CHAPTER
22
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURE D
July both airfields were firmly in Australian hands and th e
B Y7th9thDivision
had completed its main tasks . The two forward battalion s
of the Japanese force had been reduced to fragments . But, meanwhile ,
the 25th Brigade, facing the third battalion dug in round the Batuchampa r
area on the Milford Highway, had become heavily engaged ; and, on th e
extreme left, units of the 18th Brigade had become involved in a novel
river war. It was now known that Rear-Admiral Kamada ' s headquarters
were in the Batuchampar area .
On the afternoon of 4th July Brigadier Eather had held a conferenc e
at which he ordered his unit commanders to continue the northwar d
advance on a three-battalion front . He instructed Lieut-Colonel R . H .
Marson of the 2/25th to take over Nurse and Nail from the 2/31st, th e
object being to "seal off" the area from Orr's Junction westward to the
coast and clear the country thus enclosed . All three battalions were then
" to move forward slowly making utmost use of supporting arms" . 1 Thes e
included those of the 2/4th Field Regiment, of a company of the 2/1s t
Machine Gun Battalion, some anti-tank guns, and three troops of tanks .
On the right the 2/33rd had occupied Letter and Lewis on the 4th, an d
on the 5th pressed on against dwindling opposition to Mackay, Marshall ,
Mutual and Margin .
After the 2/25th had relieved the 2/31st (Lieut-Colonel Robson) o n
Nail and Nurse the forward companies of the 2/31st took up defensiv e
positions on Letter and Lewis . Then Laverton was occupied, and, afte r
a bombardment, Liverpool was taken . Heavy fire was now coming from
Metal, and about 1 p .m . Robson's command post on Lodge was unde r
heavy fire and his adjutant (Captain De Daunton 2 ) and Intelligence office r
(Lieutenant B . E . D . Robertson) were wounded and the wireless set sho t
to pieces . Robertson continued to pass information back to brigade b y
telephone until carried back under fire by Corporal Moorhouse, 3 wh o
then went out again and brought in the telephone .
When it occupied its new positions on 5th July the 2/33rd was unde r
fire from Muffle, to the east, and, like the 2/31st, from Metal . That
night mortars lobbed 650 bombs on to Metal and next morning Captain
Balfour-Ogilvy ' s 4 company took that hill, but a platoon of another company that moved towards Muffle was held up by enemy fire ; in the afternoon, however, Muffle too was taken . From midday onwards Japanes e
guns on Joint fired on the battalion's positions . At 3 .55 p .m . shells hit
'War diary, 25th Brigade .
Capt F . H . De Daunton, QX20933 ; 2/31 Bn. Storeman and packer ; of Auchenflower, Q1d ;
b . Brisbane, 24 Mar 1920 .
3 Cpl C. A . R . Moorhouse, MM, QX16959 ; 2/31 Bn. 2 Bn RAR, Korea 1952-53 . Labourer ; of
Toowoomba, Q1d ; b. Portsmouth, England, 2 Apr 1921 .
'Capt J . M . Balfour-Ogilvy, SX1662 ; 2/33 Bn . Storeman ; of Renmark, SA ; b. Renmark, 1 0
Jul 1918 .
5-7 July
ASTRIDE THE MILFORD HIGHWAY
53 3
the command post, killed the signals officer, Lieutenant Wallace, 5 and
wounded the commander of the 2/33rd, Lieut-Colonel T . R . W . Cotton ,
and others . Cotton was taken to the dressing station and G . E . Lyon ,
Eather' s brigade major, who had just arrived at the post, assumed command . A company probed forward towards Judge but came under heav y
fire and withdrew to Marshall . On 6th July the 2/25th pressed on, too k
over Liverpool and occupied Huon .
Eather ' s policy in this situation—the enemy resisting vigorously o n
naturally-strong ridges—was to use the supporting arms to the maximu m
and probe forward with patrols . Even so the Japanese were exacting a
high price . On 5th July the brigade had lost 9 killed and 13 wounded ;
31 Japanese dead were counted and 2 prisoners taken . On the 6th th e
brigade lost 2 killed and 32 wounded ; 20 Japanese dead were counte d
and 3 prisoners taken .
On the morning of 7th July Lieut-Colonel Marson ordered Major C . S .
Andrew ' s company, on Huon, to take Cult with one platoon, and if thi s
succeeded to build up to full company strength . Lieutenant Egan6 le d
s Lt H . S . Wallace, WX26133 ; 2/33 Bn. Clerk ; of Como, WA ; b. Perth, 4 Jan 1921 . Killed in
action 6 Jul 1945 .
Lt J . M . Egan, VX105958 ; 2/25 Bn. Grocer ; of West Richmond, Vic ; b . Kew, Vic, 25 Apr 1919 .
534
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURED
5-9 July
his platoon out, formed a firm base on Cult without meeting opposition ,
and sent a section to Jam . It came under fire from two pill-boxes and ,
ably led by Lance-Corporal Svenson,' wiped one out but then was force d
back. At this stage Andrew and an artillery party arrived on Cult wit h
the remainder of the company. It was now found that a copse betwee n
Cult and Jam was strongly held ; it was kept quiet by machine-gun fir e
from Liverpool .
Next day the copse was shelled but patrols probing forward met shar p
fire . Finally, after a very heavy concentration of fire by field guns, anti tank guns and machine-guns, a patrol on the 9th found the copse and Ja m
unoccupied . On Jam and in the copse 46 enemy dead were found an d
there were signs that others had been buried . The 2/25th lost 3 kille d
and 10 wounded of whom 6 remained on duty .
Almost every night small parties of Japanese raided the Australian
positions . For example, on the night of the 7th the 2/31st killed si x
raiders, and the headquarters of the 2/33rd was attacked by about 1 6
armed with rifles, machine-guns, spears and grenades . These killed the
Intelligence officer, Lieutenant Melville, 8 and wounded 3 ; 3 Japanes e
officers and 9 men were killed . Eather now sent the 2/6th Commando
Squadron (Captain G . C . Blainey) out on the left flank into the hill s
overlooking the Sumber River . Here on the 8th they occupied Job an d
next day found Freight and other hills unoccupied : it was evident that
the Japanese had abandoned most of the garden area along Phillipson's
Road .
That day after heavy bombardment the 2/33rd (now commande d
by Major Bennett°) found Justice abandoned, and a company pressed o n
to Joint where 16 enemy dead and two damaged field guns were found ;
and to Judge . On the right flank two platoons under Lieutenants Moore'.
and Richards 2 made a converging attack on Muffle, long an isolated ye t
stubborn enemy outpost well to the south of their main positions, an d
took it ; 15 Japanese dead were counted there . By the end of the da y
it was evident that the enemy rearguard had withdrawn about three mile s
along the highway to the Batuchampar area .
The effectiveness of the artillery fire—obviously a main cause of th e
withdrawal—was revealed by examination of the ridges that the Australians occupied on the 9th : shell holes on Muffle, Joint, Justice and
Jam were only about five yards apart and many bunkers had been hit ;
the two field guns found on Joint had received direct hits .
For the first five days the 25th Brigade had been fighting in fairl y
open country in which it was able to use all available supporting weapons ,
7 W02 V . P. Svenson, MBE, NX167876 ; 2/25 Bn . 3 Bn RAR, Korea 1950-51 . Labourer ; of Sydney ;
b. Sydney, 2 Jul 1924 .
8 Lt J . R . W. Melville, NX119431 ; 2/33 Bn . Bank officer ; of Croydon, NSW ; b . Christchurch ,
NZ, 17 Mar 1916 . Killed in action 8 Jul 1945 .
8 Maj G . W . Bennett, MC, WX335 ; 2/33 Bn . Pastoral overseer
; of Port Hedland-Marble Bar, WA ;
b . Subiaco, WA, 4 Nov 1912 .
I Lt N. A . Moore, VX102154 ; 2/33 Bn . Schoolteacher ; of Hamilton, Vic ; b . Hamilton, 10 Aug 1918 .
9 Lt C . H. Richards, NX163759 ; 2/33 Bn . Clerk ; of Belmore, NSW; b. Sydney, 25 Feb 1920.
9-10 July
CELLO AND COKE
53 5
but from the 9th onwards it was fighting in thick bush . The advanc e
astride the Milford Highway to Batuchampar was allotted to the 2/31s t
Battalion . On the afternoon of the 9th Colonel Robson gave orders tha t
Major C . W . Hyndman's company would be forward on the right, it s
objective being Junior, and Major H . F . Hayes ' company on the left, it s
objective being a road bend due north of Junior . These were occupie d
without loss by 5 p .m . and at 6 .25 Robson decided to move the whol e
battalion forward . Soon afterwards Lieutenant Lewis'' platoon was movin g
along the highway when five 500-kilo bombs lying in the open alon g
the road were exploded around the Australians by remote control killin g
3 and leaving 17 others dazed by the blast ; the Japanese then opened
fire with machine-guns . Corporal Mullins, 4 commanding one section,
was thrown 15 feet off the road but returned, carried out a wounded man ,
withdrew the remainder of the bewildered men, and then went back an d
carried out another wounded man . That night the 2/31st formed a
perimeter in this area and a patrol found the enemy dug in forward o f
Cello .
On the morning of the 10th Captain Lewington's 5 company secure d
a foothold in the buildings at Cello about 300 yards from the enemy.
Robson was moving forward with a reconnaissance party when a grou p
of depth-charges was exploded by remote control ; Lewington suffered
shock and the artillery observer was wounded . By 11 .30, however, Cello
had been secured and Japanese were seen at some fallen timber beyond ,
which was mortared and bombarded by the artillery .
At 12 .10 p .m . Robson ordered Hayes' company to attack through th e
company on Cello and secure the fallen-timber area . In support was a
troop of three tanks including one Frog . From 1 .45 until 2 .30 the artillery
and 4 .2-inch and 3-inch mortars fired on the area, clearing all the ligh t
timber, and the tanks, which had taken up hull-down positions on th e
road, fired into enemy strongpoints .
Hayes' company attacked at 2 .30 with one platoon and the Frog for ward . Two bunkers were soon silenced . Warrant-Officer Willson6 advanced
with one section and knocked out several Japanese machine-gun posts .
He was wounded but carried on, capturing a 40-mm gun, and in 1 5
minutes the foremost enemy position had been taken . Twenty-five Japanese
were killed and the captured weapons included one 75-mm gun, nine
light anti-aircraft guns and two anti-tank guns . A patrol then probed
forward and reported one machine-gun post on Coke .
Coke was a steep knoll on the right of the road carrying a tall tree
every few yards and with tangled secondary growth among which la y
a number of big logs 3 and 4 feet in diameter, evidently felled by timbe r
Maj R . A . Lewis, NX177993 ; 2/31 Bn. Regular soldier ; b . Wollongong, NSW, 5 Dec 1920 .
Cpl J. Mullins, MM, QX15555 ; 2/31 Bn. Tractor driver ; of Tully, Qld ; b . Ingham, Qld, 5
Nov 1917 .
5
Capt A. J . M . Lewington, NX12285 ; 2/31 Bn. Accounting clerk and wool classer ; of Lindfield ,
NSW ; b . Townsville, Q1d, 18 May 1913 .
9
WO2 R . W. Willson, MM, SX1708 ; 2/31 Bn . Farm worker; of Penneshaw, Kangaroo Island, SA ;
b. Penneshaw, 21 Jan 1914 .
E
516
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURED
10 July
getters . Robson, who considered that the shell of the enemy's resistance
had been broken, now gave a warning order to Hyndman ' s company
to take Coke and thrust along the road with all speed . The artillery an d
mortars began firing on the objective at 3 p .m . and the tanks fired fro m
a road cutting 400 yards from the foot of Coke . There was no repl y
from the enemy. Lieutenant Carroll's 7 platoon attacked at 5 p .m . with
three tanks (of the 2/1st Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron )
and with two engineers out ahead to deal with mines . The tanks (in line
ahead and about 30 yards apart) and the infantry had advanced abou t
100 yards without opposition when the enemy opened intense fire fro m
several positions on Coke and also from some on the left of the road .
The fire from the left killed Major Ryrie of the tanks and a signalle r
who were forward in the road cutting, and wounded Major K . S . Hall ,
second-in-command of the 2/31st, who, with Robson, was also watchin g
from the cutting . The forward platoon lost heavily and was halted, one
man, Lance-Corporal Rabjohns, 8 lying within five yards of the enemy an d
others within 20 yards . The posts, which numbered about seven, wer e
dug under the big logs, which gave good overhead cover, or at the foot
of big trees .
All this had happened in an instant . When the Japanese opened fir e
the men of Lieutenant Kelly's 9 platoon, which was to leap-frog ove r
Carroll's when it had passed Coke, were leaning against the bank of th e
cutting just behind Robson, Ryrie and the others . Immediately Robso n
turned and shouted : "Nine platoon, get up there on the right! "
We had a grandstand view and needed no orders by the platoon commande r
(wrote one of them later) . [Corporal Ottrey's 1 ] section crossed the road first and ran
into the fire that killed Ryrie . It was so quickly done that I am sure it was th e
same gun and the same magazine .
Ottrey and two others were hit. Lance-Corporal Cooper, 2 a former lancesergeant in the 1st Parachute Battalion, who had heard Kelly give a
shout and thought he too had been hit, collected five men, and the y
pressed on to the logs where Cooper grenaded two Japanese who appeare d
on the right . There they threw off their haversacks and fixed bayonets .
Kelly now joined this group and then arrived a second platoon whic h
Robson had sent forward . While part of the two platoons faced right
Cooper sent two men up the hill in search of the machine-gun whic h
had hit so many men on the road . The leading scout, Private Blunden, 3
fell . Cooper ran up to him and found him at the feet of a Japanese .
Cooper promptly bayoneted this man, picked up Blunden ' s Owen gu n
v Lt G. P . Carroll, NX105341 ; 2/31 Bn. Public servant ; of Cremorne, NSW ; b . Newcastle, NSW,
8 Sep 1916 .
L-Cpl G . A . Rabjohns, NX93647 ; 2/31 Bn . Station hand ; of Roslyn, NSW ; b . Crookwell, NSW,
13 Dec 1920.
9 Lt A. C . Kelly, WX26075 ; 2/31 Bn. Farmer ; of Quairading, WA ; b . Quairading, 30 Apr 1917 .
1 Cpl A. J . Ottrey, QX15632 ; 2/31 Bn . Labourer ; of Gunbower, Vic ; b . Pyramid Hills, Vic ,
6 Nov 1913. Died of wounds 10 Jul 1945 .
9 Maj E. J . Cooper, VX13988. 2/8 Fd Regt, 1 Parachute Bn and 2/31 Bn . Postal clerk; of
Frankston, Vic ; b . Mentone, Vic, 12 Oct 1920 .
9 Pte J . D . R . Blunden, VX94110 ; 2/31 Bn. Shop assistant ; of Melbourne ; b . Melbourne, 9 Ju n
1925 . Killed in action 10 Jul 1945 .
10-14 July
BRINGING OUT
THE
WOUNDED
53 7
and shot four more . Cooper held on here while the men farther dow n
the hill beat off Japanese who were coming in from the right .
On the road, when the forward tank—the Frog—had exhausted it s
fuel, it went back carrying wounded, and another tank replaced it . Private
Douglass, 4 a man of 39 who was normally a storeman at battalion head quarters, moved down the road under heavy fire and helped out tw o
wounded men, then returned on a tank and remained attending to wounde d
men who lay in the open . The tanks could not turn on the road, an d
when the leading one withdrew the others had to precede it . About te n
Japanese were now advancing round the lower slopes of Coke toward s
the wounded, but Douglass engaged them with Rabjohns ' Owen gun and
held them off until the wounded men had been taken out by the tank .
Corporal Murdock 's5 tank now gave supporting fire until its Besa gun
was damaged and could fire only single shots and all high-explosiv e
ammunition for its main gun was exhausted . At 5 .50 Murdock wa s
ordered to withdraw and to pass on an order to withdraw to the infantry .
Murdock dismounted under fire and did this ; he then directed the placin g
of four wounded on his tank and brought them out . Two of his crew
had been wounded.
Robson ' s order to withdraw was passed forward from man to man .
The forward infantry sections came out under spasmodic fire, helpin g
with the wounded, and then the battalion took up a defensive positio n
astride the road for the night . The Japanese infiltrated among the Australian posts that night and killed one man . On the 10th, 18 had bee n
killed and 23 wounded round Coke, all but 3 killed and 9 wounded bein g
in Hyndman's company ; at the end of the day 11 of the dead had not
yet been recovered .
On the left of the 25th Brigade the 2/6th Commando Squadron ha d
been ordered by Brigadier Eather to patrol to Sumber Kiri . On the 10t h
a patrol under Lance-Sergeant J . McA . Brammer encountered about 6 0
Japanese north-east of the village . Lieutenant W . Taylor hastened forwar d
with another section ; they attacked and drove out the Japanese who left
8 dead ; two Australians were killed .
There was a lull after the hard fight on Coke . The Japanese facing
the 2/31st were well dug in and well armed . Next day Eather ordered the
2/25th to relieve the 2/31st . On the 12th a patrol of the 2/6th Squadron
worked round through the bush to a point on Charm whence it overlooked the highway about two miles behind the forward positions . Here
the men watched parties of about 30 Japanese carrying supplies an d
stretchers forward . A party of about 20 approached the Australians '
observation post . The Australians withdrew and set an ambush whic h
killed six ; the others made off . The main body of the squadron on th e
13th and 14th moved to Cloncurry and Abash . In the course of this mov e
4 Pte H . F . Douglass, MM, NX90322; 2/31 Bn . Labourer ; of Taree, NSW; b. Enfield, NSW,
6
18 Oct 1905.
Cpl L . J . Murdock, SX17203 ; 2/1 Armd Bde Recce Sqn . Farmer ; of Warooka, SA ; b. Warooka,
24 Oct 1918 .
538
BALIKPAPAN
AREA
SECURED
13-18 July
one troop was ambushed, two bombs were detonated in its path, and
Lieutenant Linklater 6 and four others were killed or mortally wounded .
An N.E .I . platoon that had also been patrolling on this flank was at th e
Wain pumping station and probing northward .
After much patrolling on both sides of the highway, Eather, on the
afternoon of 14th July, ordered the 2/25th to send a company wide o n
each flank : one to Cart and the other to Calm, both of which had bee n
visited by patrols and found unoccupied . The right-hand company reache d
Cocoa about a mile south of Cart by dusk ; the left moved through Cal m
to Chair . On the 15th Lieut-Colonel Marson ordered the company o n
the right (Captain B . G . C . Walker) to advance to Cart while anothe r
company and his own headquarters moved on to Calm . In this situation
the battalion would dominate the highway from both east and west .
The enemy reacted strongly on the night of the 15th . In heavy rain
from 40 to 50 raided Calm but were driven off . In this fight which lasted
all night Lance-Corporal Grigg' moved forward alone to a log that th e
raiders were using as cover and threw grenades over the log at th e
Japanese . He was believed to have killed most of the 13 Japanese wh o
were found dead there . The Japanese raiders moved very quietly : one o f
them wounded an Australian with a sword . When daylight came th e
Japanese withdrew about 75 yards . Marson sent up three platoons under
Major Andrew at 9 o'clock next morning and these took forward ammunition, carried out the wounded and drove the Japanese away . On the 16th
an enemy force occupied Cocoa, temporarily cutting the line of communication of Walker's company on Cart, and that night raiding partie s
attacked the headquarters of the 2/33rd near Cello causing five casualties ,
and attacked the N .E .I . platoon at Wain pumping station, causing it to fal l
back some distance .
On the 17th a company of the 2/25th occupied Charm hard by th e
highway and a company of the 2/33rd took over on Cart . That evenin g
Eather gave orders for a decisive movement : the 2/6th Squadron, which
was carrying out ambushes throughout its area—it killed 23 Japanese o n
the 16th and 17th—was to patrol in strength to the highway nea r
the junction with Pope ' s Track ; the 2/31st was to relieve the 2/33rd
astride the highway ; the 2/25th was to cut the highway at Charm ; th e
2/33rd was to cut the track running east from the Pope ' s Track junctio n
along the valley north of Cart.
That night (the 17th-18th), which was dark and rainy, the Japanes e
"reacted violently to the gradual encirclement" and before dawn attacke d
the two companies of the 2/25th then on Charm and the headquarter s
of the 2/33rd . At Charm the enemy maintained constant pressure agains t
the whole perimeter until a counter-attack drove them off at 8 .30 a .m .
Here three Australians and 53 Japanese were killed, many probably b y
Lt A . F . Linklater, NX68478 . 2/6 Indep Coy, 2/6 Cdo Sqn . Clerk ; of Willoughby, NSW ; b .
Willoughby, 24 Jun 1921 . Killed in action 13 Jul 1945.
* Cpl R . F . Grigg, DCM, NX99043 ; 2/25 Bn . Station hand ; of Wagga Wagga, NSW ; b . Goulburn ,
NSW, 8 Dec 1922 .
6
19-21 July
OBJECTIVES ATTAINED
53 9
defensive fire brought down by the artillery . On the 19th and 20th the
forward companies continued to probe on both sides of the road . Ther e
was a sharp fight on Charm on the 20th . Lieutenant Raward 8 and 1 2
men of Captain R . W. P . Dodd's company went out to destroy a Japanes e
strongpoint which was found to be far stronger than expected . Raward
divided his party into two, attacked and drove the enemy out . Corpora l
Ford ,9 operating a flame-thrower with much daring, was largely responsibl e
for the success . That evening a patrol of the same company under
Lieutenant McCosker l ambushed a carrying party of 20 moving south
along the highway and killed about 17 . Round Charm the 2/25th kille d
95 Japanese and lost 4 killed and 12 wounded . The 2/33rd on the right
was now round Cart, the 2/25th on Calm, Chair, Charm and Abide .
The 2/31st was astride the highway south-south-east of Chair . Th e
tanks moving with it along the highway had been halted by a big crate r
in the road . On the afternoon of the 19th, after artillery bombardment ,
Lewington's company advanced and attacked round the right flank, an d
a tank with bridging equipment moved forward to span the crater in th e
road and let four other tanks through . By 2 p .m . the bridge was ready and
the leading tank moved up to engage the enemy ; by 3 p .m . the company
had its objectives, and had taken four heavy mortars . One of the tanks
was temporarily disabled by a contact mine which it hit just beyond the
bridge.
Patrolling continued on the morning of the 21st : the enemy was still
in the same positions on both sides of the highway . In the evening, however, it was found that the forward positions had been vacated but wer e
covered by fire from a little farther back . Patrols counted 26 dead in
the abandoned posts . That night there were loud explosions round Charm
and elsewhere, and next morning the enemy had gone . Against little
opposition patrols pushed forward to Pope's Track and beyond .2
General Milford decided that, having reached the line of Pope ' s Track,
he had his objectives and no good purpose would be served by continuin g
to thrust against the enemy rearguards . General Morshead agreed and
Milford instructed Eather to stay put and only patrol forward of th e
line he then held . 3
It was proving impossible to land the necessary tonnage of stores ove r
the open beaches because of the sea swell and it was therefore essentia l
to use the port, but when General Milford asked Rear-Admiral Nobl e
to do this Noble stated firmly that he would not send even a destroyer
into the bay unless he had a guarantee that the western side of it wa s
9 Lt J . E . A . Raward, NX114055 ; 2/25 Bn. Shop assistant; of Murwillumbah, NSW ; b. Ulmarra,
NSW, 5 Nov 1921 .
6 Sgt C . H. Ford, QX9697 ; 2/25 Bn . Railway worker ; of Dalby, Qld ; b. Brisbane, 17 Jan 1912 .
t Lt H. F . McCosker, QX37987 ; 2/25 Bn . Pineapple farmer; of Glass House Mountains, Qld ;
b. Brisbane, 30 Nov 1922 .
9 Along the highway there had been evidence of Japanese slaughter of natives ; round barracks
north of Abide the 2/31st found and buried the decapitated bodies of 16 Indonesians .
A few days later Eather, who had led the 25th Brigade for 3 years and 7 months, departed
to take command of the 11th Division . Lieut-Colonel Marson administered command of th e
25th Brigade until the arrival of its new commander, Brigadier Wood, from the Torricellis .
540
BALIKPAPAN AREA
SECURED
4-5 July
clear of Japanese guns . Thus Milford had no alternative to sending a
force across the bay . It was an interesting example of a course o f
aggressive action bein g
forced on a commander by
the administrative require . Pamaluan
ments .
On 4th July, therefore ,
Milford had given the 18t h
Brigade the task of landing
a battalion on the western
shores of Balikpapan Bay
to ensure that the enem y
could not interfere with the
working of the port fro m
that direction, and incidentally to assist N.I .C .A .
to give aid to the natives .
Brigadier Chilton gave
these tasks to the 2/9th
Battalion, with, under it s
command, a troop of th e
2/7th Cavalry (Com 2/9 Bn
mando) Regiment, a troop
of tanks, a troop of field
Balikpapan
guns, one of heavy mortars,
Nanangr
and other detachments .
This force was to land at
Penadjam from L .V .T's an d
L .C .M's on 5th July.
The L.V.T's containing
the two leading companies
of the 2/9th moved off a t
12 .10 p .m . Milford regarded this as a ticklis h
operation and watched ,
5th July-6th August
with some anxiety, from the
heights where the cracking plant stood . Naval vessels and field artillery
bombarded the objective and at 1 .35 the first troops landed without opposition . By 2 .15 the whole battalion was ashore . All the tanks bogged as the y
landed from their L .C .M's . One company patrolled southward and foun d
no enemy . There was random enemy artillery fire from a point three mile s
west of Penadjam at 3 .45, but the 2/4th Field Regiment, firing acros s
the bay, quickly silenced the gun . A second company patrolled north ward and by 6 .15 had reached the top of the hill to the north-west havin g
killed one Japanese and taken a 5-inch gun intact . Five more guns were
later found in this area . Just outside Penadjam five Indonesians wer e
discovered dead with their hands tied behind their backs .
luaraiiaa
Sappers of the 2 9th Field Company searching for mines, Balikpapan .
1st
II ,u
11,na,la /
Jule .
(Australian War rlemorial )
Stretcher hearers bringing in a wounded man, Balikpapan, 1st July .
I
,I
ua(ruliun
War
1lrunorial )
A mortar crew of the 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment firing a 4 .2 i n
support of the 2/10th Battalion advancing on Parramatta from a
position near the Vasey Highway, Balikpapan, on 1st July .
1
t S
: 1 ran
.SY.unal Co r
)
s
p
Directing mortar fire on to Hill 87 . Balikpapan, 1st July .
(U .S . Army Signal
Carps )
Infantry and artillery observers pinned down by Japanese fire from Hill 87, 1st July .
Australian 14 ar llemorial )
Men of the 2/12th Battalion north-east of Balikpapan, 2nd July .
(Australian War l/emoria/ )
A
flame-throwing tank of the 1st Armoured Regiment and men of the 2/10th Battalio n
attacking a Japanese hunker near the Tank Plateau, Balikpapan, 3rd July 1945 .
U .S .
Army S 'i¢rin f
Troops of the 2/ 10th Battalion, supported by tanks, clearing the oil refinery area ,
Balikpapan, 3rd July .
6-15 July
ALONG THE RIKO RIVER
54 1
Next day at dawn a patrol went south to Nanang village and on to
the Sesumpu River which it reached by 2 p .m . No Japanese were seen
but natives reported that some had passed through the previous day . Th e
other companies and the commando troop made local patrols .
One commando patrol was ambushed near a village not far from th e
mouth of the Riko River and lost two men killed . A platoon of th e
2/9th Battalion reinforced the commando troop and after some days o f
patrolling it was found that the enemy was dug in in the Separi area . O n
12th July, after further probing, the enemy withdrew from this position .
On 7th July a platoon under Lieutenant Gamble 4 established an artillery
observation post on high ground with a view of the mouth of the Riko
River .
Patrols of the 2/3rd Commando Squadron found enemy positions abou t
four miles west-north-west of Penadjam . At the first position a patrol
killed five ; at the second 23, it was estimated, before enemy mortar an d
machine-gun fire forced the patrol of 12 to withdraw .
Captain D. C . J . Scott of the 2/9th Battalion with two platoons an d
mortars landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of 8th July ; one
platoon was left there to examine tracks in the neighbourhood ; it found
no Japanese .
That night Chilton ordered Lieut-Colonel A . J . Lee, the commander
of the 2/9th, to land troops at Teloktebang on the eastern shore . These
landed on the 9th but found no enemy . On the 11th Chilton ordered the
2/9th to maintain a platoon base at Teloktebang and patrol northward ,
to patrol the north bank of the Riko River to the Riko Matih and north west along the high ground, to harass the enemy on the south bank of th e
Riko, and to continue patrols to the Sesumpu River and eliminate Japanes e
stragglers .
On 15th July natives reported that there were 30 Japanese at Separi ,
and patrols set out through very difficult country to find them, but whe n
they arrived the Japanese had gone . A patrol under Lance-Corpora l
McKinlay 3 reported a Japanese motor vessel of 300 tons some miles u p
the Riko and a platoon was sent out to place a standing patrol to watc h
it . They found the vessel unoccupied and boarded it . During the night
a big launch appeared towing a motor boat and prahu . The patrol opene d
fire from the motor vessel and the launch was set on fire and sank . Fiv e
Japanese were taken prisoner ; the motor vessel was sailed down to th e
mouth of the Riko .
This kind of patrolling, by land and water, continued . A patrol le d
by Lieutenant Frood6 voyaged by L .C .M . and prahu along the Parehpareh ,
and established a base to the west whence it probed westward to cu t
the enemy 's line of communication . It found about 50 Japanese wh o
were withdrawing northward . This was too large a force to be attacked
in such circumstances and the patrol was withdrawn .
* Lt A . G . Gamble, NX68801 ; 2/9 Bn . Farmer ; of Harwood, NSW ; b . Harden, NSW, 9 May 1920 .
5 Cpl C . G. McKinlay, MM, NX20981 . 7 Cav Regt and 2/9 Bn. Grazier ; of Inverell, NSW ;
b . Sydney, 20 Jun 1900 .
"Lt W . Frood, QX16591 ; 2/9 Bn . Clerk ; of Toowoomba, Qld ; b. Toowoomba, 14 May 1914.
542
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURED
16July-3Aug
General Milford decided on 16th July to place a reinforced compan y
of Lieut-Colonel A . A . Buckley's 2/ 1st Pioneer Battalion, which ha d
mainly been employed round the beach-head, under the command o f
the 18th Brigade to protect Balikpapan harbour against possible enem y
attacks from the north . Milford did not know what the Japanese wer e
doing at the top end of the bay, but the 2/9th had intercepted severa l
small craft trying to make their way there . There was now much shipping
in the port, the naval covering force had departed, and it was conceivabl e
that the Japanese, with small craft, might make a night raid on the port .
Thus Captain Morahan's 7 company with a section of the 2/4th Fiel d
Regiment and other detachments, and with two L .C.M ' s, went to Djinabora
and began patrolling . Its tasks included preventing enemy parties moving
south to the bay and possibly engaging enemy positions to the north .
On 21st July this force was enlarged to include two companies of th e
Pioneer battalion with detachments of heavy weapons under comman d
and a troop of the 2/4th Field Regiment and a searchlight in support .
This group was named Buckforce and was at first commanded by Majo r
Coleman. 8 It was to establish a coast-defence position and patrol bas e
in the Tempadung area, prevent Japanese from moving by sea to Balikpapan Bay, patrol and establish contact with the enemy, operate "suc h
water patrols as type of craft available permits" and seek more forwar d
patrol bases .
Buckforce patrolled widely in the next few days . Some Japanese were
encountered . On 26th July the Australian frigate Gascoyne, placed at the
disposal of Buckforce for the day, shelled Tempadung and Pamaluan ,
a village about 7 miles to the north-west . The latter was occupied earl y
on the 28th ; the Japanese had evidently departed a few hours before .
Next day a patrol fired on a group of eight Japanese and killed three .
Thick jungle and mangroves made both patrolling and the landing of wate r
craft difficult. On 30th July two platoons under Lieutenant Blamey 9 probed
east and north. One platoon encountered a bunker position and a ma n
was killed . Artillery fire silenced this position and both platoons attacked ,
took three bunkers and killed seven Japanese . They dug in and at 3 a .m .
on 31st July 30 Japanese attacked but were driven off by artiller y
and small arms fire .
Patrols were sent out on the morning of 1st August and found many
signs of enemy movement but saw no Japanese . On the 2nd, however ,
at 8 .30 p .m. a Japanese patrol attacked Captain Kitching'sl company but
was driven off leaving six dead . Soon afterwards three Japanese wer e
killed by a booby-trap . Buckforce had now killed 30, and taken on e
prisoner. Lieut-Colonel Buckley took command of the force on 3rd
Maj J . O . Morahan, NX28078 ; 2/1 Pnr Bn . Wool classer ; of Sydney ; b . Sydney, 23 Sep 1916 .
8 Col S . T. G . Coleman, OBE, NX468 . 2/1 Pnr Bn, 18 Bde and staff appointments . Regular soldier :
b . Sydney, 5 Feb 1916 .
9 Lt T. G. Blarney, NX52647 . 2/3 and 2/1 Pnr Bns. Accountant ; of Wollstonecraft, NSW;
Wagga Wagga, NSW, 24 Oct 1917 .
1 Capt G . S. Kitching, NX51486; 2/1 Pnr Bn. Clerk ; of Haberfield, NSW; b. Petersham, NSW,
7 Sep 1914,
8July-9 Aug
THE LAST CLASH
54 3
August and the Japanese positions were bombarded by the guns of a
whole battery, their fire being directed with the help of an observer i n
an Auster aircraft.
By 6th August the whole of the battalion was concentrated in th e
Tempadung area . Patrolling continued against parties of Japanese wh o
were still disciplined and aggressive . On the 6th observers in an Auster
guided a patrol to a group of 63 Indian prisoners, who were picked u p
by an L .C .M . next day . These had been captured in Sarawak early i n
1942 . The last clashes with the enemy in this area occurred on 9th Augus t
when a patrol under Lieutenant Morrow 2 killed three Japanese, and Captain Williams'3 company, patrolling towards the Milford Highway, als o
killed three .
After the big withdrawal of the Japanese from the Batuchampar strong hold the 25th Brigade stayed where it was but patrolled extensively every
day . On 25th July the 2/7th Cavalry (Commando) Regiment with tw o
squadrons took over the forward positions astride the highway, an d
thenceforward patrolled northward ; it had fairly frequent patrol clashe s
and set many ambushes . The last clash occurred here on 14th August
when a deep patrol of the 2/25th Battalion set an ambush on the highway ;
12 Japanese walked into it and 9 were killed .
While the 2/14th Battalion was overcoming the enemy stronghold above
Manggar the 2/ 16th had been patrolling deep into the tangle of hill s
north-east of Balikpapan . From 8th July onwards such patrolling occupie d
only a few sub-units each day and much of the effort of this battalio n
(as of others, similarly employed) went into improving its camp, makin g
fish traps, and engaging in other profitable and pleasant occupations .
After the Japanese positions above Manggar had been taken the 2/14th
Battalion was out of contact with the enemy for a time . Hundreds of
natives were then streaming into the N .I .C.A . compounds . They sai d
that about 150 Japanese were on Bale, 2,000 yards to the north . O n
10th July the 2/27th took over the left flank at Manggar, freeing th e
2/14th to probe towards Sambodja . Patrols from Major C . A . W . Sims'
company of the 2/27th clashed with parties of Japanese that day on Band
and Frost, south of Bale ; 3 Australians were killed and 9 Japanese .
Lieutenant Dempsey 4 of the 2/14th led a platoon along the Vasey High way to the Adjiraden River, made a patrol base there, and thence probe d
to Taratip without finding any Japanese .
On the 11th the 2/27th moved through and took over the base a t
the Adjiraden River and next day its command group and two companies
were established at Lamaru . Natives said that there were no Japanes e
Col W . J. Morrow, OBE, VX101929 ; 2/1 Pnr Bn . 3 Bn RAR, Korea 1952-53 ; BM HQ 2 8
British Commonwealth Bde 1953 ; CO 1 RAR, Malaya 1959 . Regular soldier ; b. Glen Innes ,
NSW, 1 Jun 1921 .
E
Maj C. G. Williams, ED, NX34898 ; 2/1 Pnr Bn. Departmental manager ; of Scone, NSW ; b .
Wee Waa, NSW, 23 Jun 1911 .
' Lt L. J . Dempsey, VX81715 ; 2/14 Bn. Clerk; of Wodonga, Vic ; b. Rutherglen, Vic, 18 Dec 1920 .
2
544
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURED
12 July-1 Aug
even in Sambodja, and on 14th July a patrol confirmed this, and a n
N.E .I . patrol found Amborawang unoccupied . On the 17th Lieut-Colonel
K. S . Picken of the 2/27th moved his command post forward to Amborawang and had one company there and one at Bangsal on the highway .
Thence on 18th July Picken
sent two companies, 43 8
strong, into Sambodja . A
patrol north along the pipe line encountered five stra y
Japanese and killed two .
A patrol consisting o f
Captain Crafter's 5 company
of the 2/27th less on e
platoon moved due wes t
across country to the Mil ford Highway on the 18th .
They reached a point abou t
two miles and a half fro m
the highway, and thenc e
Crafter and a small part y
made their way forwar d
and, having had to cut a
track through thick jungl e
for the final 2,000 yards ,
reached the road at 5 p .m .
They heard Japanese mov ing along the road and then were themselves seen and pursued . The y
evaded the enemy and rejoined the company, which moved back t o
Amborawang next day . That day (the 19th) the battalion was ordered
to return to the Adjiraden and relieve the 2/14th in the country nort h
of the airfield . It moved back in vehicles next day .
The Japanese appeared to be gradually withdrawing from the cluster
of hills round Bale . On 14th July a platoon under Lieutenant Gugger6
encountered a party of about 20 Japanese with two machine-guns on Bale .
Gugger decided to withdraw under cover of smoke to allow the artiller y
to fire . Smoke grenades could not be fired because of the density o f
the bush, so Gugger crawled forward to where the screen was neede d
and lit the grenades with a match . The Japanese drew back farther int o
the hills and on 17th July the ridges north of the Bale group were foun d
to be unoccupied except by one party, and it withdrew on the 18th .
In the next four weeks deep patrolling continued in the area north
of Manggar, and there were occasional clashes . On 1st August information arrived that about 100 Japanese were moving towards Sambodja .
Brigadier Dougherty ordered Lieut-Colonel F . H . Sublet to reinforce
', Ma) J. G . Crafter, MBE, SX4516 ; 2/27 Bn . Regular soldier ; b. Port Augusta, SA, 28 Jun 1914 .
e Lt N . A . Gugger, VX118673 ; 2/14 Bn . Storekeeper ; of Fyansford, Vic ; b. Geelong, Vic, 1 7
Sep 1919,
Aug-Sept
NON-MILITARY EMPLOYMENT
54 5
Sambodja and Amborawang, and by 3rd August most of the 2/16th wa s
concentrated at Sambodja . Long-range patrols were sent out, some remaining away five or six days, but only stragglers were found .
The 2/14th moved forward to protect the line of communication of
the 2/ 16th and particularly to deal with ambush parties along the Vasey
Highway . On 9th August Lieutenant Backhouse' and 20 men of th e
2/14th set out on a 48-hour patrol to examine the tracks between th e
two forward companies . About four hours out the leading scout sa w
and fired on four Japanese . Backhouse put one section on the track whil e
he and the two other sections attacked on the right and soon found them selves close behind the enemy . They had been unobserved but could now
see the Japanese who appeared to be "in a large-sized panic, racin g
from hole to hole" . "This situation," says the patrol report, "was no t
desirable," so the flanking group returned and a fresh attack was launched .
This time two sections attacked on the left while the third held the trac k
and watched the line of withdrawal . In close fighting seven Japanese were
killed and opposition ceased . Three Australians were wounded, on e
mortally . It was the battalion 's last engagement .
As usual the men soon found interesting employment .
An officer of this staff is building a 15-foot sailing boat just outside his ten t
(wrote a visitor to the 21st Brigade in mid-August) . Next door another is cleanin g
and polishing a set of crocodile's teeth. On the river are several sailing boats mad e
from aircraft belly-tanks . Surf boards are in use in the 2/16th Bn area farther alon g
the beach . There is plenty of sawn timber to be collected in the ruins of Balikpapan
and bigger and better huts are going up every day .
The number of Japanese dead seen and counted in the Balikpapan
operation was 1,783 . It was estimated that 249 others had also been
killed ; 63 were captured . A total of 229 Australians were killed or died
of wounds and 634 were wounded . The heaviest losses were suffered by
the 25th Brigade in its advance inland along the Milford Highway, an d
particularly by the 2/31st Battalion . 8
In September Milford received a copy of the report on the Oboe Tw o
operation by the A .O .C . R .A .A.F . Command, Air Vice-Marshal Bostock .
Bostock offered some criticism of the army on some interesting point s
7 Capt J . W. Backhouse, WX4711 . 2/28 and 2/14 Bns . Shop assistant ; of Perth ; b . Broken Hill ,
NSW, 5 Jan 1915 .
The losses—killed and wounded—in the infantry, commando, armoured and artillery units were :
Officers Other Ranks
Officers Other Ranks
—
19
2/1st Machine Gun
2/9th Battalion
2/10th Battalion
5
54
Battalion
1
16
2/7th Cavalry (Com 3
37
2/12th Battalion
mando)
Regiment
9
76
2/14th Battalion
8
55
1st Armoure d
2/16th Battalion
3
54
Regimen
t
14
2/27th Battalion
1
20
2/4th Field
2/25th Battalion
7
90
Regiment
5
10
5
2/31st Battalion
163
2/5th Fiel d
10
85
2/33rd Battalion
Regiment
11
3
2/1st Pioneer
2/6th Fiel d
Battalion
.
18
Regiment
1
3
2/2nd Anti-Tank
2/2nd Pioneer
Regiment
6
Battalion
.
546
BALIKPAPAN AREA SECURED
July-Sep t
of principle, and Milford wrote replies to this criticism into his wa r
diary . For instance, Bostock wrote : "The local army commander, during
this operation, was particularly prone to attempt to dictate the manne r
in which air support was to be applied . He wished to nominate classes o f
aircraft, types and weights of bombs and methods of attack to be employe d
to achieve the results he specified . This attitude is to be deprecated . It
is just as illogical for a local army commander to presume to interfer e
with professional and technical air force aspects as it would be for hi m
to attempt to dictate to a supporting naval force commander the classe s
of ships, types of guns and dispositions of naval vessels detailed to affor d
him support with naval bombardment . "
Milford replied : "In many instances the army commander has a vita l
interest in the method of attack to be employed since the lives of hi s
troops may be endangered . For targets in proximity to army troops th e
army commander alone knows the detailed dispositions and intention of hi s
troops and can determine methods of attack which are safe . For distant
targets the same considerations do not apply but [the] paragraph . . . doe s
not differentiate . "
Bostock also complained that "Army officers responsible for loadin g
the First T.A .F . units were not always sympathetic to R .A .A .F . requirements . . . working with a new division, some rawness was inevitable" .
Milford replied : "The allotment to ships of every man, vehicle an d
store of the whole force is an army responsibility . Since shipping is neve r
available to meet all demands (and every service and unit considers it s
demands essential) the difficulties of a satisfactory solution are ver y
great. As an example of army cuts, no supporting arms whatever an d
practically no equipment and stores for the reserve brigade could b e
included in the assault lift.
"The R .A .A .F ., accustomed to a high standard of comfort, and no t
faced by the problem of fitting masses of vehicles and stores to a minimu m
of ships, regards as unsympathetic a reduction of air force equipmen t
to a scale which on army standards is lavish . "
Indeed, rightly or wrongly, in this and other amphibious operations ,
army officers considered the equipment required by the air force in the
early stages excessively elaborate, and the discipline of air force ground
staff capable of improvement .
The Balikpapan operation—the largest amphibious attack carried ou t
by Australian troops—succeeded fairly swiftly. The attackers possessed
the support of powerful weapons : aircraft using bombs, napalm and guns ;
naval guns ; tanks, including flame-throwers ; manhandled flame-throwers . 9
The Japanese, who were in well-prepared positions and well equipped
with guns and mortars, resisted with their usual fortitude, and paid more
than seven lives for each Australian life they took . Once again they
e "The air effort expended in support of the Oboe Two operation is believed to be greater tha n
that expended directly in support of any similar operation in S .W.P .A."—R .A.A .F. Command ,
A.A .F., S .W.P .A ., Report of Oboe Two Operation, July 1945 .
1945
DEBITS AND CREDITS
54 7
demonstrated how a force of resolute men well dug in could delay a
stronger force far more formidably armed.
The immediate objectives in Borneo were to establish bases and re occupy oilfields ; the long-range objective had originally been to advanc e
westward to Java . If the attack on Java had been carried out it woul d
have been in progress at a time when American forces were committe d
to an advance northward to Japan proper, and the British-Indian force s
to an advance southward against Singapore . In retrospect the wisdom of
embarking upon this third thrust—westward against Japanese force s
isolated in the Indies—seems doubtful . Strategically the only gain woul d
have been to the Japanese whose isolated and otherwise idle forces woul d
be given employment ; it would have been proper to place this third fron t
on a low priority for equipment, and not improbable that it would have
been plagued by shortages of men, ships and aircraft.
One result of a complex of decisions, some contradictory and som e
illogical, was that, in 1945, while I Australian Corps, well equipped and
with powerful air and naval support, was preparing for or was fightin g
battles of doubtful value in Borneo, an Australian corps in Bougainvill e
and an Australian division in New Guinea were fighting long and bitte r
campaigns (whose value also was doubted) in which they were shor t
of air and naval support, and suffered such a poverty of ships and landin g
craft that, as a rule, the best they could do was to put ashore a company
or two at a time on a hostile shore . The Japanese on the other hand coul d
reflect with satisfaction that in this period their four depleted division s
isolated round Wewak and on Bougainville had kept three Australia n
divisions strenuously employed, and in Borneo three hotchpotch force s
had engaged two more Australians divisions, though only briefly .