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Deadline for submissions for August 2011 issue is
June 30, 2011.
Table of Contents
2
A Conversation With
Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander
Transformation
14
Modelling And
Simulation, Enabling
NATO Strategy
16
A View From
Allied Command
Transformation (ACT)
Planning For NonMilitary Capabilities
18
Fostering Collaboration
Through Open-Source
Software
19
ACT Begins
Cloud Computing
Initiatives
20
Joint Forces Training
Centre - At The Heart
NATO’s Preoccupations
22
JWC Certifies
NRF 16 Leadership
At Ulsues
24
Virtual Development
Of NATO’s LL Capability:
The Outcome Of The
2010 NATO LL
Conference
Email:
[email protected]
Postal :
Headquarters Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation,
Public Affairs Office
7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100
Norfolk, Virginia 23551
3
Assured Access
To The Global Commons
In The 21st Century
+1(757)747-3600
4
Structuring Partnerships
For Evolving Ambitions
6
‘Partnerships’ After
The Lisbon Summit:
Opportunity, Challenge
Or Threat
Telephone:
The Transformer Staff
Captain Jeff Bender
Chief, Strategic Communications
Mr. Roy Thorvaldsen
Chief, Public Affairs
Mr. Frank Schiller
Chief, Corporate Communications
Chief Petty Officer Chris Carrothers
Production Leading Chief Petty Officer
Petty Officer 1st Class Carla Burdt
Editor
“The Transformer 2011 –
New Look, New Content”
With our first issue of 2011, you will see we
have made a few changes. First, we have a
new look on the outside with a new cover and
design. Second, and most important, is what
we have inside. Instead of a compilation of what
took place over the past three to six months at
ACT, we now are taking a look at the present
and future involving NATO, ACT and our
stakeholders. Transformation is a continuous
process of improvements and we hope you
like the way we transformed one of our main
communication tools. Enjoy!
~Captain Jeff Bender
8
11
12
Transformation
Of NATO C-IED
Relationship With
Industry And Academia:
Increasing Opportunities
For Collaboration
2011 SACT Strategic
Engagement Overview
On the cover:
Global Commons.
Globe photo courtesy of NASA images.
Satellite photo courtesy of NASA images.
A MESSAGE FROM SACT
Who’s New At ACT?
T
he Lisbon Summit has given the Alliance a
reinforced sense of purpose and a renewed momentum across the whole range
of its activities – but nowhere more than in the field of Transformation. Never
had a Strategic Concept dedicated so much attention to issues that are pivotal
to the future of NATO capabilities, such as the analysis of future threats or the
pressing need for cost-effectiveness
and reform.
This summit has set NATO on a
path to becoming, in Secretary General
Rasmussen’s words, “more effective,
more engaged and more efficient.”
Allied Command Transformation is at
the heart of every one of these three
challenges, and this issue of The
Transformer illustrates the progress
it is making and sheds light on the
way ahead in fulfilling that mandate.
Being more effective means
succeeding in solving the toughest
and most relevant issues our nations
General Stephane Abrial
Supreme Allied Commander
are facing both in current operations
Transformation
and in future crises. A first example
is given in the following pages with the description of how we are transforming
our capabilities dedicated to countering improvised explosive devices – one of
the most essential enterprises in preserving the lives as well as the freedom
of action of our troops deployed in Afghanistan today, and on other theatres
tomorrow. Another instance of confronting an emerging challenge is in
safeguarding free and safe access to the Global Commons – the strategic
environments comprising the high seas, the international airspace, outer
space and cyber space. Our work on this topic is previewed in our cover story.
Being more engaged means drawing the consequences of the need
for NATO as an organisation, as well as for each one of its member nation
militaries, to reach out to other stakeholders. This applies in a number of fields,
giving rise to several series of collaborations on which this issue elaborates:
first and foremost, our partnerships, which come out of the Lisbon Summit
reinvigorated; but also our collaboration with partners in industry and
academia within the Framework For Collaborative Interaction.
Finally, and in keeping with the financial situation we will be living in
for many years to come, the effort to make our organisation, our capabilities
and our processes more efficient – more cost-effective – will be a common
thread to all our actions. The ideas in the pages this issue dedicates to the
review of our defence planning processes or to the use of new technologies
to save resources – through modelling and simulation or virtual lessons
learned – are but first bites at this apple. ■
Major General Mark Barrett
Deputy Chief of Staff
Strategic Plans and Policy
Brigadier General Theodosis Dourouklis
Assistant Chief of Staff
Joint Education, Training and Exercise Division
Brigadier General Giovanni Fungo
Assistant Chief of Staff
Capability Engineering
Vice Admiral Antonio Hernandez
Assistant Chief of Staff
Joint Deployment and Sustainment
Ambassador Ravic R. Huso
SACT Political Advisor
Vice Admiral Carol M. Pottenger
Deputy Chief of Staff
Capability Development
Brigadier General Luis Ruivo
Comprehensive Approach
Team Leader
Major General Ugur Tarcin
Deputy Chief of Staff
Integrated Resource Management
The Transformer
1
A Conversation With Deputy Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation
September 29, Polish Army General
Mieczysław Bieniek assumed the duties
of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation (DSACT). Now, five months
after the handover, The Transformer staff
spoke with General Bieniek about his goals
and expectations.
What were your expectations before
taking the position of DSACT?
I certainly was expecting a demanding
environment and being challenged to seek
General Mieczysław Bieniek
innovative solutions to existing and emerging
Deputy Supreme Allied
challenges. In this regard the new assignment
Commander Transformation
brought no surprises. On a daily basis I get
to discuss and brainstorm the issues that
will shape the Alliance within the next 10-15 years. I must admit that since
I always love being proactive, I feel great in the ACT working environment.
Serving in a multinational HQ offers a unique opportunity to not only see
things in new ways, but also to learn from others’ experience, which is
very useful and stimulating at the same time. I believe that since the
adoption of NATO’s New Strategic Concept the HQ’s activities have gained
some new momentum in pursuing solutions to ever more complex and
compelling demands and challenges of the 21st century. In short – I was
hoping for real intellectual challenges and pro-active work towards practical
solutions to them. I have not been disappointed on both accounts.
What element do you consider vital to the success of ACT?
I believe that we as a command have achieved quite a lot since September.
I am a strong believer of the ‘one mission-one team’ principle – the only way
to have work done right is to make sure that everyone feels like a member of
the team, knows and understands clearly the leader’s intent. Throughout my
career I have been stressing the importance of teamwork for the success of
an endeavour. Therefore I felt immediately at home in HQ SACT – the quality
of teamwork here is exactly what I was hoping to see. And one can
immediately see the result of it.
Let me just mention a few – those that I perceive as the most important
achievements.
2
The Transformer
Firstly, to support ACT work in the domain of capabilities development,
we are constantly improving and enhancing the cooperation with the academia
worldwide and with global industry players. Only months or so ago, we signed
agreements with IBM, Microsoft and Thales. I believe our last year’s Industry
Day, organized in Prague, enjoyed the highest level of interest and participation
from science and industry so far. I certainly hope that ID 2011, to be organised
in London in the autumn, will be attended by many more people and will
see even more vigorous and fruitful discussions. It also creates a perfect
opportunity and great venue to work with other key players - industry,
academia and European Defense Agency.
Secondly, partnership: during my trips to Alliance and partner countries
I strive to widen the spectrum of possible non-governmental partners. I cannot
help but mention also the Mobile Education and Training Team (METT) session
organized in Moscow in September last year. It was not only my first trip in the
DSACT capacity, but also a very fruitful event – both our Russian counterparts
and us, representing NATO, were very fond of the quality and scope of the
discussions in the framework of military-to-military NATO-Russia cooperation.
Let me just mention that it was only weeks before the New Strategic Concept
reaffirmed the importance of NATO-Russia cooperation. In this sense the
METT was an early bird of the period in the relations between this country
and the Alliance.
Thirdly, another good example of forward thinking of this HQ is
cyberdefence. The New Strategic Concept only reaffirmed the value of the work
that had already been ongoing in ACT. This work, of course, gained some new
impetus, and ACT is actively seeking further venues of cooperation with other
organisations and nations, but it confirms that ACT, as an Alliance Strategic
Think Tank looks ahead, identifying new challenges and charting new
territories of development.
How did the outcome of the Lisbon Summit affect
the work that ACT will conduct in 2011?
In ACT, implementation of military aspects of the New Strategic Concept is
our paramount task from which stem more detailed ones, such as support to
operations (ie. C-IED, COIN, training requirements, countering hybrid threats),
partnership and outreach or military transformation.
There may be many things that will influence the direction of work of
the HQ like the study initiated on the so-called ‘Global Commons,’ including
cyberdefence. Another area in which we also strive to improve is Comprehensive Approach, especially fostering cooperation with the U.N. and E.U.
In all these domains and a lot of others, ACT will do its utmost to tackle
all the challenges facing the Alliance in the near future. ■
Assured Access
ToThe Global Commons
InThe 21st Century
W
hile the Euro-Atlantic characterisation of the
Alliance makes it geographically regional, its perspective
and interests are global. For more than 250 years,
the more globalised the world’s trade and information
systems have become, the more Nations have come to
view cooperation as an elixir to increase prosperity and
stability. In this same way, the more the Alliance works
with the rest of the world, the more the rest of the world
wants to work with the Alliance. It is this growing
interaction with our partners that allows us the
freedom to share and exchange views on ideas,
issues, and common values.
The domains of air, space, maritime,
and cyber space are integral elements of
today’s globalised world, serving as a critical
enabler of international security and trade.
Prosperity, peace, and security rely on the
smooth flow of goods and information and
people through these four domains. Collectively
known as the Global Commons, they are the
connective tissue that allows the modern world
to communicate, interact, trade, and function
effectively. These domains are assumed by many to
be always accessible and at an ever decreasing cost.
In the future, an adversary might change that.
Globalisation as we know it is a highly efficient
system of just-in-time deliveries of resources, materials,
and manufactured goods to and from every country in the
world. These functions require assured access to all four
domains of the Commons. As Nations increasingly depend
on access to and use of the Commons, they increase
their vulnerability to potential adversaries who view our
reliance on the Commons as an Achilles heel. As the use
of the Commons has evolved, the cost of disrupting access
and use of the four domains has declined, primarily
because technology has become more readily available,
affordable and usable. We can be assured that some
actors will work to undermine the tenuous balance
between cooperation and competition that characterises
globalisation by disrupting use of the Commons.
Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is
modern piracy. Globalisation, inadequate governance, and
limited security have allowed modern pirates to exploit the
maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Using a hybrid
of technologies, such as satellite phones and GPS-enabled
navigation, together with low-tech, small-boat swarming
tactics, they plan and execute
attacks across a million square
miles of open ocean, while avoiding
interdiction. To date, commercial
shippers have absorbed the costs
that piracy imposes on them. It is
possible to imagine, however, that
in a time of austerity, as those costs
become prohibitive, shippers will
either alter commercial routes or
restrict global trade and commerce,
both to the detriment of the market.
The cyber domain has become
a dominant fact of our daily lives.
Little of our customary activities
would be possible without the
on-demand information that is now
accessible and increasingly relevant
across a broad band of social and
business relations. Despite its
omnipresence, or even because of
it, cyberspace is the least regulated
domain of all. The infrastructure
and information base of cyberspace
are almost entirely in the hands
of private and commercial actors,
while both providers and users
have been extremely resistant
to regulation and the potential
increase in security it could offer.
With the ever-increasing numbers
and sophistication of cyber-attacks,
strengthening security should be a key undertaking,
for commercial entities and governments alike.
Until recently, hackers were after the information
that constitutes the payload of cyberspace, rather than its
infrastructure. This, however, is changing. The 2010 worm
called W32. Stuxnet, which invaded the control systems
for Iran’s Bushehr nuclear complex, did actual physical
damage to the facility. It is nearly impossible to attribute the
attack without doubt, and chances are no one will
ever be held accountable for the Stuxnet worm.
Of course, not all threats to the Commons
are man-made. When Iceland’s volcano erupted
in 2010, an event that was both predictable and
unstoppable, its ash clouds disrupted air traffic
across the vital trans-Atlantic corridor for two
months. It took North American and European
authorities a full four weeks to figure out how
to achieve “almost real-time” procedures, and
delegate authority to route trans-Atlantic traffic
in an efficient and effective manner. Although
this is a regional example, it is by no means an
isolated one. Even now, Indonesia’s Mt. Merapi,
which erupts sporadically has again entered a “hot”
phase and continues to disrupt air travel in the region.
This problem of international coordination and cooperation
in the air domain is solvable, and it should not have to
wait for another crisis to spur action.
Finally, space has become increasingly vital
to daily life. Space is a central supporting element of
security and defence operations. We rely on satellites for
world-wide situational awareness, to keep track of the
weather and natural environment, and for geo-positioning
and communications, to cite just a few examples. The
almost instantaneous communications that space-based
systems make possible can have a significant impact on the
public and private good. In this increasingly interconnected
world enabled by space and cyber, leaders and citizens
interact more easily and directly, while the transmission
of information, both good and bad, increasingly is
ubiquitous and near instantaneous.
While space is currently considered a relatively
stable common with only a few potential spoilers,
this could change. The increasing use of space,
especially by commercial interests, is leading to
(continued on page 4)
The Transformer
3
Global Commons (continued from page 3)
increased vulnerabilities for both satellites and
their supporting terrestrial nodes. Technological
advances that can be used to deny and or disrupt
the use of space increasingly are accessible to
more actors, both state and non-state; and, it is not
just adversaries that need to be considered. With
greater use and demand, orbits and bandwidth
increasingly are congested and the corresponding
increase in space debris threatens all assets in
space. Accordingly, vigilance, cooperative monitoring,
and healthy relations that promote the secure and
responsible use of space among all stakeholders
are vital to the allocation and management of
this delicate common.
The future will continue to be the province
of the unknown, but that should not deter us from
thinking about how the Alliance should plan for
what we cannot see. History tells us the why and
how of the past, but it also warns us that the adversary of the future will not stand still. The evolving
globalised economic and security systems of the
modern world depend on unrestricted, access to
and use of the Commons. Disruptions to the global
supply chain of goods, energy resources, and
information will have serious effects on the
economies of nations and the security of their
citizens. If there is a “key to the Commons,” it lies
in applying a holistic approach that draws on the
knowledge and abilities of all stakeholders, from
government to academia, private enterprise to
non-profits, to help solve the problems of access,
use, and security across the four domains.
In conclusion, the trends of globalisation and
interdependence today will continue, as will their
complexities, dangers, and opportunities. As the
security environment increasingly reflects a chaotic
world, the Alliance may very well find that the new
realities of the Global Commons infer that aligning
politically, militarily, and economically with others
of like mind may be the only way to establish the
solidarity, resilience, and deterrence necessary to
meet these challenges. To effect this strategic goal,
NATO will have to work in concert with individual
powers and international organisations such as
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the European Union, the
African Union, and the United Nations. As the
world’s oldest military alliance, NATO must not
only emphasise but also help coordinate the uses
of all aspects of power – political, military,
economic and civil – to provide mutual security
and assured access to the Global Commons. ■
Strategic Issues and Engagements Branch
4
The Transformer
Structuring Partnerships
for evolving ambitions
The words of Aesop are as relevant today as they were in the fourth Century BC: “union gives strength.”
Partnerships are central to NATO’s continued success. Through dialogue and cooperation, partnerships
break down barriers, build security and foster stability in the trans-Atlantic community and beyond. The
maxim that partnerships are the cornerstone of a strong and well-connected Alliance rings truer today
than ever before. Increasingly complex security challenges, coupled with austere defence budget forecasts,
present opportunities for the Alliance and its Partners to extend regional security in profound ways.
The Alliance can work with interested Nations, international organisations and other actors to
promote international security through:
• Political consultation, information exchange and practical cooperation;
• Support for NATO’s goals and specific objectives; and
• Contributions to NATO operations.
NATO’s post-Lisbon partnership ambition aims to enhance international security, promote
democratic values and reforms, build support for missions and operations, and prepare countries for
potential membership. It advocates respect for existing partnerships while creating new ones, but aims
to widen NATO’s network to include potential partners not usually considered in Alliance dialogue.
In short, the Alliance seeks innovative cooperation throughout a broader community.
Traditionally, NATO’s partnerships focussed on states or regions because NATO, as a political and
military alliance, interacted best with those actors that shared similar political-military structures.
These relationships remain fundamental to the Alliance. However, NATO must consider all relevant actors
and issues. From political agreements to operations, the Alliance must view its actions and relationships
through a comprehensive approach. NATO must develop its ideas more openly, and it must do so with
whoever is appropriate, including academia and industry. This will be challenging for NATO its current organisational structure is designed around political-military level interaction.
Partnership Means More Friends Around The Table
Regardless of the issue, successful partnerships are built - they do not just happen. They require
deceptively simple enablers, such as using the same language and determining common ground. They
are based on some kind of mutually-agreed outcome that is well articulated. Fundamental to partnership
success is having the right organisational structures, communications channels and mechanisms to
leverage partners’ strengths, while keeping an eye on how to improve collaboration.
The strategic environment is deeply affected by both the global information revolution and the
corresponding social/political evolution it influences in every society around the world. These changes add
uncertainty, opportunity and dynamism to NATO’s affairs. Therefore, NATO must become agile and flexible;
its partnership policy should bolster Alliance capacity to navigate threats and challenges effectively.
In this environment, simplicity and strategic thinking are increasingly important. Partnership policy should
be simple, practical and applicable under varying circumstances and take into account key factors that can
facilitate success in the trans-Atlantic community. An Eight-Factor
Framework is proposed as a way to inform Alliance thinking on building
successful and resilient partnerships.
An Eight-Factor Framework
Not all of these factors, with perhaps the exception of ‘integrity,’ which is
fundamental at any time, will apply to all partnerships, and the importance of
each factor varies. For example, ‘individual strengths’ is significant in a NATO/
EU context, but less so in a NATO/‘weak state’ relationship. NATO may be more
focussed on the strategic significance and security benefits of its investment
in a weak state’s success.
The Eight-Factor Framework is a coherent means
by which to consider
the pros and cons, and
potential benefits and
costs, of any relationship
prior to moving down
Strategic Significance:
the road to partnership.
relationships are mutually important.
Therefore, in the words of
Colin Powell, “the situation
Individual Strengths:
dictates which approach
partners bring specific excellence.
best accomplishes the
team’s mission.”
An Eight-Factor Framework
Underscores Elements Key
To Resilient Partnership Polices:
1
2
3
Interdependence:
partners need each other.
4
Commitment:
invest in each other’s successes.
5
Integration:
make vital connections across
all organisational levels.
6
Information:
be transparent and share
with the entire community.
7
Formal Structure:
reinforce institutions and
governance as a means to
bolster objectivity and
partnership interests.
Opportunities
For Engagement,
A Call For
Reflection
Before potential partners
are identified, NATO
needs to understand
Integrity:
its own partnership
be trustworthy.
objectives. This is not
a simple task given the
complexity of the Alliance
and breadth of its roles. However, the first three factors (strategic significance,
individual strengths and interdependence) from the Framework could be used
as a starting point. NATO can build a partnership model by first considering
how its core roles, as defined in the new Strategic Concept, define NATO
as a potential partner for others, based an evaluation of its own significance,
strength and what it can offer others.
8
A partnership model must incorporate existing partnership frameworks,
and could be built around three nested layers, in which NATO can expect to
accomplish its core roles. First, the innermost layer is where NATO works
together with others in support of clear operational requirements. Most often,
relationships at this level have a military emphasis, and the relationship
focuses on coordinating actions amongst partners. For example, NATO
works with many different partners in a comprehensive approach to
achieve operational requirements.
The second, middle layer focuses on relationships to create opportunities
for the Alliance to better execute its roles and missions. Relationships at this
level focus on stakeholders preparing together for issues that they will face in
the areas of peace, stability, humanitarian security and economic well-being.
An example of this layer is cooperation amongst international organisations
like NATO and the EU to build role complementarity.
The third and outermost layer consists of relationships that are typically
more goal- or objectives-focussed and have a greater political emphasis. Most
often, relationships built at this level are based on broad agreements with
influential or powerful actors to shape and influence ideas, values and events.
An example of this layer is NATO’s global outreach and engagement with
rising powers to promote mutual understanding.
A three-layer model serves as a point of departure to offer new
approaches and possible solutions that can “enhance existing partnerships
and develop new ones.” It takes into account the lessons learned in ACT’s
examination of the future security environment and the corresponding security
and military implications. A single
issue could span all of the layers.
For example, building a political
relationship with an influential actor
could lead to cooperation to better
understand and address potential
security challenges and threats,
and eventually to conducting
military operations together.
Successful partnerships are
built, they do not just happen. NATO’s
partnership ambitions to enhance
international security, promote
democratic values and reforms,
build support for NATO’s missions
and operations, and prepare countries for membership require first that NATO
is a good partner. Accordingly, the Alliance must be transparent. This can be
achieved through the expression of a clear narrative to help potential partners
better understand NATO and its ambitions. The Eight-Factor Framework
can help develop NATO’s partnership narrative.
Also, NATO needs to identify with whom it should partner. Any
relationship should be productive and help NATO to achieve its objectives
with regards to its core roles as defined in the New Strategic Concept. The
three-layer model can be used as a tool to position existing and potential
partners. All partnerships, existing and new, could then be evaluated in the
context of the Eight-Factor Framework, to identify and prioritise benefits
for the Alliance, and to support the articulation of a new policy.
It must never be forgotten that partnerships are NATO’s greatest
success story. It is a truism as valuable today and tomorrow as it has
been throughout the Alliance’s history. ■
Strategic Analysis Branch
The Transformer
5
‘Partnerships’After The Lisbon Summit:
Opportunity, Challenge Or Threat
E
ach of the summits since 1989 has to a greater or lesser degree affected the way that
we interact with our Partners. There have been 22 Summits since 1957 and the Lisbon
Summit is the 12th since the Brussels Summit in 1994.
The latter is generally acknowledged as the start of NATO’s structured
partnerships programmes and in particular the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) programmes. Since 1994 12 PfP Nations have joined
NATO and one nation (Malta) has left PfP and since rejoined.
An enduring characteristic of the summits is the growing sophistication of the nature of
‘cooperation’ as well as the tools and mechanisms available to it. In this regard it was perhaps
the 15th Summit in Washington in 1999 that gave cooperation (and particularly PfP) an
operational focus with the Operational Capabilities Concept, a new Strategic Concept
and a new focus on Training and Education.
It could be argued that much of Allied Command Transformation’s current ‘military cooperation’ work can be traced to the Washington Summit. The increasing sophistication of cooperation
and expanded toolbox has led to over 30 programmes, plans, mechanisms, 4 main partnership
programmes (PfP, MD, ICI and CC) and has been invaluable in engaging with our partners, giving
them opportunities to work alongside NATO Nations and to contribute to global security. In
cooperation terms the Washington Summit will be more than just a footnote in history. It may
record that it was a milestone for refocusing cooperation, the start of a trend towards more
sophisticated ‘tools and mechanisms’ and a recognition of the importance of partners in NATO.
Since 1994 the growing importance of Partners to NATO has been reflected in the proportion
of the declarations taken up with ‘cooperation.’ The Lisbon Summit is no exception. It is likely that
the Lisbon Summit will go down in history as equal in importance to the Washington Summit. The
Lisbon Summit recognised the continuing importance of ‘cooperation’ with our existing ‘partners’
but took ‘partnerships’ to a new level. There was no surprise in the declaration seeking to promote
International Security through Cooperation and acknowledging the ‘Open Door’. However, it also
mentioned ‘A wide network of Partner relationships with countries and organisations around the
globe.’ It went on ‘NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach.’
Its effective implementation requires all actors to
contribute in a concerted effort.’ (Lisbon Summit).
The Strategic Commands will work within this
changed landscape but the Lisbon Summit Decision is
only one, albeit major factor in the future development
of ‘partnerships’ at the SC level. Other factors alluded to
within the declaration include: limited resources, required
efficiencies and the new NATO Command Structure.
Still others are the current cooperation architecture,
the plethora of ‘tools and mechanisms’ used by partners
on a day to day basis and in some instances a lack of
clear definitions to support cooperation.
So what will be the Strategic Commands’
role within the context of the Lisbon Summit?
Currently, the Military Cooperation Division, formed in
What does this mean from a Strategic Command perspective?
Regardless of the accession of 12 Nations to NATO membership, Military Cooperation at the
Strategic Command (SC) level already supports a far greater number of non-NATO Nations than
it did 10 years ago. However, the SC Military Cooperation work does not just ‘support partners’,
it contributes to partnerships policy, provides essential specialist advice and support to the SCs
on ‘partnership matters’, programme and coordinates non-NATO activities. Partners have become
an essential part of the SCs’ work. Transformation and Operations are no longer conceivable
without Military Cooperation.
Whilst noting that the number of NATO’s ‘partners‘ has continued to grow, with Nations
such as Tonga, Mongolia and El Salvador showing an interest in, and being encouraged by NATO,
‘Partners’ now means far more than just non-NATO Nations. It is extended to non-NATO actors
such as the UN, EU and the African Union. However additionally, it is clear the role of ‘partners’
in NATO will be far more comprehensive.
‘NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach
that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments.
6
The Transformer
The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai; NATO Secretary General Anders
Fogh Rasmussen and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon during the joint
press point at the Lisbon Summit November 19-20. NATO Photo.
September 2008, is the primary organisation for management and coordination of military cooperation at the SC level. It has a footprint in HQ SACT whilst
being mainly located in Mons, Belgium. It is a Bi-SC division and works equally
for both Strategic Commands.
The MCD supports over 40 non-NATO Nations, many of which have
representation in Mons, some are also represented in HQ SACT. Currently,
it does not have the mission, nor does it support non-NATO actors. It is possible
therefore that the term ‘military cooperation’ may no longer be appropriate.
‘Partnerships’ in the context of the Lisbon Summit is a far broader and perhaps
a more appropriate term covering military cooperation, relationships with other
non-state and international and industrial organisations. Whilst the post Lisbon
landscape is clear, the SCs’ role within it needs further development. It is
questionable whether the structures and mechanisms that have served the
SCs well for the past few years are now fit for purpose. One thing is clear,
it is certainly not ‘more of the same’. Even so, any changes to better support
the SCs’ redefined partnerships role must be made within the context of
reduced resources, increasing sophistication of partnerships and the tools
and mechanism and the ongoing new NATO Command Structure.
So what basic principles might govern the SC’s new partnerships structure?
The Military Cooperation Division is the main organisation for dealing
with Military Cooperation at the SC level. However, it is not the only body
responsible for the delivery of all ‘partnership’ services. Other SCs divisions
and entities also have some responsibilities for military cooperation. This
can lead to unclear lines of communication, fragmented expertise and advice,
and possibly duplication of effort. Therefore, the SCs may wish to consider
‘partnerships’ being brought under a single coordinated ‘partnerships’
umbrella with a clearly defined but flexible mandate and lines of
communication with others providing ‘partnership’ services.
While limited centralisation of military cooperation in 2008 resulted
in significant improvements, this needs further investigation in light of the
Lisbon Summit. Proposals should be made to establish which functions
should be brought under a centralised ‘partnerships’ umbrella. Additionally,
the nature of the relationships and methods of working for all functions that
impact partners need to be redefined and formalised to support the
SCs’ goals for partnerships.
M
ilitary Cooperation is bound both by unclear terms (for example
Contact Countries is a vague term with no clear definition) and
restrictive definitions and missions, which in military cooperation
terms quickly become outdated. The Lisbon Summit provides a broad and
comprehensive description of ‘partnerships’, which in turn gives the SCs an
opportunity to review and redefine its own functions, relationships and methods
of working. Built in flexibility is required in order to better and more quickly
address changing environment and requirements.
Current military cooperation representation is limited to non-NATO
nations. The Lisbon Summit provides an opportunity to expand this beyond
non-NATO nations to other actors such as EU/UN, AU etc. Consideration may
need to be given to expanding ‘partnerships’ representation at the SCs’ level
and encompassing these within a ‘partnerships’ umbrella.
However, there are two practical issues that have already been touched
upon. Firstly, resources to support partnerships are finite and subject to the
same practical limitations as other areas and disciplines. Therefore, resource
limitations will affect partnerships at the SC level. Secondly, while the
partnerships toolbox has become increasingly sophisticated and seemingly
comprehensive, that is not synonymous with usable. Therefore, there is a
case for a simplified partnerships toolbox that brings the current plethora
of tools together. The MCD has already made great progress in developing
a overarching mechanism leading to streamlined and more focused operation.
Conclusion.
The North Atlantic Council has redefined ‘partnerships’. It has acknowledged
that our relationships with non-NATO Nations, organisations and entities is
important to our work in supporting transformation and its part in regional and
global security. The current climate provides an opportunity to break out of the
mold of military cooperation and to consider ‘partnerships’ comprehensively.
This should include a redefinition of partnership responsibilities and functions,
while providing built in flexibility to expand to support new ‘partners’.
Partnerships command control and relationships will need to be redefined
to support these new requirements and the definition and development of the
necessary tools and mechanisms should …be part of this overall approach. ■
By M. Laurie Daykin, NATO Civilian, MCD
The Transformer
7
The Transformation of NATO C-IED
“The more effective a measure is initially, the faster its effectiveness tends to decay,
because the more effective the measure is, the greater is the pressure
on the enemy to adapt.” – Lt Col David Kilcullen, Australian Army
The emergence of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as
a wide scale tactical weapon employed for operational
and strategic purposes has presented NATO with a new
dynamic to its assumptions about operations, training,
and sourcing. Countering IEDs requires anticipating and
adapting innovative solutions for the deployed operational force as well as the need for creative thinking and
agile capability development across the Alliance. Allied
Command Transformation (ACT) has embarked on an
effort to reframe long held assumptions as it responds to
both current and future manifestations of the IED threat.
The proliferation of IEDs as a tactical weapon of
choice by NATO adversaries reflects a fundamental
change in NATO operational assumptions. Once confined
primarily to the realm of political terrorism, the IED threat
now encompasses much broader Alliance concerns.
It changes the way NATO approaches application of its
collective and National military capabilities to perform
strategic missions in operating environments dominated
by non-state and transnational threats.
O
riginally considered a weapon for politically
motivated but essentially criminal activists,
IEDs have become the tactical weapon of
choice by many NATO adversaries lacking
either the means or nation-state construct
for fielding more conventional military
capabilities. The strategic success of IEDs also makes
them increasingly attractive to more capable adversaries
who seek to exploit NATO limitations or restrictions. The
distraction created by the relatively slow Western military
adaptation to a threat that did not readily conform to
long-standing conventional military assumptions,
has given IEDs a strategic impact far beyond their
tactical effectiveness.
On a military level, NATO is transforming its
fundamental assumptions about what doctrinal,
8
The Transformer
Corporal McGuffog of the Royal Engineers demonstrates the use of a British metal detector to students from the Afghan National Police
on the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Course at the Helmand Police Training Centre. MOD Crown copyright.
organisational, technological, procedural, and training
capabilities are required by the Alliance to address the
range of hybrid threats. IEDs are but the most visible, and
arguably the most pressing threat manifestation. NATO
efforts at Countering IEDs began with efforts to first
understand, and then to protect against the threat.
Now, more than eight years after IEDs expanded from
a primarily terrorist tool to a viable and widespread
tactical tool, NATO is focused on developing the
capabilities required to attack adversary networks
that enable employment of IEDs.
Figure 1 illustrates how this transformation dynamic has
affected NATO efforts to address capability gaps through
training since 2005 when SACT created the NATO C-IED
Integrated Product Team (IPT). Initially focused on
informing or sharing information regarding techniques,
tactics, and training ACT produced an operational
concept and initiated educational offerings on the
concept to commanders, staffs, and Nations.
A
s NATO Nations have gained greater understanding and practical experience with C-IED,
the ACT C-IED effort shifts to more specific
leader education and training required to
develop a C-IED capability rather than theater
specific soldier awareness or acquisition of
defensive technologies. The red box in the illustration
highlights the importance of the ACT role in preventing
member Nations remaining stuck for too long in the
reactive and isolated defensive aspects of C-IED
evolution. This construct is key as the Alliance must
continuously seek comprehensive adaptation rather than
“just attempting to keep pace” as cautioned in the NATO
Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept for the
Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats.
C-IED is an area in which ACT is truly leading
operational transformation and providing Nations the
strategies required to overcome institutional inertia.
AJP 3.15 and STANAG 2294 were fast-track ratified
and formed the basis for national and specialist
capability development. These documents reflected
NATOs collective understanding and emphasis at the
time, but now less than two years later, they are already
under revision. The revised AJP 3.15 will be promulgated
to Nations in March, and the revised training standard
will be completed by summer. These revisions will not
replace fundamental concepts; instead it builds upon
them as NATO collective understanding of the threat
and requirements for multi-national development of
operationally integrated C-IED capabilities continues.
ACT is helping the Alliance collectively and organisationally move forward enabled by mission experience,
while not retarded by it.
To date, NATO’s International Security Force
Afghanistan (ISAF) mission has provided both the
strong urgency and basic operational construct to
drive fundamental transformation. Afghanistan is
the place where soldiers from individual Nations are
gaining understanding and experience dealing with
the IED threat, and it is the mission in which NATO’s
new operational doctrines are being incrementally
tested and adapted.
ISAF experience is hard won, but not definitive.
While the success of C-IED efforts in ISAF is critical to
the Alliance, Afghanistan is not the only NATO mission
where countering the threat of IEDs is critical to mission
success. IEDs are a threat tactic, the method by which
the enemy makes contact to achieve a specific result,
regardless of the way we choose to categorise a
particular NATO operational mission or environment.
Thus NATO C-IED capability concepts transcend the
type of operation and must transcend the details
of national resources in a specific theatre.
C-IED principles are valid whether the working
construct is Conventional Warfare, Counter-insurgency
(COIN), or Counter-terrorism (CT) - only the assignment
of operational responsibility and allocation of military
resources varies. NATO must avoid the
temptation to isolate C-IED as a separate
technical activity or overemphasise tactical
issues in Afghanistan when addressing NATO
operational requirements for developing
broader capabilities for countering the use
of IEDs to attack the political will of member
Nations. There are many with tactical level
experience in Afghanistan, but that experience
alone rarely provides the experience required
to address NATO C-IED challenges at the
operational and strategic levels. ACT leadership
is critical to NATO’s full evolution of its C-IED
efforts beyond simply reacting to techniques
observed in a singular theater.
Figure 1
and is offering a new course to give primarily the
intelligence and operational staff officer an understanding
of their responsibility in this area. The Attack the
Networks Tactical Awareness Course (ATAC) is offered
to Nations by ACT at Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in
Poland. Focused on how to use intelligence, information,
and combat enablers to understand the networks
operating in a given area of operation, it also provides
the skills to plan operations to influence, disrupt or
destroy the critical nodes in those networks, using
kinetic and non-kinetic means.
NATO adversaries continue to evolve their IED tactics
and techniques in order to better achieve their strategic
objectives. Regardless of the specific countermeasures
or techniques employed by friendly forces, the enemy
W
hile some Nations have developed
stand alone organisations to
coordinate C-IED operations, such
as Task Force Troy and Task Force
Paladin in the United States, NATO,
through ACT, is working to institutionalise C-IED in basic soldier and staff skills,
from tactical through strategic levels. Similar
to how Nations institutionalised NBC Defense
during the Cold War, C-IED principals need to
be institutionalised as well. Military personnel
need to be trained at all levels in C-IED
Figure 2
awareness and force protection principals no
different than we train basic trainees how to do personal
decontamination and staff officers that are taught to
plan operations in a contaminated environment. ACT
fully recognizes that the IED threat is not limited to ISAF,
but will be a condition during future operations and the
Alliance needs to be able to conduct operations where
IEDs are a condition of the operating environment.
As ACT has shifted NATO C-IED focus “left of the
boom” toward attacking the networks, it has designed
continues to observe and adapt. The pressures of
casualties, media coverage, and national politics require
the operational command to rapidly address current
theatre conditions and threats. However, as David
Kilcullen cautions, the more effective we are at any
(continued page 10)
The Transformer
9
NATO C-IED (continued from page 9)
C-IED from the perspective of a comprehensive approach
one aspect, the faster the enemy evolves to something
to continuous evolution since the challenge cannot
else. C-IED at the NATO ACT level demands a depth of
be met without considering the various considerations
understanding that enables anticipation and innovation. and experiences of NATO Nations and its Partners.
Innovation within ACT and agility within Allied
The concept of countering IEDs is action oriented.
Command Operations (ACO) requires constant
In descriptive language C-IED is a verb, not a noun.
observation and analysis of a very diverse and constantly The NATO concepts for C-IED, whether focused upon
changing global threat environment resulting in relevant knowledge development, command and control,
recognition of capability gaps and bold, coherent shifts
attacking threat networks, or force protection, are
in operational methods. ACT must also integrate
founded upon principles that are fundamental to
a wide variety of disparate national priorities and
any Nation or command’s ability to evolve and
tactical capabilities to create a unified vision that aligns
adapt based on the mission itself.
supporting and supported NATO operational activities,
Capability intentions must translate into actual
all in order to solve complex
organisational concepts and
strategic challenges.
programs that are equally
In an ever evolving
adaptive and evolutionary.
threat environment, the
Any NATO-wide program
capability to innovate
attempting to universally
and adapt is more critical
codify specific theatre
than the desire for
“best practices” as the
predetermined
NATO-wide requirement is
uniformity and stanobsolete by the time it is
dardisation. Individual
fully developed by a staff
Nations have political,
and integrated within
economic, and defence
member Nations. Thus,
considerations that
as exemplified in Annex C
influence their capability
of STANAG 2294, capability
priorities to meet specific
requirements must be
NATO operational mission
developed with an eye
Members
of
the
Afghan
National
Army
search
for
improvised
expectations that must
toward action and
explosive devices during Operation Omid Panj. (British Army
be understood. In an
flexibility not reactive
photo by Sgt. Rupert Frere)
ill-defined future threat
qualifications.
environment, the diversity
The challenge of
of national tactical capabilities may provide NATO with
training individuals and small units for specific mission
greater flexibility than the tradition of defining common tasks is different from the challenge of developing a
standards. Operational unity of effort is important, but
multinational force capable of performing the wide
agility requires a different measure of effectiveness
range of NATO military missions. While it is a National
than traditional NATO standardisation directives
responsibility to provide trained and equipped forces and
once required.
individuals to NATO operations, unique or new NATO
The solution of a single Nation cannot be
mission requirements often conflict with Troop
universalised as the de facto solution for NATO or indeed Contributing Nation defence priorities and capabilities.
for all Nations within NATO. Over-reliance upon specific
Thus it is an accepted development that NATO has a moral
individual experiences tends to perpetuate outdated
obligation to provide some common funding for training
assumptions for pre-deployment training as well as
which is required to achieve an acceptable readiness cacapability development solutions. It is only by
pability in short time, or where the Nations agree it most
multi-national cooperation that the Alliance is able to
cost effective to let NATO conduct collective training.
meet collective obligations. It is necessary to approach
Addressing these ever changing requirements and
conditions not only demands a flexible concept, it also
requires a mechanism for NATO senior leaders to make
informed decisions about the prioritisation and allocation
of common funding to achieve the desired C-IED
outcomes. For ACT, such decisions are focused on
anticipating capability requirements rather than
responding to current events.
The ACT staff requires an agile information collection
and analysis capability, manned by individuals with
deep expertise and broad operational experience.
Deep expertise is required to avoid the myopia of overspecialisation based upon a specific technique or singular
assignment. Broad experience is required to see developing
paths of threat and counter-threat evolution outside
the limits of conventional boundaries and assumptions.
Defeating a non-state or transnational adversary
ability to “network” and employ IEDs effectively against
NATO forces starts with uncovering how they are
operating in order to reveal who, why, when, and
where to focus next. The ever evolving nature of nonconventional threats means there will rarely be a clear,
or universal, answer to this requirement.
ACT has produced a C-IED Action Plan that is a living
document reflecting the true nature of the threat, as well
as NATO’s political, economic and military challenges
to meeting ever evolving mission threats. It is aimed at
reducing the immediate impact of IEDs in Afghanistan,
while also guiding the strategic development of national
capabilities within coherent doctrine. Key initiatives in
the Action Plan include: an Intel/Info Fusion study
to identify NATO organisational and operational
requirements, development of a NATO C-IED Portal,
NATO C-IED lessons learned process and numerous
other initiatives to enhance NATO’s capability to conduct
operations where threat networks use IEDs.
Implementation of these concepts cannot be done
by an ACT staff working group alone, nor can it be done
by a single Nation alone. New requirements will emerge
and obsolete practices must be critically reviewed.
Contributing Nations expect from ACT a command that is
focused and flexible, able to analyse and identify issues,
formulate relevant and feasible solutions and develop
principle based solutions to near,- medium,- and
long-term C-IED capability requirements. ■
U.S. Army Lt. Col. (P) John Greaves
Kevin McEnery. LTC, US Army, Retired.
Consultant with The Wexford Group International.
“We must be careful not to allow the gap to grow into a credibility gap.
That means we must ensure cohesion across the Alliance in our defence decisions.”
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen – 21 June 2010
10
The Transformer
In the analyse of the new threats, we can observe that
the Alliance is no longer confronted with opponents who
use a single form of action as they did in the past, but
with people able to engage in high-intensity combat
as well as criminal enterprise or terrorist actions,
sometimes simultaneously.
Nowadays, this is a significant issue, which we
know under the broad name of ‘hybrid threats’ (HT). To
give a common perception to all NATO Nations about how
to counter hybrid threats, ACT is developing a concept.
In order to go deeper into the analyse and development
of solutions, one of the major supporting activities will be
the HT experiment based upon a seminar/game structure
that will be held in Tallinn, Estonia in May 2011.
The goal of this experiment is to investigate the
utility and the feasibility of the Countering Hybrid Threats
(CHT) Concept and to develop with both military and
civilian actors a mutual understanding of potential NATO
approaches and responses. One of the objectives is to
identify appropriate military contributions within a
wider comprehensive approach to CHT.
This experiment concurred with the principles
of broad and diverse engagement of actors (Civilian,
military, NATO and non-NATO) to ensure a comprehensive
exploration of the issues identified.
F
or the first time, Industry and Academia will
be invited to participate. As the recently developed CHT
concept itself recognises the importance of making
greater use of partnerships and building better
cooperation beyond the NATO borders, it makes perfect
sense to involve industrial and academic partners in
the testing of this very ambitious concept.
For ACT, it will be the occasion to operate within
a Comprehensive Approach setting, leveraging expertise
lying outside of the Alliance and the national entities. For
Industry and Academia, it will be a unique opportunity
to participate in a NATO game and make their voice heard
as to how they can and should cooperate with NATO to
deal with hybrid threats. The National Defence University
especially, will provide substantial support to this
experiment both during the preparation of the game
and during its conduct.
This collaboration will mark a new step forward
in the development of the ACT initiative called FFCI.
Although strong signs of interest from Industry and
Academia had been perceived before, it was still
uncertain in September 2009 when ACT initiative called
“Framework For Collaborative Interaction” (FFCI) was
launched how much mutual interest there would be for
ACT, Industry and Academia to effectively work together.
Since this initiative, which give ACT the right
and ability to jointly engage Industry and Academia in
Relationship
With Industry
And Academia:
Increasing
Opportunities For
Collaboration
One of the objectives is to identify
appropriate military contributions
within a wider comprehensive
approach to CHT.
collaborative work at the non-procurement phase was
launched, more than fifteen companies have engaged
beyond initial discussions in sustained exchanges
with ACT on a large variety of topics in areas such as
Knowledge Management, Cloud Computing, Situation
Awareness and Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC).
For each of these topics, needs and objectives are
different and the FFCI approach allows tailoring of the
General Vlastimil Picek (left), Chief of the General Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic;
General Stephane Abrial (centre), (SACT) and Dr. Alexander
Vondra (far right), Minister of Defence for the Czech Republic,
at ACT Industry Day 2010. Photo by Martin Koller,
Press, Ministry of Defence, Czech Republic.
interaction with industry and academia to specifically
meet those needs.
At the very first level of interaction, the ACT Health
subject matter experts used ACT Industry Day 2010 to
identify appropriate industry partners in their area and
to create a community of interest for future projects.
The conference was therefore a good opportunity for
them to communicate on NATO’s priorities and ACT’s
program of work, generating awareness and interest.
Another example of the exploratory work that can be
conducted under the FFCI umbrella is the effort done in
the domain of Cloud Computing where ACT is working
with several companies, using their expertise and
experience to identify prospects and risks associated
with investing in cloud computing solutions, in order to
develop sound advice to NATO and National authorities.
A
t the opposite end of the spectrum, the
ACT NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) subject
matter experts focus their effort toward educating
industry on NNEC and encouraging them to use the
NNEC roadmap as a tool for guiding products
development for NNEC. ACT will also benefit from
feedback received from industry partners on the
latest NNEC documents as well as on the feasibility
and availability of required services and products.
Throughout the past year and a half, a series of
lessons were learned and identified. Among them, ACT
has tremendously benefited from exposure to cuttingedge vision from Industry and Academia to steer its
on-going internal projects and consider the initiation
of a few new ones. But more importantly, ACT did
not suspect how much its subject matter expertise;
operational insight and its ability to formulate the
future NATO needs would be of so much value
and well received by Industry in particular.
This is for ACT a true mark of success of the FFCI
initiative. In the year 2011, ACT will continue to increase
the number of opportunities for collaboration on
additional new subjects and will welcome offers from
Academia and Industry to jointly work on challenging
topics of common interest. In that respect, one of the
key milestones will of course be the ACT Industry Day
2011 conference which will be held in London on
September 12 and 13, with the support of the UK
Ministry of Defence. Record-level attendance is
expected as this year’s edition will run back to back
with DSEi (Defence & Security Equipment International),
the world’s largest fully integrated defence and
security exhibition. ■
Future Solution Modelling and Simulation Branch
The Transformer
11
2011 SACT Strategic Engagement Overview
26/27 Jan
Military
Committee
in Chiefs of
Staff Session
Brussels
January
26/27 Jan
Defence
Planning
Symposium
Oberammergau
NATO
10/11 Mar
Informal
Meeting
Of NATO’s
Defence
Ministers
Brussels
March
February
18 Feb
SACT
Seminar
Brussels
7/11 Mar
NATO-wide
Executive
Development
Programme
ACT
5/8 Mar
NATO
Network
Enabled
Capability
Conference
Finland
12
The Transformer
14/15 Apr
Informal
Meeting
Of Foreign
Ministers
Berlin
April
4/5 May
Military
Committee
in Chiefs of
Staff Session
Brussels
May
9/11 May
Allied
Reach
Poland
(ACO Lead)
9/10 June
Formal
Meeting
Of Defence
Ministers
Brussels
June
13/15 Jun
Strategic
Military
Partner
Conference
Planning
Symposium
Belgrade,
Serbia
Ju
AC
MC/CS Event
Sep
Military
Committee
In Chiefs Of
Staff Session
Conference
Sevilla
uly
August
September
SACT Key Engagements
1/2 Dec
Formal
Meeting
Of Foreign
Ministers
Brussels
4/5 Oct
Informal
Meeting
Of NATO’s
Defence
Ministers
Brussels
October
27 Oct
MC
Visit To
ACT
JALLC
11/12 Sep
Industry
Day
London
Key Political Event
November
December
January
Nov
CD&E
Development
And
Experimentation
Conference
TBC
The Transformer
13
Modelling And Simulation,
Enabling NATO Strategy
Most importantly,
the Snow Leopard
Programme has aroused
the awareness of the
06:00 “Severe Weather Alert,” the Weather Channel
collective training and announces on the radio, “Issued by The National Weather
exercise community Service, Tallahassee, FL, 2:27 am, Mon., Jan. 10, 2011
... HIGH SURF ADVISORY IN EFFECT UNTIL NOON
on the possibilities of TODAY... HIGH RIP CURRENT RISK IN EFFECT UNTIL
distributed modelling NOON TODAY...” Crazy weather, how can the weathermen
and simulation and has predict the future?”
opened the debate on
the transformation of the 09:00 The Doctor takes a last glance at my X-Ray,
“Uh-uh, you need surgery on this knee.” I look at him with
way NATO forces should some dismay, he is probably in his early 30s. “Have you done
be trained, setting the this before Doc?,” “A thousand times,” “you’re kidding me,
you not?,” “Well, actually 100 times for real and the other
foundations for a future are
900 times in an immersive surgical simulator.” It doesn’t
capability to fulfil the alleviate the pain but it feels reassuring.
ACT vision.
A screenshot of Allied Command
Transformation’s game, ‘Boarders Ahoy!’,
a 3D multiplayer game for security and search
teams that looks at the boarding of suspect
merchant vessels. The game recently won
the ‘Serious Games Showcase and Challenge
People’s Choice of Best Serious Game’
at I/ITSEC 2010 in Orlando.
Future Solution Modelling
and Simulation Branch
14
The Transformer
Modelling and Simulation seems
to be everywhere nowadays: from
entertainment to weather forecast;
from health care to disaster and
emergency response; from improvement
of transportation to the protection of
the environment; from space exploration
to readiness of military forces.
Some Nations have already
formally recognized the importance of
modelling and simulation. Among other
provisions, they declared that they
“recognise modelling and simulation as a National Critical
Technology.” They also stated that modelling and simulation
have and will continue to “provide vital strategic support
functions to our [U.S] Military.”
NATO established the extreme relevance of
modelling and simulation when the Secretary General
stated the NATO vision on the Modelling and Simulation
Master Plan (1998); “Modelling and simulation will provide
a readily available, flexible and cost-effective means to
enhance NATO operations dramatically in the application
areas of defence planning, training, exercises, support to
operations, research, technology development and armaments
acquisition.” He also established the strategy to achieve
this vision “by a NATO-wide co-operative effort that
promotes interoperability, reuse and affordability.”
The NATO modelling and simulation community
coordinates within the NATO Modelling and Simulation
Group where Nations and NATO bodies work together
to synergise efforts and share best practices and
experiences on using modelling and simulation to
support military missions. The main focus is on
standards and interoperability.
ACT plays a main role in this community. Some
visionary leaders have shown the way. Former Deputy
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Italian
Navy Admiral Luciano Zappata affirmed in Vol. 5 Issue 3
of The Transformer, “Modelling and simulation is high on
the agenda of decision-makers because of the benefits it
provides to improve interoperability, reduce cost, mitigate
risk, improve the quality of products, making them closer
to the needs of the users, and help reduce the time
to field capabilities.”
10:00 “... to summarise the results...” It seems we are
getting to the end of this JFCOM brief. It was not bad.
“Exercise Noble Resolve 2007 was conducted virtually required five months, 140 personnel and $2 million
for development. Compare that to a 2002 Millennium
Challenge exercise that was conducted live and
required five years, 14,000 personnel and $250 million
or development.” Wow, that’s savings!
12:00 I meet a pilot for lunch, a good friend of mine
who will shortly be deployed to Afghanistan.“Flying
there will be completely new for you,” I said to her. She
stares at me and says, “I’ve already been there.” I know
she hasn’t. “How did you do it,” I ask. “I’ve flown over this
terrain and practised my mission almost daily for the last
two months in a U.S. Army simulator.” Oh. “That gives
you an advantage before you get there. I’m relieved to
know you will be better prepared and safer, my friend.”
Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Force Trainer, Lieutenant
General Karlheinz Viereck is leading the transformation
in the NATO training arena. He stated in the Showdaily
magazine of I/ITSEC 2010 “when we look into the world of
distributed learning, distributed exercises, virtual worlds,
and immersive environments, [we see] key items to get
better training,” he continued asserting that “next year
[2011] is the year of modelling and simulation immersive
environments for distributed exercises and training”.
During the last decade, under the umbrella of
the NATO Modelling and Simulation Group, NATO has
demonstrated the technical feasibility of the concept of
distributed synthetic training with a whole battery of
incremental technical demonstrations and development
of agreed solutions to improve interoperability.
In 2007, ACT leadership decided to create a program
called Snow Leopard with the aim to operationalise the
technical concept and streamline the efforts of the modelling and simulation community to better serve the needs
of the training and exercise clients in NATO and nations.
Under this programme, with the support of U.S.
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and the NATO Command,
Control and Consultation Agency (NC3A), ACT has supplied
its two training centres, Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in
Stavanger, Norway, and Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC)
in Bydgoszcz, Poland, with the necessary tools to achieve
their missions.
Most importantly, the Snow Leopard programme
has aroused the awareness of the collective training
and exercise community on the possibilities of distributed
modelling and simulation and has opened the debate
on the transformation of the way NATO forces should
be trained, setting the foundations for a future
capability to fulfil the ACT vision.
ACT is also working on the important area of scenario
development. In the short term, it aims to provide a NATO
Exercise Scenario Portal that will be a one stop shopping
for the training and exercise communities to access and
reuse resources for scenario development.
On the other hand, ACT is working with nations,
industry and NC3A to construct a framework that allows
the test and evaluation community to share and be aware
of available assets, such as battle laboratories or particular
test and evaluation services. One of the most important
objectives that ACT aims to reach is to support the
deployment of systems, typically national, on the area
of operations by providing visibility of NATO reference
test facilities, ensuring that systems are ready and
interoperable for operation in theatre in advance.
17:00 “Hi girls.” No response. “Anybody here willing to
give a big hug to a tired dad?” Silence. Lucia is furiously
driving a BMW FWD on the dusty roads of the Dakar
rally. Better not to bother her, it can be dangerous ... for
me. “And where is my little princess?” She is jumping
and moving her arms in front of her Wii, trying to catch
some virtual ‘something.’ Sigh. No welcome kisses
for Dad today...
These computer games really transport my kids
to a virtual 4th dimension.
ACT examines new technologies that can be utilized
in the benefit of the warfighter. In particular, for the past
two years, ACT has been investigating virtual worlds
as a possible technology to be used for improving
NATO capabilities.
Three worlds were built. The first two were a generic
deployed operational HQ similar to ISAF and the SACT
headquarters in Norfolk. Both had conference rooms built
to very similar conditions to the real ones and were meant
to encourage distributed meeting and pre-deployment
familiarization. The final is a ship-boarding world with
the potential of facilitating the training of maritime
interdiction operations.
The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training
Centre (NMIOTC) evaluated a prototype based in this
last world in October 2010. CAPT Önder Celebi, TUR(N),
the Deputy Commander of the NMIOTC stated that “It is
obvious training facilities can exploit such technologies in
providing better quality products. We believe that this type
of capability will certainly add value.” …Celebi also spoke
about mobile training teams and how “we can use this
to train and simulate where we cannot take our
mock-up ship.”
18:30 Deep in my sofa, lazily watching TV. “Now, from
Lisbon ...,” CNN shooting the news, “... the 28 Chiefs of
State of NATO signed a common declaration after the
summit ... they have decided, among other things, to
enhance the NATO contribution to the Comprehensive
Approach, to further boost NATO partnerships with
countries and organisations, to develop a missile defence
capability, to improve NATO cyber defence capabilities
and to agree on the Lisbon package of the Alliance’s
most pressing needs.”
I’d better rest now; it seems to me I will have a lot
of work to do during the next few years.
Because of its versatility and capacity to recreate the
reality allowing harmless manipulation of the environment
to assess alternatives or present challenges to the user,
modelling and simulation is a key enabler of strategy and
capability development. Modelling and Simulation is also a
vehicle to build partnership because of its ability to provide
neutral scenarios in which future partners learn to gain
confidence to work together, to find common objectives
and to practise procedures to fulfil them.
NATO is also undertaking a severe structural reform.
In spite of future cuts, the role of ACT will be reinforced,
as ACT Chief of Staff, Royal Navy Vice Admiral Robert
Cooling, soundly declared in his December message.
“ACT has a clear role in ensuring that the overall
coherence of Alliance capabilities
is preserved or even enhanced
despite the cuts in national defence
expenditure.” Modelling and
simulation will, for sure, play an
important role in making sure
that his vision is achieved.
To do so, ACT will continue
leveraging national capabilities,
initiatives and best practices. We
have the opportunity, as well, to
take advantage of the imminent
establishment of the Modelling and
Simulation Centre of Excellence
in Italy that will serve as a factor
multiplier for the transformational
power of modelling and simulation in
NATO. We are also consolidating our
links with industry and academia
with the purpose of exploiting their
solutions and influencing their
lines of research.
Finally, a word of caution,
even if considered a key enabler
for NATO strategy, modelling and
simulation is not the panacea. It
should be used when needed to
support the NATO endeavours in
defence of the freedom and security of the allied nations. Thinking
needs to be done to ensure we better
use this terrific technology for our
benefit. I leave you with a quote
from Italian Army Brigadier General
Giovanni Fungo, Assistant Chief of
Staff Capability Engineering, when
he meditated about the quintessence of modelling and simulation
nowadays on a recent article on
the Defence Management Journal.
“…M&S is more than just a flight
simulator or a first person game,
it is about capturing the essence
of future situations, to include
operating with non-military actors
(governmental, civilian, local
population etc.), requiring quick
and sound decisions.”
20:00 Uh, too deep of a thought
for a relaxing time after dinner.
Maybe I should check out this
nice Avatar movie again. And that
is how a day of modelling and
simulation goes. ■
The Transformer
15
A VIEW FROM
A general overview of the new NATO
Defence Planning arrangements, with
a particular emphasis on the field of
planning for non-military capabilities.
During their meeting in June
2009, the Alliance’s Defence Ministers
welcomed the development of a more
coherent, traceable, transparent NATO
Defence Planning Process (NDPP) able
Allied Command Transformation
to identify, develop and deliver the
necessary range of forces and associated
and existing planning mechanisms.
be met by either the use of military
capabilities, to undertake the Alliance’s
Step 2 (Determine Requirements) and
However, stabilisation operations will
capabilities, or if available and coordinated,
full spectrum of missions. The lessons
the initial part of the Step 3 (apportion
prove an added challenge to NATO
by civilian entities. In this way a range of
learned from
requirements/set
lanning Domains and deriving
requirements
will
be
developed,
many
current NATO
targets), together
requirements and setting targets will
of which will more naturally be fulfilled
operations make
known as Step 2+.
require a coordinated approach. The
by non-military capabilities, rather than
it clear that a
The engine driving
NDPP provides the structures, and the
those of the military, when security is
comprehensive
this work is
experts will engage together in the CRR
assured.
The
current
NDPP
cycle
will
political, civilian
an analytical
to identify the military and non-military
examine tasks, such as the following,
and military
process called
capabilities required in support of
that are vital to operational success in
approach is
the Capability
operations.
humanitarian or stabilisation operations:
necessary for
Requirements
effective crisis
Review (CRR),
• delivery of essential needs to local
management.
which will identify
populations/support to restoration
How will you integrate
The new NDPP
the MCR to meet
of the basic services - access to water,
military and non-military
will address the
the quantitative
food, utilities, shelter, and
solutions in the same
whole range of
and qualitative
Brigadier General Peter Bartram
basic medical care
Assistant Chief of Staff Capability Requirements
capability planning
capabilities which
ambitions set out
• restoration of good governance
mechanism”?
will in turn capture,
in NATO’s new
in an integrated and balanced manner,
Strategic Concept and forthcoming
• restoration of public security Rather than apply the terminologies,
the single set of the Minimum Capability
political guidance.
basic justice system and rule of law
military or non-military, the CRR will
Requirements (MCR) in a continuum
During this transitional cycle, CRR
• support to restoration of political
consider only NATO requirements that are
from the near to long term to meet
2012, the MCR will be expanded to
institutions and civil and economic
fulfilled through a set of solutions which
the Alliance’s Level of Ambition.
encompass requirements beyond
infrastructures
could be military or non-military. Within
Thereafter, Nations, groups of
those of a purely military nature, as in
the CRR, the methodology for deriving
Nations, or NATO collectively will be
previous Requirements Review cycles.
• military capacity building capability requirements consists of four
encouraged to achieve these apportioned
The MCR, due in November 2011 will,
mentoring, advice, operational
main components:
targets and to provide solutions from
inter alia, identify a range of non-military
support and training
either military or non-military capabilities,
capabilities. These will be derived from
• Mission Analysis. A Mission-to-Task
• support to security sector reform
the latter identified by the NATO Strategic
the analysis of NATO mission types
Decomposition (MTD) is conducted
including disarmament,
Concept endorsed at Lisbon.
and representative scenarios in light of
in order to identify the full panoply
demobilisation and reintegration
‘operationalising’ the Comprehensive
of tasks and sub-tasks that must be
Approach and an increased emphasis
• military, police, judiciary,
accomplished to ensure success
How is the new NDPP
on stabilisation and reconstruction
prison reform
during the conduct of each specific
addressing this
operations and phases within operations.
mission type (Collective Defence,
• reconstruction of the basic
additional challenge?
This new work will be in addition to the
Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping,
infrastructure (e.g. roads, airfields,
planned analysis and lessons learned
Humanitarian Assistance, etc.). Our
electrical power)
Of the Strategic Commands, ACT has
from recent Disaster Relief (DR) and
analysis accounts for, and is informed
the lead of the Defence Planning Staff
Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
ACT has had considerable and
by, NATO current operations. We
Team (DPST) for the conduct of the NDPP
operations. The MCR’s focus is on
fruitful engagement with the Civil
will explore the implications of
identifying required capabilities. It is
Emergency Planning (CEP) domain over
NATO conducting inter alia, counter
accepted that many requirements could
the past year to exploit CEP’s experience
Planning For
Non-Military
Capabilities
16
The Transformer
insurgency, stabilisation and
reconstruction operations and
stabilisation and reconstruction phases
within operations. The tasks identified
in this analysis might be performed
through the employment of existing
or new capabilities – similarly, these
might be provided by military or
civilian capabilities.
• Situation Analysis. The Situation
Analysis comprises the development
of suitable scenarios within which
tasks and requirements are analysed
and derived. A set of Generic Planning
Situations (GPS) are examined. They
represent the context where the
Alliance might conduct an operation
under a broad range of political,
military, social, economical,
informational, infrastructure and
physical environmental parameters.
Subsequently, dedicated cases
studies will be developed to better
describe and characterise tasks
within a specific GPS. For example, in
order to examine the complete set of
requirements needed to successfully
conduct a Disaster Relief/Response
(DR) operation a case study, based
on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake
experience, will be developed. A
second case study will represent
a Support to Humanitarian Assistance
(SHA) operation based on the 2010
Haiti mission. The latter will also
include aspects which clearly lead to
the development of Stabilisation and
Reconstruction (S&R) requirements.
• Capability Analysis. The third
component is a Capability Analysis
which aims to define the type, quality
and quantity of forces and capabilities
NATO requires to execute a given task
in a given situation. Each capability, or
group of capabilities, is uniquely coded
and described in qualitative terms
emphasising the expected effects
and the enabling factors. To assess
the required quantity of capabilities,
suitable algorithms will be formulated
and employed using Capability
Assignment Logic (CAL). These
CAL formulations can be simple
mathematical expressions or advanced
analytical models used to run complex
modelling and simulation test cases.
This process is developed by
combining military and operational
Subject Matter Expert judgement
and NC3A technical and analytical
expertise.
• The last step, the synthesis, ties
together all three phases: mission,
situation and capability analyses.
This synthesis allows the identification
of a package of forces and capabilities
required to achieve the mission
objectives.
How do you translate
requirements into
Targets apportioned
to nations, groups
of nations or NATO
collectively?
Having determined the MCR for the
mandated mission types, the NDPP will
identify the relevant shortfalls. First, an
assessment of what is already available
in NATO will be conducted on the
information provided by Nations through
the Defence Planning Capability Survey.
Secondly, this is compared with the
newly identified full list of
requirements, in the understanding that
some capabilities must be maintained.
The outcome of the process is an indication
of a ‘shortfall’ or a ‘surplus’. To meet
the identified shortfalls, targets will be
drafted and apportioned to nations,
groups of nations or to NATO collectively.
In accordance with the existing policies,
these targets could be issued to provide
specialized capabilities to deliver a desired
effect during an operation in the field
of Stabilisation and Reconstruction
(S&R), Humanitarian Assistance or
Disaster Relief. Nations will be
encouraged to develop, in addition to
their military forces, additional capabilities to respond to these types of targets.
Some Nations will have well developed
internal cross departmental cooperation
mechanisms and the wherewithal to
integrate military and civilian planning
functions. However, for some allies, this
may necessitate a significant revision of
internal defence planning processes and
mechanisms. It may mean developing
an inter-ministerial structure, able to
provide an integrated mixture of military
and non-military capabilities to respond
to the needs of the Alliance. It is hoped
that all Allies will be able to support this
approach. To facilitate this evolution,
our draft targets need to be Specific,
Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and
Timely (SMART). Within the initial part
of the NDPP Step 3 the draft targets will
be discussed with the Nations prior to
being formally issued - the aim being to
find existing national resources to the
maximum extent possible.
Conclusion
Today, it is hard to envisage a crisis
or conflict being resolved solely by
military means. Security depends upon
stability and both security and stability
are influenced by factors beyond the
purely physical. Human perceptions
are the key to crisis resolution and
management. Consequently, the Alliance
must be better prepared to positively
influence peoples’ perceptions across
a wider spectrum and not just in the
traditional military (physical security)
sphere. In many cases NATO will not be
the provider of non-military capabilities,
but will need to act in coordinated
partnership and cooperation. This in
itself highlights the need to implement
the Comprehensive Approach at the
Strategic Level (as well as Operational
and Tactical), where the Alliance must
work closer with the UN, EU, World
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
amongst other global partners, agencies
and NGOs. To do that successfully, the
Alliance needs to determine the military
and non-military capabilities it requires
to achieve its strategic and operational
objectives in humanitarian, disaster relief
and stabilisation and reconstruction
operations ‘on the ground’. The NDPP
is the tool chosen by the Alliance to
address this issue. The process is new,
but the NDPP has already demonstrated
that it has the potential to provide
credible, transparent and traceable
outputs to meet the Alliance’s security
challenges of the 21st Century. ■
Mid-term Requirements Branch
The Transformer
17
NATO Undersea Research Centre
Fostering Collaboration
Through Open-Source Software
The primary mission of the NATO Undersea Research
Centre (NURC) is to support ACT in capability development
within the maritime domain. Historically, NURC has
accomplished this through the development of purposebuilt hardware and software in anticipation of future
requirements of NATO navies. Although purpose-built
systems can offer great technological advancements,
they can be expensive, difficult to integrate into existing
systems, and difficult to share among NATO Nations. To
make collaboration easier, to streamline costs, and to allow
for easier integration into existing systems, scientists and
developers at NURC have recently started using opensource software for several of the Centre’s programmes.
The MOOS-IvP platform is a suite of open-source
programmes that lets teams of developers and scientists
programme robots, in this case autonomous underwater
vehicles (AUVs). Started at MIT’s Department
of Ocean Engineering
MOOS software runs on a variety of hardware
platforms at NURC, including (from top):
a fixed sonar diver-detection system, a longrange acoustic device, the Ocean Explorer
AUV and the Mandarina ASV.
18
The Transformer
and since maintained
by the Oxford Mobile Robotics Group, the Naval
Warfare
MIT, MOOS stands
UUndersea
d
W
f CCenter andd MIT
d ffor
“Mission Oriented Operating Suite.” MOOS was originally
developed as software for AUVs, but it can be used in any
environment where multiple applications and operating
systems need to work together. The interoperability that
this allows is of great advantage to NATO militaries trying
to integrate and coordinate various hardware platforms.
Simply described, developers use MOOS-IvP to
programme a set of behaviours that can be used to control
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV). Behaviours can
be simple, such as maintain a course, or they can be highly
complex, such as keep a certain distance and bearing away
from a moving object. IvP stands for Interval Programming,
a mathematical programming model for multi-objective
optimisation. It determines the vehicle’s next best action
combining all behaviours and using the data the vehicle has
acquired about the environment, outputs the desired settings
for speed, heading, and/or depth. MOOS-IvP is being used at
the Centre in a number of different project areas:
• For port and harbour protection, using AUVs,
autonomous surface vehicles (ASVs), and a variety of
sensors and warning devices to identify and deter small
boats and swimmers from entering a restricted area.
• For mine countermeasures, using AUVs and ASVs
to find, identify, and dispose of mines.
• For antisubmarine warfare, using AUVs to gather
underwater data and behave in ways that are specific
to the current environment and more importantly the
anticipated environment.
A specific example of how MOOS-IvP can be used
for antisubmarine warfare was shown last summer during
the Generic Littoral Interoperable Network Technology 2010
(GLINT10) experiment. The goal of the 20-day experiment
(GL
was to test a small fleet of AUVs for their ability to operate
wa
autonomously and cooperatively in shallow waters near
aut
sho
shore where using sonar poses the greatest technical
challenges. The tests, which included three 21-inch
cha
AUVs running MOOS software, showed that AUVs can be
AU
programmed with behaviours that allow them to track a
pro
target autonomously and that AUVs can work together to
tar
minimize the errors associated with localizing, or finding,
min
a target.
t
More complex behaviours will be tested as part
of GLINT11, which is currently scheduled to take place
September
S
6-25 in the Gulf of Taranto.
Scientists and developers at NURC like using MOOS
because it offers a modular approach to complex projects
and it allows multiple people to work simultaneously yet
independently.
ind
Because the Centre works with so many
organisations,
software such as MOOS-IvP that facilitates
org
collaboration
ll
is extremely valuable. Programming is done
in C++, suitable for small computers, and MOOS-IvP has
a relatively quick learning curve. This latter feature is
particularly important at NURC because rapid prototyping
is common and there is a high rotation of staff, so scientists
and developers need to ramp up quickly and integrate
their work into existing projects.
The NATO military is a collaborative and rapidly
changing institution. It is also an institution where legacy
systems and new systems must be integrated. Using opensource software, such as MOOS-IvP, is a cost-effective
means for rapid, collaborative development that allows
for interoperability of existing and new systems. ■
NURC Public Affairs Office
ACT Begins
Cloud Computing
Initiatives
Current commercial developments in ‘cloud computing’, including
service oriented architectures and virtualisation, are being
widely promoted as a means of making more efficient use of
computing resources.
Cloud computing allows users to pull information from
a series of networks operating together and sharing credentials.
The main gains are cost savings and increased
interoperability: ‘cloud computing’ offers opportunities to reduce
operating costs for information systems, together with increased
efficiency and flexibility in the way information is stored, managed
and used. This is achieved through shared network-delivered services,
both public and private, in which each user sees only the service,
as the implementation or infrastructure is managed elsewhere. HQ
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) staff involved in
planning and developing future information systems can benefit from
greater awareness of the prospects and risks associated with investing
in ‘cloud computing’ solutions, in order to develop sound advice to
NATO and national authorities.
To this end, HQ SACT personnel from Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) Division, with the ACT Office of Security and Capability Engineering
Division, have recently initiated several related projects that will greatly
improve the staff’s depth of current knowledge about the prospects for
benefitting from ‘cloud computing’ techniques in the NATO environment.
The projects involve information exchange with industry and
experimentation that will identify pros and cons of ‘cloud computing’
in the NATO environment. The results should also be beneficial
to NATO as a whole.
The NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) has begun a high
level advisory study for HQ SACT on “Implications of ‘cloud computing’
developments for NATO operational structures. More than 20 companies
involved in the development and implementation of ‘cloud’ technologies
are participating in this multinational study. The results will represent
the combined views of industry across many of the NATO nations.
Through ACT’s Framework For Collaborative Interaction (FFCI),
several non-procurement collaborative projects have been launched
with companies to obtain a range of industry perspectives on ‘cloud
computing’ and learn from industry knowledge and experience in
applying ‘cloud’ solutions.
IBM held a series of information exchange
workshops with HQ SACT staff during 2010 and has additional
projects planned in 2011 that will focus on “on-premise” ‘cloud
computing’ challenges.
Microsoft Corporation has agreed to conduct technical
workshops on ‘cloud computing’ in early 2011 and has also been
exploring some specific applications for ‘cloud’ solutions to solve
capability shortfalls. The current focus for Microsoft collaboration
on ‘cloud computing’ is “off-premise” scenarios.
Several other companies, including Hewlett Packard,
Dell, Orange Business Service and others, are initiating similar
collaborative projects to help HQ SACT address ‘cloud computing’
issues through the FFCI initiative.
In addition to the collaborative projects, there are also some
related projects within the C4ISR Division, funded as a part of the
ACT Programme of Work, that are contributing to the overall ‘cloud
computing’ investigations.
Experimentation and development projects are addressing a
number of identified challenges related to ‘cloud computing.’ ACT is
experimenting with practical ‘cloud’ solutions for the consolidation
of the former ACT C4I San Diego data centre and the Norfolk-based
reference facility located in the C4ISR Technology & Human Factors
Branch. The combined data centre will be used to support several
activities, including: the Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXercise,
eXamination, eXperimentation and eXploration event (CWIX);
Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA); Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) and architecture experimentation.
Industry was also invited to participate in the most recent
“Tidesprint” meeting in November 2010. Among several workshops
run during the event, the one on ‘cloud computing’ was particularly
well supported, and results of the discussions have been published
on a collaborative website that is accessible to the participants. ■
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division (C4ISR)
The Transformer
19
JOINT FORCE TRAINING CENTRE
At The Heart Of NATO’s Preoccupations
T
he Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), NATO’s focal
point for tactical level combined and joint training
and transformation, focuses on training aimed at
achieving tactical interoperability. Therefore, the
Centre hosts activities or deploys providing support
and expertise in the training of all Alliance and
Partner Forces.
The JFTC conducts International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command
training and Operational Mentor and Liaison
Team (OMLT) training. Besides, it hosts Counter
Improvised Explosive Device Courses, Coalition
Warrior Interoperability Exercises and offers
a platform for testing and experimentation.
Since NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002,
transformation has been one of the Alliance’s
priorities. The transformation enabled NATO’s
enlargement and a setup of a new command
structure. Officially established in 2004 in
Bydgoszcz, Poland, the JFTC soon started to play
its role under the Allied Command Transformation
(ACT) training network and evolved constantly.
NATO’s transformational ambitions include the
creation of further integrated, network-enabled,
combined joint forces.
Forming them requires investment in
both training and transformation, down to the
tactical level. This is the “raison d’être” for the
20
The Transformer
JFTC. Initially, the JFTC was mainly designed to
support the NATO Response Force (NRF) Training
at the Component Command level, but since
2008, following a decision of the Supreme Allied
Commander Transformation, the JFTC has focused
on pre-deployment training of Allied Forces for
current operations. NRF training support became
a matter of secondary importance. The authorised
strength of the JFTC has risen from 84 to 105. This
increase in personnel highlights the importance of
training conducted by the JFTC in order to meet the
demand for high quality tactical level training for
the Alliance forces. The NATO Lisbon Summit
in 2010 pointed out the importance of counter
insurgency operations and stabilisation and
reconstruction missions as well as providing the
necessary training and exercises for assuring our
defence against a full range of security challenges.
The JFTC plays a distinct and unique role
within NATO by focusing on joint and combined
training at the tactical level. Additionally, it
co-operates with other Alliance member Nation
training centres, including Partnership for Peace
training centres, and “Centres of Excellence” in
order to ensure application of NATO standards and
doctrine in the combined and joint areas at tactical
level. In this role, the Joint Force Training Centre
is a critical element in assisting the transformation
of Alliance and Partner forces.
Currently the Joint Force Training Centre
has focused on ISAF pre-deployment training. It
supports ISAF commanders at the tactical level
ensuring that ISAF Regional Command (RC) Headquarters achieve a high level of interoperability and
flexibility and that soldiers are fully prepared to
execute assigned missions
upon their deployment in
Afghanistan. Training events
for deploying Regional
Command staffs include media,
counter improvised explosive
device, counter insurgency,
cultural, functional area
systems, electronic working
procedures and staff function
specific training. The capstone
event for regional events is a computer assisted
exercise in which theory is turned into practice.
Plans for 2011 include two RC North training
events and the support of one for RC South. The
first RC North training will be connected to the
US Unified Endeavour training event for US-led
Regional Commands.
Training events for OMLTs focus on
preparing team members to teach, coach and
mentor their Afghan National Security Forces
counterparts. Training includes counterimprovised explosive device, counter insurgency,
cultural, and mentoring tactics, techniques and
procedure training. Like Regional Command staff
training events, Operational Mentor and Liaison
Team training events also utilise simulations to
better prepare the team members to execute
their missions once in theatre. While the Kandak
(battalion) level OMLT training is a combination
of theory and practice and therefore conducted
at the US Joint Multinational Readiness Centre
in Hohenfels, Germany, the Above Kandak level
OMLT training combines academics and
Computer Assisted Exercises based on
extended case studies.
JFTC staff deploys into operations very
frequently in order to make training relevant
and to offer the best available training support.
Both Regional Command staff and Operational
Mentor and Liaison Team training events utilize
subject matter experts from Allied Nations,
Non-Governmental Organisations, International
Organisations and marry up actual Afghan
In case studies, supported by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), the officers discuss possible solutions.
National Security
Forces Officers with
the training audience.
The result being
that the deploying
personnel receive the
most current training
available and are able
to engage in conversations with those who
have the first hand
knowledge of the actual situation in theatre.
Additionally, since 2010 the JFTC has
hosted Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Courses (C-IED). The Staff Officer Awareness
Course (SOAC) and the Battle Staff Course (BSC)
are designed to prepare Staff Officers for the
Improvised Explosive Device threat. The SOAC’s
aim is to give Staff Officers, assigned to Brigade
Headquarters level and above, an overview of
the threat from IEDs with the emphasis on staff
interaction, responsibilities and approaches to
defeating the IED system in accordance with
NATO C-IED Doctrine. The Battle Staff Course
is designed for Staff Officers and Senior NonCommissioned Officers assigned to Brigade
Headquarters level and below. Its purpose is to
provide officers with knowledge on principles and
processes to attack and degrade the insurgent
network and IED system. In 2011, the JFTC will
host six Attack the Network C-IED courses and,
for the first time, the NATO C-IED conference.
Also for the first time,
the JFTC will host
the Coalition Warrior
Interoperability
Exercise (CWIX). Later
this year 500 software
developers and system
experts from 15 Nations
will arrive for the
largest JFTC event yet,
testing and improving
the interoperability of more than 100 functional
area systems used for battlefield management
and overwatch. This ACT-led exercise is intended
to improve the interoperability of NATO as well
as National Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and it will rely
on Combined Federated Battle Lab Network
(CFBLNet) for distributed system trials.
The JFTC established its connection to the
CFBLNet last fall. It allows the JFTC to take part in
distributed training events and in the future it will
significantly strengthen its role in the establishment
of the Afghan Mission Network Training Federation. For the first time the JFTC used its CFBLNet
connection during last year’s NATO Education and
Training Network (NETN) Modeling and Simulation
Group 068 (MSG 068) Experiment that took place
simultaneously in six headquarters. The main goal
of the experiment was to prepare recommendations
for persistent infrastructure architecture, shared
scenarios and resources sharing within NATO,
NATO Nations, PfP and Contact Countries.
As JFTC takes ownership of the NATO
Live Virtual Constructive (NLVC) suite of training
tools and becomes the hub for NLVC-based training,
JFTC is also becoming an important partner with
ACT’s Distributed Training and Exercises
(DTE) project.
The JFTC’s motto,“Transformation Through
Training”, reflects its mission. The JFTC plays a
key role in the NATO transformation process by
delivering NATO centralized pre-deployment
training at the tactical level and thus supports
current operations, by organising conferences
and courses and by offering a platform for
experimentation. The training facility is designed
to be flexible and can be easily configured to meet
different demands. Conducting experimentation or
supporting current operations, the JFTC is at the
very heart of the Alliance’s preoccupations. The
importance of training and of experimentation will
grow and the JFTC intends to fulfill its missions
in the best possible way to help NATO to master
tomorrow’s challenges. ■
(Left) The plenary sessions are held in the Auditorium seating 300
people. (Bottom left) As often as possible, the training audience
interacts with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Afghanistan,
NATO, NGOs and IOs. (Above) An air view showing the JFTC as
combination of renovated and newly constructed buildings.
The Transformer
21
Joint Warfare Centre Certifies
NRF 16 Leadership At Ulsnes
Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10
took place from December 3-16 and
trained expeditionary forces of the
NATO Response Force (NRF) on
Crisis Response Planning procedures
and served as a final step in the
training and evaluation process of
the NRF 16 Rotation. The exercise
was conducted simultaneously
at six locations in Italy, Belgium, Norway and Turkey.
Sponsored by NATO’s Allied Command Operations,
SFJO 10 was conducted by U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel J.
Locklear, III, Commander Joint Force Command Naples
(JFC Naples), and directed by German Army Lieutenant
General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre
(JWC). The exercise trained, evaluated and certified JFC
Naples together with its respective Component Commands
of the NRF rotation this year. The main aim was to train
and exercise JFC Naples as Joint HQ Main (JFC Naples
currently leads NRF 16) as well as NATO’s Allied Land
Component Command Madrid (LCC Madrid) for the
Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE).
Based on a sophisticated contingency scenario
related to an asymmetric environment, NATO’s three level
(strategic, operational and tactical) STEADFAST Series of
Exercises are designed to continuously develop the
expeditionary capabilities and functionality of the NRF.
Also, the exercises help maintain a level of readiness
for NATO forces all over Europe. Creating the exercise
scenario for that training falls under the responsibility
of the Joint Warfare Centre’s Joint Exercise Division. It
takes more than a year to fully plan a STEADFAST SERIES.
U.S. Air Force Colonel Jeffrey “Pep” DeVore, Chief
of the JWC’s Joint Exercise Division explained, “It is a
daunting task to take a STEADFAST series exercise from
cradle to grave, especially when you consider we are
working three STEADFAST series exercises in parallel
with two ISAF exercises at one time. On the surface,
the task seems quite simple, but when you realize all
the detail our scenario and planning teams put into
an exercise, even the 13 to 14 month cycle isn’t long
enough to cover all the areas we would like to.”
DeVore went on to explain, “The dynamic security
environment NATO faces today is extremely complex.
Although JWC strives to cover as much as we can for NRF
training, there are always some parts and aspects we will
not be able to cover due to time constraints or resourcing.
But, our job is to prepare the NRF for possible rotation and
we take that responsibility very seriously.”
The scenario for SFJO 10, CERASIA II, was fictitious,
German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre (right) speaks to an attendee at Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10.
22
The Transformer
with various fictional countries involved, and based on a United Nations
mandated NATO-led Crisis Response Operation to restore peace and
security in a war torn region as well as to support reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance, while simulating extensive challenges for the
Training Audience, such as piracy, genocide, internally displaced persons,
natural disasters, lack of water and food supplies and security and
environmental threats. During the exercise, 961 injects were generated
over the 68 incidents in the three main events entitled: Stakeholders,
Threats and Sustainment.
“While the scenario creates the operational environment within
which the Training Audience will deploy, the Main Events List/Main
Incidents List (MEL/MIL) determines which aspects of that environment
will be leveraged to provide opportunities for the participants to achieve
the exercise and training objectives,” said Canadian Army Lieutenant
Colonel John Cullen, an analyst working at JWC’s Joint Training Division and the Chief MEL/MIL for SFJO 10. “In the case of SFJO 10, working
from the exercise and training objectives, from the desired and expected
outcomes of specific NRF processes and activities and by maximising role
players relevant to the scenario, the MEL/MIL introduced challenges to
the participants with a view to causing the Joint HQ to execute the Joint
Coordination Process and to synchronise
the components activities using campaign
assessment to set their priorities. The
MEL/MIL created situations where tension
was introduced between the stability and
security lines of operation; where solutions
required joint planning and coordination
on all time horizons and cooperation across
all of the stakeholders in the comprehensive
environment. The HQs participating in
SFJO 10 exploited the training opportunities
presented by the scenario and the MEL/
MIL, effectively applying a Comprehensive
Approach in a complex operating
environment.”
Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10
involved approximately 2,000 military and
civilian personnel from various commands
including the Rapid Deployment Corps in Italy, the Air Component Command
in Izmir, Turkey, the Special Operations Component in Ankara, Turkey, the
Maritime Component Command in United Kingdom, the Nuclear- Radiological- Biological- Chemical Defence Battalion in Hungary, the Command
Post in Slovenia, the Combined Air Operations Centre in Turkey and the
Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation Group in Italy.
On 14 December 2010, the Joint Warfare Centre hosted a Distinguished Visitor’s Day and welcomed 42 visitors to observe the exercise,
including General Walter Natynczyk, Canadian Chief of the Defence Staff;
Lieutenant General Alfredo Cardona Torres, Commander Allied Force
Command Madrid; Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Commander
Allied Joint Force Command Lisbon; Lieutenant General Vincent Tesniere,
Deputy Commander Allied Air Command Izmir and Major General Thomas
Beckett, Deputy Commander NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy. ■
Article and photos by Inci Kucukaksoy
Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre
CORE TASKS: More
Effective, More
Efficient NATO
Response Force
Each STEADFAST Series of Exercises is
tailored to meet the specific Exercise
Objectives. The Exercise Objectives for
SFJO 10 focussed on practicing
the Comprehensive Approach,
Communication and Information
Systems planning, effective channels of
communication and interaction between
the Main HQ, Forward Element and the
Component Commands, operational
campaign assessment, operational
logistic planning, joint targeting, CBRN
Defence Capability and Strategic Communication (StratCom) and Intelligence.
One peculiarity of the exercise was
the first-time participation of SHAPE
StratCom into the exercise construction.
Thus, the effective involvement of StratCom and their meticulous assessment of
all 68 incidents ensured that the StratCom desired effects were considered and
acted upon throughout the exercise. “A
StratCom presence was required during
the Main Planning Conference, Incident
Development, and Scripting Workshops
to ensure StratCom considerations were
woven into the exercise narrative in a
manner requiring decision makers at
the military strategic, operational and
mission headquarters to ensure StratCom
effects were part of their decisionmaking deliberations,” said Lt Col Rita M.
LePage, Canadian Forces Public Affairs
Officer currently working in the SHAPE
Strategic Communications office. ■
About The JOINT
WARFARE CENTRE
The Training Establishment of the
NATO Alliance: The Joint Warfare Centre
provides the best training support
possible for the collective training and
certification of NATO’s joint operational
and component level Headquarters.
Joint Warfare Centre Mission: As
directed by Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation (SACT), Joint Warfare
Centre promotes and conducts NATO’s
joint and combined experimentation,
analysis and doctrine development
to maximize transformational synergy
and to improve NATO’s capabilities
and interoperability.
Provides operational level training
in support for ongoing operations;
Conducts training of joint and combined
staffs (NATO Command Structure/NATO
Force Structure); Supports concept
and doctrine development; Assists the
developmental and experimental work
of ACT on new concepts, technologies,
modelling and simulation; Performs joint
analysis, collects Lessons Learned, and
feeds them back into the transformational network through the JALLC;
Provides a biannual Iraqi Key Leader
Training course to senior representatives
of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office,
Ministry of Defence and Ministry
of the Interior. ■
The Transformer
23
Virtual Development of NATO’s Lessons Learned Capability:
Outcome of the 2010 Lessons Learned Conference
How to take the
LL capability forward
Introduction
a (somewhat modified) definition for a LL Capability,
develop some insight into the supporting pillars that
the capability should consist of, and apply findings from
recent JALLC analyses to determining the critical success
factors for the capability. The remainder of this article
will discuss these three aspects, which have since been
presented in greater depth to HQ SACT leadership in
a point paper called Lessons Learned Capability –
An Examination & Proposal.2
Nations which determined that there are three critical
factors for the success of a LL Capability. These are
Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement, and Information
Assurance. Panel discussions led to the idea that, of
these factors, Leadership is so important that it too
merits being considered a base for the supporting pillars.
Consensus at the conference was strongest on the
need for Sharing to be the fundamental tie binding the
pillars of the LL Capability together. Without Sharing,
The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)
hosted the 2010 NATO Lessons Learned (LL) Conference
in Lisbon, Portugal from October 26-28. The aim of the
conference was to provide NATO’s forum for exchange
of information within the NATO LL community and, in
so doing, to stimulate discussion on best practices for
LL Capability – A Definition
joint analysis, the LL Process, Remedial Action Processes,
The definition of a LL Capability as
and supporting tools. One of the two specific goals of
agreed at the 2010 NATO LL Conference is:
this year’s conference was to determine what
“A lessons learned capability provides a
constitutes a LL Capability.1
commander with the structure, process
The term “LL Capability” has been adopted within
and tools necessary to capture, analyse
ACT over the last year and a half and several articles
and take remedial action on any issue
published in The Transformer and JWC’s Three Swords by
and to communicate and share results to
HQ SACT LL staff in that time have attempted to describe
achieve improvement. A desire to improve
what such a capability might be. They have focused on
and the right mindset are essential to
describing the value of this capability and the LL elements ensure that the capability works
Figure 1 – The LL Capability Temple
available within NATO to support it. Where these articles
in harmony.”
(and other documents such as recent drafts for a revised
The most significant change made to that
Bi-SC LL Directive) have missed the point however is in
definition proposed at the beginning of the conference
which should take place at all phases in a LL Process,
not defining the term “LL Capability”, not explaining the
was to substitute the word “commander” for “an
lessons that are identified or learned and which are not
way in which the existing
organisation or headshared results in their potential value being severely
elements are expected to
quarters,” as “commander” limited–particularly in an organisation like NATO.
contribute to developing
emphasizes the critical
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of a LL
this Capability, and in not
role of leadership and
Capability’s supporting pillars and bases, a figure
indentifying the critical
command responsibility
which JALLC refers to as the LL Capability Temple.
In order to provide an opportunity to readers
factors for success of this
in the overall LL capability,
for discussing further development of the
capability. Perhaps most
The Supporting Pillars
one of the critical success
LL
Capability
in NATO, JALLC has opened a forum
significantly, prior to this
Processes
factors that will be
in
the
NATO
LL
Portal.
To
participate,
year’s LL Conference, no
There are two processes, internal and external.
discussed below.
please visit the LL Portal at http://nllp.jallc.nato.int
one had addressed the
A LL Capability needs The former provides the nation, headquarters, or
on either the NS WAN or the Internet.
question of who exactly
organisation with the requisite mechanisms to facilitate
to consist of supporting
should benefit from this
the gathering of observations, to staff and analyse those
pillars, which at the
capability; that is, who is
observations, to endorse and take remedial action (as
conference were proposed
it that needs to learn individual lessons. Thus this year’s
applicable), and finally to assist subordinate commands
and, after some discussion, generally agreed to be:
conference presented a valuable opportunity to agree
with their lessons. The latter provides the ability to
Processes, Structures, and Tools, all resting on a base of
a definition for such a Capability and discuss these
access, view and share lessons from/to external sources.
a common Mindset for collecting, implementing, and
other aspects.
Clearly, the processes go hand-in-glove with the
sharing lessons. The right Mindset requires a desire to
On the first day of the conference, COL Nick
structures and tools.
improve and, as we belong to an alliance of nations, a
Lipscombe, GBR A and JALLC LL Analysis Branch Chief,
desire to share that improvement for the greater benefit
presented a draft definition of a LL Capability and some
Structures
of the organisation as a whole. The right mindset is,
background discussion as food for thought. Over the next
There are two parts to the structures: the policy and the
therefore, what underpins the LL Capability–without
two days this background and draft definition served as
people. First, structures require a clear delineation of LL
it the pillars will not stand up.
the basis for much of the panel discussion and, by the
procedures and responsibilities and so policy, directives
Also presented at the conference were findings from
time the conference closed, attendees were able to agree
and operating procedures are needed to ensure full
a recent JALLC Analysis of LL Sharing in NATO and the
Discussion Forum
on the NATO LL Portal
24
The Transformer
understanding, compliance and common and
reciprocated functionality of the processes and tools.
Second, LL staff officers (LLSO) need to be trained on
these processes and be provided in the right numbers
at the right locations within the NCS and NFS (or other
nation, HQ or organization) so that the LLSO has a
thorough understanding of the field within which
he/she is operating. LLSOs should have access to
commanders and the key leaders who are empowered
to prioritize, endorse and task; in short, to ensure that
the remedial action process functions smoothly.
It is interesting to note that there is no standard
location of the LL staff within HQ structures. Some are
located in the Knowledge Management Directorate
(KMDs), others in operations directorates (mainly under
training branches) and some in resources/logistical
directorates. The one area that would seem to be the
most suitable to ensuring the requisite profile and
support is in the command group, yet not one HQ
appears to have considered this.
Tools
There was broad agreement that the tools required to
execute a LL capability are, firstly, technological tools to
facilitate staffing and sharing of lessons and, secondly,
training and education. With the former, the most
obvious is some form of LL database, preferably one that
is compatible and accessible across all parts of NATO and
contributing nations, including Partner Nations. There
is no doubt that the more user friendly the technological
tools and the smoother the process, the greater the
probability of LL Practitioners and Stakeholders using
them and the higher the likelihood of sharing among
users. On the other hand, there appears to be a danger
that the availability of technological sharing and staffing
tools can engender an assumption, among the staff that
use them, that the tools will allow automatic learning
of lessons without any active effort on the part of those
who need to learn them.3 No technological tool is a
substitute for thought and effort applied by trained
and engaged LLSOs, Stakeholders, and Leaders.
The other tool is Education and Training, which is
crucial to ensuring a common understanding of the
process and a commonality of execution across the
capability spectrum. In NATO there are (currently) two
courses; the LL SOs’ course and the LL Analysts’ course.
Nations and individual HQs also offer various forms
of LLSO Training.
Critical Success Factors
As mentioned above, the JALLC report on The Lessons
Learned Process and Lesson Sharing in NATO and Nations
identified three critical factors for success of any LL
process. These are: Leadership Engagement, Stakeholder
Responsibility, and Information Assurance. Each needs
to be included in the development of NATO’s LL Capability,
for, in their absence, few are the lessons being learned in
NATO by those who need to learn them and too seldom
are they shared.
Conclusion
JALLC believes that a LL Capability as described in this
article can provide the framework for increased lesson
learning in NATO, but the capability cannot succeed
without leaders and stakeholders. JALLC’s goal for the
2011 LL conference is to include more of the stakeholders–
Leadership
operators, planners, logisticians–while reducing the
JALLC has found that successful LL Processes are often
number of pure LL practitioners, especially participants
personality driven, from the top down, while less sucfrom national LL organisations that are not directly
cessful ones often can be found in organisations where
involved in the development of NATO’s LL Capability. We
leaders, despite paying lip service to the importance of LL, also intend to include the NATO standardization working
often are not engaged in driving the process or are not
groups, who we consider to be the principle stakeholders
accessible to their LL practitioners. For a LL Capability to
in a great number of the lessons that arise from JALLC
work, leaders must be engaged and they must be
analyses, and a broader cross section of NATO Force
provided with high quality (see the success factor
Structure HQs. Including these vital elements of the LL
Information Assurance), actionable written products
Capability can only help in furthering its development.
and they must give direction based on those products
However, the mere existence of a LL Capability and
to the appropriate stakeholders and action bodies. And
its constituent elements does not guarantee that NATO
they must hold assigned stakeholders and action bodies
can become a successful learning organisation. As
accountable for executing actions assigned.
Danish Air Force, Brigadier General Peter Sonneby,
JALLC Commander
Stakeholder
stated in his closing
Responsibility
remarks at the
LL Practitioners, the LLSOs
conference, LL
and data collectors, are
Practitioners are not the
not the beneficiaries of a
Stakeholders in LL. They
In 2010, JALLC inaugurated a newsletter to keep
lesson or, by extension,
do not benefit from learning
the LL Community apprised of JALLC activities and
the existence of a LL
specific, individual lessons.
LL developments. The Explorer is published
Capability – Stakeholders
They are merely the
in electronic format and is available
are. Stakeholders are the
facilitators to help leaders
on both our NS WAN and our Internet sites.
persons or organisations
and stakeholders learn
[www.jallc.nato.int]
that are affected by a
lessons and implement
problem and/or its
change. No LL Practitioner
resolution. For this reason, stakeholder involvement is
has the authority to make major changes within an
crucial to organisational learning. Stakeholders must be
organisation; that is, to require other branches or
made aware of lessons that affect them, be convinced
individuals to learn a given lesson or change the way
of the value they present, and be tasked and held
they do business. Even JALLC, a key element making
accountable by leaders for taking action based on those
up NATO’s LL Capability, can do no more than make
lessons. Stakeholders must bring to light those problems
recommendations to NATO’s leaders based on our analysis
that they believe can be rectified through the LL Process.
work. JALLC cannot make them act upon those recommendations. They are free to disregard them – at NATO’s peril. ■
Information Assurance
Proper staffing of lessons is essential in order to be
By Mr. Chuck Ridgway NATO CIV and COL Nick Lipscombe GBR A
1
able to ensure their validity and applicability for the
The other was How to turn Lessons Identified into Lessons Learned,
which, as it turns out, is closely related to the existence of a LL
stakeholders affected. For lessons originating within
Capability and, in particular, the presence of the three critical factors
success of for that capability that will be discussed in this article.
an organisation, decisions based on faulty information
2
The subject point paper is available on request from JALLC via the
NS WAN. A complete report on the proceedings of the 2010 NATO LL
or inadequate assessments may lead to more problems
Conference, including those portions not related to the subject of this
rather than correction of existing ones. When implementing
article, can be found on JALLC’s NS and unclassified Internet sites.
[www.jallc.nato.int].
external lessons, the originator’s analysis must be
3
That is to say, an attitude that merely entering a lesson into a LLDb is
tantamount to all stakeholders achieving instantly the required level
trustworthy. A system must be in place to verify and
of awareness of the issue and the remedial action being implemented.
JALLC has seen many examples of this assumption, most recently in a
validate raw observations, to ensure the correct root
proposal by one headquarters to establish an automatic data dump of
causes and remedial actions are identified, and to
all lessons in their internal LL archive into the NATO LLDb maintained
by JALLC without any staffing or intellectual review by a sentient
separate low-value/quality lessons from good ones.
human being, as if such data transfer were equivalent to all NATO
JALLC’s New Newsletter The Explorer
learning these, as yet unstaffed or unendorsed, lessons from theatre.
The Transformer
25