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The Transformation of the Russian Religious Consciousness over the PostPerestroika Period.
Valentina Mikhailovna Nasrtdinova
Lecturer Institute of International Relations, History and Oriental Studies
Kazan Federal University, Kazan, Russia
E-mail: [email protected]
Contact: +79003290039
Abstract
The relevance of the problem under analysis is defined by the deployment of the complex
multifactored processes in the structure of the domestic social consciousness, attributed to the
religious sphere. The aim of the article is to conduct an analysis of the transformative processes in
the Russian religious consciousness of the last decade of the XX century in order to establish the
cause-effect relationship between the ongoing social process and the sociocultural background of
the 1990s, appraising contemporaneity with its interrelation and interconnection with the preceding
period. Within the framework of the paper we have coherently kept to the historical and dialectical
methods, allowing to study the problem in its relation to various patterns and trends, both
preceding and succeeding, and to gain the understanding of its embodiments and incarnations,
sometimes rather contradictory. The nature of the transformative processes in the domestic
religious consciousness has been explained throughout the paper, the reasons of mass
Christianization and further insufficient involvement of people in religious life (inchurchment) have
been defined within the paper as well. The practical application of the present materials is
introduced by the possibility of consulting them, while studying the history and sociology of religion
in Russia.
Keywords: religious consciousness, university education, student’s education, Russian
Orthodox Church, post-Perestroika period, religious turn, inchurchment, social presence,
political fatigue.
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Introduction
The last decade of the XXth century in Russia, which as well happens to be the first one in
the newest Russian history, marking its factual inception, is being most commonly referred to as
“the wild Nineties”, or “the unruly Nineties”. The application of these powerful, emotionally
colored epithets, resulting evidently and inevitably in a certain stigmatization of the noumenon is
deep-rooted, well-justified and fairly explicable: the named period of time is remembered
predominantly for its drastic and rapid social stratification, skyrocketing inflation, oppressive largescale unemployment and unprecedented crime rates. Additionally, that relatively short period that is
being considered within the framework of the present paper tends to be abundant in events and
phenomena which are currently believed to be historically influential and emblematic because of
their far-reaching implications and the impact they had had and are still having upon all the spheres
of social life. Being both substantially eventful and informationally saturated, the aforesaid
historical period thus appears to be a relevant object of the academic research in general. In
particular, it introduces extraordinary significance for a scientific survey in the field of social
philosophy, analyzing the deployment of certain processes and tendencies within the structure of the
social relations and the tissue of the social consciousness of the epoch in question. The
transformational processes the religious consciousness of the Russian society had been being
characterized by during the so-called post-Perestroika period in Russia are being analyzed
throughout the given paper.
Methodological Framework
Methodological framework of the paper is mainly represented by the application of certain
fundamental methods of scientific research. The historical method, requiring attention to
chronology, dynamics and evolution of the historical course of the problem under consideration,
provides the benchmark for establishing general facts and principles. The dialectical method, based
on the understanding, that contradictions between social processes are the determining factors in
their interaction, contributes to a thorough, across-the-board assessment of the problem. The
comparative and axiological approaches, as well as the classic descriptive method were no less
instrumental for the present study.
Results
The sociocultural background
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While analyzing the evolution of the religious consciousness in the post-Perestroika
Russian society, one has to take into consideration the influence of the number of the
interdependent tendencies, existing at that time. On the one hand, the loss of the all-encompassing
popularity of the Soviet ideals gave rise to the anxious search of the new moral compasses and
spiritual guidelines to substitute them, and the turn of the popular attention towards the religion is
therefore essentially logical. At the same time, the objective impossibility for any religion to
become a universal principal, consolidating and structuring the society’s intellectual life was as well
becoming more explicit because of the notion of the “dethroned”, “debunked” essence of the
religious nature, widespread across the minds of the ex-Soviet citizens. Within the Marxist theory
religion was being coherently considered as an artificial ideological construct, designed to reinforce
the inequality and labor exploitation in an unjust class society. Developing the thesis of the
religion’s social roots, the socialists claimed its functional, instrumental role in the capitalist
society, where it was merely supposed to serve the means of comfort, consolation and relief, thus
providing the due theoretical framework for the richness of the high-ranking people and the poverty
of the lower-ranking ones, respectively. Thanks to the Soviet atheistic propaganda initiators’ efforts,
the understanding of religion as socially and analytically synthesized ideologeme was commonly
and clearly shared in the domestic society. Though, criticizing the religious faith, the Soviet state
elaborated a comprehensive and sophisticated system of specific beliefs, which, being well-timed
and persuasive enough, have managed to occupy a traditional religious “niche” in the social
consciousness: the Marxist treatises replaced the Gospel, the political activists became “the
prophets of the new era”, the anticipation of “the bright future of Communism” was no less
impatient, than “the Second Coming” might have been. During the Soviet State’s existence its
citizens were duly provided with both moral values and political benchmarks, and the dissolution of
the USSR predetermined the situation of the social exclusion, marginalization, emotional
frustration, ideological vacuum, spiritual crisis, overall social anomie.
Spiritual renaissance
On the other hand, certain positive tendencies in the religious sphere have turned out to be
substantiated by the realia of Perestroika as well. Thus, the 1988 year seems to be a start point of
the growth of the national self-consciousness, the society’s rising attention towards the national
culture, the global aspiration to spiritual renaissance, the amplification of the pro-Christian feelings
in general, and the uprise in the pro-Orthodox feelings in particular. Primarily, this trend is to be
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attributed to the celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus’ which is
sometimes regarded as “the Second Baptism of Rus’ ” itself. This tendency is examined from the
various perspectives in the works of the Russian scholars in the field of religious studies. For
instance, V. Kasyanov believes, that at the said period of time an exceptionally positive attitude
towards the religion formed both at the level of state policy and at the level of popular perception
[Kasyanov, 2005]; S. Filatov describes the beginning of the Nineties as the period of the boundless
interest and sympathy to the spiritual sphere [Filatov, 2002], L. Mitrokhin makes reference to the
period of time in question, outlining the context of a ‘religious euphoria’, which, he admits, was
mainly encapsulated in the understanding, that ‘Russia is futureless without the religion’
[L. Mitrokhin, 2003, 84]. The author of the present paper submits the application of the term
‘religious turn’ with respect to the aforesaid phenomena as well, being certain, that this term is
capable of reflecting the distinctive character and the peculiarities of the religious consciousness of
the post-Perestroika era relevantly and adequately.
The Orxodoxy, which was playing a prominent role in the life of the society, gained
visibility, evolving into a cornerstone of the ‘spiritual renaissance’ or a ‘religious turn’, mentioned
above. Following the long decades of suppression of religion and militant atheism, Orthodox
Christmas was finally re-established as public holiday in 1991.
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the religious life of the early 1990s is the
tendency of mass christening. Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) cites the following data: “In the late
eighties and in the early nineties millions of people on the entire territory of the former USSR have
been christened. In the large urban cathedrals dozens and hundreds of people were christened every
single day. Annually, one priest might have christened several thousands of people” [Hilarion
(Alfeyev), 2008, 162].
The other noticeable tendency observed is the substantial increase of the number of the
Russian Orthodox Church parishes, which since 1989 it has almost tripled: from humble 9734 to
impressive 27942 [Alexy II, 2007].
In her book “Following a Narrow Path”, referring to Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (VCIOM), V. Chesnokova describes both the process of steady rise of the quantity of
believers (chiefly Orthodox) and the reduction of the quantity of disbelievers over the last decade of
the XX century [Chesnokova, 2005].
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However, does such a declarative self-determination of people provide enough ground to
suppose, that already in the post-Soviet period, the Russian society becomes deeply and consciously
religious, and the Orthodoxy, in turn, becomes its spiritual leader?
Appraising the genuine level of the Russian people’s involvement in active religious life,
S. Filatov consults the materials of the public opinion polls, and states the following: only about 67 % of Russians attend worship services not less than once a month; furthermore, there are strong
grounds for believing that even these figures are rather exaggerated. Only about 8 % of Russians
partook of the Eucharist during the year (1999). The awareness of the fundamental principles of the
Christian doctrine, demonstrated by the respondents, is also insufficient: only about 18 % believe in
the existence of the living personal God, about 24 % – in afterlife, only 10 % – in the resurrection of
the dead. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of Moscow, less than 2 % of adult
population of the city attended the Easter church service in Moscow, whereas the latter,
undoubtedly, is no way the most non-religious city of the Russian Federation. [Filatov, 2012].
Therefore, the optimistic thesis about an unconditional and definite restoration of the
Orthodoxy and the society’s readiness to adhere to it on regular basis is refuted by what the
objective givenness was like at that moment. In this connection, there are several essential questions
to be answered:
 firstly, what are the reasons of the outer demonstration of the loyalty to the
Orthodoxy, mass Christianization, and further self-identification with this
denomination?
 secondly, taking account of the obvious social interest and popular support of the
Orthodoxy, why did it turn out to be so superficial, being so global originally; what
interfered with the growth of the real, not announced religiousness?
Facts behind the figures
Working on the identification of the reasons of the Orthodoxy’s popularity’s intensive
growth and the subsequent aspiration to associate oneself with it, especially in terms of the outer
displays, we have arrived at the conclusion, that the fall of the Soviet Union, accompanied by the
decay of the system of Soviet values, caused the dramatic escalation of the global crisis of selfidentification in the domestic society. “Having suddenly stopped being ‘Soviet’, the people, hence,
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re-embraced their ‘Russian’ identity. And ‘Russian’, traditionally, means ‘Orthodox’ – J. Sinelina
writes. [Sinelina, 2013].
The following cause, which, we believe, contributed to the above-described rallying
around the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), is the factor of fear, incarnated in the general sense of
uprootedness, hopelessness, deprivation, insecurity. Trying desperately to cope with the rapid
political and socio-economic metamorphoses, looking for something stable in the shaky world, the
people were not only seeking solace and relief in the Christian doctrine, but had also had recourse to
the ROC as the institute-guarantor of the traditional values, national unity, patriotism.
The factors, which conditioned the inconsiderable degree of the society’s involvement in
the religious life, or, also referred to as ‘inchurchment’, are listed below.
Firstly, during the whole decade of the 1990s, one had to make great efforts for the
provision of oneself and one’s family. The epoch, introducing numerous challenges, teeming with
obstacles to be overcome, rich in various problems, requiring being solved, demanded the
considerable degree of what we identify as ‘social presence’. This is an original term, developed by
the author of the present paper, and designed to reflect the intensification of the proximate influence
of the social relations upon the life of an individual, their overwhelming and tangible presence in
the human lives. So, responding to different challenges, experiencing complexities, dealing with
arduous tasks, the people were too taken up with the daily grind and, therefore, unable to devote
enough time and pay enough attention to the studies of religious doctrines.
Second, the principle of the ‘deferred good’, implying the necessity of being a god-fearing
righteous in the earthly life in order to enter the gates of heaven and find the eternal bliss afterlife,
which is inherent to all of the so-called Abrahamic religions, was taken reluctantly, with great
difficulty. On the one hand, the tradition of the cultural continuity was ruined over the decades of
the Soviet Power and the principle of the ‘deferred good’ could no longer be taken for granted
therefore. On the other hand, paradoxically, exactly the Soviet period shaped the minds of the
generation of disabused sceptics, unwilling to expect the fulfillment of any foggy promises,
especially those, which are indefinitely postponed and hardly verifiable. On the contrary, various
mascots, amulets, charms have gained incredible popularity during the 1990s. The main reason is
that all of them are believed to have an ‘immediate impact’, being powerful enough to improve the
life and destiny of a person right from the moment they have been purchased. The social
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consciousness of that time was strongly exposed to the tendency of global commercialization,
related to the notion, that ‘everything can be bought or sold’, and the religious consciousness had
not been spared either, being to a certain extent affected by this trend. Psychologist V. Semenov
points out ‘the apparent intimization and pragmatization of the life values’ in the mid 1990s
[Semenov, 1995].
Third, the character of the state-church relations has also become a factor, retaining the
qualitative growth of Russian religiousness and preventing the process of the people’s
inchurchment. In compliance with S. Filatov’s observation, by 1997 the separation of church and
state, enshrined in the Russian Constitution, was no longer observed and became a matter of theory
rather than practice. The government sought the support of the Russian Orthodox Church, and
therefore, the state policies in the field of religion were being considerably changed. Sponsoring the
construction of cathedrals and attending the worship services afterwards became an integral part of
the government officials’ public activities. The presence of clergymen was permitted at schools,
since the studies of Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture were initiated, in the Armed forces, law
enforcement agencies, etc. [Filatov, 2002]. Surprisingly, though, such governmental facilitation and
endorsement caused a boomerang effect only. Expected to be a ‘sanctuary of morality’, a ‘politicsfree reservation’, the religion, namely, the church, evolved into a sphere of influence, skillfully used
by political technologists for promotion of political parties and their candidates’ image making.
Over the years the life of a single Russian citizen was extensively politicized, resulting finally in a
prevailing condition of political fatigue, which is a strenuous unwillingness to reside in the fusion
of the private issues with the political ones. As far as the Church, becoming deeply involved in
political affairs, had failed to meet the expectations of people, the ‘religious euphoria’ of the early
1990s soon came to its end.
Fourth, lacking in the human resources, the Russian Orthodox Church could not practically
cope with the gigantic stream of believers. In 1917 the number of Orthodox clergymen amounted,
pursuant to various sources, to 66000 or 11000 people, in contemporary Russia this figure is about
30000 people, whereas in the beginning of the 1990s there were no more than 7000 priests at the
disposal of ROC. [Vasilieva, 2007; Patriarch Kirill, 2013].Without the implementation of the
appropriate missionary work the newcomers, instigated by their emotional and intuitive impulse,
soon satisfied one’s initial curiosity and left the religious circles without having truly entered them.
Moreover, for the majority of Russians the Church Slavonic language of worship was
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incomprehensible. That’s why a certain per cent of the newcomers soon became distant from the
church as well.
Conclusions
Resuming the results of the analysis conducted, we have ascertained, that the phenomenon
of mass Christianization, inherent to the social relations of the 1990s, was predetermined, on the
one hand, by the fall of the Soviet Union, which caused ideological vacuum and social anomie in
the public consciousness, and, on the other hand – by economic and political instability,
stratification of society, inflation, unemployment, high crime rates, and the overall complexity of
the social realia of that time.
We also deem, that the character of state-church relations of that period, the absence of the
sufficient number of clergymen, political fatigue, ideological skepticism, social and psychological
unpopularity of the principle of ‘deferred good’, the rhetoric of the majority of Abrahamic religions
is based on, were the restrictive factors, which interfered with the growth on the qualitative, not just
quantitative religiousness (inchurchment) of the people.
Acknowledgements
The work is performed according to the Russian Government Program of Competitive
Growth of Kazan Federal University.
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