University of Wollongong
Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection
University of Wollongong Thesis Collections
2002
Rigidity and mental health: challenging the view
that rigid thinking leads to poor mental health
Terri Said
University of Wollongong
Recommended Citation
Said, Terri, Rigidity and mental health: challenging the view that rigid thinking leads to poor mental health, Doctor of
Psycology(Clinical) thesis, Department of Psychology, University of Wollongong, 2002. http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/2144
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the
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RIGIDITY AND MENTAL HEALTH : CHALLENGING
THE VIEW THAT RIGID THINKING LEADS TO POOR
MENTAL HEALTH
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree
DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY (CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY)
From
THE UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG
By
TERRI SAID, BA (Hons) (Psych), M A (Psych)
Department of Psychology
2002
1
DECLARATION
I, Terri Said declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requi
for the award of Doctor of Psychology (Clinical Psychology), in the department of
Psychology, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise
referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications a
any other academic institution.
Signed:
Date
11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to my supervisor Dr Joseph Ciarrochi fo
the patience, time and effort he spent assisting me in formulating, conducting an
writing up my research.
I would also like to thank Greg Scott for the significant role he played in the
of the data. Thankyou for all your patience !
I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my parents for valuing my education, their inv
support and faith in me has allowed me to go on and achieve so much. I also wish
acknowledge my sister and brother and extended family for all the encouragement
have received over the years. I would like to especially thank Dal for her valuab
support during the write up of my thesis.
My deepest thanks to Al - for as long as I have been studying, from high school
to this degree you have always been a vital source of comfort, practical assistan
strength. You have earned this degree as much as I have !! To my dear friends Tra
Avril, A.J. and Sarah I am extremely grateful for the constant moral support and
you guys have always had in me, this has truly made all the difference.
Finally with much love to my grandmothers who have inspired me to pass on to oth
their most precious gift of love, warmth and guidance.
HI
ABSTRACT
A substantial amount of research has suggested that cognitive rigidity is associa
poor mental health (e.g., Dieserud, Roysamb, Ekeberg, & Kraft, 2001; Dugas, Gagnon
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Haaga, Fine, Terrill, Stewart, & Beck, 1995; Nezu, Nez
& Perri, 1989). We hypothesized that some types of rigidity may not be associated
poor mental health. The Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS; Thompson, Naccarat
& Parker, 1989) was used to assess two types of rigidity, namely, the Desire for
Structure (DS) and Response to Lack of Structure (RLS). We hypothesized that RLS
but not DS would be related to poor mental health outcomes. Studies 1 (n = 302) an
(n = 351) revealed that those with a personal tendency to express negative reacti
when confronted with a lack of structure were consistently shown to experience po
mental health. These outcomes included greater depression (assessed in studies 1
hopelessness (assessed in studies 1 & 2), suicide ideation (assessed in studies 1
anxiety (only assessed in study 2) and stress (only assessed in study 2). In cont
these findings, those who had a tendency to desire structure were consistently sho
not to experience poor mental health. The second study extended the first study b
expanding the range of mental health variables assessed to include measures of an
stress and life satisfaction. Also tested in both studies was the possible intera
between stressful life events and RLS and DS. Support was found for an interactio
between stressful life events and RLS across both studies. These findings indicat
those who were highly rigid tended to experience greater increases in poor mental
health in response to stressful life events. Some support was found for the expect
that DS would not interact with stressful life events. However, since this finding
not replicated across both studies, it was treated with caution. The results of th
research not only replicate but extend previous research by demonstrating that th
IV
in fact two types of rigidity which are qualitatively different in terms of their
implications for mental health.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ABSTRACT
ii
iii
T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
v
T A B L E O F FIGURES
xi
T A B L E OF TABLES
xiii
INTRODUCTION 1
Aims of the present research
2
Organization of this thesis
3
CHAPTER 1
A n introduction to mental health and cognitive
rigidity
6
1.1 The mental health crisis
7
1.2
Theoretical
framework
10
1.2.1 The direct relationship betweenrigidityand mental health
10
1.2.2
14
Rigid people and stressful life events
1.3 Cognitive rigidity defined
15
1.4 Introduction to the review of cognitive rigidity
measures
17
1.5 Summary
18
vi
CHAPTER 2
Cognitive rigidity as measured by maximum
performance tests
2.1
Measures of cognitive rigidity based on m a x i m u m
Performance
2.2
20
21
The research: Social problem solving, suicide, depression
and hopelessness
23
2.3 Models integrating stress, rigidity and mental health
24
2.4
26
Summary
CHAPTER 3
Cognitive rigidity as self-reported tendency
28
3.1
Individual differences in the desire for simple structure
29
3.2
Comparison between P N S and other self-report measures
of rigidity
3.3
Rigidity as measured as a self-reported tendency and
mental health
3.4
3.5
32
35
The possibility for a positive relationship between desire for
structure and mental health
38
Summary
41
vii
CHAPTER 4
Personal need for structure 43
4.1 An introduction to the concept of need-for-structure 44
4.2 The phenomenology of Personal Need For Structure - PNS 47
4.3 A psychological theory of epistemology 47
4.4 Implications of PNS for cognitive functioning 49
4.5 PNS and mental health 55
4.6 RLS, DS and mental health 56
4.7 The relationship between PNS and stressful life events 57
4.8 Advantages of the PNS scale 59
4.9 Summary 60
The present research: Research hypotheses 61
Study 1 61
Study 2 63
CHAPTER FIVE
Study 1 methodology, results and discussion 64
5.1 METHOD 65
5.1.1 Participants 65
5.1.2 Design and procedure 65
viii
5.1.3 Materials 66
5.2 RESULTS 68
5.2.1 Descriptives 68
5.2.2 Regression analysis between rigidity, stress and mental health measures 69
5.2.3 The interaction between rigidity and stressful life events 70
5.3 Study 1 discussion 75
CHAPTER SIX
Study 2 methodology, results and discussion 78
6.1 METHOD 79
6.1.1 Participants 79
6.1.2 Design and procedure 79
6.1.3 Materials 80
6.2 RESULTS 82
6.2.1 Descriptives 82
6.2.2 Regression analysis between rigidity, stress and mental health measures 83
6.2.3 The interaction between rigidity and stressful life events 84
6.3 Study 2 discussion 91
IX
CHAPTER 7
Overall discussion
7.1
Hypotheses one and two: D o R L S and D S have the same
implications for mental health ?
7.2
93
96
Hypotheses three and four: Does cognitive rigidity moderate
the relationship between stress and mental health ?
102
7.3
Other explanations for the pattern of findings
108
7.4
Limitations and future directions
109
7.5
Conclusion
116
REFERENCES 117
APPENDIX A
INFORMATION SHEET
130
APPENDIX B
CONSENT FORM
131
APPENDIX C
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY II (1996)
APPENDIX D
PERSONAL NEED FOR STRUCTURE SCALE (1989)
132
133
APPENDIX E
THE BECK HOPELESSNESS SCALE (1974)
134
APPENDIX F
THE DEPRESSION, ANXIETY AND STRESS SCALE (1995)
APPENDIX G
135
THE SATISFACTION WITH LIFE SCALE (1985)
136
X
APPENDIX H
SUICIDE IDEATION QUESTIONNAIRE (1987)
137
APPENDIX I
HASSLES SCALE (1981)
138
APPENDIX J
DEBRIEF HANDOUT
139
APPENDIX K
R A W DATA STUDY 1
140
APPENDIX L
R A W DATA STUDY 2
141
XI
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Depression (Study 1) 72
Figure 1.2: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Hopelessness (Study 1) 72
Figure 1.3: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Suicidal Ideation (Study 1) 73
Figure 2.1: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Depression (Study 1) 74
Figure 2.2: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Hopelessness (Study 1) 74
Figure 2.3: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Suicidal Ideation (Study 1) 75
Figure 3.1: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Depression (Study 2) 86
Figure 3.2: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Hopelessness (Study 2) 86
Figure 3.3: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Suicide Ideation (Study 2) 87
Figure 3.4: Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events
for Anxiety (Study 2) 87
Figure 3.5: Interaction between RLS and Stressful life Events
for Stress (Study 2) 88
xii
Figure 4.1: Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events
for Depression (Study 2) 89
Figure 4.2: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Hopelessness (Study 2) 89
Figure 4.3: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Suicidal Ideation (Study 2) 90
Figure 4.4: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Anxiety (Study 2) 90
Figure 4.5: Interaction between DS and Stressful Life Events
for Stress (Study 2) 91
xiii
TABLE OF TABLES
Table 1: Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of major sample
characteristic variables (Study 1) 68
Table 2: Intercorrelations between rigidity, stressful life events
and mental health measures (Study 1) 69
Table 3: Regression analysis between rigidity, stressful life events
and mental health measures (Study 1) 70
Table 4: Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of major
sample characteristic variables (Study 2) 82
Table 5: Intercorrelations between rigidity, stressful life events
and mental health measures (Study 2) 83
Table 6: Regression analysis between rigidity, stressful life events
and mental health (Study 2) 84
1
INTRODUCTION
2
Aims of the present research
The present research has two primary aims. Firstly, we wish to show that not all ty
of cognitive rigidity have negative implications for mental health. Cognitive rigid
has usually been conceptualized in ways that present rigidity in a somewhat negativ
light. The conceptualizations of Intolerance of Ambiguity (Eysenck, 1954; FrenkelBrunswick, 1949), Rigidity (Gough & Sanford, 1952), Uncertainty Orientation
(Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984; Sorrentino & Short, 1986), Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960)
and Authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950)
illustrate this point. More specifically, the scale measuring Authoritarianism (Ado
al., 1950) relates rigidity to the concepts of power, toughness and authoritarian
aggression.
Previous research concerning rigidity as measured in terms of one's ability to be
flexible has demonstrated that those who are highly inflexible/highly rigid tend to
experience poor mental health outcomes, such as hopelessness, depression and suicid
behavior (e.g., Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a; Cannon, 1999; Dieserud et al., 2001;
Haaga et al., 1995; Nezu et al., 1989; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte, Cools &
Payvar, 1990). Previous research that measures rigidity in terms of a self-reported
tendency has also found that those who are considered to be rigid tend to experienc
negative mental health outcomes. For example, Dugas et al. (1998) found that
Intolerance of Uncertainty has been identified as an important variable related to
and generalized anxiety disorder. There is also some suggestion that high degrees o
dogmatism are related to irrational beliefs and emotional disturbance (Ellis, 1986).
3
Past research has consistently shown that rigidity is mostly associated with poor me
health outcomes. In contrast to these findings, we hypothesized that only some aspec
of what can be called rigidity will be associated with poor mental health. In partic
some people can be described as rigid because they desire structure and have a
preference for order and routine in their lives (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, &
Moskowitz, 2001). We expect that these people will not experience poor mental health
outcomes. In contrast, some people are described as rigid because they respond
negatively when their structure is taken away (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson
et al, 2001). It is these people in particular who we expect will experience poor men
health. We justify these predictions later in the theory and hypotheses section.
Our second aim is to replicate and extend previous research (e.g., Neuberg & Newsom,
1993) concerning two aspects of cognitive rigidity, DS and RLS and their potentially
divergent relationships with mental health. The present research extends previous
research by including additional measures of mental health such as depression,
hopelessness, suicidal ideation, stress and life satisfaction to the study of DS and
The present research intends to expand our understanding of the potential usefulness
the PNS scale beyond its established role in many psychological events (e.g.,
stereotyping; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, & O'Brien, 1995) to the implications that it
may have for mental health.
Organization of this thesis
Chapter 1 orients the reader to research relating to the prevalence of psychological
disorders in Australia. This is then followed by an introduction to the theoretical
framework that is used to guide the formation our hypotheses. The chapter also
4
discusses the definitions relevant to the concept of cognitive rigidity and some of t
issues associated with the measurement of cognitive rigidity. Cognitive rigidity can
measured in two different ways. The first measures cognitive rigidity in terms of
maximum ability tests and the second measures cognitive rigidity in terms of selfreport tendency tests.
Chapter 2 looks at the measurement of cognitive rigidity in terms of ones maximum
ability to be flexible. In doing so, this chapter discusses various scales, which are
considered to be measures of cognitive rigidity. These types of scales are mostly
concerned with an individuals ability to be flexible in the way that they solve probl
This chapter reviews some of the research concerning the relationship between rigidit
as measured by ones ability to be flexible and mental health.
Chapter 3 discusses cognitive rigidity as conceptualized as a self reported tendency.
discusses some of the most well known measures in this genre, with particular
reference to a measure of cognitive rigidity - the PNS scale (Thompson et al., 1989).
The results of our analysis suggest that the PNS scale is the ideal instrument in ter
allowing us to satisfy the aims of the present research. The chapter then proceeds to
discuss the relationship between self-report rigidity and mental health. The chapter
introduces the idea that not all types of cognitive rigidity are expected to have neg
implications for mental health.
Chapter 4 continues to examine the concept of PNS. The chapter begins to discuss the
need-for-structure concept and the role that it has in assisting individuals to under
and navigate their environment. Also discussed is the theoretical basis for the PNS
5
construct and the implications that it may have for both cognitive functioning and
mental health. The chapter discusses the two factors of the PNS scale and examines
how they might relate to mental health. The research hypotheses are outlined at the en
of this chapter.
Chapter 5 explains the subjects, materials and procedures related to Study 1. The resu
as well as a discussion of the results pertaining to Study 1 are then presented.
Chapter 6 explains the subjects, materials and procedures related to Study 2. The resu
as well as a discussion of the results pertaining to Study 2 are then presented.
Chapter 7 presents the overall discussion of the results pertaining to each of the
hypotheses relevant to both of the studies conducted. This chapter also discusses the
implications and limitations arising from this research and highlights areas for futur
research.
6
CHAPTER ONE
AN INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL HEALTH
AND COGNITIVE RIGIDITY
7
This chapter will introduce the reader to the concept of cognitive rigidity and h o w it
might relate to mental health. A brief overview of Australia's current mental health
status will be provided. The evidence based on this review suggests that poor mental
health is a significant problem affecting a substantial proportion of the Australian
worldwide community. It is argued that although there are many factors influencing ou
mental health, the evidence thus far suggests that cognitive rigidity is thought to
factor worthy of some investigation (Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a; Chang, 2002;
Dieserud et al., 2001; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte
et al., 1990). This chapter will also introduce Thompson et al. (1989) and Neuberg an
Newsom's (1993) proposed definition of cognitive rigidity. This definition
distinguishes between two types of rigidity, the poor/negative manner of response wh
confronted with unpredictable/unstructured situations and the extent to which people
desire structure in their lives. The hypotheses regarding the way in which these two
aspects of rigidity might relate to mental health will be outlined. This will be fol
by a discussion that offers some working definitions of the concept of cognitive
rigidity. The chapter will then conclude with an introduction to the various ways in
which cognitive rigidity can be measured.
1.1 The mental health crisis
Almost 2.5 million Australians are estimated to have a mental disorder, with almost
half of these people affected long term. It is also estimated that one in five Austr
will be affected by a mental health problem at some stage in their lives (Henderson,
Andrews, & Hall, 2000). Almost one out of five children and adolescents suffers from
mental health problem or disorder within any six-month period (Zubrick, Silburn,
Burton, & Blair, 2000).
8
Individuals with mental health problems and mental disorders are at markedly
increased risk of suicide (Brown, Beck, Steer, & Grisham, 2000). Suicide is now a
major cause of death among young people in Australia, second only to motor vehicle
accidents as the single greatest cause of death. In NSW there are in excess of 700
suicide deaths and approximately 24,000 suicide attempts annually (Howe, 1999). A
recent 20 year prospective study, found that suicide ideation was one of the unique
factors for suicide (Brown et al., 2000). A survey at the University of Wollongong
(Ciarrochi & Deane, 2000) indicated that 16% of students reported levels of suicide
ideation akin to those with chronic psychiatric problems (Reynolds, 1987). Suicidal
behavior can adversely effect the family, the individuals peers and the community
(Kalafat, 1997).
Depression is a factor commonly associated with suicide in all age groups. The
majority of people who die from suicide meet criteria for depressive disorder in th
weeks before death (Brown et al., 2000). After a previous suicide attempt, depressio
the next highest risk factor for youth suicide (Silburn, Zubrick, & Garton, 1996).
Depression is a significant problem worldwide with projections to the year 2020
indicating that depression will contribute the largest share to the burden of disea
the developing world and the second largest worldwide (Murray & Lopez, 1996). A
recent survey of Australia's mental health revealed that the prevalence rate of
depression among the Australian population is about 5.8% (Henderson et al., 2000).
Depression was more frequent in females (7.4%) than in males (4.2%). Compared to
other age groups, those in the 18-24 year group evidenced the highest rate of depres
disorders (11%). Depression has been significantly related to school difficulties, jo
loss, physical illness, unsatisfactory relationships and impaired social judgements
9
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Forgas, Johnson, & Ciarrochi, 1997; Tarris, Bok, &
Calje, 1998). One of the major antecedents of depression is life stress, which inclu
both daily hassles (Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981) and major negative li
events (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegal, 1978).
Depressive disorders are associated with high rates of co-morbidity. A recent surve
Australia's mental health revealed that of women with a depressive disorder 57% had
least another mental disorder and 66% of men with a depressive disorder had at leas
one other mental disorder (Henderson et al, 2000). Depressive disorders can co-occur
with other disorders such as substance abuse, eating disorders and anxiety disorder
Depression however is more likely to be associated with anxiety disorders more than
any other disorder. Over the half the people with an affective or depressive disord
have an anxiety disorder (Henderson, Jorm, Korten, Jacomb, Christensen, & Rodgers,
1998; McLennan, 1998). According to a recent survey of Australia's mental health,
anxiety was the most common disorder affecting Australians (Henderson et al., 2000).
It affected just under 1 in 10 adults, which comprises 1.3 million adults. Anxiety
disorders were most prevalent in people aged 18-54. Women were 3 times more likely
to suffer from an anxiety disorder than men.
The personal and financial costs of mental health problems to local and worldwide
communities is a significant problem. Mental disorders are estimated to be the four
most expensive disease group, after digestive system diseases, circulatory disorder
musculoskeletal problems (Murray & Lopez, 1996). The institutional and non-
institutional cost of mental disorders in Australia has been estimated at $2.58 bil
1993-1994 alone. That year it constituted 8.3% of the total health system costs.
10
Intentional injuries cost a further $69 million and the cost for depression in that
was $521 million (Murray & Lopez, 1996). Currently mental health problems are
responsible for 11% of the disease burden worldwide. Predictions suggest that by 202
the disease burden of mental health conditions may increase to 15% (Murray & Lopez,
1996). The disablement data suggest that anxiety disorders account for 2.7 million d
per month and depressive disorders 3.5 million days per month that people were unab
to carry their usual activities such as work or home responsibilities (Henderson et
2000). The aforementioned statistics demonstrate that the burden of mental disorders
the Australian and worldwide community is a serious matter. This is most particularl
true in light of the fact that mental health problems are related to high levels of
absenteeism, lost productivity, heavy burdens on careers and families, legal costs a
lost quality and years of life (Henderson et al., 2000; Murray & Lopez, 1996).
1.2 Theoretical framework
1.2.1 The direct relationship between rigidity and mental health
The modern world can be viewed as largely unstructured and unpredictable.
Philosophers representative of ancient cultures such the Dalai Lama through to
psychologist/theorists such as Albert Ellis, contend that our world is by nature
unstructured and unpredictable. In fact, whether one looks at life from a Buddhist
perspective or a Western perspective, "the fact remains that life is change ... all
events, and phenomena are dynamic, changing every moment, nothing remains static"
(Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998, p. 163).
This climate of change can be distressing for some individuals. However this does no
always have to be the case. Buddhists, for example, meditate on the transience of li
11
and in doing so claim to overcome the distress associated with that transience.
Followers of the Buddhist traditions, such as the Dalai Lama suggest that because
today's world is characterized by sudden, unexpected change, the attempt to develop
flexible mode of thinking can be crucial to survival, (Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998). A
supple mind can help us overcome "extreme thinking which leads to negative
consequences" (Dalai Lama & Cutler, 1998, p. 198). Thus Buddhists argue that the
ability to shift perspective can be one of the most powerful and effective tools we
to help us cope with life's daily problems. Flexibility of mind allows us to reconci
external changes going on around us and to assist in the maintenance of composure
even in the most restless conditions, thereby nurturing the resilience of the human
spirit.
Within the normal population, some people respond poorly to a lack of structure. The
individuals are usually labeled "rigid". However the reality is that life is always
unstructured and it is always in a state of flux. Therefore it is highly likely that
reality may be difficult for some people to deal with, and thus they may be subject
feelings of disappointment or they may even feel overwhelmed by life.
There has been a substantial amount of evidence to suggest that rigid or inflexible
people experience poor mental health compared to those who are not so rigid (e.g.,
Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Nezu et al., 1989). Indices of poor mental health
such as depression, hopelessness and particularly suicidal ideation and behavior ha
been commonly cited as being the likely result of a number of factors, with cognitiv
rigidity being one of the more important ones (Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a; Dieserud,
et al., 2001; Haaga et al, 1995; Nezu, 1985, 1987; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte
3 0009 03290830 8
12
et al., 1990). There have also been numerous studies which have found a significant
link between social problem solving deficits, a form of rigidity, and maladjustmen
reviews, see D'Zurilla, 1986; Nezu et al., 1989).
We wish to argue that the story is not so simple. Some aspects of cognitive rigidi
lead to poor mental health (e.g., Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a; Dieserud et al., 2001
Haaga et al., 1995; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte et al., 1990). However, we
wish to argue that other aspects of rigidity may not have detrimental effects. As
to earlier, an important distinction has been made in the field between those who
structure and those who respond poorly to the lack of structure (Neuberg & Newsom,
1993).
Thompson et al. (1989) formulated the PNS scale, which assesses individual
differences in the extent to which people have a chronic need to have structure in
lives. As mentioned earlier, this scale has two highly related yet conceptually dis
sub-factors, DS and RLS. DS measures the extent to which people desire structure i
their lives (e.g., "I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more"
measures poor/negative manner of response when confronted with
unpredictable/unstructured situations (e.g., "I hate to change my plans at the las
minute") (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). There is also preliminary evidence of
correlations among these two factors with measures of the Big Five Inventory of th
Omni Personality Survey (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991) and social anxiety measures
that suggest that these factors are somewhat distinct in the manner posited (Neube
Newsom, 1993).
13
We wish to argue that desiring structure in itself is not irrational and thus will n
to poor mental health. We can strongly desire structure but not respond poorly when
lose it. Indeed people who desire structure may well create worlds that are more
predictable and pleasant. We propose that it is the conversion of desires into
absolutistic demands or "musts" that is likely to result in emotional disturbance. Th
view is supported by Rational Emotive Theory (RET; Ellis, cited in Dryden, 1991).
According to Cognitive Behavioral Theory (CBT; Beck, 1976) and RET, rigid people
have irrational or dysfunctional assumptions that may not be commensurate with the
reality that they are facing. RET argues that if humans would stick to preferences o
desires - "I would like this very much, but I don't have to have it" and not transmu
into an absolute must, they would not have so much emotional trouble (Ellis, cited in
Dryden, 1991). Hence according to RET desiring structure will not lead to emotional
distress. The RET framework would assume that those who convert their desires for
structure ("I prefer it when the rules in a situation are clear") into absolutistic
("The rules in a situation must always be clear"), are those who are more likely to
experience emotional disturbance. These demands suggest that the person is not
accepting reality. When their demands are contradicted by reality these individuals
likely to respond with thoughts such as "I can't handle this situation, or this is aw
Therefore the demands and the resulting thoughts are likely to lead these individual
experience substantial distress (Ellis, cited in Dryden, 1991). The RET framework
would assume that people high in RLS have unrealistic demands about reality. In ligh
of the perspective offered by Ellis, it is highly possible that those who respond poo
to a lack of structure may be those who do not just desire structure but those who d
the presence of structure as a necessity or a must.
14
W e therefore predict that not all individual differences inrigiditywill have the same
relationship with mental health. Specifically we hypothesize that the desire for stru
will not be related to poor mental health. Rather it will be the poor response to a l
structure that will relate to poor mental health.
1.2.2 Rigid people and stressful life events
It is reasonable to consider that cognitively rigid people adopt less flexible ways o
responding to and dealing with life stressors. Indeed there is ample evidence support
the stress-diathesis models of suicidal behavior (Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a, 1988b;
Dixion, Heppner, & Anderson, 1991; Dixion, Heppner, & Rudd, 1994; Priester &
Clum, 1993; Schotte & Clum, 1982, 1987). Schotte and Clum's (1982, 1987) diathesisstress-hopelessness model of suicidal behavior is one example. According to their
model, inflexible problem solving affects an individual's capacity to cope, thereby
predisposing the individual to become suicidal under conditions of chronic stress. It
the people who are considered to be highly rigid who have been shown to respond to
stressful life events with poor coping. Stress diathesis models therefore predict an
interaction between rigidity and stress.
Therefore our next hypothesis is that highly rigid people would respond worse to stre
than those lower in rigidity. That is, stress will be associated with greater increas
poor mental health among those who are more rigid compared to those who are not as
rigid. Earlier, the RET framework was used to argue that the RLS factor might
represent a more dysfunctional form of rigidity than does the DS factor. Accordingly
is hypothesized that those high in RLS will respond more poorly to stressful life eve
15
compared to those low in R L S . The final hypothesis is that D S will not interact with
stressful life events.
1.3 Cognitive rigidity defined
Cognitive rigidity can be conceptualized in several ways. For example, it can be viewe
in dispositional or personality terms in that people may differ in the extent to which
they tend to be flexible. Cognitive rigidity can also be conceptualized in terms of o
skill or maximum ability to be flexible.
Cognitive rigidity has been primarily defined as encompassing the cognitive distortio
of dichotomous, or all-or-nothing thinking, and the inability to be flexible in terms
generating or acting on alternative solutions (Weishaar, 1996). These elements of
cognitive rigidity have been incorporated into more recent research on problem solving
(Weishaar, 1996). Using the problem solving approach is one method of measuring
cognitive rigidity, in that this approach assesses one's ability to be flexible. These
measures aim to obtain an indication of one's optimal problem solving performance.
The ability too effectively problem solve is dependent upon a number of factors. These
factors include the ability to define and formulate the problem, to be able to generat
alternative solutions, to be able to monitor and evaluate possible solutions (D'Zurill
Chang, Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998), to be able to anticipate solution consequences
(Schotte & Clum, 1987) and to abstain from the tendency to perseverate and resist the
acquisition of new behavior patterns by holding onto previous and nonadaptive styles
of performance (Ferrari & Mautz, 1997). These facets of the problem solving process
have been applied to the study of interpersonal or impersonal problem solving ability.
16
A s mentioned earlier, cognitive rigidity can also be conceptualized in terms of a
tendency rather than an ability. In this context, the term cognitive rigidity refers to
cognitive style whereby individuals display significant tendencies towards being
inflexible and/or intolerant toward ambiguity. Thus these individuals may be able to be
flexible yet they do not tend to be flexible. Such individuals are also likely to show a
definite preference for order and predictability, and hence may be dispositionally
motivated to cognitively structure their worlds in unambiguous ways.
There are a number of conceptualizations relevant to the definition of cognitive rigidi
as a self-reported tendency. For example, one could conceptualize cognitive rigidity in
terms of individual differences in the amount of effortful, elaborative thought people
desire (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), in terms of people's preferences for having control
over their lives (Burger, 1992) and in terms of individual differences in one's
preference for cognitive simplicity and structure (Thompson et al, 1989). Rigidity can
also be conceptualized as individual differences in people's need for closure or
people's desire for an answer on a given topic compared to confusion and ambiguity
(Kruglanski, 1989). These concepts represent different aspects of cognitive rigidity.
However, they also all possess, as a component of their conceptualizations, the notion
of a preference for cognitive simplicity and structure.
A primary focus of this paper concerns a specific aspect of cognitive rigidity - the nee
for structure. A need for structure is thought to occur when an individual desires, or i
compelled to impose structure, in order to dispel uncertainty, doubt and ambiguity. The
imposition of structure is associated with cognitive consequences such as generating
fewer hypotheses (Freund, Kruglanski, & Schpitzajzen, 1985). There is evidence
17
suggesting that those with a high need for simple structure are not those w h o are
constrained to simplify and structure their world due to a lack of intellectual
capabilities, but rather they do so because they prefer to (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
Thus this motive to structure one's world is argued to represent a chronic motive no
limited capacity.
The PNS scale which measures the need for structure is argued to be representative o
an aspect of cognitive rigidity. This is because it is highly correlated with two we
known measures of rigidity. These measures are the Rigidity scale (r=.60) (Gough and
Sanford, 1952) and the Rigidity About Personal Habits scale (r=.64) (RAPH; Meresko,
Rubin, Shantz, & Morrow, 1954). Thompson et al. (2001) argue that magnitude of the
PNS - RAPH correlation is high enough to indicate a degree of redundancy between
the two measures, the PNS scale assuming phenomenological precedence.
1.4 Introduction to the review of cognitive rigidity measures
There are a number of instruments with which one could use to measure cognitive
rigidity. These measurements capture different, but equally important aspects of
cognitive rigidity. Therefore it is essential to make a distinction between them. As
the aforementioned distinctions regarding various conceptualizations of cognitive
rigidity, these measures can be classified into one of two groups - rigidity as meas
by maximum ability tests and self-report measures that capture a person's tendency
towards being rigid or a person's typical level of rigidity. Some measures of cognit
rigidity focus on maximum /optimal functioning (e.g., the Means-Ends Problem
Solving procedure; MEPS; Piatt, Spivack, & Bloom, 1975a), while others are a mixture
of optimal and typical functioning. Self-report measures tend to fall into the latte
18
category (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Caputi, 2000). Measures that tap into m a x i m u m or
optimal performance with regards to cognitive rigidity tend to be those which are
concerned with problem solving ability. Optimal performance is often what a person is
capable of at a particular moment in time. Respondents are instructed to complete the
measure to the best of their ability.
Self-report measures in contrast, tend to be more dependent upon self-evaluation as
opposed to aptitude. The emphasis is more on the various ways in which people
typically think and behave as opposed to what they are capable of. For example a selfreport measure called the PNS scale (Thompson et al., 1989) instructs respondents to
"read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each
according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences". One of its items includes " I
that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more". Self-report measures also t
not to impose time limits upon the test taker. The distinction between maximum
performance rigidity and self-report rigidity primarily deals with the difference
between one's optimal ability to solve problems and one's motivation or desire to thin
and behave in ways that are considered to be rigid. Therefore it is argued there is a
difference between what one is capable of doing as opposed to what one typically
chooses to do.
1.5 Summary
Cognitive rigidity is a factor that has significant implications for mental health. E
in the chapter it was mentioned that the present research wished to explore the ways i
which cognitive rigidity as measured as a self-reported tendency relates to mental
19
health. The PNS scale is a self-report measure, which captures the tendency to think
and behave in a rigid manner. This scale is valuable for the purposes of the present
research because unlike other measures of rigidity, it can be broken down into two
related yet conceptually distinct sub-scales, namely DS and RLS. In order to place the
concept of cognitive rigidity as measured as a self reported tendency in context,
Chapter 2 will present a review regarding some of the instruments used in assessing
cognitive rigidity as measured by maximum performance as well as a brief review of
the research concerning the relationship between performance rigidity and mental
health. This chapter will be followed by chapter 3, which deals with rigidity as
measured as a self-reported tendency and its relationship with mental health. These
chapters are designed to highlight the position that the information gleaned from both
of these approaches is valuable in suggesting that some types of rigidity are associat
with poor mental health and the inability to effectively cope with stressful life even
20
CHAPTER TWO
COGNITIVE RIGIDITY AS MEASURED BY
MAXIMUM PERFORMANCE TESTS
21
This chapter will discuss the measures of cognitive rigidity that are typically used in
problem solving/mental health research. The chapter will conclude by examining the
relationship between rigidity as measured by maximum performance and mental health.
2.1 Measures of cognitive rigidity based on maximum performance
The most common measures of cognitive rigidity that are based on performance have
tended to concentrate on problem solving ability (Weishaar, 1996). A performance test
directly assesses a person's ability to apply skills effectively to a particular prob
solving task (D'Zurilla & Maydeu-Olivares, 1995). The person's performance is then
judged or evaluated and this measure is viewed as an indication of the level of abili
that particular area (e.g., Nezu & D'Zurilla, 1981a, 1981b). Thus, tests of problem
solving ability aim to capture one's maximum performance in that area.
There are two main types of measures of problem solving ability namely
social/interpersonal problem solving measures and impersonal problem solving
measures. The majority of the literature concerning the relationship between mental
health and rigidity as measured by maximum performance tests tend to focus on poor
problem solving skills. More specifically on social problem solving deficits as oppose
to impersonal problem solving deficits (Weishaar, 1996).
Of all the "performance" measures of cognitive rigidity that are suitable for use with
adult populations, there are three instruments that have been the most commonly used
in the research concerning social problem solving skills and mental health. These thre
include the MEPS (Piatt et al., 1975a), the Inventory of Decisions, Evaluations and
22
Actions (IDEA; Goddard & McFall, 1992) and the Interpersonal Problem Solving
Assessment Technique (IPSAT; Getter & Nowinski, 1981).
We focus on the MEPS because it is one the most widely used measures of social
problem solving ability in research involving mental health (D'Zurilla & MaydeuOlivares, 1995). In this procedure the respondent is presented with a series of 10
incomplete stories that have only a beginning and an ending. In the beginning of the
story, the protagonist is faced with a specific problem, and at the end the problem i
resolved. The respondent is asked to fill in the middle of the story that connects th
beginning to the ending. The respondent therefore has to suggest a number of strateg
or alternative solutions for overcoming the given problem situation. The response is
analyzed, quantitatively scored and this measure is viewed as an indicator of the le
of the respondent's problem solving ability or ability to be flexible. The MEPS is
reported to have a test-retest reliability for 2.5 weeks of .59 and for 8 months a
reliability of .43. Its level of internal consistency ranges from .8 to .84 (Piatt e
1975a).
There are a number of impersonal problem solving measures that are utilized in
research concerning impersonal problem solving and mental health. The Alternate Uses
Test (AUT; Wilson, Christensen, Merrifield, & Guilford, 1975), Kelly's (1955) Role
Construct Repertory Test and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT; Witkin, 1950) are
some examples.
23
2.2 The research: Social problem solving, suicide, depression and
hopelessness
The study of cognitive rigidity/flexibility is considered to be of great significance
to the role that it plays in each of the various psychological conditions such as
depression, anxiety, hopelessness and suicidal behavior (Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a,
1988b; Beck, 1976; Dixion et al., 1991; Dixion et al., 1994; Nezu, 1985, 1986, 1987;
Priester & Clum, 1993; Schotte & Clum, 1982, 1987).
A substantial amount of the recent research assessing the relationships between
cognitive rigidity and suicide, depression and hopelessness tends to measure cognitiv
rigidity or inflexibility by the presence of problem solving deficits, particularly s
or interpersonal problem solving deficits (Weishaar, 1996). This is because of the
greater clinical significance that has been assigned to the role of interpersonal pro
solving as opposed to impersonal problem solving to the study of suicidal ideation
(e.g., Bonner and Rich, 1988a; Dixon et al., 1991; D'Zurilla et al., 1998; Priester &
Clum, 1993), to the study of suicide and hopelessness (Schotte & Clum, 1982, 1987;
Weishaar, 1996) and to the study of depression (D'Zurilla, 1986; Nezu, 1987).
The significance of interpersonal problem solving deficits is clearly highlighted whe
considering its role in research concerning depression. A popular perspective for
examining depression and depressive symptoms has been via the problem solving
framework. Within this framework depression and depressive symptoms are believed to
be triggered though an interaction of stressful events and rigid problem solving (Nez
1986, 1987). The reciprocal relationship between ineffective social problem solving
skills and depression is supported by the research indicating that depressed individu
24
have been shown to demonstrate poor performances on the M E P S . These individuals
can be said to demonstrate cognitive rigidity as they were unable to generate a
sufficient number of alternative solutions to the proposed problem situations (Marx,
Williams, & Claridge, 1992; Schotte & Clum, 1982, 1987). The importance of
interpersonal problem solving deficits is further emphasized when considering that
once suicidal individuals engage in interpersonal problem solving, the same deficits
accompanying impersonal problem solving not only emerge, but are magnified
(McLeavey, Daly, Murray, O'Riodan, & Taylor, 1987).
2.3 Models integrating stress, rigidity and mental health
The following discussion involving life stressors, rigidity and mental health is desig
to highlight the point that those who are rigid and who are exposed to life stressors a
more likely to evidence greater increases in negative mental health states. Models that
integrate stress and cognitive rigidity with negative mental health outcomes such as
hopelessness, suicide and depression are based primarily in a stress-diathesis format.
This format imposes life stressors upon on a set of cognitive risk factors (suicidal
ideation, depression and hopelessness) that result in suicidal behavior. The risk fact
pose a vulnerability to suicide that becomes evident as a result of adverse conditions
such as life stressors. More recent models such as Dieserud et al. (2001) however
support the concept of a cognitive path to suicide attempt, separate from the path
mediated through depression/hopelessness/ideation.
Schotte and Clum's (1982) diathesis-stress-hopelessness model of suicidal behavior
argues that inflexible problem solving may predispose individuals to become hopeless
and suicidal under conditions of chronic stress (Schotte et al., 1990). They proposed
25
that the combination of life stress and poor social problem solving ability affects an
individuals ability to develop effective solutions for adaptive coping, which in turn
results in hopelessness. This hopelessness is then postulated to put individuals at
increased risk for suicidal behavior. Schotte and Clum's theory therefore predicts that
deficit in problem solving abilities, as measured by the MEPS, will lead to suicidal
behavior primarily through its impact on hopelessness.
Several studies support various aspects of Schotte and Clum's model (Bonner & Rich,
1987, 1988a, 1988b; Dixion et al., 1991; Dixion et al., 1994; Priester & Clum, 1993) by
primarily providing support for direct associations between two or more variables
within the model (Dixion et al., 1994).
More recent research has expanded previous research on stress-vulnerability models of
depression and problem solving deficits as it relates to suicide attempt (Dieserud et a
2001). These findings indicated a two-path model of suicide attempt in a clinical
population. The first path began with low self-esteem, loneliness and relationship
difficulties, which progressed to depression, and was further mediated by hopelessness
and suicidal ideation which lead to suicide attempt. The second path developed from
low self-esteem and a low sense of self-efficacy and advanced to suicide attempt,
mediated by a negative appraisal of one's own problem solving capacity and
inflexible/poor interpersonal problem solving skills. Dieserud et al. (2001) argue that
the results of this study may indicate that the ability to exercise flexible interperso
problem solving might act as a protective mechanism for suicidality regardless of the
levels of depression and hopelessness. Due to the fact that there has been little
empirical data linking social problem solving deficits to suicidal behavior except as
26
they relate to hopelessness (Weishaar & Beck, 1990), the research by Dieserud et al.
(2001) is of importance in providing empirical support to several aspects of social
problem solving deficits that may be relevant to the construction of a cognitive profi
of individuals who are likely to engage in suicidal behavior (Ellis & Ratliff, 1986).
Measures of maximum performance possess both strengths and weaknesses. One can
argue that optimal performance measures tend to be objective and therefore not
subjected to bias. Another strength is that maximal performance tests are often of
demonstrated reliability and validity (Dennis, Sternberg, & Beatty, 2000). For example
it can be argued that optimal measures possess more stringent guidelines with which to
score and interpret test results. Test performance under maximal conditions may also
better simulate performance during challenging real-world events than test performance
under typical conditions. These tests can also have some problems. The most
significant problem is that they often are stressful and anxiety provoking. Due to thi
effect some people may not able to present their optimal level of performance. Dennis
et al. (2000) argues that some of these assessments also require significant lengths o
time to administer. Finally, optimal performance measures do not really capture one's
typical response style as do self-report measures. Therefore it is argued that self-re
measures may better capture how people behave and think the majority of the time.
2.4 Summary
The evidence presented suggested that cognitive rigidity as measured by optimal
performance tests tends to have negative implications for one's mental health. Those
who are highly rigid or inflexible were shown to experience poor mental health
(Bonner & Rich, 1988a; Dixion et al., 1993; Marx et al., 1992; Nezu, 1987; Schotte et
27
al., 1990). The experience of stressful life events appeared to exacerbate the mental
health of those who were considered to be highly rigid (Dieserud et al., 2001; Schott
al, 1990; Schotte & Clum, 1982,1987; Yang & Clum, 1994).
Although measures of maximum performance were shown to possess both strengths
and weaknesses, the fact remains that their aim is to provide a specific type of
information. This information chiefly pertains to one's ability to be flexible in the
manner in which they solve problems. The present research however is concerned with
another type of cognitive rigidity, a type which provides information which focuses
upon individual differences in the extent to which people are chronically motivated t
simply structure their worlds. The emphasis is therefore placed upon ones choice or
tendency to behave and think in a rigid manner. Measures of cognitive rigidity in ter
of maximum performance do not meaningfully address these interests, in that no
measure of maximum performance allows one to assess two important motivational
concepts relevant to the study of cognitive rigidity, which are central to this paper
namely Desire for Structure and Response to Lack of Structure.
28
CHAPTER THREE
COGNITIVE RTGrDITV AS A SELF-REPORTI.
TENDENCY
29
Measures of cognitiverigidityas a self-reported tendency have been widely used in
psychological research. Some examples include conceptualizations such as Intolerance
of Ambiguity (Eysenck, 1954; Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949), Rigidity (Gough & Sanford,
1952), Uncertainty Orientation (Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984; Sorrentino & Short, 1986),
Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960) and Authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950). These
theoretical perspectives have made valuable contributions towards our understanding of
human cognition, motivation and personality. This chapter will argue that despite the
usefulness of the aforementioned measures in psychological research, they are not well
suited to address the primary aims of the present research. The PNS scale is a self-
reported tendency measure of cognitive rigidity that is considered to be more suitable
for the purposes of the present research. This chapter will begin to present the ratio
behind this selection. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a discussion regarding
relationship between cognitive rigidity as a self-reported tendency and mental health.
3.1 Individual differences in the desire for simple structure
The PNS scale (Thompson et al., 1989) is one measure in particular that has promise in
its ability to provide a more complete understanding of cognitive rigidity. This self-
report measure is distinct from the aforementioned process measures in that it does no
assess matters relating to social problem solving. The PNS scale can be considered as
an individual difference measure capturing a particular aspect of cognitive rigidity
previously defined in the introduction - the need for structure. This scale and its tw
sub-factors, DS and RLS have been shown to possess internal (Cronbach alpha =.77)
and test-retest (over 12 weeks whole scale r= .76, factor 1 r=.84 and factor 2 r=.79)
reliability and more than adequate convergent and discriminant validity (Leone,
Wallace, & Modglin, 1999; Neuberg, Judice, West, & Thompson, 1997; Neuberg and
30
Newsom, 1993; Thompson et al., 2001). Evidence for the convergent and discriminant
validity of the PNS scale will be elaborated upon and is presented below in section 3
The data on the PNS scale indicates that individuals do in fact differ in the extent
which they are chronically motivated to simply structure their worlds (Moskowitz,
1993; Neuberg and Newsom, 1993; Thompson et al, 2001).
The PNS scale measures the need-for-structure construct. This scale is considered to
a valid measure of cognitive rigidity due to the fact that it correlates very highly
other very well known measures of cognitive rigidity. For example, as mentioned
earlier in chapter 1, the PNS scale evidenced correlations of (.60) with the Rigidity
scale (Gough and Sanford, 1952) and (.64) with the RAPH scale (Meresko et al., 1954).
A major advantage of the PNS scale is that unlike other scales which measure cognitiv
rigidity as a self-reported tendency, the PNS can be broken down into two related yet
conceptually independent sub-scales. As briefly alluded to earlier in chapter 1, these
two sub-scales represent two distinct types of rigidity, DS and RLS, and are signific
in that we can make different predictions from each of them (Neuberg & Newsom,
1993). Neuberg and Newsom (1993) and Thompson et al. (2001) present evidence that
the 11-item scale captures two related but conceptually independent factors. One sub-
scale measures the extent to which people desire to establish structure in their lives
example "I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life". The other sub-scale
measures the manner in which people respond to a lack of structure, for example "It
upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it". Confirmator
factor analysis tested the proposed two-factor model against a one-factor alternative
Results indicated that the two-factor model better accounted for the subject's data t
31
the one-factor model (Neuberg & N e w s o m , 1993; Thompson et al., 2001). The two
factors correlated fairly highly (inter-factor correlation's ranged from .54 to .75).
recently Hess (2001) provided evidence supporting the assertion that the two-factor
model structure of the PNS scale provides a reasonable description of the data across
number of age groups (21-85 years). Thus, the PNS scale and its two factors are valid
for use with university undergraduates (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) as well as older
populations.
The individual difference notion of desire for simple structure can be seen as similar
previous attempts to address personality influences in social thought processes.
Authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950), Dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), Intolerance of
Ambiguity (Eysenck, 1954), Uncertainty Orientation (Sorrentino & Hewitt, 1984;
Sorrentino & Short, 1986), The Need For Closure Scale (NFCS; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994) and the Rigidity scale (Gough & Stanford, 1952) all represent
different aspects of cognitive rigidity. They also all possess as a component of their
conceptualizations the notion of a preference for simple cognitive structures. It is
argued that although all these personality constructs share some similarities, they ar
importantly divergent from the PNS scale. Most significantly we now argue that the
PNS scale is far better suited to reliably and directly operationalize the desire for
simple structure construct. Most importantly, due to the fact that the PNS scale
operationalizes two conceptually distinct yet highly correlated aspects of cognitive
rigidity, DS and RLS, we argue that it is the scale that is best suited for our purpos
that it allows us to test our hypotheses that not all types of rigidity have the same
relationships with mental health.
32
3.2
Comparison between P N S and other self-report measures of
rigidity
We now return to the previously raised issue of discriminant validity. As mentioned
earlier, there are some similarities between the PNS and other individual difference
measures of rigidity. For example, the Authoritarian syndrome has implied rigidity in
both cognitive function and in the acceptance of social hierarchies (Adorno et al.,
1950). Dogmatism is concerned with openness and closedness of belief systems
(Rokeach, 1960). Intolerance of Ambiguity was theorized as a construct related to
one's resistance to a lack of conceptual clarity (Eysenck, 1954). Uncertainty
Orientation addresses the ways in which people attempt to seek cognitive clarity
(Sorrentino and Short, 1986). The Rigidity scale (Gough & Sanford, 1952) reflects the
flexibility of thought and behavior and the NFCS (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994)
reflects the desire for any answer on a given topic compared to confusion and
ambiguity. Another related scale includes the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS;
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), which measures chronic preferences of people to engage in
effortful, elaborative thought.
The issue as to whether alternative conceptualizations reliably capture the desire for
simple structure was explored by Neuberg and Newsom (1993). Confirmatory factor
analyses and average inter-item correlations indicate that the Authoritarianism,
Dogmatism, Intolerance of Ambiguity and Uncertainty Orientation measures all seem
to assess multiple constructs, as single factors models provided very poor fits to the
data and average inter-item correlations were quite low. Conceptually these alternativ
are characterized by other unrelated constructs as well as their attention to simple
cognitive structuring. Neuberg and Newsom (1993) argue that Authoritarianism for
33
example also assesses conventionalism, power and toughness, authoritarian aggression
and submission, all of which appear to have little overlap with PNS. Dogmatism refers
primarily to belief systems and their openness and closedness, not cognitive structure
or their simplicity. Intolerance of Ambiguity relates to ones resistance to lack of
conceptual clarity independently of the need for conceptual simplicity. It is argued t
the inclusion of other constructs within these scales vastly limits their utility as a
straightforward operationalization the desire for simple structure construct.
Moreover, as operationalized, these alternative constructs (i.e., Authoritarianism,
Dogmatism, & Intolerance of Ambiguity) are only somewhat correlated with the PNS
scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). The magnitude of the correlations ranges from low
to moderate. In fact Neuberg and Newsom (1993) found that only one item from each
of the Authoritarianism, Dogmatism and Intolerance of Ambiguity scales correlated
above .30 with the PNS scale or either of its sub-factors, and none of these three ite
did so consistently across scale administrations. Although the desire for simple
structure may be relevant to these constructs, clearly the PNS is not redundant with
these alternative operationalizations.
The PNS scale strongly correlates with another measure of rigidity, the Rigidity scale
(Gough & Stanford, 1952). However, it does so on the basis of only a small set of its
items (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). It therefore seems to be the case that a sub-
component of the Rigidity scale begins to capture the desire for simple structure, but
with weak reliability. The Rigidity Scale measures the flexibility of thought and
behavior. However, in its original form it consists of multiple factors and is argued
appear unreliable and nonunitary (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). The PNS demonstrated
34
negative, weak correlations with the N C S (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) suggesting that
these two scales may be orthogonal constructs. This remained the case when Neuberg
and Newsom (1993) broke the NCS into its three sub-components - cognitive
persistence, cognitive confidence and cognitive complexity.
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) presented the NFCS, which is another instrument that
has as part of its conceptualization the desire for simple structure. In contrast to
other self-report measures the NFCS was according to Kruglanski, Atash, DeGrada,
Mannetti, and Webster (1997, p. 1005) "designed to operationalize the very same
construct" as the PNS scale. The NFCS reflects the desire for any answer on a given
topic compared to confusion and ambiguity.
The NFCS is presented as a unidimentional instrument possessing strong discriminant
and predictive validity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). However, the NFCS fails to
exhibit discriminant validity and it fails as a unidimentional instrument (Neuberg et
1997; Thompson et al., 2001). Counter to the claim of unidimensionality, the NFCS is
multidimensional instrument likely composed of at least two orthogonal factors, the
desire for non-specific closure and the desire for specific closure (Neuberg et al.,
Thompson et al., 2001). As a consequence, interpretations of research in which the
scale is used as if it were unidimentional obscures conceptual clarity and renders da
interpretation problematic.
The NFCS fails to exhibit discriminant validity relative to the preexisting instrumen
most conceptually akin to it (Neuberg et al., 1997). The evidence has also shown that
compared to the NFCS, the PNS scale more adequately satisfies many basic criteria of
35
good measurement (Neuberg et al., 1997; Thompson et al., 2001). For example,
Neuberg et al. (1997, p. 1408) argues that the PNS scale demonstrates internal
consistency, a clearer dimensional structure, and "considerably greater evidence of
validity than the NFCS facets of Preference for Order and Preference for
Predictability." When used as a unidimentional instrument, it is highly redundant with
the preexisting PNS scale. In fact the strongest items of the NFCS are borrowed from
the PNS scale. The two scales consistently show very high correlations (median r=. 79)
When used as a multidimensional instrument, the first two of its five facets are
indiscriminable from the two factors of the PNS scale, and a third facet is
indiscriminable from the Thompson et al. (2001) preexisting Personal Fear of Invalidi
Scale. Based on the analysis of Neuberg et al. (1997), it appears that the NFCS fails
add anything beyond what is captured by extant instruments.
The case for PNS's discriminant validity is further strengthened when one considers t
breadth of demonstrated PNS influences. A discussion of the influences of the PNS
scale and the advantages of using this scale for the purposes of the present research
be presented in chapter 4.
3.3 Rigidity as measured as a self-reported tendency and mental
health
The previously discussed literature in chapter 2 suggests that those who exhibit
problem solving skill deficits tend to suffer negative mental health outcomes such as
depression and suicidal behavior (e.g., Dieserud et al., 2001). It was also shown that
these effects are further exacerbated when individuals are exposed to stress (e.g.,
Schotte et al., 1990). We will now turn to the research concerning rigidity as measure
36
as a self-reported tendency and its relationship with mental health. We argue that the
PNS scale is best suited for the purposes for the present research, however some of th
other self-report measures of rigidity have also yielded findings that are relevant to
hypotheses. The following is a review of some of this research.
Intolerance of Uncertainty is a measure of self-report rigidity that has been identifi
an important variable related to worry and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Dugas
et al., 1998). Those who evidence high scores on the measure of Intolerance of
Uncertainty tend to possess the tendency to react negatively to an uncertain event or
situation, independent of its probability of occurrence and of its associated
consequence. In other words for the same uncertain situation, two people with the same
perceptions of both its probability of occurrence and consequences may differ in their
threshold of tolerance towards the situation. Those who are intolerant of uncertainty
would deem the situation to be disturbing or even unacceptable (Ladouceur, Gosselin,
& Dugas, 2000). This resistance and negative response to a lack of certainty or clarity
is argued to be reflective of cognitive rigidity. This is due to fact that those who r
such a manner are displaying a definite lack of flexibility in their behavioral respon
to a lack of clarity or certainty. Intolerance of Uncertainty has been shown to be rel
to trait worry in non-clinical subjects, even when anxiety and depression levels are
partialed out (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte,
Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). GAD patients as opposed to patients suffering from other
anxiety disorders, and moderate worriers show greater levels of intolerance of
uncertainty (Ladouceur, Freeston, Dugas, Rheaume, Gognon, Thibodeau, Boisvert,
Provencher, & Blais, 1995, cited in Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997).
37
Albert Ellis has commented upon a related aspect of cognitive rigidity- dogmatism.
Those who are thought to be dogmatic as measured by the Dogmatism scale (Rokeach,
1960) tend to be rigid in that their belief systems are not flexible, as they are conci
to possess closed belief systems. There is some suggestion that a high degree of
dogmatism is related to irrational beliefs and emotional disturbance (Ellis, 1986). Ther
is also some evidence suggesting that increasing dogmatism carries with it increasing
feelings of guilt and hostility in both males and females and increasing aggression in
males (Heyman, 1977). The increase in hostility as dogmatism increases reflects the
increasing disaffection and defensiveness of the more dogmatic individual. Heyman
(1977) found that disaffected feelings and actions whether they be dogmatic, hostile or
aggressive, are accompanied by increasing feelings of guilt. This suggests that these
disaffected patterns include anger and disappointment turned inward as well as
outward.
Intolerance of Ambiguity (Eysenk, 1954; Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949) is another aspect
of cognitive rigidity that has been shown to be related to poor mental health. Ambiguity
is very similar too the concept of intolerance of uncertainty in that it refers to the
of clear meaning associated with various life experiences. The person with low
tolerance of ambiguity experiences stress reacts prematurely and avoids ambiguous
stimuli. A person with a high tolerance for ambiguity perceives ambiguous stimuli as
desirable, challenging and interesting (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). Those who are
highly intolerant of ambiguity are said to evidence the cognitive distortion of
dichotomous or all-or-nothing thinking (Bochner, 1965).
38
Yapko (2001) argues that intolerance of ambiguity may be one of the most powerful
and pervasive risk factors for depression. Consistent with this position is the researc
Anderson (1990). Anderson (1990) argues that those who are intolerant of ambiguity
are thought to be motivated to rapidly resolve uncertainties that are sparked by
rumination about negative life events. It is at this point that those who are intoleran
ambiguity find themselves unable to escape the negative implications of this
rumination. Therefore to attain resolution they adopt negative expectancies that they
tend to hold with certainty. That is, they ultimately come to experience depressive
predictive certainty and depression. These results were consistent with later research
that found ambiguity intolerance to serve as a vulnerability factor for both the certai
of future suffering and for depression (Anderson & Schwartz, 1992).
3.4 The possibility for a positive relationship between desire for
structure and mental health
Although admittedly speculative, this section aims to introduce the idea that structuri
one's world can lead to positive outcomes. Religion may provide one example of how
this can be possible. Those who are religious tend to exist in a world with more
structures in place compared to those who are not religious. For example religion often
provides people with guidelines on how to think and behave and it provides people
with explanations for why things are the way they are. Thus religion can provide people
with a lot of structure. Evidence suggests that religious people are more structuring a
rigid (Saroglou, in press). There is also evidence that suggests that religious people a
happier and report better mental health (Thoresen, Harris, & Oman, 2001, cited in
Plante & Sherman, 2001). The desire for structure might influence people to gravitate
towards a structured existence. It is possible that amongst other factors, that such
39
structuring m a y lead these people to be happier. This speculative suggestion is raised in
order to consider the possibility that desiring structure might have some benefits.
The empirical literature suggests that when studies are based on measures of general
religiosity (e.g., attitude to religion, intrinsic religiosity, religious affiliation an
religious behavior such as prayer and church attendance) the association between
religiosity and various aspects of rigidity is mostly positive (Saroglou, in press). For
example, this is the case with dogmatism (Francis, 2001), low openness to experience
(Saroglou, 2002) and values emphasizing the need for reduction of uncertainty and low
importance attributed to the values emphasizing openness to change (Schwartz &
Huismans, 1995). Religiosity is therefore argued to be more predictive of high need for
order, structure and closure. This notion is supported by the finding that religiosity
(e.g., attitude to religion, intrinsic religiosity, religious affiliation and religious
such as prayer and church attendance) is positively related to the need for closure as
measured by the NCFS by Kruglanski and Webster referred to earlier (Saroglou, in
press). That is, religiosity is associated with a high desire for definite order and
structure in one's life and a strong dislike of chaos and disorder. Given that the NFCS
is argued to be redundant with the PNS scale (Neuberg et al., 1997) one could say that
religious people tend to exhibit a high need for structure or a high desire for simple
structure in their lives.
A number of surveys and studies across Europe and North America have revealed that
religious people more often than non-religious people report better mental health,
feelings of happiness and greater satisfaction with life. For example, Thoresen, Harris,
and Oman, (2001, cited in Plante & Sherman, 2001) review and present scientific
40
evidence supporting the argument that religious/spiritual factors positively influence
physical and mental health. Fallot (2001, cited in Lamb, 2001) also reviewed the
research and concludes that in the main, religion is often related to more positive
mental health outcomes such as happiness and peacefulness. Finally Koenig (2001)
reviewed a century of research examining religions relationship to mental health and
other behaviors affecting mental and social functioning. Results suggested that most
mainline religions with well-established traditions and accountable leadership tend to
promote positive (i.e., well-being and life satisfaction) rather than negative human
experiences. Recent research indicates that people with open and mature religiosity
seem to be high in emotional stability (Saroglou, 2002). It was also found that
religiosity was associated with low neuroticism. Weerasinghe and Tepperman (1994)
also found that religion was associated with greater happiness and was a key factor in
suicide prevention. There is also evidence suggesting that the link between faith and
well-being remains even after statistically extracting the effect of general social acti
and connectedness associated with religiosity (Ellison, 1991). One might ask why it is
that religious individuals tend to experience positive mental heath. It is speculated th
amongst other variables, that the desire for structure evident amongst religious
individuals might contribute somewhat to their mental health.
In addition to our speculations about religion, there is some evidence to suggest that
rigidity may sometimes be beneficial. Budd (1993) found that those with a distinct
cognitive structure have better self-reported coping skills. Evans, Thompson, Browne,
and Barr (1993) found that in adults with acute leukemia in remission the presence of
cognitive structuring was related to psychological well-being. Cognitive structure in
this study was measured in terms of being intolerant of ambiguity and as being one
41
prone to seeking clarity. Finally, Bar-Tal (1994) found that when high monitors have
high ability to achieve cognitive structure they suffer less psychological distress.
Cognitive structure in these studies refers to an individuals preference for structure,
akin to the concept of desire for structure mentioned earlier. There is also some
evidence indicating that authoritarianism which is considered to represent an example
of rigidity, is moderately correlated with better mental health in that those who are
considered to be authoritarian have shown to exhibit greater self-esteem and less
anxiety (Ray, 1984).
3.5 Summary
This chapter presented the argument that when compared to the other measures of
rigidity as a self-reported tendency, the PNS scale was considered to be the most
suitable for the purposes of the present research. It was argued that in comparison to t
other scales, the PNS scale was shown to be the best instrument with which to reliably
measure the desire for simple structure concept. In contrast to some of the other scales,
the PNS scale assesses individual preferences for organization and structure, without
assessing additional components such as attitudes towards political and social issues. I
comparison to the other measures of cognitive rigidity, the PNS scale is unique in that
in capturing the desire for simple structure concept it allows for the valid and reliabl
measurement of two empirically related yet conceptually distinct factors, DS and RLS.
It is these factors and their potentially divergent relationships with mental health, wh
form the primary focus of the present research.
This chapter also presented the argument that although most of the evidence presented
thus far suggests that rigidity is associated with poor mental health, such as in
42
depression, there is some evidence that suggests that some aspects ofrigiditysuch as
the desire for structure, may at times be associated with positive mental health. The
following chapter presents a comprehensive overview of the PNS construct and it
elaborates upon its two factors, DS and RLS and how they might relate to mental
health.
43
CHAPTER FOUR
PERSONAL NEED FOR STRUCTURE
44
The personal need for structure concept was introduced in the previous chapter. This
chapter will expand upon the information already provided on the PNS scale. The
chapter will begin by outlining the early origins of the PNS construct. We will also
discuss the role that PNS plays in the ways that people negotiate their social worlds
This will be followed by a discussion on the phenomenology of PNS and of the more
recent theoretical formulations of this concept. The last stages of the chapter will
on the PNS scale and its relationship with cognitive functioning and mental health.
Specific attention will be placed upon the two factors of the PNS scale, DS and RLS
and how they relate to mental health.
4.1 An introduction to the concept of need-for-structure
How meaning about the social world is attained is an essential concern of social
cognition. Harvey (1963) argued that a biogenic need for structure can be postulated.
However, be it a biological need or not, the making sense of situations appears to be
essential to the prediction of recurrences and differences in the world. To cope or e
to survive in our environment may require the ability to comprehend and define it.
This skill can be conceptualized as a causal drive. Heider (1944, 1958) argued that
humans posses such a drive which is designed to establish a set of causal explanation
aimed at not only reducing the unpleasantness of doubt, but also providing a sense of
mastery over the environment. One can therefore conceptualize the tendency to impose
meaning on the environment as a chronic tendency that Thompson et al. (1989) labeled
the personal need for structure. The tendency to structure our environment can serve
many purposes some of which are explored below.
45
The world we live in can be described as complex, laden with a multitude of
information. As a result of the vast amount of information surrounding the senses and
the well-documented limits in attentional capacity the information processing task can
be rather overwhelming (Pashler, 1992). According to Neuberg and Newsom (1993)
people can reduce their cognitive load in two fundamental ways. The first of which
involves the use of avoidance strategies. Avoidance strategies allow individuals to lim
the amount of information that they are exposed to. One can create barriers that restri
the chances that social and environmental information will unexpectedly impinge on
their lives. Individuals may also ignore or pay less attention to potentially available
information.
Information reduction can also be achieved by attempting to structure the world into a
simplified more manageable form. One can engage in behavioral structuring by
establishing routines and relying on formalized social scripts in their encounters with
others. One could also reduce the amount of informational quantity and complexity by
engaging in a process called cognitive structuring. Cognitive structuring refers to the
creation and use of abstract mental representations (e.g., schemata, scripts, and
stereotypes). Representations as such are simplified generalizations of previous
experiences. Although these generalizations may not always accurately apply to certain
situations, they serve peoples needs for cognitive efficiency, enabling them to draw
inferences about new events without having to expend a great deal of cognitive
resources.
Structures that are best able to reduce one's cognitive load are those that are simple,
meaning that they are relatively homogeneous, well defined and distinct from other
46
structures. This enables clear interpretations of n e w events. Simple structures are
argued to aid in the efficient processing of social, environmental and personal
information. There is research, which also demonstrates structure consistency biases in
attention, interpretation, memory, inference and impression formation, suggesting that
people also possess a tendency to maintain such structures (Fiske & Taylor, 1991;
Moskowitz, 2001). Neuberg and Newsom (1993) argue that people meaningfully differ
in the extent to which they are dispositionally motivated to cognitively structure thei
worlds in simple unambiguous ways.
The use of simple cognitive structures underlies many important psychological events
such as stereotyping, prejudice, affective extremity and certain psychopathologies such
as depression (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller et al., 1995; Thompson et al.,
2001). Research has emphasized the social perceiver's flexibility in response to
alternative social-cognitive motivations (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Much of this
work still assumes that simplification motives serve as the default, with alternate
motives such as accurate perception primarily arising when activated by extraindividual forces. Neuberg and Newsom (1993) therefore argue that an exploration of
individual differences in the desire for simple structure enables one to begin addressi
the ubiquity of the simplification motive. Evidence supporting such a motive based
individual difference would not only imply the flexibility of the social perceiver but
would also place the source of at least some of this flexibility within stable aspects o
the perceiver as opposed to within the perceivers environment. Neuberg and Newsom
(1993) also argue that research has focused primarily on environmental factors (e.g.,
context) and on short term unstable perceiver factors (e.g., mood). The desire for
47
simple structure concept therefore, joins other attempts to link notions of motivation
and social cognition with personality.
4.2 The phenomenology of Personal Need For Structure - PNS
The PNS scale was designed to capture as a chronic individual motive several aspects
of the desire for simple structure. One of the aspects is the desire for structure and
other refers to the manner of response to a loss of that structure. A person high in de
for structure may be one who leads a simple, tightly organized life. Those who respond
poorly to a lack of structure are those who should experience discomfort if they
perceive structure and clarity to be missing from situations. They find ambiguity and
"grey" areas annoying and uncomfortable. Those who respond poorly to a lack of
structure are also more likely to be disturbed by people who vacillate or by opinions
and situations that lack clarity and order. This style may lead to rigid, inflexible
thinking and an unquestioned acceptance of the validity of one's own beliefs. Finally,
this style of thinking and behaving may also be less useful in situations requiring the
rapid review and reconsideration of beliefs in light of new evidence.
4.3 A psychological theory of epistemology
The theory of lay epistemology described the cognitive and motivational aspects of
knowledge seeking (Kruglanski, 1989). The cognitive component of knowledge
seeking refers to the specific content of the concepts, while the motivational componen
refers to how motives influence the initiation, course and cessation of the knowledge
seeking process. Both the cognitive and motivational components function concurrently
in a two-stage process of hypothesis generation and validation. The hypothesis
generation stage is dependant on cognitive capability, which is in turn governed by the
48
availability (e.g., the required knowledge stored in long term-memory) and the
accessibility (the momentary ease of retrieval of a portion of what is stored in longterm memory) of certain thoughts or hypotheses. During the process of hypothesis
validation one gathers evidence that serves to refute or support their hypotheses. In
order to reduce doubt individuals perceive a stimulus, generate hypotheses regarding
the appropriate category with which to capture that stimulus, test the hypothesis, free
the hypothesis testing when an appropriate solution has been made and then make
inferences and plan accordingly. The evidence attended to and the significance given to
any piece of evidence as well as the dissolution of the validation process is influenced
by how quickly the person desires an answer and whether a specific type of answer is
desired.
Kruglanski and Freund's (1983) model focused on the testing and cessation of
knowledge seeking processes. They conceptualized these processes as being influenced
by two orthogonal motives: a) needs for structure and b) needs for specific versus nonspecific closure. A need for structure occurs when an individual is compelled to impose
structure to dispel uncertainty and ambiguity. The need for structure is concidered to
be the equivalent to the need to quickly remove doubt and arrive at any meaning that
sufficiently captures the stimulus situation. This is associated with cognitive
consequences such as generating fewer hypotheses and a less thorough review of
relevant information (Freund et al, 1985; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). A need for
validity is related to the perceived costs of error due to some decision. When costs are
substantial, individuals are more cautious in their judgements. Fear of invalidity is
associated with the generation of more hypotheses (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).
49
Thompson and her associates extended the theory of lay epistemics into the realm of
individual differences. Thompson et al. (2001) postulated that the needs for structure
and validity characterized typical response styles of certain individuals that would be
evident across situations. Individual differences in dogmatism, authoritarianism, and
intolerance of ambiguity have been described as "hot" motives that served basic
emotional desires. However, Thompson et al. (2001) argues that these
conceptualizations contain components of structure seeking that imply that such
differences might exist independent of the "hot" emotional components. Structure
seeking may interact with situational demands, leading individuals to remain in or seek
out situations that best serve these needs. Thompson et al. (2001) contend that our
understanding of how people interact with and comprehend their environments can be
increased if we reframe the situationally based need for structure and fear of invalidi
as being representative of chronic tendencies.
4.4 Implications of PNS for cognitive functioning
The psychometric fitness of the PNS scale and its two sub-factors was established
earlier in chapter 3. It was reported that the PNS scale and its two factors showed
evidence of more than adequate convergent and discriminant validity. The PNS scale is
argued to be able to predict several aspects of everyday social-cognitive functioning.
These include the application of pre-existing beliefs and stereotypes and the ability to
predict more complex planned behaviors that are subject to a variety of additional
external constraints. However, being a relatively new scale, only a handful of studies
have been published that examine the characteristics of high and low PNS scorers
(Schultz & Searleman, 1998). As argued earlier, our social and non-social
environments are complex, containing vast amounts of information, which may be
50
difficult to process comprehensively. Consequently, one m a y form cognitive categories
that represent our abstracted, simplified ideas of the nature of the world and its
contents.
It is argued that the PNS scale serves as a valid operationalization of the desire for
simple structure. Those scoring high in PNS should form and possess more simply
structured, less complex views of the world than those who score low in PNS. Neuberg
and Newsom (1993, study 3) argued that the existence of a consistent negative
relationship between PNS and structural complexity would amount to further strong
evidence for the validity of the PNS construct.
The results indicated a strong pattern of negative correlations between PNS and sort
complexity. Those high in PNS demonstrated card sorts that were less complex than
those who were low in PNS did. Hence they were more likely to use simplistic
categorical structures. The results indicated that the PNS predicts both a stable and
general preference for structure, as correlations were evident across four domains (tw
social and two non-social). Noteworthy is that the subjects completed the PNS 4-6
weeks prior to the sorting task. The two PNS factors correlated differently with
complexity, depending on the particular sort. RLS was negatively and significantly
associated with sort complexity across all four domains self, elderly, furniture and
color. In contrast, DS evidenced modest correlations with complexity for the color and
furniture sorts only.
The research that is published suggests that high PNS is associated with a greater
tendency to stereotype in ambiguous situations (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, study 4;
51
Schaller et al., 1995). Work on impression formation and stereotyping has shown that
people often categorize others and view them as members of a group about which they
already possess generalized knowledge as opposed to perceiving them as individuals.
Social categorization processes as such are likely to occur in order to reduce cogniti
load and to simplify the cognitive task of understanding others.
Stereotyping can be viewed as a structural means of simplifying an already complex
world. Neuberg and Newsom (1993, study 4) found that high PNS people were more
likely to apply existing gender stereotypes when drawing inferences about individuals
from ambiguous behavior. This study however focused only on a process that arises
only after group stereotypes were established. Later, we shall discuss the Schaller et
(1995) studies, which explored how such stereotypes arise in the first place, as well
assessing the link between PNS and stereotype formation.
Moskowitz (1993) explored whether the need to impose structure might be strong
enough to promote the unconscious use of trait inferences in the categorization of
behavior. Spontaneous trait inferences (STI's) are one way in which people may try to
structure or attempt to control their interpersonal interactions. Therefore people hig
the desire for structure may rely on such inferences to a greater degree. They may als
take these inferences to be more than summaries of their observed behavior. Indeed
they may assume that their inferences serve as descriptors of the personality of the
perceived person. Heider (1944) described dispositional inference as the most complete
and structured explanation for an event. This argument lead Moskowitz (1993) to
consider that those who employ STI's are more likely to make the inferential leap from
52
behavior identification to dispositional attribution. His results indicate that high
people are more likely than low PNS individuals to form STI's.
Thompson, Roman, Moskowitz, Chaiken, and Baragh (1994) have found that priming
effects were also mitigated by PNS. In their research high PNS subjects were more
likely to use constructs that had been recently primed in making subsequent judgments
about the target's ambiguous behavior. In contrast, the judgements of those who were
low PNS scorers were not consistent with the primed constructs. Thompson et al.
(1994) concluded that high PNS individuals tended to freeze on the first available
explanation were confident in their decision and so were unlikely to search for other
judgments. Those low in PNS, however, were less confident in their most accessible
judgments and would therefore be more motivated to consider alternative judgments.
Kaplan, Washula, and Zanna (1993) assessed the influence of PNS on impression
formation processes. They found that high PNS subjects under time pressure were less
likely to integrate new information about positive or negative traits regarding a tar
Kaplan et al. (1993) also found the amount of information (whether it be 1 or 6 piece
had little effect on high PNS subjects who encountered pressure. Their judgments were
mostly guided by their initial impression. Schaller et al. (1995) found that high PNS
subjects were more likely than low PNS subjects to form erroneous group stereotypes.
However, high PNS subjects were more likely to stereotype targets and engage in more
simplistic forms of reasoning only when subjects were not required to later justify t
judgments. When subjects knew that they had to publicly justify their judgments, high
PNS subjects became less simplistic in their judgments and low PNS actually became
less complex in their reasoning processes.
Pilkington and Lydon (1997) more recently conducted an impression formation
experiment whereby those high and low in PNS and those high and low in prejudice
rated the interpersonal attractiveness of homosexual and heterosexual targets who
possessed attitudes that were similar, ambiguous or dissimilar to the subject. They
suggested that the desire for cognitive simplicity characteristic of high PNS would
predispose such individuals to be more responsive to information consistent with their
pre-existing schema's, whereas low PNS subjects would be more responsive to schema
inconsistent information.
Pilkington and Lydon (1997) argued that as a result of the threatening worldview
inherent in prejudice, PNS would interact with attitude similarity and prejudice to
predict judgments of interpersonal attraction. In accordance with this view, low PNS/
low prejudice subjects appeared more receptive to information indicating that the targe
held attitudes differing from their own. Low PNS/ high prejudice subjects seemed to
base their attraction judgments of the target primarily on information indicating attit
similarity. Subjects high in PNS and high in prejudice were more responsive to
information indicating the targets attitude dissimilarity, whereas high PNS/low
prejudice subjects were most responsive to the target's attitudes that were similar to
their own. Identical effects were obtained when Pilkington and Lydon replaced their
measure of prejudice with a more direct measure of psychological threat.
Finally, the PNS conceptualization demonstrates its breadth by moving beyond
cognitive styles to behavioral preferences such as self-reliance in behavior selection
and to the prediction of planned behaviors. Neuberg and Newsom (1993, study 2)
54
found a positive correlation between PNS and routinization indicating that those high
PNS are more likely to create behavioral routines than are low PNS scorers. Similarly
those high in PNS also tended toward being low self monitors, indicating that that suc
individuals may be characterised by the use of their own structures as a determinant o
behavior. These results allow for the probability that high PNS individuals should als
be likely to arrange their social interactions in ways that allow them to avoid
complexity and retain their simple structures. Thus such individuals may gravitate
toward predictable social interactions.
In line with the aforementioned research, Thompson et al. (2001) looked at the degree
of rigidity evident in one's personal habits, which includes traditionalism, rule
boundedness and discomfort and opposition to change as measured by the RAPH
(Meresko et al., 1954). People scoring high on the RAPH are less likely to modify their
behaviors and personal habits even when it may be appropriate to do so (Meresko et al.
1954). A positive relation between high PNS and RAPH scores was found. This
suggests that those high in PNS tend to exhibit behavioral rigidity regardless of the
inappropriateness of their behaviors or habits, or perhaps even when it may be more
beneficial for them to change their behaviors. This is consistent with the research
indicating that high PNS individuals are more likely to use their own structures as a
determinant of behavior as opposed to external influences as is the case in high self
monitors. Thompson et al. (2001) argue that the magnitude of the PNS-RAPH
correlation (r=.64, p< .001) is high enough to indicate some degree of redundancy
between the two measures. Thompson et al. (2001) argues that the PNS scale possesses
phenomenological precedence as the need for structure could be manifested in rigidity
55
concerning personal habits, but it is less likely thatrigidityin personal habits could
cause a high need for structure.
Finally there is some preliminary evidence for behavioral validity of the PNS scale in
terms of its ability to predict more complex planned behaviors. Neuberg and Newsom
(1993, study 5) found that despite the existence of potentially influential environmen
cognitive and social forces, the behavior of completing a subject pool requirement was
predicted by subjects preferences for simple structure. They found that students high
PNS were more likely to complete the requirement earlier in fact, they were more likel
to complete the requirement at all, compared to low PNS individuals. These results are
corroborated by Roman, Moskowitz, Stein, and. Eisenberg, (1995) who found that
high-PNS subjects also participated earlier in the semester and completed their resear
participation more quickly once beginning their involvement.
4.5 PNS and mental health
There is preliminary evidence suggesting a relationship between global PNS and
mental health (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Thompson et al., 2001). The relationship
between PNS and mental health can be observed when assessing the cognitions of
depressed people. Cognitive simplification is implicated in depression (e.g., Beck,
1967). Therefore it is reasonable to expect high PNS individuals to be susceptible to
depression. Recent research provides preliminary evidence of a relationship between
depression and PNS, such that a moderate positive relationship was found between
PNS and Beck Depression Inventory scores (Thompson et al., 2001). This is reasonable
considering the presence of stable, negative, global attributions and rigid schemata i
56
depressed individuals. It is this thinking style that reduces "the complexity, variability
and diversity of experience and behavior" (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979, p. 15).
4.6 RLS, DS and mental health
The PNS can reliably be broken down into two sub-scales (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
As mentioned earlier in chapter 3, these sub-scales have been shown to capture two
related, but conceptually independent factors. Factor one is DS. This factor refers to
extent to which people prefer to structure their lives. Some individuals may be higher
their desire for structure (e.g., "I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life",
like to have a place for everything and everything in its place") than others. Factor t
is RLS. This factor refers to the manner in which people respond when confronted with
unstructured, unpredictable situations. Those considered to be high in RLS tend to
respond negatively to interruptions to routines or to uncertainty/unpredictability (e.g
"It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it", "I hate
to be with people who are unpredictable"). For each sub-factor some items are reversed
scored, so that high scores on either factor imply that the respondent tends to react v
poorly to a lack of structure or that they have strong tendencies to desire structure in
their lives.
Neuberg and Newsom (1993) argued that identifying the relationship between PNS and
the constructs of the Big Five personality dimensions would be useful for both the
purposes of assessing convergent and discriminant validity and for exploring proposed
distinctions between the two PNS factors (John et al., 1991). Results indicated that bo
PNS factors were significantly negatively correlated with Openness. This is to be
expected as rigid individuals would be more likely to be less open to a wide range of
57
experiences. DS but not RLS was positively correlated with Conscientiousness. This
was to be expected due to the pro-active nature of the DS factor. RLS but not DS was
significantly positively correlated with Neuroticism and significantly negatively
correlated with Extraversion. This was expected due to the social-affective nature of th
RLS factor.
Neuberg and Newsom (1993) assessed the relationship between PNS and measures of
trait anxiety and affective distress as a means of assessing the hypothesized distinctio
between the two sub-factors. As expected, correlations of PNS with measures of
affective distress assessing social anxiety and trait anxiety revealed that such distres
far better reflected in the RLS as opposed to the DS component, as evidenced by
significant positive correlations. Thus far the preliminary evidence seems to support a
distinction between the two sub-factors of the PNS scale in predicting mental health
outcomes. The different predictive abilities of the two-sub factors is further highlight
when one assesses how each sub-factor behaves in relation to reactions to stress.
4.7 The relationship between PNS and stressful life events
Recent research lends support to the argument of a distinction between the two
components of the PNS scale (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999). Elovainio and Kivimaki
(1999) found a significant relationship between RLS and psychological strain. In
contrast to this result, they found that the relationship between DS and strain was
insignificant. They concluded that RLS is a factor, which may effect an individuals
vulnerability to stress. These results are consistent with previous research that also
found that DS appears to act as a psychological resource which decreases self-reported
58
strain, whereas RLS seems to represent a sensitivity factor for stress and strain
(Kivimaki, Elovainio, and Nord, 1996).
Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) in a second study broadened the focus of the
relationship between DS, RLS and strain by taking contextual factors into account.
Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) assumed that the relationship between DS, RLS and
strain might be moderated by the level of complexity of the environment in which one
operates. More specifically they expected that the relation between RLS and
psychological strain would be stronger among those working in high complexity
occupations than among those operating in low complexity occupations. No predictions
were made regarding DS, strain and complexity.
The results of study two revealed that the relationship between PNS and strain do in
fact vary across the different components of PNS and is dependent on job context. The
association between strain and RLS seemed to be linear and particularly clear when a
high RLS person has to deal with the demands of a complex work situation. These
findings strongly support the notion that high RLS increases strain under conditions
high complexity compared to low complexity conditions. Different results were
obtained for the relationship between DS, strain and complexity. The results
demonstrated that not even being in a more complex and unstructured environment
seemed to make individuals high in DS more vulnerable to the effects of stress. Psych
strain in both these studies as well as in the Kivimaki et al. (1996) study was asses
utilizing a five-item scale of psychological strain symptoms derived from the
Occupational Stress Questionnaire (Elo, Leppanen, Lindstrom, & Ropponen, 1992).
59
9 6 . 5 % of the subject pool across all these studies were Finnish w o m e n . This m a y limit
the generalizability of these studies to other populations.
4.8 Advantages of the PNS scale
It is argued that the PNS scale unlike most of the other self-report scales is novel in
it reliably distinguishes between two different types of rigidity, DS and RLS. This is
important as this scale allows us to test our hypotheses that RLS and DS may have
different relationships with mental health. As mentioned in earlier on in chapter 3, th
are alternative personality constructs that appear to have the desire for simple struct
as part their conceptual constitution (e.g., Need for Closure, Authoritarianism, Rigidit
Dogmatism, Uncertainty Orientation and Intolerance of Ambiguity). However, all of
these constructs are also characterised by additional unrelated constructs. In contrast
the aforementioned scales, the PNS scale assesses individual preferences for structure
and organization, without assessing attitudes toward other factors such as political an
social issues.
Alternative constructs such as the Need for Closure, Authoritarianism, Rigidity,
Dogmatism, Uncertainty Orientation and Intolerance of Ambiguity are only marginally
correlated with the PNS scale. The Rigidity scale and the NFCS are instruments that
have been shown to correlate with the PNS scale. However, the Rigidity scale only
correlates with the PNS on the basis of a small subset of its items (Neuberg & Newsom,
1993) and the evidence previously presented suggests that the NFCS can be considered
redundant with the PNS scale (Neuberg et al., 1997, Thompson et al., 2001). The PNS
scale is unique in that the aforementioned findings regarding the breadth of PNS
demonstrated influences do not follow from the alternative self-report measures of
60
cognitiverigidity.Although one can hypothesize an alternative personality influence
for any single finding, it is important to note that none of the aforementioned self-re
measures of cognitive rigidity may be able to account for the full range of PNS
findings. For example one could argue that strong authoritarians might be likely to
stereotype others and complete their subject pool requirements. However it seems
unlikely that such individuals should be particularly prone to simple organizations,
spontaneous trait inferences, depression and so forth without accepting the notion that
desire for simple structure partially underlies Authoritarianism. (Neuberg & Newsom,
1993).
4.9 Summary
At the beginning of this chapter we elaborated upon the notion of desire for simple
structure. Simple structures are described as being relatively homogeneous, well
defined and distinct from other structures. It was argued that people meaningfully diff
in the extent to which they are dispositionally motivated to cognitively structure thei
worlds in simple unambiguous ways.
This chapter also presented the evidence which illustrated that the use of simple
cognitive structures underlies many important psychological events such as
stereotyping, prejudice, behavioral rigidity and certain psychopathologies such as
depression (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Schaller et al, 1995; Thompson et al., 2001).
This chapter presented evidence indicating that those who have a personal need for
structure do in fact form and possess more simply structured, less complex views of the
world (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). This tendency was shown to be more prominent in
those who respond poorly to a lack of structure compared to those who desire structure.
A key focus of this paper is to elaborate upon the relationship between the two factors
of the PNS scale and mental health. The preliminary evidence thus far suggests that
RLS factor of the PNS scale behaves somewhat differently to the DS factor of the PNS
scale (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999; Kivimaki et al., 1996; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
It seems that the DS component has far less of an association with negative mental
health states than does the RLS factor. The research therefore, lends support to the
argument that different types of rigidity might predict different outcomes with rega
mental health. Also of interest was the research involving the interaction between
complex environments and the components of PNS (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999;
Kivimaki et al., 1996). The evidence provided preliminary support that the relationsh
between PNS and strain vary across the different components of PNS and is dependent
on the complexity of one's environment.
The present research: Research hypotheses
Study 1
The present research aimed to replicate and expand the previous research concerning
the components of PNS and mental health. The present research is unique in its aim to
more comprehensively address the possibility that cognitive rigidity may well have
different components, which have contrasting implications for mental health. The
present research extended previous research such as that conducted by Elovainio and
Kivimaki (1999), Kivimaki et al. (1996) and Neuberg and Newsom (1993) by using
Australian university students comprised of both males and females. The
aforementioned research was conducted on American (e.g., Neuberg & Newsom, 1993;
Thompson et al, 2000) and Finish populations (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999; Kivimaki
62
et al., 1996). In their assessment of the relationship between the components of PNS
and mental health, prior research failed to provide a comprehensive assessment of
mental health. For example, Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) and Kivimaki et al. (1996)
utilized a five item occupational strain measure. The present research meaningfully
extended this previous research by including additional measures of mental health to
include the domains of depression, suicidal ideation, hopelessness and life satisfactio
The Neuberg and Newsom (1993) studies did not formally assess the relationship
between stress and PNS. Although Elovainio and associates began to address this
relationship, they used a specific measure of stress - occupation complexity. Their
focus was to address the issue of cognitive rigidity and its potential role in relatio
occupational strain. The present research expanded these studies by utilizing a more
powerful and comprehensive measure of life stress. This measure addresses a wide
variety of stressful events that one may encounter in life. Stressful events such as
relationship stress, financial hassles and transportation problems might examples of
some of the stressors that individuals might be exposed to.
The theoretical framework that guided our hypotheses was discussed in chapter 1 in the
theory and hypotheses section. Raised in that section was our argument that desiring
structure in itself is not irrational and thus will not lead to poor mental health. We
strongly desire structure but not necessarily respond poorly when we lose it. RET
argues that if humans would stick to preferences or desires and not transform them int
absolute musts, they would not have so much emotional trouble (Ellis, cited in Dryden,
1991). Hence according to RET desiring structure will not lead to emotional distress.
The RET framework would assume that those who convert their desires for structure
("I prefer it when the rules in a situation are clear") into absolutistic demands ("Th
63
rules in a situation must always be clear") are more likely to experience emotional
disturbance. These demands suggest that the person is not accepting reality. When their
demands are contradicted by reality these individuals are likely to respond with
thoughts such as "I can't handle this situation, or this is awful". Therefore the demands
and the resulting thoughts are likely to lead these individuals to experience substantia
distress (Ellis, cited in Dryden, 1991). The RET framework would assume that people
high in RLS have unrealistic demands about reality. In light of the perspective offered
by Ellis, it is possible that those who respond poorly to a lack of structure may be thos
who do not just desire structure but those who deem the presence of structure as a
necessity or a must. In light of the above we expect that DS and RLS will not have the
same relationship with mental health. Therefore we predict that:
H 1 : Response to lack of Structure will be significantly associated with lower
levels of mental health.
H 2 : Desire for structure will not be related to lower levels of mental health.
H 3 : Those high in Response to Lack of structure will respond worse to
stressful life events compared to those low in Response to Lack of structure.
H4 : Desire for structure will not interact with stressful life events
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to expand and replicate the results of study 1. This study expanded
upon study 1 in that we included additional measures of mental health to include measure
of anxiety, stress and a positive measure of well-being, life satisfaction.
64
CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY 1
METHODOLOGY, RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
65
5.1
METHOD
5.1.1
Participants
Three hundred and two university students (70 male and 232 female, mean age = 20)
participated in the study in order to satisfy a course requirement. A small number of
students failed to complete the questionnaire. For these reasons the following numbers
of people were excluded: 8 people for the Hassles scales, 12 for the Suicide Ideation
Questionnaire, 2 for the Beck Depression Inventory, and 2 for the Beck Hopelessness
scale. The P N S scale was not included in the questionnaire battery for thefirst38
subjects. Thus, these 38 subjects were not included in the analyses. The total amount of
subjects included in the analyses were 240 students (50 male and 190 female). There
were no differences in the mental health between people w h o did or did not complete
the entire protocol.
5.1.2 Design and procedure
This study utilised a cross-sectional design. All participants were recruited from the
University of Wollongong. Testing times for the present research were placed on
university notice boards. Subjects volunteered to participate by placing their names
next to the times that suited them best. All participants completed a battery of
questionnaires. The measures that formed part of the questionnaire appear below.
Participants were given an information sheet (e.g., Appendix, A ) and a consent form
(e.g., Appendix, B). They were advised that their participation was voluntary and that
data would be collected anonymously. After the study, subjects were fully debriefed
and provided with a hand-out that encouraged them to seek assistance if struggling with
suicidal thoughts. Contact details for a list of professionals and helping organisations
were included (e.g., Appendix, J).
66
5.1.3 Materials
The Beck Depression Inventorv-H fBDI-TI- Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). The BDI-II
consists of 21 items. These items are statements that measure cognitive, somatic and
behavioral indices of depression experienced during the past two weeks. Each item is
scored 0 to 3 with high scores indicative of depression. Examples of statements inclu
' I do not feel sad", "I don't have enough energy to do much". The inventory shows
good internal consistency (.86). It has been shown to have good construct validity in
university population (Oliver & Burkham, 1979). The scale is included in Appendix C.
Suicide Ideation Questionnaire (SIO: Reynolds, 1987). The SIQ consists of 30 items
(e.g., "I thought it would be better if I were not alive") concerning thoughts relati
suicide that occurred in the previous month. The 7-point scale ranges from " I never
had this thought " (0) to " almost every day" (6). The SIQ is highly reliable (intern
consistency =.96). It is also related to a number of theoretically relevant measures
including depression, hopelessness, and negative life events (Reynolds, 1987). The
questionnaire in included in Appendix H.
The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). The
BHS contains 20 items measuring the extent of negative expectations and pessimism
regarding the future. Subjects rate items as true or false (e.g., "I look forward to
future with enthusiasm", "My future seems dark to me"). The BHS has high levels of
internal consistency (KR-20= .89) and it predicts eventual suicide (Beck, Steer,
Kovacs, & Garrison, 1985). The scale is included in Appendix E.
67
Personal Need for Structure (PNS; Thompson et al., 1989, submitted). The P N S has 12
items. Respondents rate each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from "strongly
disagree" (1) to "strongly agree"(6). The scale aims to capture, as a chronic individu
motive, several aspects of the desire for simple structure. The scale has two factor
structures - Desire for Simple Structure (DS) and Response to Lack of Structure (RLS).
Items indicative of DS include "I enjoy having a clear, structured mode of life" and "
like to have a place for every thing". Items capturing RLS include "It upsets me to go
into a situation without knowing what to expect" and "I hate to change my plans at the
last minute". The scale has good internal reliability and test retest reliability (DS=
& RLS= .79). The scale is included in Appendix D.
Stressful Life Events (Hassles Scale) (HAS; Kanner et al., 1981). The HAS is a 117item inventory that assesses the frustrations and irritations of everyday encounters.
includes items such as "troublesome neighbors", "financial insecurity", "difficulty wi
friends" and "transportation problems". It is rated on a 3-point Likert scale ranging
from "somewhat severe" (1) to "extremely severe" (3). The three point severity scales
were summed to generate a cumulative severity score (Kanner et al., 1981). The HAS
evidences moderate reliability (test-retest: .48 to.79 over lmth). The HAS has adequat
construct validity, correlating in the expected direction with measures of stress,
negative affect and psychological symptoms (Kanner et al., 1981). In future discussion
regarding the HAS, hassles will be referred to as stressful life events. Internal stre
measured by the DASS, which we included in study 2. Thus, we decided to use the
term stressful life events to refer to the HAS in order to avoid confusion with intern
stress as measured by the DASS. The scale is included in Appendix I.
68
5.2 RESULTS
5.2.1 Descriptives
Table 1 presents the rate of suicidal ideation, depression, and hopelessness,
other central sample characteristics. The mean rate of depression reported he
represents a mild level of depression and is similar to that found in differe
samples (e.g., Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996: M = 12.56). Although some of the men
health variables had distributions that were not normal (e.g., few people had
ideation) we had no theoretical basis on which to transform the scales, so we
analyzed raw data (see Mayer, Carlsmith, & Chabot, 1998). The same approach was
followed for study 2. Our primary safeguard against type 1 error was to exami
consistency of effects across both studies and to give the greatest weight or
to the results that were replicated. As a further precaution, we used a two-t
of .05 even though all our predictions were directional and might have been s
tailed.
Table 1
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of major sample characteristic variables.
Measure
M
SD
DS
3.81
LOl
RLS
3.64
.77
Depression
12.73
9.13
Hopelessness
24.13
3.95
Suicidal Ideation
20.56
22.47
Stressful Life Events
53.95
33.85
Note: " D S " indicates Desire for Structure and "RLS" indicates Response to Lack of
Structure.
69
We predicted that RLS would be associated with poor mental health outcomes and that
DS would not be associated with poor mental health outcomes. As can be seen in Table
2 these predictions were supported. RLS was associated with more depression,
hopelessness, and suicidal ideation, and with more stressful life events. Although
significant, the correlations between RLS and the mental health variables were small.
As predicted DS was not associated with poor mental health. In fact DS was actually
significantly associated with less hopelessness. Concerning the other measures,
depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation are all positively interrelated.
Table 2
Intercorrelations between rigidity, stressful life events and mental health measures.
1 2 3 4 5 6
IDS « .57** ^05 U3* T08 ^01
2. RLS -- .24** .15* .13* .14*
3. Depression - .58** .69** .40**
4. Hopelessness -- .57** .18**
5. Suicide Ideation - .32**
6. Stressful Life Events
Note. "DS" indicates Desire for Structure and "RLS" indicates Response to Lack of
Structure.
*P<0.05. ^.PO.Ol
5.2.2 Regression analysis between rigidity, stress and mental health measures
We next used regression analysis to examine the extent to which RLS and DS uniquely
relate to each aspect of mental health. As expected, the regression analysis in Table
reveal that when controlling for DS, RLS is significantly related to depression, suic
70
ideation and hopelessness. This indicates that as predicted, those who respond
negatively to a lack of structure tend to evidence poorer mental health outcomes in that
they experience greater amounts of depression, suicide ideation and hopelessness.
Also as predicted, when controlling for RLS, DS was not associated with poor mental
health outcomes. Indeed it actually shows a significant negative relationship with
depression, suicide ideation and hopelessness. This indicates that those high in the
desire for structure do not experience poor mental health outcomes. In fact the data
suggest that these individuals tend to experience better mental health in that they
evidence less depression, suicide ideation and hopelessness.
Table 3
Regression analysis between rigidity, stressful life events and mental health measures.
RLS
Beta
R Square
Beta
DS
R Square
Total R Square
Depression .40*** .106 -.30*** .053 .109
Hopelessness
.33***
.047
-.32***
.067
.089
Suicide Ideation
.26***
.073
-.23**
.036
.053
Note: "RLS" indicates Response to Lack of Structure and "DS" indicates Desire for
Structure. 'Total R Square" is the amount of variance explained by both D S and R L S
combined.
*P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P<0.001.
5.2 J The interaction between rigidity and stressful life events
Our third hypothesis was that those high in Response to Lack of Structure will respond
worse to stressful life events compared to those low in Response to Lack of Structure.
71
General Linear Model (GLM) Analyses of Covariance (ANCOVA) were used to
evaluate the impact of sex, stressful life events, rigidity (DS and RLS), and the
interaction between stressful life events and rigidity on our measures of mental hea
(suicide, depression, and hopelessness). All independent variables were treated as
covariates and were converted to Z scores in order to reduce the problem of collinea
(Aiken & West, 1991). The main variables in this study were not dichotomised. There
were no median splits used in any analyses. Sex was effect coded (-1 male; 1 female).
The first set of analyses focuses on stressful life events. There was significant mai
effects of stressful life events on depression, F (1,234) = 35.26, MSE = .15, B = .13
< .001, hopelessness, F (1,234) = 4.21, MSE = .035, B = .025, p < .05, and suicidal
ideation, F (1,234) = 20.50, MSE = .48, B = .20, p < .001, indicating that stressful
events was associated with worse mental health outcomes. We examined all the results
while controlling for sex and found no differences in the conclusions. Thus sex does
not confound our conclusions. The main effect results for RLS on depression,
hopelessness and suicidal ideation were significant and are of the same nature of th
already reported in Table 3, all ps<05. Concerning our third hypothesis, the results
indicated that there was a significant interaction between RLS and stressful life ev
for depression, F (1,234) = 5.00, MSE = .145, B = .056 p = .03, hopelessness, F (1,23
= 5.87, MSE = .035, B_= .029, p = .02, and suicidal ideation, F (1,234) - 4.45, MSE =
.488, B = .097, p = .04. Figures 1.1 to 1.3 illustrate the interaction. As predicted,
stressful life events was associated with greater increases in depression, hopelessne
and suicidal ideation amongst those high in RLS (rigidity) compared to those low in
RLS.
72
1
0.9
0.8
—
c 0.7-
06
1 "
jg 0.5
*
- Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
i ngn Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
*
I" 0.4°0.30.2
0.1-
n
\j
i
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 1.1 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Depression.
1.35
1.3
Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
co 1.25
to
» 1-2
w
Q)
© 1.15
a
o
1
1.1
1.05
1
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 1.2 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Hopelessness.
73
2.5 2
c
o
2 1.5 2CO
—
^ ^ _ ^
_•
* " ^ ^
High Negative
Response to
Lack of Structure
2 1
o
3
CO
n
u
- Low Negative
Response to
Lack of Structure
H
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 1.3 Interaction between R L S and Stressful Life Events for Suicidal Ideation.
W e next utilized A G L M A N C O V A to test our fourth hypothesis that D S would not
interact with life stress. As reported in the previous analyses, stressful life event
significant effect on all three of the mental health variables, all ps< .05. The mai
results for DS on depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation are the same as the
previously reported results in the regression analysis in Table 3. As predicted DS w
not associated with worse mental health outcomes, all ps>.05. Unexpectedly, the GLM
ANCOVA revealed that there were significant interactions between DS and stressful
life events for depression, F (1,234) = 7.00, MSE = .144, B = .063, p = .009,
hopelessness, F (1,234) = 5.11, MSE = .035, B = .027, p = .03, and suicidal ideation,
(1,234) = 4.09, MSE = .488, B = .089, p = .04. Figures 2.1 to 2.3 illustrate this effe
Stressful life events were associated with greater increases in depression, hopeless
and suicidal ideation among those high in DS (rigidity) compared to those low in DS.
74
0.9 -,
0.8
0.7
**•-*
c 0.6
o
—
8 °5
p
£. 0.4
cu 0.2
Q
0.3
0.1
n
- Low Desire for
Structure
Structure
I
u
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 2.1 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Depression.
1.25
1.2
3 1.15
Low Desire for
Structure
•High Desire for
Structure
<_>
c
v>
I 1.1
a
•? 1.05
0.95
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 2.2 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Hopelessness.
75
2.5
2
o3
co
_•
^ ^ ^
—" " '
en
al Ideation
2
—
- Low Desire for
Structure
I lign Uesne loi
Structure
10.5 n
u
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 2.3 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Suicidal Ideation.
53 Study 1 discussion
The results for study 1 confirmed our first two hypotheses concerning the distinction
between the two types of cognitive rigidity (DS and RLS) and their relationship with
mental health. As predicted in our first hypothesis, when controlling for DS, RLS was
significantly and positively related to poor mental health. This indicates that those w
respond negatively to a lack of structure are likely to suffer more depression,
hopelessness and suicidal ideation compared to those who do not respond as poorly to a
lack of structure.
Also as predicted DS was not positively related to poor mental health. In fact the
regression analysis revealed that when controlling for RLS, DS was actually
significantly and negatively associated with depression, hopelessness and suicidal
ideation. In contrast to RLS, having a high desire for structure may be advantageous in
76
that these individuals report better mental health as reflected by their lack of
depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation.
The remaining hypotheses (H3 & H4) addressed the relationship between the two types
of rigidity, stressful life events and mental health. It was hypothesized that those h
in RLS would respond more poorly to stressful life events compared to those low in
RLS. As predicted stressful life events were associated with greater increases in
depression, hopelessness and suicide ideation among those high in RLS compared to
those low in RLS.
Our next hypothesis was that DS will not interact with stressful life events. This
hypothesis was not supported A GLM ANCOVA revealed significant interactions
between DS and stressful life events for depression, hopelessness and suicide ideation
These results indicate that stressful life events are related to greater increases in
depression, hopelessness and suicide ideation for those high in DS as opposed to those
low in DS. Even though stress lowered the mental health of those high in DS at a faste
rate, those high in DS still evidenced better mental health overall compared to low DS
individuals.
The first study was limited in that it only focused on three aspects of mental health,
depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation. The second study attempted to expand
upon study 1 by including additional measures of mental health. The second study
sought to include two additional indexes of mental health namely anxiety and stress. I
addition the second study also included a measure indicative of positive mental health
77
namely life satisfaction. Study 2 tested the same four hypotheses as those tested in
study 1.
78
CHAPTER SIX
STUDY 2
METHODOLOGY, RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
79
6.1 METHOD
6.1.1 Participants
Three hundred and fifty one university students (83 male and 268 female, mean age =
22) participated in the study in order to receive course credit. This study comprised
two parts, survey A and B. Those who did not complete both surveys were excluded
from the final analyses. In other words, if a subject completed A and not B, or B and
not A, they were excluded from the final analyses. Thus 330 students (76 male and 254
female, mean age =22) were included in the final analyses. There were no differences
in the mental health between people who did or did not complete the entire protocol.
6.1.2 Design and procedure
This study utilized a cross-sectional design. All participants were recruited from the
University of Wollongong. Sign up sheets detailing testing times were placed on the
university notice boards. Three researchers conducted a large research project whereby
all their measures were divided into two separate surveys, survey A and survey B.
Students were required to complete both surveys, once they completed both surveys
they were then given course credit. At the conclusion of subject recruitment, surveys
were matched based on a unique code that each participant generated. Both surveys
began with an information sheet briefly outlining what they would be expected to do
(see Appendix A). Participants were also advised that their involvement was voluntary
and that they could withdraw at any time without penalty to course grades. They were
also informed that data would be collected anonymously. Following this was a consent
form (see Appendix B) indicating that any data collected would be used for article
publication and conference presentations. Measures relevant to this study are detaile
below. At the conclusion of the study, participants were fully debriefed and provided
80
with a handout that encouraged them to seek assistance if struggling with suicidal
thoughts. Contact details for a list of professionals and helping organizations were
included (see, Appendix J).
6.13 Materials
We used the same measures in study 1 to assess Personal Need for Structure, Suicide
Ideation and Hopelessness.
The Depression, Anxietv and Stress Scale (DASS; P.F. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond,
1995; S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 1995). The DASS is a set of three self-report
scales designed to provide relatively pure measures of the three related negative
affective states of depression, anxiety and stress. The Depression scale measures
dysphoria, hopelessness, self-depreciation, anhedonia, devaluation of life, inertia and
lack of interest or involvement. The Anxiety scale measures autonomic arousal, skeleta
muscular effects, situational anxiety and subjective experiences of anxious affect. Th
Stress scale is sensitive to levels of chronic non-specific arousal. It assesses diffi
relaxing, nervous arousal, and being easily upset or agitated, over-reactive or irrita
and impatient. The DASS Depression and Anxiety scales show good convergent
validity with other scales designed to discriminate between depression and anxiety
(P.F. Lovibond & S.H. Lovibond, 1995). Alpha coefficients for the three 14-item
DASS scales are as follows: Depression = .91, Anxiety = .84, and stress = .90 (N =
2,914; S.H. Lovibond & P.F. Lovibond, 1995). The scale is included in Appendix F.
The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) is
a well-validated measure of subjective satisfaction with life that allows respondents
81
weight domains of their lives in terms of their own values (Pavot & Diener, 1993). It
consists of five statements (e.g., "I am satisfied with my life") measured on a 7-poin
Likert scale ranging from completely agree (1) to completely disagree (7). Cronbach
alpha coefficients (.80 to .89) and test-retest reliability values (.54 to .83) have b
the acceptable range (Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991). The instrument has
been factor analyzed all five items load on one general factor of well being. The scal
included in Appendix G.
Stressful Life Events (Hassles Scale) (HAS; Kanner et al., 1981). The HAS is a 117-
item inventory that assesses the frustrations and irritations of everyday encounters. T
HAS underwent some minor modifications in this study, in that 5 items were added
(items 118-122). It was felt that hassles dealing with aspects related to study "Having
bad university classes and lecturers/tutors", relationships "not being in a relationshi
"financial life" "becoming financially independent" and "family issues such as
problems/arguments with parents, siblings and other family members" were missing
from the original scale. It was also felt that these are issues that may well be highly
relevant to young adults. This is significant especially in light of the fact that the
respondents in this study were mostly first year psychology students. Items are rated o
a 3-point Likert scale ranging from "somewhat severe" (1) to "extremely severe" (3).
The three point severity scales were summed to generate a cumulative severity score
(Kanner et al., 1981). The HAS evidences moderate reliability (test-retest : .48 to.79
over lmth). The HAS also has adequate construct validity, correlating in the expected
direction with measures of negative affect, psychological symptoms and other stress
scales (Kanner et al., 1981). The scale is included in Appendix I.
6.2
RESULTS
6.2.1 Descriptives
Table 4 presents the rate of life satisfaction, suicide ideation, hopelessness, depres
and anxiety as well as other central sample characteristics. The mean rate of depressi
found here represents a mild level of depression. Mild levels of depression have been
found in various college samples (e.g., Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996: M = 12.56).
Table 4
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of major sample characteristic variables.
Measure
M
DS
3.81
3.55
RLS
DasDepression
DasStress
DasAnxiety
Suicidal Ideation
Stressful Life Events
Hopelessness
Life Satisfaction
.58
1.04
.55
6.39
51.01
1.16
4.64
SD
.99
.91
.59
.67
.55
.65
34.03
.15
1.35
Note: " D S " indicates Desire for Structure and " R L S " indicates Response to Lack of
Structure.
W e predicted that R L S would be associated with poor mental health outcomes and that
DS would not be associated with poor mental health outcomes. As can be seen in Table
5 these predictions were supported As expected RLS was associated with more
depression, stress, anxiety, suicide ideation, hopelessness and with more stressful li
events. RLS was also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. Also as predic
DS was generally not associated with poor mental health in that DS was not
significantly related to depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation. The measures
83
depression, anxiety, stress, suicide ideation and hopelessness were all positively
interrelated. Life satisfaction correlated negatively with the aforementioned variab
Table 5
Intercorrelations betweenrigidity,stressful life events and mental health measures.
~1 2~ ~T~ ~T~ ~1 6 7 8 9
1. DS » .57** .09 .29** .17** .06 IT* TOO ^03
2. RLS - .25** .40** .35** .19** .23** .17* -.13*
3. DasDepression -- .70** .73** .72** .44** .60** -.58**
4. DasStress -- .81** .52** .55** .40** -.44**
5. DasAnxiety - .57** .51** .45 -.47**
6. Suicidal Ideation -- .39** .54** -.52**
7. Stressful Life Events ~ 28* -.35**
8. Hopelessness — - 59
**
9. Life Satisfaction
Note: " D S " indicates Desire for Structure and " R L S " indicates Response to Lack of
Structure.
*P <0.05. **_°<0.01.
6.2.2 Regression analysis between rigidity, stress and mental health measures.
We used regression to examine the extent to which RLS and DS uniquely relate to each
aspect of mental health. Table 6 presents the regression analysis between rigidity,
stress and mental health measures. As predicted, when controlling for DS, RLS was
significantly associated with poor mental health outcomes. This indicates that those
who respond negatively to a lack of structure tend to evidence greater amounts of
84
depression, suicide ideation, stress, anxiety and hopelessness and lower levels of life
satisfaction. As expected the regression analysis in Table 6, demonstrates that when
controlling for RLS, DS was not associated with poor mental health outcomes. In fact
DS was found to be significantly associated with less hopelessness.
Table 6
Regression analysis between rigidity, stressful life events and mental health
measures.
RLS
Beta
R Square
DS
Total R Square
Beta
R Square
DasDepression
29***
.058
-.08
.004
.066
DasStress
41***
.112
-.01
.000
.159
DasAnxiety
37***
.093
-.04
.001
.122
Suicidal Ideation
22***
.033
-.06
.003
.037
Hopelessness
25***
.044
-.15*
.015
.044
.023
.08
.004
.023
Life Satisfaction
-.18**
Note: " R L S " indicates Response to Lack of Structure and " D S " indicates Desire for
Structure. "Total R Square" is the amount of variance explained by both DS and RLS
combined.
*P<0.05. **P<0.01. ***P< 0.001.
6.2 J The interaction between rigidity and stressful life events
We next evaluated our third hypothesis that those high in Response to Lack of
Structure will respond worse stressful life events compared to those low in Response
Lack of Structure. A GLM ANCOVA was used to evaluate the impact of sex, stressful
life events, rigidity (DS and RLS) and the interaction between stressful life events
rigidity on our measures of mental health (suicide, depression, anxiety, stress and
hopelessness). All independent variables were treated as covariates and were converte
85
to Z scores in order to reduce the problem of collinearity (Aiken & West, 1991). The
main variables in this study were not dichotomised. There were no median splits used
in any analyses. Sex was effect coded (-1 male; 1 female). The first set of analyses
focuses on stressful life events. There was significant main effects of stressful life
events on all mental health measures all ps <.001 indicating that stressful life event
was associated with worse mental health outcomes. We examined all the results while
controlling for sex and found no differences in the conclusions. Thus sex does not
confound our conclusions. A GLM ANCOVA was used to examine the relationship
between RLS and mental health. The main effect results for RLS on all the mental
health measures were the same as those previously reported in the regression analysis
in Table 6, all ps<05. As predicted these results indicate that people who evidenced
high scores on negative response to lack of structure scored higher on depression,
hopelessness, suicidal ideation, anxiety and stress. Those high in RLS also reported t
they experienced lower levels of life satisfaction. Most importantly, as predicted in
third hypothesis, there was a significant interaction between RLS and stressful life
events for depression, F (1,325) = 4.52, MSE = .27, B = .054, p= .03, anxiety, F (1,32
= 5.37, MSE = .21, B - .052, p = .02, and stress, F (1,325) = 7.79, MSE - .27, B = .07
p = .006. Figures 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate this effect. Stressful life events were
associated with greater increases in depression, anxiety and stress among those high i
RLS compared to those low in RLS. Contrary to what was predicted, there was no
significant interaction between RLS and stressful life events for hopelessness, life
satisfaction and suicidal ideation. However, although not significant, Figures 3.2 and
3.3 illustrate a pattern of results consistent with our predictions, in that stress wa
associated with greater increases in hopelessness and suicidal ideation among those
high in RLS compared to those low in RLS.
86
i.__
1-
Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
•High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
c 0.8
o<0
0) 0.6_a©
Q 0.4
0.2
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 3.1 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Depression.
1.25
1.2
Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
•High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
co
0)
g 1.15
(0
(0
©
g. 1.1
o 1.05
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 3.2 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Hopelessness.
87
6.8
6.7
6.6
C 6.5
o 6.4
©
6.3
6.2
O 6.1
3
6CO
5.9
5.8
5.7
Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
•High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 3.3 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Suicide Ideation.
1.2 -,
0.8
©
"5 0.6
c
<
0.4 -
/
s
s
*
0.2
/
S
*
*
y
Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
•High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
0-
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 3.4 Interaction between RLS and Stressful Life Events for Anxiety.
1.8
1.6
1.4
—
1.2
to
co
*
1
_
3) 0.8
0.6
0.4
L o w hassle
• Low Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
High Negative
Response to
Lack of
Structure
High hassle
i
Figure 3.5 Interaction between RLS and Stressful life Events for Stress.
A GLM ANCOVA was used to test our fourth hypothesis that DS would not interact
with stressful life events. As reported in the previous analyses, stressful life e
a significant effect on all the mental health variables all ps <.001. The main eff
results for DS and mental health are the same as the previously reported results i
regression analysis in Table 6. As predicted DS was not associated with worse ment
health outcomes, all ps>.05. Most importantly, as predicted in our final hypothesis
GLM ANCOVA revealed that there were no significant interactions between DS and
stressful life events for depression, F (1,325) =1.12, MSE = .27, B = .03, p = .29,
satisfaction, F (1,325) = 1.02, MSE = .016, B = -.069, p = .31, hopelessness, F (1,
= .405, MSE = .022, B = .05, p = .53, suicidal ideation, F (1,325) = .075, MSE = .35
= .088, p = .79, anxiety, F (1,325) = .448, MSE = .21, B = .017, p = .504 or stress,
(1,325) = .117, MSE = .27, B = .096, p = .73. Figures 4.1 to 4.5 illustrate this e
Consistent with our predictions, stressful life events was not associated with gre
89
increases depression, hopelessness, suicidal ideation, anxiety and stress among those
high in D S (rigidity) compared to those low in DS.
0.9
0.8
0.7 -I
c
0.6
Low Desire for
Structure
• High Desire for
Structure
o
1 °5 ^
(0
a 0.4
©
Q
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 4.1 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Depression.
1.25
1.2
S 1-15
L o w Desire for
Structure
•High Desire for
Structure
©
c
CO
I 1.1
©
|
1.05
0.95
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 4.2 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Hopelessness.
90
6.8
6.6
| 6.4co
Low Desire for
Structure
•High Desire for
Structure
©
Z 6.2
co
T3
I 6
CO
5.8
5.6
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 4.3 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Suicidal Ideation.
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Low Desire for
Structure
•High Desire for
Structure
IT 0.5'5
5 0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 4.4 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Anxiety.
91
1.6
1.4 1.2 -
1
—
CO
CO
2 0.8
- Low Desire for
Structure
i ngii uesne loi
Structure
*>»
CO
0.6 0.4
0.2
nVJ
L o w hassle
High hassle
Figure 4.5 Interaction between D S and Stressful Life Events for Stress.
6.3
Study 2 discussion
Study two was designed to replicate and extend study 1. The results for study 2
confirmed our first two hypotheses concerning the distinction between the two types of
cognitive rigidity DS and RLS and their relationship with mental health. As predicted
in our first hypothesis, the regression analyses revealed that when controlling for DS,
RLS was significantly and positively related to poorer mental health outcomes. This
indicates that those who respond negatively to a lack of structure are likely to suffer
more depression, hopelessness, suicidal ideation, anxiety and stress compared to those
who do not respond as poorly to a lack of structure. They are also more likely to
experience significantly lower levels of life satisfaction.
A s expected D S did not relate to poorer mental health outcomes. In fact the regression
analysis revealed that when controlling for RLS, DS was actually significantly and
92
negatively associated with less hopelessness. In contrast to RLS, having a high Desire
for Structure may be advantageous in that these individuals report better mental health
as reflected by their lower levels of depression, hopelessness, suicidal ideation, anxi
and stress.
The remaining hypotheses (H3 & H4) addressed the relationship between the two
types of rigidity, stressful life events and mental heath. H3 hypothesized that stressf
life events would be associated with greater increases in depression, hopelessness,
suicide ideation, anxiety and stress among those high in RLS compared to those low in
RLS. These hypotheses were mostly supported in that a GLM ANCOVA revealed
significant interactions between RLS and stressful life events for depression, anxiety
and stress. The depression results replicate those found in study 1, however the study
results were not replicated for hopelessness and suicide ideation. Nonetheless taken as
whole the results indicate that as predicted stressful life events would be related to
poorer mental health for those high in RLS as opposed to those low in RLS.
Our final hypothesis was that DS would not interact with life stress. This hypothesis
was supported. A GLM ANCOVA revealed that there were no significant interactions
between DS and stressful life events for depression, hopelessness, suicide ideation,
anxiety and stress. This indicates that life stress is not related to increases in lowe
levels of mental health in those who are high in DS.
93
CHAPTER SEVEN
OVERALL DISCUSSION
94
Whereas previous research has consistently found that cognitive rigidity has negative
implications for mental health (Bonner & Rich, 1987, 1988a, 1988b; Chang, 2002;
Dieserud et al., 2001; Dixon et al., 1994; Dugas et al., 1998; D'Zurilla, 1986; Ellis,
1986; Nezu et al., 1989; Priester & Clum, 1993; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte et
al., 1990), the results of the present study support the proposition that not all types
cognitive rigidity relate in the same manner to mental health. The results across both
studies consistently supported our first two hypotheses. It was found that the response
to a lack of structure was consistently related to poor mental health outcomes whereas
desiring structure was not related to poor mental health. Therefore the evidence
suggests that not all types of cognitive rigidity have negative implications for menta
health.
Support for hypothesis three was found across both studies. Stressful life events were
found to have a more adverse impact upon those who were high in RLS compared to
those low in RLS. Those who were high in RLS showed greater increases in depression
(Study 1 & 2), suicide ideation (Study 1), hopelessness (Study 1), anxiety (Study 2) a
stress (Study 2). The results for depression replicated across both studies. Although t
results for hopelessness and suicidal ideation did not replicate across both studies, t
pattern of results (study 2) illustrated in figures 3.2 and 3.3 were still consistent
our predictions. It was found that stressful life events were associated with greater
increases in hopelessness and suicidal ideation in those high in RLS compared to those
low in RLS. The evidence concerning our final hypothesis that predicted that DS would
not interact with stressful live events was somewhat inconsistent. In study 1 we found
that DS interacted with stressful life events, whereas in study 2 there was no
interaction.
95
Our predictions regarding DS, RLS and mental health were based on some of the major
theoretical principals of Albert Ellis. As mentioned above, the results of the present
research generally supported these predictions. There are however, a number of
alternative theoretical explanations consistent with those of Ellis that may also be us
to explain the findings involving rigidity and mental health. The theoretical principle
from CBT (Beck, 1967, 1979) and Self-Complexity theory (SC; Linville, 1982, 1985)
are such examples. Explanations as to how these theories might be used to account for
the observed relationships between rigidity and mental health will be presented in
section 7.1.
Due to the fact that the present research measured rigidity in terms of a self-reported
tendency, the results obtained provide information that is qualitatively different from
the types of information obtained via measures of maximum performance. Performance
measures of cognitive rigidity tend to provide information relating to one's ability to
flexible in the way that problems are solved. The present research however, aimed to
address the issue as to individual differences in people's motivations regarding their
tendencies toward being rigid. It was decided based on a number of factors that the
PNS scale was the ideal instrument with which to achieve the aims of the present
research. Such factors included the fact that the PNS scale is unique in that it has tw
highly correlated yet conceptually independent factors, DS and RLS. These sub-factors
allow one to distinguish, using the one scale, between two different types of rigidity.
One type has negative implications for mental health (RLS) and one type does not
(DS). This is a significant point in light of the fact that cognitive rigidity has usua
conceptualized in a somewhat negative light. The conceptualizations of previously
96
discussed self-report rigidity scales such as, Intolerance of Ambiguity, Uncertainty
Orientation, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism, are some examples of this.
As explained in chapter 4, the PNS scale, unlike the other scales, is free of additional
factors. Whereas the alternative self-report scales are characterized by other unrelate
constructs as well as their attention to simple cognitive structuring. Authoritarianism
for example, also assesses conventionalism, power and toughness, authoritarian
aggression and submission, all of which have little overlap with PNS. Intolerance of
Ambiguity relates to one's resistance to lack of conceptual clarity independently of th
need for conceptual simplicity.
7.1 Hypotheses one and two: Do RLS and DS have the same
implications for mental health ?
Our results consistently demonstrate that RLS and DS do in fact have different
relationships with mental health. RLS has a negative relationship with mental health
whereas DS does not. We will discuss the outcomes of each hypothesis, beginning with
those relating to RLS. We expected that those high in RLS would report poor mental
health outcomes. As expected we found that those who responded poorly to a lack of
structure were those who reported feeling more depressed, hopeless and suicidal in
their thinking. The aims of study 2 were to replicate this pattern of results and expand
the measures of mental health to include anxiety, stress and a positive measure of
mental health, life satisfaction. The identical pattern of results from study 1 was
replicated in study 2, in that we found that RLS was once again related to poorer mental
health outcomes. It must be noted that although significant, many of the correlations
between RLS and the mental health variables particularly in study 1, were small.
Thesefindings,which demonstrate a relationship between R L S and poor mental health,
are consistent with several previous results concerning the PNS construct. Neuberg and
Newsom (1993) found RLS to be positively correlated with neuroticism, anxiety and
social anxiety. Whereas Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) and Kivimaki et al. (1996)
found that RLS was related to occupational strain symptoms such as difficulties in
concentrating, depression and nervousness.
It is possible that those who respond poorly to a lack of structure experience poor
mental health as a result of the incompatibility between their beliefs and reality. E
(Ellis & Yeager, 1989) posits that people posses numerous irrational beliefs that lead
them to unnecessary levels of emotional distress. Statements of demand represent an
example of an irrational belief. People who make such demands essentially believe that
they must have that which they desire. They also believe that they must have control
over things, or that things must be the way they want them to be in order to be conten
or happy. They unyieldingly and rigidly command the way in which their world must
operate. RET argues that if humans would stick to preferences or desires - "I would
like this very much, but I don't have to have it" and not convert them into rigid
demands, they would not have so much emotional trouble (Ellis, cited in Dryden,
1991). Hence according to RET, desiring structure will not lead to emotional
disturbance. In light of the perspective offered by Ellis, it is highly possible that
who respond poorly to a lack of structure may be those who do not just desire structur
but those who demand that structure be present in order for them to be satisfied. The
fact that their manner of response to a lack of structure is negative and that they
98
evidence poor mental health as a result of the perceived loss of structure, supports th
possibility.
One can also interpret the relationship between RLS and poor mental health from the
perspective of Aaron Beck. The perspective offered by Beck is consistent with that of
Ellis. There are however, slight differences as to where they would place their initial
emphasis in appraising and treating the nature of the cognitive distortions, which then
result in emotional disturbance. In explaining this relationship Ellis would place the
initial emphasis on one's irrational beliefs or absolutistic demands. For example an
individual high in RLS might hold the belief that reality must be structured and that t
world must be a stable place. Ellis would also argue that these individuals might
magnify an events "badness" and convert something that might realistically be
considered a hassle into a horror (Ellis & Yeager, 1989). Beck would place his initial
emphasis on automatic thoughts or distorted inferences that people may make about
their ability to cope with an event. For example, the rigid person might think "This
problem is too complex, I won't ever be able to solve it". Beck would initially
challenge this inference. For example he might say, "where is the evidence that the
problem is too complex ?" The technique he uses is the downward arrow technique,
which will allow one to eventually arrive at a person's irrational or core beliefs such
"I'm incompetent". Ellis argues that the initial solution should not be aimed at helpin
clients give up the derivatives of their demands. He believes that in order for the cli
to get better, the initial focus should be on encouraging people to recognize their
absolutistic demands or must beliefs, and to help them give them up. After this is
achieved, one should then tackle the major (explicit and implicit) inferences and
attributions that they derive from these musts (Ellis, 1972).
99
In contrast to Ellis, Beck continues to place his initial emphasis on distorted inferences.
He argues that people can make distorted inferences in the form of rigid assumptions
such as overgeneralizations and all or nothing thinking. Problems arise when critical
incidents occur (e.g., stressful event) and mesh with a person's distorted inferences.
Once activated, these faulty assumptions produce an upsurge in negative thoughts
which then lead to unpleasant emotions (Beck, 1967). Therefore those high in RLS may
have poorer mental health because they are likely to possess distorted inferences as
well as irrational beliefs, both of which could decrease their ability to effectively d
with lack of structure. Such thoughts may lead them to experience unnecessary
disturbance.
SC theory by Linville (1982, 1985) offers an alternative view to that of Ellis and Beck
in explaining why those high in RLS experience poor mental health. The tendency to
form simple self-representations is argued to meaningfully influence mental health
(Linville, 1982, 1985). Those who are high in RLS tend to form simple selfrepresentations (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, study 3). The evidence also suggests that
they tend to form simpler and less complex self-representations than those who are high
in DS (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993, study 3). Linville (1982, 1985) posited a model that
implicated self-complexity in extreme affective reactions to self-relevant external
events. The notion of the quantity of self-aspects is central to her theory. Linville
(1982, 1985) argued that when a stressful event occurs, it affects the self-aspect most
pertinent to the stressor. She proposed that for a person with numerous self-aspects
(high quantity/complexity) the affected self-aspect is but one of many aspects. Thus a
relatively small proportion of the total self will be affected. By contrast, a stressor
100
negatively affect a greater proportion of the total self in those w h o have fewer aspects
in their self-concept. There is evidence suggesting that individuals with simpler selfrepresentations are more likely to respond to self-relevant events with affective
extremity (Cohen, Pane, & Smith, 1997; Kalthoff & Neimeyer, 1993; Linville, 1985,
1987; Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992). Hence it is possible that those high in
RLS possess simpler self-representations, which in turn prompts them to respond to
certain events with the affective extremity noted in the present research, such as
depression, hopelessness or suicidal ideation.
The aforementioned theoretical orientations (Ellis, Beck, & Linville) are not
inconsistent with each other. They merely emphasize different elements that may be
used to account for the disturbance noted in high RLS individuals. For example, where
Linville might place the emphasis on simple self-representations, Ellis places his
emphasis on the possibility that RLS individuals are unhappy because they make
absolutistic demands and possess irrational beliefs about how they think reality should
be. All these approaches are compatible with each other. The views of Ellis and
Linville are compatible in that Ellis believes that it is best not to make single or li
evaluations of the self. In fact part of a RET intervention is to assist people to have
more diverse self-representations. Thus Ellis would attempt to encourage individuals to
diversify the way they see themselves. The views of Beck and Ellis are compatible as
they both emphasize the importance of dysfunctional cognitions in human disturbance.
Our second hypothesis predicted that people who desired structure would not
experience poor mental heath outcomes. As expected, study 1 revealed that those who
desired structure did not experience poor mental heath. In fact we found that they
101
actually experienced better mental health in that they reported lower levels of
hopelessness, depression and suicide ideation. In our second study we extended our
measures of mental health to include anxiety, stress and life satisfaction. The result
study 2 replicated those for study 1 in that once again, DS was found not to be
associated with poor mental health. In fact DS was found to be significantly associate
with less hopelessness. The evidence is clear for hypothesis two in that DS was
consistently not related to poor mental health. Although we did not hypothesize that D
would lead to better mental health outcomes, we did find evidence of a negative
relationship between DS and some mental health variables. However the evidence
regarding a significant negative relationship was not perfectly replicated across both
studies. Study 1 produced clear evidence that DS was associated with lower levels of
depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation. However, even though the majority of
the correlational and regression data for the mental health variables and DS were in t
negative direction in study 2, hopelessness was the only mental health variable that
evidenced a significant negative relationship with DS. The results indicated that DS c
be related to mental health but is not related when controlling for RLS. Thus, DS does
not uniquely predict mental health when controlling for RLS. The results from both
studies support our argument that not all types of rigidity relate in the same manner
mental health. What was consistent was the lack of a positive relationship between DS
and mental health, which was quite different from what was observed for RLS and
mental health.
The evidence that desiring structure is not related to poorer mental health outcomes i
consistent with previous results concerning the PNS construct. Recent research found
that unlike RLS, DS was not related to psychological strain symptoms such as
102
depression, nervousness and difficulty concentrating (Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999;
Kivimaki et al., 1996). Similarly, Neuberg and Newsom (1993) found that DS did not
significantly relate to manifest anxiety.
Commensurate with the view offered by Ellis and RET is the finding that desiring
structure does not have negative implications for mental health. As mentioned earlier,
according to Ellis and RET individuals fall into emotional peril because they make
demands as to how reality should be. The irrational belief is evident when someone
believes that they absolutely must have that which is desirable. According to Ellis
(Ellis, cited in Dryden, 1991) simply desiring structure is not irrational and will not
lead to emotional trouble. In fact, one of the therapeutic aims of RET therapy is "to
help people strongly desire only that which they believe they completely require "
(Ellis & Yeager, 1989, p. 20).
7.2 Hypotheses three and four: Does cognitive rigidity moderate
the relationship between stress and mental health ?
As per our third hypothesis, we expected that those high in RLS would be those who
experience greater increases in poor mental health as a result of the stressful life ev
that they may encounter. As expected, we found that those high in RLS responded
more poorly to stressful life events compared to those low in RLS. Those in high RLS
evidenced greater increases in depression (study 1 and 2), hopelessness (study 1, not
study 2), suicide ideation (study 1, not study 2), anxiety (study 2) and stress (study
The effects for hopelessness and suicidal ideation found in study 1 may not have
replicated for two reasons. Firstly, the effect may not have been strong enough, or ther
103
simply may not be any effect. The fact that anxiety and stress were only tested in stud
2, means that one cannot speculate upon the reliability of these findings. Future
research may attempt to replicate the results for anxiety and stress. The most consiste
finding replicated across studies 1 and 2 and the one we will focus on in this section
the relationship between stressful life events, RLS and depression.
These results implicating RLS as a vulnerability factor for stress are somewhat
consistent with the results obtained by Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999). These
researchers found that RLS not DS was related to an elevated risk of occupational
strain symptoms, only in those who worked in high complexity jobs. Elovainio and
Kivimaki (1999) argue that working in a high complexity job may be particularly stress
provoking due to the requirement of multi-level expertise, subjugation to time pressure
performance expectations and unpredictable environments. It is pointed out here that
job complexity may be equated with life stressors in that they are both situations tha
have the potential to exert a negative effect upon some individuals. Those who respond
poorly to a lack of structure may be more susceptible to the effects of chronic stress
life events for a number of reasons, some of which are presented below.
The results of the present research suggests that those high in RLS are those who tend
to experience poor mental health in that they evidence more depression, hopelessness,
suicide ideation, anxiety, stress and lower life satisfaction. These elements of poor
mental health are commonly believed to heighten one's vulnerability to stressful
experiences, resulting in the accentuation of one's initial poor mental state (Bargh &
Tota, 1988; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Therefore, the initial experience of poor
104
mental health amongst those high in R L S m a y be a factor that could lead these
individuals to be more vulnerable to the effects of life stress.
Consistent with the perspectives of both Beck and Ellis is the suggestion that high RLS
individuals are more affected by stress as a result of their irrational beliefs and as a
result of the distorted inferences that they may make in times of stress. For example
they might infer that their goals are unattainable. There is some evidence suggesting
that RLS is more highly related to behavioral routinization than is DS (Neuberg &
Newsom, 1993, study 2). High RLS individuals with simple structures who consistently
create routines may be especially likely to perceive certain events (e.g., unplanned
occurrences) as being interrupting. Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) argue they may also
perceive their goals as being unattainable. There is well-documented evidence
suggesting that emotions occur when schemata, goals or activities are perceived to be
interrupted or challenged (Berscheid, 1982; Fiske, 1993; Mandler, 1975; Simon, 1967).
Given that high RLS individuals may be more likely to perceive events as being
interrupting - given their general non-complexity and preference for routine, such
individuals may be particularly emotionally reactive, experiencing both greater
amounts of emotion and larger swings in the valance of their emotions (Neuberg &
Newsom, 1993). It is therefore possible that those high in RLS who react in an
emotionally extreme way to situations in which they feel they cannot apply simple
structures may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of life stressors.
The results across both studies consistently found that those high in RLS were more
vulnerable to stressful life events in that they evidenced greater increases in depress
One reason for this could be that in times of stress rigid people might not be able to u
105
positive information to help them cope with the situation. For example, Beck's
cognitive model of depression emphasizes not only hopelessness but also a view of
depressed persons as employing rigid and polarized or dichotomous thinking (Beck,
1979). Beck (1979) also argues that elements such as subtle, negative, global
attributions as well as rigid self-schemata disrupt the depressive's ability to utilize
positive information, all of which tend to typify a depressed state. This style of think
reduces the complexity and diversity of behavior and experience. Beck might therefore
argue that it is possible that those high in RLS in response to stressful life events
experience greater increases in depression because their rigid self-schemata may disrupt
their ability to utilize positive information. Interestingly, Neuberg and Newsom (1993)
found RLS and not DS to be significantly and negatively related to cognitive
complexity. Thus Neuberg and Newsom (1993) argue that to the extent that cognitive
simplification is implicated in depression, one might therefore expect those high in
RLS to be susceptible to depression. The results of the present research supports this
assertion in that depression was significantly related to RLS not DS in both the studies
conducted.
It is possible that those high in RLS in response to stressful life events show greater
increases in poor mental health, particularly depression, because they are not able to
cope effectively with stress. Another possible reason why those high in RLS might
experience difficulty dealing with stress may be because they might retrieve
autobiographical memories that are too general and that are lacking in the rich, detaile
information that is required to cope with stress. There is some evidence with particular
reference to depression, which suggests that this might be the case. Cognitive
simplification and overgeneral thinking is pivotal to cognitive theories of depression
106
(e.g., Beck, 1976) and more recently research has demonstrated that this cognitive st
extends to autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986;
Williams & Dritschel, 1988, 1992; Williams & Scott, 1988). A host of studies has
shown that depressed and parasuicidal respondents perform poorly in tasks in which th
goal is to retrieve a specific memory (Williams, 1992, 1996, Williams & Broadbent,
1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1988, 1992; Williams & Scott, 1988). Instead of specific
memories they offer summarized and general memories.
Recent research has shown that the generation of specific memories is important in
order to deal appropriately with social problems (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996;
Williams, 1996; Williams & Dritschel, 1988). Goddard et al. (1996) also found that the
retrieval of categoric/general memories during a social problem solving task was
strongly associated with the generation of less effective solutions. Given that socia
problems are more open ended than other types of problems, they require the use of
specific memories. These memories are more useful as a database as they are rich in
detail and offer a large number of cues from which to generate a range of potential
solutions. In contrast, general memories offer a more restrictive database and functi
more effectively in closed problems for which the solution is fixed and variable
(Williams, 1996). Williams (1992) proposed that a categoric retrieval style inhibits
effective social problem solving because the database that it makes available is
restricted due to of its lack of specific information.
There is also some evidence suggesting that overgenerality in autobiographical memory
is a trait marker of vulnerability to depression, because memory characteristics did
change as depression improved (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993). There is
107
evidence suggesting that those high in RLS engage in cognitive simplification with
regards to the self and in a more general sense (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Neuberg
and Newsom (1993) also argue that their data suggest that individuals who organize
information in less complex ways may posses memory structures that are less complex.
It is therefore possible that subjects high in RLS, who tend to utilize less complex
structures lacking in specificity, may, in response to stressful events, recall informat
or memories that are overgeneral and lacking in specificity. The recollection of these
types of memories may give them few cues on how to cope with the stress. Therefore
these individuals are inhibited from engaging in effective social problem solving. This
results in an inability to deal effectively with stress which would subsequently lead t
greater increases in poor mental health, especially depression.
Our final hypothesis was that DS would not interact with stressful life events. This
hypothesis met with mixed findings. Unexpectedly the results of study 1 revealed that
stressful life events were associated with greater increases in depression, hopelessness
and suicidal ideation among those high in DS. However it should be noted that even
though stress lowered the mental health of those high in DS at a faster rate, those high
in DS still evidenced better mental health overall compared to low DS individuals.
Study 2 generated results in the expected direction in that DS did not interact with
stressful life events. Therefore it is argued that if there is any such interaction, it
not appear to be particularly reliable or to have a particularly large effect. The resul
were fairly consistent with this, despite the finding that the results of study 1 were n
perfectly consistent. Nonetheless, due to this discrepancy, we cannot treat this as a
robust finding. Perhaps future research may address and resolve this issue by
replicating the study, focusing on the relationship between DS and stressful life events
108
The results obtained in our second study, which was based on a larger sample size, is
somewhat consistent with previous research concerning DS and stressful events
(Elovainio & Kivimaki, 1999).
Elovainio and Kivimaki (1999) found that unlike RLS, DS actually decreased the risk
of psychological strain at work. Being in an unstructured and complex environment
appeared to make those high in DS less vulnerable to the effects of stress. These
researchers argue that the desire to establish structure in one's life may actually ser
a buffer or as a protective trait against psychological strain for those who may be
subjected to a stressful environment.
A potential explanation for these findings can be found in the argument that those high
in the desire for structure may possess better coping skills with which to manage
stressful environments (Kivimaki et al., 1996). Kivimaki et al. (1996) argue that the
desire for structure may mobilize adaptive appraisal-focused, emotional focused or
problem focused coping processes which may protect one against the level of strain.
Although speculative, the implications of this explanation will be addressed in the
section dealing with future research.
7.3 Other explanations for the pattern findings
Stressful life events tended to be correlated with rigidity. Therefore those high in
rigidity may have experienced poor mental health due to the stress that they may
encounter. In other words, stressful life events may confound the relationship between
rigidity and mental health. However, inconsistent with this possibility was the finding
109
that R L S was still significantly related to poor mental health even after controlling for
stressful life events. This was the case across both studies.
Social desirability may have been another variable that could have confounded the
results obtained. Social desirability may have affected the way in which subjects
responded to the measures of rigidity and mental health. Inconsistent with this view is
the evidence that found no relationship between social desirability and RLS or DS
(Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
7.4 Limitations and future directions
The results of the present research are significant in that they have a number of
theoretical and practical implications for the construct of cognitive rigidity. The
evidence gathered from the current research replicates and extends the preliminary
findings that suggest that rigidity can be divided into two factors - DS and RLS, both
of which have differing implications for mental health. The results of the present
research are also significant in that they show that not all types of rigidity have neg
implications for mental health. The evidence suggests that there is a type of rigidity
does not relate to poor mental health and that in some cases, such as in the case of
hopelessness may in fact be somewhat beneficial. This type of rigidity is called the
desire for structure. Response to a lack of structure is the other type of rigidity tha
been shown to be associated with mostly negative mental health outcomes.
A primary limitation of the present research is that it employed a cross-sectional
design. Due to the correlational nature of the design one cannot infer causation. Given
the significance of the research findings, perhaps future research should address this
110
problem by conducting longitudinal research. For example, one can measure rigidity
and mental health at time one and then after a period of time measure these variables
again. Using this method one can better understand the relationship between rigidity
and mental health, in terms of understanding whether rigidity precedes poor mental
health. This method might bring us closer to addressing the issue of causation.
Another limitation of the present research is that it did not test between the various
theoretical positions that were offered as potential explanations for the observed resul
Four different positions were presented in order to account for the results obtained. Th
first was Ellis who would place his initial emphasis on the argument that those high in
RLS make themselves miserable because they might possess irrational beliefs. For
example, these people may place unrealistic, absolutist demands upon reality. The
second explanation was that of Beck who would place his initial emphasis on the
argument that high RLS individuals possess distorted inferences which mesh with
stressful incidences which then instigate an upsurge of negative emotions. The third
position was Linville's argument that those who possess simple self-representations are
more likely to be negatively affected by stressors. This is due to the fact that as stre
will negatively influence a greater proportion of the total self in those who have fewer
aspects in their self-concept. It is therefore possible that those high in RLS experienc
poorer mental health because they tend to possess simpler self-representations. The
final explanation was that those who are high in RLS experience more detrimental
mental health outcomes because they do not possess effective coping mechanisms.
Such mechanisms are necessary to be able to solve or cope with stressful life events. It
would be interesting for future research to test between these four possibilities. The
following is a discussion of each one.
Ill
Future research could directly test Ellis's theory and measure the beliefs of those high
in RLS in order to test if they actually do make absolutist demands on reality. Then one
could conduct therapeutic interventions, with control groups, that might address this
cognitive style and attempt to modify the belief that one must have something a
particular way in order to be able to cope with a situation. Ellis, for example, would
attempt to encourage individuals to stop demanding and to accept that reality may at
times be unstructured. He would encourage high RLS individuals to see that this
scenario would not be as catastrophic as they might believe. One would collect pre and
post measurements of the participant's mental health and rigidity status in order to
evaluate the efficacy of the intervention.
Future research could also test Beck's theoretical explanation. For example one could
measure the distorted inferences of those low and high in RLS to test which group is
most likely to make such inferences. Should those high in RLS appear to make
distorted inferences with great frequency, future research could address this
phenomenon. For example, one could conduct an intervention whereby one group of
these individuals is initially taught to make more accurate inferences and the other
group would serve as a control group and would not be taught these skills. In teaching
accurate inferences Beck, would start to challenge the distorted inferences, by focusin
on automatic thoughts such as "I'll never be able to cope with this much chaos or lack
of structure". He would then challenge the distortion via socratic questioning or via
behavioral experiments. These techniques are designed to reduce the tendency to focus
on negative inferences and make room for the possibility that one can cope with the
things one initially thought they could not. After the intervention, one could assess i
112
the intervention decreased the frequency of distorted inferences. Future research could
measure rigidity and mental health before and after the intervention in order to
ascertain if the intervention was successful.
The rectification of rigid thinking styles, such as irrational beliefs and distorted
inferencing, may be significant, particularly in light of how important the ability to
flexible is thought to be for one's mental health as well for reducing psychiatric
symptomatology (e.g Dali Lama & Cutler, 1998; Dixion et al., 1994; Lerner & Clum,
1990; Linehan, Armstron, Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 1991; Salkovskis, Atha, & Storer,
1991).
Another avenue for future research could be to test whether Linville's (1982, 1985) SC
theory is a useful explanation for the observed findings. Firstly, future research sho
attempt to replicate the findings of Neuberg and Newsom (1993) which suggest that
those high in RLS possess simple self-representations. Future research might conduct
interventions and in doing so manipulate self-complexity, whereby those high in RLS
are taught to recognize the various aspects of the self. At this time one would measure
their current mental health and rigidity. Another group of high RLS individuals can be
incorporated into the study who are not taught to consider the ways in which they could
be complex. One way of encouraging individuals to appreciate their complexity could
be to draft a pie chart in which they draw up a number of aspects relevant to
themselves. They then could meditate on each aspect of themselves in terms of what
they might mean to themselves or to their friends, colleagues and families. After a
period of time research could then examine the effectiveness of the intervention by
measuring the participant's mental health status.
The present research revealed that high R L S individuals were shown to be more
affected by stress. One reason that was proposed to account for this was that those high
in RLS might have a poor ability to cope with stress. Future research could assess this
explanation and investigate the actual coping mechanisms and styles of those high in
RLS, in order to ascertain if they do in fact use non-effective coping styles. Although
speculative, Kivimaiki et al. (1996) suggested a link between coping mechanisms and
desiring structure. Thus, future research could assess whether there is in fact a positi
relationship between various adaptive coping styles such as perceived coping ability
and the desire for structure component of the PNS scale.
Longitudinal research could explore further the relationship between RLS coping. It
could begin by measuring rigidity, initial coping styles and mental health at time one.
One group of high RLS individuals could receive training in coping skills and the other
group could act as a control group and yet another group could receive supportive
therapy, which does not specifically address coping skills. After a period of time all t
subjects would retake the measures of mental health and coping in order to ascertain if
coping skills training was effective.
Earlier it was suggested that those who perform poorly in social problem solving tasks,
and who therefore fail to cope successfully with life stress are those who tend to recal
autobiographical memories that are overgeneral and non-specific. It might be
interesting for future research to evaluate the types of memories that those high in RLS
might recall and their capacity to engage in effective social problem solving. There is
evidence suggesting that those high in RLS engage in cognitive simplification
114
regarding self-representation and the broader environment (Neuberg &
Newsom,
1993). Neuberg and Newsom (1993) also argue that their data suggest that individuals
who organize information in less complex ways may posses memory structures that are
less complex. It is therefore possible that subjects high in RLS, who engage in
cognitive simplification, may in response to stressful events, recall information or
memories that are overgeneral and lacking in specificity. Future research could
therefore test this hypothesis. If this is the case, perhaps an intervention could be
conducted whereby one group of subjects high in RLS is taught to be more specific in
encoding and retrieval of emotional events and another group acts as a control. After a
period of time one could assess these groups in order to ascertain if the training
received had the beneficial effect of enhancing the ability of those high in RLS to find
effective alternative solutions to their problems.
The present research consistently found that RLS was related to poor mental health.
Future research might also attempt to replicate these results across different age group
as well as with various clinical samples, such as with clinically depressed patients, or
those with social anxiety or obsessive compulsive disorder. Future research might also
attempt to replicate the findings regarding DS and mental health with various clinical
samples as well as across other age groups such as children, adolescents and the
elderly.
The results of the present research indicate that desiring structure is not associated w
poor mental health. The present research also found some evidence suggesting that
desiring structure is consistently associated with less hopelessness, and thus may be
beneficial for one's mental health. It is possible that structuring one's environment ma
115
provide a sense of direction for those w h o are hopeless. This speculation could also be
explored in future research. These results lead one to wonder if there are other
circumstances situations where desiring structure could be good for you. For example,
past research has provided indirect evidence for this adaptivity assumption whereby
those high in global PNS were found to be more likely to complete their research
requirements on time than low PNS subjects (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; Roman et al.,
1995). Future research could replicate and extend the these findings by examining
whether those high in DS are the ones who complete their work on time or whether it
would be those high in RLS who would complete their work on time.
The motivation to desire structure in one's life could lead a person to create a mean
understanding the world in a less chaotic manner and to interact with the environment
in a more manageable way. Future research could therefore investigate the usefulness
of DS in the applied domain of health. A major problem amongst health practitioners is
that some patients fail to follow prescribed medical/drug regimes (Meichenbaum &
Turk, 1987). Perhaps those high in DS would be more likely to follow medication
instructions and keep appointments (Thompson et al., 2001).
As a global construct, PNS has been related to a number of psychological events. Such
events include the formation of new stereotypes (Schaller et al., 1995), being less li
to change beliefs when confronted by new information (Rice & Okun, 1994) and being
more likely to form spontaneous trait influences (Moskowitz, 1993). The current
research has shown that DS and RLS relate differently to mental health. Therefore it i
also possible that these two types of rigidity may relate differently to the
aforementioned phenomena. Future research should explore such a possibility. It is
116
possible, for example, that those w h o are less likely to change beliefs when confronted
with new information may be those who are high in RLS not DS. This is a possibility,
especially in light of the argument that RLS represents a qualitatively different type o
rigidity than does DS.
7.5 Conclusion
Past research has suggested that rigidity is associated with poor mental health. It is
argued that even the term "rigidity" tends to imply something negative. The scale used
in the present study has been associated to redundancy with another measure of rigidity
- the RAPH (Meresko et al., 1954) and is therefore argued to be reflective of cognitive
rigidity. The results of the present research indicate that there are some types of rigi
that have negative implications as evident by the results regarding RLS and mental
health. However, we found that there is one component of rigidity - the desire for
structure - that was not related to poor mental health. In fact it was found to be
associated with less hopelessness across both studies.
The results of the present research encourage us to re-evaluate our negative framing of
all rigidity. Practitioners need to recognize that some clients may indeed value structu
and that valuing and desiring structure does not necessarily result in poor mental healt
outcomes. The results of the present research should encourage therapists to try and
differentiate between these two types of rigidity and to treat only the types which pose
a threat to one's mental health and to one's ability to adjust to stressful life events.
117
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130
APPENDIX A
INFORMATION SHEET
UNIVERSITY OF W O L L O N G O N G
INFORMATION SHEET - SURVEY B
Culture, willingness to seek help, and dealing with life
problems and stress
Keiren Hynes. Terri Said, Greg Scott and Dr Joseph Ciarrochi
This research project is being conducted by Ms Keiren Hynes as part of her Mpsyc (Clinical)
degree, M s Terri Said as part of her DPsyc (Clinical) degree, and by M r Greg Scott as part of his
P h D Psychology degree, supervised by Dr Joseph Ciarrochi in the department of psychology at
the University of Wollongong.
This study is a completely anonymous survey. You will first be asked to fill out a
survey that consists of 20 written scenarios. Y o u will then be asked to describe h o w
you would feel in response to each of these scenarios. Y o u then will be asked to
complete a second survey. The second survey assesses h o w m a n y hassles/problems
are in your life and h o w you typically respond to these life situations both
cognitively and emotionally. W h e n you have completed both the surveys, you will
place all forms in an envelope and seal it. This will ensure your confidentiality.
Your participation in this research is voluntary and you are free to refuse to
participate and to withdraw from the research at any time. Your refusal to participate
or withdrawal from this research will not in any w a y affect your grades or your
relationship with the department or the university.
If you would like to discuss this research further please contact Dr. Joseph Ciarrochi
on (02) 42214488. If you have any enquires regarding the conduct of the research
please contact the Secretary of the University of Wollongong H u m a n Research
Ethics Committee on (02) 42214457.
1
131
APPENDIX B
CONSENT FORM
UNIVERSITY OF W O L L O N G O N G
CONSENT FORM - SURVEY B
Culture, willingness to seek help, and dealing with life
problems and stress
Keiren Hynes. Terri Said. Greg Scott and Dr Joseph Ciarrochi
This research project is being conducted by Ms Keiren Hynes as part of her Mpsyc (Clinical)
degree, M s Terri Said as part of her DPsyc (Clinical) degree, and by M r Greg Scott as part of his
P h D Psychology degree, supervised by D r Joseph Ciarrochi in the department of psychology at
the University of Wollongong.
This study is a completely anonymous survey. You will first be asked to fill out a
survey that consists of 20 written scenarios. Y o u will then be asked to describe h o w
you would feel in response to each of these scenarios. Y o u then will be asked to
complete a second survey. The second survey assesses h o w m a n y hassles/problems
are in your life and h o w you typically respond to these life situations both
cognitively and emotionally. W h e n you have completed both the surveys, you will
place all forms in an envelope and seal it. This will ensure your confidentiality. Y o u
will also be asked to provide relevant personal information, and to generate a
participant code. B y entering this code and not writing your n a m e on the survey, or
in the personal information section, your confidentiality will be assured.
Your participation in this research is voluntary and you are free to refuse to
participate and to withdraw from the research at any time. Your refusal to participate
or withdrawal from this research will not in any w a y affect your grades or your
relationship with the department or the university.
If you would like to discuss this research further please contact Dr. Joseph Ciarrochi
on (02) 42214488. If you have any enquires regarding the conduct of the research
please contact the Secretary of the University of Wollongong H u m a n Research
Ethics Committee on (02) 42214457.
Life M a n a g e m e n t Survey
I, (Participant's name) consent to
participate in the research conducted by M s Keiren Hynes, M s Terri Said, M r Greg
Scott and Dr. Joseph Ciarrochi as it has been described to m e in the information
sheet. I understand that the data collected will be used for article publication and
conference presentations and I consent for the data to be used in that manner.
Signed Date
/ /
2
132
APPENDIX C
THE BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY II
Date:
Kame:
Marital Status:
—
Occupation:
.
:
.
Age:
Sex:
1
Education:
yructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and
ken pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the w a y you have been feeling during the past two
[e^s, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group
gem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. B e sure that you do not choose more than one
jatementfor any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
6. Punishment Feelings
0
I do not feel sad.
0
I don't feel I a m being punished.
1
I feel sad m u c h of the time.
1
I feel I m a y be punished.
2
I am sad all the time.
2
I expect to be punished.
3
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
3
I feel I a m being punished.
2. Pessimism
7. Self-Dislike
0
I a m not discouraged about m y future.
0
I feel the same about myself as ever.
1
I feel more discouraged about m y future than I
used to be.
1
I have lost confidence in myself.
2
I a m disappointed in myself.
2
I do not expect things to work out for m e .
3
I dislike myself.
3
I feel m y future is hopeless and will only get
worse.
13. Past Failure
0
I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
2
As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
3
I feel I a m a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure
0
I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the
things I enjoy.
1 I don't enjoy things as m u c h as I used to.
2
I get very litde pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
3
I can't get any pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
Guilty Feelings
3
I don't feel particularly guilty.
8. Self-Criticalness
0
I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual.
1
I a m more critical of myself than I used to be.
2
3
I criticize myself for all of m y faults.
I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0
I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
not carry them out.
2
I would like to kill myself.
3
I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
0
I don't cry anymore than I used to.
1
I cry more than I used to.
2
I cry over every little thing.
3
I feel like crying, but I can't.
I feel guilty over m a n y things I have done or
•=•' should have done.
j^jfejjuite guilty most of the time.
| i l % g u i l t y all of the time.
Continued on Back
gllIl§Subtotal Page 1
['J*"* •^^d^CMago -Sin fSe^m^M^*• MissCopyright © 1996 by Aaron T. Beck
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
0154018392
.Agitation
17. Irritability
g
I am no more resdess or w o u n d up than usual.
0
I a m no more irritable than usual.
I
I feel more resdess or w o u n d up than usual.
1
I a m more irritable than usual.
.
I am so resdess or asitated that it's hard to stay
still
I a m so resdess or agitated that I have to keep
moving or doing something.
2
I a m m u c h more irritable than usual.
3
I a m irritable all the time.
3
0
I have not experienced any change in m y
appetite.
la
M y appetite is somewhat less than usual.
lb
M y appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a
M y appetite is m u c h less than before.
I have lost most of m y interest in other people
or things.
2b
M y appetite is m u c h greater than usual.
3a
I have no appetite at all.
It's hard to get interested in anything.
3b
I crave food all the time.
!. Loss of Interest
0
I have not lost interest in other people or
activities.
1
I am less interested in other people or things
than before.
2
3
L indecisiveness
0
18. Changes in Appetite
I make decisions about as well as ever.
19. Concentration Difficulty
0
1 I find it more difficult to m a k e decisions than
usual.
2
I can concentrate as well as ever.
I can't concentrate as well as usual.
It's hard to keep m y mind on anything for
very long.
I find I can't concentrate on anything.
I have much greater difficulty in making
decisions than I used to.
3 I have trouble making any decisions.
IWorthlessness
0 - I do not feel I a m worthless.
I I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful
as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other
people.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0
I a m no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1
I get moretiredor fatigued more easily than
usual.
I a m too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things
I used to do.
I a m too tired or fatigued to do most of the
things I used to do.
2
3
3 I feel utteriv worthless.
i. Loss of Energy
0 I have as much energy as ever.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0
- 1 don't have enough energy to do very much.
I
I have not noticed any recent change in m y
interest in sex.
I a m less interested in sex than I used to be.
3 I don't have enough energy to do anything.
2
I a m m u c h less interested in sex now.
3
I have lost interest in sex completely.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
[Changes in Sleeping Pattern
1 I have not experienced any change in m y
sleeping pattern.
LU
a
o
<
la I sleep somewhat more than usual.
"> I sleep somewhat less than usual.
04
-1 I sleep a lot more than usual.
jMsleep a lot less than usual.
CO
3a
I sleep most of the day.
Jb
I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back
to sleep.
CO
Subtotal Page 2
* ^is form is printed with both blue and black ink. If your
snot
appear this way, it has been photocopied in
Mo
'copyright laws.
Subtotal Page 1
Total Score
133
APPENDIX D
PERSONAL NEED FOR STRUCTURE SCALE
Using the scale provided as a guide, write the number that best describes h o w m u c h you
agree or disagree with each of the following statements according to your attitudes,
beliefs, and experiences in the blank space under "Agreement Rating". It is important
for you to realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People
are different and w e are interested in h o w you feel. Give only one answer for each
statement. Please respond to all statements:
Strongly Moderately Slightly Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Agree
1
2
3
4
5
Agree
6
Agreement
Rating
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can
expect from it
2. I'm not bothered by things that interrupt m y daily routine
3. I enjoy having a clear and structured m o d e of life
4. I like to have a place for everything and everything in it's place...
5. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes m y
life tedious
6. I don't like situations that are uncertain
7. I hate to change m y plans at the last minute
8. I hate to be with people w h o are unpredictable
9. Ifindthat a consistent routine enables m e to enjoy life more
10.1 enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations
11.1 become uncomfortable w h e n the rules in a situation are not clear.
4
134
APPENDIX E
THE BECK HOPELESSNESS SCALE
Beck Hopelessness Scale
Please circle the response that most accurately describes you. Circling T means you believe
the statement is true, circling F means you believe the statement is false. Please respond to
each question.
1) I look forward to the future with enthusiasm T F
2)
I might as well give up because I cannot make things better for myself
3)
When things go badly I am helped by knowing they cannot stay that
way forever
T
T
F
F
4)
I can't imagine what m y life will be like in 10 years
T
F
5)
I have enough time to accomplish the things I most want to do
T
F
6)
In the future, I expect to succeed in what concerns m e most
T
F
7)
My future seems dark to me
8)
I expect to get more of the good things in life than the average person
9)
I just don't get the breaks, and there's no reason to believe I will in
T
the future
F
T
T
F
F
10)
M y past experiences have prepared m e well for m y future
T
11)
All I can see ahead of m e is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness
T
F
12)
I don't expect to get what I really want
T
F
13)
When I look ahead to the future, I expect I will be happier than I am now
14)
Things just won't work out the way I want them to
T
F
15)
16)
I have great faith in the future
I never get what I want so it is foolish to want anything
T
T
F
F
17)
It is very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction in the future
18)
The future seems vague and uncertain to m e
T
F
19)
I can look forward to more good times than bad times
T
F
20)
There's no use in really trying to get something I want because I probably
T
13
F
T
T
won't get it
F
F
F
135
APPENDIX F
THE DEPRESSION ANXIETY STRESS SCALE
DASS
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates h o w much the
statement applied to you over the past month. There are no right or wrong answers. D o
not spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did
1
2
3
not apply to me at all
Applied to m e to some degree, or some of the time
Applied to m e to a considerable degree, or a good part of the time
Applied to m e very much, or most of the time
I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things
I was aware of dryness of m y mouth
I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all
I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid
breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)
5. I just couldn't seem to get going
0
0
0
]
]
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
0
0
1
]
2
2
3
3
6.
7.
8.
9.
I tended to over-react to situations
I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g., legs going to give w a y )
I found it difficult to relax
I found myself in situations that m a d e m e so anxious I was
most relieved w h e n they ended
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
0
0
0
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
0
0
1I
]I
2
2
3
3
11.1 found myself getting upset rather easily
12. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
13. I felt sad and depressed
14. I found myself getting impatient w h e n I w a s delayed in any
way (e.g., lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting)
15.1 had a feeling of faintness
0
0
0
1
I
I
2
2
2
3
3
3
0
0
I
I
2
2
3
3
16. I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything
17. I felt I wasn't worth m u c h as a person
18. I felt that I was rather touchy
19. I perspired noticeably (e.g., hands sweaty) in the absence of
high temperatures or physical exertion
20. I felt scared without any good reason
0
0
0
I
1
I
2
2
2
3
3
3
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
1.
2.
3.
4.
14
The rating scale is as follows:
0
1
2
3
Did not apply to m e at all
Applied to m e to some degree, or some of the time
Applied to m e to a considerable degree, or a good part of the time
Applied to m e very much, or most of the time
21
22
23
24
25
I felt that life wasn't worthwhile
I found it hard to wind d o w n
I had difficulty in swallowing
I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did
I w a s aware of the action of m y heart in the absence of physical
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
I felt down-hearted and blue
I found that I was very irritable
I felt I was close to panic
I found it hard to calm d o w n after something upsetting m e
I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but unfamiliar
task
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
31.1 w a s unable to become enthusiastic about anything
32. I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what 1 w a s doing
33. I was in a state of nervous tension
34. I felt I was pretty worthless
35. I was intolerant of anything that kept m e from getting on with
what I was doing
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
I felt terrified
I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about
I felt that life was meaningless
I found myself getting agitated
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself
41. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)
42. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
15
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
136
APPENDIX G
THE SATISFACTION WITH LIFE SCALE
Life Satisfaction Scale
Below arefivestatements with which you may agree or disagree. Using the 1-7 scale
SSET^^ES
Wi , eaCh item
"t
"y
CirC ng
"
*-PP-Priate nJnLrt
mat statement. There are n_ _,___, an^Ta
Strongly
Disagree
1 In most ways m y life is close to m y ideal
2. The conditions of my life are excellent
3. I am satisfied with my life
4. So far I have gotten the important things
I want in life
5. If I could live my life over, I would change
almost nothing
16
e
^e 1. "f^ ^ ^
Strongly
Agree
137
APPENDIX H
SUICIDE IDEATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Suicide Ideation Questionnaire
Directions
Listed below are a number of sentences about thoughts that people sometimes
have. Please indicate which of these thoughts you have had in the past month. Please
circle the number under the answer that best describes your o w n thoughts. B e sure circle
a number for each sentence. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.
Almost
e
This thought was in m y mind:
ery
y
day
1. I thought it would be better if I was not alive
2
1
I thought about killing myself.
1
Couple
of times
a week
I had this
thought
About Couple
About before but I never
once of times
once not in the had this
a week a month a month past month thought
2
4
6
7
2
4
6
7
3. I thought about h o w I would kill myself
1
2
4
6
7
4.
1
2
4
6
7
1
2
4
6
7
I thought about when I would kill myself.
5. I thought about people dying
6. I thought about death 1
4
7
7. I thought about what to write in a suicide note
1
4
7
8. I thought about writing a will
1
4
7
4
7
9. I thought about telling people I plan to kill myself.
1
10. I thought that people would be happier if I were not
around
1
11. I thought about how people would feel if I killed
myself.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
12. I wished I were dead
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13. I thought about h o w easy it would be to end it all
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2
3
4
5
6
7
2
3
4
5
6
7
14. I thought that killing myself would solve m y
problems
1
15. I thought olhers would be better off if I was dead
1
16. I wished I had the nerve to kill myself. '
17. I wished that I had never been b o m
1
2
4
7
2
4
7
18. I thought if I had the chance I would kill myself.
1
2
4
6
7
19. I thought about ways people kill themselves
1
2
4
6
7
20. I thought about killing myself, but would not do it
1
2
4
6
7
17
138
APPENDIX I
HASSLES SCALE
Hassles are irritants that can range from minor annoyances to fairly major pressures, problems, or
difficulties. They can happen a few or m a n y times.
DIRECTIONS:
Listed in the center of the following pages are a number of ways that you can feel hassled. There
are two things that y o u need to do:
1. L o o k d o w n the list of hassles. Tick (V) the hassles that you have had in the past month. If
there are hassles in the list that you did N O T have in the last month, do N O T tick them.
2. L o o k at the numbers on the right of the items you ticked. Circle the number that best
describes h o w S E V E R E ( B A D ) each ticked hassle was.
(V)
HASSLES
Somewhat
Moderately
Extremely
Severe
Severe
Severe
1. Misplacing or losing things
2
3
2.
Troublesome neighbors
2
3
3.
Health of a family member
2
3
4.
Social obligations
2
3
5.
Inconsiderate smokers
2
3
6.
Troubling thoughts about your future
2
3
7.
Thoughts about death
2
3
8.
Not enough money for clothing
2
3
9.
Not enough money for housing
2
3
10.
Concerns about owing money
2
3
11.
Concerns about getting credit
2
3
12.
Concerns about money for emergencies
2
3
13.
Someone owes you money
2
3
14.
Financial responsibility for someone w h o doesn't live with you.
2
3
15.
Cutting down on electricity, water, etc
2
3
16.
Smoking too much
2
3
17.
Use of alcohol
2
3
18.
Personal use of drugs
2
3
19.
Too many responsibilities
2
3
20.
Decisions about having children
2
3
12
Somewhat
Moderately
Extremely
Severe
Severe
Severe
Non-Family members living in your house
1
2
3
Careforpet
1
2
3
Planning meals
1
2
3
Concerned about the meaning of life
1
2
3
Trouble relaxing
1
2
3
Trouble making decisions
1
2
3
Problems getting along with fellow workers
1
2
3
Customers or clients give you a hard time
1
2
3
H o m e maintenance (inside)
1
2
3
Concerns about job security
1
2
3
Concerns about retirement
1
2
3
Laid-off or out of work
1
2
3
Don't like current work duties
1
2
3
Don't like fellow workers
1
2
3
Not enough money for basic necessities
1
2
3
Not enough money for food
1
2
3
Too many interruptions
1
2
3
Unexpected company
1
2
3
Too much time on hands
1
2
3
Having to wait
1
2
3
Concerns about accidents
1
2
3
Being lonely
1
Not enough money for health care
1
2
3
Fear of confrontation
1
2
3
Financial security
1
2
J
Silly practical mistakes
1
2
3
Inability to express yourself
1
2
3
Physical illness
*
2
3
Side effects of medication
1
Concerns about medical treatment
1
1
Physical appearance
1
Fear of rejection
Difficulties with getting pregnant
l
1
1
Sexual problems that result from physical problems
I
Sexual problems other than those resulting from physical problems.
1
13
3
-*
2
3
9
.
9
3
z
3
2
3
Concerns about health in general
Not seeing enough people
Somewhat
Severe
1
Moderately
Severe
2
1
2
Friends or relatives too far away
1
3
2
3
Preparing meals
1
2
3
Wasting time
j
2
3
Car Maintenance
\
2
3
Filling out
forms
1
3
2
Neighborhood deterioration
1
2
3
Financing children's education
1
2
3
Problems with employees
1
2
3
Problems on job due to being man or woman
1
2
3
Declining physical abilities
1
2
3
Being exploited
1
2
3
Concerns about bodily functions
1
2
3
Rising prices of common goods
1
2
3
Not getting enough rest
1
2
3
Not getting enough sleep
1
2
3
Problems with aging parents
1
2
3
Problems with your children
1
2
3
Problems with persons younger than yourself.
1
2
3
Problems / hassles with your lover
1
2
3
Difficulties seeing or hearing
1
2
3
Overloaded with family responsibilities
1
2
3
Too many things to do
1
2
3
Unchallenging work
1
2
3
Concerns about meeting high standards
1
2
3
Financial dealings with friends or acquaintances
1
2
3
Job dissatisfaction
1
2
3
Worries about decisions to change jobs
1
2
3
Trouble with reading, writing, or spelling abilities
1
2
3
Too many meetings
1
2
3
Problems with divorce or separation
1
2
3
Trouble with arithmetic skills
1
2
3
Gossip
1
2
3
Legal problems
1
2
3
14
Somewhat
Moderately
Severe
Severe
91.
Concerns about weight
1
2
92.
Not enough time to do the things you need to do
1
2
93.
Television
1
2
3
94.
Not enough personal energy
1
2
3
95.
Concerns about inner conflicts
1
2
3
96.
Feel conflicted over what to do
1
2
3
97.
Regrets over past decisions
1
2
3
98.
Menstrual (period) problems
1
2
3
99.
Theweather
1
2
3
100.
Nightmares
1
2
3
101.
Concerns about getting ahead
1
2
3
102.
Hassles from boss or supervisor
1
2
3
103.
Difficulties with
1
2
3
104.
Not enough time for family
1
2
3
105.
Transportation problems
1
2
3
106.
Not enough money for transportation
1
2
3
107.
Not enough money for entertainment and recreation
1
2
3
Shopping
1
2
3
109.
Prejudice and discrimination from others
1
2
3
110.
Property, investments or taxes
1
2
3
111.
Not enough time for entertainment and recreation
1
2
3
112.
Yardwork or outside home maintenance
1
2
3
113.
Concerns about news events
1
2
3
108.
__
friends
3
114.
__
Noise
1
2
3
115.
__
Crime
1
2
3
116.
__
Traffic
1
2
3
117.
_
Pollution
1
2
3
118.
Not being in a relationship
1
2
3
119.
Having bad University classes and lecturers / tutors
1
2
3
120
Becoming financially independent
1
2
3
121.
Problems/arguments with parents, siblings& other family members
1
2
3
122.
Understanding University classes and assignments
1
2
3
15
HAVE WE MISSED ANY OF YOUR HASSLES? IF SO,
WRITE THEM IN BELOW:
Somewhat
Moderately
Extremely
Severe
Severe
Severe
123.
1
2
3
124.
1
2
3
125.
1
2
3
ONE MORE THING: HAS THERE BEEN A CHANGE IN
YOUR LIFE THAT AFFECTED HOW YOU ANSWERED THIS
SCALE ? IF SO PLEASE TELL US WHAT IT WAS:
16
139
APPENDIX J
DEBRIEF HANDOUT
UNIVERSITY O F W O L L O N G O N G
DEBRIEF H A N D O U T
AIMS: We were interested in your skill at perceiving, understanding and managing your
emotions. W e also measured h o w stressful your life was and h o w you typically respond
to that stress. W e expected that people high in emotion skill would better be able to deal
with life problems and stress. W e were also interested in h o w cognitive factors might
influence such stress.
It is possible that after completing the questionnaires you may feel the need to talk
someone about h o w you are feeling. If you have been struggling with a personal problem,
it is often helpful to talk to someone about it. Often they can help just by understanding,
or they might provide some ideas about h o w you could solve your problem. If you have
had suicidal thoughts or feelings lately, it is very important that you talk to someone
about it. Below is a list of organisations w h o have people trained to listen and be
supportive of people w h o contact them. They welcome calls from anyone wanting to talk
over anything that is of concern to them.
Service
Phone
University of Wollongong Counselling Services
(Free to university staff and students)
Life Line 131114 (24 hour)
(Crisis intervention, ongoing problems, and referrals)
17
02- 4221 3445
140
APPENDIX K
RAW DATA
STUDY 1
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