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Politicus Journal
Editor’s Letter
It gives us great pleasure to release Politicus Journal’s first Issue of the fourth Volume of our
publication! Both myself and Daniel were amazed by the quality of the submissions we received
from Queen’s students who represented a diverse array of both faculty discipline and year of study,
and this issue shows just that.
Of course, there are a number of committed and passionate individuals who we must thank in
particular for, without their tireless support and dedication, this unique forum for undergraduate
academic engagement could not continue to exist.
First and foremost, an immense thank you must go to the team of devoted student volunteers that
make up both our Management Board and our Editorial Board. The impassioned work of these
individuals is not only what allows Politicus Journal to function, but truly thrive as an academic
organization.
A very gracious thank you must also go to our distinguished academic partners and panel of
referees who took time out of their rigorous schedules to assist in the making of this issue, namely,
Professor Stéfanie von Hlatky, Professor Hans Christian Breede, Professor Kyle Hanniman, and
Professor Jessica Merolli from the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s. Your guidance and
support are the reason why the Politicus Journal, as an undergraduate student-run organization, is
able to continue learning, developing, and growing within academic circles.
Finally, we would also like to thank the Arts and Science Undergraduate Society for their
continued financial generosity and logistical support. Namely, we must highlight the support of
Mitch Thibault, Brian MacKay, and Darrean Baga for their encouragement and support in all
aspects of the Journal.
So here’s to a wonderful first Issue of Volume four and we both look forward to starting on the
second!
Sincerely,
Ryan Anderson & Daniel Cassese
Co-Managing Editors, 2016-2017
1
Politicus Journal
Contents
The Quebec and Northern Ireland Conflict: The Use of Violence
to Promote Independence and/or Recognition
4
Harrison Kennedy
The Future of Nuclear Sharing: Anglo-American Lion’s Subsidiary
Concern with the Sovereign Scottish Sheep
15
Willow S.R. Hillman
Competing for Power: How Russian-American Relations Have
Affected the War in Syria
31
Eli Berman
France and the National Front: Exploring Economic Regime Crisis
and the Rise of the Far Right
48
Alexandra Lloyd
New Medievalism in Lebanon: The Case of Hezbollah
63
Connor Klauck
Volume Four | Issue One | February 2017
2
Politicus Journal
The Quebec and Northern Ireland Conflict: The Use of Violence to
Promote Independence and/or Recognition
Harrison Kennedy
This article investigates the use of violence by separatist movements within their
respective countries, to examine how effective they are in gaining independence or
recognition from the state. The main examples that will be compared are Québec and
Northern Ireland. This article focuses on the time period from approximately 1920 to
1980, a time when there were rising tensions among separatists in Québec and
Nationalists/Catholics in Northern Ireland. In both cases, led to the use of violence as
means to gain independence. The article will show how a group of terrorist
organizations used violent means in order to achieve independence for their respective
regions. The use of violence would prove to be unsuccessful in achieving
independence, but nevertheless would promote the separatist movement to find
alternative peaceful ways to achieve greater recognition within the state.
Introduction
This article examines the use of violence, such as bombings, assassinations, or kidnappings, by
separatist movements as a means to achieve their ends. It questions both the degree to which these
acts of violence were supported by the independence movements, and how effective they were in
achieving recognition from the state’s government from which they sought independence. This
article will focus on a comparison of Québec and Northern Ireland. This comparison is apt due to
the similarities of their nationalist movements and parliamentary structure. Both utilize the
Westminster system of government and present similar timeframes of violence during the 1960s
and 1970s. The struggles of the movements in Québec and Northern Ireland centred on the
respective population's national identity and their minority status within their countries. Québec's
people faced the challenge of the French language losing its status as the primary language of the
province, while Northern Ireland's struggles involved the Catholic minority, who wanted to
separate from Great Britain. This article will ultimately argue that the use of violence was used to
3
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promote independence and recognition, also explaining how the use of violence fueled the
independence movements in the comparative cases of Québec and Northern Ireland. However, the
use of violence would be unsuccessful to achieve independence for the respective regions. The
resolve of the governing bodies had been underestimated, which necessitated finding less violent
routes to achieve greater recognition within the regions.
This article first explores the background history of Québec and Northern Ireland’s
nationalist groups from approximately 1920 to 1960, as a means to better understand the history
of struggle and suppression within their respective states. It is important to examine the position
of each government in order to understand the difficulties faced by each of the independence
movements. Secondly, the article provides an examination of the rise of violence by nationalist
movements during the 1960s and 1970s in their efforts to achieve independence from the
governing country. This section will also discuss how the respective governments responded to
the rise of violence by political and police/military means. Thirdly, after reflecting on the use of
violence by separatist movements, this article addresses how violence itself provided the
inspiration for them to continue their efforts; rather than giving up their cause. They were
determined that their efforts would not be wasted, so they sought other non-violent means to
continue the separatist movement during the 1980s. Separatism as a movement would thus undergo
a transformation; though violence had been ineffective, in both cases it had strengthened the will
to continue.
Definitions
Before going further, it is important to define some key terms. Separatism or independence
movements can be defined as minority ethnic or cultural groups pursuing their own nationalist
goals, which are different from the main collective of the state’s people ethnically and culturally.1
In addition, violence is the use of physical force against one’s perceived enemy.2 The examples
shown in this article will show separatist organizations’ use of violent methods, which include
bombings, assassinations and kidnappings. The use of violence can result from a degree of
1
Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People, 3rd ed
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 77, 108.
2
Tommy McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament (London: Pluto
Press, 2011), 3.
4
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oppression being put on a select group by a state. This in turn is deemed by the oppressed group
as justification for the use of physical violence against the state, to challenge its central control.
The term terrorism can be understood as “in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose,
objective or cause… with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public.”3
These definitions help focus the understanding of these terms, which will be used throughout the
rest of the article.
Historical Background of Quebec and Northern Ireland
Québec struggled with its identity significantly in the early half of the 20th century, especially as a
result of the challenges to the French language and culture within the Federation of Canada. The
1920s to the 1940s saw the rise of industrialization in Québec, but Québecers had difficulty coping
with this kind of expansion, due to inadequate education and training. 4 More importantly, the
French language was not an integral part of the business, industrial or technological fields, which
were dominated by English-speaking people. There are many examples of French workers striking
due to this unequal treatment of the French language and culture, such as the Asbestos strike in
1949. French Canadians developed a defensive attitude against English Canadian domination.5
The Québecois people formed the majority in Québec and lived in their own province within the
Canadian Federation. Québec’s Government, under Maurice Duplessis from the late 1940s through
most of the 1950s, created little change in Québec society and arguably Duplessis lacked
progressive intentions. Progress in Québec would not improve until his death in 1959 and the rise
of the Québec Liberal Party in 1960, leading to a new age for Québec.6
Northern Ireland faced its own struggles during the same timeframe, though different in
some ways to those of Québec. Northern Ireland is a state in which a fight for domination exists
between two groups. Ireland was partitioned in 1920, a move which was ratified with the Anglo
3
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.01.
4
Laurier LaPierre, “Quebec: October 1970,” The North American Review 256, no. 3 (1971): 2425.
5
Peter Desbarats, Rene: A Canadian in Search of a Country (Toronto: Seal Books, 1976), 89-90.
6
Luc Bernier, “Chapter 7: Who Governs in Quebec? Revolving Premiers and Reforms.” In
Executive Styles in Canada: Cabinet Structures and Leadership Practices in Canadian
Government, ed. Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey and Michael Howlett (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2010), 133-134.
5
Politicus Journal
Irish Treaty in 1921.7 Thus the southern part of Ireland became a free state with dominion status
and a Catholic majority, whereas Northern Ireland would remain a part of Great Britain with a
Protestant majority and a minority Catholic population. It is important to understand that in
Northern Ireland the population had two factions, the first being the Unionist/Protestants, who
were loyal to the union with Great Britain. The second faction was made up of the nationalists,
who were mostly Catholics seeking to reunite all of Ireland.8 Northern Ireland developed into a
“particularist regime,” a state where one group of people imposed hegemonic control over all other
minority groups within the state, in this case the Catholics.9 There was a great deal of
discrimination by the Unionist/Protestants against the Nationalist/Catholics. This included
limitations on Catholics who could vote in elections, discrimination in employment and difficulty
obtaining housing; Catholics generally had fewer skills compared to Protestants.10 The oppressive
use of police and security services increased with the Special Powers Act in 1922 which enabled
authorities to intern people without trial, removed the need for warrants, established curfews,
prohibited inquiries (i.e. into authorities killing civilians) and authorized the use of force to obtain
information.11 This would continue over the decades and led to the rise of protests as well as
eventual violence.
Rising Nationalism and the Use of Violence
The 1960s saw the rise of a strong nationalistic movement in Québec. Part of this was called the
Quiet Revolution, which was a major political event with the Québec Liberal Party coming into
power.12 Québec became more defined as a nation, with the purpose of the Québec government
shifting to be more involved in the protection of French Canadian values in Québec. In addition,
the Quiet Revolution resulted in Québecois realizing they were able to control their own destiny
through the Quebec government’s reforms. However, there would also be the rise of Québec
7
Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 2nd ed. (Routledge: New York, 2013),
15.
8
Ibid., 3.
9
Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism Understanding Northern
Ireland, 2nd ed. (London: The Athlone Press Ltd, 1997), 108-109.
10
Ibid., 119-120, 129-130.
11
Ibid., 125-127.
12
Laurier LaPierre, “Québec: October 1970” The North American Review 256, no. 3 (1971): 25.
6
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Separatism. In 1960, the political organization Rally for National Independence asserted its main
aim as the “outright independence of Québec”.13 During the 1960s, a preliminary report of the
Canadian Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism stated that the disadvantage of
the French-speaking Canadians lay especially in economic and social terms, including low wages
and underrepresentation in government employment and public service.14 As an outcome of the
Commission, the Federal Government enacted both English and French as the official languages
in 1969.15 However, the nationalism movement was on the rise in Québec and was beginning to
use violence to have their voice heard.
The Front de liberation du Québec (Québec Liberation Front – FLQ) was established in
1963 as a separatist revolutionary terrorist group to lead worker uprisings, which in turn targeted
English businesses and political establishments with the use of “robberies, violence, bombings,
kidnappings and selective assassinations, culminating in insurrection and revolution.”16 The FLQ’s
actions escalated in intensity throughout the 1960s.17 The FLQ terrorist group’s objective was “the
violent destruction of the Canadian Federation – the disruption, through criminal activity, of a
country whose population had conferred political responsibility on [the Federal government].”18
The FLQ was not a unified body, but operated as cells, which “were constantly breaking up and
reforming because of police raids, arrests, and convictions in court, and also because of differences
among the members.”19 April 1963 saw the first death, a 65 year old watchman and war veteran at
a Canadian Military recruitment centre caused by an FLQ bomb.20 The FLQ responded:
“[u]nfortunately, a revolution cannot be carried out without bloodshed. A man is dead, but the
13
Reginald Whitaker, Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress
America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 272.
14
Janet Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 26.
15
Ibid., 27-28.
16
William Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider View (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2007), 18-19, 21.
17
LaPierre, “Québec: October 1970,” 26.
18
Pierre E. Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993), 132.
19
Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider View, 21.
20
Whitaker, Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada, 272.
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Politicus Journal
revolution will go forward.”21 There were more than 200 bombs detonated between 1963 and
October 1970.22
The FLQ was seen as a growing and active threat during the early 1960s and continued to
escalate their activities. The Québec separatist movement started to rise significantly, exemplified
by the use of violence by the FLQ during the October Crisis, which started on October 5, 1970
with the kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner. The FLQ demands included
the publication of the FLQ manifesto, the liberation of political prisoners, an airplane to transport
the kidnappers to Cuba and $500,000 in gold.23 On October 10, Québec’s Minister of Labour and
Immigration, Pierre Laporte, was kidnapped by a different FLQ cell and would later be executed
on October 17.24
The October Crisis found the Federal Government, the Québec Provincial Government, the
City of Montréal and their respective police forces underprepared as they “had never before
experienced such a concentrated terrorist action, with kidnappings and sustained confrontation.”25
The October Crisis resulted in a major turning point for Québec, as it was driven into a chaotic
period of domestic violence and disorder. Hours after the kidnapping of Pierre Laporte, Québec
Premier Bourassa called on Prime Minister Trudeau to enact the War Measures Act.26 Trudeau’s
response to Bourassa was that the Québec Attorney General could request armed forces to aid
them, but the WMA could not be simply enacted. The federal government also had concern about
a lack of intelligence of the current crisis, making it difficult to determine if Québec was actually
in a “state of emergency” that would justify imposition of the WMA.27 They both decided to wait
and see how events progressed.28 Under specific circumstances the WMA can be used when there
is “a state of war, real or apprehended, or insurrection, real or apprehended”; therefore, under threat
of a possible insurrection in Québec the WMA was officially enacted on October 16, 1970.29 By
the time that Cross was released from captivity in early December, the Police Services in Québec
21
Ibid., 272.
22
Ibid., 31-32.
23
LaPierre, “Québec: October 1970,” 23.
24
Whitaker, Secret Service: Political Policing in, 32, 21-22, 24.
25
Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider View, 94.
26
Trudeau, Memoirs, 137.
27
Ibid., 137.
28
Ibid., 137-138.
29
Ibid., 142.
8
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had arrested 453 people during the enactment of the WMA.30 In addition, approximately 200
people were arrested prior to WMA enactment. On November 1970, the Québec Government
estimated the FLQ had 100-125 men as part of the terrorist group, which was enough to make the
Québec Government concerned about the stability of the law and order of Québec.31 In the end,
the use of violence by the FLQ did not achieve independence for Québec. However, this did
promote independence to be pursued by other non-violent means, due to the strength of the
Canadian Government and its military reaction to the situation.
The use of violence can also be seen in the actions of Nationalists/Catholics in Northern
Ireland, who were the primary agitators for change. The Nationalists advocated for reforms due to
the discrimination faced by Catholics in the job market, housing, unfair electoral reform and the
stern powers used by the police authorities in Northern Ireland throughout the mid-1960s.32 The
actions were unproductive until 1968 and the use of civil rights marches, “which were to become
increasingly
provocative.”33
Nationalists/Catholics
challenged
the
status
quo
of
Unionist/Protestant domination of Northern Ireland and faced attacks by Unionists and even by
government authorities.34 Inspired by the civil rights movement of African Americans in the United
States, Northern Ireland saw a similar rise in the advocacy of civil rights during the 1960s.35 The
British Army was deployed in August 1969 in order to stabilize the region.36 The British Army’s
deployment was to help maintain the status quo of the political power in Northern Ireland, which
was a disadvantage to Nationalists/Catholics.37 There were many issues that incited the rise in the
use of violence in Northern Ireland at this time, including the internment of Catholics in 1971 by
the British authorities.38 Another issue occurred in January 30, 1972, when British soldiers fired
30
LaPierre, Québec: October 1970, 28.
31
Tetley, The October Crisis, 1970: An Insider View, 28.
32
Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict
and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 124-125.
33
Ibid., 124-125.
34
McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament, 3.
35
Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 36.
36
Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War, 20.
37
Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 18-19.
38
Ibid., 44-45.
9
Politicus Journal
on a nationalist civil rights crowd of approximately 3000-5000 people in Londonderry; 13 civilians
were killed and similar amount were injured.39
The peaceful protests transitioned into the use of violence by the beginning of 1969, due to
the failure, by peaceful means, to attain civil rights.40 The Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) was not fully established until 1970. Their purpose was to reunite Ireland and end British
rule by violent means, which they hoped would eventually restore balance for the rights of
Nationalists/Catholics in Northern Ireland.41 The PIRA continued the legacy of hundreds of years
of Irish conflict against British rule and they adhered to the proclamation of the 1916 declaration
uprising that all of Ireland is to be an Irish Republic.42 In 1971 and 1972, the PIRA started a
campaign against British rule in Northern Ireland, in which it targeted British soldiers and bombed
British and Unionist owned businesses.43
In February 1971, the first British soldier was killed by the PIRA, which would start to grow
stronger by attaining increased finances and gaining access to modern Russian and Libyan made
weaponry.44 In July 1972, PIRA targeted Belfast, which resulted in the deaths of nine people,
becoming known as Bloody Sunday.45 These incidents would greatly fuel anger towards the British
and Unionist rule in Northern Ireland. A bombing campaign started in England, targeting London
in 1973 and also led to the killings of 22 civilians in a Birmingham pub in 1974.46 In response to
the violence, the legislature in Northern Ireland was prorogued in 1972 and the British Government
established direct rule in Northern Ireland.47 The conflict in Northern Ireland would continue, a
conflict that would be difficult to halt, due to the mutual anger and hatred between both groups.
39
Lord John Widgery, Bloody Sunday: Lord Widgery’s Report of Events in Londonderry Northern
Ireland on 30 January 1972 (London: Stationary Office, 2001), 1, 23.
40
McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament, 1.
41
Tonge, Northern Ireland, 41, 61.
42
Ibid., 41.
43
McKearney, The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament, 112.
44
Tonge, Northern Ireland, 46.
45
Ibid., 47.
46
Tonge, Northern Ireland, 48.
47
Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 76-77.
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Peaceful Means of Independence/Resolution
The use of violence was not successful in attaining Québec independence, but it would help
promote the movement through non-violent means, especially through the political field. The Parti
Québécois (PQ), which was a separatist party, rose to power in 1976, earning 71 seats in the
Québec legislature with 41.4 percent of the votes.48 The major enactment by the PQ was legislating
the protection of the French language in order to avoid the dwindling use of French in Canada,
thereby protecting the presence of the culture in Québec.49 The PQ was deeply interested in
separating from Canada, and developed the concept of Sovereignty-Association to allow equal
working partnership between Québec and Canada and to “increase the autonomy of the Québec,
but abdicate part of sovereignty to maintain economic ties with Canada.”50 A referendum on
Sovereignty-Association was scheduled for 1980.
The Québec referendum would ask Québecers to give permission for the government to
“negotiate sovereignty for Québec and a new political, economic and linguistic relationship with
the rest of Canada.”51 The Québec Liberal Party was opposed to the wording of the referendum
question, and challenged that the PQ party did not explain how the economic situation could
radically change the relationship between the provincial and the Federal government.52 The rising
interest for Québec independence from Canada continued to grow. In 1962 only eight percent of
Québecers wanted to separate, rising to 20 percent in 1976, then finally 25 percent immediately
before the referendum.53 However, there was a great deal of advocacy by the Federal government
for Québecers to vote against the referendum question, in order to allow negotiations to be
conducted for constitutional amendments.54 On May 20, 1980, the Québec referendum resulted in
59.6 percent of Québecers voting “No” against 40.4 percent voting “Yes”.55
48
Francois Rocher, “Self-determination and the Use of Referendums: the Case of Québec,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 27, no. 1 (2014): 28.
49
Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War, 27-28.
50
Rocher, “Self-determination and the Use of Referendums: the Case of Québec,” 28-29.
51
Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War, 28.
52
Rocher, “Self-determination and the Use of Referendums: the Case of Québec,” 31.
53
Hudson Meadwell, “The Politics of Nationalism in Québec,” World Politics 45, no. 2 (1993):
231.
54
Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War, 28.
55
Trudeau, Memoirs, 283-284.
11
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The end of the referendum led to constitutional talks with the provinces. Rene Lévesque
attempted to halt the progress of the patriation of the 1982 Canadian Constitution and Charter.56
Trudeau saw the final success in the patriation of the Constitution Act of 1982 including the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.57 The patriating of the Canadian Constitution and the
Charter in 1982 can be seen as a means to bring together the two founding groups of Canada.58
The independence movement did see the benefits of the use of violence in promoting independence
by other means through the PQ, but the Québec referendum results in 1980 were decisive in
showing the Québec people’s desire to remain within Canada.
The Troubles in Northern Ireland saw the use of violence continued into the 1980s in the
struggle to force British withdrawal, but resulted in a changing purpose for hope of equality in
Northern Ireland, rather than reunification with Ireland.59 In 1984, the Grand Hotel in Brighton
was bombed by the PIRA, which was almost successful in the attempt to kill key Conservative
Cabinet Ministers and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.60 The bombings
by the PIRA forced a need to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, for which the UK and
Ireland established the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.61 These discussions were held between
Ireland and the UK, in order to find a peaceful resolution that can be implemented in Northern
Ireland.62 This agreement enabled the creation of a binational structure in Northern Ireland, to
respect both Catholic and Protestant interests. The agreement additionally provided a working
relationship to have the UK and Ireland work together on the future of the Northern Ireland peace
process, which would continue into the 1990s. They were able to resolve the issue of establishing
fairer policies, such as lessening discrimination against Catholics for housing and employment.63
The Unionists were opposed to the Irish Government having a say in internal matters in Northern
Ireland.64 However, the Nationalists were content that the Anglo-Irish Agreement enabled support
56
Ibid., 326-327.
57
Ibid., 329.
58
Muller, Language and Conflict in Northern Ireland and Canada: A Silent War, 29.
59
Tonge, Northern Ireland, 23.
60
Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Press, 2011), 379-383.
61
Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 127.
62
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years 396-399.
63
Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 138-139.
64
Ibid., 131.
12
Politicus Journal
from Ireland, including that of an Irish identity connection.65 Ultimately, the PIRA’s use of
violence would not lead to the independence of Northern Ireland, but would bring greater attention
to discussion for attaining peace, especially between Catholics and Protestants, since the use of
violence did not result in unification of all Ireland.
Conclusion
The use of violence can be seen to promote independence movements in the cases of Québec and
Northern Ireland, by providing encouragement for the struggles faced within their respective
countries. Ultimately, the use of violence led to both independence movements to find alternative
ways in order to find a successful means to advance their causes. However, the use of violence can
be seen to have had a greater and more sustained impact on the population of Northern Ireland
than it has had on the population of Québec. In Canada, the French language is recognized as an
official language after the Constitution Act, 1982, though Québec symbolically did not sign the
Constitution due to the resistant PQ Government.66 Northern Ireland would make gains towards
resolutions to create a more stable government, to respect both Unionist/Protestants and
Nationalists/Catholics, but would not allow the Catholics equal participation until the 1990s.
Although the use of violence had been condemned by the respective governments, it did give rise
to greater recognition for the independence movements that were oppressed or marginalized within
their states. The use of violence can be seen as being used when a group of people of an ethnic or
cultural group are greatly marginalized within a state. In the end, the use of violence for
independence or separatist movements seems, from these examples, likely to achieve little more
than finding an alternative for a more peaceful dialogue with the central government of the country.
65
Ibid., 135.
66
Trudeau, Memoirs, 326-327.
13
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Bibliography
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Executive Styles in Canada: Cabinet Structures and Leadership Practices in Canadian
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University of Toronto Press, 2010.
Criminal Code. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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McKearney, Tommy. The Provisional IRA: From Insurrection to Parliament. London: Pluto
Press, 2011.
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O’Leary, Brendan and John McGarry. The Politics of Antagonism Understanding Northern
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Rocher, Francois. “Self-determination and the Use of Referendums: the Case of Quebec.”
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Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. London: Harper Press, 2011.
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Trudeau, Pierre E. Memoirs. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1993.
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Widgery, Lord John. Bloody Sunday: Lord Widgery’s Report of Events in Londonderry Northern
Ireland on 30 January 1972. London: Stationary Office, 20
14
Politicus Journal
The Future of Nuclear Sharing: Anglo-American Lion’s Subsidiary
Concern with the Sovereign Scottish Sheep
Willow S.R. Hillman
Following the defeat of the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014, and the
temporary hiatus in the Scottish Independence movement, claiming that the nation’s
quest for independence has been defeated would constitute an impetuous conclusion.
Borne of a certainty that the issue will resurface, the purpose of this paper is to
examine the systemic change that the suppositional Scottish sovereignty would have
on the ‘special’ relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US). This paper claims that Scottish independence would neither significantly, nor
permanently, adversely affect the Anglo-American special relationship. The important
role that nuclear deterrence plays in supporting a legitimate claim to permanent
membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the strength of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), aids in demonstrating the paper’s
position. This is clear in that, neither the geographic location of the UK’s nuclear
arsenal in Scotland, nor ‘lost’ tax revenues that would result from this secession, serve
as sufficient factors to significantly impact the Anglo-American special relationship in
terms of the UK’s capacity to maintain its role as a useful nuclear ally to the US
through the key institutions of the UNSC and NATO.
Introduction
In the wake of the defeat of the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014 and the resultant, albeit
momentary, lull in the winds of change in the United Kingdom, it would be hasty to conclude that
the nation’s quest for independence has been quashed. When the issue resurfaces, the domestic
changes that would occur in the UK in the case of Scottish sovereignty provide urgent grounds for
analysis. It is the purpose of this paper to examine, not the domestic changes within the two
prospective countries, separately, but rather the effects that the systemic change in the UK, arising
from the possible secession of Scotland, would have on the ‘special’ relationship between the
United Kingdom and the United States. The first part of this paper will be divided into two main
sections; the first of which will outline the history of Scotland’s quest for independence from the
UK. Interposing these two sections will be a brief mention of some modern concerns that are,
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while important, currently indeterminate, such as Brexit, the Supreme court ruling on UK Prime
Minister May’s actions in the matter and the fledgling Trump Administration. The second section
of this first part will demonstrate why the relationship between the United States and the United
Kingdom is considered special. While the justifications for the classification as special vary
greatly, a select bloc of scholars, including theorists such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, think
of this ‘specialness’ as owed to the unusual nuclear sharing between the two countries which was
initiated towards the end of the Second World War. They argue that the existence of these nuclear
sharing arrangements and, in particular, the subsistence of them has led to a longevity that indeed
makes the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) special.
The second part of the paper will demonstrate that, in the hypothetical case wherein Scottish
sovereignty is realized through referendum, the AASR would be neither significantly, nor
permanently, adversely affected. This will be done by first shedding light on the notion that a case
wherein an independent Scotland would create tensions between itself and the UK, by deciding to
appropriate the UK nuclear arsenal, which is docked on Scottish soil, is, while ill-advised, an
example of a near-impossibility. Second, the more salient issue, borne of a concern about ‘lost’
tax revenue will be discussed and found to be far less potent than one would think. Using these
two examples, it will become clear that the UK’s ability to perform its duties as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, which is a position that has become synonymous
with nuclear ‘have’ countries, and is one of the most illustrious members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization will not be affected in significant enough a degree to permanently affect the
AASR.
Part 1: The Players
Scotland: Nationalism and its Quest for Independence
To “… foster and maintain Scottish Nationalism by securing self-government for Scotland…”1:
this is the objective that was present on the membership cards of the Scottish Nationalist
Association, circa September 1927. While the desire for Scottish home rule can be traced to the
mid-19th century, the modern mobilization of Scottish nationalism, aimed at home rule and later,
1
“Independence Referendum: The story of Scotland’s Historic Vote,” The Scotsman, accessed
October 21, 2015.
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independence, begins in 1927. Founded by 22-year-old law student, John MacCormick, the
Glasgow University Scottish Nationalist Association is recognized as one of the forbearers of the
National Party of Scotland, which formed in 1928. The merger of Glasgow University’s Scottish
Nationalist Association, the Scots National League and the Scottish National Movement - all of
which were individual Scottish nationalist associations - yielded the UK’s first Scottish nationalist
party. The ideological underpinnings of this ‘National Party of Scotland’ were Scottish nationalism
and Scottish independence/home rule. The Scottish National Party that exists today in UK politics
was created on December 14, 1933 as the result of the amalgamation of the National Party of
Scotland and the smaller Scottish Party (1932).
The story of the Scottish National Party’s quest for Scottish independence begins with
drafting of the Scottish Covenant in April 1949. It reads, in part, "... we solemnly enter into this
Covenant, whereby we pledge ourselves... to do everything in our power to secure for Scotland a
Parliament with adequate legislative authority in Scottish affairs.”2 Despite the fact that the petition
was not far from two million signatures strong, the UK dismissed the petition, as was their right.
On Christmas day of the following year, a group of Scottish students, frustrated with London’s
decision, stole the Stone of Destiny from Westminster Abbey,3 attempting to return it to its rightful
home in Scotland. The Stone of Destiny, sometimes called the ‘Coronation Stone’ is a Scottish
artifact, historically used in the coronation of monarchs of Scotland, England and now Great
Britain. The Stone is still used to this day. While the students’ attempt to return the Stone to its
home in Scotland failed, Scotland’s quest for a measure of home rule did not. Pressure for
‘devolution’ (the UK Parliament granting powers to a Scottish Parliament) came in the form of a
referendum held on March 1, 1979. While a majority of 51.6% voted in favour of a Scottish
Assembly, this first referendum failed, due to the fact that the majority only translated to 32.9% of
the total vote, falling short of the required 40%.4 The second devolution referendum, held on
September 11, 1997, however, proved successful in securing a ‘Yes’ to Scottish Parliament with a
majority of 74.3%. This referendum resulted in the UK Parliament’s creation of a Scottish
Parliament via the November 17, 1998 Scotland Act. Today, the Scottish Parliament has power
over ‘devolved matters’ which include agriculture, forestry, fishing, education, the environment
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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and health to name a few, while the UK Parliament retains ‘reserved’ powers over matters such as
immigration, trade, defense, foreign policy and energy.5 While the UK is not a federal
parliamentary constitutional monarchy like Canada, the separation of powers between the Scottish
Parliament’s devolved powers and London’s reserved powers is strikingly similar to the separation
of powers in Canada between “provincial” and “federal”.
Following a few separate attempts at drafting independence legislation, the Scottish
Independence Referendum Bill was published on March 21, 2013 and outlined that the referendum
for Scottish independence would be held on the 18th of September of the following year. This bill
was passed on November 14th, 20136, thereby fixing the date for the referendum. The months
leading up to the referendum consisted of extensive campaigning by two different groups in
Scotland. The ‘Yes’ campaign represented the separatist camp and the ‘Better Together’ campaign
represented the anti-secessionist camp. On the ‘Yes’ side, the Scottish National Party published
the comprehensive document entitled Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland.
While this document outlines much of the rationale underlying the Scottish independence
movement, the result of the 2014 referendum was conclusive. Of the 85% voter turnout, 55%
represented the ‘No’ vote.
As it stands, Scotland remains part of the UK. Officially, however, the Scottish National
Party “... remains committed to Scottish independence as [they] believe that it is the only way to
create a socially just, progressive and successful country.”7 While the party has not divulged any
plans for future referendums for Scottish independence, it is not unreasonable to think that another
will be held in the future. Given the strong response to the question posed by the referendum, the
expressions of nationalism on both sides as well as the high voter turnout, the issue will
undoubtedly resurface at some future date. If one considers the Canadian example of secessionist
ideology, Québec’s quest for independence has been rather tenacious, resurfacing every few
decades.
5
The Scottish Parliament, “What are the powers of the Scottish Parliament?,” The Scottish
Parliament, accessed October 21, 2015.
6
“Independence Referendum: The Story of Scotland’s Historic Vote,” The Scotsman.
7
Nicola Sturgeon, “Our Vision,” SNP, accessed November 19, 2015.
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The Wild Cards: Brexit, the Supreme Court, and Trump
While the main actors in this examination are clearly the UK and the US, concerns regarding recent
events have been brought to light. First, the question of what the results of the ‘Brexit’ vote will
mean for the UK’s role on the world stage, and the Scottish nationalist movement is concerning to
some. Given the lack of clarity in this, one cannot presently hope to comment on the larger
implications that Brexit may have on the Anglo-American special relationship. Second, the Trump
Administration’s foreign policy objectives may come to bear on this discussion, but discussing
this too hastily constitutes mere speculation. Away from such uncertainty and nonacademic
practice, this paper wishes to stay.
The US and the UK: The Anglo-American Special Relationship
When the day comes that Scotland’s quest for independence re-emerges, the United Kingdom will
undoubtedly face a number of obstacles, which they will need to overcome. Certain changes will
need to be made in order for this to happen. The important question, however, is what this systemic
change would mean for the special relationship that exists between the US and the UK. The origin
of this Anglo-American Special Relationship is heavily debated amongst scholars. The most
convincing of these proposed origins is, as scholars, such as Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh, claim,
the uncommon nuclear/information-sharing relationship that is postulated as existing between
these two countries.
Dobson and Marsh argue that “… if one state willingly agrees to share the means of mutual
destruction with another when there are no compelling national security reasons of its own for
doing so then one might suggest that a prima facie special relationship exists.”8 In saying this, they
suggest that despite the fact that one reading of realist thought would say that the special
relationship should have never emerged between the two nations, it should have certainly ended
following the fall of their common enemy, the Soviet Union.
Let us look at the emergence of the nuclear/information-sharing relationship between the US
and the UK. First, the atomic bomb’s creation was made possible by the splitting of a uranium
8
Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?,”
International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 681.
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atom in 1938, by three chemists in Berlin.9 In order to harness the tremendous power that they had
discovered for use as an explosive, further discoveries were required. In an attempt to prevent the
realization of the German aspirations to pursue this and gain the upper hand in World War II,
Albert Einstein contacted US President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, in December of 1941
authorized the Manhattan Project; the US’s own nuclear program. This year also marked the
beginning of a British nuclear program. By 1943, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill and
President Roosevelt had agreed to work together on the Manhattan Project.10 At the first Québec
Conference of 1943, the leaders had “... agreed that the atomic bomb would be used only by
‘mutual consent’,”11 and almost a year later at the second Québec Conference, Roosevelt promised
that after the war, full collaboration between the two countries would occur. Dawson and
Rosecrance’s claim that, “Britain had accepted American domination in atomic weapons
developments after 1942, but it had placed great store on Roosevelt’s promise- given at Hyde Park
in 1944- of ‘full collaboration’ after the war”12, epitomizes the relationship that arose between
these two nations. While this collaboration was promised to occur immediately following the war,
it wasn't until more than a decade later that legislation was implemented to this effect. This was
partly due to a setback, which took place in 1946 when the US introduced the McMahon Act,
which effectively ended the nuclear relationship.13
This, however, didn’t stop Britain from pursuing its own nuclear program, which proved to
be successful. Finally, in 1958, the Mutual Defence Agreement re-invigorated the relationship. In
1961, the UK gave up on independently pursuing their nuclear program and, rather, opted to join
the US Skybolt program. This provided them with US delivery-system technology that their own
program had been lacking. When the program was cancelled the following year by the US, UK
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan “… persuaded President Kennedy to provide the submarinelaunched Polaris instead.”14 Eventually, “[w]hen the United States moved on to the longer-range
9
“The Manhattan Project,” American Museum of Natural History, accessed November 19, 2015.
10
“Fact Sheet 5: The History of the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Ministry of Defence,
accessed November 19, 2015.
11
Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American
Alliance,” World Politics 19, no. 1 (1966): 24.
12
Ibid. 22.
13
“Fact Sheet 5: The History of the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme,” Ministry of Defence.
14
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” International
Affairs 85, no. 2 (2009): 265.
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Trident missile [in 1982], the UK modified the Polaris sales agreement to purchase these.”15 These
Trident missiles and their submarine-based launching systems make up the modern UK nuclear
arsenal.
Currently, four British submarines are nuclear-capable and moor at Her Majesty's Naval
Base, in Clyde, Scotland. The missiles that they are capable of launching represent the only nuclear
weapons that the UK possesses. The nuclear missiles themselves are called Trident missiles and
are carried by four British Vanguard-class submarines. Each submarines carries 16 missiles at a
time, each of which are designed to carry up to 12 nuclear warheads.16 This means that each
submarine could realistically carry 192 nuclear warheads. This was, however, made impossible by
the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, which restricted the number of nuclear warheads that each
submarine could carry to 48.17 This number has been further reduced to 40 by the UK government
in recent years. Only one of the four vanguard submarines is on patrol at any one time. While the
Trident missiles themselves are the only part of the UK nuclear arsenal with the name ‘Trident’,
the entire nuclear system is most frequently referred to as Trident. When people speak of the need
to replace Trident at the end of its 30-year lifespan in 2024,18 they refer to the need to replace the
Vanguard-class submarines as opposed to the missiles themselves.
Despite the impediment imposed by the US on the UK’s path to the development of a nuclear
arsenal, the UK is the only country in the world that shares a special nuclear relationship with the
US. Regardless of the opinions and the underlying rationale of those who lobbied for the
relationship to be avoided, the fact remains that it did come to exist. Not only did it come into
existence, but it also remained in place after the fall of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union.
This fact, according to Dobson and Marsh, breaks realist cannons and demonstrates the weakness
of realist thought.19 Given the conditions present in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union, no
country has provided a significant enough threat to the US to warrant the maintenance of a nuclear
alliance with any one country. This is especially true given the existence of NATO, which serves
as a military alliance between its 28 member states. Article 5 of the NATO treaty asserts that an
15
Ibid., 269.
16
“Trident Missile Factfile,” BBC News (London, UK) Sept. 23, 2009.
17
Ibid.
18
James Cook, “Daily Question: How Much Does Scotland Pay in Tax and How Much Does it
Spend?,” BBC News (London, UK), Aug. 25, 2014.
19
Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, “Anglo-American Relations,” International History Review.
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attack on one member country ought to be considered an attack on all member countries and be
responded to as such. In the case of an attack on one, it is the duty of the others to provide aid.
While in certain, more extreme circumstances this may be constituted by militarily involvement,
it is important to note that Article 5 does not require this sort of involvement. Especially given this
broad and strong military alliance, the US-UK nuclear relationship emerges as anomalous and
special in its own right. Provided the rise of a credible threat, the US has as many as 26 allies (of
28 current members) other than the UK to rely on. Even in 1949 when NATO was formed, the US
had 10 allies other than the UK. Despite this, the US saw fit to enter into a special nuclear
relationship with the UK. To this day, “... Britain remains the only American ally allowed
preferential access to US nuclear technology.”20
As one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, thereby
possessing veto power, and also one of the five recognized nuclear states in the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the UK has certain obligations to the international
community, and more importantly, to its most powerful ally, the US. The question that lies here is
whether or not the effects of hypothetical Scottish sovereignty on the UK would prove to be
significant enough to warrant a failure to uphold the obligations that they have to the US. In effect,
the assumption is that a UK without a nuclear weapons arsenal or in possession of an unreliable
arsenal, is a UK that is unable to maintain its role as a reliable ally.
Part 2: The Breakdown
This second part will dismantle two issues surrounding the UK nuclear arsenal that could suggest
that Scottish sovereignty would affect the usefulness of the UK to the US. The first is an issue born
of the fact that the military base that plays host to the UK nuclear arsenal is located in Scotland.
The second is a more practical issue dealing with the supposed loss of tax revenue associated with
Scotland becoming a sovereign nation. In effect, the thought is that losing the collective income
tax revenue generated by Scotland would hinder the UK’s ability to invest in certain things such
as replacing the Vanguard Submarines by 2024, thereby potentially affecting its status in the
UNSC and NATO.
20
David Reynolds, “Re-Thinking Anglo-American Relations,” International Affairs 65, no. 1
(1988-1989): 110.
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Before looking at these possibilities- which are endowed with the potential to affect the UK’s
usefulness to the US as an ally in terms of nuclear capabilities- a discussion of the ostensible
nuclear arms-reliant relationships that the UK has, ought to be facilitated. In determining the
associations and characteristics that appear to be contingent on the UK’s possession of a nuclear
arsenal, progress can be made in determining the effect, if any, that Scottish independence could,
potentially, have on the UK’s possession and/or maintenance of their arsenal. This would go to
great lengths to determine whether the UK would be capable of maintaining its special nuclear
relationship with the US.
As has already been stated, the UK is one of the five permanent members (the others being
China, Russia, France and the US) of the UNSC and also one of the recognized nuclear states by
the NPT. The UK’s importance to the US can be examined through the lens of their UNSC
permanent membership and status as one of the most powerful of the NATO allies.
The UK’s importance to the US through the UNSC is relevant, at least while weapons of
mass destruction exist. The maintenance of nuclear weapons stores by each of the five permanent
members of the UNSC looks to be important in remaining a legitimate permanent member. Given
that the five permanent members have historically been thought of as nations with the ability to
affect and manage international security threats and risks the most effectively, it is only logical
that each of the individual five ought to possess the means to influence even the most extreme
security issues. This sort of logic is likely the origin of the common “... fear that abandoning the
UK's nuclear weapons would loosen... [the UK’s] grip on permanent membership.”21 Even today,
there is much speculation about the permanent members’ legitimate claim to their positions, due
to the fact that there is belief that the five no longer represent the global situation and the power
distribution therein. While it is unclear what the impact that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have
on the AASR- in terms of the traditionally nuclear states that comprise the UNSC- would be, it is
clear that the legitimacy of the UK’s claim to its permanent membership would likely come into
question. Because the permanent members of the UNSC have traditionally been nuclear ‘have’
states, it is not absurd to entertain the notion that other players might begin to question, not only
the military fortitude, but also the usefulness a nation would have without its most powerful
weapons. This, of course, is only important were the UK to somehow, either lose their weapons,
21
Rupert Meyers, “Why Britain Needs Nuclear Weapons,” GQ, Sept. 29, 2015.
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or become unable to maintain a reliable arsenal. There is, perhaps, more of a potentially
problematic scenario when it comes the impact that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have on the
AASR through NATO.
NATO is, among other purposes, a military security alliance that holds collective defense
close to the heart of its existence. While it is clear that not all NATO members are nuclear states,
some of the most powerful of the member states are recognized nuclear states (US, UK and
France). While the alliance would not be without nuclear weapons if the UK became weaponless
or simply had reduced nuclear capabilities, the overall number of effective weapons in the alliance
would decrease. This reduction in overall weapons holdings could potentially reduce the
effectiveness of the organization as a whole. If one state, such as a less nuclear-effective UK was
deemed to be the cause of a weakening NATO, it is not a stretch to entertain the notion that the
special relationship that exists between the UK and the US would certainly be affected.
An Appropriated Arsenal?
Returning now to two possible issues that could affect the UK’s nuclear arsenal and, therefore, its
usefulness to the US, it can first be seen that the secession of Scotland would only marginally
inconvenience the UK with regards to the housing of the nuclear capable submarines. Formally,
in the 2013 document Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, the Scottish
National Party expressed disdain for the Trident program, describing it as, “... affront to basic
decency with its indiscriminate and inhumane destructive power.”22 This statement is not off-base
given the indescribably catastrophic effects that they are known to have on their victims. Given
this and the very fact of their existence, nuclear weapons play a key role on the international stage.
Due to the interplay of alliances and the reality of mutually assured destruction, the use of nuclear
weapons by any one state is highly unlikely. Their possession, however, regardless of the
likelihood of their use is important as a deterrent. Therefore, in the case of the UK, the weapons
would need to be relocated onto UK soil in the case of Scotland’s secession.
One misguided worry associated with the UK’s re-appropriation of their property is, on the
view, posed by a Scotland that would aim to retain the UK’s missiles, appropriating them for their
22
Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Edinburgh:
St. Andrew’s House, 2013, accessed October 21, 2015, 232.
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own use. While the concern warrants some merit given the example of Ukraine, Scottish
aspirations would be ill-advised for a new country faced with a slew of exceedingly more important
decisions and concerns.
First, a discussion of the merit of concerns that Scotland would seek to appropriate the UK’s
arsenal for their own use is pragmatic. Misguided as the concern may be, it is not a completely
unwarranted one, especially when one considers similar concerns held by Ukrainian officials
following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, 1994
marked Ukraine’s decision to surrender the one third of the formerly Soviet nuclear arsenal in their
possession and subsequently sign on to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.23
Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is one of the signatories of the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum, which commits it to respecting Ukraine’s borders and sovereignty (among other
obligations)24, the world saw its annexation of Crimea a mere 20 years after Ukraine had made the
decision to give up its nuclear weapons. Reiterating the fact that Ukraine had given up nuclear
weapons because of the Memorandum, Ukrainian official, Pavlo Rizanenko of the Udar Party
notably communicated “... the strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake.”25 Even
given this historically-warranted concern, misgivings in the UK/Scotland dynamic remain
misguided.
Put simply, Scottish nationalists would not want the UK’s arsenal to remain on their soil.
Scottish nationalists who comprise the SNP, which would be the most likely candidate for forming
government in Scotland made a few things exceedingly clear in their attempts to sway people’s
opinions leading up to the 2014 Referendum: one, that “... the decisions which affect Scotland
should be made by the people who live and work here”26 and two, that any and all decisions will
be made with the Scottish people in mind; and also that they have no desire for Trident to remain
on their soil.27 While the SNP’s disdainful stance on nuclear weapons is clear here, the official
policy, communicated via their Scotland’s Future document, demonstrates, not only the lack of
23
UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs, Accessed January 30, 2016.
24
General Assembly Security Council, Ukraine: The Budapest Memorandum of 1994 (New York:
United Nations, 19 December 1994).
25
Oren Dorell, “Ukraine may have to go nuclear, says Kiev lawmaker,” USA Today (Tyson’s
Corner, VA), Mar. 11, 2014.
26
Nicola Sturgeon, “Our Vision,” SNP.
27
Ibid.
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desire that Scotland’s leading party would have in retaining UK weaponry, but also the intention
that they have to do so, demonstrated by the claim that they “… will be able to remove Trident
from Scotland’s soil.”28
Second, despite the extraordinarily comprehensive nature of the Scotland’s Future document,
a great number of policies would need to be decided on by the sovereign state of Scotland and a
number of positive relationships and alliances would need to be created.
Therefore, even in the case that Scotland had the goal of appropriating the UK arsenal, it would be
highly inadvisable to create tensions with the UK, especially in the unstable state in which it would
temporarily exist. Again, as far as the SNP’s official policy is concerned, a sovereign Scotland
would wish to maintain good relations with the UK and they would continue to work with them
“... in defense alliances to promote peace and security...”.29
The Purported Impact on the UK’s Tax Revenue
The second more practical concern with regards to how Scottish independence would affect the
UK’s ability to fulfill its obligations as a useful ally to the US lies in the problem of tax revenue
and the impact that the revenue lost would have on the UK. Given the UK’s need to replace the
current Vanguard submarines by 2024, the issue of determining the source of the funds needed to
replace them is particularly salient. In terms of income tax revenue, it is assumed that Scottish
independence would result in a significant loss of total tax revenues in the UK. This impact is not
nearly as drastic as most would aim to suggest. Scotland itself generated £53 billion in income tax
revenue in the 2013 tax year. This represents 9.1% of the UK’s total income tax revenue for that
year.30 It is important to note, however, that Scotland was home to only 8.3% of the population of
the UK at this time. Alone, this information would seem to support the original assumption, that
Scottish secession would mean huge losses in tax revenue. On this end, Scotland appears to
generate more revenue that it would in a hypothetical system where tax revenue generation was
proportional to the population of a given area. In this hypothetical, proportional tax system, it
would appear that Scotland generates £5 billion more than it is due. Such a first impression is just
28
Ibid.
29
Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future:, 2013.
30
James Cook, “Daily Question: How Much Does Scotland Pay in Tax and How Much Does it
Spend?,” BBC News.
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that: an impression: an appearance. In the case of Scotland, this addition of spending into the
account represents the point at which Scotland’s appearance is juxtaposed with the reality of the
situation. Using the same tax year of 2013, it was seen that Scotland spent £65.2 billion of the
generated income tax revenue, or 9.3%.31 This means that Scotland spent 0.2% more than it
generated. This deficit works out to be about £1.16 billion. Granted, running a deficit is a problem
with roots at the national level, the point stands. While a single year’s data is not an allencompassing representation of the trends present in a county’s account, it can be seen that the
aggregate loss in income tax revenue that would be incurred by the UK’s loss of Scotland would
not be as much of an issue as it is assumed to be. In fact, a fairly convincing argument could be
made to the effect that, at least in 2013, the UK would have been better off, economically, without
Scotland and the deficit it created.
The important implication of this tax concern is the effect that it would have on the UK’s
ability to allocate tax revenue in replacing the submarines that carry Trident missiles. It can be
seen here, that the loss of Scottish tax revenues would, by no means, economically cripple the UK,
rendering it unable to invest in the upkeep of its nuclear arsenal. While a reordering of the finances
would be in order following a referendum resulting in Scottish independence, the UK would retain
the ability to upgrade their arsenal. So long as part of their nuclear arsenal could be replaced before
2024 and the other two were earmarked for future replacement, there is no logical reason that the
UK would not be able to fulfill its role as a permanent UNSC member, thereby fulfilling its
obligation to maintain a legitimate claim to the role, perceived or otherwise; or the nuclear
deterrence and collective defense that its NATO membership requires. As was previously
discussed, it is uncertain what the effects that a nuclear-weaponless UK would have on the AASR
through the UNSC, but its legitimacy as a permanent member should not be called into question
and especially in no greater measure than it already is, provided that it is able to maintain a reliable
nuclear deterrent, irrespective of size.
The same sort of logic applies to the effect that Scottish independence would have on the
UK’s ability to maintain its obligations to NATO, thereby, retaining its status as a valuable US
ally. So long as the UK is able to maintain a reliable nuclear arsenal, regardless of its size,
throughout the period of time that it will take to fully replace all four submarines, there is no reason
31
Ibid.
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that it would not be able to fulfill its collective defense obligations to its fellow NATO memberstates. Given that this is the case; it would necessarily remain a useful ally to the US.
Conclusion
Scotland has a long history of desire for home rule and independence, one that cannot be easily
subdued. The systemic changes that would occur within the UK in the case of the realization of
this goal would be minor and, therefore, concern for the continuation of the AASR and its health
proves less imposing than it might appear. The nuclear capabilities of the UK that make it a useful
ally to the US through the UNSC and NATO would be neither significantly nor permanently
affected to a degree that would affect the strength of the AASR. It would be able to fulfill its
obligations to both organizations and, therefore, the US with or without Scotland. While all
potential effects warrant consideration, even if only in passing, certain actions do not pose serious
enough concerns to warrant belaboured consideration. The Anglo-American Special Relationship
is a lion that ought not be overly concerned with the actions or opinions of a weaker entity such as
Scotland. The impact that this nation’s potential independence has had on the strength and
persistence of this strong relationship is negligible.
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Dawson, Raymond and Richard Rosecrance. “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American
Alliance.” World Politics 19, no. 1 (1966): 21-51.
Dobson, Alan P. and Steve Marsh. “Anglo-American Relations: End of a Special Relationship?”
International History Review 36, no. 4 (2014): 673-697.
Dorell, Oren. “Ukraine may have to go nuclear, says Kiev lawmaker.” USA Today. (Tyson’s
Corner, VA), Mar. 11, 2014.
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“Fact Sheet 5: The History of the UK’s Nuclear Weapons Programme.” Ministry of Defence.
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https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27383/C
m6994_Factsheet5.pdf
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“Independence Referendum: The Story of Scotland’s Historic Vote.” The Scotsman. Accessed
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“The Manhattan Project.” American Museum of Natural History. Accessed November 19, 2015.
http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/einstein/peace-and-war/the-manhattan-project
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http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/comment/articles/2015-09/29/britain-needs-nuclearweapons-operation-trident
Reynolds, David. “Re-Thinking Anglo-American Relations.” International Affairs 65, no. 1
(1988-1989): 89-111.
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Scottish Government. Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland. Edinburgh: St.
Andrew’s House, 2013.
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Competing for Power: How Russian-American Relations Have Affected
the War in Syria
Eli Berman
The war in Syria is one of the most prevalent and complex issues in international
relations today. Two of the world’s major powers, Russia and the United States, have
been heavily involved in Syria for a number of years. This essay examines how the
unsteady relations between the two countries have affected the war in Syria. It argues
that both Russia and the United States intervened in Syria based on a competition for
power relative to one another, which has consequently prolonged the war. While also
discussing the roles of Turkey, Iran, and ISIS in the war, this essay adopts a realist
perspective by contending that the states involved in Syria are driven by a
competition for power. That said, the future for Syria looks grim until Russia and the
United States are willing to put their power struggle aside and work together.
Introduction
One of the most prominent issues in international relations today is addressing the war in Syria
and the problems deriving from it. Since early 2011, the country has been plagued with a war
involving various actors with conflicting interests, ranging from domestic insurgents and
government forces, to terrorist groups and foreign powers.1 The ongoing violence has resulted in
a refugee crisis with millions of Syrians fleeing the country, consequently affecting the security
environment within a region that was already unstable.2 The conflict has developed into a
complicated proxy war, with Russia and the United States providing military, financial, and
logistical support to opposing actors.3 Russia wants Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to remain in
1
Christopher M. Blanchard, Carla E. Humud, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “ARMED CONFLICT
IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE,” Current Politics and Economics of the Middle
East 6, no. 2. (2015): 313; Jörg Michael Dostal, “Transnational War in Syria: The Eisenhower
Doctrine in the 21st Century?,” Romanian Political Science Review 16, no. 2 (2016): 214;
Spyridon Plakoudas, “Putin, Assad, and Geopolitics,” Middle East Review of International Affairs
19, no. 3 (2015): 34.
2
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 321.
3
Dostal, 202, 203.
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power, while the United States strives for the implementation of a new Syrian leader that would
not challenge American objectives in the region.4 Depending on the outcome of the war, there
could be a dramatic shift in the international balance of power.5
This essay aims to look at how tensions between Russia and the United States have affected
the Syrian civil war. What are the factors driving their respective interventions in Syria? Has the
unstable relationship between Russia and the United States merely extended the war in Syria?
Their relations in the context of Syria are paradoxical; while there are continuing efforts to improve
cooperation between the two countries and resolve the conflict, Russia and the United States are
indirectly fighting each other in Syria.6 This paper will argue that their respective actions in Syria
are motivated by a competition for power, and intervention by these two influential states has
prolonged the war in Syria.
This essay will employ a realist perspective, contending that Russia and the United States are
acting out of self-interest as they try to gain power in Syria. It will begin with a summary of the
arguments, followed by an overview of the relations between Russia and the United States in the
context of Syria. The paper will go on to explain how the war has been prolonged by this powerdriven, unstable relationship, before discussing the role of two key regional actors in the conflict,
Iran and Turkey. An outline of the role of ISIS in Syria will follow, concluding with policy
recommendations on how to address the complex problems posed by the war in Syria and a
summary of the arguments made.
Literature Review
A detailed summary of the conflict in Syria is provided in a 2015 article written by Christopher
Blanchard, Carla Humud, and Mary Beth Nikitin. The authors outline the complex nature of the
war, discussing every major actor involved in the conflict and their respective interests behind
their participation. Additionally, they discuss the humanitarian crises that have arisen from the
war, including the refugee crisis and Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons against opposition
forces.7 The article outlines international responses to these crises, focusing on the efforts to
4
Dostal, 214; Plakoudas, 34.
5
Dostal, 214.
6
Ibid, 212.
7
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 314.
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remove the dangerous chemicals possessed by Assad’s government, before going into greater
detail regarding the United States’ response to the war. This piece provides an excellent overview
of the conflict in Syria, providing details on all of the relevant actors involved, their respective
interests, and how the multitude of crises derived from the war have been addressed by the
international community.
In his article written in the fall of 2015, Spyridon Plakoudas examines the reasons for Russia’s
intervention in Syria, focusing on the geopolitical significance that Syria represents for them.
Plakoudas contends that there are many reasons contributing to Russia’s involvement in Syria,
such as supporting their only Arab ally and developing their influence in a region that contains a
significant amount of oil.8 With that said, Plakoudas argues that the overarching motive for Putin’s
decision to intervene was to challenge the United States’ status as a unilateral hegemon and reestablish Russia as a world power.9 Plakoudas approaches this analysis from a realist perspective,
as his argument maintains that states are the significant actors in international relations, and Russia
is intervening in Syria out of self-interest.
In comparison, Jörg Michael Dostal’s article published in March of 2016 aims to explain the
interests that have driven the United States’ involvement in Syria, while providing a historical
context of American presence in the Middle East. Dostal argues that the United States’ engagement
in Syria exemplifies a contemporary form of the Eisenhower doctrine.10 This refers to the former
American president’s announcement made during the Cold War, which promised military or
economic aid to any country in the Middle East needing help in resisting communist aggression.11
Dostal also argues from a realist perspective, maintaining that the United States are driven by the
need to defend Syria as an “external balancer in the Middle East”.12 In other words, American
involvement in Syria is based on the need to maintain regional power.
Argument Overview
The war in Syria has been extended by Russian and American intervention, as both countries have
been providing significant support to actors on opposing sides, consequently extending the
8
Plakoudas, 35.
9
Ibid, 37.
10
Dostal, 214.
11
Ibid, 184.
12
Ibid, 214.
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conflict. American aid to anti-Assad forces has prolonged the conflict, as it would have likely
ended a long time ago with Assad emerging victorious,13 given that his government possesses
superior resources and a stronger domestic support base compared to the insurgents.14 However,
the United States felt that they had to intervene in order to maintain their hegemonic status. In the
absence of an American intervention, an Assad-Russia victory would have significantly helped
Russia transform the international balance of power into a multipolar world, an outcome that would
conflict with American interests.15 Conversely, if the United States had intervened against Assad’s
government and Russia refrained from getting involved, the United States would have easily
overtaken Assad’s regime and likely followed through with their objective of establishing a more
pro-Western Syrian leadership. This would have directly contravened Russian interests. Therefore,
Russia’s intervention has also contributed to the prolonging of the conflict.
While the United States is operating under the veil of ‘responsibility to protect’, and Russia
claims they are targeting ISIS as opposed to supporting Assad’s regime, both countries have
ulterior motives for intervening These can be partially attributed to their self-interest of achieving
power relative to each other.16 The preoccupation with power between these countries has resulted
in each providing substantial support to opposing actors in the conflict. Additionally, Iran and
Turkey have played crucial roles in Syria, mostly acting on behalf of Russian and American
interests respectively.
Aside from Russia, Iran is the most significant actor that has contributed to the survival of
Assad’s regime.17 They have provided weapons, military training to pro-Assad forces, and military
assistance to the Assad regime.18 Perhaps most important, however, has been the consistent and
13
This assumes that the presence of ISIS in Syria would not have extended the war to the same
degree that Russian and American intervention has. The conflict in Syria would have been much
less complex with the absence of Russian and American intervention. Russia and the United States
share the common interest of eliminating ISIS, so they likely would have worked with the Syrian
government to defeat ISIS as opposed to prolonging the war by supporting various proxies.
14
Ibid, 203.
15
Jamal Wakim, “END OF AL-ASSAD, OR OF ERDOGAN? TURKEY AND THE SYRIAN
UPRISING,” Arab Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (2014): 191; Plakoudas, 37; Dostal 198, 214.
16
Amitai Etzioni, “The Salience of Salience in International Relations,” The Brown Journal of
World Affairs 22, no. 11 (2016): 243; Plakoudas, 34.
17
Mahmood Monshipouri and Erich Wieger, “Syria: The Hope and Challenges of Mediatoin,”
Insight Turkey 16, no. 2 (2014): 153.
18
Andrew W. Terrill, “Iran’s Strategy for Saving Asad,” The Middle East Journal 69, no. 2 (2015):
229-234.
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substantial degree of financial support that Iran has provided to Syria. This financial aid has been
crucial to maintaining the Syrian economy, and has kept Syria’s military intact, despite facing
constant opposition from the outset of the war.19 By providing billions of dollars to Syria, Iran has
been a key ally to the Assad regime, and has extended the war by offering much-needed financial
assistance that has helped sustain both the Syrian economy and military.20
In contrast, Turkey has contributed to the extension of the war in ways different than the United
States, Russia, or Iran. While there is no doubt that Turkey supports the United States’ foreign
policy in Syria – and consequently opposes Russian and Iranian interests – by providing aid to
Syrian insurgents, their support of ISIS and other terrorist groups undermines the legitimacy of
their allegiance to the United States. Although Western media has largely disregarded it, Turkey
has supported terrorist groups like al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, and ISIS; the details of this aid will be
expanded upon later.21 Turkey has strengthened these groups by providing various forms of aid to
them. This has also contributed to prolonging the conflict, as the threat of terrorism must be
addressed before stability can be initiated.22 In short, Turkey has prolonged the conflict by
supporting ISIS and other terrorist groups.
It is also worth noting that the lack of cooperation between Russia and the United States in
fighting ISIS – driven by a preoccupation with power relative to one another – has allowed ISIS
to expand their influence in Syria.23 As their respective foreign policies have prolonged the war,
ISIS has been able to increase their power in the region since the start of the war in 2011. Instead
of directing their resources solely towards combatting ISIS, Russia and the United States have
been preoccupied with a competition for power, resulting in much of their resources and efforts
being devoted towards opposing forces in Syria. This power for the Islamic State has further
complicated the conflict; not only do they represent another actor in a war filled with several forces
already fighting for competing interests, but Assad has stated that he will not begin diplomatic
negotiations on resolving the conflict until terrorist threats are addressed.
19
Terrill, 229.
20
Ibid.
21
Sener Aktürk, “Toward a Turkish-Russian Axis? Conflicts in Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, and
Cooperation over Nuclear Energy,” Insight Turkey 16, no. 4 (2016): 19; Monshipouri and Wieger,
157; Dostal, 206, 207; Wakim, 194.
22
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 317, 326.
23
Panayiotides, 12.
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Russian-American Relations in the Context of Syria
The relations between Russia and the United States have not always been as hostile as they are
currently. Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the two countries maintained a peaceful,
productive relationship.24 However, the end of the nineteenth century also signified the end of their
amicable relations, stemming from a number of reasons.25 Animosity between them grew with the
rise of communism in the Soviet Union, and the tensions established during the Cold War have
remained steady.
Since the Second World War, Russia has sought to reach a balance of power with the United
States, and this competition for power is currently as clear as ever.26 The war in Syria was chosen
as a case study because it is a prime example of how the power struggle between Russia and the
United States has affected international relations. As summarized by Dostal, “the conflict in Syria
since 2011 has turned into the most dramatic power contest in post-Cold War history”.27 Indeed,
both countries are using the war in Syria as a means to achieve power. Russian presence in Syria
is a direct threat to American interests, while the United States’ objective of ousting Assad from
power directly contravenes Russian interests.28
That said, there have been some attempts at cooperation between the two countries on resolving
the conflict. For example, they worked together with the United Nations to establish a deal that
would facilitate the removal of chemical weapons from Syria with the help of other countries.29
While the operation was “completed” in September of 2014, chemical weapons have been used in
Syria since then.30 As Dostal argues, “the outside powers know that they essentially maintain the
ability of the different groups to sustain the fighting on the ground, rather than to allow any of the
24
Charles E. Ziegler, “Russian-American relations: From Tsarism to Putin,” International Politics
51, no. 6 (2014): 672.
25
Ziegler, 685.
26
Ibid, 672.
27
Dostal, 211.
28
Luis Simón, “US LEADERSHIP AND NATO: Balancing Priorities in America’s European
Strategy,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 17; Dostal 214.
29
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 329; Dostal 207.
30
Rick Gladstone, “Syria Used Chlorine in Bombs Against Civilians, Report Says,” New York
Times, last modified August 24, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/middleeast/syria-used-chlorine-in-bombs-againstcivilians-report-says.
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parties to ‘win’.”31 Until the United States and Russia can put their self-interest for power aside
and collaborate to resolve the conflict, the fighting in Syria will continue.
It should be noted that multiple sources have indicated that recently appointed American
President Donald Trump seeks to mend relations with Russia and work together to address the
conflict in Syria.32 However, it is too early to tell whether Trump’s intentions of repairing RussianAmerican ties will materialize, and if these new relations will be able to adequately resolve the
conflict in Syria. At the time of this writing, it is clear that a lack of cooperation between the two
countries – driven by a competition for power – has contributed to the prolonging of the war in
Syria.
American Foreign Policy in Syria
Although their reasons for intervening in Syria are commonly attributed to humanitarian assistance
and the ‘responsibility to protect’, one of the main factors contributing to American intervention
in Syria is to maintain their status as a global hegemon. A top priority for the United States is
ensuring that they maintain a unipolar world, as opposed to allowing Russia to achieve a balance
of power through a ‘victory’ for the Assad government. This is not to say that humanitarian
concerns deriving from Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons on insurgents have not played a
role in the United States’ intervention in Syria, they certainly have.33 Nevertheless, for the United
States, maintaining their status as a unilateral world power is a foreign policy priority and key
contributing factor to their intervention in Syria. As noted by Wakim, “US global hegemony would
be achieved through the direct control of the Middle East”.34 From the United States’ perspective,
this “direct control” is only attainable with the removal of Assad from power.
By providing substantial aid to Syrian insurgents, the United States hope to oust Assad from
power and install a more pro-Western government that will allow them to achieve regional
31
Dostal, 202.
32
“Trump and Putin ‘will try to mend ties’, Kremlin says,” BBC.com, last modified November 14,
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37981770; “Trump and Putin discuss ‘strong
and enduring relationship’ between U.S. and Russia,” CBC.ca, last modified November 14, 2016,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-putin-talk-1.3851092l; Matthew Chance, “Will Russia roll
out the red carpet for President Trump?,” CNN.com, last modified November 9, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/europe/russia-donald-trump-putin/
33
Etzioni, 244; Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 329.
34
Wakim, 191.
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objectives. Dostal describes one of these goals: “for the US, the ideal outcome of the Syrian war
would be the construction of a regional system in the Middle East, in which all Arab state units
would have to accept permanent US military bases”.35 In trying to achieve this outcome, the United
States has provided both financial and military support to Syrian insurgents, including weapons as
well as military training.36 To put these efforts in perspective, the United States spent roughly $500
million that resulted in the training of merely a few Syrian rebels.37 While it was an unsuccessful
effort, this displays their strong commitment to ousting Assad from power by supporting
insurgents.38
In addition to Russia’s support of Assad, the biggest threat to American hegemony in the
Middle East is a potential alliance between Syria, Iraq and Iran.39 For the first time in their
postcolonial histories, these states have been working with each other in recent years.40 A fullfledged alliance between these three would significantly undermine American power and influence
in the region, as not only do they all oppose American interests, but each have also been
increasingly cooperative with Russia recently, further contravening American regional
objectives.41 Therefore, the United States is intent on removing Assad from power to avoid this
alliance and retain a power advantage over Russia.
If the United States had not provided support to Syrian insurgents, the Assad government
would have triumphed over the rebel groups, due to better resources and a stronger domestic
support base. They possess an air force, a unified army, and better intelligence capabilities; Syrian
rebels would not be able to overcome these disadvantages.42 As such, the conflict has been
prolonged by American intervention.
35
Dostal, 214.
36
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 335; Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt,
“Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” New York Times, last
modified October 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagonprogram-islamic-state-syria.html?&hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=firstcolumn-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news; Barbara Starr, Tal Kopan, and Jim Acosta,
“U.S. suspending program to train and equip Syrian rebels, CNN.com, last modified October 9,
2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/09/politics/us-syria-rebels-arms-program-suspended/
37
Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper, and Eric Schmitt; Barbara Starr, Tal Kopan, and Jim Acosta.
38
Ibid.
39
Dostal 194, 214; Etzioni 243.
40
Dostal 194.
41
Etzioni 243; Panayiotides 15.
42
Dostal, 203.
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Russian Foreign Policy in Syria
Conversely, Russia seeks to alter the international balance of power by supporting the Assad
government, hoping that they will be able to keep Assad in office. If this were to happen, Russia
would be able to increase their influence in the Middle East, a region historically controlled by the
United States.43 As argued by Simón, “one of the main motivations for Russia in the Middle East
is to thwart US policy objectives in the region.”44 Russia has stated that they have intervened in
Syria to target ISIS; while this is partially true, they have also targeted Syrian opposition forces
and provided substantial aid to the Assad government. In addition to supplying military support,
Russia has invested billions of dollars in Syrian industries, like energy and tourism.45 Russia’s
intervention in Syria was their first military operation outside the boundaries of the former Soviet
Union since 1989.46 When that is acknowledged in combination with the substantial degree of
financial and military support provided to the Assad government, it is clear that Russia is heavily
committed to keeping Assad in power.
Like the United States, Russia’s intervention in Syria is driven by a desire to achieve an
increase in power, ultimately striving for a multipolar world as opposed to one under the influence
of American hegemony. This position is accurately summarized by Panayiotides: “Pax Americana
is not an acceptable option for Russia as a power model in the Middle East.”47 As such, they believe
that supporting Assad at any cost is their best course of action in achieving a balance of power
with the United States. In addition to opposing American regional objectives, Russia’s support of
Assad can be attributed to their interest in maintaining their only naval base in the Mediterranean
Sea, located in the Syrian city of Tartus.48 If Assad’s government remains, so will the naval base;
any alternative would put their naval base at risk, which would pose major problems for Russian
influence in the region.49 Furthermore, Russia is aware that a fall of the Assad regime would most
likely result in the dissolution of a geopolitical alliance between Russia, Iran, and Syria “that has
43
Plakoudas, 35.
44
Simón, 17.
45
Panayiotides, 20.
46
Plakoudas, 35.
47
Panayiotides, 20.
48
Aktürk, 19; Panayiotides, 20.
49
Panayiotides, 20.
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kept Syria out of the western sphere of influence since the mid-1950s”.50 Therefore, Russia needs
Assad to stay in power in order to secure influence in the region and consequently undermine
American hegemony.
Comparatively, the United States wants Assad out of power to secure their influence in the
region and sustain their hegemony. If the United States intervened and Russia did not, the United
States would have ousted Assad from power, which obviously conflicts with Russian interests.
Therefore, Russia felt they had to intervene to sustain and perhaps try to expand their regional
influence, consequently contributing to the extension of the war.
The clear lack of cooperation between the two countries has also prolonged the conflict in
Syria; if they could put their self-interest regarding power aside, a resolution would be much more
attainable. Even John Kerry, the American Secretary of State, has acknowledged that “any viable
peace process in Syria will require close cooperation between Russia and the United States.”51
While it could be argued that Russia has more to gain in Syria than the United States does, a ‘loss’
for either state would have drastic repercussions in the balance of power between them.
Iran’s Role in the Conflict
Iran also plays an important role in the exacerbation of the war in Syria, as they have “chosen to
support the Assad regime at virtually any cost.” 52 This support has been displayed in a number of
ways, including the military training of various pro-Assad forces and supplying weapons to the
Assad regime.53 Iran’s funding of Hezbollah militia forces is especially noteworthy, as Hezbollah
have played an important military role in support of the Assad regime.54 Iranian forces have also
intervened in Syria, mainly represented by the Quds Force, an elite special forces branch of the
Iranian military.55 Most relevant to this paper, however, is the substantial degree of financial aid
that Iran has given to the Syrian government.
50
Dostal, 211.
51
Simón, 16.
52
Monshipouri and Wieger, 154.
53
Terrill, 229, 232, 234.
54
Ibid, 233, 234.
55
Terrill, 230.
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As a result of both the war and various economic sanctions on their oil exports, the Syrian
economy has suffered considerably since 2011.56 That said, Iran has consistently provided several
billions of dollars to the Assad regime in financial aid, which has kept Syria’s military intact
despite suffering consistent and strong opposition since the early stages of the conflict.57
Furthermore, Iran has provided the Syrian government with “billions of dollars in credit to
purchase oil, food, and import goods from Iran”.58 In turn, their support has also helped sustain
Syria’s economy. Despite suffering economic setbacks of their own while supporting Assad, Iran
has remained committed to the survival of the Assad regime, even after a change in leadership.59
While it is beyond the scope of this paper, Iran believes maintaining ties with Syria – largely due
to geostrategic significance – is imperative to their regional goals, and thus, will continue to
support the Assad regime for the foreseeable future.60 Iran’s financial support has provided muchneeded assistance to Syria’s depleted economy, and has allowed the Assad regime to remain in
power and continue fighting, prolonging the conflict. If Iran had not provided financial aid to the
Assad regime, both Syria’s military capabilities and economy would have been weakened to an
even greater degree. Consequently, Iran has contributed to the extension of the conflict in Syria in
ways that are different than both the United States and Russia.
Turkey’s Role in the Conflict
In contrast, Turkey has played a unique role in Syria. While some of their actions in Syria have
been tailored to American interests, such as their support for Syrian insurgents, they have also
complicated the war by aiding terrorist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaeda and al-Nusra. These groups
entered Syria on a larger scale in early 2014 from bases located in Turkey.61 In addition to
providing a “safe haven” for these terrorist organizations, “Erdogan’s Turkey had been engaged
in a long-standing program of arms supplies to the Islamist groups, including [ISIS], and had
accepted oil smuggling from Syria to Turkey on a large scale, which in turn financed [ISIS]
56
Ibid, 229.
57
Ibid, 230.
58
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 329.
59
Terrill, 223.
60
Ibid, 235.
61
Wakim, 194; Dostal, 207.
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terrorism.”62 Indeed, Turkey’s role in Syria appears contradictory; they support American interests
by opposing Russia and aiding Syrian rebels, while simultaneously providing aid to terrorist
groups that merely exacerbate the conflict.
Turkey’s position in Syria is further complicated with the American support of Kurdish
forces in Syria, as long-standing tensions between Turkey and the Kurds have escalated in Syria.63
Turkey is strongly opposed to Kurdish nationalism and the autonomy they seek, while the United
States has strengthened the Kurds’ military capabilities to combat ISIS after their efforts to train
Syrian insurgents failed.64 While some aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria align with
American interests, others – such as their significant support of terrorist groups – certainly do not.
However, American management of the balance of power in the Middle East since the late 1950s
is partly based on an alliance with Turkey. The United States cannot afford to abandon a key
regional ally.65 Overall, Turkey’s logistical, military, and financial support of terrorist groups in
Syria has prolonged the war, given that a resolution to the conflict is unattainable until the threat
of terrorism is addressed.
The Presence of ISIS in Syria
ISIS is certainly the most prominent non-state actor involved in the war in Syria, regarding both
how much land they control and the global degree of influence they possess. While Russia and the
United States have drastically competing interests, both share the objective of defeating ISIS.66
Despite this, their respective desires to achieve power relative to one another through supporting
opposing forces in Syria have resulted in the strengthening of ISIS. The longer the conflict is
extended, the more time ISIS has to gain power. As Panayiotides notes, “the prolongation of the
conflict has allowed [groups like ISIS] to establish themselves in Syria”.67 This strengthening of
ISIS has further prolonged the conflict, as Assad’s government is “unwilling to open discussions
regarding any transitional arrangements until its concerns with regard to terrorism” are addressed.68
62
Wakim, 194; Dostal, 208
63
Etzioni, 247; Dostal, 213.
64
Dostal, 213; Etzioni 247
65
Dostal, 185.
66
Ziegler, 687; Panayiotides, 23.
67
Panayiotides, 21.
68
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin 317.
42
Politicus Journal
While many sources have indicated that ISIS-controlled territory has declined in recent months,69
the prolonging of the war has allowed ISIS to become and remain one of the most powerful nonstate actors involved in the war in Syria. Furthermore, ISIS represents another formidable
participant in a conflict already filled with many. Nevertheless, while they are allocating their
resources towards fighting ISIS, Russia and the United States are preoccupied with a power
struggle, resulting in most of their efforts directed towards opposing forces in Syria.
Policy Recommendations
While a conflict as complex as the one in Syria will never be solved with a panacea, there are a
few steps that can be taken in order to initiate a resolution. First and foremost, ISIS needs to be
removed from the country through a cooperative military effort by the international community.
The world is in agreement that the threats posed by ISIS need to be addressed. They should
collectively decide how to execute this, but eliminating ISIS should be their top priority, even if it
means putting ‘boots on the ground’. A main reason why Afghanistan and Iraq were state-building
failures is because security and stability were never established in the first place.70 Therefore, the
first step to restoring peace in Syria should involve the dissolution of ISIS in the country.
Furthermore, Assad has stated that he will not enter discussions regarding a resolution until the
threat of terrorism is addressed. This represents an additional incentive to defeating ISIS in Syria.
While there are certainly other threats to stability in Syria, ISIS has undoubtedly helped fuel the
conflict, and poses a threat to the entire international community. Therefore, eliminating ISIS
would not only provide a greater likelihood of stability in Syria, but it is also the easiest threat to
address, given the global consensus towards eradicating ISIS. Other threats to stability in Syria,
such as sectarianism, insurgencies, or external intervention come with political intricacies that are
much more difficult to address. Thus, defeating ISIS should be the first course of action to attaining
peace in Syria.
69
Nick P. Walsh, “As Donald Trump takes over, a diminished ISIS awaits,” CNN.com, last
modified January 18, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/18/middleeast/isis-loses-territory-iniraq-syria/; “Islamic State group ‘lost quarter of territory’ in 2016,” BBC.com, last modified
January 19, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38641509
70
Charles J. Sullivan, “Is Nation-Building a Myth? State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy
Challenge,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (2016): 60.
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Second, as Russia and the United States are the two most powerful actors involved in Syria,
they should take on a leadership role and work together to establish a resolution for Syria beyond
eliminating ISIS. While their competition for power has been a driving force in exacerbating and
prolonging the war in Syria, political elites in both countries must put their ideological differences
aside, and collectively use their resources to resolve the conflict. As Blanchard et al. contend, “the
humanitarian and regional security crises emanating from Syria now appear to be beyond the
power of any single actor, including the United States, to contain or fully address”.71 Simply put,
the war in Syria will continue for the foreseeable future until Russia and the United States are
willing to cooperate. Whether this collaborative effort would entail diplomatic negotiations, fullscale military intervention, or something else is a decision that should be left to each country’s
political elites. However, peace in Syria is significantly more attainable once Russia and the United
States are willing to cooperate. As mentioned earlier, multiple sources have indicated that the
recently appointed American President Donald Trump strives to mend ties with Russia and work
with them to resolve the conflict in Syria; however, it is too early to tell if these intentions will
materialize.
Third, Bashar al-Assad must remain in power for the near future. The American objective of
replacing Assad with a more pro-Western leader would be detrimental. As shown in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Libya, American-led regime changes have proven to be disastrous, even when a war is
‘won’ and a tyrannical leader is removed from power.72 Furthermore, as Etzioni notes, “such
regime changes more often lead to high-level anarchy, which in turn is followed not by
democratization but instead by the installation of new authoritarian regimes.”73 Therefore, Assad
should not be ousted from power, despite his problematic history with regards to human rights
violations. When viewing this conflict with long-term stability in mind, it appears necessary to
leave Assad in power for the time being. If stability were achieved, it would be useful for the
United States and/or other states within the international community to maintain a small, but
nevertheless notable military presence in Syria to ensure governance legitimacy, especially
regarding human rights violations.74
71
Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin, 314.
72
Etzioni, 244, 245.
73
Eztioni, 245.
74
Sullivan, 63.
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Politicus Journal
If peace in Syria is reached, international actors can focus on initiating economic
development through trade and investments. The growth of industries would result in the gradual
creation of jobs, which would hopefully lead to the development of other areas such as social
services and education. Of course, all of this is much easier said than done, and resolving a conflict
as complex and violent as Syria’s is a long process.
Conclusion
The war in Syria is a multifaceted, complicated conflict involving many actors fighting for
conflicting interests. Russia and the United States, the two most powerful states participating in
the war, have been involved in the conflict for years. Their tense relations have resulted in what is
best characterized as a competition for power, which has been displayed in the war in Syria. Russia
strives to keep Assad in power and ultimately shift the international balance of power to a
multipolar world; conversely, the United States wants to remove Assad from the Syrian leadership
and install a more pro-Western president. Iran shares the Russian objective of keeping Assad in
power, and is willing to do whatever it takes for that to happen. In comparison, Turkey has been
supporting anti-Assad forces, but has also provided assistance to various terrorist groups. Further
complicating the conflict, ISIS remains a relatively powerful force in the war. Peace and stability
in Syria seems like an unattainable goal at this point in time, but it is possible. While other factors
come into play, the most important element in reaching a resolution in Syria is for Russia and the
United States to put their competition for power aside and work together. Until then, the future for
Syria looks bleak.
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Politicus Journal
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47
Politicus Journal
France and the National Front: Exploring Economic Regime Crisis and
the Rise of the Far Right
Alexandra Lloyd
This paper examines the collapse of France’s distributive and accumulative economic
regimes in relation to a broad change in voter attitudes and preferences that has led
to the political rise of the far-right populist party, the National Front. The country’s
continued economic stagnation, as well as its rising income inequality has caused antiestablishment and anti-integrationist sentiments to rise within the electorate. In
addition to a purely market-based analysis, cultural explanations for the increase in
xenophobic attitudes and the popularity of the National Front are also considered.
Introduction
Throughout the past twenty years, there has been an increase in the political salience of far right
anti-integrationist populist parties in Western developed states.1 In his book Globalization and
Inequality: Neoliberalism’s Downward Spiral, Rapley argues that the explanation for the rise of
these far right parties can be tied to the sphere of political economy and the domestic failures of
distribution and acquisition regimes.2,3 According to Rapley, the success of these two regimes
leads to political security for ruling elites within a state whereas their failure can cause widespread
instability.4,5 Further, Rapley argues that there is a clear correlation between the failure of Western
1
Godin, E. (2013). The porosity between the mainstream right and extreme right in france: Les
droites décomplexées under nicolas sarkozy and marine le pen's leadership. Journal of
Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), 53-67.
2
Rapley, J. (2004). Globalization and inequality: Neoliberalism’s downward spiral. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
3
Distributive regimes can be defined as the strategies employed by elites in state that relate to
dispersion of resources within society. Accumulation regimes are the strategies utilized by elites
to gain these resources in the first place (Rapley, 2014, pp.30).
4
Rapley, J. (2004). Globalization and inequality: Neoliberalism’s downward spiral. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
5
More specifically, Rapley argues that failure in a distributive regime can lead to immediate crisis
and political instability, while a failure in an accumulation regime is not as urgently pressing.
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Politicus Journal
distributive regimes and the rise of right-wing parties in the mid-1990s, though he concludes that
these parties never gained enough momentum to ascend to have significant numbers in national
legislatures.6 However, following the economic turmoil of the global financial crisis of 2008, there
has been an increasing number of far right parties that have won a historic number of seats in
national and international legislatures. For example, France’s far-right party the National Front
(NF) lead by Marine Le Pen won the national election for European Parliament seats in 2014,
stunning France and the world.7
In this paper it will be argued that the economic stagnation and rising inequality recently
experienced in France has caused a failure in the accumulation and distributive regimes within the
country, leading to a change in voter attitudes, interests, and preferences that strengthened support
towards the NF party. This position will be supported by establishing the failure of France’s current
accumulation regime through the use of macroeconomic indicators in order to analyze the effects
this economic stagnation has had on voter’s attitudes. Then, France’s distributive regime will be
examined to illustrate how rising wealth and income inequality has changed both the political
environment and voting behavior in France. In addition, the influence of high public deficit level
as well as taxation policy will be examined as factors that further cemented voters’ distrust for
more moderate and established political parties within the government. Lastly, the
counterargument that the rise of far right parties and their xenophobic platforms should be
understood through a purely cultural perspective will be outlined and refuted.
Accumulation Regimes and Economic Stagnation
In this section, it will be established through macroeconomic indicators that there is an ongoing
crisis with regard to France’s accumulation regime as demonstrated through its stagnate economy.
This deficiency of economic growth and the continual lack of accumulation of financial and
economic resources have impacted attitudes, interests, and preferences of voters to shift towards
more populist and anti-globalization parties such as the NF party.
6
Rapley, J. (2004). Globalization and inequality: Neoliberalism’s downward spiral. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
7
John, M., & Abboud, L. (2014, May 25). Far-right national front stuns french elite with EU
‘earthquake’. Reuters.
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Politicus Journal
Though France did not initially seem as affected by the 2008 global financial crisis in
comparison to other European Union (EU) countries such as Britain, by 2009 France had entered
into an economic recession.8 At the time of the crisis, France’s economy was heavily dependent
on domestic consumption for over 70% of its GDP.9 This reliance on internal economic activity,
as well as the French banking system’s lack of open integration with global financial institutions,
protected these aspects of the French economy from the effects of the financial crisis.10 However,
this does not mean that other sectors of the French economy were shielded from the effects of the
2008 global financial crisis. Namely, the financial crisis caused a sharp contraction of international
trade that led to a crisis for French exporting firms whose exports no longer had viable markets,
and yet continued importing at a higher cost.11 Thus, a balance of trade deficit was created in
France of about $100 billion USD in 2008, which is roughly the same as France’s current balance
of trade deficit.12 The collapse of French firms coupled with a high trade imbalance lead to the
economic downturn for the French economy during 2008 and 2009.13
Moving into the mid-2010s France has continued to experience widespread economic
stagnation. As of March 2015, France’s GDP sat at about 2.8 trillion with an extremely slow
economic growth rate of 0.4% over the last four years and a rising deficit of 4.4% of the GDP.14
This growth rate is extremely slow when compared to other EU countries that were initially and
more obviously affected by the financial crisis, such as Britain whose economy is estimated to
grow by upwards of 3.2% in the next year according to World Bank estimates.15 Despite having
one of the highest productivity rates in Europe, France continues to have a marginally high
unemployment rate of 9.9%, and an extremely high youth unemployment rate of 24%.16 France’s
average household net financial wealth per capita is also relatively low, as it sits at USD 48 741,
8
Han, S. (582). Income inequality, electoral systems, and party polarization. European Journal of
Political Research, 54 (1), 582-600.
9
Focus Economics, (2016). France economic outlook. Focus Economics.
10
Credit Suisse Research, (2014). The global wealth report.
11
Han, S. (582). Income inequality, electoral systems, and party polarization. European Journal of
Political Research, 54 (1), 582-600.
12
OEC, (2016). France [Data file].
13
Briconge, J., & et al. (2012). Firms and the global crisis: French exports in the turmoil. Journal
of International Economics, 87(2), 134-146.
14
OECD, (2015). OECD economic surveys: france 2015. OECD Publishing: Paris.
15
World Bank, (2016b). France [Data file].
16
OECD, (2015). OECD economic surveys: france 2015. OECD Publishing: Paris.
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Politicus Journal
lower than the OECD average of USD 67 139.17 Overall, France’s slow growth and high
unemployment signal that the French economy has entered a period of sustained stagnation.
The reasons for France’s continued stagnation in the face of growth throughout the rest of
the G7 countries affected by the financial crisis, are varied and complex though a few key factors
stand out as major contributors. Firstly, weak product competition in some markets has led to
raising production costs, ultimately undermining potential economic efficiency.18 The
government’s strict labour regulation has contributed to high unemployment, as both the private
and public sectors suffer from a lack of flexibility and efficiency. Further, these laws have been
shown to unfairly target young workers’ social mobility and choice of jobs, which explains the
extremely high youth unemployment rate.19 Lastly, unsustainably high levels of public spending
without any resulting job growth has caused France’s deficit to continue to increase, adding yet
another burden to France’s potential economic growth.20
A clear correlation can be seen with regard to the economic crisis of France’s accumulation
regime from 2008 onwards, and the political rise of the NF party in France from 2010 onwards.
The financial crisis negatively affected most voters’ opinions of the established parties within the
French and the European parliaments. Suffering the social costs of continued economic stagnation,
such as rising unemployment rates, French voters began to become dissatisfied with the traditional
political parties in France. Further, disaffected voters turned towards radical parties like the NF,
as these parties were seen by voters to be outside of traditional spheres of government.21 After the
effects of the economic crisis fully set in, voters shifted towards the NF as it was the only party
with “clean hands” in regard to the failure of the French economy.22 The negative economic effects
of 2009 recession led to increased critical opinions of established political parties within France
that allowed for furthered political support given to the country’s more radical parties.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Godin, E. (2013). The porosity between the mainstream right and extreme right in france: Les
droites décomplexées under nicolas sarkozy and marine le pen's leadership. Journal of
Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), 53-67.
22
Mondon, A. (2015). The french secular hypocrisy: The extreme right, the republic and the battle
for hegemony. Patterns of Prejudice, 49(4), 392-413.
51
Politicus Journal
Not only did voter attitudes shift against the established government, but they also moved
to be less accepting of global economic globalization liberalization and globalization after the
financial crisis. The financial crisis mainly affected France because of its dependence on global
markets. In order to capitalize off of the frustrations of the French people, the new NF leader, Le
Pen, shifted her party away from its past openly racist platform towards a newer more populist,
anti-integration, anti-establishment platform. In particular, Le Pen drew on voters’ anger regarding
increasing unemployment rates and anti-globalization sentiments in her 2012 campaign.23 The
National Front positioned itself as a party that protects “the people” from the negative effects of
globalization, which was blamed for creating France’s poor economic performance24. This rhetoric
led the party to an increase in popularity. The NF first won 12% of the vote in the 2010 regional
elections, then 15% of the vote in the 2011 cantonal elections.25 The party had its major
breakthrough with political salience after it won 20% of the populous vote in the 2012 presidential
elections.26 In sum, voter dissatisfaction caused in part by economic stagnation led to a political
opportunity for the NF to capitalize off of legitimate frustrations the people had with their
government’s accumulation regime failure.
Distributive Regime and Economic Inequality: A Market Based Perspective
France’s recent economic stagnation must also be considered in tandem with its rising rates of
socioeconomic inequality among its population, as the country’s loss of growth did not affect every
income level in society equally. In this section, France’s rising rates of inequality will be
established and explained from a market-based perspective in order to illustrate how market forces
have led to changes in both the political environment of France as well as voting preferences
amongst certain groups.
23
Ibid.
24
Godin, E. (2013). The porosity between the mainstream right and extreme right in france: Les
droites décomplexées under nicolas sarkozy and marine le pen's leadership. Journal of
Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), 53-67.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
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Politicus Journal
The OECD states that the top 20% of France’s income earners earn more than five times the rate
of the bottom 20%.27 From 2005 to 2011, the Gini coefficient for net income in France has risen
from 0.29 to 0.34, one of the only G7 countries to do so after the financial crisis.28 When calculated
with part-time or self-employed workers, France’s Gini coefficient rises even more29. When
segregated between market and net income, the OECD showed that market income is more
unequally distributed with a Gini coefficient of about 0.44 in the late 2000s.30,31 In addition to
rising income inequality, Credit Suisse Research has found that there is rising wealth inequality in
France since 2009 as well.32 These statistics show a relative rise in inequality in France during the
past several years.
From a purely market-based perspective, France’s rising inequality in the last few years
can be explained by the effects the 2008 financial crisis had on the country. In comparison to other
G7 countries, France is one of three countries in the G7 to report rising wealth inequality after
2007.33 The effect that the financial crisis had in other countries was a somewhat equalizing one,
as states directly affected in the banking crisis saw a drop in wealth inequality due to the collapse
the large banks disproportionately affecting the wealthy in those countries closest to the centre of
the crash.34 This is because France was not as immediately affected by the finial crisis of 2008, as
its banking system was more regulated and less globally integrated than many other European
countries. France was not as detrimentally affected by the crisis through connections in the
financial sector, such as Britain’s financial sector, but rather through a drop in GDP and foreign
trade.35 The majority of French workers felt the negative effects of economic depression, such as
27
OECD, (2011). An overview of growing income inequalities in OECD Countries: Main findings.
OECD Publishing: Paris.
28
World Bank. (2016c). Gini index (world bank estimate) [Data file].
29
OECD, (2011). An overview of growing income inequalities in OECD Countries: Main findings.
OECD Publishing: Paris.
30
Ibid.
31
This comparative increase in market income inequality can be explained by lack of progressive
income tax rates and social security contributions by the state.
32
Credit Suisse Research, (2014).
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Briconge, J., & et al. (2012). Firms and the global crisis: French exports in the turmoil. Journal
of International Economics, 87(2), 134-146.
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Politicus Journal
high unemployment rates and strict labour laws, whereas the wealthy elite in France suffered very
little consequences.
This recent rise of market-driven socioeconomic stratification has impacted both the
political environment as well as voter’s preferences immensely, giving rise to increased antiestablishment populism and xenophobic attitudes. In terms of France’s political environment, there
has been a broad shift to the right among more centre-right parties as France’s political discourse
begins to polarize.36 Increasing income inequalities create incentives for political parties to
polarize as central conflicts between core supporters of left wing and right wing parties become
more relevant.37 Thus, political parties are more incentivized to appeal to their core supporters with
more extremist positions on divisive issues. Permissive electoral systems, such as France’s
plurality voting system, allow for parties to easily change their position without restriction. This
was illustrated in France through the NF’s repositioning of itself as a more populist under Le Pen’s
leadership in recent years.38 Overall, the rise of inequality within the population created the need
for more divergent political spaces, as different sections of the population begin to have various
more polarized views on salient issues.
With regard to voting behaviour, changes in income inequality have correlated with support
for the xenophobic and populist platform of the NF. The majority of the population have been
given cause to believe that they are being withheld resources that should be rightfully theirs. As
reported by Halligan, there is rising anger in youths and the middle classes who feel like they are
being systemically disadvantaged by a system that only benefits the wealthy French elite.39 Thus,
these voters seek to exercise what political power they do have to vote for parties they see as
outside the establishment such as the NF. The NF explicitly critiques of the political establishment
that these voters feel excluded from. Further, these voters are attracted to the populism offered by
far-right parties such as the NF as they draw on concepts of egalitarianism that are rooted in
36
Godin, E. (2013). The porosity between the mainstream right and extreme right in france: Les
droites décomplexées under nicolas sarkozy and marine le pen's leadership. Journal of
Contemporary European Studies, 21(1), 53-67.
37
Han, S. (582). Income inequality, electoral systems, and party polarization. European Journal
of Political Research, 54 (1), 582-600.
38
Godin, The porosity between the mainstream right, 53-67.
39
Halligan, L. (2014, October 14). How did france get it so wrong?: As france's economy stagnates
under francois hollande's socialist government, there are fears that ed miliband would repeat his
mistakes if he won power. The Telegraph.
54
Politicus Journal
particularism and in-group mentalities that appeal to the working and middle classes.40 Therefore,
it can be concluded that middle and lower class workers’ dissatisfaction with the current
distributive regime in France has contributed to the NF’s popularity.
Another side effect of growing inequalities is the rise of xenophobic attitudes towards
immigrants. There is a strong link between the loss of social mobility caused by systemic economic
inequalities in Europe and sectarian intolerance. This is furthered by the loss of economic agency
caused by growing inequalities, collective and individual actors exercise xenophobic attitudes
when faced with a distributive regime crisis by which they are being negatively affected.41
Immigrant groups are often used as scapegoats for the systemic problems caused by the failure of
distributive regimes to adequately and effectively redistribute resources in society. The
scapegoating of immigrants as the cause of economic issues such as poverty, unemployment, and
income inequality in society appeals to working and middle class workers’ desire to find a simple
solution to a complex problem.42 As immigrant groups are already racialized and “othered” in
society, they make an easily exploitative target for far right groups like the NF to place blame upon
in order to gain voters. To conclude, market forces related to the global financial crisis has led to
increased economic inequality amongst French citizens, causing a shift in both the political
landscape as well as voter attitudes.
Distributive Regimes and Economic Inequalities: A State-Centric Analysis
The more recent market-driven failure of France’s accumulation and distributive regimes simply
worked to continue to raise socioeconomic stratification that had been in France for the past
century. This stratification has been caused by poor public policy and fiscal management on the
part of the French government. There has been a lack of adequate response from the French
government to the changing economic conditions since the 2009 depression, leading France to a
situation where there are not enough revenues to maintain current public spending levels. Thus
there has been a significant breakdown in the redistribution of resources by the French state,
40
Derks, A. (2005). Populism and the ambivalence of egalitarianism: How do the underprivileged
reconcile a right wing party preference with their socio-economic attitudes?. World Political
Science Review, 2(3), 175-200.
41
Burgi, N. (2014). Societies without citizens: The anomic impacts of labor market restructuring
and the erosion of social rights in europe. European Journal of Social Theory, 17(3), 290-306. R
42
Derks, Populism and the ambivalence of egalitarianism: 175-200.
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Politicus Journal
causing a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of voters and leading to a change in voter attitudes towards
the more anti-establishment parties.
The OECD suggests one of the largest reasons for France’s economic decline is its
increased and unsustainable public spending.43 This massive public spending is overall negative
for the French economy and French workers, as it creates massive public spending deficits which
can hinder growth while at the same time not effectively addressing issues surrounding social
mobility in the country.44 While high public spending may seem like a classic example of welfare
state redistribution of wealth, this is simply not the case with France. Rather social spending in
France goes largely towards pensions and healthcare, which are mainly utilized by the elderly, not
government safety nets for the poor or public works projects for the working age sector of the
population.45 Further, France’s social policies are not geared towards progressive redistribution
and its funding for public spending comes not from progressive tax rates, but from a mix of a
regressive payroll tax, a regressive sales tax, and a small general social contribution tax.46 These
payroll taxes can actually hurt workers the most, as these taxes act as a disincentive to create jobs
on the part of the employer, while at the same time allowing the wealthiest members of French
society to be largely unaffected by taxation.47 Though there are high tax rates on most income
brackets, the wealthy are not “taxed down” the same way they are in Canada, meaning that the
average worker is the one most hurt by the state’s tax system.48 Moreover, France has the least
progressive tax system out of the entire EU, with high rates of tax evasion among elites.49 There
has been a steady rise of inheritance as a percentage of the disposable income over the past thirty
years, leading to a situation where annual inheritance flow makes up around 20% of disposable
income in France.50 France’s taxation is focused on the labour market and earned incomes, not
bequest taxation, creating a situation where the rich are able to get richer through their non-taxable
43
OECD, (2015). OECD economic surveys: france 2015. OECD Publishing: Paris.
44
Smith, T. (2004). France in crisis: Welfare, inequality and globalization since 1980. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Picketty, Thomas et al. (2013).The top 1 percent in international and historical perspective.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 3-20.
56
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inheritance.51 Thus France’s taxation system further entrenches economic inequalities among its
citizens. In summary, France’s inefficient public spending and taxation systems have deepened
socioeconomic stratification within the country.
The consequences of these long-term public policy initiatives are similar to those already
discussed in relation to market driven failures in distributive and accumulative regimes. Once
again there is a sense that many working and middle class voters feel like the system is set up to
work against them. Young working and middle class people in particular feel disenfranchised, as
they see few of the benefits of taxation in France yet receive proportionally higher taxes than the
elites in the government.52 Low income factory workers know that the French system is not
progressive, and that higher class lawyers and brokers can simply deal in cash to avoid taxation in
a tax system that is already built in favour of the wealthy.53 This has created resentment towards
the government on the part of low income workers. Moreover, these groups feel like the
government is unresponsive to their desires as recent polls suggest 61% of France’s labour pool
supports extending the legal limit on the working week and relaxing strict labour regulations that
have caused chronic unemployment. These polls also suggest that 56% of the population supports
lower public spending as well.54 Yet no significant action has been taken by the government on
these public policy issues.55 It is not surprising, when taking these factors into account, that the
French people would turn their support to a populist party that promises sweeping political change
to the establishment if elected. The NF also gives voters a sense of their national identity back
through its hyper-nationalist narrative that many voters had lost due to their dissatisfaction with
the state.56 In sum, the working – and middle – class supporters of the NF were in part influenced
to vote for that party based on distrust of the current government.
51
Ibid.
52
Chrisafis, A. (2012, April 30). French election: Marine le pen voters grapple with their role as
kingmakers. The Guardian.
53
Smith, T. (2004). France in crisis: Welfare, inequality and globalization since 1980. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
54
Halligan, L. (2014, October 14). How did france get it so wrong?: As france's economy stagnates
under francois hollande's socialist government, there are fears that ed miliband would repeat his
mistakes if he won power. The Telegraph.
55
OECD, (2015). OECD economic surveys: france 2015. OECD Publishing: Paris.
56
Burgi, N. (2014). Societies without citizens: The anomic impacts of labor market restructuring
and the erosion of social rights in europe. European Journal of Social Theory, 17(3), 290-306.
57
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Alternative Perspectives: A Cultural Explanation of Voting Behaviour
There are of course alternative arguments within the literature that explain the rise of right wing
parties in France from a different perspective, instead choosing to place primary importance on
cultural factors while disregarding economic factors entirely.57 This argument states that increases
in immigration as well as perceived cultural differences have led to challenges to the secular white
Francophone identity, causing support for the strongly anti-immigration NF party to grow.
According to the OECD, in 2001 France accepted 91 875 immigrants into the country. This
number has continuously increased over the past ten years and rose to 171 925 by 2013,58 Due to
a very low fertility rate of 2.0, the French economy is faced with a declining population and is
forced to allow in immigrants in order to maintain population levels.59 However, it has been argued
that this increased rate of migration can lead to social tensions within the state.60 There have been
racial tensions in France for centuries, however it has been argued that with the most recent influx
of immigration into the country xenophobia and racism is reaching new heights.61 The racist
rhetoric used by radical political parties within France has changed with the times as well, and has
shifted to take on a distinctly nationalist angle. The type of racial prejudice exhibited by the NF in
its policies towards immigrants is not traditional in the sense that it does not explicitly link
Whiteness to racial superiority.62 Instead, the discourse on immigration has shifted to an “us versus
them” rhetoric of cultural difference, where the cultural divide is seen too large to cross and it is
presumed that there will always be conflict between the Western and Islamic civilizations.63
Further, Godin writes that the FN’s “anti-integrationist stance against immigrants, and particularly
Muslims, is justified by the belief that they cannot be assimilated into the national community
because of the radical incompatibility between their ethnic and cultural roots and that of the French
nation”. Therefore, an argument can be made that with an increase in immigration rates there has
57
Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? radical right-wing voting in
six west european countries. European Journal of Political Research, 47(6), 737-765.
58
OECD, (2016). International migration database [Data file].
59
World Bank. (2016a). Fertility rate, total (births per woman) [Data file].
60
Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? radical right-wing voting in
six west european countries. European Journal of Political Research, 47(6), 737-765.
61
Ibid.
62
Mondon, A. (2015). The french secular hypocrisy: The extreme right, the republic and the battle
for hegemony. Patterns of Prejudice, 49(4), 392-413.
63
Ibid.
58
Politicus Journal
been a perceived rise in cultural clashes leading to rises in anti-immigration attitudes amongst
voters.
While migration and identity politics have arguably contributed to the rise of xenophobic
attitudes seen in the NF in France, it would be reductionist to say that rise of far-right parties is
solely created through cultural mixing. The overall consensus in the literature is that increase in
xenophobic sentiments tied to far-right parties is largely due to complex economic and political
factors, as well as issues of ethnic identity64 . Further, it has had been proven empirically that larger
immigration populations do not necessarily lead to furthered racism and xenophobia in European
countries.65 Instead, findings identified complex factors such as social capital, unemployment, and
fiscal redistribution needed to be considered as well in order to adequately explain ethnic
intolerance in the region66 . Therefore, while a cultural perspective can add useful insights to antiimmigration sentiments in France, political and economic factors must be considered as well.
Conclusion
This essay’s focus on the correlation between the rise of the far right in France to the economic
regime crisis has illuminated several overlapping factors as to why French voters’ attitudes have
shifted to the right in the past several years. The failure of France’s acquisition and distribution
regimes, driven both by market-based and state-based forces, has caused: lower and middle class
workers to be dissatisfied with the established government; more political opportunities for
populist right wing parties; and a furthered distrust of globalization and immigrant populations
amongst conservative voters. As Western countries continue to face long term growth problems
and rising inequalities into the future, the discussion surrounding far right politicians and political
parties will become increasingly salient.
64
Roemer, J. E., & Straeten, K. V. d. (2005). Xenophobia and the size of the public sector in france:
A politico-economic analysis. Journal of Economics - Zeitschrift Für Nationalökonomie, 86(2),
95-144.
65
Jesuit, K., Paradowski, P., & Mahler, V. (2009).Electoral support for extreme right-wing parties:
A sub-national analysis of western European elections. Electoral Studies, 28 (2009). 279-290
66
Ibid.
59
Politicus Journal
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of International Economics, 87(2), 134-146.
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and the erosion of social rights in europe. European Journal of Social Theory, 17(3),
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Mondon, A. (2015). The french secular hypocrisy: The extreme right, the republic and the battle
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data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/countries/1W-FR?display=graph
62
Politicus Journal
New Medievalism in Lebanon: The Case of Hezbollah
Connor Klauck
This article examines the rise of a new medieval system in the Republic of Lebanon. In
examining this puzzle, this article first discusses the theoretical approaches that states
may take to defeat non-state actors. This paper then proceeds to look at the rise of
Hezbollah and its place in Lebanese society, from the organization’s founding in 1982
to 2015. This paper found that due to Hezbollah’s extensive funding and support from
Iran, as well as popular support amongst Lebanese Shi’ites, it is unlikely that the group
will lose influence in the near future and that Lebanon can be defined as existing in a
new medieval system.
Introduction
Lebanon has seen countless regimes and internal divisions in its long and storied history. In recent
decades no actor in Lebanese politics has made a greater impact outside the official system than
Hezbollah. Hezbollah, the militant organization, has provided Shi’ites in Lebanon with a number
of social services, diverting people’s loyalty away from the Lebanese Republic. The purpose of
this essay is twofold. Primarily, this essay will demonstrate how Hezbollah has undermined
Lebanon’s state autonomy in the age of New Medievalism. Secondly, this paper will examine the
policies available to the Lebanese Republic for regaining this lost autonomy. This essay will first
demonstrate the origins of Hezbollah as a militant organization; subsequently, the discussion will
turn to Hezbollah’s Iranian ties and funding. Hezbollah’s actions in Lebanon will then be analyzed
to show the extent to which they replace state-sponsored services. Finally, the Lebanese Republic’s
options for responding to the challenge posed by Hezbollah will be examined. This paper aims to
expand the discussion on the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the New Medieval period.
New Medievalism has been a relatively underused term in political science parlance since
its coinage in the 1960s.1 One scholar, Hedley Bull, defined the term in 1977 writing that:
1
Friedrichs, Jörg. "The Meaning of New Medievalism." European Journal of International
Relations 7.4 (2001), 476
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“If modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability
to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on
the other hand with sub- state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept
of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a new mediaeval form of universal political
order might be said to exist.”2
Friedrichs expands upon Bull’s definition by writing that neo-medievalism is “a system of
overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held together by a duality of competing and
universalistic claims.”3 To Bull, the future of the Westphalian state system is one where the nationstate is undermined by sub-state actors and the disorder that characterized the original Medieval
Era is set to return. However, Friedrichs’ definition sees the duality of sovereign states and the
world market economy as holding the entire system together. Although, Friedrichs does add the
caveat that the historical equivalents, the Holy Roman Empire and the Church, both suffered
decline and the medieval system collapsed, meaning that the stability of this duality will not last.
Thus, if Hezbollah is operating in a state of New Medievalism, the Lebanese Republic and
Hezbollah must share authority and loyalty of citizens to a great extent. As establishing that the
Lebanese Republic’s legal sovereignty is in question exceeds the scope of this paper, Bull’s
definition of New Medievalism will be slightly altered for this paper’s use. Hezbollah does not
contest the sovereignty of Lebanon; rather it undermines Lebanon’s autonomy. Wolff defines
autonomy as the power “to exercise public policy functions independently of other sources of
authority”4 in a defined territory. Wolff’s definition changes the criteria to determine if Lebanon
exists in a new medieval state to requiring a shared loyalty and authority of citizens, to the extent
that Lebanon cannot function without Hezbollah’s operations.
Theoretical Approaches to Defeating Non-State Actors
Prior to discussing the specific case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, this paper will discuss the theoretical
approaches a state may take to defeat a non-state actor that has supplanted the loyalty of a portion
2
Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP
1977), 246.
3
Friedrichs, "The Meaning of New Medievalism," 476.
4
Wolff, S. “Approaches To Conflict Resolution In Divided Societies: The Many Uses Of
Territorial Self-Governance.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 20.1 (2013), 5.
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of the population. Depending on one’s theoretical position, there are a number of different tactics
available for a state to regain lost autonomy. The approaches discussed below will be from the
realist, institutionalist, and constructivist lenses.
The realist approach to regaining autonomy focuses on the utilization of power.5 Therefore,
the preferred tactics include military force, the isolation of groups, instigating internal splits in
sub-state organizations, and bribery.6 The realist approach to engaging sub-state actors can best be
described by the phrase “divide and conquer”. In the case of Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military wing
is better armed and more effective in combat than the Lebanese Armed Forces.7 This severely
limits the impact any Lebanese military operation may have on reducing Hezbollah’s operations.
Hezbollah has eroded the Lebanese Republic’s autonomy to such a degree that in addition to
eliminating the Republic’s monopoly over the use of force in its territory, the Lebanese Republic
is largely prevented from using any force against Hezbollah for fear of reprisal.
The institutionalist approach to the problem prioritizes negotiation and discussion. The
institutionalist approach acknowledges the interests and goals of both parties and seeks to establish
a compromise between them.8 To this end, the tactics of mediation and co-optation are the most
widely used by institutionalists. The co-optation of high-ranking officials has merit and historical
success, for example the co-optation of various Afghan warlords into the post-Taliban
government.9 The issue present for utilizing this tactic is that Hezbollah has already co-opted
themselves into the Lebanese government with their political wing. Any further attempts to
integrate Hezbollah leadership into the official governing apparatus of the Lebanese State would
result in Hezbollah gaining more power and influence over the rest of Lebanese society furthering
Hezbollah’s own goals.
The constructivist approach is focused on reframing the identities of actors involved. This
involves tactics such as socializing groups into a constructive mindset and shaming groups
5
Hofman, Claudia and Ulrich Schneckener. “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors In State- And
Peace-Building: Options And Strategies.” International Review of the Red Cross 93.883 (2011),
6.
6
Ibid.
7
Morris, Loveday and Haidamous, Susan. "For Lebanon's Sunnis, growing rage at Hezbollah over
role in Syria." Washington Post. 12 June 2013.
8
Hofman, Claudia and Ulrich Schneckener. “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors In State- And
Peace-Building: Options And Strategies,” 49.
9
Ibid.
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nationally and internationally for their actions. These tactics harm a group’s legitimacy and brings
them to the negotiating table. While the constructivist approach also has merit, Hezbollah has preemptively countered any such efforts through an extensive propaganda campaign designed around
rebuilding homes destroyed during fighting with Israel, and fighting only during times that do not
inconvenience local Shi’ite farmers.10 While Hezbollah continues to face criticism at the
international level, they have largely insulated themselves from dissent at the national level with
their Shi’ite support base, preventing a solely constructivist solution to the conflict.
Hezbollah’s Origins
Hezbollah was founded in 1982 as a Shi’ite militant organization in southern Lebanon with the
original aim of harassing the Israeli occupying forces.11 In addition to their original intentions, in
1985, Hezbollah released a document known as “the Open Letter”. This was essentially a founding
manifesto explaining Hezbollah’s entire organizational structure, enemies and identity.12
Hezbollah has stated that its activities in the military and political spheres are inseparable from
one another.13 Hezbollah has perpetually fought with its mortal enemy, Israel, in the years since
the occupation. During times of conflict with the Israelis, Hezbollah has used tactics such as
abductions, suicide attacks, and missile strikes.14 The use of these tactics has resulted in Hezbollah
being labeled as a terrorist organization by states such as the United States, the United Kingdom
and Saudi Arabia.15In the years following the 2006 July War with Israel, Hezbollah has been
engaged in projecting force abroad, siding with the Assad Regime in the ongoing Syrian Civil
War,16 and supporting the Shi’ite government there.
10
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study." Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 36.11 (2013), 909.
11
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 901.
12
Ibid.
13
Dubowitz, Mark, and Alexander Ritzmann. “Hezbollah’s German Helpers.” Wall Street Journal,
19 Apr. 2007.
14
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship: A Case Study Of How State
Sponsorship Affects Terrorist Group Decision
Making.” Perspectives On Terrorism 6.4-5
(2012), 97.
15
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 906.
16
Slim, Randa. "Hezbollah and Syria: from regime proxy to regime savior." Insight Turkey 16.3
(2014), 61.
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Although originally founded as a solely militant organization, Hezbollah established a
political wing of its organization in 1990.17 The decision to enter Lebanese politics officially was
contested internally by Hezbollah’s elites. The decision was made as an attempt to give the
organization greater legal validity.18 This decision was also the result of firm pressure from Iran,
wishing to lend legitimacy to their proxy and further their own regional goals.19 Through its
political wing, the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, Hezbollah has managed to get its members
elected to the Lebanese Parliament and maintain a disproportionate amount of influence in the
Cabinet to its size in Parliament.20 In addition to the official political influence, Hezbollah
maintains and cultivates the goodwill of citizens harmed through its clashes with Israel. To this
end, one major tactic Hezbollah uses is to rebuild homes destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in the
South. Under this program, over 17 000 destroyed or damaged homes were rebuilt before 2006.21
This allows Hezbollah to combat Israel without fear of losing its vital Shi’ite support bases.
Iranian Funding and Ties
Although Hezbollah formally began in 1982, in Lebanon, small disparate groups that would
eventually form Hezbollah’s core existed. The 1979 Iranian Revolution provided Hezbollah with
a viable sponsor, and Iran was more than happy to support the fledgling organization.22 In its
founding documents, Hezbollah explicitly states its ties to the Supreme Leader of Iran and has
aimed to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon based on the Iranian system.23 Iran supplies
Hezbollah with both material and non-material resources such as weaponry, funding, training and
expertise.24 While this may seem to be to the exclusive benefit of Hezbollah, this is not the case,
as Iran “wants a military proxy that would allow it to extend its reach while avoiding the costs of
war.”25 Hezbollah secures Iranian influence beyond its borders and provides Iran with a loyal ally
17
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 902.
18
Ibid.
19
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 100.
20
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 913.
21
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.
22
Haddad, Simon. "Explaining Lebanese Shii Adherence to Hezbollah: Alienation, Religiosity and
Welfare Provision." Defense & Security Analysis 29.1 (2013), 18.
23
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 903.
24
Ibid.
25
Szekely, Ora. “Hezbollah’s Survival: Resources and Relationships” Middle East Policy 29.4
(2012), 112.
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in an increasingly anti-Iranian geopolitical climate. Iran provides a great deal of finances to
Hezbollah’s education programs to the sum of $1.6 million in 1987 alone.26 This number however
is only a small part of the aid delivered to Hezbollah from Iran. It has been estimated that Hezbollah
requires approximately $500 million annually27 to sustain its social, military and political
operations. Recent reports indicate that Hezbollah may be receiving anywhere between $100-200
million in aid from Iran.28 It is also important to note that while Iran may represent a significant
portion of Hezbollah’s revenue streams they are not the only source. The remaining $300-400
million in revenue comes from more diverse supporters. Due to the illegality of financing terrorist
organizations, it is difficult to accurately track the flow of Hezbollah’s funds, but there are some
leads.
A sizeable portion of Hezbollah’s revenue comes from legitimate humanitarian aid funds,
donated to Hezbollah through a series of charitable front organizations.29 European, specifically
German, donations contribute to Hezbollah’s operating budget on such a scale that Hezbollah
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said that any European restrictions on funds would “destroy
Hezbollah. The sources of our funding will dry up and the sources of moral, political and material
support will be destroyed.”30 This European aspect of Hezbollah’s financing will be discussed in
greater depth in subsequent sections of this paper. The last methods for Hezbollah in regard to
fundraising include imposed levies on businesses run in Hezbollah controlled regions and appeals
to Shi’ite diaspora living across the world.31 These levies are essentially taxes paid to Hezbollah
in lieu of taxes paid to the state.32 Hezbollah’s vast majority of funding come from misdirected
donations and levies. The disparate revenue streams make tackling Hezbollah’s finances difficult,
but they provide valuable insight into the global network the Hezbollah has built.
26
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 905.
27
Rudner, Martin. "Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering." Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 33.8 (2010), 702.
28
Ibid, 705.
29
Ibid, 703.
30
Dubowitz, Mark, and Alexander Ritzmann. “Hezbollah’s German Helpers.”
31
Rudner, Martin. "Hizbullah Terrorism Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering," 701.
32
Ibid.
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Social Welfare Programs
Hezbollah focuses its provision of services on four core areas: financial aid, medical care,
education, and media. Hezbollah’s services are targeted at the Shi’ite community in Lebanon,
which has long been neglected by the Lebanese state and received little to no state social services33.
Hezbollah has capitalized on this neglect and institutionalized sectarian government with one
Hezbollah operative stating:
“the government is built like a puzzle . . . We (the Shi’ites) do not get anything
from the government because the regime is still sectarian . . . The resistance was
being attacked by the government and the government is not taking the opinion of
a great portion of the Lebanese since one and half million went demonstrating
because they were not looked at by the government.”34
This shows that the Lebanese government fostered the situation in which Hezbollah emerged from,
thus creating the greatest threat to their own autonomy. Through their social service provision,
Hezbollah supplants loyalty for the Lebanese Republic for the 27% of Lebanese who identify
themselves as Shi’ites.35
A large part of Hezbollah’s financial aid program involves welfare for families of those who
died fighting for the organization. To entice young family men to join the group, one of
Hezbollah’s welfare agencies states that, “the martyr goes forward welcoming martyrdom while
relying on resistance institutions, which take care of his son and family after him.”36 In providing
for the families of those who die in Hezbollah’s operations, the organization removes one of the
greatest obstacles to recruitment; that being the fear of leaving one’s family uncared for and
destitute. In addition to direct financial aid, Hezbollah also subsidizes vocational training and
cultural programs.37 This sort of financial aid to Shi’ite Muslims has occurred since the founding
days of Hezbollah. In 1982, Hezbollah, backed by Iran, provided financial aid to 135 000 families
33
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.
34
Haddad, Simon. "Explaining Lebanese Shii Adherence to Hezbollah: Alienation, Religiosity and
Welfare Provision," 25.
35
"Lebanon." The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 10 Mar. 2016.
36
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 93.
37
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 902.
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in need.38 These families and other dependents rely on Hezbollah’s success for their own personal
well-being making rebellion unlikely
In addition to providing financial aid, Hezbollah also directly administers medical care to its
supporters. Hezbollah’s medical apparatus is extensive and consists of two hospitals, 17 clinics,
numerous pharmacies and dental clinics.39 While these facilities provided day-to-day medical care,
they assumed a vital role during previous conflicts with Israel. Not only do these clinics provide
Hezbollah with safe facilities to treat wounded fighters, they also present a propaganda
opportunity. Hezbollah treats civilians wounded in clashes at these facilities to ensure their loyalty.
Also, Hezbollah can show these injuries as the result of Israeli aggression. In clashes in 1983,
“Hezbollah paid 70 percent of the medical costs of civilians injured in its clashes with Israel.”40
Ensuring that the people under their rule are taken care of physically bolsters Hezbollah’s support
among the local population.
Hezbollah also provided multiple levels of education to its people. These range from primary
to post-secondary education opportunities. The curricula for Hezbollah’s institutions consist of
both secular and Islamic teachings.41 Hezbollah’s school system does not only educate students,
but also indoctrinates them into the ideology of the organization. As with all of Hezbollah’s social
initiatives, the education program was largely paid for by Iran.42 Iranian education funding allowed
for the creation of 130 000 scholarships for post-secondary study in Iran,43 allowing Hezbollah to
offer improvements in people’s lives that greatly surpass anything offered by the Lebanese state.
Controlling education as a method of indoctrination is nothing new, yet the extent that Hezbollah
controls the education of its people is notable. From pre-school to post-secondary institutions,
Hezbollah provides textbooks, lunches, and transportation for free to its students.44 In conjunction
with Hezbollah’s vocational training program and pension plan, citizens under Hezbollah rule
enjoy the cradle to grave benefits that the Lebanese Republic cannot afford to match.
38
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.
39
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 905.
40
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.
41
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 905.
42
Ibid.
43
DeVore, Marc R. “Exploring The Iran-Hezbollah Relationship,” 94.
44
ibid.
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The last strategy that Hezbollah utilizes to supplant the Lebanese Republic’s authority is its
extensive media campaign.
Hezbollah’s media operation continues and reinforces the
indoctrination present in the schooling system.45 The extensive media apparatus consists of both
modern and traditional methods. Mosques and religious centers inside Lebanon have become open
recruiting grounds for Hezbollah.46 As well, a number of mosques and religious centers abroad
have been shown to exist as recruiting centers for Hezbollah.47 The modern avenue consists of
Hezbollah run newspapers, radio shows and television stations.48 The media apparatus built by
Hezbollah over the past four decades has been lauded as the most successful in the Arab world,
both Sunni and Shi’ite,49 until ISIL claimed that mantle in the recent years. This extensive media
apparatus along with the education system gives Hezbollah a level of totalitarian control over its
people.
Provision of welfare, healthcare, education, and media are four central pillars of the modern
state today. Hezbollah has managed to tap into the disillusion of the Shi’ites population in Lebanon
where a survey revealed that only 14% of respondents believed that the government provided them
with adequate services.50 It was shown in this same survey that nearly 90% of all Shi’ites are the
recipients of some form of aid administered by Hezbollah.51 These all provide Hezbollah with a
reliable support base, much to the detriment of the Lebanese Republic’s autonomy.
The unique aspect of Hezbollah is that although they are supplanting the government’s
loyalty and service provisions, they are not in open conflict. Hezbollah’s military wing has always
been preoccupied with fighting foreign actors and their proxies, both inside and outside Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s eternal enemy, as mentioned above, is Israel and more recently they have engaged
anti-Assad militants in Syria. This puts the Lebanese Republic in a very peculiar position. Any
attempts to remove Hezbollah by force would be seen as self-destructive for the Lebanese
Republic. Currently Hezbollah acts in congruence with the Lebanese Republic by providing
45
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 905.
46
Ibid.
47
Weinthal, Benjamin. "950 Hezbollah Operatives, 300 Hamas Members In Germany Intelligence Report." The Jerusalem Post. 1 July 2015.
48
Lamloum, Olfa. "Hezbollah’s Media." Global Media and Communication 5.3 (2009), 355.
49
Ibid.
50
Haddad, Simon. "Explaining Lebanese Shii Adherence to Hezbollah: Alienation, Religiosity and
Welfare Provision," 24.
51
Ibid.
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services to those who the latter has historically neglected. While the above passages lend the air
of futility in the attempt to regain lost Lebanese autonomy, there are alternative options to those
discussed. The simplest way to disrupt Hezbollah’s welfare operation is to disrupt the flow of
money coming in from Iran and Europe. However, this remains an unlikely prescription for the
problem, as Iran shows no sign of reducing or halting monetary transfers to Hezbollah. Indeed,
with the recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal),
Iran is in the economic position to increase aid to Hezbollah, further reinforcing Hezbollah’s hold
on people’s loyalty. Cutting the flow from Europe should be the nominally easier of the options
but there exists a reluctance and naivety amongst European countries to act. Germany in particular
accepts the belief that Hezbollah’s political and military wings operate separate from one another,52
even with clear Hezbollah statements saying that they are not. In recent years, this naivety has
begun to wear off, with Germany labeling Hezbollah’s military wing a terrorist organization in
2013.53 Despite this designation, Hezbollah’s political wing continues to be legal in Germany, and
funds continue to flow back to Lebanon.54
If Hezbollah’s revenue flows were disrupted despite the difficulty, Hezbollah’s carefully
cultivated support base would begin to erode. This would allow the Lebanese Republic to enter
the vacuum of service provision and focus on eliminating the feeling of alienation present among
the Shi’ites.55 Reducing the feeling of alienation amongst Shi’ites greatly weakens the new
medieval system. In turning citizens’ loyalty back to the State, authority returns to the state as well.
Hezbollah has entrenched themselves into Lebanon’s social make up to the extent that the question
arises of whether it would be harmful for Lebanon as a whole if Hezbollah was removed. Barring
any mass injection of funds for the Lebanese Republic from a third-party, Hezbollah seems to be
a permanent fixture in Lebanon’s political system. In this new medieval era, Lebanon experiences
crisscrossing loyalties and overlapping authority.56 The current situation in which the Lebanese
state provides for the Christian Maronites and Sunni Muslims in which Hezbollah provides for the
52
Dubowitz, Mark, and Alexander Ritzmann. “Hezbollah’s German Helpers.”
53
Weinthal, Benjamin. "950 Hezbollah Operatives, 300 Hamas Members In Germany Intelligence Report.”
54
Ibid.
55
Haddad, Simon. "Explaining Lebanese Shii Adherence to Hezbollah: Alienation, Religiosity and
Welfare Provision," 24.
56
Winn, Neil. "Conclusion: Neo-medievalism, Civil Wars and the New Diplomacy." Civil Wars
6.2 (2003), 141.
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Shi’ites remains a delicate but stable status quo. Hezbollah has stated that, “the main problem in
the Lebanese political system which prevents its reform, development and constant updating is
political sectarianism.”57 As this sectarian system is designed to protect minority rights inside of
Lebanon. Hezbollah views it as an obstacle and has designs on altering the system to better suit its
own interests.58 Yet, Hezbollah reinforces the sectarian system by appealing only to the Shi’ite
minority. Hezbollah inside of Lebanon has been described as a “state within a state,”59 and having
joined the political system, has largely moved away from a military overthrow of the Lebanese
Republic. Hezbollah and the Lebanese Republic have reached a tentative modus vivendi that works
for the time being provided neither side moves against the other.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that Lebanon indeed exists in a new medieval state. The Lebanese Republic
and Hezbollah both provide services and cultivate the loyalty of large segments of the population.
The Lebanese Republic has historically favoured the Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims
while Hezbollah has patronized the Shi’ites. With a vast network of revenue streams, direct Iranian
aid, misdirected donations and local tithes, Hezbollah has managed to accumulate vast sums of
wealth and distribute it to 90% of the population under its control. Hezbollah distributes this aid
in the forms of financial aid, medical care, education subsidies and media programs. These four
pillars of Hezbollah’s welfare system have replaced the official Lebanese Republic’s program for
the Shi’ite population. Through their military wing, Hezbollah has shown that they are a capable
fighting force with the ability to project force abroad, notably during the ongoing Syrian Civil
War. With Hezbollah’s military ability to project force abroad while still maintaining control of
their territories within Lebanon, the entrenchment of the organization within the country is clearly
evident. The situation remains precarious for Lebanon and a new conflict has the potential to erupt
on short notice. The delicate peace between the Lebanese Republic and Hezbollah remains for the
time being mutually beneficial, as Lebanon is relieved of providing for 27% of its population,
57
Haddad, Simon. "Explaining Lebanese Shii Adherence to Hezbollah: Alienation, Religiosity and
Welfare Provision," 24.
58
Azani, Eitan. "The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study," 901.
59
Abdul-Hussain, Hussain. "Hezbollah: A State Within A State." Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology 8 (2009). 68.
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while Hezbollah maintains influence and the position of a power broker within the country.
Moving forward however, the clearest way for the Lebanese Republic to retain autonomy within
their borders is to work to integrate Hezbollah into the formal state institutions. This institutionalist
approach has already begun to happen, but there are important caveats to note. Were Hezbollah to
fully integrate into the Lebanese Republic, it is likely that their Iranian funding would be cut off
or severely reduced. This in turn would cause a funding crisis for the welfare system that Hezbollah
provides and could serve to only exacerbate ethnic tensions in the country. In addition, the
integration of the group into the state would certainly anger hardliners within Hezbollah and
threaten the delicate peace within Lebanon. A smaller, more radical Hezbollah could return to
assassinations and bombings, causing severe loss of life. With these important caveats noted, the
integration of Hezbollah slowly over several years is the most effective and peaceful way to ensure
stability and end the new medieval state inside of Lebanon.
While the Lebanese Republic is weakened by this arrangement and has lost the monopoly
on the use of force within the borders of Lebanon, rebuilding peace in the country remains more
important for the people than struggles for power. Hezbollah for the time being is to remain an
influential sub-state actor in Lebanon and continue to supplant the loyalty of the Lebanese
Republic.
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2017 Undergraduate Student
Summer Research Fellowship
(USSRF)
The Undergraduate Student Summer Research Fellowships (USSRF)
provides an opportunity for any continuing undergraduate students at
Queen’s to develop their research skills under the guidance of a faculty
researcher. Over the course of the summer, students will develop a
research project in social sciences, humanities, or creative arts. Students
may consider projects in disciplines outside of their own field of study or
outside of their focus study areas, as well as those directly connected to
their prime area of study.
Nineteen fellowships are available on campus and two (with the possibility
of up to three) of the 2017 fellowships will be offered to students whose
projects take place at the Bader International Study Centre (BISC) at
Herstmonceux Castle, East Sussex, England.
Deadline:
4:00 pm, Friday March 10, 2017
Forward enquiries to:
Lynn Roberts, University Research Services
[email protected]
For complete Fellowship Guidelines and Submission Instructions see University
Research Services website: http://www.queensu.ca/urs/undergraduate-studentsummer-research-fellowships-ussrf
77