Mark Voyger
NATO Allied Land Command
Lawfare as the Pivot of RUS
Hybrid Warfare:
RUS Use of the Law as an
Instrument of State Power
RUS Hybrid Warfare ‘Hydra’:
Deployable abroad and inside RUS
INTELLIGENCE
DIPLOMATIC
LEGAL
SOCIO-CULTURAL
TARGET NATION
POLITICAL
INFORMATION
RUS adversaries
and
RUS population
ECONOMIC
INFRASTRUCTURE
RUS HYBRID
CYBER
CONVENTIONAL
WARFARE
STRANDS
Mapping LAWFARE: Intersection of
PMESII/DIMEFIL with Areas of Law
LAWFARE
LAW
POLITICAL
DIPLOMATIC
SOCIO-CULT
ECON-FIN
THEORY
Sovereignty
vs. selfdetermination
Spheres of
interest
Cultural values
over individual
rights
INT’L ORG
Exploitation of
UN SC, OSCE
INT’L
TREATIES
Rebus sic
stantibus
vs. pacta sunt
servanda
RUS-SYR SOFA: No
RUS liability for
war crimes on SYR
territory
RUS treatymaking: Using
negotiations to
delay and
regroup
Exploiting
energy
contracts,
loans to UKR
CUST INT’L
LAW
Fluidity, based
on practices of
states
Passportization
RUS citizenship
on historical
grounds
Immunity of
foreign
companies
HUMANIT
LAW
Responsibility
to protect
compatriots
CONSTIT
LAW
Supremacy of
RUS
Constitution
over int’l law
CRIMINAL
LAW
Suppression of
‘Color
Revolutions’
Use of Interpol to
issue arrest
warrants for UKR
officials
Closing of
minority groups’
institutions
Prosecuting
Russians
abroad
Nazi accusations
against UKR,
Baltic States
INFO
INFRA
INTEL
MIL
CONV
Exploiting
int’l org for
intel
Color
Revolutions
– domestic
threat
MIL-NON
CONV
RUS and Soviet Lawfare: Historical Perspective
RUS and Soviet Experience with Nation-State System (18th–20th c.)
•
Partition of sovereign states (POL – 3 times in 18th c.)
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Suppression of nationalist movements (POL, HUN)
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Division of spheres of influence (along with other Great Powers)
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Use of ethno-religious rifts to destabilize neighbors (Ottomans)
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Limited sovereignty of Soviet satellites (HUN, CZE, POL)
RUS Empire Lawfare: Skipping the Lessons of Westphalia 1648
•
The Kucuk-Kaynarca Treaty of 1774: RUS as the protector of the Balkan
Christians
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Catherine the Great: 1783 Proclamation of Annexation of Crimea
•
RUS Expansionism in 19th c.: Legal Justifications
Soviet Lawfare:
•
“We can and we must!”: Lenin’s 1919 Speech on Probing POL
•
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact 1939: Nullity of Soviet guarantees to POL
•
Formal declarations of war: extracting contributions legally
•
Export of Bolshevik revolution (POL, HUN, DEU, BGR, SPA)
•
Third World Decolonization
RUS Use of the Law as an Instrument of State Power
Customary International Law and Law of Armed
Conflict:
• Prevent war through negotiations and
agreements
• Regulate the right to go to war (jus ad bellum);
• Set the rules of engagement and the laws of
war (jus in bello)
• Normalize post-war relations through
ceasefires, armistices and peace treaties.
International law is NOT carved in stone:
• “International law is what states make of it”
• Based on fundamental legal principles but also
derives from state practices
RUS Bending of International Law:
• RUS unable to change international legal
system on its own ‘de jure’
• Attempts to change it ‘de facto’ (legal
revisionism)
RUS Exploitation of Legal Loopholes:
• Minsk 2 Provisions: on RUS-UKR border and
on foreign formations and units in UKR
• Manipulations of the Vienna Document 2011:
‘no notice’ exercises, troop numbers
RUS Decision-makers: legal background!
RUS Lawfare: The Actors
Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation
• ‘Making it all legal’
Valentina Matvienko, Federation Council [RUS Senate] Chair
• Authorizing use of RUS troops abroad
Sergey Naryshkin, RUS Duma [RUS House] Speaker (until 2016)
• Statements on RUS encirclement by NATO ‘beachheads’
Dmitriy Medvedev, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation
• RUS government’s rubberstamping of Presidential policies
Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation
• RUS Foreign Policy and Status in the World: Polycentric World
• Expanded use of RUS compatriots abroad
• RUS MOFA’s “White Book on Human Rights Abuses in UKR”
• RUS MOFA representatives: from human rights to nuclear treaties
RUS as the Perceived Target of ‘Western Lawfare’
A. Bastrykin, RF Investigative Committee Chairman:
• International law as tool of Western Hybrid Warfare
• RUS to counter by tighter social, information and financial control
Supremacy of RUS Constitution over International Law:
• Theoretical justification (Jun 2015), Enacted into law (Dec 2015)
• RUS Law on Foreign Property (23 Oct 2015)
• RF Constitutional Court vs. EU Court on Human rights
Yuriy Chayka, General Prosecutor of the RF
• Report on the status of law-enforcement and rule of law in RUS – 27 Apr
2016, RF Federation Council
• UKR ‘Right Sector’ accused of attempting to organize a coup in RUS
• Preventing social unrest by blocking social media
Maj-Gen. Moskalkovska, new RF Ombudsman (22 APR 2016)
• Former Head of Legal Department of RUS Ministry of Interior
• Threat: Human rights theme exploited by the West to destabilize RUS
• Response: Expand protection of RUS compatriots abroad
• Objective: “Protect not only the individual, but mostly the system of values”
RUS PERCEPTIONS OF ‘COLOR REVOLUTIONS’:
THE KRONOS SYNDROME
‘Color Revolutions’: A Western Hybrid
Warfare Tool
• ‘Kronos Syndrome’: Pre-emptive
fear of violent regime-change
among elites in states historically
prone to revolutions and coups
•
Moscow Security Conference 27 Apr
2016: Color Revolutions as Regional
Destabilization
• Domestic Military Threat: RUS
National Guard
• Concept used by RUS to muster
support among autocracies in
former Soviet space: Central Asia,
Belarus
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION OF RUS ACTIONS IN UKR:
LAWFARE IN ACTION
•
•
•
•
RUS Rationale (Spring 2014)
Engineering of socio-political facts on the ground in UKR
Ethno-cultural divisions to trigger regional secession
Incorporation into the RF through expedited local referenda
Justification of RUS military intervention to protect RUS citizens
Legal basis of RUS actions
•
Draft Amendment Bill for accession of new territories to the RF
(28 February 2014)
•
Crimea Referendum (16 March 2014)
RUS Creative Bending of International Law
RUS citizenship through RUS passports
• Abkhazia, S. Ossetia, Crimea, Donbas
RUS Citizenship Law Amendment (Apr 2016)
• Historical, cultural, linguistic principles
Anti-Nazism: Legitimation of RUS Actions
• Anti-Kyiv/Baltics Nazi Propaganda Claims
• Anti-Nazi Declaration at UN
• Stalin’s 1941 Order (Igor Girkin/Strelkov)
RUS ‘Humanitarian’ interventionism
• Transnistria, Abkhazia, Crimea, Donbass
• Appeals to UN from Donbass Militants
• ‘Humanitarian Convoys’ Technique
• Expanding RUS ‘Responsibility to Protect’
RUS Lawfare: Harassment of the ‘Near Abroad’
RUS Lawfare and Donbas Separatism:
• 1971 UN Decolonization Declaration: Legal Grounds of
Donbas Separatist ‘Road Map’ of May 2014
‘Legal Revivalism’: LTU Draft Dodgers Case
• Harassing neighbors by reviving defunct Soviet laws
• Dissolution of the Soviet Union ‘illegal’
Kidnappings and High-Profile Trials:
• Nadezhda Savchenko et al., Eston Kohver
Permeability of Borders:
• Securing the borders in Eastern Europe
• Unilateral Demarcation: Legitimacy vs. Legality
RUS High Seas Harassment: LTU Fishing Vessel
• Contested Areas in the High North
RUS Lawfare in the Arctic and the Black Sea:
Matching Legal with Lethal
RUS Arctic Claims: The Lomonosov Ridge
•
2001 initial RUS claim before UN
•
2007 North Pole RUS flag planting
•
2014 research results
•
2015 re-submission
De facto Black Sea borders
Implications for the International System and
Security Architecture
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Areas vulnerable to RUS Lawfare:
Crimea and Donbas
Unregulated borders along RUS periphery
The Arctic/High North
Belarus and Kazakhstan
The ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Transnistria, Ossetia, NagornoKarabakh
RUS ‘Lawfare’: Strengths and Weaknesses
‘Under the radar’, less unrecognizable
Exploits existing legal loopholes
Uses negotiations to delay and regroup
Creates ambiguity among allies
Cannot remain secret: provides indications of RUS
intent and potential actions
Can be countered conceptually and in practice
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Recommendations:
Include “L” in the PMESII framework
Track
and
analyze
RUS
legal
developments
Counter proactively RUS bending of
international law
Uphold
peremptory
norms
of
international law
Expose the political purposes behind RUS
‘peacemaking’
Oppose RUS ‘responsibility to protect’
Close existing ‘loopholes’ exploited by
RUS
Approach negotiations with RUS as a
multi-dimensional chess game: calculate
future RUS moves, beware of potential
loopholes
RUS LAWFARE: THE DARK SIDE OF THE LAW
The Final Answer:
“I WILL MAKE IT LEGAL!”