Canadian Slavonic Papers
Collective Farm Production in East and West Ukraine during the Fourth Five-Year Plan (19461950): A Comparative Study
Author(s): DAVID R. MARPLES
Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December
1980), pp. 496-505
Published by: Canadian Association of Slavists
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40870537 .
Accessed: 16/06/2014 00:42
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Canadian Association of Slavists and Canadian Slavonic Papers are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DAVID R. MARPLES
inEast andWest
CollectiveFarmProduction
UkraineduringtheFourthFive-Year Plan
(1946-1950):
A ComparativeStudy
This paper willpresentan analysisof agriculture
in Ukraineduringtheyearsof
thetirstpostwarrive Year Plan, 1946-1950.It cannotclaimto be definitive,
and
are
as I
conclusions
There
are
two
reasons
for
this.
So
far
my
onlytentative.
other
of
studiescomparingthetwo parts Ukrainehaveyetappeared;
know,no
whichcannotalwaysbe
second,thedata used are takenfromSovietstatistics,
thatthisworkwillmake a contriacceptedas valid. It is hoped, nevertheless,
butionto our scantyknowledgeof the years 1946-1950in Ukraine.
I will attemptto answertwo basic questions.First,how farwerethedein
mandsof thePlan in agriculture
Secondly,was agriculture
actuallyfulfilled?
thealready"sovietized"East Ukrainemoreproductivethanin WestUkraine?
In answeringthe second question,thispaper will examinetheavailabilityof
and theimpactof thecollectivization
labour,livestockand machinery
process
upon agriculturalproductionin the westernareas of Ukraine.
in East Ukrainehad experienced
almosta decade
ByJune1941,agriculture
of the collectivefarmsystem.In contrast,theformerPolish regionsof Volyn,
Lviv,Stanislavand Ternopilhad beenoccupiedfora mereeighteenmonths,and
theChernivtsiand Izmail regions(annexedfromRumania)forless thana year.
Consequently,the Soviets had not had timeto consolidatethe systemin the
westernareas beforetheoutbreakof theGerman-Sovietwar;only12.8percent
ofall farmsin thewesternregionshad beencollectivized,
withthehighestfigures
Thisfactorwas
21.5 percentin Volynand thelowest2.7 percentin Chernivtsi.1
to have a major influenceon postwardevelopments.
A fullevaluationof the effectsof the Germanoccupationwould require
a paper to itself.Sufficeit to note thatthetotalsown area forall categoriesof
farmsin Ukrainedecreasedbyoversixmillionhectares(29 percent).2At theend
of 1945theheads of cattlewere72 per centofthe 1941total,forpigsthefigure
was 31.5 percent,forsheepand goats46.3 percentand forhorses42.8 percent.
In thewesternregions,thesituationwas similar.The sownarea had beenreduc1. Sotsialistychna
UkrainskoiRSR (Kiev, 1968),
perebudovai rozvytoksifs'kohohospodarstva
p. 93.
2. Narodnehospodarstvo
UkrainskoiRSR; statystychnii
zbirnyk(Kiev, 1960),p. 129.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CollectiveFarm Productionin East and West Ukraine| 497
ed by35 percent,thenumberofhorsesby44 percent,ofcattleby48 percentand
of pigs by 83 per cent.3
SovietsourcesmaintainthattheGermansdestroyedall thecollectivefarms
setup in WestUkrainebeforethewar. In Ternopiloblast,thetotallossesto the
in Drohobych
kolhospsare estimatedat over one billionroubles.4Agriculture
oblast had been almosttotallyruinedby thewar and 1,083peasanthomeshad
been burntdown, while in the Volyn region519 populationpointshad been
destroyedand over 3,500 peasant farmsburntdown.5
The restorationof the economywas thereforethe main goal of the new
Five-Year Plan,whichwas approvedbytheAil-UnionSupremeSovietinMarch
and initiativewere
1946.It shouldbe bornein mind,however,thatinvestment
devotedprimarilyto industry.In agriculturethe goal of the new Plan was to
increaseproductionin theSovietUnion by 27 per centover thelevelof 1940.6
For the UkrainethePlan specifieda totalgraincollectionof 27.8 milliontons
at an averageharvestof 14 centnersperhectare.The harvestofsugarbeetswas
to be raisedfromthe 1940 total of 13 milliontons to 15.7 milliontonsat 190
centnersper hectare.The sown area was to be increasedfromthe prewar21
millionto 30.5 millionhectares,of which21.3 millionhectareswereto be on
collectivefarms.Out of thistotal 19.6 millionhectareswereto be devotedto
graincrops,2.6 millionto technicalcrops,2.8 millionto vegetablesand potatoes
and 5.4 millionto foddercrops.7
For livestockthePlan stipulateda 50 percentincreaseinheadsofcattleand
oxen, 330 per centforpigs and 220 per centforsheepand goats.8In termsof
numbers,thismeantthatby 1950,therewereto be 2,629,000horses,approximatelyhalfofwhichwouldbe on collectivefarms,over12millioncattle,6,780,000
sheep and goats, including3,100,000 in kolhospsand 9,600,000 pigs with
a smallincreaseoverthose
3,300,000on collectivefarms.Thesefiguresrepresent
for 1940.
In the difficult
Stalin and the FirstSecretaryin
postwarcircumstances,
inthe
to
increase
the
level
ofpartyrepresentation
Ukraine,Khruschchev,
sought
ruralareas. In East Ukraine,theywerequite successful.In 1946,thenumberof
partyorganisationsin collectivefarmswas raised from 1,431 to 6,690.9By
3. M. K. Ivasiuta,Narysyistoriikolhospnoho
v zakhidnykh
oblastiakhUkrains'koi
budivnytstva
RSR (Kiev, 1962),p. 75.
4. Ibid, p. 74.
5. Ibid, loc. cit.
6. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 203.
7. Zakon o piatiletnem
i razvitiianarodnogokhoziaistvaUSSR na 1946plane vosstanovleniia
l950gg. (Kiev, 1946),pp. 25-26.
8. Ibid.,loc. cit.
9. V. Iurchuk,Borot'baKP Ukrainyza vidbudovii rozvytoknarodnohohospodarstva(19451952rr.)(Kiev, 1965),p. 101.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
498 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes
February1947 in the CommunistPartyof Ukraine(CPU) therewere75,700
kolhospmembersand in thefollowingyear partyorganisationswereoperating
in 11,895collectivefarms,or 42.3 percentofthetotalnumberinEast Ukraine.I0
Politically,East Ukraine posed relativelyfew problemsfor the Soviet
were administrative,
as may be seen from
authorities.The main difficulties
a decree of the All-UnionSupremeSoviet in September1946,"Concerning
measuresforliquidatingviolationsof the Statuteof the agriculturalartelon
collectivefarms."11
The defectsindicatedincludedthe squanderingof labourdue
to
the
days
usage of excessadministrative
personnelon collectivefarms.In
East Ukraine,26,200 partyworkersweresentfromthe raion centresintothe
kolhospsto eliminatethesemistakes.12
Sovietsourcesconsiderthe1946droughtas thechiefcause ofthefaminein
East Ukraineduringthisyear. Indeed,thecrop yieldsweredisastrous.In the
Kiev region,for all typesof farms,grain was harvestedat 6.5 centnersper
hectare,and in the Kharkivregionat only 3.8; for Ukraineas a whole,the
harvestof graincrops dropped from7 centnersper hectarein 1945 to 4.6.13
Losses wereespeciallyseverein the southernstepperegions,withgrainyields
of 2.3 centnersin Odessa and 2.9 centnersper hectarein theCrimea.14On the
collectivefarmsthesituationwas evenworse,witha totalgraincollectionof 3.8
centnersper hectareand a sugar beet harvestof fortycentnersper hectare
comparedto 157 in 1940.15
Nevertheless,
althoughthedroughtwas a majorfactorin thefamine,itwas
not theonlyone. Droughtconditions,albeitto a lesserextent,werereportedin
westernoblaststoo, yettherewas no faminethere.The inthenon-collectivized
of the collectivefarmsin the East was undoubtedlya contributory
efficiency
factor.They had sown only60 per centof theirwintercropsin theappointed
timeand had ploughedonly30 percentof thetotalarea underspringcrops.16
In 1946thelosses to livestockon all typesoffarmsweresurpassedonlyby
thedevastationof the war years.The numberof pigsfellfromover 2,800,000
on 1 January1946to 1,800,000withintheyearwhilethenumberof horsesdecreased by 360,000.17Since, however,the numbersof livestockon collective
10. lurchuk,Borot'baKP Ukrainy,p. 101.
11. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 208.
12. lurchuk,Borot'baKP Ukrainy,p. 105.
13. Sotsiqlistychna
perebudova,p. 212.
14. Ibid., ¡oc. cit.
15. Narodnehospodarstvo,
p. 190.
16. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 212.
17. Narodnehospodarstvo,
p. 216.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CollectiveFarm Productionin East and West Ukraine| 499
farmsremainedfairlyconstant,18
one may surmisethat thiswas due to the
of
other
animals
from
delivery
regionsof the Soviet Union.
What weretheoveralleffectsof the 1946 famine?First,therewas a considerablemigrationof East Ukrainianpeasantsto the westernprovinces,and
it is likelythattheybroughttheirdistrustof collectivization
withthem.Second,
the failureof the Plan to meetits targetsin agriculture,
especiallyin animal
livestock,was largelydue to the famineof 1946.
From 1947 to 1949,East Ukrainianagricultureunderwenta gradual imThe totalsownarea was increasedby4 millionhectaresoverthetwo
provement.
yearperiodand cropyieldsbeganto improve.19In termsofcentnersperhectare,
winterwheatrose from5 to 12.9,springwheatfrom3.4 to 5.2,oats from5.2 to
9.3, sugarbeetsfrom43 to 98 and potatoesfrom55 to 114.20Whenone considers,however,thatalmosthalfthetotalgraincollectionof 1948was procured
by the state,as opposed to 35 per cent in 1940,thenit is clear thatthe East
Ukrainianfarmerwas stilllivingat subsistencelevel.21
In WestUkraine,bycontrast,theSovietauthorities
werefacedin theearly
post-waryears withsevere political problemsin the formof the Ukrainian
InsurgentArmy(UPA). At theend of thewar,theRussianscontrolledonlythe
major townsin WestUkraine.The villageswerehostileenclavesof nationalist
resistance.This paperwillnotgivean analysisof UPA, butitmustbe takeninto
account that the Russians could make littleprogressin agricultureuntilthe
nationalistgroupshad been defeatedand theruralpopulationcould be moved
intocollectivefarms.
Further,whereasin East Ukraine,communistand Komsomolforcesin the
ruralareas weresubstantial,in West Ukrainein thefirstpostwaryears,party
workersformedonlya tinyminority
in thevillages.The Russianscounteredthe
hostilityof the local populationby dispatchinga greatnumberof partyand
Soviet workersinto the westernregionsfromEast Ukraineand the Russian
Republic. Thus fromJuly 1944 to July 1946, over 86,000 partyand Soviet
workersarrivedin WestUkrainefromotherregions.22
But eventhenthegreat
wereconcentrated
majorityoftheprimarypartyorganizationsand communists
in oblast and raioncentres.For example,of 140communists
workingin Dolyn
raion,Stanislavoblast,only3 workedin thevillages,whilein nearbyNadvirna
thefigurewas 15 out of 227.23As late as 1 January1950,only 10 per centof
18. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 237.
19. Narodnehospodarstvo,
p. 129.
20. Ibid, pp. 186-89.
21. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 225.
22. Iurchuk,Borot'baKP Ukrainy,p. 132.
zav period kolektyvizatsìì
23. V. P. Stoliarenkoand I. K. Sas, "Diialnist'partorhanizatsii
sela (1947-1950),"Ukrains'kyi
khidnoukrainsTcoho
zhurnal,1963 no. 5, p. 72.
istorichnyi
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
500 1 Canadian Slavonic Papers
In Lvivregion,
collectivefarmchairmenin WestUkrainewerepartymembers.21
cent.25
the
number
was
5.5
be
the
slowest
to
one of
collectivized,
per
As a resultthe collectivizationof agriculturein West Ukraineproceeded
onlyslowly,and one mayestimatethatin January1950morethan25 percent
of theland remainedin thehandsof individualpeasants.26
(In East Ukraine,at
thistime,kolhospscontrolled82.1 percentofthetotalsownarea and statefarms
of thewestern
9.6 percent.)27Withintwelvemonths,however,collectivization
all freedomof choice injoininghad ended
regionswas 99 per centcomplete;28
or deportation.29
and all resistancewas punishedby imprisonment
Beforediscussingproductionresults,it is pertinentto discuss the agriculturalprioritiesin Ukraineduringthisperiod.Iurchuk,in a Sovietdoctoral
was to create
statesthattheprimeconcernof theSovietauthorities
dissertation,
a strongfodderbase foranimals.80Consequentlyin April 1949,theAll-Union
Supreme Soviet recommendedthat the sown area under perennialgrasses
shouldbe increasedto 5.8 millionhectaresin 1949and 8 millionhectaresin 1950,
and forfoddergrassesto 3.2 and 3.5 millionhectaresrespectively.31
Thus therewas a considerableincreasein the sown area of fodderand
perennialgrasses at the expense of grain crops, and animal husbandrywas
developed by loweringthe consumptionlevels of the population. Thus in
Ukraine in 1946,graincrops occupied 75.7 per cent of the sown area of all
categoriesoffarms,and foddercrops7.4 percent.By 1950,thesownarea under
grainhad beenreducedto 65.4 percentofthetotaland thatunderfoddercrops
had increasedto an unprecedented
17.1percent.32By 1953,thearea undergrain
cropswas smallerthanin 1913.33As a result,thewagesin grainof thecollective
farmersuffereda continualdecline.
A second priorityof Ukrainianagriculturein the postwaryearswas the
amalgamationofkolhospsintolarge"model" farmsand theso-called"agrarian
cities." The 26,400 collectivefarmsin East Ukraineat the startof 1950 were
24. I. A. Teterin,Sotsialistychni
v sifskomuhospodarstvi
oblastei
peretvorennia
zakhidnykh
Ukrainy(Kiev, 1954),p. 22.
25. Leninizmtorzhestvuie
(Lviv, 1957), p. 219.
26. At thistimethe kolhospsoccupied only 66.4 per centof the total arable land {Narodne
hospodarstvo,
p. 154).
27. Ibid., p. 140.
28. Ivasiuta,Narysyistoriikolhospnoho
budivnytstva,
p. 122.
29. See, for example, L. Shankowsky, "UkrainsTca povstancha armiia," in Istoriia ukrains'koho
viis'ka (Winnipeg, 1953), p. 811.
30. Iurchuk,Borot'baKP Ukrainy,p. 111.
31. BorysLewytzkyj,
Die Sowjetukraine,
1944-1963(Berlin,1964),p. 52.
32. Narodnehospodarstvo,
134-39.
pp.
33. Lewytzkyj,
Die Sowjetukraine,
p. 53.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CollectiveFarm Productionin East and West Ukraine| 501
unitedin 14,433new farms,or 55 per centof the originalnumber.34
In West
was
reduced
from
UkrainefromJune1950to June1951,thenumberofkolhosps
7,191 to 4,450.35One goal of thismeasurewas to raise the area of individual
collectivefarms,since the largerstatefarmswerethoughtto be moreefficient
agricultural
producers.Butitalso servedto increasethedegreeofpoliticalcontrol
overthekolhosps,as can be seenfromthefactthatthepercentage
ofcommunists
amongstcollectivefarmchairmenrosefrom16.2to 54.2 throughthisprocess.36
However,it was no mean task to organizethegiantfarms.Farmerswho had
barelygrownaccustomedto theiroriginalkolhospwerenow compelledto join
an even largerinstitution.
Reportssuggestthatiftheamalgamationled to deficienciesin East Ukraine,in the West theconsequencewas totalchaos.
of postwarfarmingwas increasedmechanization,
The thirdpriority
partiimplements
cularlyin thewesternregionswhichhad beenlackinginagricultural
in the prewarperiod. In 1946,the Galician Ukrainianregionspossessed 501
machines.By 1950,therewerein opertractors,7 combinesand 266 threshing
ation 8,984tractors,229 combinesand 2,802threshers.
By theend of thePlan,
the237 MTS in West Ukraineploughedalmost 3 millionhectaresof land for
thekolhosps,comparedto a mere334,000hectaresin 1940.37
The raisingof mechanizationin thewesternareas was accompaniedby an
of politicalcontrolexercisedby theMTS overthekolhosps.On
intensification
12 December 1949,MTS politicalsectionswerecreatedin thewesternoblasts.
These were manned by communistsdispatchedfromvarious oblasts of the
Theirtaskswereidenticalto thoseofthepoliticalsectionsorganized
republic.38
in East Ukrainein 1933,i.e. to purgeMTS and kolhospsof hostileelements,to
of obligations
collectivefarmdemocracy,to ensurethe fulfillment
strengthen
39
to thestateand agreementsbetweenthe MTS and kolhosps.
In examiningthe resultsof the FourthFive-Year Plan, I willturnfirstto
animalhusbandry.Here,itis evidentthatforalmosteverycategoryoflivestock
theresultsfellfarshortof thedemandsof thePlan. Onlythenumbersofcattle
and oxen combinedexceededthelevelsattainedin 1941and thenettotalofjust
over 11 millionwas wellbelowtheanticipated12,230,000.The numberofsheep
on collectivefarmsof Ukrainewas 800,000fewerthan the 1941 totaland the
numberof horsesfellshortof the targetby almost400,000.40
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Ibid. p. 50.
RSR (Kiev, 1967),vol. II, p. 403.
Istoriiaselianstvaukrains'koi
Teterin,Sotsialistychni
p. 23.
peretvorennia,
Ivasiuta. Narvsvistoriikolhospnoho
budivnvtstva.
d. 13h
Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 72.
39. Ivasiuta,Narysyistoriikolhospnoho
budivnytstva,
p. 132.
40. Narodnehospodarstvo,
p. 216.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
502 I Revue Canadiennedes Slavistes
As mentionedearlier,the famineof 1946 playeda keypart in the heavy
lossesto livestockin East Ukraine,and formanyyearsEast Ukrainewas to lag
farbehindtheWesternregionsin thisrespect.The figuresfor1954indicatethat
land.
Ukraineaveraged27,500cattleper one hundredhectaresof agricultural
In West Ukrainehowever,theaveragewas 36,170,risingas highas 43,000in
Lviv. In termsofsheep,goatsand pigs,WestUkraineaveraged29,400forevery
one hundredhectares,comparedto theUkrainianSSR averageof22,300.West
Ukraine,with12.4percentof Ukraine'sarable land in 1950,possessedover25
per centof thetotal horses.41
The planned increaseof the sown area was exceeded by over 100,000
hectaresforall categoriesoffarmsand by4 millionhectaresinthekolhosps.The
sown area under technicalcrops (all farms)was increasedfrom2,699,600
hectaresin 1940to 2,889,700hectaresin 1950.42For thegrosscollectionofcrops,
thequantityofgraincollectedtrebledbetween1946and 1950.Yetforall thisthe
totalof 1,248millionpoods gatheredin Ukrainein 1950 comprisedonly77.4
per centof the 1940 collectionof 1,613millionpoods.43The yieldsper hectare
weresharplyreduced.Thus forall typesof farmsin Ukraine,theaveragegrain
yieldin 1950was 10.2againsttheplanned14. Sugarbeetswereharvestedat 177
centnersper hectare,whereasthe Plan aimed at 190.44
Table I
Table of AgriculturalCrops in Ukraine
Crop
All grain
Winterrye
Winterwheat
Winterbarley
Springrye
Springwheat
Oats
Millet
Sugar beets
Potatoes
(centnersper hectare)
1950
1940
All farms Kolhosps All farms Kolhosps
9.7
10.2
12.6
12.4
10.2
11.1
11.4
11.1
11.1
11.1
12.3
12.1
5.5
5.6
11.4
11.2
6.4
6.9
6.6
7.4
7.6
6.1
14.8
8.4
8.8
8.9
12.4
12.1
6.0
6.5
14.9
14.7
175
177
157
159
66
107
92
101
UkrainskoiRSR v 1964 rotsi.
Source: Narodnehospodarstvo
(Kiev, 1965),pp. 190-91,248.
shchorichnyk
Statystychnii
41. Narodnoehospodarstvo,
pp. 236-8.
42. Ibid., pp. 129-33.
43. Ibid., p. 174.
44. Ibid, pp. 186-89.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CollectiveFarm Productionin East and West Ukraine| 503
The resultsof the harvestsare illustratedin Table I. It is clear thatthe
harvestof cropsforall categoriesof farmsin 1950was consistently
higherthan
on kolhospsand usuallyhigherthan that on the state farms.The totalgrain
harvestattainedonly9.7 centnersper hectareon collectivefarmsand 9.6 centnersper hectareon statefarms.Of all thecropssown,theharvestofsugarbeets
and potatoesalone produceda higheryieldthan in 1940.45
When one considersthe problemsencounteredin Ukrainianagriculture
from1946-50,thefailureof theFive-Year Plan was perhapsto be expected.Yet
in comparativeterms,theresultsin the"backward"westernregionsweremuch
betterthanin East Ukraine.Whereastheharvestof graincropsforall typesof
inthewesternregions
farmsin Ukrainewas 10.2centners
perhectare,thereturns
wereas follows;Volyn10.3,Transcarpathia(theonlyoblastin Ukraineto fulfill
thePlan) 14.6,Lviv 11.6,Rivne10.5,Stanislav12.7,Ternopil11.1,and Chernivtsi 11.1.46
The superiority
oftheharvestsin WestUkrainecan be seenin almostevery
of the plan forsugarbeetsin Ukraine,for
categoryof crops. The fulfillment
to thereturnsin thewesternregions.In comparison
example,was due primarily
withthe Ukrainianaverage yieldof 177 centnersper hectare,the harvestin
Volyn was 227, in Lviv 212, in Rivne 231 and in Chernivtsi262 centnersper
hectare.47AdmittedlyWest Ukraine provided a favourableclimatefor the
harvestof sugarbeets,but thereis no indicationthattheweatherconditionsin
East Ukrainein 1950 wereadverse.
It shouldbe emphasisedthatthehigheryieldsinWestUkrainewereachieved
in spiteoftheweaknessesofthecollectivefarmsin thearea. The outputofwork
percollectivefarmerin thewesternregionsof Ukrainein 1950was lessthanhalf
thatof his East Ukrainiancounterpart.48
Moreover,East Ukrainewas much
betterprovidedwithagricultural
theperiodofthePlan.
machinery
throughout
Each tractor,forexample,serviced140.9 hectaresof land,49whereasin West
Ukrainetherewas one tractorforevery440 hectaresofland.50The 1946famine
aside, whatotherreasonswerethereforthebetterresultsin thewesternareas?
affectedEast ratherthanWestUkraine
First,thePlan's stresson industry
in takinglabourfromtheruralareas.Bothregionssuffered
extensive
population
lossesthroughthewar,but rurallabour was morereadilyavailablein thewest45. Ibid., p. 190.
46. Ibid., p. 206.
47. Ibid., p. 210.
48. Teterin,Sotsialistychni
peretvorennia>
p. 22.
49. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 268.
DU. M. u. Butsko,KrKb - orhamzatorvsenarodnoi
oblazakhidnykh
dopomohytrudiashchym
steiURSR v vidbudovi
i dalshomurozvytku
narodnoho
(Kiev, 1959),p. 91.
hospodarstva
[1944-1950rr]
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
504 1 Canadian Slavonic Papers
in theprewarperiod.Thusthesocial
em areas whichhad notbeenindustrialized
In WestUkrainein 1950,over
was
different.
quite
makeupof the two regions
In East
on
fora living.51
63 percentof thepopulationstilldepended agriculture
Ukraine,the 1959census(thefirstsince 1939)revealedthatonly37.9 percentof
thefigurefor 1950was therefore
thepopulationwas employedin agriculture;52
probablyabout 45 per cent.
The shortageof labour in the villagesof East Ukrainewas heightenedby
themigration
ofworkersfromEast to WestUkraineduringthe1946famineand
by the constanttransferof skilled agriculturalpersonnelfromeast to west
duringthe collectivizationprocess. In the period of the Plan, about 16,000
In additionfrom1944-50,
agricultural
specialistsweresentintoWestUkraine.53
to West
a considerablenumberof partyand Soviet workersweretransferred
Ukraineto combattheUPA forces.The resultwas a continualdrainon themanpowerresourcesof theeasternregions.
A secondreasonfortherelativesuccessofagriculture
in WestUkrainewas
thatthis "newer" Soviet region,being preoccupiedwithcollectivization,
was
carriedout in the Soviet
exemptedfromthe disastrousagrarianexperiments
Union after1949,such as thegrasslandrotationsystem.Sovietsourcesadmit
that this systemwas applied wholesale to manyareas of East Ukraine,and
especiallythe southernsteppe regions,regardlessof local soil and climatic
conditions.54
Althoughthe area of foddergrassesincreasedover the 1940-50
periodby800,000hectaresin East Ukraine,in WestUkraineitactuallydeclined
by over 30,000hectares.55
Third, the low level of productionon the collectivizedfarmsof East
Ukrainewas a directresultof the Soviet policyof reducingtheprocurement
priceson agricultural
goods almostto thelevelof 1927-28.56Thispolicygavethe
East Ukrainian farmerlittleincentiveto raise agriculturalproductionand
drasticallylowered his standard of living.In West Ukraine in 1940-50the
and procurement
existingkolhospswerebeing"organizationally
strengthened"
demandswerekeptto a minimum.In 1950,theeightwesternoblastsaccounted
foronly9 percentofall grainprocuredand purchasedbythestate.57
Thusinthe
periodof the Plan, West Ukrainefeltfeweffectsof the pricesqueeze.
51. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 265.
Narodne
52.
p. 9.
hospodarstvo,
"Pikluvannia
M.
P.
53.
Khorolets,
komunistychnoi
partii pro pidvyshchenniakulturnoRSR (1946-1950rr.),"
oblasteiukrainslcoi
rivniatrudiashchykh
tekhnichnoho
Ukrains'ky
zakhidnykh
zhurnal,1960,no. 5, p. 13.
istorichnyi
54. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 245.
Narodne
55.
hospodarstvo,
p. 169.
56. Sotsialistychna
perebudova,p. 244.
57. Narodnehospodarstvo,
p. 269.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CollectiveFarm Productionin East and West Ukraine| 505
This comparisonof East and West Ukraine has assumed that the two
however,theGalicianregions
regionsare partofan integralwhole.Historically,
had developeda more "westernized"outlook thantheireasterncompatriots.
Thus theenergiesand resourcesof theSovietstatein these yearsweredirected
towardssubduingthis nationalistopposition.In turn,the interestsof thepoliticallysecureEast Ukraineweresubordinatedto thestruggleto sovietizethe
in 1946-50
westernregions.The dramaticdeclineof East Ukrainianagriculture
was a directresultof the problemsencounteredin collectivizingthe western
regions.
This content downloaded from 194.29.185.216 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 00:42:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions