On the Duality of Greed*
Long Wang and J. Keith Murnighan
Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Rd
Evanston IL 60208
Contact information for J. Keith Murnighan:
847 467-3566
[email protected]
October 31, 2007
*A previous version of this paper benefited tremendously from the comments and suggestions of Max
Bazerman, Kevin Gibson, Jennifer Jordan, Madan Pillutla, A. F. Robertson, and ChenBo Zhong. We are
extremely thankful for their reactions and their ideas. Any problems that remain in the paper, of course,
are all our responsibility.
On the Duality of Greed
Abstract
Greed is a central element in human existence and an often cited factor in a variety of organizational
scandals. In this paper, we investigate the personal and social dynamics of greed: we develop a theoretical
model that is grounded in four literatures: historical/philosophical, economic, political, and social
psychological/game theoretic. The model proposes that a series of personal, interpersonal, emotional,
and social forces contribute to greed‘s basic duality: on the one hand, greed is connected to positive
hedonic outcomes; on the other hand, it can generate considerable guilt and regret. This duality is
reflected in the cognitions, emotions, and social influences that surround greed. We also report the
qualitative and quantitative results of two web-based surveys that probe the threshold between resisting
and succumbing to greed. In particular, we investigate the effects of five critical factors: desirability, guilt,
empathetic perspective taking, regret, and fear. Results suggest that the first three factors are more
influential in the decision to act with or to resist greed than the last two. Our discussion explores the
genesis, the catalysts, and the ramifications of greed.
On the Duality of Greed
―I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself.‖
Ivan F. Boesky, Commencement address, May 18, 1986,
School of Business Administration, UC Berkeley
―If we're looking for the sources of our troubles, we shouldn't test people for
drugs, we should test them for stupidity, ignorance, greed and love of power.‖
P.J. O'Rourke, journalist, 1992
―From the top to the bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused … Nothing can calm
it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain. Reality seems valueless by comparison.‖
Emile Durkheim, Suicide, book 2, chapter 5 (1897, trans. 1951)
It is often claimed that human greed has no bounds. The quotes that begin this paper and any number of
noteworthy stories from human history document the fact that people are often tempted by and succumb
to greed; even for the wealthy, contentment can be elusive. It seems that almost everyone craves more,
and these desires often stimulate action that may not always be socially desirable.
Greed has been defined as ―an excessive desire to get more … a primarily materialistic type of desire‖
(Balot, 2001: 1). Greed is not only one of the seven cardinal sins but it may be ―the matriarch of the
Deadly Clan,‖ i.e., the basic root of all of the cardinal sins (Tickle, 2004). (The other six are pride, envy,
sloth, gluttony, lust, and anger.) The New Testament suggests that ―the love of money is the root of all
evil.‖ Buddhist philosophy is similar: ―Whoever is free from attachment knows neither grief nor fear.
From greed comes grief; from greed comes fear.‖ (Fetherston, 2000: 30).
Although the publicity that has surrounded recent corporate scandals might suggest that greed is
flourishing more than ever, greed has surfaced throughout human history. Discovery of riches in the
Orient and the Americas, for instance, led Europeans to frenzied explorations. The discovery of gold in
the western United States led to the famous ―gold rush.‖ (Ironically, toward the end of the rush, the
wealthiest men in San Francisco were not prospectors but the owners of railroads and stagecoaches.) The
best historical example of greed may be the well known myth of King Midas, who used his one unlimited
wish to turn all that he touched to gold: ―Midas let his greed blind him.‖ (Encyclopedia Mythica;
www.pantheon.org).
In many respects, Dennis Kozlowski provides a particularly notable recent example of greed. From 1975
to 1992 he moved from being an accountant to Tyco International‘s chairman and Chief Executive
Officer. He supervised hundreds of acquisitions, growing Tyco from a $40 million company into a $40
billion conglomerate. During his last four years as CEO, his compensation was just shy of $400 million.
In June of 2005, he and his Chief Financial Officer were convicted on 22 of 23 counts of grand larceny,
conspiracy and securities fraud; they had stolen $600 million. At the time, Kozlowski owned a huge
collection of original art, a $30 million house in Florida, two other homes, and a $16 million yacht. He
spent over $30 million of Tyco‘s funds for an apartment in New York. A birthday party for his wife
(which included an ice sculpture replica of Michelangelo's David spewing vodka from its private parts
and an anatomically correct cake with exploding breasts) cost over $2 million, half charged to Tyco as a
business expense. Other Tyco charges included a $1650 notebook, a $445 pincushion, and a $7 million
apartment for his ex-wife.
Greed is part of everyday parlance. It provides the primary focus for many 19th and 20th century novels
(e.g., Dickens, Balzac, Wolfe, and Mailer) and surfaces repeatedly in the news: from 1988 to 1998, greed
appeared 236 times in Los Angeles Times headlines (Robertson, 2001). A simple Google search of
―corporate greed‖ yields more than a million webpages.
Greed has often been cited as the primary reason behind the spate of recent corporate scandals (e.g.
Bryce, 2002). Alan Greenspan (2002), then Federal Reserve Chairman, warned that ―an infectious greed
seemed to grip much of our business community‖. When greedy action is directed toward attaining
inordinate amounts of valuable objects, it is seen as truly reprehensible. But greed‘s motivational force is
also deeply rooted in human nature (Robertson, 2001). Greed is not uniformly negative, as capitalistic
economies are based, in large part, on a reification of greed. A 1996 Harris poll, for instance, found that
61 percent of Americans believed that ―Wall Street was dominated by greed and selfishness‖ yet 70
percent also believed that ―Wall Street benefited America.‖ As a reporter recently noted, ―My brain‘s
convinced that greed has made America better. But my stomach still tells me something else.‖ (Robertson,
2001: 3).
Given the centrality of greed in human life, our search of the literature led to a surprising result: empirical
research has only rarely addressed the personal and social dynamics that propel greedy action. Research
on prisoners‘ and social dilemmas, in which economically rational, individual action leads to worse group
outcomes than collective, cooperative action, has found that, as individual benefits increase, so does
greedy action (Dawes, 1980). This research has also noted that greed for gain appears to be more
motivating than the fear of loss (Dawes et al, 1986; van de Kragt et al, 1983). But the study of greed, in
either organizations or the general public, is either rare or hidden within the context of a different central
theme.
The conceptual analysis of greed, in contrast, has deep roots in a variety of intellectual and philosophical
disciplines. Thus, the first part of this paper reviews the literature on greed from four different
perspectives: historical/philosophical, economic, political, and social psychological/game theoretic. This
interdisciplinary review documents the importance of the underlying, personal, and interpersonal
dynamics of greed in human interaction. It also helps to confirm our initial assumption, one that echoes
the assumptions of ancient philosophers, that everyone feels and is motivated, at some time, by greed.
Whether and when people act on these feelings provide the basis for our empirical research.
Background
Historical and Philosophical Perspectives
In his portrait of Callicles, Plato pointed out that greed (pleonexia) is rooted in human physicality (Balot,
2001). For Plato, greed was the origin of war, civil strife and personal immorality. Plato‘s summary of
Socrates‘ dialogues in The Republic suggests two complementary approaches to greed. First, greed drives
individuals to act immorally and unjustly. Second, greed even hurts the people whose greedy acts have
been successful. Like Solon and Herodotus, Plato argues that justice creates human happiness; greed and
injustice undermine and destroy it. Plato emphasized the role of ―psychic health‖ or ―psychic harmony‖
as a proper structure within individuals‘ souls in fostering justice and inhibiting greed. Thus, a person
with a just and healthy soul would necessarily refrain from immoral and greedy behaviors.
Aristotle agreed, echoing Plato‘s notion that people have natural acquisitive desires (Balot, 2001).
Aristotle widened the conceptualization of greed‘s targets to include all of the goods of fortune rather
than simply material goods. He contended that greed accounted for the drive to obtain more at the
expense of communal canons of distributive justice. He felt that greed was the only vice that drove
people to break the rules of law and fairness (Shklar, 1990).
Aristotle also discussed the psychology of greed, proposing that greed stems from an irrational desire to
pursue bodily pleasure, revealing ignorance of the nature of a truly good life. He perceived virtues as an
intermediate state between excess and deficiency: virtues are ruined by too much or too little; but
preserved by the mean (Furley, 2003). Aristotle contended that individuals often confuse the true and
natural needs of acquiring strictly necessary goods (telos) with the perceived needs of maximizing profit.
Thus, people may seek more simply because they want more than others and more than they deserve.
Aristotle also noted that individuals often judge others‘ behaviors to be greedy only to justify their own
greedy action. As has been repeated in an old Dutch proverb, ―the inn-keeper trusts his guests only as
much as he trusts himself.‖ As a result, greed is a practical problem of individual behavior as well as a
potential virus in a community or society‘s interactions.
Like Plato and Aristotle, Thucydides treated greed as a universal facet of human nature. He referred to
greed as the desire to possess more than one‘s share of material goods. Thucydides‘s analysis was multifaceted. On the one hand, he noted greed‘s negative attributes, e.g., the pursuit of individual self interest
and the cause of mistrust. On the other hand, he may have been the first author to note that greed might
also drive human progress. He felt that greed was the motivation behind Athenian imperialism and their
creation of their extensive empire.
David Hume expanded the discourse on greed by focusing on two of its central characteristics, avarice
and miserliness. Whereas a miser is retentively greedy, an avaricious person is acquisitively greedy. Hume
(1741/1995) saw greedy people as ―men of immense fortunes, without heirs, and on the very brink of the
grave, who refuse themselves of the most common necessaries of life, and go on heaping possession on
possessions, under all the real pressures of the severest poverty (570).‖ Although Hume treated greed as
an inferior passion, he also admitted that it could become a predominant inclination. Like Thucydides,
Hume held a somewhat contradictory view about greed. On the one hand, he deemed greed an
irreclaimable vice: ―the avidity of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends is
insatiable, perpetual, universal and directly destructive of society‖ (Hume, 1739/2001: 316) On the other
hand, he noted that greed motivates people: it could become a virtue in commerce.
Kant defined greedy avarice as ―acquiring the means of good living in excess of one‘s true needs‖ (Kant,
1796/1964: 96). He attributed it to self-seeking, especially the insatiable acquisition of wealth for the
purpose of sumptuous living (Faust, 2006). Like Hume, Kant defined miserly avarice in terms of
stinginess or niggardliness: ―to get and keep all the means of good living, but without regard to this
enjoyment‖ (Kant, 1796/1964: 98). Kant argued that both greedy and miserly avarice are duty
transgressions that become vices when they are intentionally adopted as basic principles.
This brief summary cannot do justice to the long history of greed in philosophy and intellectual thought.
Although scholars like Thucydides and Hume identified positive aspect of greed, they also disparaged its
dark side. Most other ancient and contemporary philosophers viewed greed as iniquitous and immoral,
commonly identifying it as the cause of vices, evil, and misery (Faust, 2006). Philosophers also treat it as
universal, fundamental and ubiquitous. It should be no surprise, then, that, in the munificence of the
modern corporate world, greed continues to thrive.
Economic Perspectives
The economic literature has long portrayed homo economicus as a rational profit maximizer. The assumption
of self-interest, which inherently implies the desire to achieve and/or maximize material gains and to
minimize losses, is central to most economic models. Homo economicus distinguishes neither needs from
wants nor intrinsic values from extrinsic commodities. Indeed, maximizing gains suggests unlimited
wants and greed (Schwartz, 1986). The goal of maximizing self-interest frees individuals to act with guile,
to engage in ―the full set of ex ante and ex post efforts to lie, cheat, steal, mislead, disguise, obfuscate,
feign, distort and confuse‖ (Williamson, 1984: 198). Some economic approaches to greed leave only a
fine line between acceptable and unacceptable greedy action, ―The noblest of human motivations is
greed. I don't mean theft, fraud, tricks, or misrepresentation. By greed I mean people being only or
mostly concerned with getting the most they can for themselves and not necessarily concerned about the
welfare of others.‖ Williams (2000).
The case for greed in economics may be traced to Adam Smith, who helped to build economics on a
foundation of self-interest (Stigler, 1975). Individuals, according to Adam Smith, should act selfishly
rather than try to do ―good‖ for others because ―it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest‖ (Smith,
1776/1994: 15). The invisible hand of the market operates as a self-constraining system to govern market
transactions and regulate self interests. In doing so, it rationalizes selfishness into social virtues, making
good emerge as a byproduct of selfishness (Heilbroner, 1980). By greedily pursuing their own self-interest,
Smith suggested that individuals promote the interest of the society more than they can via benevolence
(Schwartz, 1986).
Although the notion that self-interest governs all human relationships is a simplification of the broad
spectrum of Adam Smith‘s positions (e.g. Schwartz, 1986; Werhane, 2000;Fleischacker, 2004), his ideas
on self-interest have played important roles in both lay and economic analyses of greed. In his
introduction to The Wealth of Nations, Lerner claimed that Adam Smith ―gave new dignity to greed and a
new sanctification to the predatory impulses‖ (Lerner, 1937: ix). More recent interpretations also treat
greed and envy as the driving forces of human well-being (Engler, 1995). Because the mechanics of selfinterest have been fundamental to economics since Adam Smith (Letwin, 1963; Stigler, 1971; Hirschman,
1977), ―the vast forces of greed‖ (Arrow, 1980) have been identified as a basic motive for economic
behaviors in modern capitalism.1
As one of its major critics, Karl Marx argued that capitalism was driven by greed: ―this boundless greed
after riches, this passionate chase after exchange value, is common to the capitalist and the miser; but
while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser‖ (Marx, 1967: 153). In
Economic and Philosophic Manuscript, Marx (1844) even argued that ―the only wheels which political
economy sets in motion are greed, and the war of avaricious-competition‖ (Marx, 1844: 1). A Marxian
view, then, suggests that greed is an essential element in the monetary and political systems of modern
capitalism.
Neoclassical economics‘ focus on self-interest almost seems to glorify greed. Self-interest maximization
literally implies excessive wealth acquisition. Economic theory does not clearly distinguish greed and selfinterest maximization. In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman (1962: 133) addressed the pursuit of
self-interest in a free economy with a frequently repeated quote: ―the only social responsibility of business
is to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game.‖ A combination of limited cognitive ability (Simon, 1978) plus the self-interested
impetus behind opportunism (Williamson, 1994) can lead to deception, cheating, and fraud (cf.,
Murnighan, Cantelon, and Elyashiv, 2001; Bazerman and Banaji, 2004).
An economic approach to greed pays little attention to ethical issues and the multitude of human
motivations (Stigler, 1980; Sen, 1987). Repeated exposure to economics and business education also
seems to increase self-interested behavior: both economists and economics students behave more selfinterestedly than their peers (Marwell & Armes, 1981; Frank, et al, 1993) and MBA students cheat more
than their law school and non-business student peers (McCabe, et al, 2006). In addition, greed has been
identified as one of the common antecedents to deception (Murnighan, 1991; Lewicki, et al, 1994; Levine,
2000).
Clearly, greed and self-interest are intertwined in economic theory. Whereas self-interest can be perceived
as an important foundation of human behavior, greed may be viewed as a central motivation and
behavioral guide for self-interested individuals. The ideology of economics seems to implicitly encourage
immoral, greedy action. At the same time, greed can enhance and promote economic and social wellbeing in terms of pecuniary and/or material gains. It may even enhance societal prosperity.
Simultaneously, however, it creates a difficult tension between ethicality and profitability.
Political Perspectives
Greed also has deep roots in the history of politics. In his review, Robertson (2001: 140) notes that
―Human history has been largely about getting more … greed detects the metaphoric shift from physical
need to political necessity.‖ The political perspective on greed is similar to the economic view in its focus
on self-interest. As early as the fourth or fifth centuries B. C., Sophists proclaimed that political
associations were formed for the self-interested reason of mutual defense (Mansbridge, 1990).
Thomas Hobbes is often treated as a critical proponent of self-interest: his Leviathan (Hobbes,
1651/1950) portrayed humans as being predominantly egoistic (Hampton, 1986; Kavka, 1986). He
focused on two kinds of self-interest, for economic gains and for personal glory. According to Hobbes,
self-interest is the prime human motive. Thus, people naturally become enemies because ―a) sometimes
they desire the same objects (―competition‖) b) anticipating the possibility of desiring the same objects
they seek to pre-empt one another (―difference‖); c) they demand to be valued by others as they see
themselves (―glory‖)‖ (Hobbes,1651/1950; in Gauthier, 2003: 119).
Hobbes asserted that individuals‘ comparisons and competition lead to unlimited, insatiable desires,
which he did not expect to cease until death. In addition, their naturally passionate greed limits their
abilities at self-restraint (Schwartz, 1986). Thus, every person may compete against every person,
especially when their unlimited greed is unleashed, and the unbridled desire for material or mental gains
may lead to endless war of all against all. Thus, Hobbes noted that self-interest is also the most
destructive human motive: its free operation could devastate mankind (Myers, 1983). To avoid anarchy,
he recommended that the state use its sovereignty and power to ―bridle men‘s ambition, avarice, anger
and other Passions‖ (Leviathan, xiv: 196).
Machiavelli, another founder of modern political science (McCoy, 1943; Mansfield, 1981), analyzed how
politics can deal with human evils. Machiavelli claimed that human nature is driven by an innate and
insatiable lust for power. As a result, ambition and avarice are ubiquitous, making people ―insatiable,
arrogant, crafty, and shifting, and above all else malignant, iniquitous, violent and savage‖ (Viroli, 1998:
15). Ambition and avarice encourage both acquisitiveness and destructive competition as a means of
affirming superiority over one‘s enemies (Viroli, 1998). For Machiavelli, an amoral, insatiable hunger for
power is unavoidable and the art of war is necessary for political glory. He indicated that rulers must use
all means necessary, including deception and conspiracy, to exercise power and keep order. In The Prince
(1513, xx), he contended that ―A man striving in every way to be good will meet his ruin among the great
number who are not good.‖ Thus, a prince must learn ―how not to be good and to use his knowledge or
refrain from using it as he may need‖ (Kegley and Raymond, 2002: 22-23). Overall, Machiavelli separated
ethics from politics: the doctrine of power acquisition and amoral maneuver was central to his political
analysis.
War is a central topic in political science, and both ancient and contemporary political thinkers point to
greed as a reason for war. Herodotus cited greed as the fundamental reason behind Persian imperialism.
Thucydides reformulated the Herodotean treatment of greed in his analysis of Athenian imperialism
(Balot, 2001). Machiavelli also argued that ambition and avarice are the causes of disorder and war (Viroli,
1998). Recent research has identified greed and unbridled economic acquisition as an essential factor of
the Thirty Year‘s War (e.g., Kegley and Raymond, 2002) as well as contemporary civil wars (Collier &
Hoeffler, 2004).
While political and economic perspectives share the same assumptions of self-interest, early political
thinkers like Machiavelli took an even more blatant stance on greed. They viewed people as incorrigibly
selfish, greedy, and competitive, requiring strong institutions to control their seemingly insatiable desires.
Social Psychological/Game theoretic Perspectives
Greed remains one of the oldest and most chronically unresolved questions at the heart of social
psychology (Robertson, 2001). Much of the social psychological research on greed takes a game theoretic
approach, focusing on the payoff matrices of interpersonal interactions. Our review of the literature
indicates that empirical research on greed has primarily been in the context of prisoners‘ and social
dilemma games (Dawes, 1980), in which economically rational, individual action leads to worse group
outcomes than collective, cooperative action. Prisoners‘ and social dilemmas model some of the basic,
underlying tensions of groups and societies. In these strategic games, greed and fear provide two clear
incentives to defect (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Coombs, 1973) because a greedy choice of defection
leads to higher short-term outcomes than more selfless choices of cooperation. Fear, however, can
motivate the same defection choice by allowing an individual to avoid the lowest short-term outcome,
i.e., the ‗sucker‘ outcome which results when cooperation is met by another‘s defection.2
Empirical findings indicate that fear and greed have different effects on cooperative choices. Dawes and
his colleagues (Dawes et al, 1986; van de Kragt et al, 1983), for instance, designed two social dilemma
games: one that included no fear, i.e., a money back guarantee for any party that cooperated when others
did not; and one that included no greed, which prevented defections that would hurt cooperators. The
‗no fear‘ condition allowed defections but cooperation entailed no risk; the ‗no greed‘ condition ensured
that cooperative choices were never wasted. The results suggested that greed was the primary force
behind non-cooperation: removing fear made little difference in cooperation rates but removing greed
increased cooperation. Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) also investigated fear and greed using a different
set of manipulations, finding that both fear and greed motivated non-cooperation but that greed
predominated. In a third study, this time using a commons dilemma (in which subjects decided how
much to take from a common resource), Poppe and Utens (1986) found similar results: greed rather than
fear was the primary motivation. Other related research on the volunteer dilemma (e.g., Diekmann, 1985,
1986) also suggests that greed dominates altruism and increases with group size (Murnighan, Kim and
Metzger, 1993).
Overall, the findings in dilemma research are quite straightforward: as individual benefits increase, so
does greedy action. In addition, greed seems to drive decisions more than the fear of being victimized:
people are tempted away from cooperative choices more by a desire for personal gain than by a desire to
guard against loss.
Because prisoners‘ and social dilemmas are built on a game theoretic foundation, the social psychological
and economic approaches to greed are quite similar. Allport (1954, 5) defined social psychology as a
―scientific attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals are
influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of other human beings.‖ In terms of Allport‘s
criteria, however, social psychological research has not specified the basic psychological mechanisms
underlying greed in human behavior. These are central issues in the research that we report here.
Synopsis
Our review suggests that greed is a central concept in philosophy and social thought and a central part of
human nature. Historical and philosophical approaches typically link greed to immoral and inappropriate
behavior (e.g. Hume, Kant); contemporary analyses suggest that vice and excess are two essential qualities
of greed (Robertson, 2001, p. 14). Adding religious admonitions leads to the clear conclusion, and a
general, pervasive belief, that greed is wrong. Greedy action that is directed toward attaining inordinate
amounts of valuable objects is seen as reprehensible, definitionally and perceptually. A contrast is offered
by greed‘s connection to self-interest and maximization, foundational elements of modern economics and
political science.
Even so, both economics (Rabin, 1993; Sen, 1987) and political science (Mansbridge, 1990) have recently
called for attention to the transformative power of altruism and morality. In addition, psychological
research has repeatedly demonstrated that people are not unitary, self-interested actors (e.g. Miller, 1999;
Batson, 2006). Thus, greed may be neither an unusual motivation nor universally active, leading to
questions about the contingencies that drive or inhibit greedy action.
Greed evokes strong emotions (Loewenstein, 2000; Elster, 1998). Loewenstein (1996) postulates that
emotions differentiate what people think they should do from what they really want to do. His analysis
focuses on the effect of visceral reactions - craving, hunger, thirst, and desire - on impulsivity and selfcontrol. Visceral factors have two defining characteristics: ―1) a direct hedonic impact; and 2) an effect on
the relative desirability of different goods and actions‖ (p. 272). These conceptual connections to greed
are also consistent with Aristotle‘s argument that individuals ignore the nature of their real needs when
greed promotes an irrational desire to pursue bodily pleasure (Balot, 2001).
Self-reflection following greedy behavior can lead to feelings of guilt and regret, outweighing short-term
satisfaction and undermining previously happy feelings (Solon and Herodotus, in Balot, 2001, p. 236).
The psychological literature on the self (e.g., Baumeister, 1998) makes it clear that individuals anticipate
their subsequent feelings (Mellers et al, 1999), even as they are about to engage in current behavior. More
specifically, when faced with decisions that can reflect on an individual‘s sense of self, people tend to
make choices that reinforce their own self-images (e.g., Murnighan, Oesch, and Pillutla, 2001). Thus, in
investigating the dynamics of greed, our initial research not only addresses contemporaneous cognitions
and emotions but expected cognitions, self-impressions, and future emotions.
Recent Research
In sum, the literature suggests that attractive material objects activate greed and that the possession (not
necessarily the consumption) of these attractive objects may satisfy greedy motivations. Although
philosophers view greed and greedy action as immoral and deplorable and suggest that it will ultimately
make people unhappy, satisfying one‘s greed can lead to (at least) short-term happiness. Identifying the
forces that determine the threshold for resisting rather than succumbing, then, becomes a critical issue.
Ancient philosophers and contemporary researchers have the same answer: the temptation of the
desirable outcome and desirability-related hedonics. Philosophy and research both focus on our
acquisitive, self-interested nature, which dominates the importance of other factors. For example, as war
profiteers, even after feudal barons and kings had accumulated excessive wealth, they continued to
engage in war to acquire more. In the current era, the world‘s wealthiest people, like Bill Gates and
Warren Buffett, have accumulated fortunes that exceed the GDPs of many small and middle-sized
countries. Both of them, however, have embarked on massive charity programs. Had they acted the same
way in ancient times, they would have been called ‗benevolent dictators.‘
Modern research has modeled greedy decision making in restricted ways in a series of recent experiments
on the dictator game. In the dictator game, one player, the dictator, independently and completely
controls an amount of money and can keep as much of the money as he or she wishes. Dictators can also
choose to send any portion of the money that they control to another person, the recipient, who is
typically unidentified. Most economic models suggest that rational dictators will be neither generous nor
altruistic, but will keep the money they control and send none of it to recipients. Observations from a
number of experiments, however, indicate that many dictators send money to anonymous recipients and
that experimental conditions (e.g., the anonymity of the dictator) can influence these frequencies
(Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger, 1997). The monetary amounts in these experiments are typically
small, but Carpenter, Verhoogen, and Burks (2005) compared the choices of dictators who were
endowed with $10 or with $100 and found that the mean proportions of the endowment offered were
not significantly different. Thus, although the necessarily small stakes in most experiments may not
activate true greed, independent dictators who do not need to share their endowments still tend to share
them; at the same time, equal divisions are quite rare.
Although giving dictators legitimate reasons for retaining their endowments significantly reduces their
generosity (Cherry, Frykblom & Shogren 2002), research also suggests that dictators are concerned about
how their behaviors reflect on their self-impressions (Murnighan, Oesch & Pillutla, 2001). By nature,
people tend to be motivated to create positive self images (Baumeister, 1998). Not only do they want to
create positive social impressions (Schlenker, 1980) but they also want to reduce anguish when they
observe themselves.
The logic of self impression management suggests that the desire to maintain a positive self-image might
reduce greedy action. In particular, hedonism can create a paradox because generosity and altruism, as
well as the accumulation of wealth, lead to happiness (Easterlin, 1973, 2001; Isen, Horn & Roensen,
1973; Rosenhen, Underwood & Moore, 1974; Konow & Earley, 2007). Although greedy actions may
result in short-term happiness, reflection may create regret, guilt, and general feelings of unhappiness.
The fact that these feelings can be anticipated (Zeelenberg, 1999) can contribute to blunting greedy
action. Thus, we propose that when individuals‘ a priori thoughts about their agonized post hoc feelings,
e.g., anticipated regret and anticipated guilt, are sufficiently strong, greedy action will be less likely. The
questions then become when these thoughts are likely to surface and what might make them sufficiently
strong.
Another potentially important issue that is not often addressed in discussions of the dynamics of greed
involves the interpersonal context that surrounds greedy action. Greed does not exist in social vacuum: it
almost always involves a complementary reduction in other people‘s outcomes, even as the greedy actor
achieves substantive gains. Again, most people also understand these interactive effects. Thus, we would
posit that resisting greed may depend on social construals: social consequences influence greedy choices
when individuals believe that their actions affect others‘ outcomes. The well-known ―fixed-pie bias‖
suggests that individuals often view outcomes as zero-sum, i.e., what one person gains, another loses
(e.g., Neale and Bazerman, 1991). Greed has been condemned since ancient times because excessive
acquisitiveness ―violates the fairness upon which the community‘s welfare and stability are based‖
(Hesiod, in Balot, 2001, p.73). Thus, perceptions of outcome interdependence, which increase
dramatically when involved others are attractive, should also limit greedy action. More specifically, if
individuals empathically take the perspective of the people who would be negatively affected by their
greedy acts, they should be less likely to engage in those acts.
Idiosyncratic interpretations, however, allow people to justify a variety of their more questionable actions.
For instance, when questioned about stealing $170 million and pocketing an additional $430 million
through the sale of company stock, even as he was lying about Tyco‘s finances, Dennis Kozlowski said,
―There was no criminal intent here. … I think I did everything according to, you know, the way the
programs were outlined, and the way it was done by my predecessors.‖ (Prisoner 05A4820, CBS News
60 Minutes).
The ability of individuals to justify their own outcomes is legendary (e.g., Aronson, 1980; Messick et al.,
1985). Justifications are particularly useful when individuals contemplate greedy action, either a priori or
post hoc. Viewing greed as questionable and detrimental can inhibit greedy actions but contextually-based
interpretations can diminish the perceived negativity of greed and even allow people to justify greedy
action. Contemporary ethical research, for instance, shows that perceived inequity or unfairness can
stimulate reciprocal unethical conduct. People steal in the name of justice (Greenberg, 1990; 1993) and
engage in deviant acts when their organizations cannot live up to their original expectations (Kemper,
1966).
Several ethical models (Jones, 1991; Murnighan, Cantelon & Elyashiv, 2001; Chugh, Banaji, & Bazerman,
2005) also suggest that individuals are not often completely aware of the ethical characteristics or
consequences of their decisions. Instead, their cognitive constraints bias their ethical judgment in selfinterested ways, either consciously or unconsciously (Murnighan, Cantelon, & Elyashiv, 2001; Chugh &
Bazerman, 2006). Perceptions of inequity can make greedy action seem appropriate. When impulsive
greed and self-interested justification dominate consciousness, crowding out empathic perspective taking,
they can also negate the restraining forces of self-impression management.
The Current Studies
Our brief review suggests that a variety of contrasting forces influences greedy decision making. From an
outsider‘s or a victim‘s point of view, greedy action is deplorable; from a philosopher‘s or a religious
point of view, greedy action is reprehensible. From an economic or the short-term point of view of a
greedy actor, greedy action can lead to remarkably positive outcomes. From an emotional point of view,
greedy action might initially lead to joy; after reflection, however, it may create anguish. Thus, we propose
that a series of dual forces influence greed and greedy action. They include personal, interpersonal,
emotional, and social forces.
Proposition 1: Although the motivation behind greed can lead to economically beneficial action
for individuals and society, both personal inner feelings and general social perceptions strongly
work against it, creating a duality between individuals‘ inner desires and feelings of self-culpability.
When individuals‘ a priori thoughts about their agonized post hoc feelings, e.g., anticipated regret
and anticipated guilt, are sufficiently strong, greedy action will be less likely.
A bounded awareness of ethicality (Murnighan, Cantelon, & Elyashiv, 2001; Chugh & Bazerman, 2006)
also suggests that greedy decision making has a dual nature. On the one hand, greed and temptation may
be instinctual; on the other, inner reflection warns against greedy action, as self-recrimination typically
follows. Dual process models have deep roots in philosophy and intellectual thought, including Aristotle,
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hume. More recent dual models identify two types of cognitive reasoning, rulebased and associative3 (Sloman, 1996, Stanovich & West, 2002). A rule-based system uses symbolically
represented, intentionally accessed knowledge to guide reasoning (Smith & DeCoster, 2000); it primarily
deals with analytical, rational, and explicit thought processes. In contrast, an associative system operates
preconsciously (Bargh, 1994), is typically difficult to control or modify (Kahneman, 2002), and involves
automatic and tactical thought processes, exerting few cognitive demands.
This duality also resembles a battle between two different human natures. Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, for
example, all discussed the struggle between good and bad human nature (Froster, 1962). Like any other
decision, ethical decisions activate these two cognitive systems. Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and WadeBenzoni (1998) extended dual reasoning to a dual-self model, distinguishing an emotional, impulsive, and
hot-headed ‗want-self‘ from a rational, cognitive, thoughtful, and cool-headed ‗should-self.‘ Their
arguments echo contemporary thought on opposite selves (Freud, 1923; Inhelder & Piage, 1958; Strotz,
1956). Moore and Loewenstein (2004) also proposed that, on the one hand, self-interest is automatic,
viscerally compelling, and usually unconscious, but on the other, caring about others or abiding by ethical
and professional obligations typically requires thoughtful, controlled decision processes. These arguments,
taken together, suggest that the bounded nature of human cognition (Simon, 1978) reduces the likelihood
of orderly, consistent ethical decision making (Murnighan, Cantelon & Elyashiv, 2001; Chugh &
Bazerman, 2006).
Our review suggests that an empirical investigation of greed would be particularly worthwhile, and that
our initial empirical approach should be primarily exploratory. Although previous work has repeatedly
indicated that more desirable objects are likely to stimulate stronger feelings of greed and more greedy
action, other cognitive and interpersonal concepts have not often been empirically explored. Thus, our
initial research also focuses on justifications, the perception of the impact of an individual‘s actions on
others, expressions of regret and guilt, and emotional reactions. Although these are the general categories
for our observations, we were also open to other factors that might have influenced our respondents‘
decisions.
Proposition 2: Greed‘s emotional desires compete with moral and ethical cognitions, creating a
threshold that determines whether individuals engage in greedy action.
Figure 1 depicts our model of the dynamic forces that influence greed action. We suggest that everything
typically starts with inner desire/temptation, i.e., a potential, desirable outcome. Anticipation may include
emotional cognitions about how we will feel after a greedy action; alternatively, these anticipatory
thoughts may be overwhelmed by an outcome‘s desirability, in which case greedy action is very likely. In
contrast, however, the more that people engage in pre-action thoughts of their likely post hoc reactions,
the less likely greedy action should be.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Immediate actions following greedy action or resisting it can be positive or negative, positive if we are
delighted by attainment of the outcome or by the fact that we have done the right thing and resisted,
negative if we still wish for the outcome that we have not actively sought or because we have not resisted
and have done what we recognize is wrong. Positive and negative reactions can both lead to a variety of
ultimate reflections, which emphasizes the fact that the decisions to act with or to resist greed are
particularly noteworthy decisions. Also, after reflecting on previous greedy actions, the anticipation of
moral and social cognitions and emotions prior to subsequent greedy actions should become more likely
and have a restraining effect.
To explore these connections, our first study used a web-based survey to ask people to describe and
discuss instances when they had succumbed to greed and instances when they had resisted greed. We
asked them open-ended questions about the antecedents and the consequences of their decisions; we also
asked them to rate their choices in terms of an initial set of concepts (regret, guilt, issues of morality, etc.).
Our second study was a more tightly focused survey that assessed these same concepts, as well as issues
raised by the first study.
Study 1
Methods
Participants
We invited 1500 registrants of StudyResponse, a website established by the School of Information
Studies at Syracuse University, to participate. All of the invited participants had indicated a willingness to
participate in research. Overall, 141 individuals completed the survey (which is reproduced in Appendix
1) and submitted completed answers. Participants were 65 percent female, 76 percent white, and averaged
37 years of age; 79 percent had attended college.
Procedure and Materials
The first screen on the webpage was a general introduction. Given greed‘s negative connotations, we
were concerned that potential participants would reject a request for information about how greed
influenced them. Thus, we tried to engage them with a personal story, which we related, with minor detail
changes, as an actual event in one of the author‘s lives:
―(At the age of 5), I was at the grocery store with my mother. I was looking at baseball cards
while she was checking out. I couldn‘t resist, so I put a pack of the cards in my pocket, as
unobtrusively as possible. No one noticed – until I got home, when my mother discovered
what I had done. She marched me back to the store by my earlobe and made me apologize in
public and pay for the cards. (I had already opened the pack.)‖
The instructions then revealed that we were interested in studying greed. We asked respondents to tell
two personal stories, one when they were tempted by greed and acted greedily and one when they resisted
greed and did not act greedily. Half of the surveys requested the greed story first; half the resist story first.
After each story, they evaluated their behaviors in the story on 8 semantic differentials using 10-point
scales: regret/not, correct/wrong, justified/unjustified, delighted/mortified, excited/depressed,
good/bad, happy/sad, and satisfied/unsatisfied. Two open-ended questions followed: one asked them to
identify factors that made it difficult for them to resist greed; the other asked about the factors that made
it easy to resist greed. They were then asked to define greed in their own words, followed by a request for
demographic information.
Results
Qualitative Observations
The surveys included a wide variety of vivid stories that presented a diverse set of perspectives on greed.
Many of the stories, given the impetus of the story we provided, included instances of theft, often
committed when the story teller was young. In general, people expressed negative actions toward greed
and positive reactions to the times when they resisted greed. As expected, we witnessed the strong and
dynamic influence of both short-term emotions and long-term moral cognition on greed.
Different story tellers emphasized different factors when they recalled the moment of their decisions, and
many of the stories emphasized a variety of different factors. The stories that we have repeated here
highlight the personal and interpersonal factors that most frequently surfaced, including desirability,
regret, guilt, fear and empathic perspective taking. People reported feeling very good about themselves as
a result of resisting greed. Several respondents related stories in which, following a purchase, they had
received more change than they were due. The temptation to keep the extra change was often quite
strong, e.g., ―I discovered that I had been under billed and I felt the urge to just walk away.‖ At the same
time, they were pleased with themselves when they returned the extra change, e.g., ―she really thanked me
and I felt very, very proud of myself.‖ Such happy memories could be enduring. As another respondent
noted, ―I‘m 37 now and still remember the (thankful) smile.‖
They also reported feeling very bad about succumbing to greed. One respondent was particularly pointed:
―All of the bad memories in my life are the result of acting in ways I knew at the time were not right.‖
The stigma of being greedy can also be long lasting. For one respondent, ―this still haunts me even
though it was 30+ years ago.‖
Awareness of outcome interdependence also appeared in several stories; resisting seemed to make these
incidents more memorable, e.g., ―There must have been a real run on the sweet and sour ribs (my
favorite) and there weren't many left. I could have easily eaten what was left, but only took a few. The
lady behind me tapped me on the shoulder and thanked me for leaving some as they were her favorite
too. (She left one also.)‖
Clear statements of joy from greedy action were not common, but this may reflect the fact that people
told old stories which gave them a chance to reflect. One notable exception, however, was this one: ―One
fine morning I saw my neighbor‘s garden with a new variety of flower plant. I wanted to have it in my
garden so without any ones knowledge I took it from their garden and kept it inside my balcony so that
they cannot see. I was happy.‖ This respondent did not, unfortunately, indicate whether he or she was
still happy about the action.
Several of our respondents displayed considerable skill at self-justification, e.g., ―The bar owners were
perverts and dirtbags. I stole money from the bar and overcharged customers. I felt justified and angry
for even having to be in that particular situation.‖
Respondents also indicated that these kinds of decisions were critical for them in terms of their selfdefinitions: ―How you react to these situations will define your character for the rest of your life.‖ And ―I
got out of that habit … a stupid thing to do. I felt ashamed, and embarrassed.‖
Personal and Interpersonal Factors
Desirability often surfaced as the dominant force behind a greedy act. For instance, one respondent
recalled, ―My future mother-in-law wanted to buy me a pair of gold cufflinks for my wedding. I did not
mean to spend the amount I did and I knew it was way over what she had in mind but I really liked the
one with the diamonds as opposed to just gold ones. However, greed took over and I convinced her to
get the diamond ones.‖
In contrast, regret and guilt were also commonly noted, each acting as a restraint on greedy impulses.
People not only experienced their own feelings of regret (―I felt very miserable about it‖) but expected
that similar mistakes would lead others to feel regret as well: ―We all live with regret.‖ Morality and the
consequences of immoral action also provided a means for restraint, e.g., ―Thankfully I thought better of
it. I don't want to go to hell.‖
Feelings of guilt were similar, seemed to be even more frequent, and often led to the surreptitious return
of a stolen item, e.g., ―I took it, and went to school. I spent the whole day feeling horrible, and the next
day, I took some money from home, went back to the store and just left the money on the counter. I
never had the nerve to tell the owner I had taken the candy.‖ And ―I felt so guilty that I went back to the
aisle I had taken it from, took it out of my bag and put it back on the shelf.‖ And ――My mom asked me
to make a $700 deposit in her savings account for her and I had put a hundred of it in my pocket and
deposited the $600. Yet I felt so bad about it that I ended up making two trips to the bank that day to
deposit the other $100. I felt so much better or actually relieved after.‖ One more: ―I stole one then
threw it away because I felt guilty for stealing it.‖
People who didn‘t feel guilty about acting greedily still managed to restrain themselves when they were
sufficiently fearful of being caught: ―I slipped the bottle in my coat pocket. It wasn‘t over guilt but out of
fear of being caught. I did feel relief after I put it down and left the store.‖ And ―it would be easy to take
records by hiding them in our clothes. As we were loaded with several records in our clothes, I started
feeling paranoid, as though I was being watched, so I put the records back and promptly left the store.‖
Empathic perspective taking also helped people to curb their greedy feelings. After being under-billed,
one storyteller waited in line for 15 minutes to return the money simply because ―I thought how I would
feel at her age‖ and ―how nervous she was on her first day of work‖.
Combinations of several factors were also common. One person first noted their negative post hoc
reactions, ―I was so disturbed by my act, I didn't sleep for a week‖ and followed with a comment on
morality, ―I have a deep faith, and for me to even contemplate doing something like that is very, very
difficult.‖
Quantitative Results
Table 1 summarizes results for the quantitative items, completed after people told their stories. People
indicated consistent negative feelings for their greedy actions. In particular, they reported feeling more
incorrect when they succumbed to their greed than when they resisted greed. They also frequently
mentioned morality as a basis for their decisions to resist greed and immorality as a reason for their
decisions to succumb. Although self-justifications occasionally surfaced in the stories, respondents clearly
condemned their greedy actions as unjustified.
Insert Table 1 about here
Long-term negative emotions were also strongly connected to greedy behavior. Acting on one‘s greed led
to self-reported regret and bad feelings; resisting led to reports of happiness, excitement, satisfaction, and
delight. Their emotional and moral reactions were highly correlated: a single factor accounted for 74.2
percent of the variance of their perceptual ratings (Cronbach‘s  = .95). This suggests that anti-greed
moral standards have an emotional component and that self-conscious emotions helped restrain greedy
impulses.
Two research assistants, blind to the goals of our research, rated the morality of the action in each of the
stories. They independently rated 115 ‗succumb‘ stories and 109 ‗resist‘ stories4 for morality, ethicality,
goodness, justifiability and correctness. Ethicality and correctness were reversely coded. For both coders,
a single factor accounted for most of the variance (> 90) in their ratings; their ratings were consistently
reliable (r‘s >.77). The average of a combination of the ratings of the resist stories was 8.25; the average
for the succumb stories was 2.90, a clearly significant difference (t = 16.24; p < .001).
Two additional research assistants also read either a subset or all of the stories as well as participants‘
open-ended responses and comments on greed. They rated whether five factors that we identified from
the stories - desirability, regret, guilt, fear of reprisals, and empathetic perspective taking - emerged in the
stories and if so, how strongly each factor influenced the story tellers‘ final decisions. Although the two
coders‘ ratings for the subset of the data that they both rated were correlated, their reliability was low,
probably due to the diversity of the stories. Their ratings, however, suggested a similar pattern. Thus, we
continued with an analysis of the complete set of ratings, albeit cautiously.
Table 2 reports the incidence of people mentioning these issues directly or indirectly in their stories.
Desirability was most frequent, followed closely by mentions of guilt. Mentions of regret were relatively
frequent, followed by empathic perspective taking; mentions of fear were least frequent.
Insert Table 2 about here
Analysis of the intensity ratings indicate that empathic perspective taking inhibited greedy action (t= 5.37;
p< .001). Unexpectedly, thinking about regret and guilt beforehand did not appear to be related to
resisting greed. Instead, anticipated regret (t= 10.96; p< .001) and post hoc guilt (t = 13.88; p< .001) were
both significantly related to resisting greed. The intensity of fear also had an impact (t= 2.05; p=.05).
Finally, the ratings yielded a surprising effect for desirability: it was mentioned more in the resist than in
the succumb stories and its intensity did not differ significantly for the two types of stories (t = 1.42, ns).
Discussion
Study 1 clearly indicates that people have generally negative reactions to their own greed, even when their
actions resulted in material gains. Instead of delight, most of our respondents reported that greedy action
led to long-term feelings of guilt and regret.
By analyzing the stories and their responses to an open-ended question5, we identified several factors that
inhibited or reduced greed. First, people‘s views of greed were clearly influenced by the fixed-pie bias:
they realized that their greedy temptation could mean taking advantage of other people – and stronger
empathic perspective-taking did inhibit their greedy actions, at least for the stories they reported.
Second, anticipated or experienced regret and guilt also seemed to help people overcome their
temptations. In part, this was because past greedy action often stimulated bad memories, which in turn
reduced current feelings of greed and inhibited inappropriate greedy behaviors.
Finally, although our respondents indicated that they were more likely to resist their greed when they
were less tempted by the desirability of the potential outcome, our raters observed greater desirability in
the resist rather than the succumb stories. This might reflect an underlying desire for approval:
respondents look better to themselves and to us as researchers if their stories show them valiantly
resisting strong temptation and only succumbing in trivial ways. They might have also tended to report
more positive memories, like those that included empathetic perspective taking. Although participants
indicated that fear of penalty and publicity also reduced their temptation, their stories did not raise this
issue very often.
This first set of findings provides considerable support for the logic of our model (Figure 1). As a first
empirical foray into the dynamics of greed, we felt that anonymity was necessary. We also decided that
sharing a story about a personal instance would make it easier for people to respond at all. In retrospect,
it is clear that our theft story primed many respondents to relate theft stories of their own. This may have
heightened the unethical nature of greed in our results. To avoid this problem, and in an attempt to
replicate Study 1‘s findings, Study 2 did not use an example anecdote but, instead asked a new set of web
respondents, without any preamble, to report stories in which they had resisted or succumbed to greed
Study 2
Our first study, a starting point for our exploration of greed, found that greed is deeply rooted in both
morality and self conscious emotions. People generally hold negative moral attitudes toward greed and
feel bad about their own greedy behaviors. However, greed also involves moral complications
(Robertson, 2001). Feelings of greed are natural, ubiquitous, and universal. Everyone experiences feelings
of greed sometime or another. Yet, greed is notoriously seen as a major sin or vice. On the one hand,
greed is wrong, bad (e.g., Krugman, 2002), immoral and unethical (e.g. Plato, in Balot, 2001). On the
other hand, our natural needs and wants mean that we cannot easily escape greed‘s temptations. As one
of the characters in the movie Trainspotting put it, it‘s not that addicts don‘t know that heroin kills; it‘s just
that shooting up makes you feels so good. Like addictions, greed is intrinsic, dynamic, and can grow
across spans of a person‘s life cycle (Robertson, 2001, p. 32). Thus, disciplining or restraining greed
represents a tremendous challenge, a dissonance of human nature.
Study 2 continues to explore this duality. Our respondents‘ stories in Study 1 repeatedly indicated that
immediate, impulsive desire could crowd out other concerns (Loewenstein, 1996; Moore & Loewenstein,
2004) and blind normal ethical rectitude; at the same time, deliberation typically activated ethical
cognitions and post-greed negativity (Bazerman, et al., 1998).
Although our discussions of duality have focused primarily on cognitions, we also observed affective
duality. In particular, two types of emotions typically surfaced and, like cognitions, they were either
conscious or impulsive. Conscious emotions included feelings about the long-term consequences of
greedy action, such as guilt, regret, and empathy (Eisenberg, 2000; Frijida, et al, 1989); impulsive
emotions included immediate feelings like excitement, passion, and fear. Impulsive emotions tended to be
particularly strong in the short run; conscious emotions tended to surface in long-term, ―what if‖ thinking.
A cognitive-affective duality model suggests that succumbing or resisting to greed may depend on when
and how strongly long-term emotions and conscious cognitions appear. Our reading of the stories in
Study 1 led us to identify five primary factors that seemed to influence greedy decisions:
temptation/desirability, regret, guilt, fear, and empathetic perspective taking. Participants‘ ratings in Study
1, however, did not unanimously support all five factors. Thus, Study 2 addressed these five factors
directly, incorporating specific measures of each factor to further investigate whether, when, and why
people act on or resist greed.
A variety of related research findings also contribute to understanding the duality of greed. First, as a
visceral feeling, greed has a direct impact on the desirability of different goods and actions (Lowenstein,
1996). The converse, of course, is also true: the desirability of an object can easily stimulate greed.
Intuitively, people assume that more desirable stimuli and more of these stimuli will increase their
happiness, i.e., hedonic feelings magnify greed. Thus, we present a more formal series of propositions, all
implied by the details of Figure 1. The first concerns desirability, a logical stimulant to greed:
Proposition 3: As desirability increases, so will the temptation of greed, making moral cognitions
less likely, and increasing the likelihood of greedy actions.
Second, greed activates emotions. Study 1 showed that greed led to negative post hoc feelings, in particular,
regret and guilt. Experiencing these greed-related emotions should inhibit future greedy action. Research
has clearly shown, for instance, that people are motivated to avoid post-action regret (Bell,1982; Loomes
& Sugden, 1982; Simonson, 1992; Zeelenberg, 1999). Janis and Mann (1977) suggested that people can
delay their decisions and consider what acts might subsequently generate regret. Similarly, Savage (1951)
and Luce and Raiffa (1957) proposed the minimax criterion for individual decision making under
uncertainty: people seek to minimize their maximum regret. Our literature review and Study 1‘s results
both suggest that greedy action often leads to unforgettable regret and negative feelings. Our respondents
often reported feeling tortured when they reflected on their prior greedy action.
Guilt, another negative reaction to greedy action, is clearly connected to regret, regret over wrongdoing
(Eisenberg, 2000). Classic psychoanalytic theory defines guilt as a ―superego response to one's own
unacceptable impulses‖ (Eisenberg, 2000, p.). Self-reflection can lead to regret as well as feelings of guilt.
Although Study 1 focused on both guilt and regret, several of our respondents‘ stories indicated that guilt
was particularly influential. This is consistent with theories of morality which describe guilt as ―a
quintessential moral emotion‖ (Eisenberg, 2000).
Although regret and guilt6 may be correlated, they can also exert separate effects. Unlike regret, guilt is a
self-conscious, moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). Previous research suggests
that feelings of guilt are positively related to moral behavior and moral character (Hoffman, 1998; Walker
& Pitts, 1998). When actions create feelings of guilt, people are willing (Roseman, Wiest and Swartz, 1994)
to make reparations (Frijida, et al, 1989; Lewis, 1993) or punish themselves (Ferguson & Stegge 1998;
Hoffman, 1998). Feelings of guilt also lead to increased cooperation in repeated negotiations (Ketelaar &
Au, 2003). In sum, feelings of guilt may be particularly important in the process of resisting greed (Lewis,
1993). In addition, Study 1 and previous research on morality has suggested that guilt might be more
potent in limiting greed than other emotions, including regret.
Proposition 4: Guilt and regret, typically activated by post hoc cognitive reflection, also involve
emotional suffering, which, if activated soon and strongly enough, can curb greedy action.
A third important emotion frequently associated with greed is fear. Research on game theory suggests
that, although greed has more impact than fear as an incentive to defect in prisoners‘ and social dilemma
games (Coombs, 1973; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Dawes et al, 1986), fear also has its own effects.
Unlike guilt and regret, which tend to entail post hoc feelings, fear is often an anticipatory feeling
(Lowenstein, et al, 1999). Because of potential detection and punishment, greedy action can be risky: its
potentially positive outcomes can lead to social ostracism and/or substantive penalties. Thus, fear of
detection increases pessimistic risk estimates and should also reduce greedy behavior.
Proposition 5: Fear of undesirable future outcomes – an emotion-laden calculation of expected
losses – can also help inhibit greed‘s temptation.
Finally, greed has individual, interpersonal, and social meanings. What one person takes another person
may lose. Thus, the choice to act greedily activates a pro-self versus pro-other dilemma. Study 1‘s stories
suggested that as empathic perspective taking increased; so too did the frequency of pro-other choices.
Research has often cited empathy as a source of moral motivation (Eisenberg, 1986; Hoffman, 1987).
Empathy refers to the affective responses stemming from the comprehension of another‘s current or
potential emotion or experience (Eisenberg et al, 1994; Goldman, 1993). Empathic perspective taking in
Study 1 entailed caring about other‘s potential or actual outcomes, especially their suffering. Previous
research suggests that empathy elicits altruistic motivations (Underwood & Moore, 1982; Batson, Early &
Salvarani, 1997) that are particularly strong when others might encounter a loss (Lee and Murnighan,
2001). Empathy can also instigate imaginative understanding of others‘ emotions, resulting in similar self
emotion (Eisenberg, & Strayer, 1987; Brothers, 1990; Goldman, 1993), even personal distress (Hoffman,
2000; Batson, Early & Salvarani, 1997). Thus, we expect that empathic perspective taking will affect both
sides of greed‘s duality, dampening its temptation and inhibiting greedy action.
Proposition 6: Empathetic perspective taking (which requires conscious cognitive awareness) will
help reduce greedy behavior.
Study 2 investigated all of these decision factors: desirability, regret, guilt, fear and empathetic perspective
taking. We expected that the choice to act on feelings of greed would depend on a mix of social and
personal influences, a duality that can simultaneously be both appealing and appalling.
Method
Participants and Overview
We randomly invited 1,600 participants from StudyResponse to answer our web-based survey
(reproduced in Appendix 2). None had participated in Study 1. Although 88 participants submitted
answers, only 66 did so completely. This reduced set was included in the analyses. Participants were 63
percent female, 80 percent white, and averaged 40 years of age; 77 percent had university or higher levels
of education.
Procedure and Materials
The procedures of Study 2 were similar to Study 1, with additional survey items. After a brief
introduction, we asked participants to tell us two different personal stories in which they were adults and
had been tempted by greed and they either acted greedily or resisted and did not act greedily. The order
of the stories was counterbalanced.
After each story, participants responded to Study 1‘s set of 8 semantic differential questions. We also
added several questions to assess the five factors identified in Study 1. We asked participants to rate
desirability and their feelings of regret, guilt, fear, and empathic perspective taking when they were
making their choices, on 10-point Likert scales. They also reported whether their fear was due to a fear of
being penalized, having their actions revealed publicly, or some other reason. The order of these
questions was counterbalanced in the survey.
Participants also rated the morality of their behavior in their stories, on three scales (moral vs. immoral,
correct vs. wrong, good vs. bad).
Like Study 1, open-ended questions asked participants to identify factors that made it easy or difficult to
resist greed. Two final, additional items assessed their nationality and religiosity.
Results
Qualitative observations
Like Study 1, our respondents in Study 2 frequently reported positive feelings when they told stories
about resisting greed. For instance, one respondent wrote, ―I didn't compromise my morals. It felt really
good‖. Happy feelings and positive memories seemed to be long-lasting: ―I still receive greeting cards
from her at all holidays thanking for my help and the enduring friendship that has developed between her
family and mine.‖ Another respondent noted, ―those memories would have been horribly tainted forever
had I betrayed (my friend).‖ In contrast, succumbing to greed was not connected to happy feelings: ―The
temptation is too bad.‖ ―I felt like a horrible grandson.‖ ―I felt extremely guilty and low. I haven't done it
since.‖
Study 2‘s direct measures of five personal and social factors were also revealing. Each factor was evident
in people‘s stories. Desirability was particularly common. For instance, one respondent noted desirability
and only minimal regret: ―The desire to be like my friends was too strong. I did feel bad but not much.
Once I got home and took out the accessories and started wearing them I did not feel bad anymore.
Every time I wear one I think about when I stole them. Sometimes I think about doing it again. To keep
from being tempted I do not shop at that store anymore. The temptation is too bad.‖ Another reported a
different source of temptation: ―My greed usually pops up ONLY when exceptionally great food exists at
a party.‖ Another also revealed minimal regret: ―This is a little greedy, but it felt so good!"
Guilt and regret also surfaced in many stories. Regret surfaced in both resist (e.g., ―I wanted to act
greedily and take a LOT of books, I resisted the impulse. I THOUGHT I MIGHT REGRET IT LATER
") and succumb stories (e.g., ―I remember sneaking up to the banquet table, and getting into a (mild)
argument over who was going to get the last steak. I won, out of sheer persistence. Felt kind of
disappointed in myself afterwards. But was awfully good‖). Guilt was also common, but guilt-ridden
succumb-to-greed stories seemed to be less frequently combined with desirability than the guilt-ridden
resist stories. For instance, one respondent wrote, ―I found a money order for 300 bucks. I wanted it
BAD, but my conscience ate at me. I didn‘t spend it. I didn‘t want to have the guilt over my head. Greed
is a sin, and the temptation for something better without earning it seems so easy.‖ Another said, ―I first
thought wow, I could really make a lot of money. However, I started to feel guilty. I felt better knowing
that I didn't compromise my morals, and made them very happy. It felt really good.‖ A third said, ―They
made a mistake loading my truck carrying TVs, I started to take the 5 extra TVs but then I started feeling
guilty and did not steal.‖
Fear was also frequently mentioned. For example, one respondent reported. ―I was tempted last year
while filing our income tax returns. The fear of discovery and prosecution was strong enough to check
my behavior… I obeyed the law, although we did end up having to pay more taxes instead of getting a
refund.‖ Another respondent stated, ―Greed makes you feel like you are always being watched. I felt the
whole time that he knew that I was hiding something and I hate that feeling.‖
Empathic perspective taking was also particularly evocative in the stories. For instance, one loquacious
respondent wrote, ―Had I been greedy, I would have applied for the position and most likely, been given
the position ahead of my mate. I thought about him, and his wife, his quiet manner and about the risk he
had taken leaving a long term job in a large city. And yet, I needed a job. I thought about how I would
feel for the rest of my life knowing (even if I didn't get the job) I screwed him over. Our relationship
would have lost its innocence, its joy. I thought about the look that would come into his eye.‖ As a result,
he left the town without a job although he was more qualified for the job his friend found.
Justifications, however, occasionally trumped perspective taking. One respondent wrote, ―I justified it in
my own mind that if I didn't take what I wanted and only a few more people showed up to get anything,
things might go to waste.‖ Another noted that ―one time I found some money on the street and kept it
instead of trying to figure out who lost it. I told myself that I would never be able to find the person who
lost it.‖
Quantitative Results
As shown in Table 1, the quantitative data replicated the results of Study 1. Our respondents viewed
greed as immoral, incorrect, and bad. These three dimensions were highly correlated and one factor
clearly accounted for 88 percent of the variance of the three dimensions ( =.90). In rating their own
stories, the respondents rated their greedy behaviors as more immoral and incorrect than their resisting
behaviors.
Like Study 1, although respondents occasionally reported different self-justifications as motives for their
greed, they unambiguously considered their greedy actions unjustified. Our research assistants‘ ratings of
the morality of the stories concurred, consistently indicating that resisting was seen by respondents as
more moral than succumbing. Although the reliability was low for aggregated scales (<.50); the
individual results of each research assistant were consistent and strong. Thus, Study 2 clearly replicated
Study 1 findings about people‘s moral judgments of greed.
Also like Study 1, greed generated strong negative emotions. People felt more regret after they
succumbed than when they resisted. They also reported more happiness, excitement, satisfaction, and
delight when they resisted. Also like Study 1, one factor accounted for 70 percent of the variance of these
responses (= .95), again suggesting that moral judgments against greed had an emotional component.
Thus, Study 2 continued to indicate that greed evokes both morality and emotion, that these reactions are
highly correlated, and that emotions have an important part in decision making when individuals are
tempted by greed.
Participants‘ own ratings again supported the importance of a subset of the five personal and
interpersonal factors. This time, respondents reported that their outcomes were more desirable in their
succumb stories than in their resist stories. They reported resisting more when they thought about feeling
guilty. Anticipated regret, however, did not have significant effects; neither did fear. Although our
respondents reported feeling fearful about being caught this did not extend to their ratings.
Empathic perspective taking, by contrast, had robust effects. Consistent with our qualitative observations,
respondents‘ ratings were significantly stronger when they resisted greed than when they succumbed.
Logit regression analysis using the conditions of resisting or succumbing as the dependent variable also
provided consistent support. Desirability was positively related to greedy actions (b=.16; p=.05) and
empathic perspective taking was negatively related to greedy actions (b=-.28; p<.0001). Guilt was
negatively related to greedy behaviors, but its effect was marginal (b=-.14; p=.09). Anticipated regret was
again not significant (b = -.33, n.a.). Fear‘s marginally significant effect suggested, surprisingly, a positive
effect on greedy actions (b=.14, p=.09).
Our results also suggest that individuals might considerably underestimate the negative emotions that
they will experience after they have succumbed to greed. In the succumb stories, anticipated guilt led, on
reflection, to more negative feelings (r=.52, p<.01), a relationship that we did not observe in the resist
stories (r=.13, n. a.). Given the role of desirability in augmenting greed (t=2.25, p<.05), this suggests that
individuals are likely to be tempted by short-term acquisitive happiness, possibly to the point of rejecting
or being unaware of self-conscious emotions when they succumb to greed. With reflection, however,
negative and conscious emotions surface and can be particularly strong in the long run (t=5.58, p<.001).
This is particularly true for people who actually considered these post hoc negative feelings upfront but still
failed to curb their greed.
The same two research assistants independently rated the five factors. Table 2 shows the overall
incidence of people mentioning these issues, as well as the frequency that they mentioned them in their
succumb versus their resist stories. As before, desirability was the most prevalent factor in the stories,
followed closely by mentions of guilt. Mentions of regret were relatively frequent, followed by empathic
perspective taking; mentions of fear were least frequent.
The data in Study 2 were generally but not completely consistent with the data in Study 1. Desirability, for
instance, was now prevalent in both resist and succumb stories, with no difference in intensity. Fear was
again infrequently mentioned and, for these studies, was also not significant. The other three factors,
however, all seemed to wield a powerful force on greedy decisions: feelings of guilt, regret, and
empathetic perspective taking were significantly stronger in the resist compared to the succumb stories.
Discussion
Respondents in Study 2 viewed greed just as the respondents in Study 1 did: they were indiscriminately
critical of their own greedy actions. As a result, they were also likely to experience post hoc emotional
suffering. In their minds, desirability, guilt and empathic perspective taking had strong effects on their
decision making; they viewed regret and fear as less influential. In particular, they reported that the
deterrent effect of fear was not significant: desirability was more influential than the fear of potential
losses.
The results continue to support the notion of greed‘s inherent duality. On the one hand, greed is
tempting, especially when the outcomes are truly appealing. On the other hand, self-reflection following
greedy action creates guilt and empathic distress. Whether to succumb or resist creates a battle between
two inner voices (cf., Kerr et al, 1997; Bazerman et al, 1998).
Study 2 did not control people‘s stories. Thus, different types of stories, for instance, might contribute to
variations in our findings. In addition, self-reports always pose problems of biased recall (Schwartz,
Groves & Schuman, 1998; Weingart, 1997). At the same time, the independent coding of their stories
was, for the most part, consistent with participants‘ own perceptions, especially their general moral
judgments of greed and the related interpersonal factors. Yet, the effects of some personal factors, albeit
strong, seem to be less detectable to observers. This may explain why people sometimes irrationally bear
so much risk to pursue their injudicious greed.
General Discussion
This paper presents an initial investigation of greed, a topic that has received surprisingly little attention in
the empirical literature. The results from two studies suggest that greed activates both personal and social
dynamics. Study 1 showed that a person‘s own greedy actions, though generally beneficial economically,
often led to decidedly negative post hoc reactions in the form of moral and emotional self distress. Study 2
replicated these findings without priming. Study 2 also measured five potentially influential personal and
interpersonal factors. Of the five, desirability, guilt and empathic perspective-taking appeared to have
particularly strong effects on individuals‘ descriptions of their decisions to resist or act on greed.
These findings document a dynamic process, dually cognitive and emotional, that explains how people
think about greed (see Figure 1). As suggested by ancient philosophers and intellectuals (e.g. Plato,
Aristotle, Thucydides), greed is a natural, innate passion. Desirable objects stimulate greed and its
requisite temptation. Our findings suggest that the more appealing the stimuli, the higher the expected
satisfaction and acquisitive happiness, and the more likely immediate greedy actions will result. The actual
strength of the force of desirability is difficult to accurately determine, as our reports of their effects are
divorced from the actual experience. Hedonic enjoyment, however, seems to be short lived. Consistent
with research on the illusion of satisfaction (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Buehler, & McFarland, 2001),
impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), and miswanting (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000), our data indicate that
people often overpredict both the duration and intensity of their happiness, and underestimate the impact
of their self conscious emotions. Contrary to their immediate expectations, the aftermath of greed
typically evokes personal distress and emotional torture. Anticipating these outcomes can help to inhibit
or reduce greed. In particular, our findings suggest that guilt and empathic perspective taking are
particularly important in countering greed, both a priori and post hoc.
Guilt and empathy represent the personal and social dynamics of greed. Guilt reflects conscious feelings
that stem from an inner examination of wrongdoing or unacceptable behavior (Eisenberg, 2000); it is a
central part of self-impression management processes. Because people want to see themselves positively
(Baumeister, 1998; Schlenker, 1980), they tend to engage in remedial actions to suppress their greedy
impulses to avoid both guilt and a depraved self-image.
Empathy represents the effects of an outward, social focus. Feelings of empathy make the observation of
others‘ suffering uncomfortable, or worse (Hoffman, 2000). Our findings suggest that this is particularly
undesirable when the other person is a victim of one‘s own greed. The social nature of human interaction
puts an interpersonal and a social meaning on greed: although people are naturally inclined to attend to
their own self interest, our social nature (e.g., Aronson, 1984) makes it difficult for us to ignore others‘
losses. The duality of these personal and social cognitions necessarily involves a process of interpretation,
which can be notoriously egocentric (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Our respondents‘ stories suggest that
whether people act greedily might simply depend on whether they feel sufficiently empathic toward the
potential victims of their acts to overcome their ability to justify their greedy action. These dual and
dynamic cognitions capture many of the complexities of a priori greed feelings.
This research extends dual process models to the important issue of greed. Unlike many dual process
models, however, we observe a duality in greed that is both cognitive and emotional. In particular, two
types of emotions, impulsive and conscious, seem to be inherent in the process of greed-related decisions.
Impulsive emotions like passion, excitement and fear are self-regarding; conscious emotions like guilt and
empathy are superego feelings (Eisenberg, 2000) that usually stem from self-reflection (Eisenberg, 2000;
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991; Hoffman, 1998). We posit that the choice to resist depends on the resolution
of these impulsive and conscious emotions. Impulsive emotions are typically activated by physical and
material stimuli, having a particularly strong short- but not long-term influence. By contrast, conscious
emotions hinge on relatively deep and abstract thinking focusing on self-image and long-term
consequences, and have stronger long-term effects. More specifically, our findings suggest that resisting
greed depends on the timing and strength of conscious emotions. Guilt and empathic perspective taking
can be effective in curtailing greed, but only if they are not blinded by impulsivity - excitement and selfgratification - which may be innate, immediate, subtly strong, and therefore difficult to resist.
Initial empirical research like the current project always has limitations, especially given our current
hindsight. Study 1, for instance, primed participants with an immoral greedy story on theft. It may have
prompted more negative responses toward greed. Study 2 gave participants free rein in their stories; it,
however, might have suffered from inadequate control of their definitions of greed. Although the
contrast of these two approaches may have helped to alleviate each‘s concerns, both studies depended on
retrospective sense-making. Thus, we emphasize that this paper should represent only a start in the
investigation of greed. There is no shortage of famous cases of corporate greed, such as Enron and Tyco,
but not all white collar greed involves amazing frauds or extravagant spending sprees. The results of our
research suggest that greedy misconduct may often resemble the example of Thomas Coughlin, who
billed numerous, personal purchases, both trivial and outrageous, to WalMart during his tenure as the
company‘s second most powerful executive (Bandler & Zimmerman, 2005). In a year in which he
received $6 million in total compensation, he billed the company for a wide range of expenses, from a
hunting vacation, a $2,590 dog enclosure at his home, and a $1,359 pair of handmade alligator boots to a
Céline Dion compact disc, a bottle of Stolichnaya vodka, and a $3.54 Polish sausage (Bandler, 2006).
This example is consistent with our findings that fear may not be a particularly potent inhibitor of greed,
and with Aristotle‘s argument that individuals ignore the nature of their real needs when greed drives
irrational desires (Balot, 2001). The deterrence of fear may be undermined by the illusion of happiness
because of the focalism bias, i.e., individuals focus unduly on desirable stimuli and their overestimated
future happiness (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Buehler, & McFarland, 2001). Thus, the short run can
dominate and encourage greedy action and the achievement of immediate gratification.
This means that greed‘s negative impact on society can be both widespread and devastating. Small but
greedy misdemeanors may be pervasive in corporate America. Since 1983, for instance, a Gallup poll
reports that 78 percent of the business executives surveyed had used company phones for personal longdistance calls and 74 percent had taken office supplies home for their children (Ricklefs, 1983). The
Association of Certified Fraud examiners recently estimated that internal fraud cost American firms some
$400 billon per year (Wells, 1999). In another example, according to a Modern Health review of published
stories between 1985 and 1996, 100 executives stole about $38 million from more than 40 hospitals
(Greene, 1996).
Not surprisingly, there can be more than personal recriminations for greedy action. Dennis Kozlowski,
Kenneth Lay, and Jeffrey Skilling all ruined their careers. And they are not alone. James Traficant was
expelled from the U.S. House of Representatives because of bribery, tax evasion and racketeering
(Squitieri, USA Today, 2002) and John G. Rowland, the governor of Connecticut, resigned because he
accepted tens of thousands of dollars of gifts from state contractors and top aides (Powell, 2004). These
are just a few of many possible examples of dethroned public figures.
In the long term, however, greedy behaviors are likely to induce strong guilt and regret. Although ancient
philosophers, such as Solon and Herodotus (in Balot, 2001, p. 236), emphasized the role of regret, our
findings suggest that guilt is more potent than regret. Long term guilt can outweigh short term
satisfaction, undermining previously happy feelings and causing emotional suffering. Self-impression
management concerns are also likely to expose greedy actions that can damage the self-image
(Baumeister, 1998; Murnighan et al., 2001) and both of our studies indicate that individuals widely believe
that greedy action is wrong. Although greed can be economically beneficial, it is still often seen as
reprehensible, especially after reflection.
Our findings suggest that, for many people long-term guilt is almost inevitable, even without externally
applied punishment. Previous ethical decision models (Jones, 1991; Murnighan, Cantelon & Elyashiv,
2001; Chugh & Bazerman, 2006) propose that individuals are not always aware of the consequences of
their unethical decisions. Our results imply that this may be due to the physical distance between
immediate gains and later emotional losses. The desirability of immediate stimuli is likely to prompt
overestimation of acquisitive happiness; the focalism bias (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Buehler, &
McFarland, 2001) tends to direct attention away from the fear of future, potential damage. Retrospection,
however, leads to guilt and other feelings of self-distress. Self-conscious awareness can then exacerbate
inner anguish. Thus, strong self-management concerns, rather than fear, may be more effective in
curtailing greed.
The current findings also provide insight into the social dynamics of greed. The duality of a greedy choice
represents a classic example of a person-situation interaction, one in which contextual interpretations can
help to rationalize intensions and actions. In our surveys, individuals who saw themselves as responding
to rather than initiating a sequence of events could justify their greedy choices, much like the perception
of inequity can lead to unethical conduct (e.g., Greenberg, 1990; 1993). A notorious scandal provides an
excellent example. In the Black Sox scandal of 1919, eight Chicago White Sox players were accused of
fixing the World Series. Although they were ultimately acquitted of criminal charges, they were all banned
from professional baseball for life. The facts indicate that gamblers offered them payoffs that were
multiples of their salaries. Obviously tempting, the players apparently justified their behavior because of
their resentment of an unfair, abstemious boss (chicagohs.org). Thus, reducing the probability of postgreed justification also seems like an appropriate method for reducing at least some greedy action.
This also suggests that a potentially important domain for future research concerns how individuals
justify or rationalize their greed when they make greedy decisions. Our research suggests that
justifications, though not frequently mentioned, can be particularly helpful when individuals contemplate
greedy action. A priori and post hoc justifications might also have differential impact: individuals in our
studies seemed more likely to justify their greed a priori than post hoc. However, the recall method we used
in our studies might have biased our observations. Furthermore, because of the diversity of respondents‘
stories, we could not adequately analyze the dynamics of their justifications.
Another potential direction for future research would be to investigate whether justifications of greed are
more valid in individual or in social contexts. Though economically desirable, people often have strong,
negative reactions to greedy actions in social and interpersonal contexts. Pure individual contemplation,
however, may reduce greed‘s repugnance.
In sum, our research suggests that greed involves both self- and social cognitions. Thus, the duality of
greed is cognitive, emotional, and social. Our findings suggest that the factors that are most influential in
greedy decisions, which reflect these three dualities, are desirability, guilt, and empathic perspective
taking.
Conclusions
―Greed is good. Greed is right. Greed works.‖ So said Gordon Gecko, the lead character in the movie,
Wall Street. Although this quote may be his most memorable, he continued by saying, ―Greed clarifies,
cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms -- greed for
life, for money, for love, for knowledge -- has marked the upward surge of mankind.‖ As satirical as this
movie may have been, highly publicized organizational scandals suggest that, in some instances, it may
have been on target. It also provides a perfect example of greed‘s duality.
Greed is a classic concept in human development (Balot, 2001; Robertson, 2001). Greed is basic to
human nature and inevitably affects many of our choices and decisions (e.g. Plato, Aristotle &
Thucydides). Although greed is not viewed positively, it may have been an essential element in our
ancient, evolutionary ancestor‘s survival. Not knowing the location or arrival time of your next meal
might make greed an appropriate response when bounty presents itself. In other words, evolution may
have selected greedy people. Alchian (1950) argued that profit maximization results from evolutionary
selection. Friedman (1953) suggested that survival needs justify maximization motives. Although
evolutionary arguments still stimulate considerable debate (Hodgson, 1993, for reviews), greed may be an
inevitable derivative of selective success. Survival in early eras might have required constant attempts to
acquire. Turning off what may be a natural urge in the current context of resource abundance may be
particularly difficult.
Greed is ―a force deeply rooted in our constitution as human animals‖ (Robertson, 2001; p.3). Our
research represents an initial investigation of this old and important concept. Our respondents viewed
their own greedy action in decidedly negative terms even though few (if any) of them engaged in the
kinds of self-indulgence displayed by the truly rich. It may be that resource accumulation stimulates rather
than sates, creating a vicious cycle of extravagant spending and insatiable desire. Greed‘s paradoxical
nature, however, suggests that these reprehensibly vicious cycles can both drive economic growth (Hume,
1739/2001; Smith) and augment immorality and injustice in society (e.g. Plato). Our research suggests
that solutions may be dually focused, concentrating on the importance of guilt-free self-impressions,
empathic perspective taking, and social consciousness, along with their associated emotions. Although
greed can be economically beneficial, its negative image typically makes the impulsive act of succumbing
to greed truly culpable. The lack of hedonic enjoyment following greedy economic gains also suggests
that social consensus, by our respondents and by other viewers of the human condition, is far from
favorably inclined toward greedy action. Thus, its diminution might have particularly positive
consequences, both societally and personally. As Shakespeare (1623) notes, ―The evil that men do lives
after them; the good is oft interred with their bones.‖
Footnotes
1
Popular economic thought has also been influenced by the approach espoused by Ayn Rand. Although
some readers view her philosophy as one that supports greed, we view her directives as a push toward
pure, unadulterated self-interest - a distinction that can easily blur as excessive wealth is accumulated. We
have tried to restrict our focus as much as we can to greed; this means that we have not incorporated her
work more extensively.
2
Social psychologists (e.g. Steinel & De Dreu, 2004) also define greed as the desire to get high personal
outcomes; this approach is consistent with the current analysis of prisoners‘ and social dilemmas.
3
Other notions of dual models may interpret it as automatic vs. controlled processes (e.g. Fazio,1986;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Greenwald, et al, 2002)
4
We removed incomplete stories. Thus, the coding used a smaller of number of stories.
5
Due to an unknown technical problem, we only obtained data for one open-ended question, on what
made it easy to resist greed.
6
Shame is another common emotion that is often connected with greed. For example, previous research
shows that shame and guilt can be distinct emotions in moral transgressions (Tangney, et al, 1996).
Because shame only rarely surfaced in our respondents‘ stories., however, we focused our analyses on
guilt and regret and hope to probe the potential influence of shame in future research.
The Duality of Greed 49
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The Duality of Greed 58
Table 1: Means and comparisons of participants‘ ratings of their two stories.
Study 1 (n=141)
Greed
Resist
Regret*
7.79
3.85
Correct
8.19
Justified
Study 2 (n=66)
Greed
Resist
t=
-17.95***
7.92
4.37
-6.63***
2.20
-17.95***
6.92
2.98
9.34***
6.90
2.76
11.55***
6.07
3.20
7.53***
Delighted
6.65
3.09
12.35***
6.31
4.00
5.93**
Excited
6.30
3.92
7.37***
6.33
5.05
3.33**
Good
7.28
2.30
16.05***
6.82
3.36
10.16***
Happy
6.73
2.93
3.34**
6.43
4.08
4.99***
Satisfied
6.34
2.58
10.60***
6.43
4.09
4.26***
Morality#
6.90
2.45
11.55***
Tempting#
7.80
7.02
2.25*
Fear#
4.62
4.15
1.29
Perspective taking#
5.43
7.63
5.55***
Anticipated Guilt#
5.81
7.31
3.69***
Anticipated Regret#
5.66
5.69
#Study 2 only
* reversely coded.
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
t=
.09
The Duality of Greed 59
Table 2: Percentage of stories that included one or more of the five factors related to greedy action
Greed Stories
Resist Stories
Χ2
Desirability
68.7%
84.4%
7.64*
Fear
40.9%
17.4%
14.79*
Regret
60.0%
54.1%
0.78
Guilt
86.1%
80.7%
1.16
Empathic perspective taking
25.2%
51.4%
14.19*
Desirability
71.7%
64.1%
0.82
Fear
20.0%
9.5%
2.70
Regret
48.3%
50.0%
0.03
Guilt
63.3%
45.3%
4.05*
Empathic perspective taking
50.0%
54.7%
0.27
Desirability
69.7%
76.9%
2.28
Fear
33.7%
14.5%
17.39*
Study 1 & 2
Regret
56.0%
52.6%
0.40
combined
Guilt
78.3%
67.6%
5.01*
Empathic perspective taking
33.7%
51.4%
11.19*
Study 1
Study 2
* p < .05
The Duality of Greed 60
Figure 1 The Dynamics of Greedy Action
Antecedents
Anticipations
Desirability
-Guilt
-Regret
-Fear
-Empathic
Perspective Taking
Actions
Reactions
Reflections
Engage in
Greedy Action
Positive
Satisfaction
Happiness
-----------Guilt
Regret
Fear
Empathic
Perspective Taking
or
Not
Negative
The Duality of Greed 61
Appendix 1:
A Web Survey on Greed (Study 1)
Thank you for checking out our site.
We are a two-person team, conducting a social science survey about individuals‘ basic human feelings.
Here‘s a bit of background:
Did you ever steal anything? Anything at all? For instance, one of us stole a pack of baseball cards from a
grocery story at the age of 5. Here‘s the story:
I was at the grocery store with my mother. I was looking at baseball cards while she was checking out. I
couldn‘t resist, so I put a pack of the cards in my pocket, as unobtrusively as possible. No one noticed –
until I got home, when my mother discovered what I had done. She marched me back to the store by my
earlobe and made me apologize in public and pay for the cards. (I had already opened the pack.)
We are guessing that almost everyone has stolen something sometime. But our research interests are a bit
more basic than this. Specifically, we are interested in greed.
We assume that everyone experiences feelings of greed sometime or another. We think of greed as a
universal phenomenon. To help us to learn more about greed, we ask you to reply to tell us some stories
from your own life. Please be as open and honest as you can – this will really help us understand this
important phenomenon. This survey is absolutely anonymous.
1. Please tell us a story about a situation - one of your own personal experiences - that led you to feel
greed, and in which you succumbed and acted greedily. Please give as much detail about the situation and
your feelings as you can.
After acting greedily in your story, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
After not acting greedily in your story, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Regret
No Regret at all
Correct
Wrong
Justified
Unjustified
Delighted
Mortified
Excited
Depressed
Good
Bad
Happy
Sad
Satisfied
Unsatisfied
2. Now, we need you to tell us a story about a situation that led you to feel greed, and in which you
resisted and did not act greedily. Again, please provide as much detail about the situation and your
feelings as you can.
After not acting greedily, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
After not acting greedily in your story, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
The Duality of Greed 62
Regret
Correct
Justified
Delighted
Excited
Good
Happy
Satisfied
No Regret at all
Wrong
Unjustified
Mortified
Depressed
Bad
Sad
Unsatisfied
3. In your opinion, what are the factors that make it difficult to resist greed?
4. What are the factors that make it easier to resist greed?
5. In your own words, how do you define greed?
6. Is there anything else you want to add about your own personal experiences, or anything you think
would be helpful for our study of greed?
FYI: dictionaries prove these definitions of greed: 1) excessive or insatiable desire for wealth or gain
(Webster); 2) a very strong wish to continually get more of something (Cambridge).
Finally, we‘d appreciate it if you could tell us something about yourself.
Age:
Gender: Male Female
Education level: College Graduate School Other (please indicate)
Occupation:
Race: White Black Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islands Others
Annual income: <$10,000 $10,000-20,000 $20,000-30,000 $30,000-$40,000 $40,000-$50,000
$50,000-$60,000 $60,000-$70,000 $70,000-$80,000 $80,000-90,000 $90,000$100,000 >$100,000
Thank you very much for taking this survey. If you would like feedback on what we find, please list your
email address here:
Once we‘ve tabulated our findings, we‘ll let you know what we found.
Appendix 2 (Study 2)
Thank you for checking out our site.
The Duality of Greed 63
We are a two-person team, conducting a social science survey about individuals‘ basic human feelings.
Specifically, we are interested in greed.
To help us to learn more about greed, we ask you to tell us two stories from your own life. Please be as
open and honest as you can – this will really help us understand this important phenomenon. This survey
is completely anonymous.
1. Please tell us a story about a situation - one of your own adult personal experiences - that led you to
feel greed, and in which you succumbed and acted greedily. Please give as much detail about the situation
and your feelings as you can.
After acting greedily in your story, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Regret
No Regret at all
Correct
Wrong
Justified
Unjustified
Delighted
Mortified
Excited
Depressed
Good
Bad
Happy
Sad
Satisfied
Unsatisfied
How would you rate your behavior in this story?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
very moral
10
very immoral
In this story, how tempting was the outcome to you?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
very much
When you were experiencing this situation, did you think about the possibility that you would regret your
actions?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
very much
In this story, were you afraid of:
1) being personally penalized; 2) having your actions revealed publicly; 3) both; 4) something else
If you were afraid of something else, please specify ( )
In this story, how much fear did you feel?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
No fear at all
9
10
very fearful
The Duality of Greed 64
When you were actually in this situation, how much did you care about others‘ potential or actual
outcomes?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
No fear at all
very fearful
As you contemplated your possible actions in this situation, how much did you think about whether you
would feel guilty if you acted with greed?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Did not think at all
Thought about it very much
2. Now, we ask you to tell us a story about a situation that led you to feel greed – another one of your
own adult personal experiences – in which you resisted and did NOT act greedily. Again, please provide
as much detail about the situation and your feelings as you can.
After acting greedily in your story, how did you feel? (Please circle one number for each item below.)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Regret
No Regret at all
Correct
Wrong
Justified
Unjustified
Delighted
Mortified
Excited
Depressed
Good
Bad
Happy
Sad
Satisfied
Unsatisfied
How would you rate your behavior in this story?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
very moral
10
very immoral
In this story, how tempting was the outcome to you?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
very much
When you were experiencing this situation, did you think about the possibility that you would regret your
actions?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
very much
In this story, were you afraid of:
1) being personally penalized; 2) having your actions revealed publicly; 3) both; 4) something else
If you were afraid of something else, please specify ( )
In this story, how much fear did you feel?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
No fear at all
9
10
very fearful
The Duality of Greed 65
When you were actually in this situation, how much did you care about others‘ potential or actual
outcomes?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
very much
As you contemplated your possible actions in this situation, how much did you think about whether you
would feel guilty if you acted with greed?
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Did not think at all
Thought about it very much
3. Overall, greed is
1 2
3
4
Good
Moral
Correct
5
6
7
8
9
10
Bad
Immoral
Wrong
4. In your opinion, what are the factors that make it difficult to resist greed?
5. What are the factors that make it easier to resist greed?
6. In your own words, how do you define greed?
7. Is there anything else you want to add about your own personal experiences, or anything you think
would be helpful for our study of greed?
FYI: dictionaries prove these definitions of greed: 1) excessive or insatiable desire for wealth or gain
(Webster); 2) a very strong wish to continually get more of something (Cambridge).
Finally, we‘d appreciate it if you could tell us something about yourself.
Age:
Gender: Male Female
Highest Education obtained: High School College Graduate School
Are you religious?
1 2
3
4
Very much
5
6
7
8
9
10
Not at all
Your nationality:
Occupation:
Race: White Black Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islands Others
The Duality of Greed 66
Annual income: <$10,000 $10,000-20,000 $20,000-30,000 $30,000-$40,000 $40,000-$50,000
$50,000-$60,000 $60,000-$70,000 $70,000-$80,000 $80,000-90,000 $90,000$100,000 >$100,000
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