if the President Keïta was not backed up by a big part of the
population, he had realized in few years important economic and social achievements143.
The ‘domination’ of Traoré over the country has been ‘characterized by the
liberalization of the economy, curtailment of civil liberties, and endemic corruption
amongst administrators and officials’144. The consequences for Mali have been
disastrous. In a short period of time the African nation became a country with restricted
De Jorio, R. (2003) Narratives of the Nation and Democracy in Mali: A View from Modibo Keita’s
Memorial. Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 172, 827-855. http://etudesafricaines.revues.org/1467 [Accessed:
31 March 2014], p.830.
144 Ibid.
143
47
freedom, high inequality, and lots of economic problems resulting in the extreme
poverty of one part of the population. The state still suffers from this period because of
the debts the ex-dictator has accumulated in the 1970s, and because of all the time lost
to develop Mali and the Malian’s economy. Indeed, ‘one major part of the aid granted for
the development of the nation has been embezzled to the profit of the Françafrique’s
networks’145. France supported this regime to get in exchange some resources, and
unfortunately did not contribute to the recovery of the country after the fall of the
dictator. The overt aspect of this bad governance can be the Azawad region that has
been abandoned by the Malian government years ago, and has become a dangerous
region where a lot of trafficking takes place. In addition, Paris does not want to admit the
repercussions of its links it had with the dictators of the ex-colonies. As an example the
current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagamé, declared recently that France had a role in
the genocide of Rwanda. Even if there are solid evidences, the country still refutes these
allegations. It demonstrates a decline in the French discourse toward its past. Indeed, in
2010, President Sarkozy admitted that France did some ‘mistakes’ in Rwanda146.
4.2.3. Many Interests at Stake in the Sahel Region
At the beginning of the Serval operation, the French government firmly denied to have
any interests in Africa, affirming the intervention was only aiming to the save civilians.
Contrary to what has been said, at the moment, we realize that this discourse is
changing. During the Ambassadors Conference, the 29th of August 2012, the French
President has recognized and claimed the French interests on the African continent147.
The French and African Presidents have renewed some agreements, and the metropolis
reaffirmed its friendship toward African leaders, even whose the authority is contested
in their countries. The good resolutions that took France when changing its African
foreign policy are difficult to see. The old habits are hard to change, and the decision
taken in the 1990s by the Hexagon to direct help and investments to the countries that
were on the process of democratization is not always respected. We can obviously
Outtara,V. (2007) Françafrique: une nébuleuse du colonialisme français.
http://www.thomassankara.net/spip.php?article1127 [Accessed: 11 April 2014].
146 Rwanda: the French authorities persist in their denial (2014). http://survie.org/genocide/implicationspolitiques-militaires/article/rwanda-the-french-authorities-4683 [Accessed: 14 April 2014].
147 Aggad-Clerx, F. (2013) France: Out of Africa and back? Aljazeera, 16 December.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/france-out-africa-back20131214112634946877.html [Accessed: 28 April 2014].
145
48
acknowledge that the French nation is regressing and is following the path and the
methods it has used many years ago. This late confession makes the French acts much
more credible due to the economic and strategic links Paris has in the African Continent.
The decision to intervene or not is always carefully thought. It is hard to believe,
regarding the French history in Africa, that a military intervention has simply
humanitarian objectives. Indeed, according to the realist thinking moral principles
cannot be applied to the states’ actions, and moral concerns will always come after selfinterests148. Moreover, it is obvious that ‘if Mali is destabilized, and with it many other
West African French-speaking countries where France has major economic interests, it
would have negative consequences on France's overall economic wellbeing’149. France
by intervening saved Malian civilians but the country would not have spent that much
money, and risk the lives of its soldiers if it would not have brought some advantages to
the nation150.
The special interests France has in Africa, especially the Sahel region are a well-known
fact and the world is aware of it. France has difficulties to recognize these interests by
fear to see the intervention in Mali being associated with a neo-colonialist behavior.
However, the major French interests are not situated in this Western country. Even if
this nation possesses interesting goods for the metropolis such as raw materials, gold
and gas; what grants so much importance to Mali is its geographical situation in Africa.
In fact, this ex-colony is at the heart of the Sahel region. In addition, the North of Mali,
where the Jihadist fighters are, has a direct border with Niger. This state concentrates
most of the French interests in Africa because the country is rich in uranium. A French
company, Aréva, specialized in nuclear energy is based there. This company supplies
France with 75% of its electricity. The loss of this part of Africa where Aréva is located
would be disastrous for the nation, and totally unthinkable. French troops have been
deployed on the site of the company to insure the security of the personnel. Indeed, four
members of Aréva have been kidnapped in September 2010 by AQMI in Niger. Since the
start of the confrontation in Northern Mali, France has sent more soldiers on the
Nigerian ground to protect the extraction of Uranium. The government was afraid that
Morgenthau, pp.4-15.
Mali: Is France’s Operation Serval Anti-Terrorism or Pro-Business? (2013). International Business Time,
7 February. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Mali%3A+Is+France's+Operation+Serval+AntiTerrorism+or+Pro-Business%3F-a0317900572 [Accessed: 23 February 2014].
150 Wheeler, p.30.
148
149
49
that the Malian turmoil would have a spill-over effect on Niger. The Hollande
administration had all the reasons to intervene in Mali; it wanted to stop the terrorists in
the North before they reach Niger and Aréva. The fact that the French government did
not want to admit this fact contrasts with the official discourse that highlights the
disinterested and transparent character of this operation. However, trying to conceal the
obvious might not be the best strategy as France wants to improve its image.
4.3. Conclusion
Through this chapter we saw how France did its best to legitimize its military
intervention. It has been well-prepared, and lots of elements and details have been given
by France. This profusion and abundance of different explanations supporting this
operation in sub-Saharan Africa can give the impression that France wants to convince
the international community of its good will toward Mali. Three main justifications have
been given, but the French government decided to not provide all the reasons that led it
to intervene. Indeed, according to our research, we found some other motives that could
have influenced the French officials while choosing to act or not. So what should we
think about the Serval operation? For sure, we cannot contest the legitimization and the
legal character of the mission. Nonetheless, some aspects leave us skeptical such as the
desire from the French government to affirm that no interests were at stake, or to
completely dodge its part of responsibility in the current situation of Africa. These facts
show us that the new French foreign policy toward Africa is not as modern as France
would like the international community to believe. Indeed, through the Malian case, we
saw that the country in its legitimization used lots of elements from the past, and
applied some old habits by not wanting to recognize some motives. In the next chapter,
we will study the official legitimization and justifications given by France for the
Sangaris operation in CAR, but we will also provide what we think are the other reasons
for France to intervene there.
Chapter 5: The Intervention in the Central African Republic
The French deployment in CAR took place only few months after the one in Mali, leading
to numerous allegations of France having a neo-colonialist behavior. However, if we look
closer at the CAR mission, we realize that in itself the operation has not been questioned.
Indeed, almost no critics arose about this intervention. That is partly due to the fact that
50
France itself was really reluctant to send troops to this African country. As a matter of
fact, the socialist President for the first time refused to intervene after the request of the
CAR President. If the European nation is criticized it is because of the closeness between
the two militarily interventions on the African ground. Actually, it reminds us the old
time of the Françafrique where the metropolis was intervening regularly to maintain
peace and prop up the authoritarian African governments. We will, in this chapter of the
research project, analyze and interpret the legitimization given by the government
concerning the Sangaris operation but we will also provide other aspects that have not
been mentioned by the French officials, and that we believe led them to take this
decision. We will also see and point out the change of the French government’s attitude
in its way to justify its actions in this ex-colony compared to the one granted for the
Western African country.
5.1. The French Legitimization for the Intervention in Central African Republic
The first thing we can notice when reading François Hollande’s speech of the 5th of
December 2013 announcing the Sangaris operation is the similarity with the
declarations about the intervention in Mali. In fact, we can also find the three same
major elements given for the Serval operation that is to say the Responsibility to Protect,
the duty of France to help, and the legality of the mission. The French President also
insisted heavily on the fact that this deployment had only one objective, the one to save
human lives151. This discourse and these justifications are not new in term of
legitimization. They have already been used in the past but they stay the most
convincing and the most acceptable. Nonetheless, if we compare the two legitimizations
we can see than the one dedicated to CAR is much poorer when it comes to give
elements to justify the French acts. Indeed, France decided to keep the same
argumentation for CAR but what is happening there is completely different from what is
happening in Mali, so the metropolis encounters more difficulties to provide numerous
evidences of its good will as it did for the Mali case.
151
Hollande, RCA - Déclaration du président de la République. Paris, 5 December 2013.
51
5.1.1. Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect has once again been evoked. Notwithstanding, the
situation in the country situated in the Center of Africa, as we saw, is not the same than
the one in Mali. In CAR, there are no terrorists threatening the population, and being a
danger for the region and the world. It has been said that ‘it is an interreligious conflict
that comes from a politic and religious instrumentation like the interethnic conflict in
Rwanda was the result of an ethnic instrumentation’152. The confrontation is different
but it remains really serious and dangerous. It is on the way to become a civil war with
one part of the population fighting against another part the population for religious
motives. On the contrary of Mali, this crisis is an internal one that has weak chances to
be spread to the neighboring countries. That is the reason why this conflict does not get
so much interest. As an example of this disinterest, there is a lack of understanding
within the French population who wonders if France is going to intervene in every
interreligious and interethnic conflict on the African continent153. The French Head of
state answered to this question in a declaration made in Bangui, the capital of CAR. He
explained that the French army has been sent to this African state in order to stop the
mass murdering, the rapes, and to save children from being involved into different
militias present in the country154. Even if the links are not as tight as the ones the
Hexagon has with other ex-colonies, this African country and the metropolis still have a
common past. Save lives is a noble and beautiful mission said Hollande155, and so far,
France has always been a partisan to intervene in order to help, assist and save.
5.1.2. French Duty
On the 5th of December 2013, in his discourse declaring the deployment in CAR, François
Hollande claimed that ‘it is the duty of France : duty to assist and to be joined together
Piège en Centrafrique (2013) C dans l’air. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFYAQZLN5Ps
[Accessed: 4 February 2014].
153 Piège en Centrafrique.
154 Hollande, F. (2014) République centrafricaine -Déclaration de M. François Hollande, président de la
République. Paris, 23 January 2014. http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exlphp/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___recherche_avancee/home.h
tml&VUE=mae_internet___recherche_avancee&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN=1 [Accessed: 10
April 2014].
155 Hollande, F. (2013) République centrafricaine - Message du président de la République, M. François
Hollande. Bangui, 10 December 2013. http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exlphp/cadcgp.php?CMD=CHERCHE&QUERY=1&MODELE=vues/mae_internet___recherche_avancee/home.h
tml&VUE=mae_internet___recherche_avancee&NOM=cadic__anonyme&FROM_LOGIN=1 [Accessed: 10
April 2014].
152
52
toward a small country, CAR, far away, a friend country, the poorest in the world, a
country that calls for help’156. The French troops with the African soldiers have a really
delicate work to accomplish there in the sense that if France disarms the Selekas
without disarming the anti-Balakas, there is a high risk of massacre of the Muslim
population. This mission is complicated, it could last much longer than what has been
foreseen that is to say few months, and it is also really risky for France. The country
could be accused to take side for the Christian community and to laisser-faire (let do) the
mass-murdering of the Muslim population157. Reasons given for this French duty are
more general and less associated to the history between the two countries. The
emphasis has been made on the altruistic side of this intervention. The President
explained the duty that France has toward CAR in his rare speeches about the Sangaris
operation. Discourses were mainly based on the fact this is a duty for a democratic
country to foster the democracy in a failed state. Nothing has been mentioned about the
sacrifice that the African population did for France during the two World Wars. He did
not pay tribute to the CAR soldiers as it has been the case for Mali. It is also through the
discourses of the French President that we can witness the shift in the French foreign
policy toward Africa. He does not try to persuade as much as for the intervention in Mali,
the justifications given are sparser. The foreign policy that is carried out is henceforth
better assumed.
The head of the French state also answered the criticisms made concerning the French
propensity to always intervene first in the different African conflicts. He explained that
France has always been the first country to intervene when humanitarian crises arise.
France with its history, its values, its principles, its army, and
its capacities to act. And, far from afflict us of this situation of
being first, we have to be proud that France is being waited
and hoped. Yes, proud that the populations live the arrival of
the French troops as a synonym of liberation158.
Ibid.
Piège en Centrafrique.
158 Hollande, République centrafricaine - Message du président de la République, M. François Hollande.
Bangui, 10 December 2013.
156
157
53
It is clear in this discourse that the Responsibility to Protect is not only an alibi for
France to intervene. The French government but also the French population is proud to
be a nation that defend the oppressed and in distress populations. This aspect is really
important for the French; France is what it is because of its capacity to intervene. France
finds back in this intervention, and the one in Mali prestige and grandeur. Indeed, the
country in African conflict acts alone and takes the lead of the deployments. The country
calls and still tries to convince the other Western powers to also get involved. François
Hollande said that by the French involvements in humanitarian causes lead France to
keep its importance in the world. It is especially true at the moment because Paris due to
its economic problems does not have as much influence in the EU as it would like. Even
if, as we saw, this intervention was not popular within the French population, the
extension of this military intervention was approved by the French Parliament by 428 to
14 votes. In fact, even if the President Hollande is the one that takes the decisions
regarding the French deployments abroad, since 2008 the elected representatives have
the right vote on the upkeep of the interventions in the fourth months following the start
of the actions. The deputies of the opposition (right wing party) understood the
importance of this military operation. Every member of the French parliament focused
on the moral responsibility of the liberal nation which France is when approving the
upkeep of the operation. The International community knew also that something had to
be done as soon as possible in order to avoid genocide but no country was really
enthusiastic about intervening there, even France was reluctant to act. That is maybe
one of the reasons why the CAR mission has not been the subject of critics.
5.1.3. The Right to Intervene
The French administration explicated briefly that the intervention was legal. Indeed, it
has been mentioned that the Security Council of the UN authorized, the 5th December
2013, the Sangaris operation by the resolution number 2127159. François Hollande did
not really point out this aspect of the intervention whereas the French government has
provided a more detailed legitimization for the Mali mission. So, for this military
deployment in this ex-colony, the Hollande administration just underlined that the exempire had the right to intervene because the international community granted the
authorization to do so.
159
United Nations, Security Council (2013) Resolution 2127. New York.
54
The attention dedicated to this mission situated in the Center of Africa, did not get as
much interest as the one in Mali. The French media did not relay a lot of information
about it. We think it is because a huge interest has been showed to the municipal and
European elections. But it is also because all regards in France and especially in Europe
have been turned toward the conflict in Ukraine. It can also be one of the reasons why
criticisms and accusations of neo-colonialism have been avoided. Some intellectuals of
other countries such as Canada have even highlighted the brave behavior of France and
regretted that their country does not act160. The metropolis has been spared from
reproaches because the country has only few interests in this African country which is
one of the poorest in the world. Intervening for France is really costly even if the nation
receives a financial support and, recently since April 2014, is assisted by a military help
that has been sent by the EU. This military force has deployed so far 150 European
peacekeepers in CAR161. Paris has always been concerned by the fate of the populations
in danger abroad but almost all the French military interventions in Africa have been
linked to other motives in addition to the official ones given by the government. So, we
will study in the second part of this chapter if the French government has this time again
omitted some details about the reasons of the mission in CAR in order to get the
approval of the community of nations.
5.2. The Unmentioned Reasons for an Intervention in the Center of Africa
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the CAR case is different from Mali, and this difference
also concerns what we believe are the unspoken reasons that led France to launch this
military intervention. France has been really reluctant to act, and even refused to get
involved when the CAR President requested the help and assistance of the country to
solve the conflict. Finally, after almost one year of hesitation and unwillingness Paris set
up the Sangaris operation. This decision is quite surprising as we will see below because
the European country does not have any substantial commercial links with CAR which is
one of the poorest countries in the world despite of its natural resources.
Hachey, I. (2014) Centrafrique: Roméo Dallaire craint un génocide. La presse, 28 March.
http://www.lapresse.ca/international/afrique/201403/27/01-4752106-centrafrique-romeo-dallairecraint-un-genocide.php [Accessed: 2 April 2014].
161 Braun, E. and Croft, A. (2014) EU peacekeepers take charge at Central African Republic airport, violence
rages. Reuters, 30 April. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/30/us-centralafrica-euidUSBREA3T12620140430 [Accessed: 6 May 2014].
160
55
5.2.1. The Duty to Help an Ally
Even if the conflict concerns the CAR’s population, neighboring countries are worried
about this crisis. It could have some repercussions on their nations or populations due to
the geographical proximity. Many Africans leaders asked the ex-empire to participate in
the resolution of the crisis. In fact, Paris used to find solutions to the African problems
still years after the independence. That is why African states are expecting France to get
involved this time again. Finally, after many months of reflection the socialist President
agreed to send troops but only with the aim to lead a peacekeeping mission that he
wanted to be short, less than 6 months. He justified its choice, as we saw in the previous
part of this chapter, but he added that he was not sure the African countries would have
intervened without the French’s presence in a desire to show that without the country
CAR would have been left alone. Nonetheless, the official legitimization has not been
strong enough to hide the reluctant attitude of the French government to intervene in
this ex-colony. Paris worries a lot about its soldiers. The French officials know that the
loss of soldiers would be terrible for them whereas the elections are coming. Actually, as
the population was against this mission in sub-Saharan Africa, the government is aware
that in case of death of one of the members of the contingent it would have a negative
repercussion for the socialists during the elections. Also, that is why on the front line of
this fight are present only the African armies more numerous but less trained and
equipped162. The French army is taking care of the less risky tasks.
We estimated that if the French nation intervened it is of course because of the official
justifications given but also in order to satisfy the African countries. Indeed, France
wants to keep good relation with its ex-colony and wants to keep its allies that are
present with the country in Mali. The Hollande administration is afraid that if the state
refused to act, the links with African nations could have been deteriorated. The
government which is targeting to consolidate the relations with many sub-Saharan
African states decided to act with the desire to not jeopardize its plan.
162
Ollivier, J-Y. (2014) Centrafrique : pourquoi la France est enlisée ? Le Figaro, 17 February.
56
5.2.2. Intervention as a Path Dependence
The French administration does not want to admit that the nation is embedded in the
schema of intervening in Africa every time a confrontation arises. This mission is a
burden hard to bear for France because it will not bring much to the nation. Actually,
from what we found in our research, we realize that France had only minor interests in
CAR even if the country possesses numerous valuable resources. We already know that
the operation will last more than what was foreseen (a few months) due to the
complexity of the crisis. Even if once again France received technical, financial, and now
military help from the Western countries still a lot stays to the expense of the nation
with financial difficulties. In addition, the French nation risks its reputation, the lives of
its soldiers, and lots of money just in order to save another nation which is not even a
close ally. As we already highlighted in this thesis moral principles cannot be applied to
the action of a state163. François Hollande even declared that France and CAR had a
common past, but no common present, and that nothing was sure about a common
future164. As General de Gaulle said once, states do not have friends, they only have
interests165. The behavior of state is driven by its self-interest more than the will to help
its friends or allies. Moreover, when a trade-off for a nation emerges altruism will be
surpassed by egoism166. So we can wonder why France decided to get involved in CAR.
From our interpretation of all these facts we assume that France is victim of path
dependence. Indeed, whereas we saw that by intervening the country would mainly get
disadvantages, the French President after a first refusal decided to send troops. The exempire has huge problems to leave African countries solving their crises by themselves.
For long time, interventions have been the symbol of the French power over Africa. The
nation that lost lots of influence on the international arena does not want to give up
what made it many years ago a great empire. Notwithstanding, the world is not the same
anymore, and France has to accept and respect the independence of its ex-colonies in
sub-Saharan Africa. We have to mention that in the case of Mali as well as in the CAR
case the African leaders were asking for the assistance of France. So we could imagine
Mortenghau, pp.4-15.
Hollande, République centrafricaine - Déclaration de M. François Hollande, président de la République.
Paris, 23 January 2014.
165 De Gaulle, C. In: Walther, E. (2013). La Tribune, n°55, 5 July.
http://fr.wikiquote.org/wiki/Charles_de_Gaulle [Accessed: 25 April 2014], p.8.
166 Wohlforth, p.34.
163
164
57
that there is no problem if the African nations agree. Sadly, there are lots of
authoritarian regimes that rule the ex-French colonies, and so their legitimacy is by this
fact reduced.
The French government could have broken this path at the moment it surprisingly did
not accept the request of the President Bozizé in December 2012. Some observers even
declared that President Hollande passed the first test of his new African policy in CAR
that was aiming to put an end to Françafrique167. Many solutions from this point were
available to Paris, but we have identified four that would have marked a new era in the
Franco-African relationship.
The first solution is that France could have stuck to its line and does not get involved at
all in this confrontation. The second solution is that the European nation could have
given financial, technical, and material assistance to the MISCA and African Union in
order to help them to solve this conflict. The third solution could have been for Paris to
wait the establishment of an EU mission in CAR. The last solution that was available was
that the French state could have waited the setup of the peacekeeping operation
organized by the UN, and send troops to join it168.
Notwithstanding, Paris retracted its decision and finally intervened on the 5th of
December 2014. Old habits are hard to die. France ceded, the government could not
stick to the new foreign policy established by it, aiming to the put an end to Françafrique.
By taking this decision, now France will be confronted again in the future to new
requests coming from other ex-colonies that are politically unstable. As a consequence
after this intervention it will be hard for the French nation to refuse to send armed
forces to maintain peace in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of the other Francophone
African countries possesses stronger links with France, and the metropolis is targeting
to retighten links with them. In order to achieve its goal, France would strongly be
encouraged to intervene again if a new conflict arises. This situation demonstrates that
the country is profoundly stuck in a path (inherited from the cooperation agreements
Singh, A. (2014) France: Why intervene in Mali and not Central African Republic? The Guardian, 5
February. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/france-centralafrican-republic-maliintervention [Accessed: 21 April 2014].
168 Security Council establishes UN peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic.
167
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signed at the same time the French colonies became independent) that will be now
harder and harder to reverse.
5.3. Conclusion
In this part of the thesis, we studied the official legitimization given for the CAR
operation, and what we suppose were the motives that contributed to the decision to
intervene and that the metropolis did not want to recognize. We witness the difference
of legitimization and the French weak enthusiasm for this mission compared to the one
in Mali. We found out that France has no major interests there and does not plan to
consolidate its links with CAR. It surprised us that a nation risks the lives of its soldiers,
its reputation and money with almost no interests at stake. It is for these reasons that
we suspect that the French state is embedded in a path dependence that is really hard to
reverse for the French government.
Chapter 6: The French Renewed Interest for Africa
For almost 20 years now the French nation tries to normalize and disengage itself from
the African continent. However, we are at the moment witnessing the French regain of
interest for Africa. Indeed, the first and most overt symbol of this interest is needless to
say the two military interventions in the ex-French colonies in less than one year. The
second one is the fact that the European state also shared publically its desire to
retighten economically the links with its allies in sub-Saharan Africa, and reaffirm its
influence and interests in the region. This discourse is quite new and proves the
evolution of the French foreign policy concerning Africa. It is heading toward a franker
and more transparent strategy of communication. In fact, we have to remember the
beginning of the military deployment in Mali; the French President was claiming that the
country did not have any interests in Africa and that the operation had only altruistic
goals. Lastly, we believe that this renewed interest might also come from the fact that
France has drawn from its relations with its ex-colonies prestige, grandeur but it has
also found a place where to promote its culture and values. It brought to France the rank
of one of the most powerful countries in world. Currently, the government experiences
major difficulties in France, but also in the EU. Therefore, the French nation, in looking
to gain back some of its past status is naturally opting for Africa. In this chapter, we will
describe the different motives for this renewed interest in sub-Sahara Africa.
59
6.1. Renewed Interest Demonstrated Through Interventions
Renewed interest in Africa and military interventions are closely linked. Deployments of
armed forces in the ex-colonies have always been the most overt aspect of the interest
granted by France to this part of the world. Both intervention and interest are at the
same time the symbol and the cause of each other.
6.1.1. Interventions as a Heritage from the Past
Interventions in Africa are a French tradition since the independence had been granted
to the African colonies; France intervened a lot in these newly independent states to
maintain order. In the post-colonialism’s period the number of intrastate and interstates
wars have been really high, and for many years France intervened systematically. In the
1990s, after many failures and problems experienced in Africa, France lost its interest
for the continent. After decades of close relationship with African countries, the French
government realized that its foreign policy was not sustainable anymore. Indeed, the
French’s business relations were less important with the ex-colonies than the ones with
the ex-members of the USSR. Moreover, the Francophone African countries necessitated
huge economic and military helps from France. The countries of the sub-Saharan Africa,
at that time, needed several important investments in order to be able to reach a
satisfactory level of development, but the metropolis could not afford to provide them.
The Hexagon preferred at that time to refocus its attention toward the process of
Europeanization that was ongoing. That is why that in the 1990s, France changed its
foreign policy toward Africa, and reduced a lot the number of its military deployments.
The burden was too heavy for the nation that did not have the resources, and that did
not want to perpetuate these actions.
6.1.2. The Link between the Interventions and the Renewed Interest
This decline in the French interventionism in Africa happened just after the fall of the
Soviet Union. This fact has a major importance because during the Cold War the French
attitude toward the French-speaking African countries was accepted and even
appreciated due to the fact that it prevented African nations to fall under the control of
the USSR. Actually, the French interventionism ‘before the 1990s was often understood
60
as a given necessity of the power politics of the Cold War’ 169. It was mandatory for the
French state in order to protect its interests but also the ones of the Western countries
to be so present in the African states170. In the post-Cold War era, on the international
arena the tolerance granted to France was much weaker. In addition, at that epoch, the
Françafrique’s special relations had just been discovered, and relayed by the media to
the French population that was not aware of their real nature. An important scandal in
France burst out and, the particularly discontented French nationals showed their
reluctance to witness these links being perpetrated. The government set in place had
little choice other than changing urgently the French African foreign policy if the French
state wanted to appear credible to the community of nations, but also to the French
population.
After a period of improvements, where lots of work has been done to achieve more
transparence, France started again to intervene. It did not deploy it armed forces
systematically like it has been the case before the 1990s, and surprisingly, the country
privileged multilateralism in its actions on the African Continent. Paris decided to
reduce its participation in African conflicts but not to stop them. The French officials
wanted to break the image of gendarme of Africa, but were also looking for reducing the
cost of the military interventions that were getting really expensive. So, we can
legitimately wonder why France took the decision to intervene twice in less than one
year in conflicts that are likely to last much longer than expected, and to cost lots of
money. We saw some of the reasons that we believe drove France to intervene in the
previous chapters, but we also are convinced of the importance the renewed interest
played in this decision process.
This renewed interest has been demonstrated through the two last interventions and
made possible because of the decline and the unwillingness of the United States to act.
Of course, France as a middle-size power cannot compete with the world power that
represents the United States in the world, but it found there the opportunity to
Charbonneau, B. (2008) Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa.
Modern & Contemporary France, 16 (3), 279-295. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/11/the-ongoingrelationship-between-france-and-its-former-african-colonies/ [Accessed: 25 April 2014], p. 282.
170 Ibid.
169
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reassume its power in Africa171. Indeed, lately the United States has shown some
reluctance to take the lead in some military interventions such as in Syria and in Libya,
leaving France and the United Kingdom in charge of taking the initiatives there172.
France just seized the opportunity to intervene knowing it will also be helpful in the
consolidation of its links with African states. The community of nations and the EU did
not protest against the French decisions because they knew something needed to be
done for the populations in these countries.
6.1.3. Interventions as a Sign of Power
As we know, France is encountering some financial and economic problems. The French
situation is worrying the EU, and the French influence has been diminished a lot lately.
The reasons for Paris to intervene are numerous but we also know using force could
mean for France to save its position on the international arena173. As the ex-empire is
experiencing certain difficulties, it intervenes where it knows it could be successful, that
is to say Africa. France is embedded in the path dependence toward Africa. In the sense
that even if the military deployments might not be the best idea for France to gain back a
lot of influence and power regarding its past, the country is intervening anyways. This
could be due to the fact that the French interventionism in the past brought a lot
prestige and power to France. In fact, the metropolis could have tried to consolidate its
relations with Eastern European countries because of its commercial links with them.
Instead, the French nation preferred to turn to Africa, and now is hoping it will be
successful once again with this strategy.
6.2. New Opportunities for France in Africa
For years Africa has known lots of difficulties such as the extreme poverty of the
population, corruption, political instability, civil unrests, unemployment, and many
periods of famines. At this moment, we assist to an important economic growth in
several African countries. Africa is the continent that possesses the most natural
resources on the world such as oil, uranium, gold, woods, cooper and diamonds but
Wallerstein, I. (2014) France’s Aggressive Foreign Policy. Al Jazeera America, 2 December.
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2013/12/france-foreign-policymilitaryintervention.html
[Accessed: 5 May 2014].
172 Tetrais, p.54.
173 Wohlforth, pp. 32-48.
171
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which is the poorest. However, there is a real opportunity of development for these
nations which encounter a strong economic growth due to the fact that lately China,
India, and other countries have invested a lot in the continent.
6.2.1. Economic Growth in Africa
For a few years now we witness a high growth in Africa, for example, in sub-Saharan
states the average growth was 4.9% in 2013174. ‘Investment has contributed a lot to this
economic growth and has also helped boost the productive capacity of the region’s
economy’175. ‘Increasingly, infrastructure projects are being financed from new funding
sources, such as China, but increasingly from Brazil and India’176. Moreover, Africa
represents a huge market due to its growing population. In fact, in average the
population grows every ten years by 3.2%177. In 1960, the continent was populated by
257 million of inhabitant, and it is forecast that in 2025 there will be around one billion
of Africans178. Some emerging countries such as China, India, Malaysia but also Brazil
saw in this continent a great opportunity. In the 2000’s, they began massively to invest
in the natural resources, finance, and manufacturing sectors179.
6.2.2. Competition with Other Countries
The French share of African trade plummeted from 10 to 4.7% over 10 years whereas
states such as China or Malaysia doubled their trade with this continent180. The French
Minister of Finance, Pierre Moscovici, declared that ‘[his] objective is to double the trade
flows between France and Africa’181. The last 4th of December, the Minister Moscovici
published a report called ‘Africa-France: A Partnership for the Future’. In this report, a
World Bank (2013) Africa Continues to Grow Strongly but Poverty and Inequality Remain Persistently
High. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/10/07/africa-continues-grow-stronglypoverty-inequality-persistently-high [Accessed: 28 April 2014].
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 United Nations Population Information Network (n.d) Population and Development in Africa.
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/pop.html [Accessed: 28 April 2014].
179 Dahman-Saïdi, M. (n.d) Chinese investment in Africa (part 1), BSI Economics. http://www.bsieconomics.org/index.php/developpement/item/219-chinese-investment-in-africa-part-1 [Accessed: 15
May 2014].
180 Aggad-Clerx.
181 Clémençot, J. and Maury, F. (2014) Interview Pierre Moscovici : ‘Mon objectif : doubler les flux
commerciaux entre la France et l'Afrique. Jeune Afrique, 3 December.
http://economie.jeuneafrique.com/regions/afrique-subsaharienne/20817-pierre-moscovici-qmonobjectif-doubler-les-flux-commerciaux-entre-la-france-et-lafriqueq.html [Accessed: 27 March 2014].
174
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specialist of Africa, Hubert Védrine, suggested ‘15 propositions to create a new dynamic
concerning the economy between Africa and France’182. Two of those propositions were
dedicated to first ‘reinforce the influence of France in sub-Saharan Africa’183, and
secondly on ‘reinvesting as soon as possible the French economic presence in subSaharan Africa’184. For years, Africa has been the pré-carré of the ex-empire, even if in
the post-colonial period the French’s economic presence, and the French’s aid to
development decreased a lot. The decolonization, and later the French’s decision to
disengage itself, and to normalize its relations with the African countries in the 1990s
have been possible because the state ‘was undertaking great things in Europe’185.
Nowadays, the French situation is different; the nation is experiencing lots of internal
difficulties, but is also experiencing some at the EU level. France is not the most
powerful state in the EU. The Hexagon does not have the power to influence as much as
wanted the decisions taken in the EU. So, when France realized the African continent
was on an ongoing process of development it took the decision to consolidate its links,
and to regain its importance in Africa with maybe the aim to gain back some power on
the international stage. Unfortunately for France, Asian powers such as India and China
have already become the most important economic partners of the African countries186.
That is why Paris uses all means at its disposal to consolidate its links with its excolonies.
6.3. The French Values, the French Culture, and the French Prestige
We could say that France without its values, its culture, and its prestige is not France
anymore. The French nation has always been particularly proud of and what it is, and
what it represents abroad. The importance of these three elements is essential to define
what France is. Without one of these elements the country could not be what it is. So, we
could wonder what is the place granted to Africa in France because this Continent seems
to be so important to it. We could find a beginning of answer in the two following
quotations pronounced by two French Presidents of the 5th Republic. The first one
Védrine, H. (2013) Rapport Afrique France : un partenariat pour l’avenir.
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/rapport-afrique-france-partenariat-pour-l-avenir-hubert-vedrine
[Accessed: 24 January 2014].
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Chipman, J. (1989) French Power in Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell p.29.
186 Cheru, F. and Obi, C. (eds.) (2010) The rise of China and India in Africa. New York: Zedbook, p.1.
182
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comes from François Mitterrand that once declared that ‘without Africa, there will not
be a French history in the 21st century’187. The second one is from General de Gaulle that
claimed ‘that French world power and French power in Africa were inextricably linked
and mutually confirming’188. Both of these sentences express the importance that Africa
has for the Hexagon. Obviously, this continent has a major impact on the role France has
in the world through its values, culture, and prestige.
6.3.1. Prestige and Grandeur linked to Africa
The prestige and grandeur have been always been sought by the French nation. E.H.
Carr described prestige as ‘the recognition of other people of your strength. Prestige,
which some people scoff at, is enormously important: for if your strength is recognized,
you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it’189. The notion of prestige
is primordial and dominating, it is an important aspect of the French identity. For long
time, Africa has been the proof, and an entire part of the French prestige. After, the
period of occupation in France during the 2nd World War the French grandeur needed to
be restored, and it has been the personal mission of the General De Gaulle to achieve
it190. ‘He conceives of France a certain way and cannot imagine a France that is not
great191’. The special mission France had in Africa was bringing grandeur to the country.
Even if the beginning of the decolonization process meant a loss of power for France, the
successful decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa has shown the ‘French capacity to exert
power without juridical responsibility’192. After the major shift of its French African
foreign policy in the 1990s, France tried to focus its attention toward the EU with maybe
the hope to become the most powerful actor within this union. Unfortunately for France,
financial and economic issues encountered by the country allowed Germany to take the
lead. Indeed, ‘The balance of power started to shift with German reunification and EU
expansion and after that the financial earthquake of 2008 that has sent a ruinous
Sitbon, M. (n.d) La vision Gaullienne du monde, http://www.de-gaulle.info/charlot/afrique-exploitee2.shtml [Accessed: 25 April 2014].
188 Charbonneau, p. 281.
189 Carr, E.H. (1937) Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power. In: Chipman, J. (1989) French Power in
Africa. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p.25.
190 Chipman, p.25.
191 Ibid., p. 26.
192 Ibid., p.27.
187
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tsunami across the continent’.193 In few decades France lost a lot of its prestige and
status on the international arena, especially in the 1990s.
That is one of the reasons why France seized the opportunity to intervene in its two excolonies when it saw that the United States was reluctant to act. The international
community knew something needed to be done to stop the killings both in Mali and CAR.
No one really wanted to get involved in these two crises. The African Union and its
members did not possess the necessary resources to organize these operations as
quickly as France did. In spite of the French’s difficulties on the international stage, the
country has been able to organize quickly the two missions and deploy its troops there.
France perceived in these military interventions a way to gain back power, prestige, and
grandeur. In fact, to be the leader of these operations allows France for example to
gather Western nations to raise money for helping African countries in crisis, but also to
organize, like in December 2013 in Paris, a Summit on Peace and Security in Africa
gathering more than 50 African states194. Moreover, if these humanitarian interventions
(as France called them is a success), prestige will be brought to be nation and
recognition from the international community will be granted.
Indeed, the country has not been able to reach the same level of recognition it had while
being a colonial power once it joined the EU. The Hexagon never abandoned the idea to
shine, and to be seen as an important force within the community of nations. Both the
socialist and the conservative Presidents of the 5th Republic agreed on the necessity to
have a France that matters in the world. The different foreign policies France followed
always took into account this goal. However, outside Africa the metropolis does not have
lots of power. In Asia, for example, Paris would not be able to lead and to afford the same
kind of operations even if it has some ex-colonies there. We think that France estimated
that in order to gain back importance the only viable option was Africa. Indeed, the
French government has lots of contacts and agreements inherited from the accords
Griziotto, G. and Pantaleo, E. (2014) France and the European balance of power.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/giorgio-griziotti-elicio-pantaleo/france-andeuropean-balance-of-power [Accessed: 30 March 2014].
194 Tjiurimo Hengari, A. (2013) Africa after the 2013 Elysée Summit on Peace and Security, SAIIA, 6
December. http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/africa-after-the-2013-elysee-summit-on-peace-andsecurity [Accessed: 15 May 2014].
193
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signed in the 1960s. The ex-colonies and France share a common history and the same
language. And finally, the French armies are used to intervene on the African territories.
6.3.2. The French Values and Principles
As we saw in the chapters concerning the two French military interventions in Africa,
France believes it is a moral obligation to go and rescue the countries where the
populations are in danger. The President explained in one of his speeches the
importance of the respect of these philanthropic values and moral principles.
France must stay France, more than ever, be France means
be the one that people call, the one that people hope, the one
that frees, and the one that gives rights […]. This is why,
thanks to our soldiers, France is important in the world195.
The French nation is extremely proud of its tradition to go abroad in order to save
civilians. The country is a liberal state now for more 200 years, and considered itself as
the country of human rights. This attachment for these values is profoundly anchored in
the French culture. The French nation gives a huge importance to the promotion in the
world of these philanthropic values and principles that could be embodied in the French
motto ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ that means Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.
Nonetheless, the Hexagon does not have anywhere else than the African Continent to
foster and promote these values and principles which are tightly linked with the French
hopes of prestige. But, more than anywhere else, France cannot leave the African
countries in difficulties. It is because the French nation has been a colonial power that its
paternalistic behavior is still strongly present. During the colonization period, the
European country had the duty to protect the populations in its colonies, and to some
extent France still believes it is its duty to act even if this period is over for more than 50
years now.
Hollande, République centrafricaine - Message du président de la République, M. François Hollande.
Bangui, 10 December 2013.
195
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6.3.3. The French Culture
For France its culture and its language are really important. The metropolis is looking by
all means to promote them. When the nation colonized Africa, it imposed its culture, its
religion, and its language. French is still spoken in most parts of this Continent. Africa
knows a strong increase of its populations every year. It is foreseen that in few decades
the continent would be populated by more than one billion of inhabitants, and so most
of them will be able to speak French. For now, French is the 4th most spoken language in
the world. This desire to promote the culture can be seen in the fact that there is in the
French government a ministry dedicated to the Francophone countries in the world. The
aim of this ministry is to enhance the cooperation between the head of states of the
Francophone states. Every year, an important budget of this ministry (600 million of
euros) is dedicated to fund education, cultural institutes, but also scholarships for
African students196. The Ministry of the Francophone Countries is also responsible for
500 organizations in the world that are in charge of promoting the French language and
culture197 .
In the Hexagon there is a real desire to compete against the English language but more
broadly against the Anglophone hegemony in the world. Bernard Debré, a member of
the French parliament explained that ‘there is a real confrontation between
Francophone and Anglophone, but the stake is less the language than the economic
leadership’ on the sub-Saharan Africa region198. During the colonization but also decades
after the independence of African states, France promoted its culture to them. Now that
the ex-colonies are having a good economic growth and lots of opportunities to be fully
developed, the metropolis does not want now to lose its influence over them. The
French culture and the French language are an important aspect of the French soft
power. Joseph Nye describes the soft power as ‘the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a
Benneyworth, I. J. (2011) The Ongoing Relationship Between France and its Former African Colonies.
E-International Relations Students. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/11/the-ongoing-relationship-betweenfrance-and-its-former-african-colonies/ [Accessed: 28 April 2014].
197 La Francophonie (n.d). http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/enjeux-internationaux/promotion-de-lafrancophonie-et-de/la-francophonie-20244/ [Accessed: 21 April 2014].
198 Sitbon.
196
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country's culture, political ideals, and policies’199. Indeed, culture is an efficient way to
get attention and attraction from other countries and from their populations, and so to
get more prestige and influence in the world.
6.4. Conclusion
In conclusion, in this part of the research paper we have clarified the elements that we
believe played a role in the French renewed interest in Africa. We saw that the last
French military deployments in Africa are the most obvious aspect of the renewed
interest because it reminds us the period where France granted lots of importance to its
ex-colonies and was intervening regularly on the continent. After 20 years of more or
less successful attempt of disengagement in Africa, France realized the opportunities
that the African Continent is now offering, and so the country is willing to recreate
stronger links with its ex-colonies. We suspect that this renewed interest is one of the
causes of the interventions because it is one of the most efficient ways for France to
maintain its influence over its ex-colonies. Every element is interlinked. By intervening
in Africa and by wanting to reinvest there, the French government also wants to foster
its principles and values but above all else the policy makers see a chance here to find
back a bit of the past French influence and grandeur that is so important to the French
nation.
Chapter 7: Final Conclusion
In essence, the aim of this thesis was to find which were the legitimizations used by
France for its two last military interventions in Africa, and from where the French
renewed interest in its ex-colonies was coming. We discovered that the justifications for
the two operations in sub-Saharan Africa were mainly based on the Responsibility to
Protect, the duty toward an ally, and on the legality of these French missions in
Francophone Africa. Concerning the reasons for the French renewed interest, we found
out that they were connected to the wish to retighten the commercial links with the excolonies, but also in order to protect the French sphere of influence from emerging
countries that are currently investing in Africa. In spite of the diverse explanations given
Nye. J. (2004) The Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. In: BOOK REVIEW Soft Power by
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004). Futurecasts, 6 (9). http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%206-4.htm
[Accessed: 23 May 2014].
199
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by the French officials that are emphasizing on the philanthropic character of these two
military operations, we understood that both the French interventions in Africa and the
French renewed interest for this continent are as well the result of other motives.
Indeed, through our analysis and interpretation we observed that the reasons for the
French interventionism are not completely driven by altruistic motives, as it has been
declared by Paris. However, it would also be wrong to affirm the military interventions
are solely the consequence of self-interests.
The French foreign policy toward Africa is really complex and we should not adopt a
Manichean point of view to deal with this topic and these research questions. The
French behavior depends on many factors such as history, culture but also institutions.
And because of them, for example, the government wants to foster democratic values
such as the respect of human rights or the duty to help an ally. Notwithstanding, we also
acknowledge the French desire to protect its self-interests. We should not forget that the
states have to protect their vital interests otherwise they could be penalized by the
international environment200. That is why in the military deployments, but also in the
renewed interest, we believe that one part of the French willingness takes roots in the
interests and assets at stake.
We realized in this thesis the importance, and the impact history and institutions have
on the French current decisions. Taking them into account allowed us to see the
variations over time in the French foreign policy regarding Africa. History and
institutions made us understand the reasons for the French military interventions, and
for the French renewed interest in the sense that past actions are constraining and
enabling present decisions201. It is also due to those that we noticed how the French
behavior was to some extent being dictated by the path dependence in which France is
embedded. We truly believe that the Hexagon is stuck in the role it held for so many
years, the role of gendarme of Africa. We obtained a proof of this dependency when the
country had the possibility to break the path in which the Hexagon was engaged but
failed to do so when accepting to intervene in CAR.
Grieco, J.M. (1988) Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism. International Organization, 42 (3), 485-507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706787
[Accessed: 2 May 2014], p. 488.
201 Lawson, p.401.
200
70
During our research, we became conscious that the new French African foreign policy of
François Hollande was not as diverted from the precedent foreign policies as France
would like the world to believe. Improvements have been made by France in order to
respect the normalization of its Franco-African relations wanted by the community of
nations, and that led in the 1990s to an important shift of the French African foreign
policy. But, it is yet rather obvious that the ex-colonial empire is progressively using
more and more elements from the French strategy used in the past to preserve or regain
its power and influence over sub-Saharan Africa. The French discourse concerning the
foreign policy dedicated to Africa has evolved since the beginning of the President’s
mandate, and is now more assumed and confident. Indeed, few months ago the French
behavior regarding Africa was rather unclear, opaque, and misunderstood by the
international community due to the fact that Paris only admitted philanthropic motives
for its two close interventions in its ex-colonies. This attitude made the international
community suspicious concerning the French real intentions on the continent, and it
feared even more interference from France in Africa’s affairs. The change in discourse of
the President Hollande asserting the French interests in sub-Saharan Africa has been
welcome because it has been understood, and appeared as credible. However, the
community of nations is still watching very carefully, at the moment, the French acts in
this region of the world.
Actually, we believe that before to venture any critics or accusations against France, we
should observe the continuity of the French actions in Africa, and analyze the methods
employed for the resolution of these two conflicts. At this stage of the interventions in
the ex-colonies we should not focus anymore on the legitimization of the military
deployments. Instead, we should look closer at the entirety of the aspects of the missions
in order to know if we really can considered them as humanitarian, as claims France.
Only this way we will be able to determine if Françafrique is back, as some scholars and
journalists have suggested.
71
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