Pragmata: Journal of Human Sciences
http://journal.tumkuruniversity.ac.in/
Vol. 2. Issue 2, June 2014, pp. 77-84
ISSN 2349-5065
Re-Examining ‘Communalism’
Sufiya Pathan
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Religious Studies, University of Pardubice, The Czech Republic.
[email protected]
Abstract
A short historical anecdote provokes some curiosity in relation to the question of what it
means to be ‘communal’. Ibn Battuta, a 14th century Muslim traveller described how
Muslims and ‘infidels’ did not share water or food or indeed much proximity, the infidels
taking care to stand aside when Muslims were passing and not sharing the same vessels
to eat or drink. Yet, his assessment of this situation was that the Muslims were treated
with “honour” in the Malabar where contemporary views would see, at the very least,
“discrimination” or “prejudice”. How does one understand this difference in assessment?
This anecdote poses a puzzle to our understanding of ‘communalism’. We seem to have
treated the idea as so self-evidently an apt description of our society or polity that we
have never really examined the foundations of this idea. In order to understand how Ibn
Battuta’s assessment can differ so widely from our own, we must reconstruct the bases of
this assessment or the framework of assessment from which the charge of
‘communalism’ emerges. This essay seeks to uncover that framework of assessment at
least partially. A much longer historical reconstruction is required, but the essay does
provide, through a reconstruction of the beginnings of the charge of ‘communalism’,
enough reason to reassess our hitherto uncritical acceptance of this concept.
Peculiarities of scholarship on ‘communalism’
An examination of available scholarship on communalism shows recurring peculiarities that consistently
emerge in this scholarship:
a)
‘Communalism’ seems to suffer from contradictory characteristics: It is a modern phenomenon which
is the result of colonialism1 or one which can be dated back to age-old conflicts between the Hindus
and Muslims since the medieval era2. It is a product of modernity3 versus a remnant of ‘primitivism’ in
modern India4. It has been considered the nemesis of secularism5 or the means to achieve secularism6;
a lack of secularism7 as well as an excess of it (Nandy 1985). ‘Communalism’ is the result of the
failure of education8 or the regrettable success of Western education (Sen 1993). It is majoritarianism,
but politics of a similar characteristic have been expressed by minorities as well.
b) Definitions of communalism seem to locate the problem in deeper and deeper realms almost to the
point where it becomes inaccessible to definition itself. For instance, it goes from being described as a
‘prejudice’ against particular groups to a well-developed ‘ideology’ to a ‘consciousness’ linked
intimately to the very identity of groups of people. By locating the problem in deeper and deeper
realms it is not simply definition but also the possibility of a solution that is challenged. Thus
‘communalism’ is persistent because we have not found a solution; but no solution can be adequate
because the problem seems to become deeper and deeper.
c)
Phenomena with similar characteristics are assessed extremely differently. For example, caste politics
shares practically all the characteristics that one may draw for communal politics but one is assessed as
progressive and the other as regressive. Similarly, historical accounts found in hindutva literature share
common characteristics with certain kinds of accounts that Gyanendra Pandey (1992) drew attention to
as local or community histories. Yet, the latter he assesses as positive and the former as extremely
negative.
d) When definitions are probed deeply, most often, explanations of ‘communalism’ end up invoking
evaluative frames rather than providing consistent definitions. ‘Communalism’, in every single
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contradictory account or definition still retains its negative evaluative force. Thus, even in the absence
of definitional clarity, the evaluative force remains consistent.
And if one questions the basis for these evaluative frames, a long toll of violence is invoked as
evidence for the need of a negative evaluation. Thus, in effect what is said is that given whatever
similar features other phenomena seem to share with what we call ‘communalism’, the latter has the
property of always leading to violence and therefore it is to be abhorred. Now, it may be correct to say
that there is historical evidence for violence in Indian society. But before we understand what
‘communalism’ is, how do we know it is something that produces violence? How and why it would
produce violence are questions even further from explanation. Thus the evidence of violence does not
establish either its relationship to ‘communalism’ or shed any light on the concept of ‘communalism’.
This feature marks a strange inter-changeability between concept and object. When one asks for
conceptual definition or explanation, one is only given more and more object level ‘evidence’.
e)
This concept-object swapping leads to a strange evidence loop in our historical accounts as well. Our
accounts of ‘communalism’ are circular in the sense that past conflict is cited as an explanation of the
present situation and present conflict as evidence of the problem’s existence in the past. In effect
therefore, we are ‘communal’ today because we were ‘communal’ in the past and we must have been
‘communal’ in the past since we are ‘communal’ today! ‘Communalism’ is simultaneously cause and
effect, evidence and explanation in this conceptual quagmire.
f)
Theories of ‘communalism’ seem to multiply causes infinitely without any compulsion to explain
either the relationship between the cause and effect or any relationship between causes9. Scholarship
on ‘communalism’ has proliferated causes for the problem without any attempt to arrive at one clear
causal theory. For instance, Marxist theorists have held that it is the emergence of new capitalism that
led to the birth of communalism (Bipan Chandra1984), constructivists have held that it is the rise of a
new kind of identity that gives rise to the problem, nationalists have long held that it was the colonial
policy of ‘divide and rule’ that led to ‘communalism’. What remains peculiar is not that there are
competing explanatory theories, but rather, that these theories co-exist without the need to compete or
contradict each other. Thus, ‘communalism’ is not explained, it is ‘over-explained’!
In light of the peculiarities drawn out above it seems incumbent to re-examine our theories of
‘communalism’. The first question one must ask in this direction is, what does it mean to have a theory of
‘communalism’? The numerous theories of ‘communalism’ we have are all ‘causal’ theories. This assumes
then that ‘communalism’ is a phenomenon or a set of phenomena with some underlying unity, for you
cannot have a causal theory of a concept for instance. Thus, these theories cannot answer our question
about what framework of knowledge gives rise to the idea of ‘communalism’. But do these theories answer
questions about the phenomena they seek to understand? One observes that just like in the case of a
multiplicity of causes of ‘communalism’ which seem to co-exist, a variety of different object-level
phenomena all become classified as ‘communalism’. For instance, ‘communalism’ refers to: an
unwillingness to participate in representational politics and thus remain in a state of political diminution10;
an assertion that religious communities form the primary interest groups of the state and therefore must
have exclusive self-representation11; a state policy that is oppressive towards minorities12; the prejudice of
an individual against other groups of people13 and a hegemonization or semitisation of ‘Hinduism’ in order
to replace it with ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘exclusivist’ strands14. Thus, one is hard-pressed to understand these
phenomena as one common phenomenon. The only possible essential characteristic that unifies these
phenomena is the view that each of these phenomena is really based on the antagonism between two
religious groups15 which has found expression in different ways over the ages. However, this is the one
view which all Indian scholarship on ‘communalism’ has fought tooth and nail to refute. For this is the
classic colonial vision of Indian society which requires only one cure – that it be purged of religion
altogether. This colonial view has been rejected as ‘essentialist’ and self-serving. However, we are caught
in a bind here. Either the colonialist was always right or all subsequent Indian scholarship on
‘communalism’ has been significantly wrong somewhere.
There is another possible explanation. Perhaps ‘communalism’ has changed meaning over time
and that is why a diversity of phenomena are picked up over time by the same term? However, this is not a
possible answer since all of these phenomena are still referred to as ‘communalism’ at the same time, i.e. in
our descriptions today. As long as meanings change and their older divergent referents either die or gain
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SUFIYA: RE-EXAMINING ‘COMMUNALISM’
other corresponding terms there is no problem. However, when a term changes and yet refers to all the
older divergent referents as well, then we cannot make a case for change of meaning.
If ‘communalism’ is not one phenomenon but several, then surely we should have several causal
theories that tackle individually these different phenomena. However, this has never happened. Then
perhaps we must examine ‘communalism’ as a concept more carefully. What makes this concept seem to
refer to object-level phenomena of such diverse character? A theory of ‘communalism’ must explain these
peculiar features we have observed rather than multiply causal theories. While this essay cannot provide
such a theory, it does attempt to demonstrate a more fruitful route for the investigation of ‘communalism’
by investigating the bases for this charge. The next section provides a historical reconstruction of the
concept ‘communalism’ as it first emerged into the discourse of representation politics.
Emergence of the concept of ‘communalism’
We know from etymological reconstruction that the term ‘communalism’ comes into being in the 1920’s.
Before this, the term ‘communal’ is used to refer to a type of reservations and a type of representation. This
first use of the term ‘communal’ to refer to a kind of reservations or representation provides crucial insights
into the framework of knowledge which generates ‘communalism’. However, this is a history that has
never been examined before. Here I reconstruct it only briefly in order to make explicit the framework of
knowledge about India required in order to generate the category of ‘communalism’.
In 1899, Thorburn, Financial Commissioner of Punjab made a set of observations which became
the means of instituting ‘communal reservations’ in state employment:
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Now, confining comments to the Musalman districts, the Musalmans there are so inadequately represented
that I think it will be readily admitted that if a remedy can be found it should be applied both on political
grounds and in simple justice to the people. Obviously in such districts there must be popular dissatisfaction
when the people see that a majority of posts are held by members of a class antipathetic to them in religion
and interests – a class which under the protection of our system is expropriating them and reducing them to
the position of helots.(quoted in the Memorial from the Hindu Sabha, Lahore, regarding the differential
treatment in the distribution of Government patronage, etc. 1909 emphasis added).
What is ‘adequate representation’ in government employment? In fact, what does one represent at
all in government employment? Why do all communities need to be present in numbers proportional to
their population in government services for justice to be done? It is one thing to observe the poverty or lack
of education prevalent in a community and recommend state intervention in terms of educational and
employment schemes to alleviate such circumstances, and quite another to say that the bureaucracy must be
made up of proportionate representation.
The basis for Thorburn’s proposition is that the Hindus and Muslims have “conflicting interests”
and the employment of Hindus in government services naturally creates discontent amongst the Muslims.
The language of ‘conflicting interests’ in the case of government employment is particularly strange. What
are these ‘conflicting interests’? In parliamentary governance for instance, capital and labour would be
dubbed ‘conflicting interests’, for the profits of one often rest on the exploitation of the other. However, in
this case, neither community can have a relationship of potential exploitation. What they do have is a
relationship of competition for limited state employment or resources or educational provisions. But
competition for resources is not the basis to identify ‘interest groups’; conflict in interest is the basis for the
identification of various ‘interest groups’. The absurdity of this situation is clear if one continues the
analogy. In an election if two candidates representing labour are competing for a seat in parliament, they
cannot be dubbed ‘conflicting interests’, they are merely competing with each other for a limited number of
seats and represent the same interest.
In a liberal democratic context, conflict in interest is resolved by representation since whichever
party may be in power, both parties have the chance to defend their own positions and secure what benefits
they can. The Hindus and Muslims were competing for a finite set of government positions. But to define
the acquisition of jobs as in itself an ‘interest’ is, as I have asserted above, a nonsensical claim since the
‘interest’ here is not defined in any way by particular group positions. All individuals and groups would
express this very same ‘interest’ since they would be competing for the same jobs.
There could be no ‘communal interests’ served unless one is to make either of two claims: that the
competition was really for a religious state and therefore the two religions were ‘conflicting interests’ in the
competition for state control along religious lines; or the competition itself was economic but the
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alleviation of the economic conditions of one community would make the other vulnerable since they were
natural or historical enemies who were always engaged in a civil war of sorts. Neither of these inferences is
historically tenable. It is important to note that even if Thorburn had observed existing conflict between the
two communities (though Thorburn makes absolutely no observations about incidents of violence between
the communities), there would still be no basis to define them as ‘interest groups’ on that basis.
In order to understand the questions raised above we must first grapple with what the idea of an
interest group was based on in Western political discourse. Otherwise, we assume, as we have done for so
long, that competition, identity or interest group may inter-changeably be applied to grapple with varied
problems of conflict. In Western representational discourse every mature citizen expresses a ‘will’ which is
what the process of representation marked. Therefore, when this citizen expressed his allegiance to an
interest group, it marked the mature will which understood that interests were to be secured in order to
attain equality. This is not to be confused with the more modern notion of representation of ‘identity
groups’. The problem for identity groups is not equality but the struggle to gain or retain from the State
provisions which allow the cultural life of the community to flourish. Though both identity and interest
groups are considered legitimate or desirable means to mature representation, they secure two distinct
goals: safeguarding special cultural or legal norms for minorities within a state and the possibility of
acquiring or maintaining equality given the possibility of expropriation of one group by another. Interest
groups therefore are in their very conception in conflict with one another. Identity groups, however, tend to
be in conflict only with the State.
Conclusion
The fore-going discussion raises several questions that remain un-answered. What is the basis for
Thorburn’s definition of Hindus and Muslims as ‘interest groups’? Why is it that our scholarship has been
blind to the British understanding of the communities as interest groups and has refurbished the same idea
by more acceptably dubbing communities as identity groups?
I am as yet unable to answer the first question. Thorburn did not believe that Hindus and Muslims
were in a civil war to establish a religious state. And unlike our modern scholarship, he understood what
the notion of an interest group was. Yet, it was this concept he chose to define the situation of the
communities in India, which led him to arrive at the political policy of ‘communal reservations’ as a
solution16. The implication of this definition of communities as interest groups is extremely significant. For,
interest groups can never be reconciled to each other. They are by very definition in conflict with one
another. The answer to the second question lies I believe in the fact that we have never really understood
what ‘communalism’ is and on what basis the charge rested. Instead of attempting to reconstruct and
thereby reject the basis of this understanding in colonial sources we have attempted constantly to re-define
or re-theorise the idea such that our attempts have led to the peculiarities in our scholarship I have outlined
above. This has not led us any closer to explanation but has in fact taken us even further from explaining
the phenomena we seek to address through the term ‘communalism’.
Let us return to the anecdote we began with. While none of the fore-going discussion explains
why we see discrimination where Battuta saw honour, there is still something that becomes quite clear. The
question is not whether Battuta was right or wrong. The question is how to reconstruct these assessments
such that we can understand their bases. Once we do so, we will be one step closer to coming to terms with
various phenomena we have so far obfuscated from our understanding by dubbing them ‘communalism’.
Notes
1.
A position first propounded by the nationalists and continues to be the most popular view.
2.
This is the classic colonial position which has found echo in the work of later writers like C.A. Bayly
(1998) and Christophe Jaffrelot (1999) though in slightly different ways in both.
3.
Nandy’s writings on secularism beginning with his very first piece, ‘An Anti-Secular Manifesto’
(1985).
4.
Most prominently held by Nehru (see Nehru 1934).
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SUFIYA: RE-EXAMINING ‘COMMUNALISM’
5.
Most political scientists have insisted on the need for secularism in India as an effective means to
combat ‘communalism’. See Rajeev Bhargava ed. (1998), Vanaik (1997), Cossman and Kapur (1999)
or P.R. Ram ed. (1998).
6.
See for instance Communal Road to a Secular Kerala by George Mathew (1989).
7.
For instance, Khushwant Singh and Bipan Chandra call for a mass educational programme against
communalism, that will make people realise they are essentially “secular and healthy” and that
communal attitudes do not go with their “personality and ideology” (Singh and Chandra 1985: 62).
8.
Amartya Sen in ‘The Threats to Secular India’ (1993).
9.
For instance, Smith’s (1946) work attempts to track the emergence of ‘communalism’ (which he also
implicitly referred to as under-developed nationalism), to new capitalism compounded by the old
factor of ‘religiosity’. However, a theory of capitalism in India is simply not required in order to
understand the proposition that once the colonial government disbursed jobs along community lines,
competition for employment would take place along community lines. That is a fairly simple and
straightforward observation. What is not clear is the relationship this ‘communal competition’ bears to
‘under-developed nationalism’ or ‘religiosity’. And this relationship is simply not taken up for
discussion by Smith.
10. This is implicit in the dubbing of Sir Syyed as a ‘communal’ as against ‘nationalist’ figure.
11. This is implicit in the demands of the Muslim League
12. Secularists decry the BJP as ‘communal’ because it is majoritarian.
13. Indeed for the die-hard secularist, any behaviour or attitude which may show any prejudice against any
group is potentially ‘communalism’.
14. The argument that the RSS is transforming ‘Hinduism’.
15. This characterization, however, does not directly explain questions within the third class of phenomena
to be ‘cured’ by pluralism. The problem with hindutva for instance was not simply that it was antiMuslim but also that it sought to do something to ‘Hinduism’ which is perceived as dangerous.
16. It was purely an extension of this logic that led to the charge of ‘communalism’ in the 1920’s. But this
requires a more detailed historical reconstruction.
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