Mechanistic individualism versus organistic
totalitarianism
J.J. Venter
D epartment o f Philosophy
Potchefstroom University for CHE
POTCHEFSTRO O M
A bstract
M echanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
In this article it is argued that the organistic world picture, when
functioning as a world view, is associated with a totalitarian view o f social
relationships, usually promoting the interests o f the state or the ethnic
group as the interests which should dominate. This is illustrated by
referring to the social ideas o f Hobbes, Rousseau, D.H. Lawrence and
Mussolini. The mechanistic world picture, however, when functioning as a
world view, is associated with individualism, according to which the
individuals have a relatively independent existence; it suggests that justice
and morality are the automatic products o f the equilibrating process.
Cases in point: Hobbes, Adam Smith, Kant, Darwin, New-Classical and
Monetarist economics. Finally (in Neo-Calvinist vein) it is argued that the
application o f such worldviewish metaphors should be limited, so that
justice can be done to both the differentiation o f social relationships and
their integration.
1.
Background
M ain thesis: Each extreme o f social thinking, individualism and
totalitarianism bases itself on some idea o f ultimate reality:
individualism is associated with a m echanistic p icture o f the universe
(applied to social life), a n d totalitarianism with an organistic picture
o f the universe. Such pictures becom e or are world views which
determ ine a nd give m eaning to the behaviour o f p erso n s tow ard
aspects o f the world interpreted in term s o f these pictures {in casu
social reality), i.e. these pictures determine what reality “in essence” is,
in totality and in detail (even when the picture itself is acknow ledged to
be a metaphor).
It seems as if human beings, as
to the question o f “the meaning
all commit suicide? W ho am I
expect different behaviour from
Koers 62(1) 1997:91-117
beings with self-consciousness, continually return
o f life” . Why do 1 live at all? Why shouldn’t we
with regard to other self-conscious beings? Why
me than from lions? Pictures o f the universe play
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
an orientating role with regard to such questions: they provide metaphorical
explanations o f “macrocosm ic” patterns; they also provide maps which guide
human beings through life, and relate the individual human being to other possible
beings, giving mankind a status and some aims. They can also serve to explain
the peculiarities o f social structures and the relationship o f the individual towards
them.
Although one can possibly picture the universe in an infinite number o f w ays, two
pictures seem to have dominated W estern thought: an ancient one, according to
which the universe is a living being (the organistic picture); and a m odem one,
dating from the seventeenth century, viewing the universe as a machine (the
m echanistic one).
Ancient people had no other way o f explaining the movements o f heavenly bodies
than by modelling them according to self-moving things from within their horizon
o f experience, i.e. living things (especially human beings). The universe thus
came to be viewed as an eternal, and therefore divine living being, populated by
smaller living beings, some eternal (the heavenly bodies; the “ spirits”), some
mortal or partially mortal (human beings, animals, plants; cf. Venter, 1996:1-5).
It was only after the advent o f apparently lifeless autom ata that W estern man
could conceive o f the dynamics o f the universe in terms o f a different metaphor:
that o f an automaton, with a creator god as its engineer and maintenance
mechanic (Venter, 1992a: 190-198; cf. also Hooykaas, 1972:61 ff; Dijksterhuis,
1950).
From a physical point o f view the pictures have been functioning as m odels, in
the sense that they are explanatory metaphorical standardisations (cf. Santema,
1978:2-26) w hich serve as frames o f reference for the understanding o f the
physical interrelationships in the universe at large. Both pictures, how ever, have
also been functioning as suggestive m etaphors, life maps and com passes, which
guide individual and social praxis. They have, therefore, in fact becom e life-andw orld views, w hich determine norms, values, and the structuring o f social
relationships, as Santema also noticed (1978:7ff). One could even say that from a
scholarly point o f view, they provided (seemingly) successful w ays o f
explanation, prediction and the determination o f regularities with implicit world
views, and therefore show the characteristics o f what Kuhn called a “paradigm ”,
and some o f those he later included under “disciplinary m atrix” (Kuhn, 1975:
174fl).
It is not always easy to determine whether, for any specific adherent, the specific
picture adopted functioned as only a m etaphor through which the world is m ade
intelligible and meaningful, or whether the world is supposed to be a real living
organism or a real machine. There may (proportionally) be more mechanistic
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J.J. Venter
thinkers w ho believed their descriptions o f the world (“machine”, “mechanism,”
“equilibrium”) to be only metaphors, while (proportionally) more organistic
thinkers may have believed their metaphors (“organism”, “organ”, “alive”,
“growing”) to be factual descriptions (i.e. that the world is “really” a living
being). For my argument it does not matter much whether the adherent thinks the
w orld to be “really” a machine/organism, or only “ similar to” an organism/
machine. O nce a picture fu n ctio n s as a life-and-w orld view, it provides a kin d o f
"deeper understanding" o f the world, a meaning content to our behaviour
(whether contemplative or active), an “ought”, which induces us to relate to the
world as if it really “ is” a machine or an organism. Thus the picture itself
becom es an ultimate reality; a design which is (or pretends to be) simultaneously
a structuring o f reality.
The tw o world pictures consciously or unconsciously amount to a designing o f
reality in toto, and therefore to a confusion o f picture (metaphor, subjective
construct), with reality, in the sense that they function as hermeneutic-heuristic
outlines for the (re-)construction o f reality. H eidegger (1938:82-83) saw this
(although limiting his critique to the subjective rationalism o f M odernity), when
he stated:
W here the world becomes picture, that-which-is in its totality is determined
as the intended-by-man, which he therefore accordingly wants to bring
before himself, and have in front o f him, and set before him. W orld picture
( Weltbild), essentially understood, therefore does not mean a picture o f the
world, but the world understood as picture. That-which-is in its totality is
understood in this context such that it is ju st and only that-which-is in as far
as it has been set by the representing, re-establishing human beings. W hen
w e arrive at a world picture, an essential decision about that-which-is in its
totality is executed. The being o f that-which-is is sought and found in its
being-represented (my translation - JJV; cf. also Venter, 1995:179-190).
K eeping H eidegger in mind, the questioning o f the world pictures could be done
on two counts: firstly on their being constructs o f total reality (i.e. their
“Archimedean point”-pretence) and secondly on their nonnative (world-viewish)
social implications. I shall focus on the second, thereby tackling the metaphor
from the angle o f its constructed reality.
The w eakness and strengths o f each o f the two dominant world pictures, as social
models or standards o f explanation (disciplinary matrices) and behaviour (lifeviews), I hope to open up in the next few pages. I shall take issue with the way in
which these world pictures, transformed into or functioning as world views,
construct (social) reality in their own terms, and the ways in which both o f them
determine intellectual leadership’s thinking, and function as directive forces
which cause pain and suffering. Given the fact that such world pictures vacillate
in their roles from analogies (pictorial descriptions), and standards (models) o f
Koers 62(1) 1997:91-117
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
reality, to determinants o f thought (paradigms or disciplinary m atrices) (cf.
Santema, 1978:1-26; Botha, 1986:374-383; 1992:78-115) my use o f term s will
move among these possibilities, as suits the context. M y focus will be on the
social philosophies suggested by and constructed on the basis o f these world
pictures; a theory o f metaphors, models, and/or paradigms is not intended in this
essay.
2.
Organism as societal structure
The organistic world picture suggests a holistic view o f the internal relation­
ships between entities', i.e. it tends to view individuals as parts o f a larger w hole,
on which they are fully dependent for their life and well-being, in the same way
that an organ or a member is dependent upon the living body o f which it is a part
- it cannot be taken out, sw opped, or replaced at will. This suggests, therefore,
that the individual is p a rt o f sm aller social structures, which in turn are p a rts o f
larger ones, a n d that the larger ones (usually "states"), have rightful
dom ination over the sm aller ones. It may even suggest that an elite leadership
with some special (occult) relationship to the whole, rightfully occupies the
political pow er positions. (In such views political and religious pow er structures
will tend to support one another.)
On this hypothesis, the conception o f the material universe as a living being in
Plato’s Timaeus may provide some explanation o f his totalitarian view s in the
Republic. N ot only does he view the individual in a certain sense as a smaller
replica o f the state, but he proposes totalitarian control over religion (poetry),
family life, expression, and social status by a quasi-occult com munist elite. He
tends to view social formations o f a non-state nature (such as economic
production units, religious institutions, family life, the arts), as simply parts o f the
political whole, to be subjected to the normative insights o f an intellectual elite a view which is still reflected in m odem “neo-platonist”, organistic, political
philosophies like Fichte’s.
•
H o b b es - th e sta te as a civ il person
Hobbes provides one o f the most interesting organistic approaches to questions o f
social structure - interesting because o f its inconsistency, and its explicit treat­
ment o f the relationship between “smaller” social institutions and the state as one
o f “part” versus “w hole” . Inconsistently with his mechanistic explanation o f the
state o f nature, H obbes (1972a: 170) analyses civil society using the organistic
key metaphors o f the “general will” and “ civil person” :
Now union thus made is called ... a civil person. For when there is one will
o f all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word one, it is to
be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own
rights and properties. Insomuch as neither any one citizen, nor all o f them
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J.J. Venter
together ... is to be accounted the city. A city therefore ... is one person,
whose will by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of
them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular
person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.
The change o f metaphors (projected as a change from theory to practice) is not
innocent. H obbes w rote the The Citizen earlier than w as planned in order to
influence the debate on “the rights o f dominion and the obedience due from
subjects”, and to encourage citizens not to disturb the peace o f that institution
aimed at their preservation (Hobbes, 1972a: 103). He summarily rejected, as
partial views o f interest groups, the criticism that he had allocated too much
pow er to civil authorities, taken away liberty o f conscience, and set princes above
the law (Hobbes, 1972a: 105). He proves keen to show that the dictates o f right
reason, as expressed in the law o f the land, actually express the law o f God, and
are therefore in harmony with Christianity, thus neutralising the possibility that
Christians may be more obedient to God than to their government.
The m etaphor is elaborated: the supreme pow er is like the soul, w here the will
has its seat, while the council is like the head (Hobbes, 1972a: 188). Totalitarian
consequences are drawn from it: other civil persons, like merchant companies,
are subject to the will o f the city, which is supreme; the laws o f the land provide
the correct interpretation o f rational religion. The supreme pow er is above the
law, absolute, and cannot be dissolved by those who com pact it into being. To it
belongs the sword o f justice, as well as o f war, the legislative pow er, the
judicature, the naming o f magistrates, and the censure o f doctrine (Hobbes,
1972a: 173). W hatever H obbes’s motives may have been: the basic metaphor of
the state as a single living person, is used as foundational “argument” for an allencom passing and overriding state power.
•
R ousseau: T he absolute will of the to ta lita ria n sta te
In his D iscourse on Political Econom y, Jean-Jacques Rousseau used a wide
repertoire o f m etaphors from the organistic world picture in his analysis o f
government, with the same result as Hobbes. The (living machine) body politic
has the sovereign as “head”, laws and customs as “brain”, com merce, industry
and agriculture as “mouth” and “ stom ach”, public income as “blood”, economy
as “heart” and citizens as “body” and “members” . But it is also a moral being,
possessed o f a (general) will, which is the source o f laws constituting justice (cf.
R ousseau, 1916a:252-254).
Rousseau anticipates M ussolini’s doctrine that the state makes the people; in
fact, virtue is nothing more than the conformity o f all particular wills to the
general will (Rousseau, 1916a:259-260). In virtuous people the heroic passion o f
patriotism has been made subservient to public reason, and the citizens have
becom e accustom ed to viewing their “individuality only in its relation to the body
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o f the state ... and to be aw are o f their own existence merely as part o f the state”
(Rousseau, 1916a:268). The state as permanent entity has the right to usurp the
educational rights o f the transitory institution, the family (Rousseau, 1916a:269),
as well as to intervene in the economy, with the aim to either maintain or change
property distribution (Rousseau, 1916a:272-273).
These totalitarian government pow ers are founded in a totalitarian view o f the
sovereign and the constitution, as described in the Social Contract. M orality is
founded in law, which implies that the state has the right to uphold m orality by
censorship preventing the com iption o f public opinion (Rousseau, 1916b, IV,
vii). Rousseau w anted a (M achiavellian) civil religion based on the model o f
ancient pagan state religions (continued adherence enforced by the threat o f
capital punishment), and rejected any claim o f Christianity to fulfil this role,
supposing it to be a spiritual slave morale which would leave the state without
defence and divide the loyalty o f the citizen betw een the priest and the sovereign
(Rousseau, 1916b, IV, viii). These totalitarian practices are directly related to
Rousseau’s basic organistic picture o f the state as H obbesian p erso n a ficta:
‘Each o f us puts his person and all his pow er in common under the supreme
direction o f the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each
mem ber as an invisible part o f the w hole.’ A t once, in place o f the
individual personality o f each contracting party, this act o f association
creates a moral and collective body, composed o f as many m em bers as the
assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common
identity, its life and its will (Rousseau, 1916b: 15).
Since the Enlightenment, firstly, reality becam e focused in man (man as the telos
o f the universe, according to Kant) and reality and history becam e one. A living
universe in this case is a hom o-centric universe. Secondly, since ancient times,
the organistic world picture showed a tendency tow ards pantheism (even in quasitheistic philosophical systems like Neo-Platonism). This w as associated with
magic: everything being alive usually m eant everything being “ spiritual” and
“divine” or “dem onic” to some degree. G radations o f spirituality implied a
hierarchy, w hich, on a social level, leads to elitism, w hether o f a religious
(esoteric), political (aristocratic) or gender (chauvinistic) nature. This w hole
cluster o f ideas around the organistic picture can serve to (at least partially)
explain the defence o f totalitarian and authoritarian regim es in the twentieth
century.
•
O rg a n istic holism in F ascism an d N azism
M ussolini (1935:7-8), interpreting B ergson’s organistic approach, stressed that
the conception o f the state as a philosophy o f life is directly associated with an
organic conception o f the world. The state is “divine”, spiritual, transcends space
and time, is universal, national, permanent and moral. The materially physical is
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individual, transitory, subject to natural law, ego-centric, short-lived. Life finds
its true expression only in the state, which is conscience, consciousness and
general will together - it creates the nation (M ussolini, 1935:9-12). Thus the
fascist state assumes full control o f the heart o f the citizen:
Fascism, in short, is not a law-giver and a founder o f institutions, but an
educator and a prom oter o f spiritual life. It aims at refashioning not only
the forms o f life but their content - man, his character, and his faith. To
achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority, entering into
the soul and ruling with undisputed sway (M ussolini, 1935:14).
D.H. Lawrence shares both the world picture and its w idest consequences with
Mussolini. M ysticism, occultism, elitism, racism, ethnicism are all expressions o f
his organistic pantheism in the novel, The P lum ed Serpent. A ristocratic man,
rooted in the living motherly earth and the fatherly, invisible, black sun behind the
yellow sun, is here projected as divine ruler o f his fellow human beings - he
com bines spiritualist mysticism with a “blood-and-soil” ideology (cf. further
Venter, 1996:17fF). Attention may also be drawn to the theosophic origins o f
German Nazism - showing the same basic tendencies - for example in the
thought o f Lanz (who is supposed to have influenced Hitler; cf. Tresmontant,
1991:68 ff). The broad outlines o f these ideologies are summarised as follows by
Stemhell (note the organistic base):
The essential elem ent here is the linking o f the human soul with its natural
surroundings, with the ‘essence’ o f nature, that the real and important truths
are to be found beneath surface appearances. A ccording to many Volkisch
theorists, the nature o f the soul o f the Volk is determined by the nature o f
the landscape. Thus, the Jews, being a desert people, are regarded as
shallow and dry people, devoid o f profundity and totally lacking in
creativity ... The self-same themes are to be met in the nationalist ideology
o f France: the Frenchman, nurtured by his soil and his dead, cannot escape
the destiny shaped for him by past generations, by the landscapes o f his
childhood, the blood o f his forebears. The nation is a living organism, and
nationalism is therefore an ethic, comprising all the criteria o f behaviour
which the common interest calls for, and on which the will o f the individual
has no bearing. The duty o f the individual and o f society is to find out what
this ethic may be, yet only those can succeed who have a share in the
‘national consciousness’ ...(S tem hell, 1979:337-338; italics mine - JJV).
H eidegger’s sympathies with Nazism was probably also based on a shared world
picture. In his attem pt to develop a pre-Christian philosophy, he em barked on a
“neo-platonist” search for the primitive ground o f being, which finds expression
in authentic existence. This search excluded the idea o f a transcendent creator
god from his seminarian days (cf. Tresmontant, 1991:460 ff). Thus all being can
be conceived o f as saturated with the “divine” ground, which may be subject to
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
forgetfulness, and therefore imposes the calling to search for it while “ remaining”
where you “are” . In his later w orks he identifies “essence” or “ identity”,
expressed in language, as this “ground”-language being the archaic w ord which
unifies the world quatemity: heaven versus earth and divine versus mortal. The
physical aspect (sound, mouth, body) o f the expression o f the archaic w ord
through man, is not conceived o f in terms o f the meaning-sound-dualism, but is
considered as essential component o f language, through which we are bound to
region and earth:
In the tongue (dialect) every different landscape and therefore the earth
speaks. The mouth is not simply a kind o f organ in the body represented as
organism, but body and mouth belong in the stream and growth o f the
earth , in w hich we, the mortals, flourish, from which we receive the
thoroughness o f a rootedness in soil. Together with the earth we also
certainly loose the rootedness in soil (Heidegger, 1959:205; my translation
and italics - JJV).
South African A frikaner leaders, such as H.F. Verw oerd (m urdered prime
minister and “architect” o f apartheid), N. D iederichs (former minister o f finance
and state president), P.J. M eyer (who headed the S.A. Broadcasting Corporation),
and some others who becam e influential professors in the social sciences in
Afrikaans universities, studied in Germany in the W eimar era, w here they
imbibed the organistic pantheism o f G erman nationalism (philosophically rooted
in Fichte, Herder, Schelling and even Boehme), and developed social theories in
which the ethnic nation (“volk”) is exalted as the organic unit through which
institutions and individuals become human and receive their meaning (M orphew ,
1989:63-80). The dispensation which they had in mind for South Africa followed
this basic tenet to its ultimate consequences: every ethnic nation had to have its
own piece o f land, governed by its own people and its own institutions, which
could only thrive within the ambit o f such nationhood. This w as the basis for the
establishment o f ethnic universities, schools, the prevention o f mixed marriages,
the homelands, et cetera.
“ Volk” and state more or less coincided, and
totalitarian “volk” becam e totalitarian state.
•
T h em a tic sim ila rities am on g the tw en tieth cen tu ry au th ors
Twentieth century authors tend to relate hum an beings to one another in term s
o f organically conceived social institutions such as the "nation ", the "state ", et
cetera. In this respect they do continue the basic approaches o f H obbes’s and
R ousseau’s organistic metaphorising o f the social scene, and the totalitarian
consequences are undeniable. Twentieth century authors, how ever, go further, or
rather, tend to revive ancient m ythological m odes o f thought ', the rootedness in a
motherly earth, the blood-and-spiritual bond with the forebears, the elitism based
in the “occult” capabilities o f the aristocracy, are all reminiscent, not only o f
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G reek organistic thinking, but also o f pre-Hellenic Egyptian and Babylonian
“political” theogonies.
3.
I n d iv id u a ls a s m a c h in e p a r ts
The mechanistic world picture initially served to explain the dynamics o f the
physical universe on the basis o f a cultural product, the autom aton. Very soon,
however, the picture w as transferred to other areas: first, to explain physiological
processes, and later also social processes (cf. Venter, 1992a:191-198).
•
T h e au to m ato n : indepen d en ce o f th e p a r t fro m th e w hole
The mechanistic world picture significantly differs from the organistic one in its
suggestions with regard to the part-whole-relationship: the parts o f a machine can
(with relative ease) be removed, repaired, replaced, or used as spare parts for
other machines. It thus suggests a relative independence o f the part from the
whole (com pared to an organ or member in the organistic picture), and an
aggregational view o f the whole, especially when it concerns social institutions.
God can be (“Christianly”) viewed as both engineer and mechanic, or
(deistically) as only the engineer (leaving the “automaton” to its own autonomous
contrivances).
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T h e new tonian m e ta p h o r o f g rav itatio n a l eq u ilib riu m
After the initial metaphor, that o f the clock had (in discussions o f social
problem atic) been replaced by the newtonian one o f gravitational equilibrium, a
process-feature could be introduced into the picture: “machines” could now be
seen as aggregations o f equilibrating (and disequilibrating) forces. This disclosed
important possibilities for the historicising o f reality and the body politic in the
eighteenth century: one could resist the idea o f the nanny-state, assuming
autonomous individual citizens, each taking care o f his own interest, while the
aggregation still functions according to strict natural laws o f progress by virtue o f
equilibrating competition.
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H obbes: A m echanistic dissolving o f the w hole into its g en e rativ e p a rts th e w atch m e ta p h o r
H obbes (1588-1679) w as too early to profit from a metaphorising o f N ew ton’s
(1642-1727) theory o f gravitation (published 1687) for his mechanistic
explanation o f the state o f nature. In spite o f his organistic picture o f the civil
state, his conclusions about the state o f nature are the results o f an analysis o f the
civil state as an existing whole, viewed as a “w atch or some such small engine” to
be taken apart (and not o f an empirical study o f the natural conditions; cf.
Hobbes, 1972a:99). This discrepancy can probably be explained by his motive o f
instilling obedience in rebellious citizens by providing scientifically indisputable
arguments proving (a priori, cf. Venter, 1994:37-41) the horrors o f living in a
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
state o f nature in com parison to the security provided by the civil state (cf.
H obbes, 1972b:41-42).
This mechanistic (metaphorical) dissolving o f the w hole into its generative
constituent parts, produces a picture o f the state o f nature in w hich individuals
(equal in right to everything), following their (conflicting) appetites (rather than
reason), as well as striving for self-preservation, are in constant com petition or
conflict with one another. But these prem ises also necessarily imply that such
individuals will move into a civil state by contract aimed at self-preservation
through the formation o f alliances (Hobbes, 1972a: 115-118). The com pact being
made, a living being, the body politic, com es into being, and all the totalitarian
consequences sketched above becom e operative. The alternative, therefore, is:
either bellum omnium contra om nes, or a totalitarian and authoritarian security
state. The first disjunct is supposed to eliminate itself, but can reappear if citizens
become disobedient.
Bernard M andeville transformed civil society itself into the H obbesian state o f
nature, suggesting that society flourishes as a result o f egoism (including crime),
and that intervention, even in the form o f charitable schooling o f children, would
be detrimental to its well-being.
•
A dam S m ith: th e eq u ilib riu m m e ta p h o r an d th e h u ma n m ind, m o ral life
an d econom ic processes - th e m a rk e t m e ta p h o r
It w as probably Adam Smith who first saw the applicability o f the equilibrium
m etaphor to the human mind (1980), moral life (1976), and econom ic processes
(1950). Both A dam Smith and Immanuel K ant shuttle betw een the organistic and
the mechanistic w orld pictures. They cannot afford to finally let go o f the former:
they share the Enlightenment faith in progress, and therefore presuppose a
homocentric teleology o f nature, w orking in and through man, and using as its
instrum ent the supposedly m echanical p ro cess o f com petition am ongst
individuals a n d groups. This aspect becom es the dominant one, for “G o d ’s”
teleology can only be approached through the analysis o f human efficient
causality - taken here in a fairly literal mechanical sense.
Smith views all social relationships in terms o f the m arket as model or standard.
This presupposes that the individual human being naturally relates to others in a
contractual (bartering) way:
Society may subsist among men, as among different merchants, from a
sense o f its utility, w ithout any mutual love and affection; and though no
man in it be bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a
m ercenary exchange o f good offices according to an agreed valuation
(Smith, 1976:86).
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But such an utility-based social order is “futuristic” in Sm ith’s view, since utility
is only recognised by a mature, rational humanity. For the time being mankind is
still in the emulation phase, in which the passion for out-shining others is
dominant (Smith, 1976:16, 41 fT, 114fF, 145fF). But even in the passionate
emulation phase, progress is served by self-interest, “intuited” by the
(hedonistically conceived) sense o f agreeability or disagreeableness. In the face
o f H utcheson’s rejection and M andeville’s cynical acceptance o f self-interest,
Smith elevates it to the motor o f welfare, at a level midrange betw een the social
and the unsocial passions. Self-interest is m oderated by the judgm ent o f the
im partial spectator - a proto-freudian internal, supposedly objective super-ego,
which executes judgem ent under the guidance o f agreeability, according to the
rules o f prudence (longterm self-interest) and justice (social interest). In this way
Smith hopes to avoid conventionalism (accepting that the individual becomes a
moral creature only through society), as well as arbitrary, individualistic
sentimentalism (Smith, 1976:130-150).
In the context o f economics, Smith determines the basis o f self-interest by the
Enlightenment historiographical method o f retrospective extrapolation (based on
the law o f progress) - extrapolating to w hat man “originally” (or “naturally”) is:
a farming barterer who owns the full product o f his labour. The amount o f labour
time invested in a product will therefore form the basis o f bartering negotiations;
historical developments add the rent price o f land and the profits o f stock to this
base (Smith, 1976:49-50). Individuals therefore (in an “original” sense) take care
o f their own interests in terms o f the value o f their labour, and this provides the
equilibrating forces which will move the market price in the direction o f the
“natural” (equilibrium) price:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the
prices o f commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes force
them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the obstacles
which hinder them from settling in this centre o f repose and continuance,
they are constantly tending towards it (Smith, 1950:60; my italics - JJV).
Smith is as much a contractualist as H obbes and Rousseau; yet his view o f
society as a totality differs radically from theirs: the market m etaphor - for him
probably more than a metaphor - implies that society is a process o f continuously
contracting individuals', the state is relegated to the status o f a protective
framework for this process.
•
K an t: histo ry is su b je ct to m cchanical, causal laws - th e au to m ato n
Kant (1975a) uses m etaphors reminiscent o f those o f Adam Smith in his analysis
o f historical social formations under the guidance o f the teleology o f nature.
Using the same retrospective extrapolation method, he uncovers the development
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o f reason as freedom in the individual (cf. also Venter, 1992b:33-38), which
practically means a quasi-Hobbesian natural state o f unsociability (Kant,
1975b:38-40). Conflict and competition are, as in H obbes, the forces which
necessitate the establishment o f communities, and, in the end, o f a world
community or league o f nations in which rationality and eternal peace would
reign. K ant’s view o f social history is an explicit formulation o f the doctrine o f
the balance o f pow er, starting with autonomous individuals, tlirough smaller
communities and national states, to end up with the league o f nations:
All wars are, therefore, so many attempts (truly not in the intentions o f the
people but in those o f nature), to establish new relationships among states ...
until in the end, in part by the structuring o f the best possible legal order, in
part by communal external agreement and legislation, a situation is
established w hich maintains itself analogously to civil society, ju st like an
automaton. The barbarous freedom o f the already established states ...
necessitates that our species find, in addition to the in itself salutary
resistance o f many states, a law o f equilibrium ... (Kant, 1975b:44).
“Autom aton” here takes the function o f a model (a pictorial standard); but then a
strongly representative model, intended to express a (for Kant) undeniable reality.
history is subject to mechanical, causal laws.
The views regarding society o f M althus, Ricardo, and D arw in follow the same
metaphorical pattern, based on the same mechanistic picture o f the world (cf.
Venter, 1994:5-16), stressing the “autonomy” o f the “parts” - individuals or
smaller groups, which, through competitive activities, act as m otor forces o f
history.
•
D a rw in ’s m e ta p h o r o f n a tu ra l selection
Darwin transferred the competition-equilibrium matrix, implied in the m etaphor o f
“natural selection” (and he explicitly acknow ledges it to be a metaphor), to the
study o f nature (in The Origin o f Species [1968] cf. Young, 1988; Venter, 1996:
13ff). H e also used this m etaphor in a normative sense, as a policy proposal
regarding human population development, opposing family planning schem es, so
as to ensure the continued progress o f mankind through the com petition o f
individuals. For the moral and legal sphere, however, he m oderated the dem ands
o f health and vigour in the individual (vis-a-vis social well-being), by
presupposing another equilibrating process: that between altruistic and ego­
centric instincts (cf. Darwin, 1906:194, 945-946). He thus avoids the “ social
Darw inist” consequence o f summarily characterizing the com petitively successful
.as the “civilized”, “hard-working”, or “morally good” (as w as done by Sumner,
1934, and others.)
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One should not summarily conclude that all o f these thinkers were in fact
insensitive to the “immoral” and/or “ sociopath” implications o f the egocentric
individualism they w ere preaching. They rather trusted the autom atism o f the
equilibrium process to take care o f the interests o f “ju stice ", "sobriety",
"honesty ” on the basis o f real “merit
•
T h e m a rk et m eta p h o r as the b asic m eta p h o r fo r the social scien ces
Equilibrium theorists, such as the N ew Classical and the M onetarist economists
o f the past few decades, seem to put their trust exactly in this same automatic
fairness and warranted morality o f the “market” mechanism - on condition that
w e, like Adam Smith - accept the market m etaphor as the basic explanatory or
predictive m etaphor fo r the social sciences.
To keep the competition-equilibrium structure w orkable as a standard approach
(disciplinary matrix) which is supposed to provide economists with predictive
laws, some very “unrealistic” assumptions had to be m ade, such as the
availability o f perfect information (on costs, tastes, alternatives, for both
producers and consumers), perfect competition, a perfect market.
As
irrationalism grew and the organistic picture regained some foothold, these
assumptions have been challenged in different ways. In Keynesian economics
uncertainty plays a pivotal role, and therefore the expectation o f equilibrium
becom es problem atic (although Keynes still attem pts to use it; cf. Keynes, 1936;
Torr, 1988:39-50). And according to Von Hayek the assumptions express no
more than the a priori possibilities open to an individual in the market; it
provides no analysis o f real competition processes, which are clouded by
uncertainty, and at most, tend to co-ordinate the economic and social actions o f
individuals. Von H ayek, however, retains the market metaphor for all o f society
in terms o f a “methodological” (not: ontological) individualism, according to
which the market functions as a hermeneutical process (cf. Von H ayek, 1949:33­
54; 93 ff; Venter, 1996:27fi).
•
M o n eta rism
These innovations have not totally eliminated the competition-equilibrium matrix
from the realm o f economics. In N ew Classical economics and in M onetarism
(both high profile schools which have influenced policy making very strongly), it
still holds sway. There are claims that are also applicable in - and in fact the best
approach for - other social disciplines.
In Friedm an’s version o f M onetarism, general equilibrium analysis is partitioned
into different analyses o f specific problems, while the N ew Classicals tend to
believe that everything depends on everything, and that therefore the partitioning
o f problem s is invalid. They share, however, the basic tenets that economic
agents are, to the limits o f their information, consistent and successful optimizers
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(that they make most o f their opportunities and are therefore in equilibrium); and
that agents hold rational expectations (i.e. they make no systematic errors in
evaluating the economic environment; Hoover, 1988:182-193). These tenets
express the classical competition-equilibrium matrix in an irrationalist context:
individuals act optimally for their own benefit, and w hat they do expect is what
they should expect. In the N ew Classical school the automatism is so strong that
institutional analysis o f even the business enterprise itself is rejected in favour o f
treating it as a blackbox causal link between the actions o f individuals and price
changes (M achlup, 1967:9).
Importantly, in the M onetarist case, the validity o f these tenets is not limited to
economics. The M onetarist, Karl Brunner, explicitly rejects a multidisciplinary
approach to economic problems (including, as he calls it, the Keynesian
“sociological perceptions o f non-market situations”), and w ants to apply the basic
principles o f M onetarism to other social disciplines, as if economics provides the
only valid social scientific approach (Klamer, 1985:183):
W e reject, on the other hand, an escape into sociology which offers no
relevant analytic framework. We maintain that socio-political institutions
are the proper subject o f economic analysis. This entails an entirely
different view o f the political institutions and their operation. The
sociological view typically supports a goodwill theory o f governm ent and
yields conclusions favouring a large and essentially unlim ited government.
An application o f econom ic analysis, in contrast, alerts us to the fact that
politicians and bureaucrats are entrepreneurs in the political market. They
pursue their own interests and try to find optimal strategies attending to
their interests. And what is optimal for them is hardly ever optimal for
‘public interest’ (B runner in: Klamer, 1985:186).
•
F rie d m a n : P olitical m a rk e ts v ersu s econom ic m a rk e ts
Friedman provides us with a simple exemplary analysis o f political markets
versus economic markets, in an attempt to show that the political market is
actually a less efficient system o f coordinating individual self-interest, w hich will
take aw ay our individual freedoms, the more w e put our trust in it. A ccording to
him the accepted distinction betw een the economic market as aimed at self­
interest and the political system as directed at public interest, is a myth - the latter
actually only serves the self-interest o f the public servant (to be human, is to
pursue self-interest). Secondly, exchange in the political market does not take
place on the basis o f “one man one vote”, for it actually functions on the basis o f
weighted votes o f small interest groups, which determine a w hole package to be
voted for on a “yes/no” basis, w hereas the economic market provides for a much
freer and more equitable proportional voting system (“one man one dollar”), in
which you get w hat you vote for (voting for every item separately). The essence
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o f a political arrangement is coercion; that o f a market arrangement is voluntary
co-operation between people (cf. Friedman, 1976:6 fi).
Friedman (1976:11 ff) views the equilibrating forces as moving parallel to
another: if government spending increases on the insistence o f the electorate,
without taxes increasing too (i.e. money is created ahead o f production), then this
is balanced by a hidden tax increase called inflation. Increased government
spending is also accompanied by increased government controls and security
provisions o f all kinds, which is balanced by decreasing efficiency and freedom
and increasing collectivism (Friedman, 1976). Friedman is prepared to invert this
causal chain: any increase o f private, free enterprise, capitalism is accompanied
by an increase in political freedom - in fact, individualistic free enterprise
capitalism is a sine qua non for a free political system. Even social welfare in its
broadest sense (“eleemosynary activity” - the establishment o f non-profit
institutions like universities, libraries, hospitals, et cetera) flourish during periods
o f decreasing government controls and increasing free enterprise, Friedman
jubilates, on the basis o f what he sees as the results o f 19th century laissez-faire
policies (Friedman, 1976:25 ff). Although Friedman seems to provide us with a
strictly “positive” (rather than a “nonnative”) analysis o f the economic-social
reality, his analysis is clearly aimed at promoting “freedom”, and is therefore
normative in spite o f its pretences.
These parallels show the grip which mechanistic thinking has on Friedman. Von
Hayek (1949:30), as anti-collectivistic as Friedman can ever be, but rejecting
such a purely mechanistic approach, could not find an automatic correlation
betw een individual freedom and social equity; in fact, he accepts a trade-off
between the two as unavoidable (cf. also Venter, 1996:39).
Initially, the mechanistic picture functioned as a m ethodological directive, by
which the handling o f the “organs” o f H obbes’s social organism was legitimized,
ju st as if they w ere “ independent” machine parts. This approach gave a kind o f
"autonom y " a n d mutual antagonism to the “pa rts ”, which was individualistic, at
least in consequence. G ravitation theory disclosed the possibility o f a p ro cess­
like approach within the m echanistic picture, by which historical progress
(including the automatic establishment o f justice and morality) could be modelled,
on the supposition o f individuals in competition, given diseq u ilib ra tin g fo rces to
prevent stagnation. In spite o f the collapse o f the faith in progress, and in spite
o f criticism o f equilibrium theories, the disciplinary matrix o f self-interested
individuals who create economic welfare as well as social welfare (and justice)
through an equilibrating “market mechanism” , remains very strong indeed. In this
tradition scant attention is given to the structures and functions o f different social
institutions such as the business enterprise, the state, the family - its analytical
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
toolshed makes do with terms like “individual”, “com petition”, “ self-interest”,
“market”, “buy/sell”, “equilibrium” .
Ironically, the deterministic general equilibrium approaches have been criticized
for eliminating real com petitiveness from their theory. As the representations o f
the competition-equilibrium matrix becam e more overtly mechanistic (especially
as a consequence o f the “perfect”-assum ptions), its pow er to explain or describe
the economic and/or social processes, qua processes, decreased. U nder such
theoretical ideal conditions as represented under the “perfect”-assum ptions, the
balance o f pow ers is immediate or permanent (or, more technically, takes place in
mathematical time rather than Bergsonian durée), while in reality, “to com pete”
involves surprise, novelty, innovation, and even dissembling over time (cf.
Addleson, 1988:462-463).
•
P rin cip le o f co m p etitiv en ess w ell estab lish ed in W estern cu ltu re
It is, however, noteworthy that the principle o f com petitiveness has been well
established in W estern culture, also in the analysis o f social processes.
Com petitive individualism has been transferred to com petitive nationalism, and it
seems as if competition is no more simply a means, as in the eighteenth century,
but rather something like a norm or an end. The “winning nations” are to be
taken as norm by the “losers” in the Third W orld; the GA TT agreem ent opens up
“free trade” all over the world; “com petitiveness” is the supposed answ er for a
country’s industries; at school, winning, whether in sports or in intellectual
pursuits, counts, and coming second almost does not; “publish or perish” in the
academic world is only an expression o f the competition motive as norm and does
not necessary road to “quality” or “excellence” .
It is not all that rosy however: countries are flooding each other’s m arkets with
more or less the same products; Third W orld countries are forced to com pete on
an unequal footing with First W orld countries, and becom e more and more
indebted to them; the accentuation o f individual and particular interests tends to
strengthen selfishness, and can be detrimental to creativity; human lives are
losing their value as self-interest in the context o f a collapse o f values turns into
outright egoism.
4.
Perspective: Is there a way out?
The organistic world picture promotes a “w hole” versus “part” approach in the
analysis o f social structures and processes. The interests o f the “w hole” take
precedence over those o f the “parts”, i.e. organistic thinking implies “holism” . It
is not clear w hich criteria are used to identify important “w holes” (usually states,
tribes, or ethnic groups or even “ society”) - it seems as if cultural, racial, pow er,
and geographical considerations are taken into account without much critical
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investigation. W hatever differences there may be between “parts” and their
“w hole” are easily forgotten as smaller institutions are usurped by the interests o f
larger or stronger ones. The consequences are not only almost complete control
over the lives o f individuals, but also o f associations which differ in their primary
aims (or functions) from the primary aims (or functions) o f the “w hole” . This is
totalitarianism. It can be o f a “majoritarian” orientation (like that o f Rousseau),
or more authoritarian, as in Fascist or Nazi elitism - neither has any patience with
religious, educational, artistic, sports, or other institutions viewing their roles as
different from the aim o f the “w hole” .
The mechanistic picture rejects dominance by a supposed social “whole” .
M echanists tend to view the encompassing, powerful institutions as aggregations
o f individuals - a suggestion inherent in the relative independence o f a machine
part from its machine whole. This view made it possible to combine individual
autonomy with a deterministic view o f historical progress, in which justice, peace
and moral decency could all be seen as the equilibrium product o f the opposing
“gravitational” forces o f self-interest.
This world picture allows for much
patience with the role difference o f smaller and less powerful associational forms,
and w ishes to reduce the powers and functions o f the strongest one, the state. It
assum es, however, a market totalitarianism, and trusts the “market” (i.e. the
competition-equilibrium matrix) to solve the problem s o f justice, morality, peace,
and social welfare. Efficiently successful “trading” is supposed to (always) leave
the barterers better off than before! This trust discloses the capitalist values
hidden behind the mechanistic metaphors and analytical patterns. Although
economistic in its orientation, its analytical approach obstructs any sense o f
institutional differentation. It is therefore unable to get a clear picture o f the
ethical role o f the family, or the primarily justitial aims o f the state, vis-a-vis the
profit aims o f the business enterprise.
Thus all other institutions become
progressively disem powered with regard to self-interest as such, and egoism
becom es the norm.
•
C an an y lib era tin g m ediation b etw een the tw o w orld v iew s be effected ?
It can indeed be asked whether there is a w ay out o f this impasse; whether
mediation between the two world views can be effected. A nother issue is
whether these world views possibly include some valuable elements which could
direct us in a direction away from both o f them?
The organistic picture seems to recognise the different functions o f different
social institutions, but sublimates these into the aims and interests o f the whole.
The adherents o f the mechanistic picture try to avoid the totalitarianism and
authoritarianism which w e have found associated with the organistic approach,
and allow for much more freedom o f the individual members o f “society” (and as
a result o f this, for the freedom o f w eaker institutions). Yet the latter is no more
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Mech ’nistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
able than the organists to clearly outline the pluriformity o f social relationships,
and allow for the freedom o f their functioning as social unities, for it represents
“society” as a number o f configurations o f forces (where self-interest is the real
motor force), neglecting the question o f “pow er” inequalities behind the forces, as
well as the differences in social context in which these “forces” operate.
•
P ictu re s as norm s: in tegration ism v ersu s isolation ism
Furthermore, once any (single) picture is used to explain all o f reality and to give
meaning to life (i.e. when a world picture is transformed into a world view,
regardless o f w hether it functions for its author in a “real” or in a “m etaphorical”
sense), it fulfils both a “factual” and “normative” role - in other w ords it
encom passes both an “ is” and an “ought” . In the present case this m eans that for
both pictures the world (which includes human social life) both is (similar to) an
organism or a machine, and ought to be treated as (similar to) an organism or a
machine.
Thus the organistic world view is holistic both in a factual and in a normative
sense. It contends that individuals and smaller institutions are (similar to) the
organs o f an organic w hole, and that it is w rong or evil for us human beings not to
live up to cur “part”-playing as “organs” o f the “organism ” . It cannot but react
negatively (crying “ sedition”, “treason” , “disloyalty”) in response to any claims
that a smaller/weaker social institution (say a school), might opt to follow aims
differing from those o f “ society” (which, now adays, is equated with the state, or
the “nation”). Especially nationalist political authorities are unreasonable in their
demands that all institutions fall in line with “national” aims. Churches, sporting
bodies, academ ic associations, need not, however, for example, limit their
spheres o f influence to national boundaries. In terms o f its norm ative im­
plications, the organistic world view tends to (enforced) integrationism .
Equally, the mechanistic world view zigzags between “ is” and “ought” . The
representation o f the world as (similar to) a m achine/automat incorporates a
characteristic o f m odem technology: the abstraction from a specific solution o f a
specific problem by using “neutral” modular com ponents which (though limited
by the purpose o f the particular machine), still have “a certain artificial
independence” (Schuurman, 1980:15). Thus society is represented as consisting
factually o f an aggregate o f (self-interested) forces; this is dialectically sw itched
into prom oting self-interest as the basic norm for all social functioning. In
contrast (and sometimes clearly in reaction) to organistic holism, it takes an
isolationist stance, promoting a “private sector”, individualistic approach with a
strong econom istic slant to it. There is some recognition o f the right to freedom
o f non-state institutions, but no thoroughgoing analysis o f their different
institutional functions seem s to emerge after the fragmentation o f “ society” into
neutral machine components.
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Von Hayek recognized something valuable in both pictures. He carefully and
qualifiedly borrow ed metaphors from the organistic approach, given its sensitivity
for structural unity. But he also appreciated the openness for freedom and the
anticollectivism o f the mechanistic approach, and held onto this in the form o f a
so-called “methodological individualism” (Venter, 1996:236).
•
In stitu tion al plu rality
To avoid imitating Von H ayek’s aw kw ard ride on tw o horses parting w ays, we
should first enquire whether the two world pictures really cover the w hole field o f
experience, as they pretend to, and whether they really (in “principle”) form
alternatives to be expressed in an exclusive disjunction. This difficulty is
probably rooted in the fact that the two pictures have become world views - their
limitations as only m etaphors have been forgotten, and they acquired authority
beyond their legitimate applicability.
One can, o f course, model many aspects o f “reality” in terms o f mechanical
metaphors (for example) the movement o f limbs in a body. The very existence o f
organic chemistry and biochemistry tells us, however, that such metaphorising
must have limitations. In the same way we can use biotic m etaphors to express
ourselves about non-biotic matters, such as the “growth” o f the money supply, yet
realizing that the applicability o f this metaphor is limited by the fact that human
beings make decisions about the increase in the quantity o f money (which is
clearly not the case with the growth o f an organism). Similarly one can also draw
m etaphors from other fields o f experience. D arw in’s metaphor o f (natural)
“ selection” (by his own admission) was drawn from human culture (the selection
practices o f breeders); he had to supplement its lack o f a selection agent by
metaphorising “com petition” into a natural process (an approach ridiculed by
M arx as transferring the British economy into nature). Thomas Kuhn (1975) used
the m etaphor o f “conversion” from the area o f religion, to describe the social
behaviour o f the adherents o f a “paradigm” (another m etaphor probably drawn
from grammar).
•
O n e sin g le m eta p h o r cannot explain the in terrela tio n sh ip s o f all en tities
The plurality o f possible metaphors themselves point to something beyond
language - the plurality o f possible relationships between human beings and
w hatever is in their environment. Surely the relationship between husband and
wife differs from their relationships to their expected baby, and this again differs
from that o f the family doctor towards the embryo. Society has long ago
recognized this difference, and therefore set limitations on the medical
involvement o f doctors with their own family members. And doesn’t the relation­
ship o f the sculptor toward a piece o f marble differ from that o f the person who
sells it to him? O f course one can attempt to reduce both the latter relationships
to their physico-chemical properties, but as Von Hayek has so clearly shown, one
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
will then be unable to make any specific sense o f these relationships, or o f any
other cultural activity (Von Hayek, 1952:17fT; Venter, 1996:23Iff). Every
human entity, from the moment o f conception, exists in such a plurality o f
relationships - the Hobbesian state o f nature as a state o f isolated individuals was
the product o f abstractive projection (as recognised by Hobbes himself, but
forgotten by Rousseau).
The differences among these relationships disclose the possibility that they may
be structured into different institutional forms. A group o f people playing football
may found a club as an institutional form. The club will need capital assets (such
as a playing field); has to establish itself as a “ legal person” ; will need an
administrative executive (chairman, secretary, etc.) as well as a team leadership
(captain; vice-captain), and a trainer. A drama reading group, on the other hand,
can get along by using a m em ber’s living room and kitchen facilities, taking turns
to organize meetings, but cannot get along without some intellectually developed
minds. A state needs elaborate mechanisms for the protection o f its citizens’
rights; a school only an organized teaching staff, children who w ant to learn, and
a minimum o f administrative and physical infrastructure.
Once a single m etaphor is used to explain the functioning and interrelationships o f
all entities, sensitivity for the differences among social relationships as well as the
peculiar forms o f institutionalizing which they may assume, is lost. W hether
intended as “reality” or as “only metaphor”, both the mechanistic and the
organistic world views are reductionistic in their representations o f social reality a reductionism which has worrying nonnative implications (as I attem pted to
show above). The social modelling o f the two world pictures provide normative
models which tend to cover the whole area o f social life, in all its forms. The
mechanistic one tends to reduce all social forms to that one o f which the
supposed analogy with a machine w as first perceived - inter-individual
competition (o f which the market remains as the ideal type). The organistic one
subjects all social forms to the interests and pow er o f the one perceived to be the
most encompassing, and model them according to the relationship o f an organism
to its organs.
•
Swop the roles and see what happens
The secret, probably, is to find a theoretical way o f limiting the expansion o f such
metaphors. One w ay o f going about this could be a kind o f deconstructive
behaviour-swopping procedure, in which the institutional hierarchy within the
ambit o f the metaphor is inverted.
In the ambit o f the organistic metaphor the state or the nation (and its aims) tends
to have the upper hand; thus we can limit this metaphor by sw opping state
behaviour with that o f a less powerful institution (such as a high school). In the
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ambit o f the mechanistic metaphor, the market dominates: w e can thus apply the
normal behaviour o f (say) a married couple to a market situation, and vice versa.
* Imagine organizing a school primarily according to the principles o f law and
order using a military mode o f training, the youngsters carrying arms and
doing the drill, organizing themselves into political parties struggling to gain
the upper hand; the principal and staff being elected by the children according
to the principles o f multi-party democracy. Will this provide for a balanced
process o f enculturation, which schools normally stand for? N eed I stretch the
imagination to include the possibility o f such a school becoming a mini-state in
a neighbourhood? (For some South-Africans this may be a nightmarish
rem inder o f recent historical reality.) Imagine establishing a state in con­
formity with the normal educational principles o f a high school, treating all
citizens as schoolboys and girls; the head-of-state following the decision­
making processes, aw ards and punishments o f school principals; the cabinet
handling the electorate as so many classrooms full o f schoolgoing children.
* Imagine a marital relationship constructed on the basis o f Adam Smith’s
exchange o f good offices rather than benevolence:
Hubby: “Honey, like a w ine’n dine tonight?” Honey: “O ’course, but what
d ’ye have in mind?” Hubby: “Oh, nothing much ... a quiet little place like
Spartacus’s Greek Cuisine; they have nice smalls, you know; good food;
nice music ...” Honey: “1 didn’t mean that. I mean what returns do you
hope to get from your investment?” Hubby: “Not much this time, you
know ...” Honey: “OK! you may touch my knees; but you know I get a
headache if you go any higher.” Hubby: “Well! If you get that headache
tonight, I still have the option o f popping in at Clare’s. She doesn’t get
headaches!” Honey: “Do you want me to w ear that dress with the thighhigh slit?” Hubby: “Now w e’re getting somewhere. Competition always
produces quality, whether service or product ...” (Do we need to construct
an example o f a buyer treating a shop assistant in the way spouses relate to
one another?)
The examples may be ridiculously trivial, yet they illustrate the point: stretching
their social implications to the limits by deconstructive behaviour-swopping,
highlights the strange consequences o f these reductionist normative metaphors.
* The pain/suffering indicator
A second, more serious and less trivialising approach to limit the dangerous
consequences o f misleading “is-ought” metaphors through the bridging o f the “isought” gap, can be found in the pain/suffering indicator. The interplay between
“is” and “ ought” in the two metaphors has already been noted. Accepting that
the direct move from “ is” to “ought” is invalid, it can still be argued that an
indirect movement is possible - via the pain/suffering indicator.
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Briefly: “suffering” implies “pain” (whether we use these w ords metaphorically
or literally); but “pain” does necessarily imply “suffering” . “ Pain” belongs to
life’s warning systems: when I touch a hot object, the pain I feel warns me to
pull my hand aw ay before serious damage is done, i.e. before an antinomic
situation replaces the regular one. (Acceptable punishment would then rather
belong to the category o f pain than o f suffering.) Suffering may be described as
the pain caused by a serious and long-term antinomic situation.
Thus, whenever a (supposedly) normative social m etaphor is seen to cause pain,
we have an indication o f an antinomic situation present or approaching. I cannot
feel the other’s pain, therefore I have to take his/her/their communication o f pain
seriously as an indicator that the “oughts” which govern my behaviour need
adjustment. Undeniably Christ’s maxim o f doing unto others as you would have
them do unto you, opens up a world o f possibilities to swop shoes, imagining the
consequences in terms o f pain and suffering, so as to discover when a situation
may be or become antinomic.
How many millions have died because o f totalitarian regimes based on an
organistic picture o f social life? How many may have starved or have been
marginalised (and still are), under the assumption that competition will
automatically care for justice (not to mention stress and depression as the
diseases o f our time)?
•
D ifferentation and in tegratio n
Thus, over against the totalitarianistic holism o f the organistic world view, I
would, in line with the Neo-Calvinistic tradition - for instance A. K uvper (1880),
H. Dooyeweerd (1957), D.H.Th. Vollenhoven (1964), plead for acceptance o f the
norm o f societal differentiation a n d juxtaposition (usually called “ sovereignty in
own sphere”).
The mechanists are right - social differentiation is norm ative. But one can only
avoid an isolationist (or even disintegrationist) concept o f differentation if the
principles o f differentiation are not located via self-interest, but through a
thoroughgoing analysis o f the possible forms the different human relationships
may assume, determined by all the possibilities o f interacting with, or undertaking
responsibilities and tasks in the “w orld” as environment.
Differentiation, in fa ct, implies an involving self-assertion, a n d not at all a
separation o f institutional fo rm s. Societal institutions speak, each in its own
way, to mankind. Academics produce intellectual ideas about the world at large
in a scholarly way, and in fact need their academ ic freedom and institutional
autonomy for responsible involvement conforming to the dem ands o f scholarly
work. No state should be happy when churches, universities, sporting bodies,
writers associations, all willingly submit to “national ideals”, for this is an
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J.J. Venter
indication that these institutions do not care about their own tasks anymore,
neither do they contribute freely and independently (in their own particular ways)
to the well-being o f the state as their neighbour
Some sporting bodies love to “separate” sport from politics, and some liberals
believe in the separation o f church from state. It is clear that they should be
independent from one another (authority-wise and regarding their tasks), but this
cannot mean “ separate” - at least not in the sense that the one can act as if the
other does not exist, or as if the existence o f other institutions in its vicinity is not
mirrored in its own composition and need not affect its choices. All o f the
human-in-the-world problematic will (in any case) find expression in each social
institution - the issue is only: how to actively take this problem atic into account
in the functioning o f an institution.
The economic situation in a neighbourhood will find expression in the
neighbourhood school, not only in the facilities available in the school, but also in
the attitude which the school has towards the neighbourhood and to other
institutions in it. A school in a poor neighbourhood might search for creative
w ays o f teaching with minimal means, or involve the parents in the physical
upkeep o f their school instead o f asking for more cash; it might focus in its
teaching on the transfer o f skills which may prepare the children for early entry
into the jo b market; it might even provide adult education programmes to
improve parents’ chances to find work. But if it w ants to keep up the pretence o f
being a school, it cannot give up teaching children well, and it should resist
attem pts from other institutions to instrum entalise it for jo b creation, or to prcach
a national ideal (even the ideal to care for the poor). Yet it cannot and should not
go about its educational task in isolationist terms. For, in the latter case, the
expression o f the neighbourhood problematic will w reak havoc in the educational
situation itself. (A trivial example which is everyday reality in Africa: children o f
illiterate parents from a shanty town usually differ in their proficiency as well as
their interest in reading, from those that come from middle class neighbourhoods
with a neighbourhood library and w ell-educated parents; and teachers better take
note o f this situation.)
In more general terms: the norm o f integration holds in the latter case. This
implies that social institutions should constructively ask themselves: how does
the full human problematic o f our environment (which may be a Heideggerian
“nearness” rather than only a physical neighbourhood) reflect itself within our
specific differentiated task and what constructive demands does this make on the
execution o f our daily task?
Should an institution neglect this norm, it will surely create tensions and suffering
in its own membership. One example: the capitalist ethic remunerates winning
as an indication o f “excellence” . For the travelling salesman this may mean being
Koers 62(1) 1997:91-117
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Mechanistic individualism versus organistic totalitarianism
compelled “voluntarily” to remain on the road aw ay from wife and children. It
seems to be in his interest to submit voluntarily to the interest o f his em ployer this is an isolationist (even disintegrationist) institutionalized demand, which
causes suffering because it is not integration-sensitive. And the insensitivity is
not something additional or accidental, but built into the very institutional form,
which does not set fair standards o f a good day’s w ork, but leaves it to subjective
guessing in competitive circumstances. N o w onder the pendulum presently
seems to swing in the direction o f integrationist holism!
5.
Conclusion
To draw the lines together: Von Hayek has pointed out that totalitarian planners
pretend to have an Archimedean point above their historical situation, giving them
the encompassing knowledge o f society which makes totalitarian planning
possible, i. e. they play God to their fellow human beings. Nobody can have such
insights and knowledge; therefore Von Hayek prefers to leave social develop­
ments to the spontaneous generation and functional adjustment o f institutions; the
interaction o f individuals in reaction to “ market” indicators em pow er them
incomparably more than any planner can do (cf. Von Hayek, 1952:91-102).
From a religious point o f view, Neo-Calvinists will probably applaud Von
H ayek’s criticism o f totalitarianism, but will have to ask whether his idea o f the
spontaneous adjustment o f institutions (likened to the change o f aims with which
a footpath may be used), does not leave them w ide open to instrumentalising by
pow er formations other than the state, as is presently becoming practice among
the so-called “N ew Right” (rightwing liberal) political groupings (cf. Vieux,
1994). The convergence o f spontaneous institutionalising in different cultures
seems to point to a stable range o f different possibilities given in creation:
playing, producing art forms, adoration, the providing o f food and shelter,
education o f youngsters, caring for fairness, eating and drinking, producing
offspring, intellectual thinking, building o f pow er formations. N eo-Calvinists will
plead for respect for the own integrity o f these institutional possibilities, and will
especially plead that pow er formations legitimise them selves in, and restrict
themselves to the institutions in which they occur. The principle o f “ sovereignty
in its own sphere” simply appeals for stability in disclosing the potential o f
creation, for the recognition o f human limitations as creatures coram D eo, and for
the recognition that the powerful institutions are not better equipped to handle the
affairs o f the non-powerful institutions; on the contrary, they will tend to use the
less powerful for their own interests. This is what the norm o f differentiation
actually wants to express.
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J.J. Venter
Finally:
•
The norm o f differentiation and the norm o f integration are not in a dialectical
tension with one another.
•
D ifferentiation simply means that the institution recognises its own specific
task in a network o f relationships and continuously adjust its institutional form
to improve the execution o f that task.
•
Integration means the execution o f this task in a w ay which is sensitive for the
specific contents o f the relationships in the network.
And this will sureiy be expressed in terms o f a multiplicity o f metaphors, o f which
the metaphorical limitations have to be recognised.
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