________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
PROCESS IN SOLOMON ISLANDS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE PEOPLE’S
INVOLVEMENT IN THE MAKING OF
THE DRAFT FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
_____________________________________________
A SUPERVISED RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED IN FULFILMENT
FOR THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS IN
GOVERNANCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC
PAUL MALAII MAE
School of Development Studies and Governance
The University of the South Pacific
Suva, Fiji
November 2009
DECLARATIONOFORIGINALITY
IPaulMalaiiMaedeclarethatthisSupervisedResearchProjectismyownworkand
that,tothebestofmyknowledge,itcontainsnomaterialspreviouslypublished,or
substantiallyoverlappingwithmaterialsubmittedfortheawardofanyotherdegree
atanyinstitution,exceptwheredueacknowledgmentismadeinthetext.
Signed:
PAULMALAIIMAE
Dated:29January2010
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Iwouldliketotakethisopportunitytoexpressmysincereappreciationtothosewho
assistedmeinputtingthisresearchpapertogether.
Firstly,Iamthankfulformysupervisor,ProfessorGrahamHassall,forhisguidance
throughout the research project. This research could not have been completed
withouthisremarkableassistance.Hesacrificedcountlesshoursofhistimetoread,
edit and comment on my research drafts. I greatly appreciate his comments and
critiques.
I also wish to thank all those who gave up precious hours of their time to read
through my drafts. Particularly, I would like to thank Myint Zan for his unyielding
patience to read through my drafts; Helen Tamtam and Kuriah Pitamama for their
comments,especiallyonthefirstdrafts,whichwerenotnormallyeasytoreadand
understand;andHamiltonforherinsightfulcomments.
AspecialthankyougoestotheConstitutionalReformUnit(CRU)inSolomonIslands,
especiallytothePermanentSecretary,FredrickIsomRohorua.Iamindebtedtoyour
relentlesssupportandtrustinmyresearch.Iappreciatethe“freeaccess”givento
me to conduct my research in your office. I am also grateful for the continuous
support given by the CRU media person Marilyn Maeta. Thank you for your
willingnesstoanswerthequestionsthrowninyourdirection.
I would also like to thank other academics for sharing their work and research
findings with me. Special mention is given to Katy Le Roy and Joseph Foukona for
providing me with their unpublished research work and conference papers. I
appreciateyourcontributions!
I
Iwouldalsoliketotakethisopportunitytothankmychildren,Yowaki,Tailanaand
Kalena,fortheirseeminglyendlesssupport,understanding,patienceandtolerance.
Finally,Iwouldliketothankmyparents,JanetMalefoandWilsonMaesilia,fortheir
dedication and love towards my upbringing. Without their vision I would not be
writingthisresearchtoday.Idedicatethisresearchpapertothem!
II
SYNOPSIS
ThisstudyonConstitutionalReforminSolomonIslandsfocusesontheparticipation
of Solomon Islanders in the process. Solomon Islanders had been in the past
regarded as bystanders in the constitutional building process. This came back to
haunt them today when Solomon Islanders realized that the Constitution created
during independence did not meet their desire and need for decentralization and
directparticipationindecisionmakinginthecountry.Anewsystemofgovernment
isneededtorectifythis,andtheconstitutionalreformproposedtheanswerwiththe
introductionofthefederalsystemofgovernment.
Important components of this research include a theoretical discussion on key
concepts like decentralization, democracy, participation and constitutionalism.
Theseconceptsarefundamentaltothediscussionandanalysisoftheparticipation
ofSolomonIslandersintheconstitutionalreformprocess.
The research identifies a variety of constitutional reform issues facing Solomon
Islands.ThecallforconstitutionalreforminSolomonIslandsisasoldasthecountry
itself.Numerousattemptsatreformweremadeinthepastwithnorealintentionto
gobeyondtheusualsurveysandfindings.
ThisresearchidentifiestheTownsvillePeaceAgreementasthecatalystforrenewed
callsforconstitutionalreforms.Sincethen,successivegovernmentshavemadeita
prioritytoseetheconstitutionalreformprocessachieveitsobjectives.Consultations
and surveys have been carried out, and as a result a draft federal constitution has
been drafted. Since 2004 the draft has been used as the basis for more
consultations.After4yearsofdeliberations,anotherdraftwaspublished;the2009
firstdraftofthefederalconstitutionisnowoutforfurtherdeliberations.
III
This research analyses the participation of Solomon Islanders in the constitutional
reform process and the key question is whether the draft federal constitution
represents the wishes of the majority of Solomon Islanders. The research analyses
the participation of Solomon Islanders in all the reform consultations and surveys,
andtherepresentationintheconstitutionalcongress.
The research highlights the need for Solomon Islanders to participate in the
constitutionalreformprocess.Itisarticulatedthatbetterservicesanddevelopment
will reach the grassroot people ifthere is decentralization and deconcentration of
government power. Through such popular participation Solomon Islanders can
construct a system of government that will bring the government closer to the
people. The research points out that the current system of government is not
supportive of allowing Solomon Islands owners to develop their natural resources.
Thefederalsystemofgovernmentwouldprovidethebestoptionbybringingthekey
decision making arms of the government closer to the people and can be easily
utilizedfordevelopmentpurposes.
An autochthonous constitution designed along the wishes and desires of Solomon
Islanders and instituting their chosen government system would help the country
explore new areas never explored before. A federal system of government would
alsocreatepositivecompetitivenessandgreaterparticipationindevelopmentinthe
ruralareas.
IV
TABLEOFCONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………..……………………………………………………………….I
SYNOPSIS…………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………III
CONTENTS……………..…………………………………………….………………………………………………...V
MAPS,PHOTOS,ANDFIGURES.………..……………………………………………………………………….X
ABBREVIATIONS…..……………………………………..…………………………………………………………XI
CHAPTER1:INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview…………………………………………………………………..………………………………………..1
1.2 QualificationsfortheResearchStudy……………………..………………………………………….3
1.3 ResearchQuestions……………………………………………..……….……………………………………5
1.4 ParameterofResearchandResearchMethodology……………………..……………………6
1.5 Challengesencountered…………………………………………………………………………………….9
1.6 SummaryofChapters……………………………………….………………………………………………12
1.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………..14
CHAPTER2:THEORETICALDISCUSSIONONDECENTRALIZATION,PARTICIPATION
ANDCONSTITUTIONMAKING
2.1Introduction……………………………………….…………………………………………………………….16
2.2ConceptofDecentralisation…………………………….……………………………………………...16
2.3DecentralisationandDeliberativeDemocracy……………………….………………………...19
2.4JustificationforthecallsforDecentralisation……………………………..……………………21
2.5ConstitutionalismandConstitutionalReform…………………………..………………………23
2.6WestminsterUnitarySystemvFederal/StateSystem………………………………………25
2.7LevelofparticipationintheWestminstersysteminSolomonIslands……………..28
2.8Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….………..30
V
CHAPTER3:SOLOMONISLANDSANDITSCONSTITUTIONALREFORMISSUES
3.1Introduction…………………….……………………………………………………………………………….33
3.2SolomonIslands……………………………………………………………………………………………....35
3.3ProcessofConstitutionMakinginSolomonIslands…….……………….…………………..37
3.4ConstitutionalIssuespriortoIndependenceandafterIndependence…….……….39
3.5Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………….…...45
CHAPTER4:TOWNSVILLEPEACEAGREEMENT2000
4.1Introduction…………………………………………….……………………………………………………….48
4.2TermsoftheTownsvillePeaceAgreement………………………………………………………49
4.3CallforConstitutionalReform…………………………………………………….…………………...51
4.4ImplicationsoftheTownsvillePeaceAgreement……………………………………………..52
4.5TheAftermathoftheTPA:ImmediatestepstowardsaDraftFederal
Constitution……………………………………………………………………………………………………………54
4.6Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………….56
CHAPTER5:THEDRAFTFEDERALCONSTITUTION
5.1Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………..58
5.2Availableoptionstobringaboutpoliticalchange…………..………………………………..60
5.3DraftingoftheDraftFederalConstitution……………………………………..…………………63
5.4KeyStakeholders………………………………………………………………………………….………….66
5.4.1SolomonIslandsGovernment……………………………….……………………………67
5.4.2UnitedNationsDevelopmentProject…………………………………………………68
5.4.3AidDonors…………………………………………………………………………………………69
5.5ImplicationsoftheDraftFederalConstitutionforSolomonIslands…..……………..70
5.5.1HumanRights………………………………………………………………………….…………70
5.5.2Expensivetooperate…………………………………………………………………………73
VI
5.6Movingfromthe2004Drafttothe2009firstDraftoftheFederalConstitution.75
5.7Majorchangesmadetothe2004draftbythe2009firstDraftoftheFederal
Constitution…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..76
5.7.1Changesordeletions………………………………………….………………………………76
5.7.2NoChangesordeletions…………………………………..………………………………..78
5.8Conclusion……………………………………………………………………..………………………………..80
CHAPTER 6: CONSULTATION – THE EXTENT OF SOLOMON ISLANDERS’
PARTICIPATIONINTHEMAKINGOFTHEDRAFTFEDERALCONSTITUTION
6.1Introduction………………………………….………………………………………………………………...83
6.2ConsultationandMethodology……………………………………………………………………….84
6.2.1ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(1988)……………………………………………84
6.2.2UNDPSurveysandReports(2003)….......................................................85
6.2.3MPsConstituencySurvey(2005)……………………………………..…………………87
6.2.4ConstitutionalCongressMembers’Consultations(2007–2008……..……88
6.3ConstitutionalReformUnitanditsoperations………………………………………………...89
6.4PlenaryMeetings…………………………………………………………………………………..…………90
6.5Conclusion…………………………………….……………………………………………………..………….93
CHAPTER7:ANALYSISOFTHECONSTITUTIONALREFORMPROCESS
7.1Introduction……………………………………………………………………….………….…………………95
7.2TimeFrame…………………………………………………………………..………………………….………96
7.3LowLevelofLiteracy…....……………………………………………………………………….…………97
7.4MethodofParticipation………………………………………………………………………………….100
7.5InterestGroups–Existenceofvariousinterests…………………………………………….102
7.6CCandEPACMembership–IsitreflectiveoftheSIpopulace?..……………………..103
7.6.1Membership…………………………………………………………………………………….104
7.6.2Attendanceandparticipation……………………………………..……………………105
VII
7.7IsConsultationInclusive?.…………………………………….……………….………………………..109
7.7.1YouthandWomen………………………………………………..…………………………109
7.7.2ChurchGroups………………………………………………………….……………………..112
7.7.3TraditionalAuthorities……………………………………………………………………..113
7.7.4MinorityGroups…………………………………………………….…………………………114
7.8Consultation–TheextentofConsultation………………………….………………………….115
7.8.1EarlyConsultations(Pre1998)……………………………..………………………….115
7.8.2UNDPConsultations(2003)…………………………………………..…………………118
7.8.3MPsConsultation(2005)………………………………………….………………………119
7.8.4ConstitutionalCongressConsultations(2007–2008)..………………………121
7.9ViewsoftheProvincialGovernments…………………………………………………….………122
7.10ATrulyAutochthonousConstitution?………………………………………..…………………132
7.11Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………….…………..…133
CHAPTER8:THEWAYFORWARD–RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1Introduction………………………………………………………………………….……………………….135
8.2Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………135
8.2.1LinkingtheStateswiththevillages………………………..…………………………135
8.2.2ClarifyingtheparametersoftheConstitutionmakingexercise….…….137
8.2.3 Calling for more consultative participation with members of the
educatedelitelivingandstudyingabroad…………………………………………………138
8.2.4Extendingconsultationstotheinternetdiscussionforums………………138
8.2.5 Reassessment of Solomon Islanders’ attitude and approach towards
whateversystemofgovernmentisinplace……………………………………………….140
8.2.6 AnationalSenate…………………………………………………………………………..141
8.3Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………..……………142
CHAPTER9:CONCLUSION
VIII
9.1Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..……………………...144
9.2Discussion…………………………………………………………………………..………………………….144
9.3Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..……………………….147
APPENDIXES
AppendixI:ConstitutionalReformProcessTimeline....………………………………………...149
AppendixII:ConstitutionalReformProcessQuestionnaire……………………………………153
AppendixIII:MapofSolomonIslands………………………………………………………………….156
AppendixIV:CRC1987Questionnaire………………………………………………………………….157
AppendixV:RepresentationoftheConstitutionalCongressandEPAC………………..161
AppendixVI:InterviewQuestionsforLenoraHamilton……………………………………….162
AppendixVII:MPsSurveySample:Auki/LangalangaConstituency……………………….164
AppendixVIII:MPsSurveySample:CentralKwara’aeConstituency……….…………….165
AppendixIX:ConcurrentPowersListIII………………………………………………………………..169
AppendixX:MPsSurvey–Baegu/AsifolaConstituency………………………………………..172
AppendixXI:MPsSurvey–EastAreareConstituency…………………………………………..173
AppendixXII:ThemesCommitteeMembership……………………………………………………174
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….………………………………..175
IX
MAPS
Map3.1:Solomonslandsshowingprovincesin1991…………………………..…………………34
Map3.2:ProvincesofSolomonIslandsafter1993………………………………………………….34
PHOTOS
Photo6.1:PhotoofthePlenaryMeetinginprogress………………………………………………89
Photo6.2:PhotoofmembersoftheconstitutionalcongressandtheEPACin
discussionduringtheplenarysession……………………………………………………………………..90
FIGURES
Figure7.1GraphshowingattendanceoftothejointCC/EPACPlenaryMeeting…..104
Figure7.2Graphshowingreasonsgivingbymembersfornotattendingmeetings106
Figure7.3Listofmajorreviewsandtheirrecommendationspriorto2000….………115
X
MAPS
Map3.1:Solomonslandsshowingprovincesin1991…………………………..…………………34
Map3.2:ProvincesofSolomonIslandsafter1993………………………………………………….34
PHOTOS
Photo6.1:PhotoofthePlenaryMeetinginprogress………………………………………………89
Photo6.2:PhotoofmembersoftheconstitutionalcongressandtheEPACin
discussionduringtheplenarysession……………………………………………………………………..90
FIGURES
Figure7.1GraphshowingattendanceoftothejointCC/EPACPlenaryMeeting…..104
Figure7.2Graphshowingreasonsgivingbymembersfornotattendingmeetings106
Figure7.3Listofmajorreviewsandtheirrecommendationspriorto2000….………115
X
CHAPTER1:INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
There is call for constitutional reform throughout the region as countries reassess
the viability of the constitutions they adopted at independence. Countries such as
Tuvalu,1 Kiribati and Fiji replaced their independence constitutions for modern
constitutions that are compatible with their circumstances and situations. Reforms
inFijiledtothe1997Constitution,whichwashailedasoneofthebestintheworld.
The 1997 Constitution was abrogated by the Military regime in 2009 leaving the
countrywithnoconstitutionandmorequestionsonwhattypeofconstitutionwould
satisfythecrossculturaldifferencesinFiji.
Other countries in the region are still pondering the idea of changing their
constitutions to reflect their local circumstances. For instance, there were
suggestions by individuals and political parties in Vanuatu that there needs to be
constitutional reform to assess the current political structure. In one speech, an
outgoing President of Vanuatu, Matas Kelekele, called for a constitutional reform,
citing the inadequacy of the current system.2 He suggested that the more suitable
system for Melanesian countries such as Vanuatu and Solomon Islands is a federal
systemofgovernment.
Solomon Islands has finally taken serious steps to relook at the independence
constitution,aprocessthathasbeenlongoverdue.Preindependenceleadersopted
for the monarchical unitary system of government, with a largely centralised
government. According to one of the leaders involved in this decision, Sir Peter
1
Tuvalu replaced its 1978 Constitution in 1986. The current preamble recites its constitutional history
withthewords“…[1978]ConstitutionhasservedthepeopleofTuvaluwellsinceIndependencebutnow,
morethansevenyearssinceitsadoption,itistimethatthepeopleofTuvalureconsidereditinthelightof
theirhistoryandtheirpresentandfutureneedsastheyseethem.”
2
VanuatuDailyPost,12August,2009.AlsoseeRadioAustralia,PacificBeatprogram,12August,2009.
1
Kenilorea, the monarchical unitary system was ideal for Solomon Islands as it
provides a strong central government from which power will be exerted on all the
differentislandgroups.3Thisoptionwasopposedasearlyasthefirstcelebrationof
independence,mainlybygroupsfromtheWesternProvince.Thecentralisednature
of the government was criticised for the next thirty or so years as the central
governmentstruggledtocaterfordecentralisationofpowerstotheprovinces.4
ThisstudyoftheconstitutionalreformprocessinSolomonIslandswillfocusonthe
pathtakentowardstheadoptionofthepresentdraftfederalconstitution.Important
componentsofthisstudyincludeatheoreticaldiscussionoftheapproachestakenin
the process, especially in assessing the extent to which Solomon Islanders were
involvedinthemakeupanddiscussionofthedraftfederalconstitution.Thestudy
will also provide a historical and descriptive discussion of the events leading up to
thevariousdraftsofearlierdraftfederalconstitutions.Thefocusofthisresearchis
theinvolvementofSolomonIslandersinthedesigning,planninganddrawingupof
thedraftfederalconstitution.
ThestudycriticallyanalysestheparticipationofSolomonIslandscitizensintheDFC.
The reform processes and methods, and make up of the various committees are
important areas this paper assessed to determine the fair representative
participation of Solomon Islanders. For instance, this research will analyse the
amountofconsultationscarriedoutinthecommunitiesandtheimpactthefeedback
from these meetings had on the formulation of the draft federal constitution. This
researchalsoscrutinizestheroleofvariousbodiessuchastheConstitutionalReform
3
Kenilorea,P.,2008,Tellitasitis:AutobiographyofRt.Hon.SirPeterKenilorea,KBE,PC,SolomonIslands'
FirstPrimeMinister,CenterforAsiaPacificAreaStudies,Taiwan.
4
SeeSaemala,F.1983,‘ConstitutionalDevelopment,’InLarmour,P.andTarua,S(eds.)SolomonIslands
Politics,InstituteofPacificStudies,UniversityoftheSouthPacific,pp.1–8.
2
Unit(CRU)inassessinganddraftinganewfederalconstitutionandtodesignanew
constitutionalpathforthecountrythatreflectstheneedsofthecountry.
1.2 Qualificationsfortheresearchstudy
This research aims to add to the existing information and findings on the
constitutional reform process in Solomon Islands. Constitutional reform is a
continuous process throughout the world as countries seek to rectify issues of
governance,leadership,anddeliveryofservicestotheircitizens.InSolomonIslands,
the process of constitutional reform began as early as the day independence was
declared from British control. There were various sections of the country that
favouredadecentralisedsystemofgovernmentratherthanwhatisofferedbythe
monarchicalunitarysystem.
This paper attempts to contribute to our understanding of the continuous
constitutional reform process. A literature search on constitutional reform in
Solomon Islands will show numerous publications and theses on this issue in
Solomon Islands including work by such academic researchers as Graham Hassall,5
Ian Scales,6 Jennifer Corrin,7 Jon Fraenkel,8 Sinclair Dinnen,9 Ralf Premdas,10 Yash
5
He cowrote the book AsiaPacific Constitutional Systems with Cheryl Saunders of the University of
Melbourne. His works include numerous publications and presentations on governance, constitution
makingandnationbuildinginthePacificregion,includingSolomonIslands.
6
IanScalesisaDoctoralCandidateinAnthropologyattheAustralianNationalUniversity.Hispublished
work includeRegional Politics in SolomonIslands, apaper presented at the Solomon Islands Workshop:
Building Peace and Stability, organized by the State, Society and Governance Department of the
AustralianNationalUniversity,2001,andanarticleontheSolomonIslandsWesternStateMovementin
2000(2007).
7
Some of Jenniffer CorrinCare’s most notable work on constitution making in Solomon Islands include
thefollowing:1)BreakingtheMould:ConstitutionalReviewinSolomonIslands(2007);2)Negotiatingthe
ConstitutionalConundrum:BalancingCulturalIdentitywithPrinciplesofGenderEqualityinPostColonial
SouthPacificSocieties(2006);3)ThesearchforamoreappropriateformofgovernmentintheSolomon
Iislands(2005);4)Offthepegormadetomeasure:IstheWestminstersystemofgovernmentappropriate
in Solomon Islands? (2002); 5) More on democratic fundamentals in the Solomon Islands (with Brown,
2001).
3
Ghai,11andlocalSolomonIslandsacademicssuchasGordonNanau12andTarcisiusK.
Tara.13Mostoftheliteratureishistorical,descriptiveandfocusedonvariousgeneral
aspectsoftheprocess.Mostdiscussionsareondecentralizationandconstitutional
reform.14 Government officials involved in the process also contribute to the
literaturewithpublicpresentationsandarticles.ThisincludesJohnTuhaika,Reginald
Teutao, Schmidt Schindnowski and Tom Woods, who travelled extensively
presentingpapersoncertainaspectsoftheconstitutionalreformprocess.Another
researcher who is also looking at the participation of Solomon Islanders in the
constitutionalreformprocessisKatyLeRoy.15However,mostofherworkisstillin
thepreliminarystagesandisnotyetpublished.
8
He touched on the issue of constitution making and economic development in his book The
ManipulationofCustom;FromUprisingtoInterventionintheSolomonIslands(2004).
9
His work includes a book coedited with Stewart Firth called Politics and StateBuilding in Solomon
Islands (2008), and the article 'StateBuilding in a PostColonial Society: The Case of Solomon Islands'.
2008.
10
Ralph Premdas’ work dated back to early 1980s, they include two books coauthored with Jeffery
Steeves titledTheSolomon Islands:Anexperiment indecentralization(1985), andDecentralisation and
politicalchangeinMelanesia:PapuaNewGuinea,theSolomonIslands,andVanuatu(1984).Partofthe
bookTheSolomonIslands:AnexperimentindecentralizationwasrepublishedbyRalphasanarticleinthe
PublicAdministrationandDevelopmentJournal(2006).
11
YashGhaiplayedahugeroleasadvisortotheSIGovernmentandChiefNegotiatorinthenegotiations
and drafting of the independence Constitution of Solomon Islands in the period 1977–78. This role is
documentedinthechapter“TheMakingoftheIndependenceConstitution”inLarmour,PandTaura,S.
(eds.), Solomon Island Politics (Suva, 1984), pp 952. Another notable article from him on constitution
makinginSolomonIslandsisthearticleConstitutionalReviewsinPNGandSolomonIslands(1990).
12
SomeofGordonNanau’sresearchongovernanceandconstitutionalissuesinSolomonIslandsinclude:
1)UnitingtheFragments:SolomonIslandsConstitutionalReforms(2002),and2)DecentralisationReforms
in the Solomon Islands (1998). His master’s thesis Decentralisation, Development and Popular
participationinSolomonIslands:AstudyoftheProvincialGovernmentSystem(1995)earnedhimagold
medalawardfordistinctioninresearchbyapostgraduatestudentattheUniversityoftheSouthPacific.
13
TarcisiusTaraKabutaulakaisapoliticaleconomistwhowroteextensivelyonissuesofgovernanceand
developmentinSolomonIslands.Someofhisworkrelatedtothisresearchincludethearticles:1)Aweak
stateandSolomonIslandsPeaceProcess(2002),and2)BeyoundEthnicity:ThePoliticalEconomyofthe
GuadalcanalCrisisinSolomonIslands(2001).
14
For example, Gordon Nanau’s masters and PhD theses were on decentralization and development;
TarcisiusKabutaulakawroteonissuesofgovernance,asdoscholarssuchasGrahamHassall,IanScales,
Jon Frankael and Sinclair Dinnen. Ralph Premdas studied the operation of the Provincial Government
system,takingacomparativeapproachbylookingatSolomonIslandsandPapuaNewGuinea.
15
KatyLeRoyisalsoconductingaresearchontheparticipationofSolomonIslandersintheconstitutional
reformprocessinSolomonIslandandFiji.SheisaPhDcandidateattheUniversityofMelbourneandat
the same time a Parliamentary Counsel in the Republic of Nauru. Some of her draft papers were also
reliedoninthisresearchpaper.
4
Nevertheless,itisimportanttonotethatconstitutionalreforminSolomonIslandsis
unique. It is a continuous process. The writings of previous researchers should be
viewedassignificantrecordsofpartoftheprocess,eachprovidingdescriptiveand
analytical views at different stages of this process. My research is conducted after
Katy Le Roy’s research and some of the areas covered here may not feature in Le
Roy’s work, such as the role of the Constitutional Congress, the plenary meetings
andthefirstdraftfederalconstitutionfor2009.
With this research, I hope to analyse the participation of Solomon Islanders in the
constitutionalreformprocess.ItiscommonknowledgeintheSolomonIslandsthat
often decisions of higher magnitude are made without proper consultation or
awareness.Onmostoccasions,theyaremadeunderthepresumptionthatthefinal
outcomesgenerallyreflecttheviewsanddesiresofallSolomonIslanders.Theymay
notdoso,though.Theresearchfocusesontheconsultationprocessandmethods,
the participation of key individuals and stakeholders, parliamentarians and the
involvementoftheConstitutionalCongress(CC)andtheEminentPersonsAdvisory
Committee(EPAC)duringtheplenarymeetings.
1.3 ResearchQuestion
Theimportantquestionsthisresearchpapersetsouttoanalyseinclude:
a. To what extent do the consultations reflect the views and perspective of
ordinarySolomonIslanders?
b. TowhatextentdidSolomonIslanderscontributetothecontentofthedraft
federalconstitutions?
c. Does the State Government Task Force reflect the views of Solomon
Islanders?
5
d. Does the membership of the Constitutional Congress and the Eminent
PersonsAdvisoryCouncilreflecttheapprovalormandateofthemajorityof
SolomonIslanders?
e. Does the participation of the national government affect the consultation
processandthefinaloutcomeofthedraftfederalconstitutions?
f. Did foreign stakeholders at any stage of the process tried to influence the
outcome of the consultation process and the content of the draft federal
constitutions?
g. Did Solomon Islanders freely and openly participate in the process of
constitutionalreformintheSolomonIslands?and
h. IsSolomonIslanderparticipationeffectiveinthedrawingupofahomegrown
draftfederalconstitution?
1.4 ParametersofResearchandtheResearchMethodology
a. ParametersoftheResearch
This research covers the constitutional reform process from 2000 to 2009. This
period begins with the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) in Australia to the first
DFC to the current constitutional congress set up to oversee the final Federal
Constitution.
Constitutional reform in Solomon Islands has been a continuous process since
independence. The Western Province of Solomon Islands strongly expressed their
opposition to the Westminster system of government that was adopted upon
Independence.Theirwishforafederalsystemofgovernmenthadbeenclearfrom
those years, leading to various Commissions of Inquiry, consultations and surveys
mandated by various governments in the past up to the events of 2000. The
6
Townsville Peace Agreement brought a new dimension to the problem, with a
renewedcommitmentfromtheGovernment–acommitmentthatallgovernments
afterthe2000eventswereobligedtohonour.
b. Methodology
This supervised research paper is a product of a yearlong research study I
conductedthroughintensivelibraryandinternetresearch,discussionandinterviews
with stakeholders and people that were involved in the constitutional reform
processinSolomonIslands.MyinterestinthistopicgotanewlifewhenIenrolled
for the supervised research paper in 2009. A major part of the research has been
spent collecting, collating and analysing information. The remainder of my time is
spent on the writing and refurbishing the paper based on the feedback and
commentaryreceivedfromfriendsandacademics.
Anumberofresearchmethodsemployedinthispapercanbestbedividedintotwo
parts. These are: (1) the collection process or the means of obtaining research
materials; and (2) the analytical aspect of the information collected. The collection
process comprised three stages. The initial stage involved conducting online
researchwhichassistedmetoidentifytheavailableliteratureonthetopicbyother
writersandacademics.Itwasalsoimportantasitledmetodiscoverdifferentareas
ofconstitutionalreformthathadbeencoveredinthesewritings.
Thesecondstageoftheresearchwaslibrarybased,whereIresearcheddocuments
andpublicationsonconstitutionalreforminSolomonIslandsthatmaynotbefound
online.Thisstageoftheresearchwasalsoimportantasitprovidedinsightsthatcan
be gleaned from a large number of published books, journals and unpublished
materialslikestudents’theses.Thesethesesalsoassistedmeinprovidingguidance
andadditionalliterature.
7
The third stage of the collection part of the research involved field research.
NumeroustripsweretakentoSolomonIslandstoundertakefieldresearch.Myfirst
trip, in June 2009, though brief, helped me to forge a good research relationship
with the Permanent Secretary of the Constitutional Reform Unit (CRU). This
relationship formed a crucial part of my research as much of the necessary
importantinformationcanonlybeobtainedthroughthisofficewiththeapprovalof
the Permanent Secretary and the cooperation of their media officer. Also it was
during this trip that I was granted permission to attend the plenary session of the
ConstitutionalCongress(CC)thatwassittingatthattime.ItwasindeedaprivilegeI
got first hand experience and understanding of the plenary discussions. The
outcomeofthisplenarysessionisthe2009firstdraftoftheFederalConstitution.
ImadeasecondtripinlateJuly2009,spendingmostoftimeintheCRUlibraryand
conducting research in Honiara. These researches include discussions with the CC
andEPACmembers,provincialgovernmentmembers,16prominentSolomonIslands
leaders,publicservantsandgeneralmembersofthepublic.Thistripprovidedinsight
intotheperceptionsofthepeopleinvolvedinthelaterstagesoftheconstitutional
reformprocess.
I also engaged in discussions with members of the CC and EPAC and academics
interested in the constitutional reform process through online (internet or email)
discussions. A questionnaire was distributed to members of the CC and EPAC17
seeking their views on the constitutional reform process. The aim of the
questionnaire was to collect information regarding the nominations and
endorsement of the CC and EPAC members and their level of participation at the
16
ImetandinterviewedanumberofprovincialgovernmentmembersfromMalaitaProvinceandCentral
IslandsProvinceinHoniaraduringmyfieldtripinJuly2009.
17
SeeAppendixIIforasampleofthequestionnaire.
8
plenary meetings. Similar online discussions and sharing of information was done
withotherresearchersworkingonthesamefield,suchasKatyLeRoy.Sheprovided
copiesofherunpublishedpresentationsformyresearch.
Iwasalsogiveninvaluableunlimitedaccesstoalldocumentsatthedisposalofthe
CRU office. I spent a major part of the field research project at the Constitutional
Reviewofficeidentifyingdocumentsofimportancetotheresearch.
The second part of the research involves the analysing of the materials collected.
This is the intriguing part of the research because it involved a lot of information
whichIhadtoprioritizeoralternatively,discardreluctantly.Inordertominimizethis
immense task, I looked at media publications and listed them chronologically and
concentrated mostly on events that unfolded after the TPA that relate to the
constitutional reform process. Secondly, I looked at the various consultations that
were carried out as parts of the constitutional reform process were analysed; this
involvedtheconstitutionreformcommitteeconsultationreportsof1987,theSGTF
report,theUNDPconsultationsreports,theMPs’reportsandtheCCconsultations.
Thirdly,themakeupoftheCCandEPACcommitteesandtheircontributiontowards
the final draft of the federal constitution were analysed. In doing so, I looked at
importantaspectsofthesecommittees,suchastheirattendanceandcontributionto
thefinalformofthedraftfederalconstitution.
1.5 Challengesencountered
Anumberofdifficultieswereencounteredduringthisresearch;however,noneof
thesedifficultiesposedanymajorhindrancetothefinalwriteupofthispaper.The
commondifficultiesencounteredduringtheresearchstagearediscussedbriefly.
9
a. Lackofcooperationbyinterviewees
Occasionallyintendedinterviewvisitswerepostponedwiththecommonexcusethat
the interviewee is sick or is in a very important meeting. Attempts to reschedule
these meetings yielded no better results – citing previous reasons for failure to
attendtheseinterviews.Iamoftheviewthatsomeoftheseintendedinterviewees
didnotwanttobeinterviewedabouttheroletheyplayintheconstitutionalreform
process. Others probably view academics with a certain degree of suspicion,
promptinganaturalinstinctnottoengagewiththematall.
Nevertheless,theimportantthingthoseinvolvedintheconstitutionalprocessmust
appreciateisthatthereformprocessisasignificantnationalprocess.Thereisaduty
to be accountable and transparent to the citizens of Solomon Islands. Also the
leaders involved in the constitutional reform process are important leaders and
people rely on them to make the right decisions; right decisions on issues such as
accountabilityandtransparency.Itisexpectedofleaderstoanswerquestionsposed
bytheconstituentsor generalmembersofthepubliconcurrentissues beforethe
parliament,whichinitselfiscontinuousconsultation.
Therefore, the failure to attend and discuss issues relating to the constitutional
reformprocessorreluctancetodiscussissuesrelatingtothereformprocesswould
be deemed as attempts to avoid discussing some aspects of the reform process
issues. My experience was further compounded by the opinion of some members
thatbureaucracyinformationrelatingtothegovernmentordiscussionsmadeinthe
chambersshouldbeprotected.Thestandardfortheseispublicinterest,otherwise
governmentinformationispublicinformationtoaidthepublictoaccuratelyrecord
issuesorotherwiseeffectivelyengagewiththegovernment.
10
b. Meetingkeyplayersintheconstitutionalreformprocess
Itwasalsodiscoveredduringtheresearchthatsomeofthekeyplayersinthereform
process that I wanted to talk to or interview were not in Honiara. The absence of
someofthesekeyplayersmadeitdifficulttoobtaininformationastherewereno
alternate choices available. Similarly, other key members of the reform process
residedintheprovincesandonlytraveltoHoniarawhenrequiredformeetings.This
createdaproblemfortheresearchasthecorroborationrequiredtosupportsomeof
theinformationgatheredduringtheearlystagesoftheresearchwasnotobtained.
Nevertheless, the materials uncovered from the Constitutional Reform Unit office
were sufficient to outline the roles of such key players in the reform process. This
was sufficient for the purposes of this paper. However, I will continue to pursue
thesekeyplayersforinterviewsforfuturepublicationsorresearch.
c. Gettingfeedbackfromthoseissuedwithquestionnaires
I had worked extensively to collate a list of email addresses of people who were
involved in the reform process, including those involved in past reforms. The
purposewastodistributequestionnairestothemandputtogethertheirresponses.
The questionnaire mainly targets the CC and EPAC membership. This is because at
thecurrentstageofthereformprocesstheyarethekeyplayersandtheirdecisions
willhavethemostimpactonthedraftfederalconstitution.Otherkeyplayerssuch
as those involved in the UNDP consultation or the MPs consultation were not
involved in this questionnaire as their views were already documented in those
respectivereports.
11
The response to the questionnaires was not as positive as expected. Only about
thirtypercentofthethirtytwomembersoftheCCrespondedtothequestionnaire.
This meant that the findings associated with the questionnaire may not represent
theoverallperspectiveofthoseinvolvedintheplenarysessions.Nevertheless,the
questionnaire findings provided a clinical insight to the process as individuals
involvedintheprocessgavetheiropinionontheprocessusingtheirexperienceas
evidence. It is for this reason that I saw it fit to include the findings of the
questionnairesinthispaper.
1.6 SummaryofChapters
It is anticipated that this paper should add another dimension to the existing
literature by providing discussion and analyses of the current stage of the
constitutionalreformprocess.Thispaperisdividedintoeightchapters.Chapterone
oftheresearchprovidesasummaryoftheoverallcontentoftheresearchpaper.It
(a) summarizes the purposes of the research, the methodology used to collect
information and materials, (b) identifies available literature, and (c) identifies the
difficulties encountered during the research and analyzing stages. Chapter 1 also
provides a brief summary for each of the chapters that will be covered in the
research.
Chapter two examines the different theoretical principles that are associated with
the constitutional reform process in the country. It discusses the principles of
decentralization, democracy, constitutionalism, and constitutional reform. This
chapterwillalsoexplainthedistinctionbetweenthecurrentsystemofgovernment
adoptedinSolomonIslandsandthedesiredfederalsystemofgovernment.
12
Chapter three looks at constitutional reform in Solomon Islands. It starts with a
general introduction to events that had occurred in Solomon Islands that nearly
brought the country down. It was these events that provided the catalyst for a
renewedmovetobringaboutconstitutionalchange.Thischapterthenmovesonto
providegeneraldescriptiveandinformativeknowledgeofSolomonIslands.Thispart
encompasses a discussion on constitution making and identifies the constitutional
issuesSolomonIslandsfacedimmediatelyafterindependenceuptotoday.
Chapter four looks at the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) of 2000. This chapter
viewstheTPAasaveryimportantcomponentoftheconstitutionalreformprocess
becauseittriggeredthechainofeventsthatledtothepresentationofthevarious
draftsofthefederalconstitution.TheTPAisanagreementmadeamongtwowarring
parties and the government to end fighting in Solomon Islands. And more
importantlythegovernmentmadeacommitmenttofulfillitspromisetotheparties
intheagreement.Oneofthesepromisesistoseetheintroductionofastate/federal
systemofgovernmentforSolomonIslands.
Chapterfivelooksatthedraftfederalconstitution(DFC)draftedbythegovernment
as a working paper towards the compilation of the final federal constitution. This
chapterprovidesachronologicaldescriptionofeventsaftertheTPA,beginningwith
the Buala Premiers Meeting and the formation of the SGTF team to review the
findingsofthe1987CRCfindingswiththeaimofformulatinganalternatesystemof
governmentforthecountry.Thischapterfurtherlooksatthepartiesinvolvedinthe
draftingoftheDFC,includingkeystakeholderssuchasthegovernment,UNDPand
otheraiddonors.ItalsoprovidesdiscussiononthepossibleimplicationsoftheDFC
forSolomonIslands.Chapterfiveconcludeswithacomparisonofthe2004draftof
theDFCandthefirst2009draftoftheDFC.
13
Chapter Six looks at the consultation process involved in the constitutional reform
process.Inreviewingtheconsultationprocess,thechapterbeginsbylookingatthe
consultationmethodologyusedbystakeholderstoconducttheconsultationprocess.
This involves the identification of methodology used in the 1987 CRC Report, the
UNDP surveys, MPs surveys, and the CC consultations. Chapter five closes with
discussionsontheCRCanditsoperationsandthelatestplenarymeetings.
ChapterSevenoftheresearchpaperlooksattheconstitutionalreformprocessfrom
ananalyticalperspective.Discussioninthischapterconcentratesontheconsultation
processesusedinthevariousconsultationsandsurveyscarriedoutincontemplation
of finding a system of government that would match the desires and needs of
Solomon Islanders. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the depth of
participationbythemajorityofSolomonIslandersintheconstitutionalprocess.
Chaptereightlooksat thefutureoftheconstitutionalreformprocess.Indoingso,
thepaperprovidessomerecommendationsthatshouldbeconsideredtoensurethe
processisrepresentativeofSolomonIslandersandtheiraspirations.
FinallyChapterNinewillrevisitthequestionsthisresearchsetouttoassess.
1.7 Conclusion
ThischapterhasshowntheimportanceofthisresearchtoSolomonIslands.Itadds
anotherdimensiontothegrowingliteratureonconstitutionalreforminthecountry.
Furthermore, this chapter showed that though much analysis has been published,
none specifically looked at the area of participation in constitutional reforms by
Solomon Islanders, let alone any carried out by an indigenous Solomon Islands
researcher.
14
The research parameter is clearly spelt out to the readers to ensure that readers
appreciatethepurposeoftheresearch.Itisimportanttonotethattheresearchwas
conductedbyusingthequestionsmethodologyoutlinedinthischapter.Astrategic
approach was used in the collection and compilation of information towards the
final research. The chapter summaries should assist readers browse through the
proposedchaptersinafewsentences.
Thenextchapterwilllookatsomekeytheoreticalconceptsandprinciplesthatare
very important in the discussion on constitutional reforms. It will cover concepts
such as decentralization, deliberative democracy, constitutionalism and
constitutionalmaking,andfederalandunitarysystemsofgovernments.
15
CHAPTER2:THEORETICALDISCUSSIONONDECENTRALISATION,
PARTICIPATIONANDCONSTITUTIONMAKING.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the theoretical aspects of constitutional reform and the
engagementofthegeneralpublicintheprocess.Thechapterdefinestheconceptof
decentralization.Itwillalsooutlinesomeofthejustificationsgivenbyadvocatesof
the decentralisation concept as to why it is an important aspect of any political
system.Secondly,thischapterwilllookattheissueofconstitutionmaking.Indoing
so,thepaperwillattempttoillustratewhydemocraticparticipationinconstitution
makingisvital.
Thirdly,thischapterwilllookattheissueofdeliberativedemocracyorconstitutional
modelsthatoutlinetheissueoflegitimacy.Furtherdeliberationswillalsobemade
on the theory of the Westminster system of governance and its operation in
Solomon Islands. Finally, this paper will highlight the level of participation the
Westminster system provides to Solomon Islands as compared to a wider level of
participationSolomonIslandershadanticipated.
2.2 TheConceptofDecentralisation
The concept of decentralisation cannot be fully understood on its own unless it is
definedinassociationwithothertermssuchascentralisation,deconcentrationand
devolution.18Deconcentrationisthetransferofsomeadministrativeauthorityand
responsibilitytosubordinateagenciesorofficerswhonormallyactintheinterestof
18
Nanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,DevelopmentandPopularParticipationinSolomonIslands:AStudy
oftheProvincialGovernmentSystem,”Master’sthesis,USP,p.29.
16
thesuperiorauthority.19Thisinvolvesthetransferofresponsibilitiesfromthecentral
authority to agents normally in the provinces to minimise the work load on the
centralauthorityandattempttoincreaseownershipandbindrelationshipsbetween
governmentandtheprovinces.SolomonIslandsresearcherGordonNanauobserved
thatthoughtheworkloadwasshiftedtofieldstaff,thepowertoexercisediscretion
in decision making does not normally transfer to agents.20 It remained with the
superiorinthecentralheadquarters.Hearguedthatdeconcentrationiscentredon
administrative roles, which normally fall within the bureaucratic echelon of the
country. In the case of Solomon Islands, Nanau described deconcentration as
bureaucratictransferofpersonnelandworkloadsfromheadquartertotheprovincial
authorities in the form of seconded staff officials.21 For example, the provincial
SecretarytotheprovincesisappointedbythePublicServicetoworkcloselywiththe
provincial governments to implement government policies.22 The provincial
secretariesarenotaccountabletotheprovincialauthoritiesbuttothePublicService
Commission.Therefore,thereisalreadyanelementofcentralgovernmentcontrolin
thisarrangement,whichleavesprovincialgovernmentsfrustratedandinsecure.
In devolution, as opposed to deconcentration, the recipient of authority is
authorised to make decisions on matters stipulated in the decentralisation
legislation.23Thismeansthatlegislationexplicitlyconfersnecessarypowertomake
crucial decisions on to the lower level of government to carry out its roles and
functions. Though the central government may have supervisory control over the
lowerlevelsofgovernment,thelowerlevelsofgovernmentsarelegallydistinctand
19
Premdas,R.andSteeves,J.1982,“TheHoniaraTownCouncil:DecentralisationandDissolutioninthe
SolomonIslands,”CenterforAsianandPacificStudies,UniversityofHawaiiatManoa,Hawaii,p.242.
20
Nanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,developmentandPopularParticipationinSolomonIslands,”p.29.
21
ibid,p.30.
22
Seesection116ofthe1978ConstitutionofSolomonIslands.
23
Nanau,G.1997,Decentralisation,developmentandPopularParticipationinSolomonIslands,p.31.
17
independentfromthecentralgovernment.24AgoodexampleinSolomonIslandsis
theprovincialgovernments,whoareempoweredbytheProvincialGovernmentAct
to make ordinances regarding matters within their legislative competence.25
However,suchordinancesaresubjecttonationallawsandtheConstitution.
Another term associated with the concept of decentralisation is ‘centralisation’.
Centralisation is distinct from decentralisation in its operation.26 By definition,
centralisation refers to the form of governance where there is a concentration of
decisionmakinginonepersonorgroupofpersons.27Normallythispersonorgroup
of persons is taken to refer to the national or central government. In a standard
system,allthepowersarevestedinthegovernmentanditdelegatestoitsagents
their roles and functions. The current system of government in Solomon Islands is
associated with this concept because the power is centred in Honiara, the Central
Government’sadministrativeheadquarters.
Having looked at some of these concepts and principles associated with
decentralisation, one will now take a look at the concept of decentralisation.
Theoretically,decentralisationcanbestbedefinedasthetransferofpowersandor
functions from the central government to provincial governments, or from central
government to authorities more dispersed from the centre or towards the
periphery.28 It includes the transfer of authority and responsibility within the
24
ibid.
Seesections32–34oftheProvincialGovernmentAct,CAP118,1997ofSolomonIslands.
26
Inhismaster’sthesis,GordonNanaupointedoutthatdespitethegeneralperspectivethat
centralizationanddecentralisationappearattheoppositeendsofascale,anewperspectivehasbeen
advancedbyscholars(Hart,1972andSeshadri,1978)thatshowedthatthesetwoconceptsshouldbe
viewedascomplementarytoeachother.Itwaspointedoutthatwithoutcentralisation,decentralisation
isimpossibleaswellbecausedecentralisationcanonlyoccurinasystemwherethereisaprevioushistory
ofcentralisation.SeeNanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,developmentandPopularParticipationin
SolomonIslands,”p.33.
27
ibid,p.32.
28
CommonwealthSecretariat,1983,“Decentralisationfordevelopment:ASelectedannotated
Bibliography,”MarlboroughHouse,London,p.4.
25
18
bureaucracy to officials stationed outside the headquarters and at the same time,
legallyconferspowertotheselowerlevelsofgovernmenttomakepolicydecisions
onspecifiedmatters.
The two basic aspects of decentralisation are political decentralisation and
administrative decentralisation.29 Political decentralisation provides for the
devolutionofpowerandauthorityfromthecentralgovernmenttothelowerlevelof
government.Ontheotherhand,administrativedecentralisationensuresthatpower
and its delegation is equally distributed or delegated to the lower levels of
government. At the moment in Solomon Islands, both features of decentralisation
are controlled by the Central Government and little is delegated to the provincial
governmentsandtheprovinces.
2.3 DecentralisationandDeliberativeDemocracy
Decentralisationisnormallydesiredbypeopleasarightforanygovernmentwhere
people participate in the decision making process, compared to centralisation.
Seshadri,V.notedthat‘centralisationisathreattohumanthespiriteverywhereand
its control is a concern for all men who love freedom.’30 This is a common
perspective that people have of centralisation. A common example can be seen in
the highly centralised planning structures of the communist countries such as the
former Soviet Union.31 To some people, the concept of decentralisation is
synonymous with democracy, as individual liberty is associated with people’s
participation under any decentralised system of government.32 The link between
decentralisationanddemocracyissuccinctlydescribedbyMuttalibeasfollows:
29
Nanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,developmentandPopularParticipationinSolomonIslands,”p.34.
Seshadri,V.1978,“TheUnreasonableDebateofCentralisationVersusDecentralisation,”p.670.
31
Thisiswherethereisasetplanningstructuredesignedpurposelyforthewholeoperationofthe
country.
32
Nanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,developmentandpopularparticipationinSolomonIslands,”p.37.
30
19
With ethical roots in democracy, decentralisation has become an
idealisticconcept,awayoflifeandanenditself.Itsuggestsasystem
inwhichpeoplewillbegivenanopportunitytoperformtheirindividual
goalstothemaximum.33
Participatory or deliberative democracy is a term closely associated with
decentralisation. Deliberative democracy engages in a wider consultation to gauge
the views of people who are likely to be affected by any decision made. It further
providesavoiceormediumfromwhichtheseviewsaremadeknown.Therefore,itis
agreeable that decentralisation refers to an achievement of a more participatory
democracy beyond the normal methods of representation.34 Also it can be added
here that participatory or deliberative democracy is directly linked to
decentralisationinthesensethatitispromotedthroughdecentralisation.
Thereisalsoargumentthatdecentralisationisthekeytoeffectiveimplementation
of government plans and policies.35 In comparison to the centralised system,
decentralisationappearstobemoreresponsivetothepublicandwouldguarantee
the improvement of quality and quantity of services. A good example of this
perspective of decentralisation was the ‘bottomup approach’ preached by the
Sogavaregovernmentof2007inSolomonIslands.Thisapproachwasbasedonthe
concept of decentralisation where the public is the main decision maker based on
their experiences in the bottom level of the state hierarchy. According to Gordon
Nanau, decentralisation is therefore viewed from this perspective as a strategy to
counter development problems, especially in the rural areas where government
33
Muttalibe,M.A.1978,“Decentralisation:AnewphilosophyofCorporatelife,”IndianJournalofPublic
Administration:QuarterlyJournaloftheIndianInstituteofPublicAdministration,Volume24,Number3,
pp.702–709.
34
Nanau,G.1997,“Decentralisation,developmentandPopularParticipationinSolomonIslands,”p.38.
35
ibid,p.39.
20
servicesarelargelynonexistent.36Alsodecentralisationpromotesthewelfareofthe
public and is inclusive in decision making. Participation by people in the decision
making process gives them ownership and the willingness to contribute to
developmentandthedecisionmakingprocessinthecountry.
2.4 JustificationforDecentralisation
Inhismaster’sthesis,GordonNanauoutlinesseveralaspectsofdecentralisationand
the justifications for it.37 The six justifications are: 1) decentralisation and
participation, 2) decentralisation as a development tool, 3) decentralisation for
efficient decision making, 4) decentralisation as a uniting force, 5) decentralisation
asaformofdecolonisation,and(6)decentralisationandliberalism.Forthepurposes
ofthisresearchIwillconcentrateonjustifications1and2,asatoolforparticipation
ingovernmentdecisionmakinganddevelopment.
Decentralisation is often aligned with participation in decision making. The aim of
decentralisationistobringthegovernmentclosertothepeoplesothattheytoocan
be involved in decision making. This can be achieved through various ways. For
example, in Solomon Islands, in an attempt to bring the government closer to the
people, the government created a provincial government system. Certain powers
were devolved to the provincial governments. Provincial administrative
headquartersandstationsweresetupasfocalpointsfortheprovincialgovernments
tointeractwiththepopulace.Areacouncilswerealsoestablishedastheprovincial
government link to the rural people. This illustrates the level of decentralisation
proposedintheprovincialgovernmentregimetolinkthepeoplewiththeprovince
andcentralgovernment.
36
37
ibid.
ibid,p.40.
21
Participationiscrucialinanysystemofgovernment.Greaterparticipationindecision
making means that a government policy receives the backing of the majority of
people. Therefore greater participation creates a sense of legitimacy and approval
fromthepopulation.Incountrieswherealargeproportionofpeopleliveintherural
areasitisimportantthattheirvoicesbeheardbecausetheyownthemajorityofthe
natural resources the country relies on for exports. Failure to involve resource
owners in decision making could result in their reluctance to allow government or
investors to extract their natural resources. Further still, decentralisation provides
more opportunities for citizen participation in decision making.38 This in turn
produces a healthy society as the government and people interact on a constant
basis with each other and are aware of the issues facing each other. In summary,
participatory democracy wants nothing less than full citizen participation in policy
making,whichcanonlybeachievedthroughdecentralisationofgovernmentpowers
andservices.
Decentralisation as a development tool is a fundamental aspect of the concept of
decentralization. There is a widely discussed notion that it is the absence of
development in the rural areas that pushed isolated and frustrated provinces to
demandachangeinthegovernmentsysteminSolomonIslands.Peopleareofthe
view that development can best be achieved in decentralised systems of
government.Developmentplansandprogramsaremoremeaningfulwhendrawnup
byconsensusamongthepeoplewhoareimplementingthemratherthanbypeople
basedinthemaintownsanddetachedfromtherealitiesfacedbytheruralpeople.
Decentralisingpowerandfunctionstoregionalorlocallevelsofgovernmentfurther
allows planners to identify the different groups and conditions in these areas and
38
ibid,p.43.
22
accommodatethesedifferencesintheirplansandprograms.39Thisistruewhenwe
look at a developing country like Solomon Islands and see there is little or no
developmentatallintheruralareasandyetthesepeoplearetheonesthatownthe
resources.Thisiswheredecentralisationisimportant,becauseitwillworkwiththe
resourceownersatthegroundlevelandensuretheirnaturalresourcesareutilized
andthattheyaretheoneswhogetthereturns.
2.5 ConstitutionalismandConstitutionalReform
Constitutionalism and constitution are two distinct concepts. Constitutionalism is
definedbyS.N.Katzas“aprocesswithinasocietybywhichthecommunitycommits
itself to the rule of law, specifies its basic values, and agrees to abide by a
legal/institutional structure which guarantees that formal social institutions will
respecttheagreeduponvalues.”40Ontheotherhand,aconstitutionformsthebasis
for political and legal legitimacy of any country or state. It is a document that
incorporates all the important aspects of the running of a country or state. It
outlines the important values of its subjects, the structural layout, powers and
functionsofthestate.
Constitutionalism is a continuous process in many countries in the world today,
including countries in the Pacific region. It is an important aspect of designing and
redesigningthepoliticalstructureofanycountry.Acommentatorongovernancein
thePacific,GrahamHassall,notedthat:
39
ibid.
QuotedbyHassall,G.2008,In“ThelegalpoliticsofconstitutionalreforminthePacific,”AustralianLaw
ReformAgenciesConference,PortVila,p.1.
40
23
… [a] majority of these constitutional exercises have sought devolution and
betterregulationofpolitics,whileotherswererelatedtoselfdetermination,
conflictprevention,andpostconflictpeacebuilding.41
In situations where constitutional exercises are focused on devolution and better
regulationofpolitics,theprocessisoftengradual.Thismayresultinamendmentsto
theconstitutionorenactmentoflegislationendorsingsuchdevolution.Forexample,
in Tokelau a vote calling for selfdetermination did not succeed in 2006 and 2007
when the numbers fell short of the required twothirds majority needed to obtain
selfdetermination.42 The votes were a response to demands from groups within
Tokelau, demanding more devolution of power from New Zealand. The vote failed
because there was reluctance by the majority of Tokelauans to secede from New
Zealand.
Similarly other countries in the Pacific region43 went through various measures to
give more power or authority to the lower levels of governments. Papua New
Guinea went through a lot of discussions on how best a provincial government
systemcanoperateinthecountry.Fromitspastexperienceandchallengeswiththe
provincial government system it devolved identified essential powers to the
provincial governments. Furthermore, the government of Papua New Guinea
granted Bougainville autonomy to govern themselves with only powers relating
internationaltradeandsecurityretainedbythecentralgovernment.Thedevolution
of power to the provinces and autonomy to Bougainville has so far kept the
provincescontentedwiththecurrentpoliticalstructure.
41
ibid,p.1.
RadioNewZealand,13March2007.
43
ThebestexamplesareVanuatu,PNG,Tuvalu,TokelauandNiue.
42
24
InNauruaconstitutionalexercisewasamandatoryresponseits2007financialcrisis.
AsdescribedbyHassallthisisauniqueformofstatebuildingbutitdoesresultinthe
commencement of a review of the constitution.44 In other countries in the region,
such as Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia, constitutional
exercises were part of postconflict arrangements or recommendations. As
mentionedearlier,givingautonomytoBougainvillewasaresponsetothe19871997
Bougainville crises. Similarly, one can argue that the constitutional reform process
currently being under taken in Solomon Islands is an immediate response to the
1998–2003crisis.ThesameprocesscanbeseeninNewCaledonia,wheretheFrench
governmentgrantedextrapowerstotheindigenouspeopleofNewCaledoniaafter
indigenous people had clashed with settlers. Nevertheless, the New Caledonia
situationis,ofcourse,farfrombeingsettledyet.
These modes of constitutional exercises or constitutionalism may also overlap. For
example, the constitutional reform undertaken in Solomon Islands may well be a
directresponsetothe1998–2003crisis.However,ifoneistotakeacloserlookatit,
itisclearthattheconstitutionalreformprocessiscontinuous.Itstartedasearlyas
thedaythecountrygainedindependence.The1998–2003crisiswasonlyacatalyst
tointensifythepressureforconstitutionalreforms.
2.6 WestminsterUnitarySystemvFederal(State)System
When Solomon Islands became independent from Britain it adopted the
Westminster Unitary system of government. The Queen remained the Executive
headofstate,representedbyaGovernorGeneralinSolomonIslands.Theheadof
government, the prime minister, is voted in by the elected members of the
44
Hassall,G.2008,“TheLegalPoliticsofConstitutionalReforminthePacific,”p.2.
25
legislature.45The Westminster System operates in Solomon Islands via a strong
centralgovernment,stationedinthenationalcapital.Underthissystemthecentral
governmentisresponsibleforpolicyanddecisionmakinginthebestinterestsofthe
country.46Ultimateauthority,politicalandlegalauthority,remainswiththecentral
government.
It is the elected members of parliament, through a majority vote, that elects the
prime minister, who in turn appoints the cabinet members. The members of
parliamentwerevotedintoparliamentbythemembersofthepublicthroughtheir
respectiveconstituenciesduringthenationalgeneralelections.Eachmemberofthe
cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister is responsible for a particular ministry.
Theseministriesareresponsiblefortheimplementationofthegovernmentpolicies
andplans.Policymaking,though,isinthehandsoftheministers,underadvicefrom
hisorhersecretariesanddepartmentheads.
Under the Westminster unitary system of government usually a second tier of
government is set up, but is subordinate to the central government.47 In Solomon
Islands,thissecondtierofgovernmentistheprovincialgovernment.Certainpowers
and duties have been transferred from the central government to the provincial
governmentsbasedintheprovincialheadquarters.
The Westminster unitary system of government is not fully supported by the
traditionalandculturalsetupofSolomonIslanders.48SolomonIslandsisnomadeup
ofasinglegroupofpeople;instead,itcontainaclusterofdifferentislandgroupings
45
SeeChapter5oftheConstitutionofSolomonIslands,1978,itclearlyidentifiestheroles,functionsand
powersoftheExecutive.
46
ibid.
47
SchoolofLaw,2004,“LA318:UnitaryvsFederalSystems,”UniversityoftheSouthPacific,Vanuatu.
48
SolomonMamaloniinTheFirst10yearsofSolomonIslands,editedbyCrocombe,R.andTuza,E.1992,
p.14.
26
with different ideologies. The concept of nationalism is not appreciated by the
people – rather, people have a greater sense of responsibility towards their own
kind or wantoks.49 Because of these marked differences Solomon Islanders rarely
identifythemselvesasbeingruledbyanyparticularrulinggovernment.Theirloyalty
lieswiththeirownrespectivetraditionalgovernancesystems.
A federal system of government would offer a more workable solution to the
governanceproblemsfacedinSolomonIslands.Underthefederalsystempoweris
divided between different levels of government. The federal government deals
matters relating to the nation as a whole and states deal with issues within their
jurisdiction.Thefederalgovernmentnormallyremainsintact,withmemberselected
from the states. The only powers that may remain with federal government may
include international relations and law and order. The states and the federal
parliamentoperateascoordinatedunitsinsteadofbeingsubordinatesofthefederal
parliament.
Two countries in the region that operate federal systems are Australia50 and the
FederatedStateofMicronesia(FSM).InAustralia,theCommonwealthParliamentis
the central government that makes laws for the whole country and looks after
mattersrelatingtocollectionoftaxes,internationalrelationships,andthesecurityof
thecountry.Eachstatealsohasitsownconstitution,parliamentandcourtsystem.
TheFSMalsooperatesasimilarsystemwiththeCongressoftheFederatedStatesof
Micronesia acting as the main law making body.51 The president of FSM is elected
from the four elected members from the four different states. Each state also has
49
Thetermwantokisareferencegivenbysomeonetowardsanotherpersonwhospeaksthesame
languageashe/sheis.Thetermalsovaries,dependingonthecontext;itcanalsorefertoafriendfrom
thesameislandorprovince.Whenoverseas,SolomonIslandersfromanypartofthecountryusedthe
termtorefertoeachother,anindicationthattheywerefromthesamecountry.
50
WiththerecognitionoftheQueenastheHeadofState,quiteoftenthesysteminAustraliaisreferred
toasaConstitutionalMonarchy;nevertheless,itisstillafederal.
51
ConstitutionoftheFederatedStateofMicronesia(FSM),1979.
27
electedmembersinthestatelegislatureandexecutivegovernments.Itisfromthese
neighbouring countries and others such as South Africa that Solomon Islands
modelleditsproposedfederalsystemofgovernment.
2.7 LevelofParticipationintheWestminstersysteminSolomonIslands
ThelevelofparticipationinSolomonIslandsundertheWestminsterUnitarysystem
of government is far from what was envisioned in the 1978 Independence
Constitution.Thereisahugegapbetweenthepromiseofpopularparticipationand
the reality of such participation. For instance, there are provisions in the
ConstitutionthatempowerParliamenttomakelawsfortheintegrationoftraditional
leadershipstructuresintotheformalgovernmentsystem.Thishasneverbeendone
atthenationallevelinSolomonIslands.Evenanattempttointegratethetraditional
chiefs and elders into the provincial assemblies was later criticised and was never
established.52
The current unitary system still resembles the colonial system of government, it is
justthepersonnelthatchangeshands.Inreality,SolomonIslandsremainedsubdued
by a colonial mentality from which they need to free themselves. According to
renowned Constitutional law commentator in the Pacific, Yash Ghai,53 the colonial
bureaucratic system had “… stifled people’s initiative, enthusiasm and induced a
sensedofdependencyonofficials.”54Thestructureofgovernmentadoptedthrough
theWestminstersystemhadinadvertentlyplacedpowerinthehandsofthepublic
serviceratherthanthepeoplewhomthepublicservicewassupposedtoserve.For
52
SeethecaseofGuadalcanalProvincialAssemblyvSpeakerofNationalParliament(26February1997)
Unreported,HighCourt,SolomonIslands,CivilCase309/1996.
53
HeisoneofthearchitectsoftheSolomonIslandsIndependenceConstitution,SeeGhai,Y.1980,“State,
lawandparticipatoryinstitutions:ThePapuaNewGuineaexperience.Paperdeliveredattheconference
LawintheDesignandAdministrationofStrategiesofAlternativeDevelopment,UniversityofWarwick,
p.36.
54
ibid.
28
example,thepermanentsecretariesanddepartmentheadsareresponsibleforthe
implementation of government policies, and often the implementation rest on the
discretionoftheseofficials.
TheWestminstersystemlacksthenecessaryingredientsforsuccessinparticipation
such as accessibility and ownership. At present, power is retained by the central
governmentinHoniara.Governmentservicesaredifficulttoaccessforthemajority
of Solomon Islanders in the rural areas. Solomon Islanders continue to argue that
decisionsshouldbemadebythepeopletowhomtheissuesatstakearemeaningful,
easily understood and relevant.55 They pointed out that the existing system of
government should therefore be restructured, and power should be decentralised,
so that the energies and aspirations of our people can play their full part in
promotingourcountry’sdevelopment.
A renowned researcher in provincial government systems in the Pacific, J. Crawly,
wrote in his “Bureaucratic response to provincial governments” paper delivered at
theUniversityofPapuaNewGuineain1982thatwiththecontinuingassertiveness
ofmanyprovincialgovernmentsandaweakeningofthecentralbureaucracy’sability
tocontrolthem,thecentre’sdominanceisdeclining.56Henotedthatwithtime,the
centralgovernment’scontroloverprovincialgovernmentswilldiminish,leavingthe
provincialgovernmentswithmorepowerstoruntheirownaffairs.
ThisisnotthecaseforSolomonIslands–witheachpassingyearthecontrolthatthe
central government has on the provinces gets tighter than before. It should be
remembered here that the provincial governments were established with great
55
SolomonIslandsGovernment,1987,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report–Volume3
“Recommendations,”SolomonIslands.
56
Crawly,J.1982,“TheBureaucraticresponsetoProvincialGovernment,”PaperdeliveredattheWaigani
Seminar,UniversityofPapuaNewGuinea,1982.
29
reluctanceandinsuchawayastoenhancecontrolfromthecentreandtolimitthe
powers of the provincial governments.57 This control continues to be exercised by
successive central governments in Solomon Islands by way of suspension of
provincial governments or removal of various provincial government bodies. For
example,inthepasttheHoniaraCityCouncilandtheRennellandBellonaProvincial
GovernmentweredissolvedbyorderoftheMinisterofProvincialGovernmentson
allegationsoffailuretoholdassemblymeetingsandmisappropriationofprovincial
funds.
Furtherstill,in1999theUlufa’aluGovernment(SIAC)suspendedtheareacouncils,a
part of the provincial government that was closer to the rural people.58 The
ProvincialGovernmentAct(1997)ofSolomonIslandsprovidesfortheestablishment
of a Provincial Assembly and Area Councils. The Provincial Assembly is made up of
electedmembersfromthedifferentwards.Theelectedmembersinturnelectthe
Premier.Ontheotherhand,theareacouncilswerethelowestlevelofgovernment
in the provincial government system of Solomon Islands.59 Area Councillors were
electedbywardvotersintotheareacouncils,andtheyinturnelectanareacouncil
presidentwhopresidesovertheareacouncil.TheAreaCouncilworkstogetherwith
the provincial government in dealing with issues of relevance to their respective
areas. The abolishment of the area councils meant that the national government’s
closest link to the rural communities has been terminated, leaving a majority of
SolomonIslandersfarfromparticipatingingovernmentpolicies.
2.7Conclusion
57
Ghai,Y.,1983,“ConstitutionalIssuesintransitiontoIndependence,”InR.CrocomberandA.Ali(eds),
ForeignForcesinPacificPolitics,InstituteofPacificStudies,UniversityoftheSouthPacific,p.28.
58
SeetheSolomonIslandsMagistrateCourtsBenchBook,TheConstitutionalandCourtFramework,2004.
59
SeeSection28(3)oftheProvincialGovernmentActof1997.
30
Thischapterprovidessometheoreticalexplanationofthekeyconceptsthisresearch
encountered.Itishopedthatwhenreadingtheremainingchaptersofthisresearch
onecouldusetheseconceptstoputtherestofthediscussionintocontext.
Decentralisationforthepurposesofthisresearchismainlyassociatedwithpower.It
refers to the power to make decisions at the lowest level of the government in
Solomon Islands. It is this power that is currently lacking. As a result, all other
aspects of governance fail to materialise. For instance, at the moment the power
restswiththecentralgovernmentinHoniara,andrarelygoesbeyondtheprovincial
headquarters. This has resulted in the concentration of development and key
governmentservicesinHoniaraandtheotherprovincialcentres.
Decentralisationisalsoassociatedwiththeconceptsofdeliberativedemocracyand
participation. Solomon Islanders want to be part of the government and are
preparedtoparticipateintheoperationsofthegovernment,includingcontributing
topoliciesandlawsmadebythegovernment.Afailuretoinvolvetheruralpeopleis
an indicator of a government unwilling to consult or take into consideration its
people’sviewsonissuesconsideredimportanttopeople.
This paper alleges that indicators of decentralisation and local participation are
missinginSolomonIslands.ItfurtherarguesthattheWestminstersystemhasfailed
to deliver to the people, creating a gap between the urban centres and the rural
areas.Thisgapisevidentinthelevelofdevelopmentthathastakenplaceinthese
respective areas in Solomon Islands. To balance this equation, Solomon Islanders
feelthatthereneedstobeanoverhaulofthecurrentsystem.
The next chapter looks at Solomon Islands and its constitutional reform issues. It
givesadescriptionofSolomonIslandsbeforelookingattheprocessofconstitution
31
makinginthecountry.Thechapterfurtherdiscussestheconstitutionalissuesfacing
SolomonIslandsbeforeandimmediatelyafterIndependence.
32
CHAPTER3:SOLOMONISLANDSANDITSCONSTITUTIONALREFORM
ISSUES
“FormanyThirdWorldCountriesindependenceisanoccasionmarkedbyunited,
nationwide,jubilation:thecolonialmasterisatlastevicted,andthepeoplenow
control their own political destiny. But, for the Solomon Islands, as much
uncertaintyasjoy,attendedtheindependencecelebrationson7thJuly1978.The
country’swesternprovince…boycottedtheofficialfestivies…whenattemptsto
raisethenationalflagledtoconfrontationsbetweenpeopleoftheprovinceand
migrantMalaitans.”(NewsDrum,21July1978)60
1. Introduction
SolomonIslandswasonthebrinkofanarchyintheyearsfollowingthe1998–2003
crisis.Thecountrywasrescuedfrombeingconsideredasatotallyfailedstatebythe
RegionalAssistanceMissiontoSolomonIslands(RAMSI),61anAustralianledmission
toSolomonIslands.Themission’saimwastorestorelawandorderinthecountry.
Thiswasachievedandthemissionisnowscaleddowntoadministrativeandtraining
duties,thoughthepresenceofmilitarypersonnelismaintainedinthecountry.
Theyearsfollowingtheseeventshavebeenconsideredasthetoughestyearsfaced
by the various governments that came into power and ordinary Solomon Islands
citizensalike.Inattemptingtopickitselfup,thecountryhasmadeattemptstore
assess the political and governance systems to determine possible causes of the
problem.Toreassessitselfsuccessfully,thecountryneedstotakeanotherlookat
theeventsleadinguptotheethnictension,particularlythedemandsforreformsin
thepoliticalandgovernmentsystem.
60
Premdas,R.,Steeves,J.,andLarmour,P.1984,“TheWesternBreakawayMovementintheSolomon
Islands,”SouthPacificForumWorkingPaper,Suva.p.1.
61
RAMSI–RegionalAssistanceMissiontoSolomonIslands.Participatingcountriesinclude,Australia,New
Zealand,PNG,Fiji,Vanuatu,Tonga,Samoa,Tuvalu,Nauru,Kiribati,NiueandTokelau.
33
ThereisacommonfeelingpresentamongstSolomonIslandersthatanewpolitical
structureisneededtobringlastingpeaceandunityandfurtherdevelopmenttothe
country.Thenewpoliticalstructureshouldgivemorepowertotheresourceowners
to take a greater share in decision making on the use of their resources. A draft
federal constitution needs to attempt to facilitate the aspirations of Solomon
Islanders. As such, the Government has taken a step in developing a Draft Federal
Constitutioninanticipationofsuchpoliticalchanges.
ThischapterhighlightstheconstitutionalreformissuesfacingSolomonIslands.Itwill
first provide a general geographical, socioeconomic and political description of
SolomonIslands.Secondly,thischapterlooksattheprocessofconstitutionmaking
inthecountry.Finally,thisisfollowedbyadiscussionoftheconstitutionalissuesthe
countryfacedbeforeandaftergainingindependencefromBritain.
34
3.2 SolomonIslands
Map3.1SolomonIslands,showingtheprovincialboundariesfromindependenceuntil1991.
Map3.2.ProvincesofSolomonIslandsafter1993
This map showed the 9 different provinces in Solomon Islands after 1993. This map is used as the proposed
boundariesofthedifferentstatesoncethefederalsystemofgovernmentisapprovedbyParliament
35
SolomonIslandscomprisesagroupofarchipelagicislandsstretchingover840miles
in the South Western Pacific. It has a land area of approximately 30,407 sq km
stretchedoveraseaareaof1,280,000squarekilometres.62Thesix(6)mainislands
withinthisarchipelagoareGuadalcanal,Malaita,NewGeorgia,Choiseul,Isabeland
Makira.63 The country shares borders with Papua New Guinea in the west and
Vanuatuintheeast.
The country is composed of diverse cultures, languages and customs. The people
speaksixty fivedifferentlanguagesand feelastrongdistinctiveallegiancetowards
their own clans, compared to the notion of a unified national loyalty in a state
system. It has a population of approximately 527,000 people made up of 94.5 per
cent Melanesians, 3 per cent Polynesians and 1.2 per cent Micronesians.64 Other
minority groups in the country include the Chinese, Europeans and other Pacific
Islanders.
The nation was formerly a British protectorate until it gained its independence in
1978. The system of government and legal system in Solomon Islands is virtually
introduced from abroad. It adopted the Westminster model of government
(constitutional monarchy) with the Queen as the head of state and the Prime
Ministerastheheadofthegovernment.TheNationalParliamenthas52members,
each representing the 52 constituencies and elected for a term of four years. The
electoralsystemis‘firstpastthepost’or‘simpleplurality’.Suffrageisavailabletoall
citizens who are 18 years old or above. The state power was manifested in three
areas, namely the legislature, judiciary and the executive. The country is further
separatedintoprovincesasenvisagedbytheConstitutionandprovidedforbyvirtue
62
Fraenkel,J.2003,“MinorityRightsinFijiandSolomonIslands:ReinforcingConstitutionalProtection,
EstablishingLandRightsandOvercomingPoverty,”USP.
63
SeeAppendixIIIforamapofSolomonIslands,courtesyofWorldAtlas.commaps.
64
SeeCIA–TheWorldFactBook:SolomonIslands,2010,url
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/solomon_islands/solomon_islands_people.html
36
of the 1981 Provincial Government Act. Seven provinces65 were initially created in
1981; with two additional provinces later pronounced in 1991 and 1992
respectively.66Theintentionincreatingtheseprovincesistoensurethatthecentral
governmentisrepresentedatthelocallevel.67
About85percentofthepopulationengagesinsubsistencefarming,obtainingfood
by gardening and fishing, and has little involvement in the cash economy.68
Approximately 10 to 15 percent of the working populations (i.e. those of 15 years
and over) are engaged in nonsubsistence production.69 Although exports,
particularly of unprocessed logs, have boomed, the number of wage earners has
remainedunchangedforthepastseveralyearsdespitethehighpopulationgrowth
rate.
High population growth rate and migration to urban centres continues to place
additional pressure on infrastructure and increase in demand for essential services
suchaswater,sanitation,housing,educationandhealthservices.70Theliteracyrate
in Solomon Islands is low and access to primary and secondary education is very
limited.71 The country also has one of the highest malaria infection rates in the
world.72
3.3 TheConstitutionMakingProcessinSolomonIslands
65
(1)Central,(2)Guadalcanal,(3)Isabel,(4)Makira/Ulawa,(5)Malaita,(6)Temotu,and(7)Western.
Choiseulin1992(separatedfromWesternProvince)andRennellandBellonain1991(separatedfrom
theCentralProvince).
67
Cox,J.andMorrison,J.2004,“SolomonIslandsProvincialGovernanceInformationPaper,”Reportto
AusAid,2004.
68
SeeCIA–TheWorldFactBook:SolomonIslands,2010;alsoseeUNICEFcountryinformation,2009
(www.unicef.org/infobycountry/solomonislands_statistics.html).
69
UNICEFcountryinformation,2009.
70
ibid.
71
ibid.
72
ibid.
66
37
A constitution is the basis for political and legal legitimacy.73 It represents the will
makingpowerofthepeopleandistheauthorityforthemsubjectingthemselvesto
certain political and legal institutions. This is regarded as the social contract; a
contractbetweenthegovernmentsorwhoeverisinpowerandthepeoplewhogave
thempowertorule.74Itcreatesasocialcontract,wherepeoplegrantpowertothe
governmenttogoverninreturnforbetterservices.
However,accordingtoPeterMacFarlane(2005),foraConstitutiontofulfilitsroleas
givinglegitimacytolawmakers,asaunifyingforceforitspeopleandasanagentfor
peace, certain conditions need to be met.75 This includes the inclusive and
participatory process of constitution making, which must align with the lives,
traditions and aspirations of the people. These are key factors that were often
missing from the constitutions that were drafted by the colonisers upon granting
independenceorselfcontroltoislandcountries.Someislandcountrieshavetaken
thenecessarymeasurestoreplacetheseremnantsoftheircoloniallegacywithmore
relevantandmeaningfulamendmentsorchanges;butthereareotherswhoarestill
intheprocessofoverhaulingthosecoloniallegacies.
ThecurrentConstitution(1978)ofSolomonIslandswasdesignedbylegaldraftsmen
hiredbythecolonialpowers.76Inotherwords,itdidnotcomeintoeffectasaresult
of any popular vote; but rather through an Act of Parliament by the British
Government.77Thisportraysthehallmarkofaweakconstitution,wherethewillof
73
MacFarlane,P.2005,“Interventions,ConstitutionsandPeace–SomeSouthPacificIslandExperience,
2005,”CommonwealthLawBulletin,Volume31,Number2,p.4.
74
ibid.
75
ibid.
76
YashGhaiwasoneofthetwolegaldraftsmenhiredtoworkontheSolomonIslandsIndependence
Constitution.
77
SolomonIslandsIndependenceActof1978.
38
the people was not considered important.78 There had been contentions that not
muchoftheConstitutionbearsthecontributionsofthegeneralpopulation,letalone
thefactthatthefinaldebateovertheConstitution,whichwasheldinLondon,does
not reflect any input from ordinary Solomon Islanders.79 This led to underlying
concernsandsuspicionsamongstSolomonIslandersaslittlerecognitionisgivento
any need to facilitate decentralisation of the government, its mechanisms and
powers.TheWesternProvinceshowedtheirdiscontentofthesystemofgovernment
adopted by the country by boycotting the independence celebrations. Most
Solomon Islanders align themselves with their provinces rather than with a single
stateestablishedbytheConstitution.Thisshowslackofsupportandunderstanding
ofthecontentoftheConstitution.
3.4 ConstitutionalIssuespriortoindependenceandafterindependence
Prior to independence national and provincial leaders raised a number of
constitutional issues as part of a determination towards the identification of a
political system for the new country. These include, inter alia, the method of
government to be adopted, the function of traditional authorities, and the
resentmenttowardsforeignerswhohad beenresettledintheSolomon Islandsby
theBritishColonialadministrationandgivenfreeholdtitletoland.80
Solomon Islanders had shown their dissatisfaction with the way the islands were
administered well before independence. The British, as the colonial administrator,
had always centralized all government administrative bodies and operations in the
78
Hassall,G.2008,“TheLegalPoliticsofConstitutionalReforminthePacific,”AustralasianLawReform
AgenciesConference,PortVila.
79
Kenilorea,P.2008,Tellitasitis,p.223.
80
PriortoIndependence,theBritishadministrationsettledalargenumberofGilbertesefromChristmas
IslandinlocationssuchasWaginainChoiseulProvinceandGizoandShortlandIslandsintheWestern
Province.
39
government headquarter in Honiara. This resulted in a lack of development and
distribution of services to the rural communities.81 Even after independence,
successivegovernmentsfailedtoaddresstheimportantsociopoliticalissuesfacing
the country; such as nationbuilding, land ownership, large scale resource
development, the distribution of development benefits, urban growth, urban
migrationandpooreconomicgrowth.82
In1975andtheyearsprecedingindependence,anumberofconsultativemeetings
werecarriedoutbygovernmentofficialsinthecountrytoidentifyasuitablepolitical
system for the country. National and district leaders made various submissions on
this issue to these government officials. Some districts were concerned about the
imminent loss of status in the economic sphere once a weak political system was
establishedinthenewcountry.83AsubmissionbytheWesternDistrictofSolomon
Islandsraisedthefearthatwithoutaformofgovernmentthatcouldcreateaunited
nationthroughtherespectthatpeoplehavetowardstheirregionaldifferences,the
effectsofthecurrentgovernmentstructures,powersandfunctionswouldoverrun
the numerically weaker regions by the numerically stronger nations.84 This call
reflectedthefearthatcertainregionshavetowardstheeverincreasingpresenceof
Malaitansinthedifferentregionsordistrict.Afederalsystemwouldprovideregions
control over issues of migration and resettlement within them.85 The people of
Guadalcanalraisedsimilarsentimentin1978,whenapetitionwasdeliveredtothe
government. Similar to the western demands, the Guadalcanal petition also
81
Scales,I.A.2005,“StateandLocalGovernanceinSolomonIslands:Buildingonexistingstrengths,”
PacificEconomicBulletin,AustralianNationalUniversity.
82
Tara,T.K.2002,“AweakstateandSolomonIslandsPeaceProcess,”PacificIslandsDevelopmentStories,
No.142002,East–WestCentre,Hawaii.
83
Premdas,R.Steeves,J.andLarmour,P.1984,“TheWesternBreakawayMovementintheSolomon
Islands,”SouthPacificForumWorkingPaper,Suva.p.5.
84
ibid.
85
ibid.
40
demanded that other migrant Solomon Islanders respect traditions and cultures of
thehostpeople.86
Furthermore, in its submission in 1975, the Western Council demanded that
whatever structure and principles of government was adopted should reflect the
differentcultures,ethnicdivergenceandthe wishesofthepeople.87Inadvertently,
thesystemofgovernmentvisualizedbySolomonIslanderswasnottheWestminster
centralizedgovernmentsystemestablishedbythe1978Constitution.Asindicatedin
thesubmissions,peopleoptedforthefederalsystemofgovernmentwhichtheysee
asprovidingthemmoreautonomy.
The colonial government’s failure to pay attention to the demand for a system of
governmentthatcouldenablemassparticipationfromthepeopleingovernmentled
totheformationoftheWesternBreakawayMovement.88TheMovementcameout
quitestronglyimmediatelybeforeindependencein1978.Oneoftheircorecallswas
ademandforafederalgovernmentsystemforthecountry.Themovementworked
closely with the Western Council and was of the view that the federal system of
government would be most appropriate for the country as it would cater for the
devolution of power and the equitable distribution of development benefits. The
demandsofthemovementinvolvedthecallforfullcontrolbythewesternSolomons
over its own finance, natural resources, internal migration, land, legislation and
administration.Governmentfailuretomeetthesedemandscouldresultinthenon
participationofthewesternSolomonsintheindependencecelebrations.89
86
Nanau,G.L.2002,“Unitingthefragments:SolomonIslandsconstitutionalreforms,”Development
Bulletin,Volume60,December;pp.17–20.
87
Premdas,R.,Steeves,J.,andLarmour,P.1984,“TheWesternBreakawayMovement,”p.5.
88
ibid.p.34.
89
ibid.p.14.
41
The central government’s response to the demands of the western Solomons and
the western movement, according to Ralph Premdas, took the form of limited
concessions and rational bargaining.90 A deal to include western leaders in the top
echelon of the government was agreed to, with the Deputy Prime Minister post
giventoBillyHillyandtheSpeakeroftheHousepostgiventoMaepezaGina,both
from the western Solomons.91 This defused the tension between the parties;
however,itdidnotaddressthedemandforafederalsystemofgovernmentforthe
country.
Immediately after the 1977 Constitutional Conference, a special committee known
astheKausimaeCommitteewasestablishedwiththeaimofestablishingaprovincial
government system suitable for the soon to be independent Solomon Islands. The
Committeeengagedinanextensivetourofthecountrytocollecttheviewsofthe
peopleonthetypeofprovincialgovernmentsystempeoplewanted.Thiscommittee
was commissioned with strict guidelines; to identify a simple, less expensive and
more easily operated system of government.92 In other words, the guidelines had
already limited the scope of the committee. Nevertheless, one of the key
recommendations of the committee was to adopt a quasifederal system of
government,backedbypopulardemandfromthepeopleforafederalsystem.
In 1987 a constitutional reform committee was appointed to reconsider the 1978
Constitution.93 This was the first systematic review of the constitution since it was
90
ibid.p.16.
ibid.p.18.AdditionalpostswerelaterallocatedtootherprominentwesternSolomonleaders.For
instance,in1978IsaacQoloniandMiltonSibisopereweregivenpoliticalappointmentstoappeasethe
disputewiththecentralgovernment.
92
Nanau,G.L.1997,“Decentralisation,DevelopmentandPopularParticipationintheSolomonIslands:A
StudyoftheProvincialGovernmentSystem,”p.66.
93
MembershiptothisCommitteeincludedformerPrimeMinistersPeterKenilorea,FrancisBillyHillyand
governmentofficialAndrewNori.SeeNaitoro,J.H.2000,“SolomonIslandsConflict:Demandsfor
historicalrectificationandrestorativejustice,”PacificEconomicBulletin,ANU,pp.1–14.
91
42
enactedin1978.94Theaimofthereviewwastorelookthesystemofgovernment
put in place after independence and the achievements it gathered in the previous
tenyears.Thereportwasoftheviewthatthe1978Constitution,whichwasenacted
byaforeignparliamentandembodyingforeignideas,wasnolongerappropriatefor
the country.95 It was of the view that the country’s political ideas must now pay
attentiontothelongterminterestofSolomonIslanders,includingreferencetothe
wisdomandauthorityofchiefs,culturaldiversity,indigenousownershipoflandand
natural resources, and the rightsof communities and clans as well as individuals.96
The report inter alia recommended a federal system of government, which was
perceivedastheidealformulaforthecountry’spoliticalstructure.Italsohighlighted
the need to control the movement and settlement of people throughout Solomon
Islands;bothrelatedtotheneedforafederal/statesystemofgovernment.Thecall
forafederalsystemofgovernmentduringthe1987consultationwassupportedby
the majority of provincial premiers;97 an indication of the peoples’ desire for a
changeinthesystemofgovernment.
The1987reportwasnotseriouslyconsideredbythegovernmentatthattimeand
washeavilycriticizedforbeingheavilydominatedbypoliticians’interesttoobtainor
maintainsupportfromtheprovincesseekingafederalsystemofgovernment.98One
prominent political figure heavily involved in the 1987 report was Solomon
94
SolomonIslandsGovernment,1987ConstitutionReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report,Honiara.Also
seethereportreviewbyLarmour,P.1989,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report
Review,”TheContemporaryPacific,Volume1,pp.203–205.
95
Larmour,P.1989,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)ReportReview,”TheContemporary
Pacific,Volume1,p.204.
96
ibid.
97
Nanau,G.L.2002,“Unitingthefragments:SolomonIslandsconstitutionalreforms,”Development
Bulletin,Volume60,December,pp.17–20.
98
Nanau,G.L.,2002,“Unitingthefragments,”p.19.AlsoseeTara,T.K.2001,“BeyondEthnicity:The
PoliticalEconomyoftheGuadalcanalCrisisinSolomonIslands,”p.16.andLarmour,P.1989,
“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)ReportReview,”TheContemporaryPacific,Volume1,
p.203.
43
Mamaloni, whose imprints were dominantly notable in recommendations.99 For
example, in many of his speeches he referred to Solomon Islands as a nation
conceived but never born, instead, he saw it as a nation of islands and individual
tribalunits.Andthefederalsystemofgovernmentpromoteshisideology.
In1988thepeopleofGuadalcanalagainbroughttheirdemandstotheattentionof
theGovernment.Thiswasinresponsetomultiplemurderscommittedbyagroupof
MalaitamenonGuadalcanal.TheGuadalcanalpeopledemonstratedandpresented
their list of demands to the government.100 One of the issues consistently raised
among their demands was the need for the establishment of a federal system of
governmentforthecountry.101Peoplefeltthatthereisaneedforprovincestobe
given powers to govern their own people and resources. With such power and
authority,eachprovincewouldbeinabetterpositiontorunitsaffairsandcontrol
thewaveofinternalmigrationthatissweepingpeopletowardsGuadalcanal.
Approximately ten years after the 1987 Mamaloni report and the Guadalcanal
demandsweresubmitted,theGuadalcanalpeople’sdemandsresurfaced.Thistime
theyouthsweremorepersistentanddeterminedtoseethegovernmentrespondto
their demands, including the call for the federal system of government.102 They
started using guns and machetes to evict people from other islands from areas
around Guadalcanal.103 By 2000, the number of people, mostly Malaitans, evicted
from Guadalcanal had risen beyond the 20,000 people mark.104 The Malaitans
99
Scales,I.A.2005,“StateandLocalGovernanceinSolomonIslands:Buildingonexistingstrengths,”
PacificEconomicBulletin,AustralianNationalUniversity,pp.140–148.
100
Tara,T.K.2002,“AweakstateandSolomonIslandsPeaceProcess,”PacificIslandsDevelopment
Stories,Number14,EastWestCentre,Hawaii.
101
Tara,T.K.2001,“BeyondEthnicity”,p.16;Nanau,G.L.2002,Unitingthefragments,p1720;Tuhanuku,J.
2000,SolomonIslands–onthecrossroadandinneedofthewisdomofKingSolomon,Paperpresented
atthePacificUpdatesonSolomonIslands,FijiandVanuatu,ANU.
102
Tuhanuku,J.2000,SolomonIslands,ANU.
103
Tara,T.K.2002,“AweakstateandSolomonIslandsPeaceProcess,”p.2.
104
Nanau,G.L.2002,“Unitingthefragments,”pp.17–20.
44
respondedinkindbycreatingaforcetocountertheGuadalcanalmilitant’sadvance
towardsHoniaracity.
Theoutcomeoftheseeventsthrewthecountryintoadisarrayaskeygovernment
institutionssuchasthepolicewerecompromised,leadingtoaperiodoflawlessness
andbrutalityasthegovernmentstruggledtoregaincontroloverthecountry.The
events also led to the closure of key industries such as the Solomon Islands
PlantationLimited,GoldRidgeMining,SolomonTaiyoandothersmallerbusinesses.
The task of bringing normality back to the country was further made difficult as
rogue government officials and police officers took advantage of the situation for
theirownselfishgains.Forexample,in2001hugeamountsofmoneywerepaidout
to those who lost their properties during the crisis, and high on the list was
government officials, including Members of Parliament.105 Similarly, police officers
oftenharassedfinanceofficialsoverallowanceswithoutbeingprosecuted.
3.5Conclusion
According to this chapter the underlying reality is that the Westminster system of
governmentdoesnotmeettheexpectationsofSolomonIslanders.Themajorityof
Solomon Islanders in the rural areas are finding themselves further away from the
government and its services.106 Solomon Islands sociopolitical complexities had
undermined the current system of government from the day the country attained
independence.
105
Foukona,J.2001,“StatePowersandInstitutionsinSolomonIslands’developingdemocracy,”Victoria
UniversityofWellington,NZ,pp.13–14.
106
Tuhaika,J.2005,“PoliticalandHistoricalIssuesthatinfluenceconstitutionalmakinginSolomon
Islands,”PaperdeliveredattheConstitutionalRenewalConference,PortVila.
45
Sir Baddeley Devesi reiterated the plain truth that Solomon Islands had adopted a
Britishsystemthatdoesnotfititscontext.107Ithastakenamajorconflict108forthe
countrytorealizetheneedforconstitutionalreform,thusplacingSolomonIslandsin
Hassall’s category of engaging in constitutional reform as a result of postconflict
peacebuilding.109ThischaptershowedthatthoughSolomonIslandsmayprideitself
on its unity and diversity; the plain truth is that the different ethnic groups are as
suspiciousofeachotherastheywerebeforethearrivalofEuropeans.Inthewords
of Solomon Mamaloni, a former Prime Minister, Solomon Islands “was a nation
conceivedbutneverborn.”110Inotherwords,whathemeantwasthattherewasa
lackofpatriotismornationalconsciousnessbySolomonIslanderstowardsthestate
or nation. People aligned themselves with their own traditional affinities or island
groupings.
The continuous call for the federal system of government as highlighted in this
chapter showed Solomon Islanders’ understanding of the problems facing the
country.ItisclearthatSolomonIslandsisacountryofmanypeoplewithdifferent
culturalgroupings.Whattheleadersofthecountrylackedwasthevisiontoturnthis
countryofmanydifferentpeopleintoanationwherethewishesandaspirationsof
people are recognized in how they want the country to be governed. As Edward
Wolfers (1982) has identified, decentralization is regarded as a tool for bringing
107
Speaking before the Bills and Legislative Committee in September 2009, “Sir Baddely Devesi: SI not
usedtoBritishsystem.”SolomonStarNews,September2009.
108
1998–2003crisis.Itshouldnotedthatsometimesthesepaperwillrefertothiscrisisperiodas1998–
2000or2000–2003.The1998–2000periodmarkedtheeventsthattookplacepriortotheTownsville
PeaceAgreement(TPA),the2000–2003periodmarkedtheeventsthattookplaceaftertheTPA.
However,theoverallperiodofthecrisisshould1998–2003.
109
Hassall,G.2008,“TheLegalPoliticsofConstitutionalReforminthePacific,”AustralasianLawReform
AgenciesConference,PortVila.
110
QuotedinTara,T.K.2002,“AweakstateandSolomonIslandsPeaceProcess,”PacificIslands
DevelopmentStories,Number14,EastWestCentre,Hawaii.
46
governmentclosertothepeople.111ThisremainsthewishofallSolomonIslanders;
tobringthegovernmentanddevelopmentclosertothem.
ThenextchapterlooksattheTownsvillePeaceAgreementof2000.Itistheviewof
thispaperthattheAgreementisthecatalystforthechangeinapproachtowardsthe
issueofconstitutionalreforminSolomonIslands.
111
Wolfers,E.P.1982,“AspectsofPoliticalCultureandInstitutionBuildinginMelanesia:Constitutional
PlanninginPapuaNewGuineaandtheSpecialCommitteeonProvincialGovernmentSolomonIslands,”In
thePoliticsofevolvingculturesinthePacificIslands,InstituteofPolynesianStudies,BrighamYoung
University,pp.280–303.
47
CHAPTER4:THETOWNSVILLEPEACEAGREEMENT
4.1Introduction
TheTownsvillePeaceAgreementwassignedbytheGovernmentofSolomonIslands
and the two warring factions, Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) and the Isatabu Freedom
Movement(IFM),tobringanendtofightingandhostilitiesinthecountry.Solomon
Islands had experienced the worst conflict between two island rival groups over a
numberofissues,includinglandownershipandrespecttothehostisland’scustoms.
Anumberofagreementshadbeensignedintheprevioustwoyearstoputanendto
hostilities,butmostfailedasfightingcontinuedbetweentheparties.112
InearlyOctober,2000,theAustralianGovernmentofferedtoassisttheGovernment
ofSolomonIslandstogetthepartiestonegotiateanagreementtostopthefighting.
About 130 delegates (MEF, IFM and Government) were airlifted by Australian
military aircraft to the Air force base in Townsville. Talks formally began on 10th
Octoberandweremeanttolastforfourdays.113However,talksstalledandafurther
two days were required before all parties reached an agreement. The agreement
signed on the 15th of October 2000 became known as the Townsville Peace
Agreement(TPA).
ThischapterlooksattheTownsvilleAgreement.Itistheviewofthispaperthatthe
TPAreignitesthegovernment’scommitmenttotheconstitutionalreformprocessin
thecountry.ThischapterwillfirstlookatthespecifictermsoftheTPAthatareof
interesttothisresearch.Secondly,thischapterwilldiscussthecallforconstitutional
112
Forexample,agreementssuchas(a)TheHoniaraPeaceAccorddated28June,1999,(b)ThePanatina
Agreement12thAugust1999,(c)TheMarauCommuniquédated15thJuly,1999,(d)Memorandumof
UnderstandingbetweenSIGandGuadalcanalProvincialGovernment,13thJune1999,(e)BualaPeace
Communiqué5thMay2000,and(f)AukiCommuniqué12thMay2000.
113
Byrne,P.2000,“SolomonIslandsPeaceAgreemententrenchesdivisions,”WorldSocialistwebsite.
48
reformashighlightedintheTPA.Thirdly,thisresearchwilldiscusstheimplications
of the TPA for Solomon Islands in terms of constitutional reform. Finally, the
researchpaperwilllookattheaftermathoftheTPAintermsoftheimmediatesteps
takenbytheresponsibleauthoritiestoimplementthespecifictermsoftheTPAwith
regardtoconstitutionalreforms.
4.2TermsoftheTownsvillePeaceAgreement
The Agreement has nine sections. Part one identifies preliminary issues, which
include the scope and mandate of the representatives. The agreement applies to
both the Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces and future national governments.
Likewise, the agreement recognizes persons acting in their capacities as
representatives of the parties as having full representational mandate by their
respective organizations to act as leaders. This is important to the agreement, to
ensuremembersoftheserespectivegroupsrespectthetermsoftheagreement.
Part two looks at national claims and war claims. It provides for the protection of
members of the Disciplined Forces involved with the militant groups from losing
their jobs in the force. This part also touches on other important issues such as
amnesty, rehabilitation and demilitarization of members of the armed factions. It
alsoendorsesthefreemovementofpeoplethroughoutthecountry.Thispartofthe
agreementisvitaltothesuccessfulsigningbythefactionsbecauseitprovidedthem
withsomesenseofsecurityfrombeingprosecutedordismissedfromtheirjobs.
Part three requires members of the warring parties to identify and recover the
bodiesofpersonskilledorconsideredmissingduringthecourseofthefighting.This
is important in the restoration of law and order and a beginning to reconciliatory
measures between the relatives of the victims and those involved with the armed
49
groups. This part also places responsibility on the government to provide for
employmentofthosewholostjobsorcompensationforpropertylostasaresultof
thefighting.Presumably,theaimofthisprovisionistoensurethatthosewhowere
directlyaffectedbythecrisiscanrestarttheirlives.
Part four promises constitutional reform and economic, social and infrastructural
assistancetoMalaitaandGuadalcanalprovinces.Underthispart,thegovernment
pledges to carry out developments in areas identified for the provinces by the
parties.Thepurportedaimofthesedevelopmentsistorehabilitatethepeoplefrom
these two provinces to their respective homes so that similar conflicts can be
avoided. The important provision of this part is the demand for constitutional
reforms. This was theultimate goal of the Guadalcanal people and it is recognized
hereasanimportantpartoftheagreement.
Part five provides for reconciliation between parties and the establishment of a
peace and reconciliation committee with the mandate to oversee reconciliation in
the country. Part six provides for the establishment and roles of the peace
monitoringcouncilinthecountry.
Part seven identifies the government of Solomon Islands as the sole guarantor or
authority to shoulder the expenses incurred by the parties in implementing the
agreement. This is a task the government must undertake to ensure the warring
partiesrespectandupholdtheirpromises.Itcovers,forinstance,expensesincurred
duringthereturningofarmsbythewarringfactionmemberstotheirleaders.
Part eight is a general declaration by all parties to give up fighting and to restore
peaceandharmonytothecountry.Thefinalpartrecognizesthepresenceofother
issuesthatneedtobedealtwithseparately,forexample,theissueoftheMalaita
50
speakingpeoplewhohadsettledonGuadalcanalandhadcalledithomeforyears.114
Similarly,itreiteratesthepresenceofpast peacesettlements115and theirroleand
validityintryingtorestorepeacetothecountry.
4.3Callforconstitutionalreform
Under the Townsville Peace Agreement, Section 1 (a) of Part 4 states that Malaita
and Guadalcanal Provinces shall be given more autonomy by devolution or by
constitutionalamendmenttoeffectselfgoverningstatus.Thisistoallowthepeople
of Malaita and Guadalcanal to look after their own affairs and to provide for the
needsoftheirgrowingpopulation.Part4(1)oftheAgreementfurtherprovidesfor
the establishment of a Constitutional Council with authority to ‘rewrite’ the
Constitutionandgivemoreautonomytothem.Thispartrecognisestheimportance
of decentralisation and development and the need for these two provinces to
determinetheirowndevelopmentandpoliticaldestiny.Itaimstorectifythespecific
problems that were identified in the preamble to the Constitution of Solomon
Islands.116Itisthroughmeasuressuchasthesethatalastingpeacecanbeachieved.
Furthermore,acloserlookatPart4oftheAgreementwillshowthefinerlinesofthe
unwritten nature of the terms in this part. It can be seen here that this section of
Part 4 has all the imprints of the Guadalcanal representatives.117 The call for more
autonomy for the provinces had been the wish of the Guadalcanal people since
114
OnepressingissuethatwasagreedforseparatehandlingwastheissueinvolvingtheMarauEagle
Force,anarmoftheMalaitaEagleForceformedbyMalaitansettlerswhomigratedtotheEasternpartof
Guadalcanalandhadsettledthereforgenerations.
115
SuchastheHoniaraPeaceAccord(1999),MarauCommunique(1999),PanatinaAgreement(1999),
AukiCommunique(2000),andtheBualaPeaceCommunique(2000).
116
“ANDWHEREASthepartiesaftercontinuednegotiationsintheirsearchforandthedesiretofindthe
mostappropriatesolutionforlastingpeaceinSolomonIslands...”
117
BoththeGuadalcanalProvinceandtheIsatabuFreedomMovement.
51
independence,whereas,theMalaitanpeoplechosetoremainsilentonthisissue.118
However,ifoneistolookfurtherdownPart4,onecanseethatthispartisclearly
demarcatedintermsofthedemandsofthetwowarringparties.Twoissuesinthis
partwerepurportedlyinfavouroftheGuadalcanalparty(PoliticalIssuesandLand
and Property Claims) whereas the Malaitan party settled for the financial benefits
with arrangements for the National Provident Fund (NPF) to set up a separate
superannuation fund for Malaitans. The final section of Part 4 is on social issues,
withbothMalaitaandGuadalcanalprovincesbeingpromisedvariousinfrastructure
projects. This illustrates the nature of the Agreement as the final outcome is
determinedbytheparties.Italsoillustratedthecombinedeffortsofthepartiesto
accommodateeachotherandtheirclaimstoachievealastingsolutiontothearmed
conflictinthecountry.
Though Malaitans may not be keen on federalism, the call for autonomy and
developmentprovidethemthebestopportunitytopursueeconomicdevelopment
on their island. Thus, the call for constitutional reform is may be considered as a
blessingindisguisetotheisland,toseeacommitmenttowardsdevelopmentonthe
islandbythecentralgovernmentandotherstakeholders.
4.4ImplicationsoftheTownsvillePeaceAgreement
TheTownsvillePeaceAgreementmarkedaveryimportantchapterinthehistoryof
Solomon Islands. To Solomon Islanders, the TPA represents peace – an occasion in
history where the warring parties had decided to put their differences aside for a
shotatlastingpeaceforthecountry.TheMEFspokesman,AndrewNori,declared
118
Despiteshowingsupportfordecentralisationandtheneedforafederalsystemofgovernmentinpast
constitutionalreviewsandprovincialgovernmentsurveys,thepeopleofMalaitahadalwaysmaintained
thepassivestandontheissueofstategovernment.Forexample,inAugust2000thePremierofMalaita
ProvincedeclaredMalaita’scommittaltoremainpartofaunitedSolomonIslands.SeeFugui,J.M.2001,
“SolomonIslands,”TheContemporaryPacific,Volume13,Part2,p.553.
52
during the signing of the TPA that the ‘war on Guadalcanal was over’.119 This has
gone a long way to mean that there will be no more fighting between the parties.
ThesigningoftheTPAwasmetwithjoyouscelebrationsonthestreetsofHoniaraas
formercombatantscelebratedhandinhandforthreedays.
TheTPAalsorepresentsaveryimportantundertakingbytheGovernmenttoensure
itplaysitspartinimplementingtheAgreement.Theconstitutionalreformsremaina
major undertaking by Government as it progresses in an area described as best
avoided by previous governments. Past experiences had shown that attempts to
bringaboutconstitutionalchange eitherfailed120orwereopposed bystakeholders
infavourofcheaperandlessexpensivealternatives.Orfurtherstill,reformfindings
wereshelvedandneverconsideredbypreviousgovernments.121
Ontheotherhand,itcanbearguedthattheTPAmarkedtheendtoSolomonIslands
asaunitedcountry.Itcreateddisharmonyasonlytwopartiesorprovincesbenefited
while the rest of the provinces in Solomon Islands gained nothing out of the
Agreement.Thiswasevidentinthecallforautonomyorindependencebyprovinces
afterthesigningoftheAgreement.PriortotheAgreementtherewasminimalora
passive call for autonomy, and mainly from the only two key provinces of
Guadalcanal and Western. However, the Agreement ignited the desire by other
provincestoseekautonomyfromthecentralgovernmentastheyfeltneglectedby
the government’s commitment to the Agreement.122 For instance, the Western
Province and Choiseul Provinces declared themselves separate states;123 Makira
119
Fugui,J.M.2001,“SolomonIslands,”p.552.
Forexample,theproposechangestotheProvincialGovernmentsystemin1996.
121
Forexample,thefindingsoftheConstitutionalReviewCommittee(MamaloniReport)in1987were
neverconsideredbyanypreviousSolomonIslandsgovernments.
122
SeeMoore,C.2004,HappyIslesinCrisis:ThehistoricalcausesforafailingstateinSolomonIslands,
1998–2004,AsiaPacificPress,p.147.
123
SolomonStar,24August2000.
120
53
Province also indicated their interest in becoming a separate state;124 and Temotu
andRennellandBellonaProvincesoptedforseparateindependentstates.Allthese
were seen as responses by these provinces to the TPA and the orientation of its
termstowardsMalaitaandGuadalcanalProvinces.
AccordingtoFredFono125theopposition’sperspectivewasthattheAgreementwas
a catalyst for division in the country as the government spends resources and
finance on it, neglecting the other seven provinces and their immediate need for
development.126TheNationalCouncilofWomen(NCW)condemnedtheAgreement
becauseitdidnotpromotenationalunity.127Itwasregardedasthecatalystforthe
disintegrationofSolomonIslands.
4.5 The Aftermath of the TPA: Immediate steps towards a Draft Federal
Constitution
Immediately after the signing of the TPA, a provincial premiers’ conference was
organizedbytheGovernmentforalltheProvincialPremiers.Theaimofthemeeting
wastogetthepremierstogethertodiscussissuesofconcerntothemafterthecrisis.
ThevenuewasBuala,IsabelProvince’sheadquarters.Theconferencewaslaudedas
a milestone for relationships between the provinces. For instance, the premiers of
Malaita and Guadalcanal provinces used the event to seek reconciliation and
forgiveness from other provincial heads for the involvement of their people in the
crises. The Premier of Malaita Province, David Oeta, apologized to all Solomon
Islanders for the wrongs committed against them by the people of Malaita.
124
SolomonStar,6July2000.
MPforCentralKwara’ae(MalaitaProvince)andamemberoftheoppositionpartyduring,andafterthe
TPAAgreement.
126
Fono,F.2001,“SolomonIslandsCurrentIssuesandPolitics,”TranscriptofSSGMSeminar,ANU.
127
RadioNewZealand,“CouncilofWomensaysMalaitanAutonomybillisacoverupforPeace
Agreementfailure”,16thSeptember2002.
125
54
AccordingtoGordonNanau,alltheprovincialleadersacknowledgedthattheevents
of 2000 marked the darkest hours of the country’s history.128 It was the first time
twoethnicgroupshadusedfirearmstofighteachother,resultinginlossoflivesand
greatdestructiontotheinfrastructureandindustries.
TheBualaPremiersConferenceagreedonthreekeyresolutions;
(1) That Solomon Islands Government adopt a homegrown state system of
government whereby each respective province should become a state
withitsownstateconstitution.
(2) That the Solomon Islands Government take to Parliament at the earliest
opportunitythedesireoftheProvincialGovernmentstoamendsections
114 and other relevant sections of the Constitution to give effect to
resolutionnumber1.
(3) ThattheSolomonIslandsGovernmenttakenoteofthedesiresofTemotu,
Makira/UlawaandRennell&Bellonaprovinces.129
The Buala Conference was followed by the appointment of a team to revisit the
recommendations of the Constitutional Reform Committee report of 1987.
According to Nanau, the task force completed its task and Cabinet approved the
report in June 2001.130 This report formed the backbone of the draft federal
constitution.
In practice, the government had adopted resolution two with the proposed
state/federal system. At the moment the government is still preoccupied with
resolutiontwo.Itwasenvisionedthatoncethefinaldraftofthefederalconstitution
isreadyParliamentwillinvokesection114oftheConstitution(1978)tobringabout
128
Nanau,G.L.2002,“Unitingthefragments:SolomonIslandsconstitutionalreforms,”p.19.
AllresolutionsadoptedfromNanau’s“Unitingthefragments,”p.19.
130
ibid.
129
55
the necessary changes. Resolution three of the Buala Conference remained
untouchedbythegovernmentatthemoment.
4.6Conclusion
ThischapterelevatestheTownsvillePeaceAgreementasthekeydocumentthatre
ignites the national interest in constitutional reform. It sets the platform for a
renewed interest by the government and stakeholders to explore again the
possibilitiesofchangingthesystemofgovernanceinSolomonIslands.Arguably,the
demand for the federalism system of government under the auspices of more
devolutionofpowersisengineeredbytheGuadalcanalparty.Thiswasoneoftheir
core demands prior to the crisis and it is fitting that it is recognized in the
Agreement.
Thischapterfurthershowsthequickresponsetakenbythegovernmenttoexplore
thissectionoftheAgreementasvitaltokeepingthemomentum.Itensuresthatthe
government was seen as keeping its part of the bargain. This is also vital as the
national security of the country hinges on the government’s commitment to the
Agreement as well. The success of the Agreement was twofold: 1) it stopped all
fightingbetweenthewarringfactions;2)assuredthetwoprovincesofdevelopment;
and 3) it gave renewed optimism to the government and Solomon Islanders to
explorethefederalsystemofgovernment.
On the other hand, we should not get carried away with the Townsville Peace
Agreement.ItmustberememberedwhilelookingatitthattheAgreementismade
between two warring parties and the government. The paramount interest at that
time was to restore peace and return law and order to the country. As such, the
termsoftheagreementarenormallycoinedaccordingtothewishesoftheparties,
56
andthegovernmentasapartyisobligedtomeettheirdemandstoattainpeace.For
instance, the exorbitant demands of the two parties for socioeconomic
developmentsandinfrastructurearerealisticallyunachievable.131Yetbecauseofits
commitmenttopeacethegovernmentagreedtotheseterms.
The former National Peace Council Chairman, Paul Tovua, rightly pointed out
that…“all these were written without thinking about the finance and without
conductingprioreconomicassessments.”132Thisleavesuswiththequestionofhow
muchoftheAgreementwaswrittenwithoutthinking.Thisisaninterestingquestion;
onethatcanonlybeansweredbyassumptionsfromthetermsoftheagreementand
their practicality in terms of implementation. For now, this research maintains its
position that the Agreement remains a key factor in the renewed appreciation for
thecurrentconstitutionalreformprocess.
The next chapter discusses the draft federal constitution, particularly the process
takenindraftingit.ItlooksattheBualaPremiersMeetingandtheoptionsavailable
to Solomon Islands to bring about political change. The chapter also describes the
drafting of the draft federal constitution and highlights the roles that key
stakeholders played in the process. The chapter concludes by outlining the
implicationsofthedraftfederalconstitutionforSolomonIslands.
131
132
TownsvillePeaceAgreement,2000.
Yoldi,O.“SolomonIslandsandthefailingofanation,”STARTTSwebpage,2007.
57
CHAPTER5:THEDRAFTFEDERALCONSTITUTION
“[d]emandsforstategovernmentaremattersthattouchonournationalconstitution
and cannot be pressed for by one or two provinces. The Constitution belongs to the
wholecountry,notjustafewprovincesandtheirleaders.Ifachangeisrequiredtothe
Constitutionithastocomebywayofveryclearmandatefromthepopulaceeitherby
wayofarevieworreferendum.”133
AndrewNoricommentingontheGuadalcanalDemandsof1988
5.1Introduction
TheTownsvillePeaceAgreementactedasacatalysttothestategovernmentprocess
inthesensethatitcreatedinthecentralgovernmentanobligationandasenseof
responsibility that was not present in previous agreements or reports. In showing
the Government’s commitment to the Agreement, the Premiers’ Meeting was
convened a month later. In a ‘secret’ memorandum to cabinet the Minister of
Provincial Government and Rural Development,134 requested that approval be
granted to use the Premiers Meeting to consider the introduction of the
state/FederalGovernmentSystem.135TheobjectivesoftheBualaPremiersMeeting
were:i)toprovideanopportunityforPremierstoexpresstheiropinionsopenly,and
ii) to ensure that the aspirations and desires are realistically accommodated in a
constructive and cooperative manner. The inclusion of the ‘federal government
system’ as an agenda in the meeting is both a strategic and shrewd move. It
alleviated the difference that existed between other provinces and Malaita and
133
Nori,A.2003,“StateGovernment:Throwingourpeopletothedevil,”SolomonIslandsBroadcasting
Corporation(SIBC),SolomonIslands.
134
TheMinisterforProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopmentatthattimewasNathanielWaena,MP
forUlawa/UgiConstituency.
135
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“StateGovernmentTaskForce2000:
CabinetandotherRelevantDocuments,”JointCaucusoftheN.U.R.PGovernment,28November2000.
58
GuadalcanalasanaftermathoftheTPA,136andalsoitseizedtheopportunitytosee
wheretheseprovincialleadersstandontheissueoffederalismforSolomonIslands.
The Buala Premiers’ Meeting concluded with three resolutions: 1) that a ‘home
grown’ state system be adopted; 2) that government amend section 114 of the
Constitution137 as soon as possible to give effect to resolution (1); and 3) that
provinces with the expressed desires to secede138 from Solomon Islands pursued
their cases individually with the national government. The outcome of the Buala
Premiers Meeting was approved by Cabinet on 28 December 2000 and a Reform
TaskforcewassetupbythePrimeMinister139withtheinstructionstostudythe1987
CRCReportandRecommendationscarefullyasabasistodevelopamodelforaState
governmentsystem.140TheTaskforcehelditsfirstmeetingon9February2001and
was expected to complete its task no later than 31 May 2001.141The Task Force
completeditreporton29May2001andwassubmittedbytheMinisterofProvincial
GovernmentandRuralDevelopmenttotheCabineton7June2001.TheTaskForce
identified the federal system and further produced proposed drafting instructions
fortheintendedDFC.142
136
Mostoftheotherprovinces(besidesGuadalcanalandMalaitaprovinces)feltignoredbythe
governmentasaresultoftheTownsvillePeaceAgreement.
137
ConstitutionofSolomonIslandsSection114:(1)NotwithstandinganythingcontainedintheSolomon
IslandsIndependenceOrder1978SolomonIslandsshallbedividedintoHoniaraCityandprovinces.
(2)Parliamentshallbylaw
(a)prescribethenumberofprovinces,andtheboundaryofHoniaraCityandthe
provincesafterconsideringtheadviceoftheConstituencyBoundariesCommission;
(b)makeprovisionforthegovernmentofHoniaracityandtheprovincesandconsider
theroleoftraditionalchiefsintheprovinces.
138
Temotu,Makira/UlawaandRennell/BellonaprovinceshadexpressedadesiretosecedefromSolomon
Islandsandbecomeindependentnations.
139
ManassehSogavare,seeDepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,
“MemorandumbytheHonourablePrimeMinistertoCabinet,”CAB[2000]102,18December2000.
140
Waena,Hon.N.,“MembershipAppointmentInstrument,”14thFebruary2001.
141
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“MemorandumbytheMinisterfor
ProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopmenttoCabinet,”21stFebruary2001.
142
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“SolomonIslandsStateGovernment
BudgetProjectProfile,”July2001.
59
In2002,theincomingAllanKemakezaGovernmentadoptedtheSGTFReportasthe
basis for the creation of the federal government system in Solomon Islands.143 A
ConstitutionalReviewCommitteewasestablished,andwiththeassistanceofUNDP,
undertookanassessmentoftheconstitutionalreformprocess.144Asocioeconomic
assessmentwasalsoconducted,includingtwoconsultationsconductednationwide
to identify the possible implications of the decentralisation under a new federal
systemofgovernment.145Basedontheseconsultations,adraftFederalConstitution
wasdraftedandformallylaunchedinNovember2004.TheDraftwassupposedto
be distributed for further consultation before it could be submitted as a bill in
Parliament.Inlaunchingthedraft,thePrimeMinisteratthattime,AllanKemakeza,
proclaimedthatthedraftwasaresultofextendedconsultationscarriedout‘bothin
theProvincesandHoniara.’146Thisisareflectionofthegeneralinputthepeoplehad
ontheDFC.
Furtherconsultationswerecarriedoutin2005withprovincialleadersoveraprocess
tocompleteafinalconstitutionaldrafttext.147Thisledtothepublicationofawhite
papersettingoutthe government’sreasoningforconductingconstitutionalreform
and the process needed to complete a final draft text of a new Constitution. The
whitepaperfurtherreiteratedthegovernment’saimofinvestingresponsibilityover
thecompletionofthe constitutionalreforminthe publicandruralcommunitiesin
Solomon Islands.148 Impliedly, this acknowledged the need for the creation of a
homegrownconstitution.
5.2Availableoptionstobringaboutpoliticalchange
143
Schindnowski,D.2004,“ThecapitalcostsofimplementationofstatehoodinSolomonIslands–
Builidnganadditionalinfrastructure,”November2004.
144
ibid.
145
ConstitutionalReformUnit,“SolomonIslandsConstitutionalReformProjectReport,”26thMarch2008.
146
ibid.
147
ibid.p.3.
148
ibid.
60
Inplanningtobringaboutsuchmajorchangetothegovernmentsystem,theSGTF
was faced with a very difficult question. The question is how to bring about such
change within the existing political structure of governance. Section 114 of the
Constitution gave Parliament the power to make laws that would allow
decentralisation, or give provincial governments more power or political control
overtheiraffairs.149Indefenceoftheprovincialgovernmentsystem,someleaders150
arguedthatsection114oftheConstitutionhasnotbeenexhaustedbythecurrent
government. The Government should first utilize section 114 before looking for an
alternativesystem.
However, evidence had shown that attempts to utilize section 114 of the
Constitution in the past had failed. In 1996 Parliament passed the Provincial
GovernmentActof1996torepealthe1981ProvincialGovernmentAct.The1996Act
proposedchangestotheexistingprovincialsetupwiththeestablishmenttenArea
Assemblies within each province. These area assemblies were to be constituted
equally by elected members and appointed chiefs and elders. Furthermore, each
provincewouldhaveaProvincialCouncil,insteadoftheexistingProvincialAssembly.
This Council was to be constituted by the Chairs of all the Area Assemblies in the
province.Therationaleforthischangeintheprovincialstructurewastodecentralize
the government’s power base so that it reaches the grassroot people. The key
changeinthe1996Actwasthecreationofareaassemblieswherechiefsandelders
canbemembers.Theaimwastoinvolvetraditionalleadersingovernmentdecision
making.
149
150
Seefn.137onsection114oftheConstitution.
LeaderssuchasAndrewNoriandthePremierofMalaitaProvinceRichardNaamoIrosaea.
61
The 1996 Provincial Government Act was strongly opposed by a number of
provinces.151 As a result, a court proceeding was filed against the Speaker of
Parliament by the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly, challenging the Act.152 It was
arguedbyGuadalcanalProvincethattheproposedprovincialgovernmentstructure
wasunconstitutionalbecauseitenabledhalfoftheareaassemblytobeoccupiedby
chiefsandelders.InSolomonIslandssocieties,chiefsandelderswerepredominately
male.Thisisagainstthehumanrightsnotionofequalrepresentationasenshrinedin
the Constitution, thus the High Court ruled in favour of Guadalcanal Provincial
Assembly.153
The High Court decision was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeal on the
groundthatParliamentwasentitledtomakelawsforthecountryeveniftheselaws
were deemed unconstitutional.154 Ironically, Parliament, swayed by the opposition
to the 1996 Act, repealed it and reenacted the 1981 Act as the Provincial
GovernmentAct,1997.Sincethennoattempthasbeenmadetorevisittheissueof
decentralization through the provincial government setup. A possible reason for
suchinactivityinthisareaeversincecouldbetherestrictionsthattheConstitution
may have on any possible change that Parliament may want with the provincial
governmentsystem,particularlywithhumanrightsissues.
TheotheroptionavailableunderthecurrentConstitutionistoamendsection114of
the Constitution. The SocioEconomic Study report recognized this option by
suggesting that section 114 should be amended by replacing the term ‘provincial
151
ThetwomainoppositionstothisActwereGuadalcanalandMalaitaProvinces.
SeethecaseGuadalcanalProvincialAssemblyvTheSpeakerofNationalParliamentandtheMinister
forProvincialGovernment,(26February1997)unreported,HighCourt,SolomonIslands,CivCas309/96.
153
SeethecaseMinisterforProvincialGovernmentvGuadalcanalProvincialAssembly,(11July1997)
unreported,CourtofAppeal,SolomonIslands,CivApp3/1997.AlsoSeeandBrown,K.andCorrinCare,J’s
discussiononthisinthearticle“MoreonDemocraticfundamentalsinSolomonIslands,”Victoria
UniversityofWellingtonLawReview,Volume31,2001.
154
SeeBrown,K.andCorrinCare,J.2001,“MoreonDemocraticFundamentalsinSolomonIslands,”
VictoriaUniversityofWellingtonLawReview,Volume31,p.653.
152
62
governments’ with ‘state governments’.155 This should be followed by the
introduction of a ‘State Government Act’ to elaborate on the finer details of the
state government system. An Amendment Bill was drafted in late 2001 to amend
section114,enabling‘provinces’tobereplacedby‘states.’However,inMarch2002
ParliamentvotedinfavourofthedevelopmentofacompletelynewConstitution.156
It was obvious that a new federal constitution was preferred because of its
specificitycomparedtoworkingwithinarigidConstitutionthatwasnotdesignedfor
a federal system of government. Also, changing the terms by amending the
Constitutionmaynotbeaseasyasitmaylookbecausetheimportantdetailsofthe
adoptedpoliticalsystemmustbeprovidedintheConstitutioninordertoprotectit
frombeingmanipulatedbylawmakers.
It is clear from the above discussion that the government weighed these options
before deciding on the creation of a new constitution. Furthermore, it is possible
that the government may not want to repeat a similar situation such as the one
experiencedintheProvincialGovernmentActof1996,wheretheproposedchanges
were challenged by the provincial leaders. Therefore, the government made the
right choice by opting for a new federal constitution, the choice of the majority of
SolomonIslanders.
5.3DraftingoftheDraftFederalConstitution
Uponthecompletionofitstaskin2001,theSGTFproducedclearlydefineddrafting
instructions for the intended draft federal constitution of Solomon Islands. These
drafting instructions were taken on board by the Kemakeza government and the
155
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“SolomonIslandsConstitutional
ReformProject:SocioeconomicStudyoftheImplicationsofDecentralization(DraftFinalReport),”
January2003.
156
ibid,p.7.
63
UNDP team. The aim was to present them to the general public during the
consultations. The discussions and views of the people collected during the
consultationswillassistinformingthefinaldraftinginstructions.
TheSGTFprovidedtwentyfive157mainprinciples,whichwilllaterformedthebasis
of the draft federal Constitution.158 These principles outlined the key areas of
consideration for the draft constitution. For instance, principle number five
recommended the name to be adopted by the country once a federal system of
government is secured.159 Similarly, the report further provided for the
establishmentofpositionssuchastheheadofstateandstategovernors;statearms
suchasthecourtsystem,publicserviceandpoliceforce;thenumberofstatestobe
drawn;thepoliticalstructureandevolutionofpowers;theroleoftraditionalchiefs
and land issues; the wealth sharing formula and social services such as education
andhealth;thelimitationofpoliticalparties;andfinallytheuseofminerals.
In November 2003 the Government agreed to the writing up a draft text of the
federalconstitutionforSolomonIslandsandtheproposedprinciples.160Despitethis
confirmation,thepreparatoryworkondrawingupthenewconstitutionstartedwell
ahead in 2002 when the Cabinet adopted the recommendations of the task force.
The initial deadline for the completion of the draft constitution was set for June
157
Outlineoftheprinciples:(1)TheConstitution,(2)IntroductionofState/FederalGovernmentSystem,
(3)Officialnameofstate,(4)TheHeadofState,(5)NumberofStates,(6)DecentralizationofPowers,(7)
PoliticalStructure,(8)RoleofTraditionalChiefs,(9)StateGovernors,(10)WealthSharingFormula,(11)
RepealofConstitutionalProvisionforIndependentMembersofFederalParliament,(12)Constitutional
ProvisionsforLimitationofPoliticalParties,(13)RestrictionsonFreedomofMovement,(14)Alienated
andCustomaryLand,(15)PetroleumandMinerals,(16)ProtectionfromDeprivationofProperty,(17)
CourtSystem,(18)PublicServices,(19)PoliceForces,(20)HealthServices,(21)EducationServices,(22)
RighttoEducation,(23)FederalGovernmentServices,(24)TransitionPeriod,and(25)Areasnotcovered
bySGTF2001report.
158
SolomonIslandsGovernment,“BackgroundInformationontheProposedState/FederalGovernment
SystemforSolomonIslands,”18thMarch2002,p.2.
159
Itrecommendedthename“SovereignDemocraticFederalRepublicofSolomonIslands.”
160
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandConstituencyDevelopment,“WhitePaperontheReformof
SolomonIslandsConstitution,”ProvincialStrengtheningandDevelopmentUnit,SolomonIslands,
November2005,p.26.
64
2002purposelytocomplywithParliamentaryrequirementsforpresentationofbills
fortheparliamentarysessionsetforJulyandAugust2002.Thisdidnotmaterialize
astheformalagreementforthedraftingofthedraftwasgrantedlatein2003.This
thengavetheAttorneyGeneral’sofficethemandatetoproceedwiththedrafttext
oftheconstitutionatalaterstage.Alsothegovernmenthaddecidedagainstabill,
andwasthenfocusedonthewritingupofanewconstitution.
A team of Constitutional lawyers was assigned to put together the text of the first
draftofthefederalconstitution.HeadingthisteamoflawyerswasReginaldTeutao,
aformerAttorneyGeneralofSolomonIslands,andTomWoods,aconstitutionallaw
expert appointed under the UNDP agreement. The first drafting instructions
producedbytheconstitutionallawyerswerecompiledmainlyfromtheSGTF(2001)
Report, the SocioEconomic Study (2001), and the Provincial Consultation Reports
(2002).161Uponthecompletionofthedraftinginstructions,anOverviewCommittee
(OC) was established by the Government to scrutinize the drafting instructions
before presenting them to Cabinet. The OC was predominately made up of high
government officials such as the Minister for Provincial Government and his
permanentsecretary.ThebasicreasonfortheestablishmentoftheOCwastosatisfy
the UNDP condition that a highlevel body must be established to guide the
Governmentintheconstitutionalreformprocess.162Therefore,theestablishmentof
theOCwaspurposelytofulfilthatrequirement.
After reviewing the drafting instructions, the OC resolved that the Government
required more time for a second provincial consultation to gauge feedback from
people on the drafting instructions.163 This was to ensure that the people get a
161
PresentationbyJohnTuhaikaon“theOccasionoftheCommonwealthadvancedSeminar2005on
leadingstrategicchangeinthePublicSector,”Wellington,2005,p.30.
162
ibid,p.29.
163
ibid.
65
secondlookattheinstructions.ThiswasseenbyJohnTuhaika,164tobeanimportant
decision. He pointed out that a second consultation was required because the
feedback will form the basis upon which the draft will be made.165 A second
ProvincialConsultationwascarriedoutimmediatelyfromJuly2003andranforthree
weeks.166Atthesametime,parallelconsultationsonthedraftinginstructionswere
also carried out with various stakeholders in and around Honiara. This included
consultationswithwomengroups,councilofchurchesandyouthrepresentatives.
Duringtheconsultation,thedraftinginstructionswereexplainedtothepeopleand
people were asked to share their views on it. The feedback from this Consultation
wasputtogetherandpresentedtotheconstitutionallawyersworkingonthedraft
federal constitution. Using the drafting instructions as the basis, the constitutional
lawyers drew up the DFC, which was completed in 2004 and presented to the
Government.
ThefirstdraftofthefederalconstitutionwaspresentedtotheGovernmentandthe
generalpublicinNovember2004.167TheGovernmentaskedmembersofthepublic
and communities to comment on the draft. It was expected that the final Draft
would be ready by the middle of 2005. By the end of 2005 each proposed state
should be working on the second stage of the constitutional reform process which
involvesthecreationoftheirrespectivestateconstitutions.168
5.4KeyStakeholders
164
ThePermanentSecretaryforProvincialGovernment,whowasdirectlyresponsibleforthe
constitutionalreformprocessatthattime.
165
PresentationbyJohnTuhaikaontheOccasionoftheCommonwealthAdvancedSeminar2005on
“LeadingStrategicChangeinthePublicSector,”Wellington,2005,p.30.
166
SolomonIslandsGovernmentandtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProject,“Summaryofthe
ProvincialCommunityConsultationTeamReports,”July–August,2003,Honiara.
167
SolomonStar,24thNovember2004.
168
JohnTuhaika,“PresentationonLeadingStrategicChangeinthePublicSector,”p.29.
66
5.4.1SolomonIslandsGovernment
TheSolomonIslandsGovernmentwasakeystakeholderintheconstitutionalreform
process.Pastgovernmentsbeforethe1998–2000eventshadpaidlittleattentionto
the wishes of the people for greater autonomy and decentralization. The
government thought that the provincial government system will achieve
decentralizationasfederalismwouldhave.Forexample,theKeniloreagovernment
afterindependenceoptedforaprovincialgovernmentsystem,whentheprovincial
government consultation reports indicated that the people wished for a federal
systemofgovernment.Thiswasnotthecase.Similarly,the1988MamaloniReport
was not even considered by the government at that time or by any consecutive
governments.
Interestingly,SolomonMamaloniwashimselfPrimeMinisterfortwotermsafterthe
Mamaloni Report.169 During those two terms the federal government system was
notmootedinParliament.Therecouldbeapossiblelinkbetweenthefindingsofthe
reportsandthefailedattempttodevolvepowertovillagechiefsandeldersthrough
the 1996 Provincial Government Act. This was during Mamaloni’s tenure as Prime
Minister.Nofurtherattemptsweremadeaftertherevocationofthe1996Provincial
GovernmentAct.
The TPA marked a new chapter in the constitutional reform process in Solomon
Islands in terms of government involvement. After the TPA, beginning with the
SogavareGovernment,allgovernments170madeconstitutionalreformapriorityand
wantedtoseealltheireffortsleadtotherequiredchangestothepoliticalstructure.
169
SolomonMamaloniwasPrimeMinisterfromMarch28,1989toJune18,1993,andagainfrom
November7,1994toAugust27,1997.
170
KemakezaGovernment,SogavareGovernmentandSikuaGovernment(present).
67
Assuch,morefinancialandtechnicalsupportwasgiventotheconstitutionalreform
project to ensure it was completed in their tenure. According to a UNDP source,
though the consultation was funded and supported by UNDP, the Solomon Islands
Governmentcontrolledtheconsultationprocess.Thereforethepaceandproposed
outcome of these consultations were determined by the Solomon Islands
Government.Thisisevidentinthenumeroustimelinessetbythepastgovernments,
often coinciding with the tenure of a particular prime minister in office. However,
therealitiesofconstitutionalreformprocessesdeterpastgovernmentsfrompassing
thefinaldraftofthefederalconstitution.
5.4.2 UnitedNationsDevelopmentProject
The Solomon Islands Government approached UNDP to assist with the proposed
move towards the creation of a federal Constitution. UNDP undertook an
assessment of the constitutional reform process by conducting consultations
throughoutthecountry.171Thescatterednatureoftheislandsposedadifficultyto
UNDP in ensuring that all Solomon Islanders were consulted. According to UNDP
reports “… [t]he process of constitutional review in Solomon Islands is on an
irreversibletrack.”Thoughitmaylackathoroughanalysis,realitydoesnotprovidea
way back.172 A set of standards was put forward by UNDP to ensure the minimum
standardsofdemocracyandgoodgovernanceweremet.Thisincludestheprinciples
of transparency, participation, credibility, objectivity and ownership by Solomon
Islanders.173 The Solomon Islands Government readily accepted these standards,
allowing UNDP to proceed with its efforts in conducting surveys and carrying out
consultationthroughouttheislandsin2003.
171
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandConstituencyDevelopment,“WhitePaperontheReformof
SolomonIslandsConstitution,”2005,p.23.
172
ibid,p.23.
173
ibid.
68
In 2005 UNDP weighed the options of reengagement with the Constitutional
Reform process. UNDP has serious doubts about the expensive nature of the
proposed federal system,174 and on the basis of its view that the current system is
less expensive, has backtracked on its decision to be engaged with the process.
Criticizing UNDP’s change of mind on the proposed federal system, Katy Le
Roy175arguedthatthepeopleofSolomonIslandswantedtheproposedreformsand
itshouldbetheywhoshoulddecide,andnotdonors.176Donorsshouldrestricttheir
involvement to funding and technical assistance and let the Solomon Islanders
decideforthemselves.
5.4.3 AidDonors
OtheraiddonorssuchasAustralia,177NewZealand,ACP,theBritishgovernmentand
the European Union were also involved in the constitutional reform process in
Solomon Islands.178 Most of these aid donors worked closely with the central
governmentandtheprovincialgovernmentsonareassuchasgovernanceandrural
development. However, it is understood that these aid donors were reluctant to
pursuetheissueoffederalgovernmentforthecountry.179Thoughtheirreasonsfor
such reluctance were not formally documented, it was rumoured that the general
view was the federal system of government will be very expensive to run in a
174
RegionalRightsResourceTeam(RRRT),2004,“FileDocumentsondialoguebetweenUNDPheadand
RRRTregardingtheconstitutionalprocessinSolomonIslands”RRRTDelphiFiles,Suva.
175
APhDstudentstudyingtheconstitutionalreformprocessinSolomonIslandsandVanuatuin2005.
176
SolomonIslandsConstitutionalReformUnit(CRU),2005,“FileNote:Meeting29thJune2005,”Officeof
thePrimeMinisterandCabinet,Honiara.
177
AusAIDhasbeenworkingcloselywiththeprovincialgovernmentsinSolomonIslandstodealwith
issuesofgovernance.
178
LeRoy,K.2005,“LettingSolomonIslandersspeakforthemselves,”UnpublishedUSPSeminar
Presentation,30June2005.
179
Muaki,A.“FederalSysteminSolomonIslands,”TutuvatuDiscussionForum,2009.
69
countrylikeSolomonIslands.Eventually,itwasargued,thiswillputmorefinancial
pressureontheaiddonors.
Despite the general reluctance shown by aid donors towards the constitutional
reformprocess,SolomonIslandersareadamantthatthereformprocessisthebest
way forward for the country. Interviews carried out by Katy Le Roy in her PhD
research had shown that Solomon Islanders are aware of the reluctance of aid
donorstosupporttheconstitutionalreformprocess,butthecommonresponsewas
to let Solomon Islanders decide for themselves what is best for their country.180
People are of the impression that they alone know what is best for the country,
thoughtheymayappreciateassistancefromaiddonors,butsuchassistanceshould
notbeusedtoderailtheirambitionstoseeachangeofgovernmentstructureinthe
country. This view was succinctly expressed by the former Governor General
(NathanielWaena)whenheexplainedthata“…homegrownconstitution…mustbe
something that grows out of our desperation, … something to be cherished … [we
need to] inform our critics and observers that Solomon Islanders are now well
informed …”181 and can decide for themselves. This is a general expression of the
feelingsofthemajorityofSolomonIslandersthatthetimeisnowrighttointroduce
thefederalsystemofgovernment.
5.5 ImplicationsoftheDraftFederalConstitutiontoSolomonIslands
5.5.1Humanrights
The draft federal constitution emphasized the importance of a ‘homegrown’
constitutiontoensureSolomonIslandersclaimownershipoverit.Thus,onecansee
180
181
ibid.
ibid.
70
invariousversionsofthedrafttheperceivedviewofaneedtohaveahomegrown
constitution. To ordinary Solomon Islanders, a home grown constitution should
have all the hallmarksof Solomon Islandness. In otherwords, it should provide a
Solomon Islands perspective to issues raised in the constitution. However, a
potentially troubling provision for the homegrown draft constitution of Solomon
Islandsistheextendedchapteronrights.AccordingtoCorrinCare182thischapter:
“...waspreparedandlobbiedforbytheRegionalRightsResourceTeam
(RRRT),aregionalbodyfundedasaUNDPproject.”
Thebillofrightschapterofthedraftconstitutionincreasesthenumberofsections
to 38, compared to the existing 17 sections of the current Solomon Islands
Constitution. The important question is – how much of these rights are
‘homegrown’?AlltheseprovisionsaredesignedalongtheUniversalDeclarationsof
Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against
Women(CEDAW),ConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC),andtheInternational
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).183 In CorrinCare’s
view,thisisareflectionoftherealitythatthischapterwasnotnegotiatedfromthe
startingpointofalocalagendaortheparticularcircumstancesofSolomonIslands.
Similarly,theseconceptsandthemannerinwhichtheywereintroducedappeared
to be in opposition to the calls made by Solomon Mamaloni and Peter Kenilorea
(plusothers)intheConstitutionReviewCommittee(CRC)(1987)forthe‘abolitionof
foreignvaluesystemsandconcepts’inreturnforahomegrownandmoretradition
182
CorrinCare,J.2007,“BreakingtheMould:ConstitutionalReviewinSolomonIslands,”RevueJuridique
Polynesienne,Vol.13,p156,Url:http://www.upf.pf/IMG/pdf/09corrin.pdf
183
ibid.
71
orientedsystem.184Furthermore,onecannotdisputewiththewordsofTomWoods,
alegaldraftingexpert,whostatedthatSolomonIslandersarecapableofarticulating
asystemsuitabletotheircircumstancewithouthavingthecurrentapproachonthe
billofrightsofthedraftconstitutionimposedonthemfromoutside.185Onethingfor
sure is that an imposed concept of ownership may also not be in favour of the
majorityofSolomonIslanders.
Thebillofrightschapteralsointroducesanewcategoryofrightsthatarenotfound
inotherconstitutionsintheregion.Forexample,theintroductionofthe‘indigenous
rights’canbeviewedasanattempttobalancepopularsupportforindigenousrights
withthecommonhumanrightsprinciples.Inapresentation,JohnTuhaikaadmitted
thattheinclusionofindigenousrightscameaboutasaresultofstrongsentiments
raisedduringconsultations.186Thisineffectbroughtabouttheexistenceoftwosets
ofrights,whichmayrequireaspecialformulatoprovidefortheircoexistence.The
draft federal constitution further recognizes the traditional conservative values of
Solomon Islanders and yet at the same time provide for progressive rights such as
the recognition of differences in sexual orientation in Solomon Islands. The bill of
rights chapter of the draft federal constitution at the most can be considered as
confusingandmayleadtofutureobstaclesintheoperationofitsprovisions.
Interestingly,thedraftingofthedraftfederalconstitutionfellcoincidentallywiththe
date in which Solomon Islands is due to present its report before the ICESCR
184
CorrinCare,J.2007,“Offthepeg,ormadetomeasure:Istheintroducedlegalsystemand
WestminsterstyleofgovernmentappropriateintheSolomonIslands?”AlternativeLawJournal,Volume
27,Issue5,pp.207–211.
185
UnitedNationsTelevision,“TVInterview:UNBringsthevoiceofthepeopletotheNewConstitutionin
theSolomonIslands,”ProgramNo.910,21June2004.
186
Tuhaika,J.2007,“ExpandedHumanRightsintheDraftSolomonIslandsConstitutionBillofRights,”
SpeechpresentedatthePacificRegionalConsultationforMembersofParliamentonthePacificPlan,
HumanRightsConventionsandStandardsandtheirApplicationtoDomesticLaw,PolicyandPractice,29
October–2November,2007,Auckland.
72
Committee.187 As such, Solomon Islands was under undue pressure to show to the
world that it had taken steps to rectify the shortfalls of its current Constitution by
giving more recognition to these ICESCR rights in the proposed draft federal
constitution. As such, the inclusion of these rights in the draft federal constitution
does not reflect the wishes of Solomon Islanders but rather an attempt by human
rights advocates and the government to show to the world Solomon Islands’
commitmenttoICESCR.
5.5.2 Expensivetooperate?
Concerns have been expressed that the new proposed federal government system
maybetooexpensive torunoroperate.AsindicatedintheSocioeconomicStudy
Report, the proposed state government system will not cost less than the current
system of centralized government but it could cost more, though it cannot be
determined at this stage how much that extra cost could be.188 The assessment
made by those promoting this line of thinking is that with the federal/state
government system, new financing sources are needed to finance the expanded
system of government, especially the states. It was assumed that all the expenses
will be footed by the federal government, similar to the current quota system
adopted by the central government. The expenses were seen from a mirroring
perspective, as the same functions of the federal government is mirrored down to
the state governments, and is likely to be paid by the federal government as well.
However,itshouldbenotedatthispointthatunderthefederal/stategovernment
system,individualstatesareresponsiblefortheirownfinances,eitherbygenerating
themorusingthemforservices.Thedraftfederalconstitutionprovidesforstatesto
187
SolomonIslandswasduetopresentitsreportin2003.
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“SolomonIslandsConstitutional
ReformProject:SocioeconomicStudyoftheImplicationsofDecentralisation(DraftFinalReport),”
January,2003,p.59.
188
73
generate their own income and at the same time gives the federal government
power to impose tax. As a result, both the states and the federal government
generatetheirownincomes.
Even the UNDP was aware of the purported expensive nature of these proposed
constitutional and political reforms. In a private memo to a colleague, the UNDP
resident representative based in Suva admittedly said that donors (UNDP) did not
want the reform because ‘the federal system will be prohibitively expensive.’189
Other regional stakeholders such as the Australian Government and the Forum
Secretariat,andindividualresearchers,alsoreachedthesameunfoundedconclusion
thatafederal/stategovernmentsystemwouldbeexpensivetooperate.
Nevertheless,advocatesofthefederal/stategovernmentsysteminSolomonIslands
are adamant to see through the constitutional reform process. In response to the
arguments that the system is expensive, the Deputy Premier of Western Province,
OliverZapo,publishedatwopageprivateviewintheSolomonStardismissingthose
assumptions.190HearguedthattheForumSecretariatdecisionwasmadebasedon
theUNDPopinionreachedin2003withoutanyproperassessmentoftheoperation
of the federal/state government system in the country. Similarly, those individual
findingsbythetworesearcherswereinconclusiveastheywerefocusedonincorrect
assumptions of the desire for state government by provinces. For example, they
wronglyassumedthatthepushforstategovernmentwasorchestratedbyWestern
andGuadalcanalprovinces.191
189
SolomonIslandsConstitutionalReformUnit(CRU),2005,“FileNote:Meeting29thJune2005,”Officeof
thePrimeMinisterandCabinet,Honiara.
190
“GiveUsStateGovernment,Please,”SolomonStar,Tuesday11November2008.
191
ibid.
74
Furthermore, it is argued here that it is the Solomon Islanders that want a
federal/state government system and not the international stakeholders or aid
donors. Such involvement could mean that international stakeholders are only
interestedinensuringtheirgoalsandpoliciesareimplemented.Theintroductionof
afederalsystemofgovernmentwillinadvertentlyrestraintheextentofpenetration
thatinternationalstakeholdershaveinthecountry.Forexample,inafederalsystem
thefederalgovernmentdoesnotholdmuchleverageasfarasimplementationinthe
respective states of international policies or treaties is concerned. Thus,
internationalstakeholdershavetodealwiththefederalgovernmentplusrespective
statesindividuallyinordertoimplementinternationalpoliciesandtreaties.
5.6 Movingfromthe2004Draftthe2009firstDraftoftheFederalConstitution
It took approximately four years before the second draft could be published. This
showed the thoroughness and commitment of all those involved in the process to
produce the best. During these four years a lot of consultations and surveys were
carriedoutthroughoutthecountrytogetmorecontributionsfromthepublic.192
Aftertheconsultationsandsurveys,ageneralplenarymeetingwasheldinJuly2009
foralltheConstitutionalCongress(CC)MembersandtheEminentPersonsAdvisory
Council(EPAC).193Duringtheplenarymeetingtheparticipantsdebatedthe2004DFC
and made changes based on the feedback they received from the communities
duringtheirconsultationsandsurveys.Theoutcomeofthisgeneralplenarymeeting
formedthebasisofthefirst2009draftofthefederalconstitution.
192
TheseconsultationsincludetheMPsConsultation(2005)andtheConstitutionalCongressSurveys
(2008–2009).
193
EPACismadeupofseniorSolomonIslandscitizens,includingformerpublicservants,premiersand
membersofparliament.
75
5.7 2004Draftv20091stDraft–whatmajorchangeshavebeenmadeorhavenot
beenmade?
The first 2009 draft of the Federal Constitution released in July 2009, made a
number of very important changes to the 2004 draft Federal Constitution. At the
sametime,anumberofsectionsthatwerestronglyopposedbytheprovinceswere
notamendedorremovedfromthe2004draft.Thispartoftheresearchpaperwill
discusssomeofthekeychangesmadetothe2004draftbythefirst2009draftand
whatprovisionsarestillmaintaineddespitestrongopposition.
5.7.1 Changesordeletions
Thefirstimportantchangetothe2004draftthatisworthdiscussingisthepreamble
oftheDraftFederalConstitution.Acomparisonofthesetwodraftsshowsthatthere
is a major twist in the language used in the preamble. The preamble in the 2004
draftwaswritteninaclearlayman’slanguagewhilethepreambleinthe2009draft
takesamorelegalisticapproach.
The major changes in language of the preamble suggest that the 2004 draft
contained a poorly and hurriedly drafted preamble in the 2004 draft lacking legal
draftingexpertise,anddemonstratedthehallmarkoftheinvolvementof nonlegal
personnel in its drafting. This brought forward the question of whether the 2004
draftfederalconstitutionwasmadeinahurry.Ifso,whatreasonswouldtherebe
forsuchahurriedlydesignedfederalconstitution?Iamoftheviewthatovertime,
the constitutional reform process had become a political ploy by successive
governments to regain power. Successive governments and political parties had
usedthereformprocesstostrengthentheirpoliticalstatureandsatisfythewishes
of their voters. Presumptive analysis indicated that the 2004 draft was hurriedly
76
presented mainlyto satisfy: 1)theprovincialdemand forstategovernment,2)the
government’sdesiretoretainsupportoftheprovincialleaders,and3)thedesireto
show to the nation that the government had taken steps to address an issue that
pastsuccessivegovernmentshadneglected.
Asecondmajorchangemadetothe2004draftwastherenamingofSolomonIslands
as a Democratic Federal Republic, instead of just a Republic, as was the case in
section1ofthe2004draft.194Thesechangescameaboutasaresultofthetireless
efforts of the ‘federal foundation’ themes committee set up to review the federal
foundations of the draft. The federal foundation themes committee had dissected
andexplainedthemeaningsofthetermsandwhattheywouldencompassonceput
together.195ThiswassupportedbyallmembersoftheCCandEPAC,thusexpressing
thedesiresandwishesofthepeopleofSolomonIslands.
The third important change made to the 2004 draft by the 2009 first draft is the
deletionoftheprovisionthatempowersthefederalgovernmenttointerfereinstate
affairs.Section262ofthe2004draftfederalconstitutionstatesthatwhereastate
cannot fulfil an executive obligation under the federal constitution or state
constitution, the federal government may intervene to ensure the state meet its
obligations.Thissectionfurtherempowersthefederalgovernmenttoenactlawsto
regulatetheprocessofinterferenceintostateaffairs.
Thisprovisionwasdeletedfromthe2009firstdraftofthefederalconstitution.The
reasonforsuchdeletionwasthepopularoppositionfromtheprovinces.Initsofficial
reportonthestategovernment,theWesternProvinceGovernmentarguedthatthe
provisiongavedefactopowertothefederalgovernmentfromwhichitcancontrol
194
Seethe2004draftofthefederalconstitution.
ConstitutionalReformUnit,“DocumentspreparedforthesessionsoftheThreeThemeCommittees
fromSeptember–December,”2008.
195
77
andmanipulatethestatestomeetitsownneeds.196Itwasarguedthatthisisjusta
continuationofthecentralizedsystemofgovernment,whichthefederalsystemwas
supposedtodoawaywith.MalaitaandGuadalcanalprovincesfurtherarguedthat
thefederalgovernmentshouldleavethestatesalonetoworkontheirissuesaspart
oftheprocessofdevelopingthenewfederalsystemofgovernment.197
b)NoChangesordeletions
Despite strong opposition from the provinces, there are some provisions that
remainedunchangedinthe2009firstdraft.Thefirstprovisionofgraveconcernto
the provinces is the issue of dual citizenship. Section 66 of the 2004 draft federal
constitutionandthe2009firstdraftfederalconstitutionmaintainthatanycitizenof
Solomon Islands may acquire or retain his/her citizenship of another country. This
provision allows a person to be a citizen of Solomon Islands and at the same time
retainoracquirecitizenshipofanothercountry.
ThisprovisionwasstronglyopposedbytheprovincesduringtheMP’sconsultation
andtheConstitutionalCongressconsultationsthroughoutthecountry.Inhisreport,
theMPforCentralKwara’ae,FredFono,reportedthat:
… [t]he people of Central Kwara’ae do not want or accept the
provisions allowing dual citizenship for foreigners and Solomon
Islanders.Thereisfearthatoncedualcitizenshipisallowed,foreigners
mightremittheirmoneyearnedinourcountrytotheirownsecondary
countryofcitizenship.198
196
WesternProvincialGovernment,“OfficialReportsonStateGovernment2000–2007,”June2007.
SeetheMalaitaConstitutionalCongressReportofAukivisit,December2007,andGuadalcanal
ConstitutionCongressReportsonPoliticalIdentifications,June2007.
198
CentralKwara’aeMPsreportontheFederalConstitution,2005.SeeAppendixVIII.
197
78
Thereisalsofearthatforeignerscouldusethisprovisiontoengageinunscrupulous
activities such as illegal business operations or to escape from the law in other
countries. One of the arguments raised by a number of provinces is that the
allowance of dual citizenship will lead to more corrupt practices from the public
service.199 Even with strict guidelines accompanying the current system, there is a
highrateofillegalacquisitionofpassportsintheimmigrationsection;thisratewill
intensifyiftherulesarechangedtoaccommodatethedualcitizenshipprovision.
Thesecondprovisionofconcerntotheprovincesistheprovisionfortheelectionof
thePresidentofthecountry.Section76ofthe2004draftfederalconstitution,which
is maintained in the 2009 first draft, states that the President shall be elected by
membersoftheFederalParliament.Inotherwords,thepeoplewillnotdirectlyvote
forthepresident;rather,theirelectedmembersinthefederalparliamentwillvote
ontheirbehalf.
This provision was strongly opposed during the MP’s consultations and the
Constitutional Congress consultations. The opposition of Solomon Islanders to this
provisiondrawslinkstothepeople’sdesiretobedirectlyinvolvedintheelectionof
theirnationalleader.Asnoted,SolomonIslandersfeelthatvotingforthePresident
should be done by every Solomon Islander exercising their democratic right to
choose the President, not to have the responsibility put in the hands of
untrustworthypoliticians.200
199
ThisargumentwasraisedintheReportsofthefollowingprovinces,WesternProvince,Guadalcanal
Province,MalaitaProvince,TemotuProvince,CentralIslandsProvinceandChoiseulProvince.
200
SeetheMPs’ReportforCentralKwara’ae,Auki/Langalanga,LauBaelelea,WestAreareetc,andthe
ConstitutionalCongressReportsforMalaita,Guadalcanal,Western,Temotu,ChoiseulandCentralIslands
provinces.
79
Thirdly, a large number of Solomon Islanders feel that there is no need for a third
category of powers. In both drafts of the federal constitution it is maintained that
there should also be concurrent powers shared between the federal and state
governments. The majority of the provinces201 feel that there should be only two
categories202ofpowers,tothefederalandstategovernmentrespectively,withclear
demarcation as to which powers fall under which category. It was raised that the
concurrentpowerswillprovidealoopholeforthefederalgovernmenttointerferein
theaffairsofthestates.
5.8Conclusion
This chapter highlights the different processes involved in the preparation and
making of the draft federal constitution. The Buala Permiers Meeting endorsed or
provided the green light for the government to proceed with the constitutional
reformprocessinfindinganewsystemofgovernmentthatreflectsthewishesofthe
people. This chapter pointed out that there are provisions in the current
Constitution that promote the decentralization and the devolution of powers to
lower government bodies closer to the grassroot people. These powers are
underutilized, with the government backing out of an attempt to change the
provincial government system due to opposition from a number of provincial
governments.
The CRC Report of 1987 formed the basis of the SGTF Report on the drafting
instructions. These drafting instructions were used during the UNDP consultations.
The important point to note is that the UNDP consultations were never about the
type of government system the people desire. That decision was made during the
201
Malaita,Western,Choiseul,Makira/Ulawa,Isabelprovinces.SeeListIIIofthe2009firstdraftofthe
FederalConstitution,AppendixIX.
202
NamelytheFederalPowersandStatePowers.
80
drawingupofthedraftinginstructionsbytheSGTFteam.ThepurposeoftheUNDP
consultationswasmainlytocollectinformationfrompeopleaboutwhattheywant
or think should be included in the draft federal constitution under the outlined
draftinginstructions.ThemainargumentraisedindefenseoftheSGTFdecisionwas
thatthepeopleofSolomonIslands hadalreadydecidedon numerousoccasionsin
thepastthattheywantedthefederalsystemofgovernment.203
This chapter also highlights the implications of the draft federal constitution for
Solomon Islands. These implications fall within the areas of human rights and the
expenses of running the system. This chapter views human rights as the most
contentious implication of the draft as it draws on a lot of rights and freedoms
practised in western countries. This seems contrary to the declaration that the
constitution should be autochthonous and made within the country. Similarly, the
allegedexpenseinrunningthesystemisanissueaswell.However,fornowwetake
comfort in the fact that the system has not yet been tried therefore all these
argumentsaboutexpensearestillatheory.
Thischapterfinallyprovidessomeinsightintothetransitionofthe2004drafttothe
first2009draftofthefederalConstitution.Thefirst2009draftshowsanumberof
amendments and deletions made to various provisions from the 2004 draft. This
reflects the willingness of the constitutional congress to work towards the
production of a final draft that would truly reflect the wishes of the people of
SolomonIslands.
203
Seethereportsfor:SolomonIslandsGovernment,1977,“SpecialCommitteetotheProvincial
GovernmentSystem(Kausimae)Report,”SolomonIslands;SolomonIslandsGovernment,1986,
“CommitteetoReviewtheGovernmentSystem(Lulei)Report,”SolomonIslands;andSolomonIslands
Government,1987,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)ReportRecommednations,”Solomon
Islands.
81
Thenextchapterwillfocusontheconsultationprocess,includingpastconsultations
andtheconsultationsthatwerecarriedoutafterthe20002003crises.Thischapter
focusesontheinvolvementofSolomonIslandersintheprocess.
82
CHAPTER 6: CONSULTATION – THE EXTENT OF SOLOMON ISLANDER
PARTICIPATIONINTHEMAKINGOFTHEDRAFTFEDERALCONSTITUTION
“Solomon Islanders want to be active participants in the process of
governancereformintheircountry”204
6.1Introduction
SolomonIslandershadlongbeencallingforthedecentralizationofgovernmentand
services. People wanted better services such as education, health, and proper
infrastructurethatareavailableinHoniaraontheirislands.Basedonthereportsof
various consultations that were carried out throughout the country since
independence,themajorityoftheresultsshowedthat,thepeopleweresupportive
ofanysystemthatwouldbringaboutchange.Acrosstheislandspeoplearepraying
thatthegovernmentgivefreedomandauthoritytomakedecisionstotheprovinces
to govern themselves. The DFC is not just a result of recent consultations; it is an
affirmationofthewishesofthepeoplesinceindependence.
This chapter will look at the level of participation of Solomon Islanders in the
creationofthedraftfederalconstitution.Itfirstidentifiesanddiscussesthelevelof
consultation and methodology used in the various consultations and surveys that
werecarriedoutinSolomonIslandsregardingconstitutionalreforms.Secondlythe
chapterdiscussestheinvolvementoftheconstitutionalreformunitintheprocess.
Theaimistoidentifythetypeofleadershipandguidancethisparticularbodyplays
on the process. Thirdly, this chapter will look at the plenary meetings. This is an
important aspect of the process because this is where the representatives of the
people meet and make important decisions that would affect the outcome of the
draftfederalconstitution.
204
UNDP,“ConstitutionalReformSolomonIslandsUNDPFactfindingMission25Aprilto2May2002”,
May2002,p.6.
83
The aim of this chapter is to show to the readers the different processes that the
reformprocesswentthrough beforeitcouldfinaliseits finaldraft. Atthemoment
theprocesshasnotyetreachedthefinalstages,andalldiscussionsarecentredon
theplenarymeetingsandtheconsultations.
6.2Consultationandmethodology
The methodology of consultation used since independence in the various
consultation processes had similarities. For instance, all consultations include
general meetings and obtaining feedback, individual and group submissions and
questionnaires.
6.2.1 ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(1987)
In the 1987 consultation the general public meetings provided a major source of
informationfortheteams.Servicemessagesweresenttothecommunitiesviathe
national radio205 informing the public of the dates and venues of the meetings.206
During these meetings, those who carried out the consultation briefed the people
aboutthepurposeoftheconsultationandwhytheyneededtheviewsofthepeople.
Accordingtothereport,peoplewereforthcomingwiththeviewsandopinions.
Private individuals and civil groups also presented their submissions before the
review committee. In Honiara, presentations were made in a number of locations,
including the national parliament and the governmentowned Kalala house. A
numberofprominentSolomonIslandersandacademicsusedthisoccasiontoshare
205
SolomonIslandsBroadcastingCorporation(SIBC).
SolomonIslandsGovernment,1987,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report
recommendations,”SolomonIslands,Volume2.
206
84
their views on the system of government of the country. Their views and opinions
weredocumentedinthepartofthereportcalledevidence.
Besides the general consultation meetings and the submissions, the review
committee also used a working questionnaire.207 The working questionnaire was
designedtoreplicatetheConstitution,andpeoplewereaskedquestionspertaining
totherespectivesectionsofthe Constitution.Forexample,underchapteronethe
questionnaireaskedquestionssuchaswhetherthecountryshouldretainthequeen
astheheadofstateofthecountry.208
Thefindingsofthe1987reportsweremainlycompiledfromthesepublicmeetings,
individual and groups submissions (both written and oral) and responses to
questionnaires.
6.2.2 UNDPSurveysandReports(2003)
ThepublicconsultationcarriedoutbyUNDPin2003followedasimilarpatternasits
predecessor, the Constitution Review Committee consultation in 1987. Nine
consultation teams were formed for each province. Each team comprised 6
members,includingateamleader.Intrainingsessions,teamswereremindedthat:
… team members were not going out into the provinces to consult with
peopleontheirpreferredmodelofgovernment,ortopromotetheideaofa
207
208
ibid.
SeetheappendixIV.
85
federal system, but to listen to and record the issues of concern and
suggestionsraisedbythemembersofthepublic.209
The training outcome provided the four themes that later formed a key feature of
theconsultation.
The teams were then sent to the provinces to conduct the surveys and
consultations.Locationswereselectedbasedontheirpopulationdensityandcentral
location close to other villages. The structure of the meetings was often flexible,
withmostoptingtostartwithaprayer,followedbyageneralintroduction,abrief
explanation of the existing system and the history of the reform exercise, and an
introduction to the four discussion themes.210 These meetings were often open,
givingparticipantsopportunitiestoaskquestions.Themeetingsconductedbythese
teams ranged from 11 to 18 meetings throughout the provinces. Upon the
completionoftheseconsultations,eachteamleaderpreparedadetailedreporton
the consultations, detailing the locations and attendances, methodology and the
findings.211
The results of the consultations formed the basis of the first drafting instructions.
Thesedraftinginstructionswereagaintakenbacktothecommunitiesforthepeople
to comment on them. This marked the second round of consultations that was
carried out in 2003. Again the same procedure was followed by the teams. The
findingsofthesecondroundofconsultationsresultedinthefinaldraftingofthefirst
draftfederalconstitution.
209
LeRoy,K.2008,“ConstitutionalRenewalintheSolomonIslands:PublicParticipationintheoryand
practice,”CentreforComparativeConstitutionalStudies,UniversityofMelbourneLawSchool,Melbourne.
210
ibid,p.19.
211
ibid.
86
6.2.3 MPsConstituencySurvey(2005)
InDecember2004,afterthelaunchingofthefirstdraftofthefederalconstitution,
the national Government approved the disbursement of twenty thousand dollars
($20,000 (SBD)) to each Member of Parliament to conduct further surveys on the
draft federal constitution. The purpose of the MP’s survey of their respective
constituencieswastoexplainthedraftfederalconstitutiontotheirelectoratesand
reportbacktothegovernmentthefeedbackfromthissurveytofurtherimprovethe
firstdraftofthefederalconstitution.
Unpublished feedback from these MPs’ surveys identified a trend that is now
common with all the previous consultations; almost all the electorates were in
supportofthenewproposeddraftfederalconstitution.Onlyafewconstituencieson
Malaita Province showed some form of reservation. For example, in Baegu/Asifola
Constituency and East Areare Constituency the people wanted to see the
government concentrate its manpower on economic recovery and development
rather than on the constitutional reform process.212 Others agreed with the
proposed federal system of government, but would rather see a gradual move
towardsitthanthecurrentapproach.213Theirreasonwastoensureallprovincesare
fully prepared, in terms of infrastructure and manpower, before they can be
declaredstates.
Nevertheless,themessagegatheredduringthisconsultationwasthatpeoplewant
to see the government take further steps towards the removal of the system of
governmentadoptedafterindependence.
212
Seethefollowingreports:1)“Baegu/AsifolaMPsConsultationReportontheDraftFederal
Constitution,”2005,and2)“EastAreareMPsConsultationReportontheDraftFederalConstitution,”
2005.SeeAppendixXandAppendixXIrespectively.
213
WestAreareConstituency,“MPsConsultationReportontheDraftFederalConstitution,”2005,andthe
WestKwara’aeConstituency,“MPConsultationReportontheDraftFederalConstitution,”2005.
87
6.2.4 ConstitutionalCongress(CC)Members’Consultations(2007–2008)
A key component of the Government White Paper on the federal government
systemistherequirementfortheestablishmentofaConstitutionalCongress(CC).214
ThecongresswasdulyestablishedbytheSikuaGovernmentinDecember2007.The
objectivesoftheCongress,asoutlinedbythe2005whitepaper,areto:
(a) Completeafinalcontentofanewconstitution,
(b) Prepareadetailedreportsettingoutthereasoningforthecontent
ofthenewconstitution,
(c) DefineSolomonIslandspoliticalcommunity,and
(d) Recommend an appropriate ratification procedure to bring a new
constitutionintoeffect.215
Accordingtotheseobjectives,theCongressispurportedtobeinthefinalstageof
the constitutional reform process. Alongside the completion of the draft federal
constitution,theCongresswasalsogiventhemandatetoengagewiththeSolomon
Islandscommunitiestorecommendaproceduretobringthenewconstitutioninto
effect.216
TheCCiscomposedofthirtytwomembers,twentyofwhomwerenominatedbythe
provinces and Honiara City.217 The remainder was nominated by the national
government with the inclusion of youth representatives. Furthermore, all
nominations were gender balanced and represented a cross section of the
214
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandConstituencyDevelopment,“WhitePaperontheReformof
theSolomonIslandsConstitution,”ProvincialInstitutionalStrengtheningandDevelopmentUnit,Solomon
Islands,November2005.
215
ibid.
216
ConstitutionalReformUnit,“TalkingPoints,”August,2008,p.1.
217
SeeAppendixVforthefulllistingofthemembershipoftheConstitutionalCongressandtheEminent
PersonsAdvisoryCouncil.
88
communities. The CC is assisted by an advisory body of elderly Solomon Islanders
(EPAC) and experts.218 The seniority of the membership of the EPAC is reflected in
theirstatusinsociety.Forexample,includedintheEminentpersonsadvisoryboard
werethreeformergovernorgenerals,aretiredAnglicanbishop,anumberofformer
premiers, former members of parliament, a former speaker of parliament, and a
traditional chief. The CC and EPAC members were vested with the authority to
debateanddecideonthefinalcontentofthedraftfederalconstitution.219
In2007theCCmembersbegantheirconsultationswiththeirrespectiveprovincesin
anticipation of the plenary meetings to debate the details of the draft federal
constitution.TheassumptionwasthattheseCongressmembersrepresenttheviews
ofthemajorityofpeopleoftheirrespectiveprovinces.TheCCmemberstouredtheir
respective provinces to seek the views of their people regarding the draft federal
constitution.Theseconsultativemeetingswerelongandintensivecomparedtothe
surveys carried out for the 1987 constitutional reform and the UNDP surveys. The
consultationsmainlytargetedthemaincentrallocationsontheislands.Forexample,
the Malaita CC team, led by Hudson Kwalea, held a week long conference in Auki
withparticipantscomingfromvariouspartsoftheprovince.220Theconferencenot
only covered issues relating to the draft constitution but also proposed laws that
wereconsideredimportanttothepeopleoftheprovince.
6.3 ConstitutionalReformUnitanditsoperations
With the endorsement of the Government White Paper in December 2005, the
Grand Coalition for Change Government of Prime Minister Sogavare adopted the
218
ibid.
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandConstituencyDevelopment,“WhitePaperontheReformof
theSolomonIslandsConstitution,”November2005.
220
MalaitaConstitutionalCongress,“ReportofAukiVisit,MalaitaProvince,”OfficeofPrimeMinister,
December,2007.
219
89
constitutionalreformasitsmainstrategictheme,resultingintheimplementationof
theWhitePaper.InJune2007theSogavareGovernmentsetuptheConstitutional
Congress and the Eminent Persons Advisory Council, setting the wheels of the
projectrunning.Thechangeofgovernmentinlate2007didnothampertheprogress
inconstitutionalreforms.TheincumbentSikuaGovernmentendorsedandadopted
theConstitutionalreformprogramasapriority.
With a tight deadline, the Sogavare Government shifted all operations of the
constitutional reform under the direct control of the Office of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet (OPMC). The government established the Constitutional Refom Unit
(CRU)asaspecialdivisionwithintheOPMC.TheCRUwasmandatedtomanageand
coordinate the constitutional reform project. Its key tasks involved providing
technical and material support to the CC and EPAC.221 As discussed in an earlier
section,theCCandtheEPACformedanimportantpartoftheconstitutionalreform
processasitisthebodythatwillcarryforwardthedraftfederalconstitution.
6.4 PlenaryMeetings
The first plenary meeting of the CC and the EPAC was convened in June and July
2009attheSIBC222conferenceroomandtheRedMansionHotel.Thepurposeofthe
firstplenarymeetingwastogothroughthe2004draftfederalconstitution.Thiswas
thefirsttimeacommitteesuchastheCCwentthroughthedraftwiththepurposeof
makingthenecessarychangesbasedonthefeedbackreceivedasaresultoftheMPs
survey, CC consultations, private submissions and the deliberations of members of
theCCandEPAC.
221
222
ConstitutionalReformUnit,“SolomonIslandsReformProject”,Tuesday26March2008.
SolomonIslandsBroadcastingCorporation(SIBC)isthenationalbroadcastingarmofthegovernment.
90
Thevariousthemescommitteesalsopresentedthefindingsattheplenarymeeting.
Thesethemescommitteeswereorganizedbytheconstitutionalcongresstolookat
specificchaptersofthedraftfederalconstitution.Seventhemescommitteeswere
formed under the following themes: 1) Federal Foundation; 2) Federal political
systemandpowers;3)PublicFinanceandRevenuesharing;4)FundamentalHuman
RightsandFreedomsandOtherRights;5)ConstitutionalInstitutions,Representation
andPublicService;6)LawandJustice;and7)Transition.Eachthemeshouldmeet,
debate,andpresentitsreportduringtheplenarymeeting.223
However, out of the seven theme committees, only three managed to make their
submissionstotheplenarysession.224
Photo7.1MembersofthejointCC/EPACPlenaryMeetingheldin2009.
223
SeeAppendixXIIfortherespectivethemecommitteesandmembership.
NamelytheFederalFoundation,FederalPoliticalSystemsandPowersandThePublicFinanceand
RevenueSharingthemeCommittees.
224
91
It was adopted by the plenary council that the remaining themes were to be
discussedgenerallyduringtheplenarysessions.Themainreasonscitedbytheother
four theme committees for not providing any reports were mainly time constraint
andlackoffinance.225Thefailuretoprovidethesereportsplacedanextraburdenon
theplenarymeeting.Ithasaverylimitedtimeandtheymustdiscussalltheseother
fourthemesatthissessionofplenarymeeting.
Photo7.2TwoEPACmembersputtingacrossapointduringthecombinedplenarysession.
Theplenarymeetingwasconductedinageneralopenconferencemannerunderthe
leadership of the chairman and conducted by the senior government draftsman
Reginald Teutao. The plenary meeting was confined only to the CC and EPAC
members.Iwasfortunatetobegrantedpermissiontoattendtheplenarymeetings
asanobserver.Thedescriptionthatfollowsisbasedon myobservation.The 2004
225
MarilynMaeta,CRUmediaofficer,2009.
92
draft federal constitution was divided and discussed based on the respective
themes,chaptersandsections.Theseniorlegaldraftsmanindentifiedthesectionsof
the draft federal constitution and explained them to the participants. After the
explanationofeachsection,thelegaldraftsmanthenhandeddiscussionovertothe
chairman to conduct an open discussion amongst the members. This was the
interestingstageofthemeetingsasmemberswereatlibertytopresenttheirviews
oftherespectivesectionsofthedraftfederalconstitution.Ifaparticularprovision
ofthedraftfederalconstitutionwasopposedbyamemberandsecondedbyothers;
thatwouldresultinapossibleamendmentorremovalofthepreviousprovision.
This process was very clear and less complicated as members openly shared their
views.Intheendadecisionwasmadeeitherbyashowofhandsorbyaunanimous
agreement that such provisions are retained or removed. The women
representatives and the youth representatives all had equal say with other CC and
EPACmembersatthisstage.
6.5Conclusion
The above discussion highlighted the level of consultation in the various surveys
carriedoutsincetheissueofconstitutionalreformbegan.Thischapteragreedthat
thereisvirtuallynodifferenceinthemethodologyofconsultationcarriedoutinpast
consultations with the recent consultations. And all these consultations came out
with the same responses in their reports. The only significant difference in the
consultations and surveys is the UNDP consultations, which were conducted by
UNDP without any interference from the government. This is different from the
other consultations because they were commissioned and mandated by the
government. Nevertheless, the reports all pointed out the reality – that people
demandachangeinthesystemofgovernment.
93
This chapter also discussed the importance of the consultations. It agreed that
consultation with the people is a very important aspect of this process as it
illustratestheimpactSolomonIslandershaveontheconstitutionalreformprocess.
Similarly, it also acts as a mandate to support the proposed move towards the
federalsystemofgovernmentforthecountry.
ItmustbenotedherethatthesituationinSolomonIslandsisunique,inthesense
that the process of consultation was not a recent initiation. It was a result of
previousprocessesthatwerecarriedoutasearlyasIndependenceandthecurrent
resultsoftheconsultationscontinuetoexpressthedesireofSolomonIslandersfora
federalsystemofgovernment.Inotherwords,whatthischapterissayingisthatthe
current consultation findings are basically reaffirmations of the previous
consultationsandsurveys.
The next chapter will provide an in depth analysis of the constitutional reform
processinSolomonIslands,especiallytheinvolvementofSolomonIslandersinthe
process.
94
CHAPTER7:ANALYSISOFTHECONSTITUTIONALREFORMPROCESS
“Solomon Islanders have been debating federal and decentralization issues
longer than the state itself. A number of very high quality reports have been
producedatregularintervalsovera35yearperiod.”226
TomWoods,ConstitutionalReformadvisor2008
7.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the constitutional reform process in Solomon
Islands.Thekeyquestionsthischaptersetouttoanswerarewhether:thegeneral
publicwasfullyconsulted;theresultreflectstheviewsofSolomonIslanders;andthe
Constitutional Congress is representing the views of Solomon Islanders. These are
importantquestionsthatplayamajorroleinidentifyingtheroleSolomonIslanders
playintheConstitutionalreformprocess.
Thischapterwilllookattheissuesthatwillidentifythelevelofparticipationofthe
people.Firstlyitanalyzesissuessuchasthetimeframe,levelofliteracyofSolomon
Islanders,andthemethodofparticipation.Secondly,thischapteranalyzestherole
of interest groups and their interests in the constitutional reform process. Thirdly,
this chapter analyzes role and function of the constitutional congress and the
eminentpersonscommitteetodeterminewhethertheirmembershipisreflectiveof
the views of the majority of Solomon Islanders. Fourthly, the chapter determines
whether the consultation is inclusive or not and what is the extent of these
consultationsinthecountry.Fifthly,thechapterprovidestheviewsoftheprovincial
governmentsandtheirpositionsonthefederalsystemofgovernmentandthedraft
federalconstitution.Finallythepaperanalyseswhetherthedraftisautochthonous.
226
LeRoy,K.2008,“ConstitutionalRenewalintheSolomonIslands:PublicParticipationintheoryand
practice,”CentreforComparativeConstitutionalStudies,UniversityofMelbourneLawSchool,Melbourne,
p.14.
95
7.2 Timeframe
Given the importance of the constitutional reforms the twomonth period UNDP
gave to carry out the public consultations may seem inadequate. Questions were
raisedaboutthetimeframegivenforconsultations.Forexample,peoplequestioned
theadequacyofthetimeframe;whetheritwasadequatetoconsultallcitizensof
Solomon Islands; or whether the time frame set a rigid parameter which may
provideopportunitiesforinattentionbythosewhocarriedouttheconsultations.
AccordingtoLeRoy,thepeopleUNDPengagedtoundertakethepublicconsultation
part of the process found that “the very short time frame was a challenge and a
frustration.”227Itwasachallengeinthesensethattheywereworkingalongavery
tight schedule. Furthermore, the Government was committed to the terms of the
TPAandwishedtoseethefederalgovernmentsystemestablished.Allthesefactors
added pressure for the setting of a tight schedule for the consultation. The
consequential effects of such pressure include issues such as: 1) lack of thorough
consultation with the people; and 2) the failure to reach parts of the islands that
were not accessible. This further meant that there is a certain percentage of
Solomon Islands not reached and consulted on these respective constitutional
reforms. And the questions that should be asked are: does the percentage of
Solomon Islanders not consulted warrant a voice in these reforms? If so, what
measures could be taken to include them in later consultation processes in the
future?
Despite such limitations, the reports had shown that a good majority of Solomon
Islanders were consulted. The results of the consultation showed immense
commitmentanddedicationbytheteamstomeetthedeadlines.Theconsultations
227
ibid,p.15.
96
werecarriedoutwithinaperiodofonemonth,givingenoughtimeforteamleaders
toputtogethertheirfindingsinareportandsubmitthemtoUNDP.TeamLeaderfor
WesternProvinceduringtheUNDPsurvey,LenoraHamilton,agreedthatthelimited
periodoftimedidnotaffectthefindingsandreportsoftheteams.228Thiswasalso
affirmed by the permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Provincial Government,
JohnTuhaika,whenhewascalledupontogiveanaccountoftheUNDPsurveys.229
He stated that the training and professionalism of the teams ensured that the
reportswereofaveryhighstandard.
7.3 Lowlevelofliteracy
Another issue this research will analyze to determine the level of contributions
Solomon Islanders made in the consultation process is the literacy level of the
country.TheSolomonIslandsadultilliteracyrateof25percentisamongthehighest
in the world.230 The low literacy level is likely to mean that a majority of Solomon
Islanders were not able to read, write or understand the English language. This
furthermeantthattheymaynotbefamiliarwiththeissuesdiscussed,issuessuchas
constitutionalreformsorthepoliticalconceptsused.Thisposedthequestionofhow
informationrelatingtothereformswasdisseminatedtothepeople,andwhetherit
wasinamannercomprehensibletothem.
Likewise,thelevelofliteracyalsodeterminedthecapacityofpeopletoparticipate
fully or engage in discussions on issues raised during these consultations. This was
evidentinKatyLeRoy’sresearchwhenshenotedinherunpublishedarticlethata
228
InterviewmadewithLenoraHamilton,26July,2009.SeeAppendixVIfordetailsofofthequestions
asked.
229
Tuhaika,J.2005,“PresentationmadeattheOccasionoftheCommonwealthAdvancedSeminaron
LeadingStrategicChangesinthePublicSector,”Wellington,NewZealand.
230
“UNHumanDevelopmentIndexReport,”SolomonIslands,2009,url
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SLB.html
97
local chief did raise fears that people may not grasp the concepts or understand
anythingtalkedaboutinthemeetingsbecausemostdonotreadorwrite.231Thisisa
valid point. Most the people in the rural communities do not even know what a
constitution is, let alone read its content or understand its importance. This is an
importantindicatorofthepeople’slevelofcomprehensionoftheissuesathand.
AccordingtoLeRoytheilliteracyissueisnotedbythegovernmentandstakeholders
andanumberofcountermeasuresweretaken.Firstly,publicawarenessprograms
weremadethroughthenationalradiostation(SIBC).232Theseradioprogramswere
run in Solomon Islands pijin233 with the aim of educating the people about the
constitutional reform and principles associated with it. Also radio talkback shows
wereorganizedtoallowlistenerstoraisequestionsorseekclarificationonmatters
that were not clear to them. Through this arrangement, the government aimed to
educate the people on those constitutional issues before the consultation teams
travelledouttothecommunities.
Secondly, during the UNDP consultations, the focus of the public consultation
meetings was on broad themes and issues rather than discussing various
constitutionaloptionsormodelsofgovernancedirectly.234Thepurposewastoshift
theattentionofthepeopletothethemesandissuesratherthantogointolengthy
discussions on the constitutional issues, which could further complicate the
consultation process. Remember, the system of government had already been
decidedon,theconsultationsweremainlytodiscussthethemesandidentifyareas
peoplewanttoincludeorexcludefromthefuturedraftconstitution.
231
ibid,p.22.
SolomonIslandsBroadcastingCorporation.
233
PijinisspokenandunderstoodbyalmostallSolomonIslanderssinceitbecametherecognizedmodeof
communicationthroughoutthecountry.
234
Tuhaika,J.2005,“PresentationmadeattheCommonwealthAdvancedSeminaronLeadingStrategic
ChangesinthePublicSector,”Wellington,NewZealand.
232
98
These approaches simplified the issues for the people and gauged their attention
and views. Also those involved in the consultations were fully trained with trial
exercisesonthequestionsbeforetheyweredispatched.Thismeantthattheywere
wellequippedandwerereadyforthetask.Forinstance,questionsweretranslated
into pijin and further into the respective languages of their areas they were
visiting.235
It can also be argued that the people of Solomon Islands had since independence
known what type of political structure is suitable for them. This is evident in the
numerousconsultationandsurveyreportspublishedeversincethecountryattained
independence. The centralized government system has failed the rural people
miserablybynotprovidingbasicservicesanddevelopment.ThemajorityofSolomon
Islanders, according to the results of the consultations, wanted these services and
development opportunities, and to be consulted on government development
policies.IrrespectiveofthelowliteracylevelofSolomonIslanders,peopledoknow
what form of government structure they want, and confirmed in the consultation
reports,thatitisthefederalsystemofgovernment.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the same illiterate Solomon Islanders do not
even understand the current system of government or how it operates. However,
through the development of a locally developed system of government, the rural
people can have the chance to participate in the constitution making process and
developasenseofownershiptowardsit.Fromthesurveysitcanbeconcludedthat
Solomon Islanders do not understand the system they want, though they are not
familiarwiththeterminologyforlabelingit.
235
ThiswasrevealedinapersonalinterviewwithLenoraHamilton,alegalofficerwiththeSolomon
IslandsGovernmentandRAMSIuntil2006.ShewasappointedtheteamleaderfortheWesternProvince
duringtheUNDPconsultationsin2003.
99
7.4 Methodofparticipation
The method of participation is the third important area this paper will analyze to
determine the level of participation of Solomon Islanders in the constitutional
reformprocess.Itisimportanttoanalyzethemethodologyusedduringthesurveys
and consultations to determine the level at which people were consulted. It is
importanttonoteherethatinmostoftheconsultationsand surveysthemethods
usedwereverysimilar.Asnotedearlier,intheearlysurveysandconsultations,the
method used was by way of public meetings, discussions, individual and group
submissionsandthroughquestionnaires.InthisanalysisIwillconcentratediscussion
ontheconsultationsconductedbyUNDPin2002and2003.Thisismainlyduetothe
magnitudeofthoseconsultationsandtheavailabilityofreports.
AccordingtotheSIG/UNDPConstitutionalReformProjectreportonthetrainingof
teams, one of the key objectives was to discuss and determine the appropriate
methodology for the public consultations.236 The aim was to ensure proper
informationisdisseminatedandaproperresponseisreceived.Itwasdecidedatthis
trainingthatthemethodologyusedshouldbesimilartothepreviousconstitutional
reviewsurveyin1987,butwiththeaimtocovermorecommunities.
ThegoalsoftheUNDPconsultationswereveryprecise.Teamswerenotgoingoutto
theprovincestoconsultwiththepeopleontheirpreferredmodelofgovernment,or
topromotetheideaofafederalsystem,buttolistentoandrecordtheirissuesof
concern and suggestions.237 In other words, the choice of government system was
not an option for the people to decide on as it had already been decided that the
236
SolomonIslandsGovernment(SIG)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProject(UNDP),
“ConstitutionalReformProject:ReportonTeamLeadersConsultationTrainingWorkshop,”January2003,
Honiara.
237
ibid.
100
federal system of government will be adopted. Many commentators had criticized
thisdecisionarguingthatitwasneverformallyputtothepeopleofSolomonIslands
todecideforthemselvesthesystemofgovernmenttheywant.238TheUNDPsurvey
centred only on the views of Solomon Islanders regarding issues they wanted to
includeinthecontentoftheconstitution.
AccordingtoresearcherssuchasLeRoy,thisrepresentedamajorflawinthesurvey
asitcaughtthepeopleoffguard–withthechancetocontributetothecontentof
the constitution and not to decide on the preferred system to be adopted.239
However,suchargumentsareshortsightedandcentredonlyontheUNDPsurveys.
ItmustbenotedthattheconstitutionalreformprocessinSolomonIslandsisnota
oneoff occasion spurred by the events of 1998–2003; rather, it should be seen as
continuous, beginning when Solomon Islands attained independence and ending
onlywhenanewsystemofgovernmentendorsedbythepeopleisestablished.
The method of participation was considered appropriate and fitting to the rural
communities.Peopleappreciatedthefactthattheywerebriefedonwhatwasgoing
onandwereconsultedonsuchissues.240Localpeoplefurtheragreedthatthetask
wasmadeeasierwhenteamsclarifiedconceptsandtermsinpijinorillustratedthem
in their local dialects. This made the UNDP consultation different from previous
surveys and consultations where a single team travelled to various parts of the
region–increasingthedifficultyofmakingillustrationsinthelocaldialects.
238
Nori,A.2003,“StateGovernment:Throwingourpeopletothedevil,”SolomonIslandsBroadcasting
Corporation(SIBC),SolomonIslands.
239
LeRoy,K.2005,“LettingSolomonIslandersSpeakforThemselves,”USPSeminar.
240
OralinterviewdonewithJohnKela,ChiefofDukwasivillage,MalaitaProvince,July2009.
101
Theconsultationmeetingswerealsoopen,whichgaveparticipantsthefreedomto
share views and opinions.241 In some cases, men were dominant, but this did not
deterwomenfromparticipatingaswell.Inotheroccasions,separatemeetingswere
heldforwomen,youthsandchurchleaders.Furthermore,theteamsmadeattempts
toreachtheremotepartsofthecountry.Forexample,inTemotuProvinceateam
touredtheremotepartsofTikopiaandAnutaislands.242Theseareremoteislandsin
thecountrythatwerenormallynotreachedinpastconsultationsandsurveys.
Thisshowedthatthemethodologiesadoptedinthisconsultationswererelevantand
democratic. Participation was important in these consultations and this was
reflectedinthemasscollectionofviewsandopinionsofSolomonIslanders.
7.5 InterestGroups–Existenceofvariousinterests
Therewerecriticismsthattheconstitutionalreformprocesswasriddledwithvarious
interests of political groups trying to influence or manipulate the final outcome of
thedraftfederalconstitution.243Itwasallegedthattheseinterestgroupsusedtheir
positionandfinancialpowertoinfluencethereformprocess.Forinstance,currently
the constitutional reform program is fully funded by the national government
through the Constitutional Reform Unit in the Prime Minister’s Office. The close
association of the constitutional reform administration with the Prime Minister’s
officehaddrawnwidercriticismtowardstherolesofthevariousPrimeMinistersin
the constitutional reform process.244 Commentators had attributed the
constitutional reform process to the sole determination of former Prime Ministers
241
InterviewmadewithLenoraHamilton,teamleaderforWesternProvinceduringtheUNDPsurvey
(2003),2009.
242
SeeSolomonIslandsGovernment(SIG)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProject(UNDP),
“SummaryoftheProvincialCommunityConsultationTeamReports,”March2003,Honiara.
243
Corrin,J.2008,“PlesBilongMere:Law,GenderandPeacebuildinginSolomonIslands,”p.170.
244
SolomonStar,16thSeptember2008.
102
Manasseh Sogavare and Sir Allan Kemakeza to see the change in the government
systemofSolomonIslands.245Thisisfurtherevidentinthedirectapproachtakenby
the successive Sogavare Governments to ensure the constitutional reform process
achieveitsaims.
OtherlatergovernmentssuchastheDerrickSikuagovernmentarenotkeenonthe
constitutionalreformprocess,butarecontinuingonwithitasaformofcontinuance
withgovernmentpoliciesandtheTPA.Thisisevidentintheproposedmovebythe
SikuagovernmenttoincreasethenumberofParliamentaryseatsorconstituencies
for Solomon Islands.246 This is seen by many constitutional commentators as an
attempttounderminetheconstitutionalreformprocess.247Othersevenseeitasan
attempttoappeasethedesireforstategovernment.248
It has further been alleged that aiddonors are also not supportive of the federal
systemofgovernment.Forexample,someeminentSolomonIslandersIinterviewed
pointed out that the Australian Government does not favour the federal/state
government system and may derail the efforts made in constitutional reforms.249
The reason put forward is its selfinterested nature because Australia, as a key aid
donor to Solomon Islands, is quite concerned with the purported expenses
pertainingtotherunningofthestategovernmentsystem.
ThisdemonstratesthatnotonlyareSolomonIslandersinterestedintheprocess,but
they are stakeholders as well: they all participated in the process to ensure their
viewswereconsideredortakennoteof.
245
ibid.
SolomonStar,15thJuly2009.
247
ibid.
248
ibid.
249
PrivateconversationwithLeonardMaenu’u,formerLandsCommissionerofSolomonIslands–inan
interview,July2009.
246
103
7.6 Constitutional Congress (CC) and Eminent Persons Advisory Council (EPAC)
Membership–IsitreflectiveoftheSolomonIslandspopulace?
7.6.1Membership
ThemajorityofthecongressmembersandtheeminentpersonsareseniorSolomon
Islands citizens.250 The membership ranges from retired politicians and public
servants to senior academics, religious leaders, and senior women. Each province
was responsible for the nomination of its nominees.251 The selection of nominees
was based on criteria including the nominees’ areas of work, experience and
qualification.252
Criticsarguedthatsomeofthesenominees,thoughtheywerenominatedbytheir
respective provinces, were based in Honiara.253 For example, Malaita province
nominatedAlicePollardasoneonitsnominees,althoughsheresidedandworkedin
Honiara.ThereareotherexamplesofsuchnominationslikethistotheCongress.The
importantquestionis,doessuchchoiceofnomineesrepresentthegeneralpopulace
ofSolomonIslands?
Indecidingonwhoshouldbetheirnominees,provincesdonotrestrictthemselves
to their provincial boundaries. The aim of the provinces was to recruit the best
250
SeeAppendixVonmembershipoftheConstitutionalCongressandEminentPersonAdvisoryCouncil.
MarilynMaeta,inaninterview,13thJuly2009.MarilynMaetaisthemediaofficeroftheConstitutional
ReformUnitandshehasbeeninvolvedinalotofawarenessprograms,onTVandRadio,topromotethe
draftfederalconstitution.Shehasanenormouswealthofknowledgeontheconstitutionalreform
process.
252
Forexample,agoodnumberofthenomineeswereformerpoliticians,publicservants,andsocial
workers.Theyarequalifiedpeopleinfieldssuchassociology,anthropology,law,economics,education,
medicalhealth,theologyetc.
253
MarilynMaeta,inaninterview,13thJuly,2009.
251
104
people who they think would better represent them in the CC.254 Therefore,
irrespectiveofwhetherapersonresideswithintheprovinceornot,ifhe/sheisseen
as fit to perform those duties then he/she is nominated. This was the argument
raised in defence by provinces who nominated people who lived and worked in
Honiara.Therefore,itrenderedtheargumentofdomicilenull.
However, an important point worth raising here is the lack of recognition given to
theprovincialdistrictswhenidentifyingnominees.Forexample,restrictingprovincial
nominations to only three will see districts or language groups left out since they
werenotassociatedwiththeprocess.Rememberakeyfactorthisprocessneedsto
create is the ‘sense of ownership’ by the people over the new system of
government. If this constitutional process is intended for the people then
membership of the Congress for each province should be expanded to ensure
representatives from the rural areas can share their concerns as well. There is no
guaranteethatalltheviewsofthepeoplewerecollectedduringtheconsultations,
andfurtherstill;thenatureofdiscussionattheplenarymeetingsisquitedifferent
becauseitrequiresdecisionstobemadebymembersthatwerepresentduringthe
meetings. And if an issue that was not raised during the consultations arises, a
decision has to be made. An expanded membership of the Congress will ensure
provincialnomineesarewellequippedforsuchscenarios.
Nevertheless, I hope the consultations carried out by the congress members will
rendersuchconcernsredundant.Aspointedout,theconstitutionalreformprocess
is a very expensive exercise.255 It would be very expensive to expand the Congress
membership to represent all the different districts or cultural groupings in the
country. However, it must be noted that such expenses are expected, and if the
254
255
ibid.
ibid.
105
government is to get a greater level of participation from the people it should not
considerexpensesasahindrancetoexpandingthemembersoftheCongress.
7.6.2.Attendanceandparticipation
An analysis of the level of participation of the members of the congress and the
eminentpersonsatthefirstgeneralplenarymeetingsisalsoimportant.Itwillshow
how much input each member had in the plenary discussions, which will also
determinethecontributionofeachmembertothefinaldraft.
Figure7.1belowshowsthetotalattendanceoftheCongressandEPACmembersto
the plenary meetings held from the 4th of May to the 26th of July, a total of 38
days.256 It was during this plenary session that the first 2009 draft of the federal
constitution was approved. The graph shows that only thirteen percent of the
participantsattendedalltheplenarymeetingsessions.
Figure7.1:GraphshowingtheattendanceofmembersatthePlenaryMeetings.
256
DatainformationforthisgraphwasprovidedbytheConstitutionalReformUnit,2009.
106
Incontrast,fifteenpercentofmembersfailedtoattendthemeetingsatall.Another
fifteenpercentattendednomorethan20sessionseach,withsomeaslowastwoor
threesessionsonly.Themajority(57%)oftheCCandEPACmembersattendedina
range of twentyone to thirtyseven days. In other words, they attended a good
numberofthesessions,though;theymayfailtoturnupatsomepointduringthe
sessions.
The graph (Figure 7.1) shows that attendance to the plenary sessions was
inconsistent.Itdrewquestionsandcriticismsonthecommitmentofnomineesand
elderstothisimportantevent.Furtherstill,itbroughtbacktheissueofparticipation
andcontributiontothefinaldraftofthefederalconstitution.
Acloserlookatthedatashowedthatamajorityofthe13percentthatattendedall
thesessionswereEPACmembers,257theremainderwereprovincialnomineesfrom
Malaita258and Makira259provinces and Honiara City.260 Ironically, of the participants
who attended at least 30 of the 38 plenary sessions, only two were from
GuadalcanalandWesternProvinces.261Beingthetwoprovincesthathadbeeninthe
forefrontofthepushforthefederalsystem,theyshould,onewouldhaveexpected,
havebeenactiveparticipantstothejointplenarymeetings.
The point is, if the draft federal constitution is to be considered an important
document for the future of the country then it is very important that all members
mustattendtheplenarysessions.
257
EPAChasatotalmembershipof20;however,theonlyoneswhoattendedallsessionswereColin
Gauwane,Dr.JohnRoughan,SamasoniTapualikiandDanielHo’ota.
258
HudsonKwalea.
259
ClaraRebitai.
260
JosephHuta.
261
TheywereformerParliamentariansHildaKariandJacksonPiasi.
107
Figure7.2:GraphshowingabsenteesreasonsformissingPlenaryMeetingsessions.
The second graph (Figure 7.2) showed the reasons given by participants for not
attending the sessions.262 The accumulated number of days for all the participants
who missed sessions was 748 days.263 In seventyeight per cent (78%) of the
accumulateddaysnoreasonsweregivenbytheparticipantsfortheirabsence.The
percentage of unexplained absences is big and it does cause difficulties to
proceedingsofthesessionsaswell.Forexample,inoneofthesessionsIattendeda
number of participants were missing, including the chairperson and the deputy
chairperson.Themeetingwasinformedofthechairperson’sabsence,butnotofthe
absence of the deputy chair person. As a result an ad hoc appointment had to be
madesothattheplenarysessioncouldcontinue.Thisshowedalackofrespectfor
themeetingandtheexpectationsthenominatingprovincesplacedonnominees.
Inelevenpercent(11%)oftheabsentdaysthereasongivenbyparticipantswas‘to
attendtootherimportantbusiness.’Theattendanceinformationdidnotprovideany
262
InformationsuppliedbytheConstitutionalReformUnit,2009.
Ireachedthisfigurebyaddingtheamountofdaysmissedbytheparticipantsattheplenarysessions.
Betweenalltheparticipations,theyshouldaccumulatedatotal2052daysifallattended.
263
108
definition or clarification on these important business matters. It is difficult to
comprehend what other business could be so important as to overshadow the
presenceofaparticipantatthisplenarymeeting.Whenaskedaboutthereasonwhy
one of the participants was missing, the answer received from one of the
participantswasthatthatpersonwenttotowntoarrangeforashipchartertohis
home island. If this is the kind of ‘important business’ that the Congress and EPAC
membersareinvolvedinduringtheplenarymeetings,renderingthemabsent,then
theConstitutionalReviewUnitneedstoreviewtheirlistofnomineesandappointees
tothecommittees.
Despite this absenteeism the majority of the members are committed to the
constitutionalreforms,thoughtheymayhavemissedacoupleofdays.Asthefigure
7.1showed,themajorityoftheparticipantsattendedbetween20and37sessions
outof38sessions.Thisaddsweighttotheclaimthattheplenarysessionswerein
factrepresentativeofthegeneralpublic.
7.7 IsconsultationInclusive?
This part of the chapter discusses the representation and participation of various
groupsintheconsultationprocess.Itwilldiscussandassesstheirparticipationand
levelofparticipationinthevariousconsultations.
7.7.1 YouthandWomen
Concernswereraisedthatvariousgroupssuchasthewomenandyouthswerenot
involvedinthepreparationoftheStateGovernmentTaskForceReportandmostdo
109
not know about the existence of such report.264 Furthermore, it was alleged that
womenforthemostpartwerenotinvolvedinformulatingprovincialproposalson
decentralization.265 For some provinces, according to the Socioeconomic Study
Report (2003) appointed committees did consult women; however, such
consultations were minimal and restricted to unimportant mattersas compared to
issues such as the assessment of the overall purpose, process and impacts of the
stategovernmentsystematthevillagelevel.
These are serious allegations that need rectification. The important question that
needstobeaskediswhatimportancedoestheSGTFhaveinidentifyingthebasisof
the Draft federal constitution; and if so would the exclusion of women severely
affect their findings? As earlier chapters have pointed out, the SGTF plays a very
important part in advising the Government about the desire for more
decentralization and identifying a model of government to be used. However, the
exclusion of women from the Task force did not impair the findings of the Task
Force.ThefindingsoftheSGTFweremainlybasedonearlierconsultationreports–
it was just a task of collating those findings and deriving workable instructions for
drafting.Theimportantareasshouldbetheconsultationstageandthecongress,in
whichwomenparticipatedsignificantly.Therefore,theargumentthattheexclusion
of women from the SGTF had resulted in a greater disadvantage to women in the
consultationprocessdoesnotholdmuchwater.
Women representation was high in the CC as it was a requirement that provincial
and national nominations must take into the equation the issue of gender. Each
provincenominatedafemalemembertobeintheCCtorepresenttheperspective
264
DepartmentofProvincialGovernmentandRuralDevelopment,“SolomonIslandsConstitutional
ReformProject:SocioeconomicStudyoftheImplicationsofDecentralisation(DraftFinalReport),”
January,2003.
265
ibid.
110
of women from the provinces. Also these women nominees were selected from
various backgrounds and involvement with women in their respective fields. For
example, Malaita Province nominated Alice Pollard as one of their nominees. Alice
Pollard is a renowned Solomon Islander who had worked in various sectors in
Solomon Islands on issues relating to women. Similarly, there were other women
such as Catherine Pule, Judith Fangalasu, Connelly Sandakabatu and Phylisca Fate,
whowerenominatedasnationalnomineeswithavastknowledgeofissuesrelating
to women from the various backgrounds ranging from girl guides head to church
work,education,andyouthissues.Thesewomenrepresentativesbroughtwiththem
awealthofexperienceandunderstandingofissuesrelatingtowomen.
Theonlydrawbacktowomenisthenatureofselectingnomineeseitherbyprovinces
orthenationalgovernment.Almostallofthewomenrepresentativesarebasedin
Honiara,anddonotreflecttheopinionsthemajorityofwomenfromtheruralareas.
Thusthequestionworthaskingiswhetherthesenominatedwomenreallyrepresent
theviewsofthemajorityofwomenintheruralareasoronlytheviewsofthosewho
residedintheurbanareas.
Alsovariouswomengroupsinthecountrymadeoralsubmissionsbeforethevarious
constitution reform committees as well. For example, in Honiara the National
Council of Women (NCW) made a presentation before the CC highlighting their
viewsonthedraftfederalconstitution.266Anothermeetingwasheldonthe13thof
August 2008 where members of the CC for Honiara City Council met with women
leadersfromvarious organizations267inthecity.268Noseparateconsultationswere
266
HoniaraCityConstitutionalCongress,“ReportontheIdentificationofPoliticalCommunities,”27th
October2008.
267
Includingthe:1)SolomonIslandsNationalCouncilofWomen;2)WomenforPeace;3)FamilySupport
Center;and4)SolomonIslandsIndigenousWomenAssociation.
268
HoniaraCityConstitutionalCongressReport,27thOctober,2008.
111
conductedforwomenoryouthsinanyoftheotherprovincesbytheirrespectiveCC
teams.
Youthsontheotherhandwereunderrepresentedattheplenarymeetingsorinthe
generalmakeupoftheCCmembership.Atthemoment,therewereonlytwoyouth
representatives in the CC, both of them based in Honiara. According to the CRU,
plans are underway to engage youths throughout the country to participate in the
constitutional reform process in the country. Until those plans materialize, at the
momentyouthsareunderrepresentedatthenationallevelandmayhaveanimpact
on any future implementation of the draft federal constitution. Based on the
reports, Honiara City is the only area where youths were consulted during the
consultations carried out by the CC members.269 The obvious reason for this is the
advancedlevelofyouthinvolvementinnationalissuesinthecapitalascomparedto
theruralcommunities.
7.7.2 ChurchGroups
SolomonIslandsisaChristiancountryandchurchesplayaveryimportantroleinthe
communities.Asaresult,itisalsoimportantthatchurcheswereconsultedonthese
constitutional reforms. The research has shown that churches participated in the
consultations as well. The UNDP reports, MPs’ report, Provincial governments’
reports and the CC reports show that church leaders were consulted on these
reforms. On some occasions, special meetings were held purposely for church
delegations.270 For example, the Central Islands Province CC members met with
members of the Anglican clergy in Tulagi in 2008 to brief them about the draft
federal constitution.271 On other occasions, church representatives made
269
ibid.
CentralIslandsProvince,“PoliticalcommunityconsultationpreliminaryReport,”20thOctober,2008.
271
ibid.
270
112
submissions on behalf of the church or churches before the touring consultation
teams.272 This was done in Honiara in 2008 when the Solomon Islands National
Council of Churches Association (SICCA) made a presentation before the
constitutionalreformteamonthedraftfederalconstitution.273
Theengagementofthereligiousbodiesintheconstitutionalreformprocessisavery
important step towards public participation because a large number of Solomon
Islandersareaffiliatedwiththesechurchgroups,andthechurchcanraiseissueson
behalf of their congregation members. In some parts of the Solomon Islands
churchesplayedahugeroleintheirlocalpolitics.Forexample,onNewGeorgiathe
Christian Fellowship Church played a very important role in its politics.274 Isabel
provinceispredominantlycontrolledbytheAnglicanChurch,andthechurchplayed
a huge role in its politics.275 All this showed that the church is a key player in
SolomonIslandscommunitiesandtheyrepresentedalargepopulationofSolomon
Islandersaswell.
7.7.3 Traditionalauthorities
TraditionalauthoritiesareanotherimportantcategoryofpeopleinSolomonIslands.
Research showed that this category of leaders did not contribute much to the
constitutional process. I agree that chiefs were consulted during the consultation
process; however, the level of consultation carried out with the chiefs and
traditional elders was done on an individual basis. For example, discussions were
held with respective individual chiefs during the consultations to collect their
personalviewsontheconstitutionalreformprocess.Anotheraddedbonuswasthe
272
HoniaraCityConstitutionalCongressReport,27thOctober,2008.
ibid.
274
ThecurrentMPforthisConstituency,JobDuddleyTausinga,maintainedhisseatlargelybecauseofthe
religiousallegiancepeopleinthisareahadtowardshisfather,thefounderoftheChurchofChrist(COC).
275
Forexample,thelateparamountchiefoftheislandwasaformerbishopoftheAnglicanChurch.
273
113
inclusion of the Guadalcanal Chief Sabivo Laugana.276 Again, this was just a single
appointment by the government with no mandate to represent the views of all
chiefs on Guadalcanal or Solomon Islands. The CC members of Guadalcanal took
extrameasurestoconsultmembersoftheQaenaAlumovement277aboutthedraft
federal constitution. This is good because it reached out to the traditional
communitiesaswell.
Nevertheless, very few of the traditional authorities throughout the country were
consultedormadesubmissionstotheconstitutionalcongressmembers.Iamofthe
view that there should have been combined submissions made by the various
housesofchiefs throughout the country to the constitutional congress. This is to
ensure they carry more weight compared to individual submissions, as well as
deliveronthepromiseofanautochthonousconstitutionmadewithinthecountryby
the citizens of the country itself. It would have been a boost to the drafting
committeeifcombinedsubmissionshadbeenpresented.
Thefailuretogaugemorerepresentationfromchiefsandeldersmayalsohavesome
impact on some provisions of the draft federal constitution in the future. For
example,therearecertainprovisionsoftheconstitutionthatmaybeconsideredas
potentialdangerstotheroleofcustomandtraditionalleadershipthatissupposedly
guidedbythechiefsorvillageelders,forinstance,issuessuchastheapplicationof
humanrightsandcustomarylaw.Acombinedsubmissionbyvarioushousesofchiefs
could have raised more awareness with the drafters to take note of such sensitive
issuesinSolomonIslands.
7.7.4 Minoritygroups
276
HewasnominatedasanationalnomineetotheConstitutionalCongressbythenationalgovernment.
InotherliteraturepublicationsthismovementisreferredtoastheMoroMovement,usingthenameof
theleaderofthemovement,PilesiMoro,todescribeit.
277
114
There was little discussion on the participation of minority groups in the
constitutionalreformprocessandconsultations.Forpurposesofthispaper,minority
groups refers to nonindigenous Solomon Islanders – including the Chinese,
Gilbertese,EuropeansandotherPacificIslanderswhohadsettledinSolomonIslands
sincethelate19thcentury.278However,intermsofconsultation,theminoritygroups
werewidelyconsulted.Theseconsultationsincludedvisitsmadetothesegroupsor
communities. For example, the Gilbertese communities of Wagina in Choiseul and
GizointheWesternProvincewereconsultedduringalltheconsultationsthatwere
carried out so far. Similarly, the national government took further steps to include
representativesoftheseminoritygroupingsintheConstitutionalCongress.
Therefore,intermsofthedifferentminoritygroupingsinSolomonIslands,attempts
were made at all levels to include them in consultations and the participation
process. It is up to these representatives to attend meetings on behalf of their
respectivegroupings.Forexample,duringtheplenarymeetingstheGilberteseand
Tuvaluan community representatives were present throughout the meetings.
However,thesamecannotbesaidabouttheChinese;theattendancedatacollected
showed that the national nominee for the ethnic Chinese citizens missed all the
plenary sittings.279 Nevertheless, it is a bonus to see that these minority groupings
wereconsultedandparticipatedintheconstitutionalreformprocess.
7.8 Consultation–Theextentofconsultation
7.8.1 Earlyconsultations(Pre1998)
278
ThisdoesnotincludeindigenousminoritygroupssuchasthePolynesiansofTikopia,Rennell,Bellona,
SikaianaandLordHoweislands,whosettledtheislandsaftertheMelanesiansoccupiedthemuchbigger
islands.
279
InformationcollectedfromtheConstitutionalReformUnit,2009.
115
As indicated in earlier sections of this paper, consultation into identifying an ideal
alternate system of government for Solomon Islands started well before
independence. In December 1977 a Special Committee under the leadership of
veteran politician David Kausimae was appointed to review the provincial
governmentsysteminSolomonIslands.Thiscommitteewasappointedinresponse
togrievancesraisedbymembersofParliamentforWesternProvince.280
A nationwide consultation was carried out with the different provinces. Trained
government personnel were dispatched to the provinces with the instructions to
reportbacktothecentralgovernmenttheviewsoftheprovincesandtheirpeople
onthesystemofgovernmentthattheypreferredforthecountry.Thefindingsfrom
theprovinceswereoverwhelminglyinfavourofthefederalsystemofgovernanceto
be introduced in the country. However, the government failed to take any serious
note of the findings of the consultations, resulting in the unilateral declaration of
selfgovernmentbytheWesternProvince.
AnothercommitteecalledtheLuleiCommitteewasappointedin1986toreviewthe
provincial government system.281 Again, after consultation with the provinces, the
report recommended a federal system of government for the country. In 1987, a
major review committee was established with the task of carrying out a review of
the Constitution of Solomon Islands. It conducted extensive consultations
throughout the provinces, documenting the people’s submissions and desires. The
findingsoftheconsultationswerepublishedinthreevolumeshighlightingthedesire
forafederalgovernmentsystem.282
280
JohnTuhaika,2005,“PoliticalandhistoricalissuesthatinfluenceconstitutionalmakinginSolomon
Islands,”p.3.
281
SolomonIslandsGovernment,1986,“CommitteetoReviewtheGovernmentSystem(Lulei)Report,”
SolomonIslands.
282
ibid.
116
Figure7.3Tableshowingthemajorreviewsandsurveysconductedbythegovernmentpriorto2000.
I
Source:CompiledbyPaulMae2009.
In all these reports, it is evident that consultation had been carried out by those
taskedwithcarryingoutthesereviewsorsurveys.Whetherthereviewwastoassess
the provincial government system or review the constitution, people continued to
press their desire for a federal or state government system. If one looks closely at
thespanoftimeoverwhichthesesurveyswereconducted,itcanbenoticedthatit
covered a period of more than twentyone (21) years, and the outcomes are too
consistent to be manufactured. Also it is important to note that these surveys
covered about three generation groups of Solomon Islanders. The only possible
explanation for the diversion of recommendation in the Tozaka Report could be
because of the proposed restructuring of the provincial government system
undertaken by the Ulufa’alu government at the time of the survey. Otherwise, the
117
authorisoftheopinionthattherecommendationcouldhavebeenthesameasthe
previousreportsandfindings.
7.8.2 UNDPConsultations(2003)
ByvirtueofanagreementsignedwiththeNationalGovernmentinearly2002,UNDP
wascommissionedtocarryoutconsultationsandsurveysinSolomonIslandsonthe
prospect of introducing a federal system of government. UNDP carried out two
consultations.ThefirstwasinFebruary2002when9teamsweredispatchedtothe
provinces.283AsecondconsultationwascarriedoutinAugust2003,usingthesame
teamsandtargetingtheprovincesaswell.AccordingtoJohnTuhaika284thefindings
ofthenineteamswereconclusive;peopleinallnine provinceswereinsupportof
theintroductionofastategovernmentsystem.
ThefindingsontheseUNDPconsultationsshowedthattheviewsofthepeopleon
the form of government system for the country are consistent with the past
demandsforafederalsystem.Furthermore,ahigherlevelofeducatedpeopleinthe
rural communities elevated the understanding of people of the federal system to
another level. This meant that the people are more aware of the system and its
implicationsandareadamantthatitisthebestgovernmentsystemforthecountry.
The UNDP consultation/survey differs from the past surveys because it was
conductedbyabodyindependentofthegovernment.Allthepastconsultationsand
surveys were carried out by teams put together by the government, and in most
283
Tuhaika,J.2005,“PoliticalandhistoricalissuesthatinfluenceconstitutionalmakinginSolomon
Islands,”p.3.
284
TuhaikaisaformerPermanentSecretary(PS)oftheMinistryofProvincialGovernment,andlater
formerPermanentSecretaryoftheConstitutionReformUnit.Hewasactivelyengagedinallthese
consultationsuntil2008,andwasreplacedbyFredrickRohoruaasthePSfortheConstitutionalReform
Unit.
118
cases were headed by politicians. The UNDP survey, though sanctioned by the
government,runsindependentlyfromanygovernmentinterference.Theimportant
pointisthattheUNDPreportcorroboratethefindingsofthepastconsultationsand
surveys. The UNDP report further set aside any doubts about the authenticity of
those previous consultations, surveys and reports. The consistency shown by the
UNDP report indicated that the people’s desire for the federal/state government
system is not manufactured by politicians but is a longterm wish of the people of
SolomonIslands.
7.8.3 MPsConsultation2005
The MPs consultation carried out in 2005 was purported to be extensive and
thoroughtoletthepeopleknowaboutthedraftfederalconstitutionandalsogauge
theirviewsonitscontent.TheMPswereeachgranted twentythousand($20,000)
by the government to visit their respective constituencies and inform and at the
sametimeconsultthemabouttheirviewsforthedraftfederalconstitution.Theaim
oftheconsultation,aswashighlightedearlieron,waspurposelytopresentthethen
new draft federal constitution to the people and report back to the constitutional
reform unit. However, research showed that the consultation was uncoordinated,
inconsistentandlackedanyqualityfindings.285Forexample,majorityofthereports
wereillstructured,andlackedanydetailedminutesordiscussionoftheconsultation
process followed, the feedback from the communities, and the general view from
thepeople.Mostofthemwerebriefandlackedqualitypresentationstandards;286a
poorreflectionoftheamountofmoneyinvestedbythegovernmentinthissurvey.
285
SeeAppendixVIIandAppendixVIII.
SeeappendixVIIforthereportsubmittedbytheformerMPforAuki/Langalanga,Bartholomew
Ulufa’alu.
286
119
Thepossiblereasonforsuchinconsistentreportingcouldbethelackoftrainingfor
those who assisted the MPs carry out the consultation. Also thereis evidence of a
lackinqualifiedpersonnel,clearguidelinesandthepersonallimitationsoftheMPs.
For instance, a few MPs recruited qualified legal draftsmen to assist them during
these consultations whereas others saw no need for such legal professionals. This
alsoreflectedonthefinalreportpreparedbytheMPsforthecabinet.ThelateMP
for Auki/Langalanga287 submitted a onepage report giving a general outline of the
consultationandthepositionofhisconstituents.Thequalityofthereportwasvery
poor;evensimpleEnglisherrorswerevisibletoreaders.
AsimilarreferenceofpoorconsultationreportingcanbedirectedtowardstheMP
for Central Kwara’ae Constituency, Fred Fono. In a letter published in the local
newspapersomeconstituentsaccusedtheMPofdoingaverypoorjobwiththefinal
report.288TheMPsreportontheMPsConsultationwasbriefanddidnotincludethe
views and speeches made by individuals during the consultation. In a general
assessmentoftheMPsconsultation,theMalaitaConstitutionalCongressReporthas
thistosayaboutit:
The consultations done in the past by the Malaita members of
parliament are nothing more than rush consultations. It was raised
that in a lot of places the MP’s spent no more than one hour and
rushedthediscussioninsteadofspendingmoretimesothatthereisa
thoroughexplanationofthesystem.289
The important point to note is that given the magnitude of the process the
expectation is for all MPs to conduct a consultation and report back to the
287
LateBartholomewUlufa’alu–seetheAuki/Langalanga2007ConsultationReport,AppendixVII.
SolomonStar,“MalaitaIndependence”,Wednesday4March2009.
289
MalaitaConstitutionalCongress,“ReportofAukiVisit,MalaitaProvince,”10th–15thDecember,2007.
288
120
government. Such reports should reflect on the events, the locations visited, the
views of the people on the draft constitution and any general advice for
improvement. Only a few of these reports satisfy these criteria, leading one to
conclude that the MPs consultation process was a general fiasco, leaving more
questions than answers. For example, the Ma’asina Forum alleged that the reason
FredFonodidnotincludetheminutesandspeechesmadebyparticipantsduringthe
consultationwerebecausemostoftheparticipantsdidnotapprovedfederalism.290
SuchallegedpoorreportingbyMPsandstakeholdersengagedintheconsultations
withthegeneralpublicneededtobetransparentorotherwisesuchreportscouldbe
opentodebates.
7.8.4 ConstitutionalCongressConsultations(2008–2009)
CCmembersalsocarriedoutconsultationsintheirrespectiveprovinces.Unlikethe
previous consultations, the consultations carried out by the CC members are
purposelytotalktotheirpeopleandseektheirviews.SincetheCCmembersarethe
recognizedrepresentativesofthepeoplewhentheplenarymeetingsconvene,itis
importantthattheysoughtouttheviewsofthepeople.
The importance of the CC cannot be overstated because it is the only medium of
connectionthepeoplehavetowardsthefinaldraftingoftheconstitution.Therefore,
whateveramendmentsorchangespeoplewanttobemadetothe2004draftofthe
federal constitution have to be mediated through these congress members. The
congress members’ role is to solicit feedback and present it during the plenary
meetings. However, the important question that one may ask at this stage is
whether these consultations were directed towards these aspects of the reform
process. This is not the case. From observation of the consultation minutes and
290
“Ma’asinaForumrefutesFredFono’sconsultationReport,”SolomonStar,12August2009.
121
discussion points of some of these consultations, it is obvious that these
consultationsresembletheonescarriedoutbytheMPsin2007.
TheCCmembersmisinterpretedtheroleintheconsultationprocessandinsteadon
anumberofoccasionspresentedthemselvesasagentsoftheCRUwiththedirection
to explain the draft constitution to the people or clarify areas of interest to the
people.Furthermore,theyplayedthe‘filtering’roleforthegovernmentbydeclining
propositionsfromthepublicthatmayhaveseemedcontrarytosomeofthetermsof
thedraftfederalconstitution.Theirroleasmentionedearlierwasbasicallytosolicit
feedbackandpresentitonbehalfofthepeopleattheplenarymeetings.Onother
occasions, members of the congress set up additional agendas which were not
supposedtobepartoftheirobjectives.Forinstance,inanoutlinedistributedbythe
Makira/UlawaCCTeamfordiscussion,additionalheadingswereinsertedtotheones
outlinedinthe2004constitutionaldraft,totheextentthatsomeoftheseheadings
arecontradictorytothosealreadyinthedraft.291Theunderlyingpointisthatwhen
the people heading such important consultations do not know their roles and
functions, there is a high likelihood that the general population can be misled as
well.
7.9 ViewsoftheProvincialGovernments
From the results or recommendations of the various constitutional reviews and
provincial government reviews that were conducted since 1976 the general view
wasfortheestablishmentofafederalorstategovernmentsystem.Thispartofthis
chapterwilllookattherespectiveviewsoftheprovincessinceindependenceonthe
issuesofstategovernmentanddecentralization.
291
Muaki,A.“FederalSysteminSolomonIslands,”BloggeronTutuvatu.comdiscussionforum,2009.
122
(i)
CentralIslandsProvince
Central Islands Province has been a passive advocate of the federal government
system,onlyindicatingtheirpreferenceforitduringconsultationsandsurveys.This
is unlike Western and Guadalcanal provinces, for which research had shown that
therewasnodesireforafederalsystemofgovernmentpriortotheeventsof2003–
2003(crisis)besidesthefindingsoftheCRCin1987.Nevertheless,the1987position
was reiterated during the Buala Premiers Conference (2000) and adopted in later
reports.
ThereasonsforCentralIslands’Province’sdesireforthefederalgovernmentsystem
werethesameastherestoftheprovinces,citinglackofdevelopmentinitiativesand
decentralisation from the central government. Speaking during the Province’s
SecondAppointeddayinJune2007,thePremierofCentralIslandsProvince,Patrick
Vasuni,describedthecurrentprovincialgovernmentsystemasnotinlinewiththe
government development approaches such as the ‘bottom up approach.’292
AccordingtothePremier,provincesareoverlyreliantonthecentralgovernmentfor
finances and manpower, which were inadequate and most of the time rendered
their planned activities nonachievable. The premier stated that “…the current
provincial government system is weak and inadequate to embrace rural
development.Legallythesystemisnotcompetenttoenforceruraldevelopmentand
lackscapacitytoenterintocontractualagreement.”Thecruxofthispointisthatthe
provincialgovernmentshavepowersonlyintheory;practically,theycannotengage
in development contracts or partnership with investment partners without the
centralgovernment’sapproval.293ItwasenvisagedbytheProvincialleadershipthat
292
293
SolomonStarNews,29June2009.
SeeNori,A.“StateGovernment:Throwingourpeopletothedevil,”2003.
123
thefederalsystemofgovernmentwillboostthe‘bottomupapproach’asprovinces
willbeabletouserevenuederivedfromtheirjurisdictionsaswellasmanpower.
Theprovince’spositiononfederalismwasreaffirmedinlate2008intheCCteam’s
community consultation preliminary report.294 All communities visited by the
constitutionalcongressteamwereadamantthatthewayforwardforthecountryis
through the federal system. In this report the province opted for a gradual
transition, with the intention of becoming a territory of the federal government
beforebecomingafullstate.295Thereasonforsuchacalculatedapproachcouldbe
becauseofthelackofbasicinfrastructuraldevelopment.Thus,itisassumedthatthe
transitional period should be used to develop its infrastructural base before the
provincecouldbecomeastate.
(ii)
GuadalcanalProvince
Guadalcanal Province’s position on the federal system of government remains
consistent with its stand in the Kausimae CRC report in 1987. As the province that
hosts the national capital of Solomon Islands, Guadalcanal province experienced a
lot of challenges associated with it. Examples include, the continued expansion of
the Honiara city boundary without the consent of customary land owners; the
increase in squatter settlement on customary land; and the disrespect towards
Guadalcanal people and their culture by people from other islands. The
decentralizationofpowerfromthecentralgovernmentwillprovidemorepowerto
theprovincetodealwiththeseissues.
294
295
CentralIslandsProvince,“PoliticalCommunityConsultationPreliminaryReport,”20thOctober2008.
ibid.
124
Furthermore,theprovincewasupsetbythemannerinwhichthewealthgenerated
within the province was redistributed throughout the country based on a formula
designedbythecentralgovernmentwithouttheprovince’sapproval.Forinstance,
Guadalcanal province had played host to a number of major developments in
SolomonIslandssuchastheoilpalmplantations,GoldRidgeandlogging;anditwas
theprovince’sdesiretoseemoneygeneratedfromtheirresourcesusedtodevelop
the infrastructure within the island.296 However, the government’s distribution
formulaoperatesinawayinwhichtheprovinceswiththelargestpopulationgetthe
larger share of the revenue compared to those with a smaller population, even
thoughthebulkoftherevenuefromresourceswasgeneratedfromtheprovince.297
ThiswasconsideredunfairandunjustbyGuadalcanalProvinceanditsdemandsfor
thestategovernmentsystemhaveremainedthesametilltoday.
The failure of past governments to consider these demands and calls for state
government seriously has culminated in the 1998—2003 crises, resulting in mass
destructiontothecountry’sinfrastructureandeconomicsystems.
(iii)
IsabelProvince
IsabelProvince’spositionwasclearatthePremiersConferencein2000:theprovince
wanted a system allowing for more decentralization of the central powers of the
government.298ThoughIsabelProvincewasnotoneoftheprovincesthathadcalled
for a federal system of government after independence, the 1987 CRC report
showedthatitissupportiveofthefederalsystemforSolomonIslands.299
296
Tara,T.K.“BeyoundEthnicity:ThePoliticalEconomyoftheGuadalcanalCrisisinSolomonIslands,”
SSGM,2001.
297
ibid.
298
SolomonStar,17thAugust,2000.
299
SolomonIslandsGovernment,“CRC(Mamaloni)Report,”1987.
125
AcloseranalysisoftheIsabelstandshowedthattherewasaslightdifferenceinthe
system of government put forward by the province. Though the province agreed
with the idea of a federal system, it nevertheless wanted the federal system to
operate in a tripartite structure, giving recognition to the traditional leadership,
churchandtheformalgovernmentsystem.300Recentsurveysshowthatthiswishis
consistentwiththeirearlierwishessincethe1987report.
This raised further questions as to whether the idea of a federal system is widely
understood in Solomon Islands, or whether different people have different
understandingsofhowthesystemshouldlookoroperate.ThecaseofIsabelshowed
thatthoughtheyagreedwiththeadoptionofthefederalsystem,theperceptionof
howthesystemshouldoperateistotallydifferentfromhowkeyplayerssuchasthe
WesternandGuadalcanalprovincesperceivedit.Thus,itposesfurtherquestionsas
towhetherthereshouldbefurtherconsultationcarriedouttodeterminethetypeof
governmentsystemthatshouldbeadoptedinthecountry.
(iv)
MalaitaProvince
MalaitaProvinceisperhapstheonlyprovincethatstillmaintainsmixedfeelingson
theissueofdecentralization.Availableliteratureshowsthatthoughdecentralization
is an issue, the province still maintains that the current system of provincial
governmentsiscapableofservingtheneedsofpeopleintheruralcommunities.301It
isjustamatterofgovernmentfailuretoempowertheprovincestooperateontheir
own.
300
IsabelConstitutionalCongress,“ReportonNomineesCommunityIdentification,”26thSeptember,
2008.
301
ThisstandisstronglyadvocatedbyAndrewNori,MalaitaPremierIrosaeaandtheCivilSocietygroup
Ma’asinaForum.
126
The constitutional review findings since independence showed that Malaitans, like
all other Solomon Islanders, approved the federal system of government for the
samereasonsraisedbyothers.However,ontheprovincialandnationalfrontthere
seemedtobecontrastingmessagescomingoutfromMalaitanleaders.AndrewNori,
a prominent Malaitan leader, is adamant that the provincial government system is
adequate for Solomon Islands; taking into consideration the financial burden the
new system will place on the newly formed states.302 On the other hand, extreme
lobbyinggroupssuchastheMa’asinaForumdemandedabsoluteIndependencefor
Malaita.303Inaresolutionpassedin2004,itwasassertedthattheMalaitaProvincial
Government had opted for Independence from Solomon Islands, a claim bluntly
refutedbythecurrentPremierofMalaita.
Despite the mixed messages coming out from various Malaitan leaders and the
province, the views of the ordinary people are clear; people are in support of the
federal system. One Malaitan leader pointed out that the people of Malaita are
supportiveoftheproposedfederalsystem.304Itisthepettypoliticsoftheprovincial
leadersandthenationalgovernmentthatiscreatingcomplexities.
(v)
Makira/UlawaProvince
Makira Province indicated in the 1987 CRC Report that its people desire a federal
system of government. Prior to that my research does no show any indication or
desiresbytheprovincetoadoptafederalsystemofgovernment.
The events of 1998—2003 (crisis) brought about a desire to secede from Solomon
Islands, citing unfair treatment in development goals to provinces, lack of
302
Ironically,thisisaturnaroundfromhisoriginalposition,whichwaswidelydocumentedintheCRC
Reportin1987.
303
Kofana,G.“Ma'asinaForumWantsIndependenceforMalaita”SolomonTimesOnline,7April2008.
304
“InterviewmadewithColinGauwane,amemberoftheEminentPersonsAdvisoryCouncil(EPAC)”,10th
July,2009.
127
developmentandlackofbasicnecessities.Theprovince’sdesiretosecedewaslater
downgradedtoacceptanceoftheideaofafederalsystemofgovernment.Sincethe
inceptionofthefirstdraftofthefederalconstitution(2004),theprovincehadbeen
working on plans and proposals to further the federal system of government. For
instance, in 2007 during the province’s second appointed day the Premier read a
number of promulgations empowering chiefs with more authority and power of
control in their communities and regions.305 The Premier announced that these
measuresweretakenbytheprovinceinanticipationofthefuturefederalsystemof
government.
(vi)
RennellandBellonaProvince
RennellandBellona,sinceitsinceptionin1994,hadcontinuedtoharbourfeelingsof
beingignoredbythecentralgovernment.Peopleoftheprovincefeltthattheywere
being marginalized in a Melanesian dominated country.306 Rennell and Bellona
Province is the only predominantly Polynesian province in a country dominated by
Melanesians.Rightlyso,thepeoplehadreservedfeelingstowardsthegovernment
policiesandthelackofdevelopmentintheprovince.
Nevertheless,theprovincewasnotconsideredasoneoftheactivesupportersofthe
federal/stategovernmentsystem.Duringtheearlyconsultationscarriedoutpriorto
independence and after independence up to 1994, the voice of the people of the
province was counted together with the other Melanesian dominated islands that
madeuptheCentralIslandsProvince.Itwasnotuntilafter1994thatthetwoislands
ofRennellandBellonawereformallyrecognizedasoneseparateprovince.
305
SolomonStar,17thAugust,2000.
RennellandBellonaConstitutionalCongress,“ReportontheIdentificationofPoliticalCommunitiesin
RennellandBellonaProvince,”24thSeptember2008.
306
128
The events of 1998—2003 had a major impact on the province’s outlook to
development and commitment from the central government. In early 2000, the
province declared its interest in becoming a country totally independent from
Solomon Islands. During the Premiers Conference in Buala in 2000 it was resolved
thatprovincesthathadthedesiretoseekindependencewilldosoindividuallywith
the central government on an individual basis. Since then the province’s stand on
theissueofindependencehaswatereddown.
Nevertheless, the province continues to participate in the consultation process
towards constitutional reform and the introduction of federalism. From such
participation,theauthorisoftheviewthattheprovincehadrelinquisheditsdesire
for independence and is now viewing the state/federal government system as the
best alternative to absolute independence for the province. The report on
identification of political communities reaffirmed the province’s position on the
draft federal government system.307 All the provincial government leaders and
communityelderswereadamantthatRennellandBellonaProvinceshouldbecomea
statewhentheproposeddraftfederalconstitutioncomesintoeffect.
(vii)
TemotuProvince
TemotuProvinceisoneoftheleastdevelopedprovincesinSolomonIslands.Inthe
1987 CRC report the province fully supported the recommendation for federal
systemofgovernment.308However,theprovinceremainedpassivesupportersofthe
federal system with no public demands for its immediate introduction. It was not
until the events of 1998—2003 (ethnic tension) that theprovince started to public
demandstatehoodandindependencefromthecentralgovernment.
307
ibid.
SolomonIslandsGovernment,1987,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)ReportVolume3:
Recommendations,”SolomonIslands.
308
129
The province’s call for statehood or independence was mainly due to the fact that
thecentralgovernmentfailedtoprovidebasicnecessitiesanddevelopmenttothe
peopleoftheprovince.309Asoneoftheprovincesstronglyhitbytheevents,sucha
reactionisexpectedastheprovinceattemptedtoputpressureonthegovernment
to provide similar developments committed by the government to Malaita and
GuadalcanalprovincesundertheTPA.
The call for full independence was downgraded to support for federalism in later
yearsastheprovinceendorsedtheconstitutionalreforms.Inhisinauguralspeechin
2009,thenewPremieroftheprovince,MrDaiwo,reiteratedhisprovince’ssupport
for the federal government system. He stated that “…if the majority of the people
wanttheFederalsystemthenwewillgoalongwithit,wewillalsosupportitbecause
itisagovernmentinitiative.”310Thesewordssayalotabouttheprovince’sposition.
At the outset, it means the province is committed to the constitutional reform
processandisreadytoembracetheproposedchangesinthegovernmentsystem.
However, closer analysis of the words could draw concluding remarks that the
provinceisreliantonthepositionofotherprovincestodetermineitsfate.Whatit
says is that if the majority of provinces feel otherwise about the federal system of
government, then Temotu province will also stand by their decision and follow it.
ThepositionofTemotuProvinceonthefederalstategovernmentsystemwasclearly
resolved in the Constitutional Congress Report on Temotu Province (2008) where
the province come out in support of the draft federal constitution and the move
towardsafederal/stategovernmentsystem.
(viii)
309
310
WesternProvinceandChoiseulProvince
SolomonStar,18thSeptember2000.
SolomonStar,17thMarch2009.
130
WesternProvinceandChoiseulprovincehadbeenconsistentwiththeirdemandfor
a federal system of government for the country ever since independence. Prior to
independencebotherprovinceswerecombinedasoneprovince.311Choiseulbecame
aseparateprovincein1992.However,theirpositionhadalwaysbeenthesame,to
becomestates.Accordingtoavailableliteraturetheyhadalwaysfeltthattheyhad
contributedmoretotheeconomyofthecountryintermsoftheirnaturalresources;
however,thereturnsintermsoffinanceanddevelopmentareverylowcomparedto
other provinces with a much lower economic contribution.312 Also, Western and
Choiseul provinces were fearful of the gradual expansion of the Malaitans through
the government ranks and in the business sector.313 There was a desire to protect
their provinces from such unwanted expansion in the spheres of influence.
Therefore there is a need to prevent this, and the best possible way to do this is
through extended powers granted to the provinces by the central government.
However, such extended powers were not forthcoming in the current provincial
government system, thus the best possible option is through a federal system of
government.
Their position remained the same through the various constitutional reviews and
provincial government reviews carried out by consecutive Solomon Islands
governments.Today,despitebeingdividedintotwoseparateprovinces,thedesire
forthefederalsystemofgovernmentismaintainedbythecurrentgroupofleaders
for Western and Choiseul provinces. This is affirmed by the respective position
311
UnderthenameWesternProvince.
WesternProvince,“OfficialReportsonStateGovernment2000–2007,”June2007.
313
Nori, A. 2003, “State Government: Throwing our people to the devil,” Solomon Islands Broadcasting
Corporation(SIBC),SolomonIslands.
312
131
papers314 presented by the constitutional congress representatives of these two
provincesin2007and2008.
7.10 Atruly‘autochthonous’Constitution
The process of constitutional reform in Solomon Islands was long process initiated
immediately after independence. It was obvious to Solomon Islanders that the
independenceConstitutionwasnottrulyreflectiveoftheirviews.315Theconcerted
andpersistentpushedforafederalsystemandconstitutionalreformwasrecorded
inalmostallreviewsandsurveyscarriedoutontheConstitutionandtheprovincial
government system.316 The early reports plus the post–2000 surveys and
consultationsformedthebasisoftheconstitutionalreforms.
These consultations, reviews and surveys fully documented the perspective of
Solomon Islanders. The inadequacy of the of the provincial government system to
deliver services to the rural communities highlighted the demand for the
introduction of a better system. The roles of traditional leaders were not properly
recognized under the provincial government system due to the diverse cultures in
Solomon Islands;317 the diversity of the country makes it difficult to make and
implement laws intended for a particular province (or state);318and the need for
flexibilitytooperateandenterintoagreementswithinvestors.319Thesearebutjust
314
SeetheChoiseulConstitutionalCongress,“ReportontheIdentificationofPoliticalCommunitiesin
ChoiseulProvince,”24thOctober,2008,andthePositiononConstitutionalIssuesPaper(24thOctober,
2008)andtheWesternProvinciaGovernment,“OfficialReportsonStateGovernment2000–2007,”June
2007.
315
Bennett,J.A.1986,WealthoftheSolomons,UniversityofHawaiiPress,Hawaii,p.148
316
KausimaeReport(1978),MamaloniReport(1987),LuleiReport(1999).
317
SeeWaena,N.,“MembershipappointmentInstrument,February2001;Brown,K.andCorrinCare,J.
2001,“Moreondemocraticfundamentals;andCRC(Mamaloni)Report,1987.
318
SolomonIslandsGovernmentandUNDP,“Summaryoftheprovincialcommunityconsultationteam
reports,”March2003andJuly–August2003respectively.
319
LeonardMaenu’u,PSforPostandCommunications(1987)inCRC(Mamaloni)Report1987.
132
some of the issues that Solomon Islanders continue to face and that have formed
thebasisoftheconstitutionalreforms.
The reforms and the content of the draft federal constitution are not written by
foreignlawyersjustforthesakeofcreatingafederalconstitutionaswastheimplied
origin of the independence constitution. Rather, the content of the draft federal
constitution was drawn from the wishes and prayers of Solomon Islands and
balanced with the modern technicalities of today’s world. A good example is the
attempt made in the draft federal constitution to balance the principles of human
rights and the concerns of customary law in Solomon Islands. This illustrates the
active role of the various concerned local groupings in the drafting of the draft
federalconstitution.
Thus,itissafetostatethattheDFCofSolomonIslandsisautochthonous.Ithasgone
throughanumberofprocessesandalongperiodoftimetoreachthestageithas
nowreached.Itwasdesignedanddevelopedlocallywiththetechnicalassistanceof
overseasexperts.
11.Conclusion
This analysis pointed out the fact that Solomon Islanders participated in and
contributed to the making of the draft federal constitution. It clarifies concerns
raisedbyafewSolomonIslandersandcommentatorsthatthereformprocessisnot
reflectiveoftheviewsofthemajorityofpeopleinthecountry.Thechapterpointed
outthatsomeoftheseviewswereshortsightedandselective.Thispapermaintains
the view that the constitutional reform process is a gradual process, and the
renewedcommitmentshownbygovernmentsafter2000toconstitutionalreformsis
justpartofthewholereformprocessthatwasstartedwellbeforetheindependence
celebrations.Itthereforecarriestheviewsandperspectivesofnotonlythecurrent
133
generationofSolomonIslanders,butalsotheviewsofSolomonIslanderswhohad
since long gone but were participants in the numerous consultations, surveys and
reviewscarriedoutinthepasttomapoutabetterfutureforthecountry.
The next chapter will look at some recommendations or ways in which the
constitutionreformprocesswillneedtoassessitselfinordertofurtherimprovethe
levelofparticipationtowardsthedraftfederalconstitution.
134
CHAPTER8:THEWAYFORWARD–RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1.Introduction
This chapter looks at some of the areas that may require improvement to allow
Solomon Islanders greater participation in constitutional reforms. In doing so, this
chapter provides a number of recommendations, including areas such as (a)
improvement of the link between states and the villages, (b) clarification of the
parameters of the constitution making exercise, (c) call for more consultation with
and participation of the educated elite of Solomon Islands, (d) extension of
consultations to the online discussion forums, (e) assessment of Solomon Islands
leadershipbehaviour,and(f)thepossibilityofestablishingabicameralsystemwith
theintroductionofanationalsenate.
Itishopedthatsomeoftheserecommendations,iftherelevantstakeholdershave
notyetconsideredthem,willberelevanttotheconstitutionalreformprocess.
8.2Recommendations
8.2.1Linkingthestateswiththevillages
The constitutional reform process is on the verge of achieving a noble cause by
giving more power to the people to determine for themselves their future and
destiny in developing their respective communities. However, the important
questionthatmustberaisedhereis,howmuchofthesepowerswillfilterdownto
thevillagelevel?Thereisafearthatthesystemissusceptibletobeinghijackedby
the powerhungry middleclass and the powers will not reach their proposed
destinations. Phil Powell, a US economist, argues that the ‘impotence of the
Melanesianstateiscausedbyweakornonexistentlinksbetweenthestateandthe
135
institutions that already exercise legitimacy in Melanesian life.” He further agues
that the ‘successful redesign of the Melanesian state requires dilution of this
mismatch and a graft of the state with traditional institutions so that legitimacy is
effectivelyshared.”320Inotherwords,thereneedstobealinkbetweenthestateand
the village committees or elders, lowest sectors of governance in the country. The
area councils once created under the current Constitution to provide that link has
sincebeendisbandedin1998.
According to the draft federal constitution of Solomon Islands, the federal system
willoperateinsuchawaythattheexistingnineprovinceswouldbecomestateswith
constitutionalautonomyandgreaterlegislativepowers.TheDFCdoesnotprovidea
formulafromwhichpowerwillfiltertothevillages.Thisprovidespotentialloopholes
forcorruptopportunistleaderstoshutthatlinkagethroughtheenactmentofstate
laws. Katy Le Roy pointed out that according to the Powell perspective, turning
provinces into immediate states ‘does nothing to enhance the legitimacy of
government structures’.321This calls for hindsight on the part of the constitutional
congressmembersandtoprovidefortheprotectionofsuchalink.
Itisimportantthatlegitimacyisdictatedbythepeoplerightatthelowerechelonof
thestructure.Powellproposesthatpowerbedirectlydelegatedtolargenumbersof
villages or ethnically homogeneous groups.322 Katy Le Roy dismisses this as
impractical for Solomon Islands, taking into consideration the country’s large
population. I propose a delegation of power from the state level to the villages or
clan groups to ensure wider participation in the political system and instilling a
ownership mentality in the people. The simplicity of this proposal is that the large
320
SeeLeRoy,K.2006,“InstitutionalTransferandIndigenousGovernmentintheSolomonIslands,”An
amendedversionofapaperdeliveredatthePIPSAConference,USP,p.8.
321
ibid.
322
ibid.
136
populationinSolomonIslandscanbeeasilybrokendownintosmallermanageable
clan groupings or village groups, and if properly utilized, this could help avoid the
perceivedhijackingofpowerbythepowerhungrymiddleclass.
8.2.2 Clarifyingtheparametersoftheconstitutionmakingexercise
There have been a number of misconceptions by readers and researchers that the
parameters of the constitution making exercise were narrowly set and should be
expandedtolookatotherpossibleoptionsofgovernanceaswell.KatyLeRoyargues
that the consultations carried out were purposely to determine whether people
wereinsupportoftheproposedfederalsystemofgovernment.323Itsresultswereto
beusedasayardsticktodeterminethesupporttheproposedconstitutionalreforms
have from the general population. These general misconceptions were raised
possiblybecauseofthelackofclarityintheparametersoftheconstitutionmaking
process.Theprocessisgenerallyreferredtoastheconstitutionalreformprocessin
Solomon Islands, a generalization that would make readers assume that the
constitutional reform process is all about finding possible alternative systems of
governanceforthecountry.
ItshouldbenotedthatgovernmentactiontoheedthecallofSolomonIslandersfor
federalism has long been overdue. It is common knowledge amongst Solomon
Islandersthatthepeoplewantafederalsystemofgovernment,supportedbypast
survey results. The recent surveys were rightly directed, as the government was
clearonwhatitwantedtohearfromthepeople.Inotherwords,thesurveyscanbe
consideredasreconfirmationexercisesinwhichthegovernmentsoughttohearthe
viewsofthepeopleandseeiftherehavebeensomechangessincethepastsurveys
323
LeRoy,K.2008,“ConstitutionalRenewalintheSolomonIslands:PublicParticipationintheoryand
practice,”p.13.
137
wereconducted.Thustocallforanexpandedparameterforthecurrentsurveysuch
astheUNDPsurveyisconsideredignorantattheleastoftheconsultativeprocesses
carriedoutinSolomonIslandsontheseissuessinceindependence.
8.2.3 Calling for more consultative participation with members of the
educatedelitelivingandstudyingabroad
SolomonIslanderslivingabroadshouldbeencouragedbytheCRUtoparticipatein
theconstitutionalreformprocessaswell.Itwillbebeneficialtothereformifsuchan
opportunity is provided to Solomon Islanders who live or study abroad. With their
levelofeducationandexperience,theywillbeabletoshedmorelightonsomeof
these constitutional and political issues facing Solomon Islands. Not only that, but
some of these Solomon Islanders living abroad might be living in countries that
operate under similar political systems such as the federal system of government,
thereforetheywouldbeinabetterpositiontoinformSolomonIslandersaboutthe
operationsofsuchsystem,whichwouldbeaplusbesidestheusualforeignexpert
advisers.
Also it is important to involve young Solomon Islanders studying abroad in the
processtoensuretheyfeelpartoftheprocess.Itislogicalthatoncethisproposed
federalsystemcomesintoplaythemostlikelygroupofpeoplethatwillimplementit
willbethosewhoarenowdoingtheirstudies;andnotnecessarilythecommonfolk
consultedintheruralareas.ThereforeitisimportantthatSolomonIslandstudents
aremadepartoftheconstitutionalreformprocesstoensuretheyhaveasenseof
ownershipwhenimplementingitinthefuture.
8.2.4 ExtendingConsultationstotheInternetdiscussionforums
138
The internet is one of the latest modern technologies to reach Solomon Islands,
connectingpeoplewithrelativesandwantoksthroughouttheworld.Todayalotof
interactioniscarriedoutthroughasystemthatlinkspeopletogether.Forinstance,
there are online discussion forums and online news outlets that are frequently
visited by Solomon Islanders. A lot of these websites were setup by individual or
groupofSolomonIslanderstodiscussissuesofimportancetothem.Obviously,the
constitutional reform process is a very important issue, and if properly planned
should feature in all of these web pages. Unfortunately, though, the CRU web
page324 does not provide an avenue for active engagement with the general
population,unlikethesewebsitesrunbySolomonIslandsindividualsorgroups.
I wondered how much attention is given to these online discussions. For instance,
local websites such as PFnet,325 tutuvatu,326 TARD,327 lifhaus,328 Solomon Times,329
andnumerousotherstudents’blogsites330runnumerousinsightfulopenforumson
issuesinSolomonIslandsincludingtheconstitutionalreformprocessandtheoption
ofafederalsystemofgovernmentforthecountry.Mostofthecontributorsinthese
forumsaretertiarystudents,academicsandSolomonIslandersworkingforregional
and international bodies outside of the country. These forums provide a wealth of
SolomonIslanderopiniononthereformprocess,anditwouldbeofgreatassistance
totheprocessifattentionispaidtotheseforums.
324
www.sicr.gov.sb.
PeopleFastaemNetwork—aUNDPinitiativethatbringstheinternetnetworkclosertopeopleinthe
ruralareas,givingthemaccesstoemailandinformation.
326
WebsitecreatedbyGuadalcanalintellectualstodiscussissuesrelatingtoGuadalcanalandSolomon
Islandsasawhole.
327
TobaitaAuthorityforResearchDevelopment–Astudentorientedassociationthatalsorunsablogsite
fordiscussionofissuesrelatingtoTobaitainterestandSolomonIslands.
328
LocalsocialnetworkingwebpagesrunbySolomonIslandswithactiveopenforums.
329
Localonlinenewspaperoutletthatalsocoordinatesanactiveopendiscussionforumonissuesof
importancetoSolomonIslands.
330
Forexample,Avaikistudentwebpage,CentralMalaitaStudentsAssociation(CMSA)blogsite,Solomon
IslandsMedicalStudentsAssociation(SMSA)blogsite.
325
139
Also, the CRU, as the body that oversees the final stages of the process, should
seriouslyconsiderengagingintheseforumstosolicittheviewsofSolomonIslanders
aspartoftheconsultationprocess.Informationshouldbedistributedtotheseweb
orblogsiteslettingthemknowabouttheinvolvementoftheCRUintheirrespective
discussion forums. A dedicated person or team should be given the task of
monitoring the web sites or blogs to engage in the forums by way of giving
informationortakingnoteoftheviewsraisedinthesediscussionforums.
8.2.5 ReassessmentofSolomonIslanders’attitudeandapproachtowards
whateversystemofgovernmentisinplace
A major reservation to the workability of the federal/state government system in
SolomonIslandsonceitisadoptedbycountryisthechangeitsetouttoachieveas
compared to the unitary system of government. During the consultation process
Solomon Islanders called for a change in the system of government, a change that
will give the majority of Solomon Islanders greater access to development and
important services. A number of commentators argued in support of the unitary
systemofgovernmentbysayingthatthesystemisworkable,butwithouttheproper
attitude and approach from state leaders and governments the much needed
benefits failed to filter to the rural communities.331 The question is what change
would the proposed new political system of government have if the attitude and
approach taken by national leaders and governments remain the same? In an
opinion written by John Roughan on political leadership in Solomon Islands he
suggestthatachangeinpoliticalsystemmaynotachievetheproposedoutcomesif
theleadersmaintainedthesameattitudeandapproachtoleadershipandissuesin
SolomonIslands.332
331
332
Roughan,J.2003,“PreparingnewLeaders,”SolomonIslandsBroadcastingCorporation,Honiara.
ibid.
140
This paper recommends a reassessment of the attitude and approach of Solomon
Islands’ leaders to issues of governance and development. If the proposed
federal/stategovernmentsystemistoworkinthecountrythereneedstobeawider
consultationonawiderangeofissuesincludingtheenvironment,understandingof
the traditional land tenure, management of resources, issues of climate change,
educationandhealth.333SomeleadersinSolomonIslands,lackinganunderstanding
of some of these issues, often made uninformed decisions. A classic example is
decision made by the Solomon Islands Government supporting Japan’s whaling
activities.334Alotofcommentatorsonthisissueofwhalinghadbluntlypointedthat
thedecisionwasbasicallymadeinexchangeforfinancialsupportfromJapan.Some
observers were of the view that the constitutional process and reforms to the
system of government is just another ploy by politicians to keep their cronies and
political affiliates in the political loop. In other words, federalism provides an ideal
opportunityforformerpoliticianstomaintaintheirexpensivelifestylesandremain
inpowerunderthefaçadeofthedifferentstates.
Though federalism looks promising in theory, in reality it may not provide the
adequateservicesifthesameleadershipstyleandapproacharemaintained.There
needs to be a new approach to leadership to show the country’s commitment to
achievingwhattheoldsystemofgovernmentfailedtoachieveinthepastthirtyor
soyears.
8.2.6 ANationalSenate
Thereisevidencefromthevariousconsultationsthatpeoplewereconcernedabout
the rights of members of the federal parliament to vote on national issues. It is
333
KeniloreaJnr,P.“Thefirst2009draftFederalConstitution”SolomonStarOnline,Wednesday9
September2009.
334
RadioAustraliaNetwork,“WhalingandthePacificvote:TheimportanceofthePacificindecidinghow
farwhalingnationscango,”InFocus,http://australianetwork.com/news/infocus/s1400056.htm
141
arguedthatwiththeproposedsinglefederalparliamentsystemtheprovinceswith
more members in the federal parliament will have more say in national issues
comparedtosmallerstates.
Tosolvethisproblemthispapersuggeststhattheconstitutionalcongressconsider
the introduction of a bicameral legislature or a House of Representatives and an
upper house such as a Senate. As in any bicameral system, the House of
Representatives is representative of the population and larger provinces or states
will have more representatives in the Federal Parliament. However, a Senate is
createdtocounteranyabuseofpowertheHouseofRepresentativesmayendureas
aresultofitsunequalrepresentation.IntheSenateorlowerhouseeverystatewill
haveequalrepresentationirrespectiveofitssizeorpopulation.Itisenvisionedthat
abillshallonlybecomelawoncepassedorapprovedbybothhouses.
Theideaofasecondchamberhasbeenraisedinpastconsultationswithoutfurther
discussion onitbytheParliament.Duringthe1987ConstitutionalReview,SirFred
Osifelodidraiseinhissubmissiontheestablishmentofasecondchamber,againfor
thesamereasonsmentionedabove.335Furthermore,theSenatewouldensurethat
the legislative rights of the smaller states are protected from abuse by larger and
more represented states. The Senate should also be empowered by the Federal
Constitution to reject legislation passed in the House of Representatives. This
arrangementensuresthattherightstovoteonlegislativemattersareequallyvoted
onbyallthedifferentgroupsincludingtheminoritygroups.
8.3 Conclusion
335
SolomonIslandsGovernment,“ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report,”1987,Evidence,
p.14.
142
The success of the draft federal constitution is dependent on the participation of
Solomon Islanders in the process. The proposed linkage between the rural villages
and the national leadership hierarchy is important in realizing the importance of
ordinarySolomonIslandersindecisionmaking.
Furthermore,itisimportantthatSolomonIslandersareawareofthepurposesofthe
constitutionmakingexercise.Thisisakeyfactorinenticingthesupportandbacking
ofallSolomonIslanders.Thecurrentconstitutionalreformexerciseisnotaforumto
determinewhetherSolomonIslandsshouldadoptafederalsystemofgovernment;
rather,itisintendedtodesignanddraftadraftfederalconstitution.
Alsoweseetheneedforanexpandedconsultationprocess,especiallyinthelatter
stages of the constitutional reform process. Likewise, the point about a national
senateshouldbeseriouslylookedatbythoseinvolvedintheconstitutionalreform.
Itsimportancecannotbeoverlooked.
Thenextchapterprovidesageneralconclusiontotheresearchpaper.Itwillrevisit
thequestionsthisresearchsetouttoanswer.
143
CHAPTER9:CONCLUSION
9.1Introduction
ThischapterrevisitsthequestionofwhethertheviewsofthemajorityofSolomon
Islandersaretakennoteofleadinguptothefirstdraftfederalconstitution.Andif
so,doesthisformamanifestreflectionoftheviewsofSolomonIslandersduringthe
consultation processes or do the public consultations reflect ‘genuine public
participation.’ As noted by Le Roy in her PhD thesis (Draft) all the phases of
participatory constitution making processes require certain core elements, which
include a distinct phase of raising public awareness, followed by extended
opportunities for people to express their views and preferences, followed by a
deliberativedraftingprocessthatisopenandrepresentative,takingintoaccountthe
views of the public. These are the three basic elements of a participatory
constitutional making process. Again, the key question is how much of this
participatory constitutional making process is adhered to in the Solomon Islands
constitutionalreformprocess.
9.2Discussion
The author embarked on the research with the perception that the constitutional
reform process lacked consultation and the mandate of the people. This was
changedthemomenttheauthorenteredtheConstitutionalReformUnitofficeand
sawtheextentofconsultationcarriedoutthroughdecadesofconsultation.
Looking back, one can conclude that Solomon Islands’ leaders at the date of
independencehadplayedtheirpartinchoosingasystemofgovernmentforthenew
independentcountry.Thesystemofgovernmenthasservedthecountryforatleast
144
thirty (30) years; nevertheless, the majority of Solomon Islanders were still
unsatisfied with the level of development.336 It is time that the next generation of
SolomonIslands’leadersconsidersasystemthatbetterreflectsthediverseheritage
and cultures of Solomon Islanders, an opportunity the independence leaders were
not afforded. It is understandable that the unitary or centralised system of
government does not reflect well the diverse cultures and scatteredness of
Solomon Islands. It is time Solomon Islanders must take the challenge to come up
with a system of government that is conducive and responsive to the needs and
aspirationsofSolomonIslanders.
It is evident from all the consultations and surveys carried out ever since
independence that Solomon Islanders want a decentralised system that would
reflect the uniqueness of the country. The closest to a best system of government
for the country is the federal/state government system – and it is the system
SolomonIslanderswanttoseeimplemented.Asinanyproposedchangeofsystem,
there will always be those who will oppose the changed for fear of disrupting the
present status quo. Therefore they may oppose the proposed change by whatever
meansavailable,includingscaretacticssuchasspreadingfearthatfederalismwould
leadto‘disintegration’ofSolomonIslandsorits‘expensiveness’tooperate.
Thereneedstobemoreparticipationinthemakingofthedraftuntilafinalcopycan
beagreedupon.Sofar,thedraftfederalconstitutiononlyencapsulatesthedesireof
SolomonIslandersforachangeinthesystemofgovernment.However,thedetailof
thisanticipatedchangeisstillentangledinthelegalisticwritingofthedraftfederal
constitution. A peek at the 2004 draft federal constitution will reflect these
anomalies.ThisisreflectedintheWesternProvince’srejectionofthe2004draftof
336
SeeSolomonIslandsGovernment,ConstitutionalReviewCommittee(Mamaloni)Report,1987,andthe
SolomonIslandGovernment/UNDPSurveyfindingsin2003.
145
the federal constitution. The Western Province viewed the 2004 draft federal
constitutionas:
…areluctant,condescending,fearfulldocument,aswellasprostatus
quoatheart.337
WhattheleadersofWesternProvincesawinthe2004draftfederalconstitutionis
just a continuation of the central government system or a failure on its part to
depart from the spirit and letter of the 1978 Independence Constitution.338 It is
reluctantbecauseincertainsectionsitwantstogivepowersandfunctionstostates,
but then it hesitates and provides other controlling provisions. Furthermore, the
2004 draft federal constitution is seen as condescending because it still views the
prospectivestatesas‘agents’and‘subordinates’ofthefederalgovernment.339Also,
thepaperarguedthatitisfearfullbecausethedraftfederalconstitutionseemsto
takeonthebeliefthatallstateswouldnotbeabletotakeonmajorresponsibilities
andthatanyofthemcouldcauseinstabilityifgiventoomuchpower.Allthesecan
be discerned from a number of provisions, including the provisions on state and
federal powers, concurrent powers, revenue sharing, security, boundary, and also
theformulationofstateconstitutions.
Ifeelthatthepaperhasadequatelydealtwithallthequestionstheresearchsetout
to find answers to. I agree that the consultations, surveys and reviews do in fact
reflect the views and perspective of the majority of Solomon Islanders since
independence.Theseviews,perspectivesandcontributionsplayamajorroleinthe
final makeup or content of the draft federal constitution. Similarly, government
appointed committees such as the State Government Task Forceand the Congress
337
WesternProvincialGovernment,“OfficialReportsonStateGovernment2000–2007,”June2007.
ibid.
339
ibid.
338
146
Members and Eminent Persons have the full support of the communities they
represented. Though more members could have boosted these committees, the
purpose and the processes these committees were involved in gave them the
supportandmandateneededtoproceedwiththeirroles.
Also it can be pointed out here that research has shown that the national
governmentand foreignstakeholdersdid makevariousattemptsto destabilise the
constitutional reform process. For instance, foreign aid donors withdrew from
supporting the process in 2004, citing the expensive implications of the federal
government system if implemented. Similarly, various governments tried to
influencetheprocessbyattemptingtospeeduptheprocessforunknownpolitical
agendas.
Nevertheless, all these do not prevent Solomon Islanders from participating freely
andopenlyintheConstitutionalreformprocess.
9.3Conclusion
This chapter brings to an end another segment to a long constitutional reform
process in Solomon Islands. One cannot determine when the final draft of the
federal constitution will be ready. Experience has shown that numerous dates had
beensetandbypassedovertheyears.Thisisthenormfortheconstitutionalreform
processinSolomonIslands.Last,Icanrecall,thedateforthefinaldraftwassetfor
December2009;ithassincebeenpostponedtoanotherlaterdateon2010.
Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a setback to the constitutional reform
process. Rather it should be viewed as another step towards the maturity of the
reformprocessinSolomonIslands.Witheverypostponeddeadline,comesanother
147
yearofplanningandworking.Also,moreresearchwillbecarriedoutbyresearchers,
highlighting the different stages of this process. This by itself is evidence of the
participationofSolomonIslandersintheconstitutionalreformprocess.
148
APPENDIXI
146
SOLOMONISLANDSCONSTITUTIONALREFORMPROCESSTIMELINE
Date
Event
PREINDEPENDENCE
1977
SpecialCommitteetotheProvincialGovernmentSystemConsultation(KausimaeReport,1977)
POSTINDEPENDENCE
1978
7thJuly–SolomonIslandsgainedindependencefromBritain
IndependenceCelebrationswereboycottedbyWesternProvinceledbytheWesternProvinceBreakaway
Movement
1986
CommitteetoReviewtheProvincialGovernmentSystem(LuleiReport,1986)
1987
ConstitutionalReviewCommitteeSurvey(MamaloniandKeniloreaReport,1987)
1988
Guadalcanaldemandsandpetitionwerebroughttothegovernment’sattention
1999
CommitteetoReviewtheProvincialGovernmentSystem(TozakaReport,1999)
19982000
EthnicCrises–IFM/GRAestablished
1999
HoniaraPeaceAccord/MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweenSolomonIslandsGovernmentandGuadalcanal
ProvincialGovernment/MarauCommuniqué/PanatinaAgreement
MEFestablished
POST2000
2000
AukiCommuniqué/BualaPeaceCommuniqué/TownsvillePeaceAgreement(TPA)
BualaPremiersConference
2007
2005
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
147
StateGovernmentTaskForceReport
MarauPeaceAgreement
UNDP1stnationalConsultation
UNDP2ndnationalConsultation
9November–SirAllanKemakeza(PrimeMinister)launchedthefirstDraftFederalConstitutionforSolomon
Islands
PERIODAFTERTHELAUNCHINGOFTHEFIRSTDRAFTOFTHEFEDERALCONSTITUTION
MembersofParliamentConsultationonthefirstDFC
28June–OppositionSpokesmanClementKengavaaccusedthegovernment(GCC)ofcomplacencyinpushing
forwardthestategovernmentagenda
8August–Government(GCC)respondedtocriticismsbysettingJanuary2007asthedateofcompletionofthe
finaldraftofthefederalconstitution
5thOctober–GovernorGeneral(Waena)inaspeechdeliveredatParliamentindicatedthatthegovernmentis
finalizingthefederalsystemofgovernment
13thJune–PMSogavarelaunchedtheConstitutionalCongress
27thJuly–NamesofthemembersoftheConstitutionalCongressandEPACwerereleasedtothepublic
4thAugust–PremierofWesternProvincesubmittedtheprovince’ssummarydocumentonStateGovernment
5thAugust–SogavareannouncedthedatesforthefirstmeetingoftheCCandEPAC.AlsoOctober2008wassetas
thedeadlinefortheDraftFederalConstitutiontobesubmittedtotheCabinetinpreparationforParliament
21stAugust–SogavarewelcomedtheCCandEPACmemberstotheweeklonginductionmeetinginHoniara
1stOctober–CChelditssecondmeetingbylookingatspecificsectionsoftheDFC
15thOctober–ConstitutionalReviewCongressClosed
September–ProvincialPremiersMeeting(LakeTegnano).Inthecommuniquéallpremierssupportedthefederal
2008
148
systemofgovernmentforthecountry
3rdNovember–PSJohnTuhaikapresentedapaperatthePIMOPconsultation(onthePacificPlanandHuman
Rights)inAucklandindicatingtheintentiontoadoptalleconomicandculturalrightsofSolomonIslandsintheDFC
10thDecember–HonJaphetWaiporareiteratedgovernment’scommitmenttotheconstitutionalreformprocess
duringtheWesternProvinceSecondAppointeddayinGizo
1stApril–PMSIkuaannouncedthedeadlinefortheDFCtobeinJuly2009,revokingthepreviousdeadlinesetby
theSogavareGovernment
7thApril–CC&EPACsetup7strategicthemeswith7themecommitteestolookateachthem
9thMay–CRUlauncheditsmediacampaignontheconstitutionalreformsinthecountry,encouragingallSolomon
Islanderstocontributetotheprocess
10thJune–Sikuareiteratedthegovernment’scommitmenttointroducethefinalDFCinavisittoIsabelProvince
11thJuly–CC&EPACexecutivesmetinHoniaraoverimmediateissuesoverthereformprocess
14thJuly–WesternProvincecriticizedthegovernmentfortryingtogettheprovincetoendorsetheDFCwhichit
hadearlierrejected
15thJuly–the7themesCommitteesoftheCongressdeferredtheirmeetingsoverfinancialissues
30thJuly–NationalParliament’sStandingCommitteeonConstitutionalReviewannouncedthecommittees
commencementofinquiriesintotheDFC(ChairedbyTozaka,MP)
21stAugust–SikuahelddiscussionswithSecretaryGeneraloftheCommonwealthSecretariatoverthepossibility
ofprovidingaConstitutionalLawyertosupportthereformprocess
1st–5thSeptember–WomenGroupsheldconsultationtolookattheDFC(OrganizedbyMinistryofWomen,
YouthsandChildrenAffairs)
7thSeptember–WomenstakeholderswerepleasedwiththeDFCprovisionsrelatingtowomenandchildren
15thSeptember–PremiersMeeting(Lata)
17thSeptember–OppositionaccusedthePMofmisleadingPremiersovertheProvincialGovernmentSystem
23rdSeptember–PublichearingheldattheNationalParliamentforsubmissionsandpresentationsontheDFC.A
numberofpeoplepresentedtheirviewsincludingPremiers,theMayorofHoniaraandtheSpeakerofParliament
24thSeptember–MalaitaProvincecalledonthegovernmenttodelaytheFederalSystemofGovernment,and
2009
149
insteadconcentrateofEconomicdevelopmentissuesfirst.Other9Premierscalledonthegovernmenttogrant
provincesstatehood
29thSeptember9thOctober–PublicFinanceandRevenueSharingThemeCommitteeheldtheseriesofmeetings
5thDecember–WesternandGuadalcanalProvincialPremiersrenewedtheircallforfasterworkonthereview
process
18thFebruary–FredRohoruawasappointedthenewPSfortheConstitutionalReviewUnitreplacingthelong
servingPSJohnTuhaika
26thMarch–PublicFinanceandRevenueSharing,FederalPoliticalSystemsandPowers,andtheFederal
FoundationsthemeCommitteesresumedtheirthememeetingsinHoniara
2May–ConstitutionallawyerReginaldTeutaohopestocompletethefinalDFCdraftbyNovember
4thMay–ThefirstJointPlenaryMeetingcommencedinHoniara
29thJune–PrivateLawyerAndrewNoridefendedtheProvincialGovernmentSystemonthenationalradio
30thJune–thetwomonthlongJointPlenaryMeetingoftheCC&EPACmemberswasfinallycompleted
11thAugust–Thefirst2009DFCwasreleasedforpublicreview
PERIODAFTERTHEFIRST2009DRAFTOFTHEFEDERALCONSTITUTION
CCprovincialconsultations
12thAugust–PMSikuaadjustedthedeadlineforthefinaldrafttoApril2010
APPENDIXIII
MapofSolomonIslands
&(175$/3529,1&(
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APPENDIXVI
LenoraHamilton
InterviewmadewithLenoraHamilton,HeadoftheWesternProvinceTeamforthe
UNDPConsultationsinMarchandJuly2003.
Date:26thJuly2009
Venue:PacLiioffice,UniversityoftheSouthPacific,Vanuatu.
QuestionsaskedbyPaul
1. WhatwasyourjobdescriptioninSolomonIslands?
IwasalegaladvisorwiththeMinistryofProvincialGovernmentpriorto2003.
In2003IjoinedtheRAMSIlegalgroupasalegaladvisorwiththepublicsolicitors
office.
2. HowdidyougetinvolvedintheUNDPsurvey?
Weappliedforthepostofteamleaders.HavingworkedintheWesternProvince
forawhile,Iwasselectedastheteamleaderforthewesternprovinceteam
duringtheSIG/UNDPsurveysin2003.
3. Whatisyourroleasteamleader?
Myroleasteamleaderistocoordinatemyteam’ssurveyintheprovince.I
ensurethatteammembersreachthetargetedcommunitiesandprovidequality
reports.
4. HowmanypeoplewereinyourteamfortheWesternProvince?
OurteamfortheWesternProvinceconsistedof4people.
5. Whatstandingdoesmembersofyourteamhaveinthecommunities?
ThemembersofmyteamwerepeoplewithhighregardintheWesternProvince,
forexample,peoplelikeJacksonPiasi,alawyerandformermemberof
Parliament.
6. Doesyourteamhaveenoughtrainingbeforethesurvey?
Yes,weallattendedthetrainingscoordinatedbytheUNDPteambeforewe
dispersedforthesurvey.
7. Whatdoyouthinkofthetiminganddurationofthesurveys?
Ipersonallythinkthetimingisok,however,wecouldreachedsomemore
remotecommunitiesifitwasextendedfor2or3months.
162
8. Whatistheextentofyourteam’ssurveyinthewesternprovince?
We’vereachedouttomostofthecommunitiesintheWest,however,dueto
timelimitations;wewerenotabletoreachtheremotepartsoftheprovince.
9. Whatwasthemodeofcommunicationusedduringthesurvey?
Themoreofcommunicationwaspidginandthelocaldialects.
10. Dopeopleunderstandthepurposeofthesurvey?
Yes
11. Dopeoplehaveachoicetodecideonwhethertheywantfederalismofremain
withthecurrentunitarysystem?
Thatwasnotthefocusofthesurvey.
12. Whatisyouropinionofthesurvey,doesitconveythemajorityviewofpeoplein
theWesternProvince?
Itdoes
13. Someresearchershardarguedthatthecallforfederalismwasjustatacticused
bythosewhoareinpowertoensuretheyandtheircroniesremainedinpower,
doyouagreewiththatview?
TosomeextentIagreewiththat,buttheunderlyingfactoristhatfederalismis
longoverdueinSolomonIslands.
163
APPENDIXIX
LISTIII
CONCURRENTPOWERS(MostProvinceswantthislistdeleted)
(RennellBellona,CentralandGuadalcanalwantconcurrent
powers)
(Temotuwillnegotiateforfreeassociation)
Bothlevelsofgovernmentmaymakelawsrelatingtothe
followingmatters.
1. Governance
(a) PublicService
(b) Publicholidays
(c) Civilemergency
(d) Commissionsofinquiry
2. Justice
(a) Theadministrationofjustice
(b) Establishmentoftribunalsandquasijudicial
bodies
3. ProvisionofService
(a) Watersupply,sanitationandsewagedisposal
(b) Electricityandpowergeneration
(c) Postalandtelecommunications
(d) Portsandharbours
(e) Airports
(f) Broadcasting
(g) Fireservicesandfireprevention
(h)
Publicworks
4. Education
(a) Curriculum
(b) Vocationalandtechnicaltraining
(c) Scholarships
(d) Archivesandgovernmentrecords
(e) Librariesandmuseums
5. Health
(a) Publichealth
(b) Medicalandhospitalservices
(c) Malariaanddiseasecontrol
6. LandandWater
(a) Landtenureanddealings
(b) Landregistration
(c) LandPlanning,useanddevelopment
(d) Waterandprotectionofwater
7. MineralsandPetroleum
(a) Prospectingandminingminerals
(b) Explorationforandextractionofoilandgas
8. Agriculture,FisheriesandForestry
(a) Forestandforestresources
(b) Agriculture,apiariesandlivestock
(c) Animalwelfare
(d) Fisheries,subjecttochapter12,PartIIofthe
Constitution
9. Trade,CommerceandIndustry
(a) Pricecontrol
(b) Consumerprotectionandfaretrading
(c) Regulationofimports
(d) Insurance
(e) Alcoholandtobacco
(f) Regulationoftradepractices
(g) Statetourism
10. SocialSecurityandTradeOrganizations
(a) Employment,welfareoflabourandtradeunions
(b) Compensationandsuperannuationschemes
(c) Employmentbenefitsandpensions
11. EnvironmentandConservation
(a) Environmentprotectionandregulation
(b) Conservationofnaturalresourcesandregulation
ofinvasivespecies
(c) Wildlifeprotectionandpreservationofbiological
diversity
(d) Geneticresourcesandgeneticallymodified
resources
12. LandPlanningandManagement
(a) Landuseplanninganddevelopment
(b) Regulationofbuildingandconstruction
(c) Preservationandprotectionofhistoricalsitesand
culturalheritage
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