Money in the Politics: Aristotle on Economic
Inequality
Isak Tranvik∗
Department of Political Science, Duke University
Abstract
Politicians and pundits across the political spectrum frequently express their
concern about the growing divide between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots.’ While
the solutions they offer to ‘problem’ of increasing economic inequality vary
widely, almost all those who address the issue agree that this phenomenon is
something to be avoided. The purpose of this essay is to examine this consensus.
In other words, what is it that makes the growing wealth gap ‘bad’ ?
Though usually unstated, the logic behind the idea that increasing economic
inequality is ‘bad,’ especially in a democracy, is rather straightforward. The
poor majority, acting out of their narrow economic interests, will use their
political authority to enact legislation that redistributes the wealth of the rich
among themselves. Thus, increasing economic inequality leads to increasing
levels of redistribution which eventually catalyzes a clash among classes as the
rich invariably resist the redistributive efforts of the poor. In essence then,
accelerating economic inequality is ‘bad’ because it increases the likelihood of
class conflict.
In many ways, this way of thinking about economic inequality can be traced
to Aristotle’s Politics. However, Aristotle understands the problem of economic
inequality differently than contemporary scholars and public figures. Accordingly, in this essay I turn to the Politics in search of answers to the question
outlined above. Mobilizing arguments found in that text, I contend that the
view that increasing economic inequality is ‘bad’ because it causes class conflict is misguided. I argue accelerating economic inequality is ‘bad’ because it
divides a society into two disparate groups, each of which will jeopardize the
political freedom constitutive of the democratic community if given the chance.
∗
Email: [email protected]
1
Introduction
Increasing economic inequality is ‘bad.’ This statement has become a truism in
contemporary political debate. Politicians and pundits from both the left and the
right denounce the growing divide between the haves and the have-nots.1 The chair
of the United States Federal Reserve cites the widening wealth gap as a source of great
concern.2 Thomas Piketty’s book on economic inequality enjoys a long stay atop the
New York Times best-seller list.3 Yet for all the talk about this phenomenon, there
is relatively little discussion of why one should be concerned about the accelerating
divergence in wealth between the rich and the rest.
I argue that the ‘problem’ of increasing economic inequality, and indeed what
makes it a problem, merits further attention. In this essay, I want to question why
we think this growing wealth gap is ‘bad’ in the first place. More specifically, what
is it about economic inequality that makes it so ‘bad’ ? For whom is it ‘bad’ ? And
what does ‘bad’ mean? Even if we agree that a certain amount of economic inequality
is generally something to be avoided, our answers to the aforementioned questions
inevitably shape how we think about trying to prevent it. Should we cap incomes?
Or should we guarantee some kind of social minimum? Should we adopt the difference principle? Or should we embrace free-market economics? Or maybe increasing
economic inequality is symptomatic of a larger problem and is in need of a completely
different solution.
Though many public figures do not talk about why increasing economic inequality
is ‘bad,’ a handful of scholars have offered explanations of why it might be something
1
Noam Scheiber. Hopefuls and wealthy aligned on inequality. March 29, 2015. url: http :
/ / www . nytimes . com / 2015 / 03 / 30 / business / candidates - and - wealthy - are - aligned - on inequality.html.
2
Robin Harding. Janet Yellen bemoans rising U.S. inequality. October 17, 2014. url: http:
//www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12574e90-55f9-11e4-a3c9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3VpJ0aBbJ.
3
Piketty, perhaps unsurprisingly, presumes that growing economic inequality is a problem in need
of a solution; he spends three hundred pages establishing that inequality is increasing and the final
two hundred defending a proposal to stop this trend. (Thomas Piketty and Arthur Goldhammer.
Capital in the twenty-first century. Belknap Press, 2014)
2
to be avoided. John Rawls argues that certain levels of economic inequality are
‘bad’ because they are unfair.4 Amartya Sen is concerned with economic inequality
when it affects the ability of the poor to function as dignified human beings.5 It
appears Phillip Pettit only cares about economic inequality if it prevents those most
in need from being “fully resourced.”6 Political economists Adam Przeworski, Michael
Alvarez, Jos Antonio Cheibub Fernando Limongi assert that economic inequality is
‘bad,’ especially in a democracy, because it is destabilizing.7
Thus, each of these scholars understands increasing economic inequality as a problem because of how it affects the well-being of the least well-off. On these interpretations, it seems as though a large wealth gap merits our attention in so far as those at
the lower end of the income distribution do not have ‘enough.’8 Yet, in the accounts
mentioned above, there is little discussion those at the other end of the spectrum: the
very rich. In many ways, this way of thinking about economic inequality can be traced
to Aristotle’s Politics. However, Aristotle understands the problem of economic inequality differently than contemporary scholars and public figures. Accordingly, in
this essay I turn to the Politics in search of answers to the questions outlined above.
Mobilizing arguments found in that text, I contend that the view that increasing economic inequality is ‘bad’ because of how it affects the well-being of the least well-off
is misguided. I argue accelerating economic inequality is ‘bad’ because it divides a
society into two disparate groups, each of which will jeopardize the political freedom
constitutive of the democratic community if given the chance.
The remainder of this essay defends these claims and unfolds in three parts. In
the first part, I explore the Przeworski et al. explanation of why economic inequality
4
John Rawls. A theory of justice. Harvard university press, 2009.
Amartya Sen. The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, 2011.
6
Philip Pettit. On the people’s terms: a republican theory and model of democracy. Cambridge
University Press, 2012.
7
Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto et al. “What makes democracies endure?” In: Journal of
democracy 7.1 (1996), pp. 39–55.
8
‘Enough’ will be examined in more detail later.
5
3
is ‘bad’ in more detail. I do so for two reasons. First, while countless scholars have
responded to the work of Rawls, Sen, and Pettit, few have analyzed the work of these
prominent political economists from a non-economic perspective. Second, and more
importantly, the Przeworski et al. argument draws heavily on Aristotle’s work in the
Politics to make the case that economic inequality ought to be avoided because it
causes political instability. While compelling and certainly not entirely misguided, I
argue that this notion of why economic inequality is ‘bad’ is only partially correct.9
In the second part of this essay, I outline why the reasoning of Przeworksi et al. is
incomplete; drawing on Aristotle’s arguments in the Politics, I contend that economic
inequality is ‘bad’ because it threatens each citizen’s political freedom. In the third
and final section, I close with some thoughts on how this might change how we think
of economic inequality in modern democracies today.
Inequality and Instability
Drawing on the Meltzer and Richard median voter model, Przeworski et al. argue
“that democracy is much more likely to survive in countries where income inequality is declining over time.”10 Przeworksi explains the reasoning behind this claim in
another, more recent book. He writes, “The coexistence of universal suffrage with
unequal distribution of property is hard to fathom. The syllogism according to which
the poor would use their majority status to expropriate the rich was almost universally accepted–and it still makes logical sense today.”11 In short, why does this idea
still “make logical sense?” The unstated “logic” is rather straightforward. Because
9
Moreover, given that political economists are generally on the ‘front lines’ of debates about
growing economic inequality, it is probably prudent to closely examine what they have to say about
the issue. It is also their area of expertise and they probably produce the most scholarship on the
topic. And as the popularity of Piketty’s recent book demonstrates, people are paying attention
to what political economists have to say about economic inequality. Paul Krugman, the New York
Times columnist, is another example of a widely read and well-known political economist.
10
Limongi Neto et al., “What makes democracies endure?”, op. cit., p. 43.
11
Adam Przeworski. Democracy and the limits of self-government. Vol. 9. Cambridge University
Press, 2010, p. 85.
4
the poor always outnumber the rich,12 the poor constitute a democratic majority.
If democracy is characterized as rule of the majority, the poor, acting out of their
narrow economic interests, will use their political authority to enact legislation that
redistributes the wealth of the rich among themselves. Increasing economic inequality
leads to increasing levels of redistribution. This eventually catalyzes political instability. Why? Expanding on the logic of Przeworski et al., Ansell and Samuels note
how, within the field of political economy, it is commonly understood that “inequality
harms democracy’s prospects because, in intensifying voters’ desire for redistribution
of...elites’ wealth, it generates a similarly intense reaction by those same elites, who
will dig in their heels to maintain the political status quo.”13 In other words, the
more the rich have, the less likely they are to allow the poor to redistribute their
wealth. And the less the poor have, the more they want to redistribute the wealth of
the rich. This intuition is also commonly referred to as the “pitchfork” argument. In
short, given certain amounts of economic inequality, the poor take to the streets (with
pitchforks, apparently) to overthrow the existing economic order.14 Pitchforks or not,
economic inequality is ‘bad’ for a democracy because it leads to class conflict; the
rich and the poor engage in a competition for political power and the winner takes
the spoils. Given that political and economic circumstances often change quickly,
12
At least this is the assumption of most economists and political scientists today. While the details
of this model (the aforementioned Meltzer and Richard median voter model)are not particularly
relevant for the issue at hand, this idea is founded upon the idea that the median income (the
middle number) is lower than the mean income (the average). When defining the cutoff between
rich and poor as the mean income, the majority will be considered poor because the number of
people who make less than the mean outnumber the number of those who make more than the
mean. The poor are not necessarily poor in absolute terms.
13
Ben W Ansell and David J Samuels. Inequality and Democratization. Cambridge University
Press, 2014, p. 2.
14
In a recent Politico article, billionaire Nick Hanauer sums up the argument nicely (and a bit
dramatically), “If we don’t do something to fix the glaring inequities in this economy, the pitchforks
are going to come for us. No society can sustain this kind of rising inequality. In fact, there is no
example in human history where wealth accumulated like this and the pitchforks didn’t eventually
come out. You show me a highly unequal society, and I will show you a police state. Or an
uprising. There are no counterexamples. None. It’s not if, it’s when.”(Nick Hanauer. The Pitchforks
are Coming...For Us Plutocrats. Ed. by Politico. 2014. url: http : / / www . politico . com /
magazine/story/2014/06/the- pitchforks- are- coming- for- us- plutocrats- 108014.html#
.VTb0ziHBzGc)
5
political instability is an ever-present threat.
As stated above, this view of democracy can clearly be traced to Aristotle’s Politics. Before exploring why, it should be noted that in the Politics, democracy is
not necessarily defined as rule of the majority; Aristotle describes democracy as the
rule of the poor.15 That democracy is often thought of as rule of the majority is a
consequence of the fact that “everywhere the rich are few and the poor are many.”16
With democracy defined as the rule of the poor (who also happen to outnumber the
rich), one can anticipate why economic inequality is destabilizing in a democratic
society. When outlining the problems with determining what group should rule (one,
the few, or the many), Aristotle cites the main issue with giving authority to the
many as one of unjustified redistribution. Or, to put it more bluntly, the poor use
their power to ‘soak’ the rich. “If justice is what the numerical majority decide, they
will commit injustice by confiscating the property of the wealthy few.”17 Elsewhere,
Aristotle explicitly says that “democracy is for the benefit of the poor.”18 Thus, in
communities with high levels of economic inequality, democratic rule leads to a large
redistribution of wealth. And this “destroys” the city-state. Aristotle writes, “If the
majority, having seized everything, should divide up the property of the minority,
they are evidently destroying the city-state.”19
The similarity between these passages from the Politics and the Przeworski et
al. explanation of why economic inequality is ‘bad’ is striking. It is so striking that
it is almost certainly not coincidental. Both assert that economic inequality poses
problems for a democratic community because the poor majority will redistribute
15
He writes, “What does distinguish democracy and oligarchy from one another is poverty and
wealth: whenever some, whether a minority or a majority, rule because of their wealthy, the constitution is necessarily an oligarchy, and whenever the poor rule, it is necessarily a democracy.” (CDC
Reeve. Aristotle: Politics. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998, p. III.8)
16
Ibid., p. III.8.
17
Ibid., p. VI.3.
18
Ibid., p. III.7.
19
Ibid., p. III.10.
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the wealth of the rich minority.20 I am certainly not the first one to recognize these
similarities. As Ansell and Samuels recently noted, “The notion of ‘Democracy as
Robin Hood’ - that the poor would use the vote to soak the rich - enjoys an exalted
status in contemporary political-economy research. And perhaps for good reason,
for it draws on deep and well-known philosophical roots. One can find fear of the
depredations of majority rule in Aristotles Politics.”21
I do not highlight this similarity to prove that Przeworski et al. were directly
influenced by the Politics. Though it is certainly likely that they are familiar with
the text, that is beside the point I am attempting to make here, which is the following.
In many ways, the way political economists, and by extension, many of the rest of
us, think about economic inequality today is influenced by what Aristotle wrote
about economic inequality almost two and half millenia ago. In and of itself, this is
somewhat remarkable. But more importantly, Aristotle’s idea that the problem with
economic inequality is that the poor, if they gain power, will soak the rich remains
both pervasive and persuasive. On this reading of Aristotle, economic inequality
is ‘bad’ because it provides an incentive for the poor to upset the equilibrium of a
political community. While this line of thought can certainly be found in the Politics,
in the next section I argue that it represents only a part of Aristotle’s thinking.22
20
As stated above, the rich are not likely to give up their material possessions without a fight.
Ansell and Samuels, Inequality and Democratization, op. cit., p. 2.
22
Many working outside the field of political economy understand economic inequality as a problem for similar, albeit distinct reasons. Again, it might be helpful to briefly examine a widely cited
contemporary account of the problem of economic inequality to better understand why. Like Przeworski et al., Rawls is concerned with economic inequality in A Theory of Justice, though it is only
one issue among many that he tackles. His difference principle explicitly and directly addresses
the issue of economic inequality by requiring that “the higher expectations of those better situated
are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least
advantaged members of society.” (Rawls, A theory of justice, op. cit., p. 75) In other words, economic inequality is justified in so far as the least well off are less disadvantaged than they would be
otherwise. Thus, for Rawls economic inequality is not unconditionally ‘bad.’ It is only ‘bad’ when
the poor (the “least well off”) have less than they could have given alternative economic institutions.
And when it is ‘bad’ (when the difference principle is not satisfied), it is ‘bad’ because it is unfair or
unjust. Pettit’s “eyeball test” fulfills a similar function in his recent book On the People’s Terms.
(Pettit, On the people’s terms: a republican theory and model of democracy, op. cit.) And Sen’s
capabilities approach represents another theory that does not have much to say about economic
inequality provided all members of society are sufficiently equipped with the resources they need to
21
7
Though Aristotle thinks economic inequality is ‘bad’ for the reason mentioned above,
he believes it is ‘bad’ on other grounds, as well.
Democratic Freedom
So, what is the full story? Why does Aristotle think economic inequality is ‘bad?’
Political economists have certainly recognized part of the problem: economic inequality tends to create instability in a democracy because the poor majority will ‘soak’
the rich minority. However, political economists and many normative theorists alike
have failed to see the bigger picture: economic inequality threatens political freedom.
In his discussion of different types of constitutions, Aristotle asserts that aristocratic constitutions are chosen with the aim of creating the best laws, oligarchic
constitutions are selected so that the government might benefit the wealthiest, and
democratic constitutions are picked when the political community wants to maximize
political freedom.23 Put differently, a democracy is a political community that values
freedom more than wealth, nobility, or even merit.24 Thus, a democratic constitution
must be designed so that each citizen has as much political freedom as possible. Since
each citizen cannot exercise his25 political freedom simultaneously, the best way to
do satisfy this condition is to ensure that all citizens take turns ruling.26 This arflourish. (Sen, The idea of justice, op. cit.) Thus, while normative political theorists tend to focus
more how economic inequality creates unjust social conditions than economists, they still overwhelmingly view economic inequality as a problem of poverty. As Jeff Green notes, there is a “tendency
[in] recent liberal philosophy to operate with an explicit and lively concern for the least advantaged
unparalleled by an equal concern for the most advantaged.” (Jeffrey Edward Green. “Rawls and the
Forgotten Figure of the Most Advantaged: In Defense of Reasonable Envy toward the Superrich”.
In: American Political Science Review 107.01 [2013], pp. 123–138) Though contemporary normative
theorists may not be guilty of misinterpreting Aristotle, they still understand economic inequality
as essentially a problem of what to do about the least well-off.
23
“The distribution of offices according to merit is a special characteristic of aristocracy, for the
principle of an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy.”(Reeve,
Aristotle: Politics, op. cit., p. IV.7)
24
“Therefore we should rather say that democracy is the form of government in which the free are
rulers.”(ibid., p. IV.4)
25
I use the masculine pronoun here and throughout the remainder of this essay because Aristotle
believed that only men could participate in politics.
26
Aristotle writes: “Another [goal of democrats] is to live as one likes. This, they say, is the
8
rangement provides each citizen the chance to influence the laws and rules of the
political community. Conversely, if one does not have the opportunity to rule, one
is dominated by the ruler (or ruling class) and does not enjoy the kind of political
freedom constitutive of the democratic community. This is because, like a slave, such
an individual has no say in determining the laws and rules which he must abide by.
The rules are dictated to him regardless of whether he thinks they are fair or just.
According to Aristotle, some citizens are incapable of ruling or being ruled because
they are motivated by self-interest. Self-interested rulers threaten the political freedom of those being ruled and, by extension, the democratic community on the whole.
Why? Upon gaining political power, self-interested rulers establish a new constitution
for their own advantage. In a passage on self-interested groups of individuals, Aristotle writes, “Whenever one side or the other happens to gain more power than its
opponents, they establish neither a common constitution nor an equal one, but take
their superiority in the constitution as a reward of their victory.”27 In other words,
such rulers use their democratic power in a way that makes it impossible for others
to exercise their political freedom: they change the constitution so that other citizens
no longer have the opportunity to rule. Consequently, their self-interest brings ruin
to the democratic political community. Aristotle writes, “A political community with
self-interested rulers “results in a city-state consisting not of free people but of masters and slaves.”2829 While this is not necessarily an issue for other regimes, such a
relationship between those of who rule and are ruled is antithetical to the value upon
which a democratic political community is founded: political freedom.
result of freedom, since that of slavery is not to live as one likes. This, then, is the second goal of
democracy. From it arises the demand not to be ruled by anyone, or failing that, to rule and be
ruled in turn.”(Reeve, Aristotle: Politics, op. cit., p. VI.2)
27
Ibid., p. IV.12.
28
Ibid., p. IV.11.
29
Elsewhere, he writes: “Those constitutions that look to the common benefit turn out, according
to what is unqualifiedly just, to be correct, whereas those which look only to the benefit of the rulers
are mistaken and are deviations from the correct constitutions. For they are like rule by a master,
whereas a city-state is a community of free people.”(ibid., p. III.7)
9
What kind of citizens rule out of their self-interest? In other words, what sort of
citizens cannot participate in ruling in a democracy without jeopardizing the foundation upon which a democracy rests? According to Aristotle, both the very rich and
very poor, among others, are incapable of ruling and being ruled. He writes:
Those who are superior in the good of luck (strength, wealth, friends
and other such things) neither wish to be ruled nor know how to be
ruled...Those, on the other hand, who are exceedingly deprived of such
goods are too humble. Hence the latter do not know how to rule, but only
how to be ruled in the way slaves are ruled, whereas the former do not
know how to be ruled in any way, but only how to rule as masters rule.”30
Because of their faults, neither group is able to look beyond their immediate selfinterest; the very poor are too desperate to think about anything beyond their basic
needs and the very rich are too arrogant to be concerned with anyone besides themselves. In regards to the poor, Aristotle writes, “Popular leaders sometimes treat
notables unjustly...by redistributing their properties or incomes by means of public
services; and sometimes they bring slanderous accusations against the rich so as to
be in a position to confiscate their property.”31 If the rich are in power, “They act
arrogantly and try to get even more for themselves.”32 Furthermore, “When the rich
become more numerous or their properties increase in size, democracies change into
oligarchies.”33 Thus, should either group gain political power, the community becomes
one of masters and slaves rather than one inhabited by free democratic citizens. As
such, it appears that neither the very rich nor the very poor can rule in a community
that values political freedom.
Given that the very rich and very poor cannot both rule and be ruled in a democ30
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
32
Ibid.,
33
Ibid.,
31
p.
p.
p.
p.
IV.11.
V.5.
V.7.
V.3.
10
racy, there would appear to be few left who are capable of participating in democratic
politics. According to Aristotle, “those in middle” ought to rule in a democracy.34
He writes, “It is clear, therefore, that the political community that depends on those
in the middle is best too, and city-states can be well governed where those in the
middle are numerous and stronger...It is the height of good luck if those who are
governing own a middle or adequate amount of property, because when some people
own an excessive amount and the rest own nothing, either extreme democracy arises
or unmixed oligarchy or, as a result of both excesses, tyranny.”35
But one might wonder why “those in the middle” are the best democratic citizens.
Why do they not abuse their political authority like the very rich and the very poor?
Aristotle contends that “those in the middle” are capable rulers because they are
“similar and equal.”36 And similar and equal citizens do not threaten political freedom
of those not ruling because their personal interests are similar to the general interests
of the community. When in power, they do not try to establish a new constitution that
entrenches their authority. The main reason for this is that they, unlike the very rich
or very poor, are not a group with particular interests that undermine the interests of
others. Put differently, “those in the middle” are free from faction. Whereas factions
divide a political community and pit one group of citizens against another, “those in
the middle” do not suffer such discord. The reason for this is rather intuitive; they
are neither motivated by arrogance, like the very rich, nor envy, like the very poor.
They have enough and, as a result, they can rule without compromising the kind of
political freedom constitutive of a democratic political community.37
34
Ibid., p. IV.11.
Ibid., p. IV.11.
36
“A city-state, at least, tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar,
and this condition belongs particularly to those in the middle.”(ibid., p. IV.11)
37
In the passages on friendship in the Politics, Aristotle again argues that citizens must be “similar
and equal” to avoid the kind of faction that inevitably threatens political freedom. According to
Aristotle, the communities without faction are those where citizens are friends. Aristotle writes,
“Friendship [is] the greatest good of the city-state, since in this condition [the citizens] are least
like to factionalize.”(ibid., p. II.4) And citizens can only be friends if they are (relatively) equal.
38
Thus, without equality there can be no friendship among citizens. And without friendship the
35
11
Finally, understanding democracy as requiring citizens to be “similar and equal”
helps the modern reader make sense of what appears, at first glance, to be rather
strange passages in the Politics on ostracism. If democracy is nothing more than
what Meltzer and Richard describe, why would Aristotle defend exiling the very
rich or very strong from a democratic society? While Meltzer and Richard might
argue that it is best for the ‘excellent man’ to flee a democratic political community,
Aristotle explicitly states that there are reasons for the political community to remove
the man, especially in a democracy. This is because, as stated above, those who rule
and are ruled in a democracy must be “similar and equal.” The very rich man (or
the very poor man) is not capable of participating in democratic politics. Thus,
there is no room for him in a democratic community. Taken in this context, the
passages on ostracism make much more sense. Like the very poor, the very rich or
very great threaten political freedom, the fundamental value in a democratic political
community. Consequently, they must be expelled from the community. Aristotle
writes, “Where acknowledged sorts of superiority are concerned then, there is some
political justice to the argument in favor of ostracism.”39
According to Aristotle, economic inequality is ‘bad’ because it threatens that
which is valued most in a democratic community: political freedom. The argument
can be summarized as follows. A democracy exists to maximize political freedom.
The best way to maximize the freedom of all citizens is for each citizen to take
turns ruling and being ruled. Because those who rule have the capacity to threaten
political freedom of those not ruling, only citizens who will not act in such a manner
can rule. These citizens are “those in the middle” who are “similar and equal.” This
group does not compromise the political freedom of those not ruling because they
rule with “an eye towards the common benefit” instead of ruling with their particular
political community is divided. As has been shown above, a divided community is a community
where political freedom is threatened. As a result, it seems clear that the democratic community
must consist of those who are “similar and equal;” only “those in the middle” fit this category.
39
Ibid., p. III.13.
12
interests in mind. In contrast, both the very rich and the very poor rule out of
self-interest and ultimately infringe upon the political freedom of those being ruled.
Thus, economic inequality is ‘bad’ in so far as it divides the political community into
groups where some are very rich, others are very poor, and few are left in the middle.
In such circumstances, there are not enough of “those in the middle;” as a result,
the democratic political community will be ruled by citizens who establish a new
constitution where they are masters and everyone else is a slave.
At this point, it might be helpful to compare this more complete presentation of
Aristotle’s views to the story Przeworski et al. tell about economic inequality. As
noted above, it is clear that one can find evidence in the Politics to support the
‘Robin Hood’ model of democracy. Aristotle explicitly states that the poor majority
will use their democratic authority to redistribute the wealth of the rich minority. And
though Aristotle is not quite as direct about the resulting instability that Przeworski
et al. contend inevitably follows, Aristotle appears to acknowledge some kind of
power struggle between the rich and the poor will accompany the poor’s attempt at
redistribution.40 However, the reason that the instability claim is more difficult to find
is because instability is not Aristotle’s main worry. According to Aristotle, economic
inequality is ‘bad’ for a democracy because it compromises political freedom. In
other words, while economic inequality might lead to instability in a democracy, it
ultimately is ‘bad’ because it creates a community of masters and slaves. Instability is
of secondary importance for a democratic political community; for if political freedom
is undermined, then the political community is no longer democratic. Instability may
be ‘bad’ for a democracy, or any constitution, for that matter. But in a democracy,
40
The political community marked by faction is held together only by a truce or agreement.
“The community becomes an alliance that differs only in location from other alliances in which
the allies live far apart, and law becomes an agreement, ‘a guarantor of just behavior toward one
another.”’(ibid., p. III.9) While an alliance or truce might be stable for a time, it often does not last.
Aristotle writes, “Whenever one side or the other happens to gain more power than its opponents,
they establish neither a common constitution nor an equal one, but take their superiority in the
constitution as a reward of their victory.” (ibid., p. IV.12)
13
Aristotle’s central concern is that economic inequality undermines political freedom.
Conclusion
In closing, it should be noted that Aristotle was by no means an unconditional (or
perhaps even conditional) defender of democracy. In fact, he explicitly criticized
democratic constitutions on the grounds that they are often unjust because they
demand unqualified equality even from those who deserve more than an equal share.41
In this essay, I am uninterested in how democratic Aristotle “really was.” Instead, I
focus on Aristotle’s discussion of democracy in the Politics to respond to those who
assert that democracies are inherently unstable because of what the poor majority
will do to the wealthy minority. While this conception of democracy can certainly be
found in the Politics, I contend that there is more to Aristotle’s story.
For Aristotle, economic inequality is not simply a problem of what to do about the
least-well off. He is also concerned that economic inequality threatens the political
freedom of all democratic citizens; neither the poor nor the rich can both rule and
be ruled. In other words, economic inequality is ‘bad’ for a democracy because it
creates a community of masters and slaves. It is a problem because it generates both
excessive poverty and excessive wealth. The political freedom of citizens living in a
democratic community is unsafe if the poor have too little or if the rich have too
much.
Interestingly, Aristotle also argues that the very rich harm the prospects of democratic constitutions more than the very poor. He writes, “the acquisitive behavior
of the rich does more to destroy the constitution than that of the poor.”42 He also
asserts that the rich will “act arrogantly and try to get even more for themselves [than
the poor].”43 Thus, Aristotle appears to believe that those who worry about the poor
41
Ibid., p. V.1.
Ibid., p. IV.12.
43
Ibid., p. V.7.
42
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in so far as they ‘soak’ the rich have it backwards; one concerned with protecting the
political freedom constitutive of a democratic regime ought to be most worried about
the rich and their tendency to capture political authority to further their economic
interests.
What does all this mean for those of us living in the United States (and other
advanced democracies) today?44 Though the Przeowrski et al. version of Aristotle’s
story is intuitively appealing, this essay suggests it might be prudent to move beyond
the notion that economic inequality is destabilizing in a democracy because it creates
an incentive for the poor to ‘soak’ the rich. In other words, I argue that it is time to
leave both the ‘Robin Hood’ conception of democracy and the ‘pitchfork’ response to
economic inequality behind. If Aristotle is right, economic inequality is not simply
‘bad’ for a democracy because of what it leads the poor to do to the rich; the rich are
just as likely to harm the prospects of a democracy as the poor.
While I am not defending the idea that one need not worry about how economic
inequality affects the poor, I think we should pay more attention to the influence of
the wealthy in democratic politics. This is especially true in the American context
in light of the recent Supreme Court decision that removes restrictions on campaign
donations. With no limits on such contributions, it is reasonable to believe that the
rich are able to exert more influence on the political process than at any time in
recent memory. According the Aristotle, this is a problem for those concerned with
political freedom. If the rich dominate democratic politics, the political community
is transformed into one inhabited by masters and slaves rather than free democratic
citizens. Thus, it might be checkbooks, and not pitchforks, that threaten the thing a
democracy values most: freedom.
44
Though contemporary democratic citizens no longer take turns ruling, we are still able to express
our political preferences by voting for representatives. In other words, modern democratic citizens
possess political freedom in so far as they can influence the democratic process. While they might not
actually rule, they can participate in selecting those who will rule in their place. While this matter
raises some interesting questions regarding representation, such issues are beyond the purview of
this essay.
15
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