November–December 2015 Volume 75, Number 6
The Journal
Founded 1890
RCMI
of the
Royal Canadian Military Institute
SITREP
— 18THBATTALIONCEF.WORDPRESS.COM
World War I Dental
Parade:The Royal
Canadian Dental Corps
Inside this Issue
Navigating Dark Waters by John C Thompson......................................................... 3
The Future of Racial Profiling In Canada:
Bill C-51 and Hereditary Guilt by Christopher Abbott........................................ 7
The Case against Regularizing Canada’s Irregulars by Paul Pryce....................... 11
The Royal Canadian Dental Corps:
A Century of Service by BGen (ret’d) Victor J. Lanctis......................................12
Response to Terrorism: A Vicious Cycle? by Tannuva Akbar.............................. 14
www.rcmi.org
@rcmiHQ
From the Editor’s Desk
T
he past year has seen this journal examine a variety of issues:
•
•
•
•
Our continuing role in the fight against the Islamic State
Fourth Generation warfare
The need for gender analysis in Canadian security operations
Canada Customs, now CBSA, the oldest law enforcement arm of the Canadian
government
•
Why after 14 years of international assistance and aid the governments of Iraq
and Afghanistan remain on the cusp of collapse and cannot provide the rule
of law and counter IS and the Taliban
•
Bad practices in military procurement
•
The security threat caused by the collapse of financial markets in Europe - the
bailout of Greece—and China
•
The EU’s challenge posed by the largest migration of refugees fleeing conflict
and economic migrants since WW2
•
The need to examine foreign policy with respect to the Asia-Pacific
•
The challenge of home grown terrorists
For 2016 we need to gird ourselves for the increasing reality that our secular
society may need to adjust our foreign policy to recognize that religion is playing an
increasing role in politics in the majority of troubled regions of the world. Citing a
recent Spectator editorial “Public safety before election promises: There are worse things
than a broken election promise…the government must ensure the refugee commitment
is kept, but in an intelligent way that balances humanitarian interests with national
security. That means the year-end target must be set aside.”
Our own resident terrorism expert and media analyst John C. Thompson posits
in a world menaced by significant population growth, environmental stresses and
urbanization, all connected with bewildering speed, that the old habits of thinking
about security and stability are going to be a liability. In so doing he puts into context
the world situation at year’s end.
Christopher Abbott comments on the 2015 Anti-terrorism Act Bill C-51 and
racial profiling—an ongoing public safety versus civil liberties issue especially with
respect to ‘carding’, a contentious issue in many of our cities. He posits that this
will lead to greater discretion being given to law enforcement officials, given the
preconception that terrorists are Muslim and/or Arab, and that the use of racial
profiling will increase.
Paul Pryce examines the role of Special Forces—irregular troops—in the
context of a pre-election Conservative promise, prophetic given recent IS attacks
in Paris, Ankara, Sinai and the downing of the Russian airliner, that would expand
the ranks of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).
BGen (ret’d) Victor Lanctis, the Colonel Commandant of the Royal Canadian
Dental Corps and non-resident RCMI member, examines the fascinating history
of the Corps on the occasion of its centennial.
Tannuva Akbar explores homegrown terrorism, radicalization and ISIS.
With the passage of this momentous year and with the expectation of a
2016 that will be replete with further security challenges, I extend my very best
wishes for a safe, peaceful and prosperous New Year!
Sincerely,
Colonel Chris Corrigan (retired) CD, MA
Editor and Chair of Security Studies
Copyright © 2015 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or institutional
purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.
2
SITREP
Royal Canadian Military Institute
Founded 1890
Patron
His Excellency the Right Honourable
David Johnston, C.C., C.M.M., C.O.M., C.D.
Governor General of Canada
Vice Patrons
The Honourable Elizabeth Dowdeswell, OC, OOnt
Lieutenant Governor of Ontario
The Honourable Kathleen Wynne, MPP
Premier of Ontario
General Jonathan Vance, CMM, MSC, CD
Chief of Defence Staff
His Worship, John Tory
Mayor of Toronto
Officers & Directors
HCol Gilbert W. Taylor—President
LCdr/Dr. Michael J. Hoare, CD—First Vice President
Col W. Allan Methven, CD–—Second Vice President
LCol Donald R. Fisher, CD—Director
BGen Paul A. Hayes, OMM, CD—Director
Capt Stewart C. Kellock, MOM, OStJ, CD—Director
LCol C. Edward Rayment, CD—Director
Capt Rodney W. J. Seyffert, CD—Director
Capt John E. Thompson, CD—Director
Past President
LCol James R. Breithaupt, KStJ, CD, QC
Honoraries
Col (ret’d) John Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC
Honorary President
HLGen Richard Rohmer, OC, CMM, DFC, O.Ont,
KStJ, OL, Legion d’Honneur, QC
Honorary Vice President
LCol (ret’d) Bruce W. Savage, CD
Honorary Curator
Dr. J. L. Granatstein, OC, FRSC
Dr. Desmond Morton, OC
Honorary Historians
Mr. Arthur Manvell
Honorary Librarian
LCol J. Roy Weir , CD, AdeC, QC
Honorary Solicitor
Honorary Chaplains
Maj The Rev Gillian Federico, CD
LCdr The Rev J. David Mulholland
Capt The Rev Mark L. Sargent, CD
General Manager
Mr. Michael T. Jones
Chair, Security Studies/Editor, Sitrep
Col (ret’d) Chris Corrigan, CD, MA
Vice-Chair, Security Studies/Editor, Members’ News
Mr. Eric S. Morse
An Official Publication of the
Royal Canadian Military Institute
426 University Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9
Tel: 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919
Website: www.rcmi.org
Editorial E-Mail: [email protected]
Navigating Dark Waters
by John C Thompson
T
he dark web, terrorism, hacktivists, intruding drones,
transnational organized crime—a dizzying array of
problems are growing but these are only the froth of a
growing wave of instability. The order we knew in past decades
is no longer assured.
In a world menaced by significant population growth,
environmental stresses, urbanization; and which yet remains
connected and mobile like never before, ideas and causes are
appearing and morphing with bewildering speed. In the coming years, old habits of thinking about security and stability
are going to be a liability.
Forward to the Past
Two problems are going to seize many institutions like a
mugger lunging out of an alley: First, thinking that the forms
of conflict in a post-Westphalian World will prevail over
non-state threats is going to be dangerous. The nation-state
is becoming weaker than ever compared to non-state actors.
The difference is that while conventional military and police
organizations represent significant force, they represent increasingly little applicable force.
Secondly, in a world where national authority matters
less and less, every institution of any kind is going to have to
stop thinking the armed authorities of government (and even
the rule of law) can protect them. Corporations, universities,
political parties, and every other collective social entity must
increasingly look to their own protection.
The kinetic threats offered by bombs, blades and bullets will still be just as plentiful, but non-kinetic threats to
reputation, business continuity and everything else will be
just as profound. In a world where so much virtual capability
represents real wealth, virtual threats emerged to plunder or
wreak it—or hide behind it—thus causing real damage. The
illusion that cybernetic damage does no real harm must be
discarded.
Societies where government did not have a monopoly on
force, and where institutions had to protect themselves have
been seen before—back before the end of the Thirty Years
War in 1648. In the centuries between the end of the Roman
John Thompson, a long-time Member of RCMI and a prolific contributor
to Sitrep, spent 30 years with the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies
(CISS) and the Mackenzie Institute. He is internationally recognized as an
expert security and terrorism analyst and is a frequent media commentator.
Empire and the rise of the modern state, violence was usually
perpetrated by non-state actors. Merchant cartels, insurgents,
bands of religious zealots, unemployed soldiers, pirates and
bandits, clans, mercenary contractors, independent city states
and troublesome nobles all vied to make life ‘colourful’.1 The
21st Century looks to be just as varied and colourful and all
of must look to our own personal defences.
An Intense World
The world is getting crowded; median population estimates from the UN for 2050 see 9.6 billion people on the
planet by that year.2 Even as the mean population is aging, the
sheer inertia of human population growth continues to add
numbers especially in Africa and the Middle East.
By 2014, according to the UN, 54 percent of humanity
was living in urban centres; the figure should reach 66 percent by 2050. Worse, the number of cities with populations of
over 10 million people is growing rapidly. In 1970 there were
three such cities, currently there are 28 and there should be
41 in another 15 years. In 1970 there were 141 cities with a
population of one to ten million people, now there are 460.3
So far as security threats go, densely packed crowded
cities have always presented a major problem from the stews
of the Subura of ancient Rome to the Lyari neighbourhood
of today’s Karachi. For conventional militaries, the old open
battlefields in deserts, grasslands and farms will become rare,
and fighting in urban areas is enormously expensive in terms
of resources, supplies and collateral damage. For police and
paramilitaries, densely crowded areas dominated by a hostile
entity—such as a street-gang, criminal cartel or political militia—have always been a particularly challenging situation.
Humanity is becoming more connected.4 Cell-phone
and internet coverage is rapidly growing in even some of
the poorest cities on Earth. By the end of 2015, there should
be some 3.2 billion internet users around the world—with
2 billion of them in the developing world. World-wide, the
number of cell-phone subscriptions has almost reached 7
billion. These technologies have given significant command
and control capabilities to various armed local parties that
made them almost as responsive and resilient as conventional
military communications architectures. Modern connectivity
also has made the likes of Somali militiamen, Jamaican Posses
and Pakistani Jihadis self-organizing in confrontations with
The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the
Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD
and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
3
formal armed forces.5
The incentive to violence is already becoming more
complex. We are already having difficulty feeding and providing fresh water for much of humanity, and the problem
is going to grow every year. Throughout history fear of food
shortages (rather than famine) has been a major source of
political turbulence: Keeping the Roman mob fed was the
major concern of the Emperors, and the global spike in food
prices did more to kick off the so-called Arab Spring than any
other single factor.6
When people are afraid, fear can be compounded by
the opportunistic. The methods for creating, inciting and
sustaining radical ideologies are widely understood. Political
organization, revolutionary theory and totalitarian propaganda techniques have outlived Lenin and Hitler, and become a
grab-bag of tactics which anybody with a cause can utilize
without adopting the political philosophies that 20th Century
totalitarians proposed.
Al Qaeda and its successors, particularly the Islamic
State, have successfully blended traditional religious/cultural
practices and modern communications with these ideologically-derived techniques to create a powerful engine for
recruiting and conditioning partisans to engage in violence.
Where they have led, others will follow. Currently ISIS/Daesh
can recruit and condition new supporters with a speed that
the Marxists and Anarchists of the 1970s could never have
matched.
Terrorism is inherently political, but politics themselves
have become far more confused. The proliferation of modern
communications technologies has meant that any conspiracy
buff or person given to cognitive dissonance has a means to
reach an audience, and a ready audience of people willing to
self-select their media choices to validate their own beliefs. The
Internet’s promise of a new age of freedom from propaganda
has given way to something else as humanity seems to be making a shift from the information age to the disinformation age.7
This trend has interacted with the post-modernist ‘intellectual’ climate that arose in the 1960s to further muddle
contemporary discourse; both help to create new tensions
along numerous fault-lines within our societies. All opinions
are supposedly valid—unless they contradict the assumed
values of the Neo-Totalitarianism referred to as ‘Political
Correctness’.
This new Neo-Totalitarianism is the result of the emergence of Post-Modernist thinking in the 1960s and 1970s
which allowed for other forms of destructive thought. There
was a systemic re-evaluation of the entire Western value
system and an attack on its history. The problem is that intellectual evolutions have real consequences—as two World
Wars and the evolution of Nazism, Marxism-Leninism and
other creeds clearly demonstrate.8 Westerners have seen an
attempt to pull up the roots of our own society and replace it
with any notion of the moment and the harm this has caused
is incalculable.
4
SITREP
In short with the onset of the Internet, it might be said
that never before have people known so little about so much,
or been prepared to be swayed so easily. The day of the demagogue is on us.
At the same time, Post-Modernism allowed for the
creation of political/managerial elites which self-alienated
themselves from older values, but which are entrenched
throughout the Western World and have become dangerously
self-destructive.9 A growing rejection—fuelled by anxiety
over illegal immigration, poor economic performances, Islamism, and the behaviours of many of today’s financial elites
—is gathering in Europe and the United States with Nativist
movements like the Tea Party, the English Defence League,
generation identitaire and others.
In defence of most of these Nativist movements, they
seek a return to more normative political practices and ethical
leadership within older constitutional frameworks. They have
so far stayed well clear of violence, but are not likely to long
tolerate violence or repression being visited on them.
To be truly dangerous, a demagogue needs guns, money
and political support.
Weaponry has become cheap and abundant, particularly
the ubiquitous AK-47 and the related set of infantry arms
manufactured since the USSR introduced them early in the
1950s. The AK-47 is so simple to use even a chimpanzee can
fire one (to say nothing of the African “soldiers” who gave
one to a chimp in a memorable you-tube clip). The rifle is
murderous at close range, cheap and at least 75 million have
been produced so far although the weapon is now being copied
by numerous private actors. Matched against efforts to curb
the international trade in small arms is a growing industry
for the illegal manufacture of firearms—where even a small
machine shop can easily turn out significant numbers of copies
of police and military designs with little effort.
While American’s political elites might be—tellingly
—focused on domestic gun control (and the US is truly a
heavily armed society), the entire world is awash in more
guns than ever before. The supply of high explosives might be
closely monitored, but any trained bomb-maker knows what
can be done with a few household chemicals in the correct
proportions.
Modern terrorist groups also have seamlessly fused with
organized crime for some decades. The biggest clandestine
money-makers are narcotics trafficking and people smuggling,
and it is hard to think of any major contemporary insurgent
movement that is not involved in either.10 The relationship
goes both ways; the Sicilian Mafia has turned to terrorism at
times to inhibit the Italian justice system and a Sri Lankan
underworld extortionist, Villupiliai Prabhakaran, created one
of the world’s most innovative terrorist groups—the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.11
For many years terrorist groups and insurgents used
narcotics trafficking directed towards their targeted society
to draw easy money from that society and simultaneously
contribute to the erosion of its social fabric. People smuggling
accomplishes the same end with the net benefit that the insurgent can also place his supporters inside the targeted society as
a charge on their rolls for social benefits, but also as agents for
his cause. 12 Terrorists drawing support from émigré communities is an old story, but the Tamil Tigers’ deliberate creation
of a diaspora so that they could feed on it was a new story in
the 1990s. This is also a strategy for the Muslim Brotherhood.
The internet has provided more ways of generating and
moving money than we ever imagined before, and the clandestine means of doing so are plentiful—particularly thanks
to the emergence of the Dark Web of sites and connections
normally hidden to the public. Some transactions are not all
that shadowy; one of the recently leaked files from the NSA
(another telling point about security these days) discusses
some use of on-line gaming environments by several terrorist
groups for training. They have also be known to use avatars
in games like Second Life to communicate and the virtual
economy of on-line games can actually be used to move real
money around with little notice from officialdom.
Of course, if guns are easy to acquire, offensive cybernetic abilities are even easier. Basic vandalism on web-sites
and denial of service attacks are being joined by increasingly
sophisticated attacks—often seemingly designed by nation
states. However, techniques can be deliberately farmed out
for use by non-state actors, giving the nation state whose
resources developed them almost complete deniability.13 The
other problem is that—for the moment—cybernetic warfare
is not seen as much more than vandalism writ large and not
directly lethal. Yet it still destroys invested time, money and
effort, and may in future directly destroy lives. We need to see
the malevolence in cybernetic warfare for what it is.
The techniques of activism have also become widely
known… so much so that the remnants of the old Radical Left
are still lurching around the political landscape, defined not
so much by their ideology as by their activity. Protest can be
undertaken for its own sake, largely to self-validate, while the
purpose or the expressed goals behind a protest movement
are often ill-formed or even largely unarticulated. The protestors who flock to international gatherings like a G-8/G-20
conference don’t need a purpose, they just need a venue.14
This places all manner of successful institutions at increased risk. A resource company need not be polluting to find
itself subjected to simultaneous cyber-attack, violent protest
and explosive vandalism; it is merely enough that the company might someday pollute. Appearance has become reality,
accusation is truth, and denial is confirmation. The question
might not be ‘Why are they doing this?’, so much as it might
be ‘Who is putting them up to this and how can I stop it?’
To compound matters, the world’s swelling population
and the ruthless efficiencies demanded of modern production
are leading to increased unemployment and under-employment. The old saying that the Devil finds work for idle hands
is a historical truism: There are enough examples from around
the world in recent decades of what can happen when the
young are educated and find that opportunities are few and
far between. Eric Hoffer pointed out that those who are most
likely to be attracted to a radical ideology are the ‘new poor’,
who have diminished expectations and someone to blame for
it.15 Prosperity, upwards social mobility and a middle class
lifestyle are incredible instruments of social stability, and we
endanger these at our peril.
Concurrently, unemployment and diminished expectations are placing increased stress on government welfare
systems that were designed as temporary aids to the disadvantaged; but it is hard to think of any Western nation that
doesn’t have some element of its population that is now on
permanent assistance. Meeting these obligations is a drain on
all other government functions, which makes the exercise of
a government’s authority become weaker rather than stronger. Likewise the tax load necessary to finance assistance is
a further detriment to prosperity and the middle class in a
vicious circle.
Strategic Concerns
Besides the problems of resources, population increase
and political instability, the 21st Century is going to be defined
by even more rapid technological development than was the
case for the last two hundred years. The 19th Century might
be most defined by the steam revolution, and the 20th by the
electronics revolution—at present the world is in the throes of
three related technological revolutions: Life sciences (bio-engineering and genetics); robotics, and nanotechnology.
Every major new technology has two sides to it —one
of threat and one of opportunity. Steam power revolutionized travel and trade, and made possible larger and faster
concentrations of armies than ever before—the warning of
Shiloh, Königgrätz and Sedan in 1860-1870 was that battles
like Verdun, the Somme and Ypres were possible in the future.
Computers originated as calculation machines for artillery and
missile ballistics and now have universal application.
It is impossible to predict how our current revolutions
might impact us, but we may have enormous new benefits in
medicine and food production, while making more fiendish
biological weapons than any that came before. Robotic weapons systems are already being designed, but so far everyone
is heeding the warning of the ‘Terminator’ movies and the
threshold for unregulated armed artificial intelligences has
not—yet—been crossed. Nanotechnology offers fresh miracles
in every aspect of our technology, but a cloud of self-replicating dissemblers turning a city full of humans into goo is
also possible.
We should remember, more urgently than ever, that
the new technology and all of its potentials is not necessarily
at the command of the nation state. The appearance of enhanced, genetically targeted smallpox or hummingbird-sized
hunter-killer robots might be at the behest of secretive private
actors.
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
5
As new technologies mature, the possibility of another
Dreadnought paradigm becomes possible—as new technologies are suddenly combined in revolutionary new manner the
balance of power could suddenly shift. We know full well from
the last 500 years that changes in that balance are punctuated and accented by wars; but this is also old-thinking about
conventional balances of forces. One hundred years hence
historians might remark on the 9/11 attack and similar events
as the debut of a new paradigm of power, and the inability of
the Nation State to be able to accurately bring its substantive
strength to bear against the ephemeral and fleeting strength of
an nebulous ideology matched to terrorists, hackers, activists
and gangsters.
War in the coming decades might not only be hard to
recognize, it might be unrecognizable. Could it be a competing
series of genetically enhanced plagues? Tiny groups of Special
Forces hired to utilize robotic weapons to hunt a few individuals in a feud over control of a major corporation? Might it be
the systemic murder of key scientists? Might it be more of the
pointless, amorphous sprawling sporadic violence we already
see at the heart of some major cities as gangs, terrorists and
political militias squabble without end? If a nuclear weapon
detonates in the heart of a major city, will we even know who
put it there, and why?
Could we see—for example—strawberry growers in
Mexico hire mercenaries to put a bio-toxin in Chilean product
to increase their own market share? Could an oil company
engage environmentalists to begin protests against a rival’s
assets (Canadians should bear in mind this may have already
happened to us)? Could a university’s key scientific breakthrough immediately put its research team in mortal jeopardy?
Just because the nuclear prohibition has lasted for 70
years, there is no reason to believe it will last another 70,
especially given the deal that was just worked up with the
Mullahs of Iran. The other great inhibitor on conflict in the
last seven decades was the technological, industrial, financial
and military might of the United States—now much decayed.
What the next 70 years will bring is anyone’s guess. One of
the world’s leading strategists, Colin S. Grey, warned that
predicting wars is a very inexact discipline, except that it is
always safe to predict that there will be wars.16
Again, what kinds of wars will these be—tit for tat singular nuclear exchanges? Will ballistic missile defence become
the new must-have defence technology? Will we see genocide
conducted in the usual age-old way of driving the loser out into
the wilderness to die of exposure and deprivation (which in a
world short on food and water may be more salient then ever)?
Will Hollywood’s nightmare vision of a wasteland populated
by autonomous deadly robots be realized?
At the other end of the spectrum, we are already catching
glimmers of hackers stealing information on key personnel,
systemic harassment and intimidation by activists and sabotage as non-state entities go after particular companies or
institutions. Yet these attacks might go after key economic
assets that are vital to an entire nation state, yet the act is
prompted by a non-state rival, private citizens or a terrorist
group. Constant warfare that strives not to appear unlike
warfare and yet that is its nature and intent.
There are other concerns, Samuel Huntingdon’s Clash of
Civilizations thesis was widely disputed when it came out as a
magazine article in 1995 and a book in 1996, but there has been
no better road-map to many of the emerging supra-cultural
conflicts and rivalries around the world.17 More or less at the
same time, Benjamin R. Barber’s Jihad vs McWorld gave a rival
idea that imperiled senses of identity in an increasingly globalized world was also producing conflict.18 One can wonder
about the irony of the extensive porn collection Osama Bin
Laden had on his computer when he was killed; was he more
fascinated or repulsed by it? Whose thesis—Huntingdon’s or
Barber’s—does this validate?
As the world gets more crowded and the impression
that resources are growing short intensifies, then these other themes may take on a sharper edge and a more pointed
urgency. Notwithstanding Gray’s warning, we can predict
that warfare can occur but our 19th and 20th Century ways of
thinking about it are going to be a handicap. Warfare is no
longer the exclusive business of the state, and our weak and
weary national governments are going to need all the help they
can muster… but don’t expect them to rally to your defence
against all the warriors who might be coming after you.
There is the old Chinese and Scottish curse “May you
live in interesting times”—and times are going to become
very interesting. 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Notes
1 see Martin van Crevald, The Transformation of War, New York The Free
Press, 1991.
2
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, Concise
Report on the World Population Situation 2014; United Nations, New York, 2014
3
Pg 17., Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division,
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision; United Nations New York,
2015
4
Figures from International Telecommunications Union; “ICT Facts and
Figures”; Geneva, May 2015
5
see David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban
Guerrilla, Oxford, 2013
6
‘Food prices and the Arab Spring: Let them eat baklava’; The Economist,
March 17th, 2012 and Steve Baragona; ‘2011 Food Prices Helped Trigger Arab
Spring’, Voice of America, December 13, 2011, 7:00 PM.
7
See David J. Rothkopf; ‘The Disinformation Age’, Foreign Policy, No.
114 (Spring 1999), pp 82-86. Among other articles on the web on the subject
are Mark Lee Hunter, ‘News credibility in an age of disinformation’ at gijn.org,
posted September 8 2014 and Clifford D. May, ‘The Disinformation Age’, posted
at www.nationalreview December 12, 2013.
8
The history of intellectual life can make for the driest reading, Norman
Cantor’s The American Century: Varieties of Culture in Modern Times (Harper
Collins, New York 1997) is especially useful here.
9
The first clear warning came from Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the
Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy (W.W. Norton, New York, 1996), now the
warnings are coming thick and fast from leading academics like Angelo Codevilla
??
6
SITREP
The Future of Racial Profiling In Canada: Bill C-51
and Hereditary Guilt
by Christopher Abbott
I
Malicious generalizations about Islam have become
the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign
culture in the West; what is said about the Muslim
mind, or character, or religion, or culture as a whole
cannot now be said in mainstream discussion about
Africans, Jews, or other Orientals, or Asians.1
n the aftermath of September 11th, Western nations have
concentrated national security efforts toward defeating
ideologically-driven violence. Though the War on Terror
tends to be viewed synonymously with military endeavors in
Middle Eastern countries, the fact remains that 9/11 has also
altered Canada’s domestic domain. Canada’s Anti-terrorism
Act, 2001, for example, created new terrorism offences, gave
law enforcement officers greater discretionary power, and
made the prevention of terrorism a top national security
priority. With greater discretion, a new directive, and the
implicit consent of many Canadians, policy makers and law
enforcement officials began “advocating for the racial profiling
of Arabs and Muslims as the means towards greater national
security.”2 Indeed, the practice of racial profiling – long condemned due to its inefficiency and adverse affects on targeted
communities – became a politically convenient panacea for
terrorism.
Proponents of racial profiling tend to emphasize the
efficient use of limited resources, the deterrence factor, and
the notion that ‘it just makes sense’. However, as I will show
below, the arguments in favor of racial profiling are unconvincing and widely refuted. Though the literature on racial
profiling tends to discredit the practice, the first argument of
Christopher Abbott is a Political Science specialist at the University of Toronto. Upon completion of his HBA in 2015, Christopher intends to pursue a
PhD in International Relations/International Law. Christopher also recently
completed a Junior Research Fellowship at the NATO Council of Canada.
Dark Waters cont’d
(see ‘America’s Ruling Class —and the Perils of Revolution’, the American Spectator, July-August 2010), Thomas Dye, Jeffrey Folks, Robert Reich and Thomas
Sowell.
10
One especially comprehensive survey on terrorist involvement in narcotics
is “A Global Overview Of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist And Other Extremist
Groups”, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Department of Defense May
2002.
11
See C.H.S. Jayewardene and H. Jayewardene; The Battle for Eelam (Ottawa, Crimcare, 1987) and Kirithie Abeyeskera; The Underworld of Sex, Crime and
Drugs; (Columbo, Lakehouse, 1991).
12
Elsie Gonzalez, ‘The Nexus between Human Trafficking and Terrorism/
Organized Crime: Combating Human Trafficking By Creating a Cooperative Law
Enforcement System’, Seaton Hall, May 1st, 2013; the author also did extensive
this paper concerns the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, also known
as Bill C-51, and the expansion of discretionary power given
to law enforcement officials and the government. In particular, I argue that the introduction of Bill C-51 will serve to
increase the discretionary power of law enforcement officers
by lowering the threshold for preventive arrest. Further, the
greater discretion given to law enforcement officials, coupled
with a ubiquitous preconception that terrorists are Muslim
and/or Arab, will increase the use of racial profiling.
For many Canadians, however, increasing the use of
racial profiling is not an issue. Indeed, some may argue that
a greater reliance on racial profiling in the name of national
security is justified. This brings me to the second argument
of this paper: Not only is racial profiling inefficient, it could
have disastrous effects at the state level, as well as societal and
individual level. At the state level, an increase in racial profiling
may undermine the Charter by stomping on equality rights as
outlined in section 15. At the societal level, racial profiling may
further stigmatize the Muslim and Arab communities, institutionalize racism, and degrade multiculturalism in Canada. At
the individual level, racial profiling and discrimination could
lead to serious physical, psychological, and financial harm.
What is Racial Profiling?
Though the term racial profiling is defined differently by
different organizations, it typically refers the substitution of
race, ethnicity, religion and/or national origin, or a combination of these, as a proxy for risk.3 In a more nuanced fashion,
the Ontario Human Rights Commission defines racial profiling as “any action undertaken for reasons of safety, security or
public protection that relies on stereotypes about race, color,
ethnicity, ancestry, religion, or place of origin rather than on
reasonable suspicion, to single out an individual for greater
scrutiny or different treatment.”4
work for 15 years on the Tamil Tiger apparatus in Canada.
13
‘Cyberwar: The Threat from the Internet’, The Economist, July 1st, 2010
14
The author has been amid many protests and riots over the years, his
field notes from the 2010 G-20 Conference in Toronto can be found at “Amidst
the G-20 Protests”, Sitrep, the Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute,
July-August 2010, Volume 70, Number 4.
15
Eric Hoffer, the True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, 1951, Harper, New York; Part 2. Pp 26-27
16
Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 2005
17
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order, Simon and Schuster, 1996
18
Benjamin R. Barber; Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism
are Reshaping the World; Ballentine, 1995
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
7
Locating examples of racial profiling in Canada prior to
9/11 is no difficult task. Besides the illegitimate use of racial profiling to stop and harass African-Canadian motorists (“DrivingWhile-Black”), the practice was also employed during World
War II. Indeed, after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, both the
Canadian and American government ordered the internment
of all persons of Japanese ancestry, subsequently seizing their
liberty based on their ethnic background.5
Though the use of racial profiling in the post-9/11 context has never been formally institutionalized within Canada,
there are several factors that lend credence to its existence.
First, the rhetoric used by politicians in the wake of September 11 may serve to legitimize and encourage racial profiling
among law enforcement officials. For example, Major-General
Lewis Mackenzie, security advisor to former Ontario Premier
Mike Harris, suggested “it would be criminally negligent if Air
Canada did not engage in racial profiling.”6 Second, a multitude of high profile cases suggest racial profiling exists within
Canada’s War on Terror. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen from
Syria with a degree at McGill University and the University
of Quebec, was arrested at JFK International Airport after
the RCMP provided inaccurate information about Arar to
American authorities. With no basis, the RCMP described
Mr. Arar as an “Islamic Extremist” with ties to Al Qaeda,
leading to his deportation to Syria, where he was tortured and
imprisoned for one year.7 While scholars and journalists have
expressed outrage about this incident and the consequences
of racial profiling, a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the
Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar has
also acknowledged that racial profiling may have played a role.
Finally, Reem Bahdi, a Professor at the University of Windsor’s
Faculty of Law, contends that “the lack of explicit endorsement
of racial profiling in the anti-terrorism legislation does not
mean that racial profiling does not take place in Canada.”8 In
fact, Bahdi argues, “the silence of the legislature regarding the
practice, at best, fails to effectively check racial profiling and,
at worst, creates opportunities for racial profiling.”9
Does it Work?
Proponents of racial profiling tend to rely on three arguments: the efficient use of limited resources, the deterrence
factor, and the notion that ‘it just makes sense’.10 Regarding
the efficient use of limited resources, proponents often rely
on (skewed) statistics to show that certain segments of the
population commit the said crime disproportionately more
than other segments of the population. Accordingly, it would
be efficient to focus limited money and manpower on this
segment. Applied to the War on Terror, this argument has led
law enforcement to focus on Muslims and persons of Middle
Eastern appearance or origin. Nevertheless, Daniel Moeckli
notices two major flaws in this argument. First is the issue of
“over-broadness”; that is, “the overwhelming majority of those
who are Muslim have, of course nothing to do with terrorism.”11 By focusing resources on Muslim and Arab persons, a
8
SITREP
large percentage of these resources will be wasted on Muslims
and Arabs who have no affiliation with terrorism. Second is
the issue of “under-inclusion”; that is, “profiles based on race,
ethnicity, national origin and religion are also under-inclusive
in that they will lead law enforcement agents to miss a range
of potential terrorists who do not fit the profile.”12 The recent
massacre at a Church in Charleston, South Carolina illustrates
how focusing solely on Islamic extremism led, in part, to law
enforcement agents missing other terrorists. Dylann Roof,
a white male who frequently wore flags from apartheid-era
South Africa and Rhodesia, was arrested in June 2015 after
shooting and killing nine African-Americans, in order to
incite a ‘race war’.13 Though Roof frequently posted on white
supremacist websites and was outwardly racist, a Caucasian
teenager from South Carolina does not fit the profile designed
to catch terrorists.
The second argument used by proponents of racial profiling is that it acts as a deterrent. As the argument goes, simply
knowing that you are subject to greater scrutiny and surveillance will deter you from participating in terrorist activities.
Though a lack of data makes supporting this claim as difficult
as refuting it, there are two flaws underlying this argument.
The first flaw concerns the type of criminals law enforcement
officials are trying to deter. While deterrence may work when
the potential criminal fears capture and prosecution, “such
concerns are less relevant to someone willing or eager to die
for their cause.”14 Thus, truly committed terrorists, such as
those who carried out the 9/11 attacks, may not be deterred.
The second issue with this argument is that simply shifting
resources to deter one segment of the population necessitates shifting resources away from other segments. Indeed,
nonprofiled groups will detect lower costs of offending, and
consequently commit more crimes.15
The third and most often cited argument is that ‘it just
makes sense’. For instance, Sharon Reddick argues that airport
security agents should be targeting Arabs and Muslims because “the majority of terrorists come from Arab countries, are
between the ages of seventeen and forty, and they are Muslim
extremists.”16 Thus, for Reddick and other proponents, the 9/11
attacks could have been avoided if protection against terrorism was put before “good manners and respect for everyone.”
17
One over-arching counter-argument stands in the face of
Reddick’s opinion; namely, profile evasion. As Alexander
notes, “the use of racial profiling in terrorism assumes that
terrorists come primarily in certain shapes and sizes.”18 Thus,
be studying and knowing what law enforcement officials are
looking for, terrorists “carefully alter or tailor their behavior/
appearance,” along with their documents, to avoid suspicion.19
Bill C-51: An Expansion of Discretion and The Use of
Racial Profiling
Made possible due to escalating fears surrounding
foreign terrorists organizations—namely, the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—and lone-wolf attacks on domestic
soil—namely the shootings on Parliament Hill in October
2014—the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, was loosely designed
to give the Canadian security establishment greater means
to defeat terrorism. Fraught with controversy, Bill C-51 has
been heavily criticized for a number of reasons, not the least
of which is the expansion preventive arrest powers.
Though the Anti-terrorism Act, 2001, contains provisions
for preventive arrest, the new legislation “will further lower
the threshold of preventive arrest and detention, increasing
the risk that entirely innocent people will be swept up on
mere suspicion.”20 Previously, law enforcement agencies were
permitted to arrest someone if they suspected that a terrorist
attack will be carried out. Moreover, an arrest could be made
if that arrest was necessary to prevent the carrying out of a
terrorist activity.21 However, under Bill C-51, “will be carried
out” has been substituted with “may be carried out,” (emphasis added) while “necessary to prevent” terrorist activity has
been substituted with “likely to prevent” terrorist activity.22 As
Roach and Forcese observe, “the recurring use of ‘may’ in Bill
C-51 seems designed to require only the demonstration of a
possibility rather than a probability of the terrorism offense
occurring.”
Intuitively, a lower threshold could potentially pave
the way for increased racial profiling. This is largely due to
the preconceptions that many people hold about Muslims,
Arabs, and the identity of terrorists. In a 2003 poll, 48 per
cent of Canadians approved of racially profiling Muslims and
Arabs, despite the fact that their civil liberties would be called
into question.23 Further, according to a poll conducted by
Angus Reid in 2013, Canadians’ feelings toward Muslims are
lower than any other religious group. In fact, while all other
religions were regarded unfavorably by less than 30 per cent
of Canadians, 54 per cent of Canadians held an unfavorable
view of Islam.24 The common stereotype associating Arabs
and Muslims to terrorism is ultimately a result of the way in
which the mass media framed 9/11 and the subsequent War
on Terror. Framing theory emphasizes the ability of the media
to “delineate other people’s reality, highlighting one interpretation while de-emphasizing a less favored one.”25 Further, by
applying certain frames, the media, implicitly or explicitly,
identifies the main causes and responsible agents.26 One commonly cited example of how the media frames terrorism was
a cartoon published by The Globe and Mail on Father’s Day in
2003. In the cartoon, “an Arab man with stereotypical features
gleefully receives a belt of explosives from his young son.”27
Given the way in which the media associates Muslim and
Arabs with terrorism, it is no wonder that law enforcement
officials, as humans, have commonly resorted to this tactic.
However, Bill C-51 and the expansion of discretionary power
will likely lead to an unprecedented level of unchecked racial
profiling. As Reem Bahdi eloquently notes, “When decision
makers operate against a backdrop of ingrained, but often
unconscious stereotypes, they are likely to filter and interpret
facts or events through the lens of stereotypes rather than by
making an individual and rational assessment based on the
particular facts of a given case.”
The Cost and Consequences of Racial Profiling
As discussed above, there is no hard evidence that
racial profiling ‘works’ as intended. However, there is plenty
of evidence to support the claim that racial profiling can be
damaging to the Canadian state, to Muslim and Arab communities, and to Muslim and Arab individuals.
To begin with, greater discretionary power leaves
law enforcement officials with the ability to arrest Muslim
and Arab individuals due to their religion, ethnicity and/
or country of origin. Indeed, relying on racial profiles is at
odds with the Canadian Charter, particularly section 15(1):
“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, color,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”28 At first
glance, it is evident that the use of racial profiling infringes on
the principle of non-discrimination. However, under section
1 of the Charter, colloquially referred to as the reasonable
limits clause, the government may argue that the discretion
given to law enforcement officers to prevent terrorist attacks
is “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”29
Employing the Oakes test30, the government would have no
problem proving that the objective to prevent future terrorist
attacks is both substantial and pressing. However, defending
the proportionality of racial profiling may prove to be more
difficult. To be sure, even if the government could prove that
racial profiling is rationally connected to preventing terrorism,
there is no question that this practice will irreparably damage
the right of non-discrimination. Furthermore, as was shown
above, there is no evidence that racial profiling ‘works’, and
thus is cannot be justified as a proportional measure. Nevertheless, the fact that Bill C-51 has expanded discretionary
power will likely lead to greater reliance on racially profiling
Muslims and Arabs. Moreover, I argue that the complete disregard for Charter rights, ‘in the name of national security’,
will increasingly undermine the supremacy of the Charter in
particular, and of the rule of law in general.
Another consequence arising from racial profiling is the
stigmatization of Muslims and Arabs, the institutionalization
of racism, and the degradation of a multicultural society. Those
in favor of racial profiling may believe that innocent members
of targeted communities have nothing to fear, as they will be
exonerated upon investigation. However, this type of thinking may serve to reinforce the stigma placed on Arabs and
Muslims. For example, if a law enforcement officer arrests an
innocent Muslim individual based on a racial preconception,
a White individual who witnesses this arrest will likely never
know that this Muslim individual was innocent. Instead, seeing this Muslim individual arrested will increase the likelihood
that this White individual will think of Muslims as terrorists.
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
9
The consequence is a positive feedback loop that will leave
Canadian citizens and law enforcement officials comfortable
with these prejudices, and thus “determinations of risk [will]
become even more inextricably linked with stereotypes about
Arabs and Muslims so that the Arabness and Muslimness
itself becomes a substitute for risk.”31 By exposing a segment
of the population to unwarranted racism and a great degree
of vulnerability, the multicultural identity of Canada is at risk.
Infringing upon section 15 rights and leaving Muslims
and Arabs vulnerable to racism ultimately culminates at the
individual level. Indeed, individuals wrongly identified as
terrorists suffer irrevocable harm. For example, since the
enactment of the Anti-terrorist Act, 2001, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) has been tasked
with providing a list of individuals or organizations suspected
of engaging in terrorist activities to financial institutions.32
Encouraging the blatant use of racial profiling, financial institutions are advised to “regard with suspicion not only the
people whose names are actually on the list, but also anyone
whose name resembles the name of a listed person.”33 Of course,
the majority of individuals with the last name Hussein are not
terrorists. Nevertheless, Liban Hussein, a Somali immigrant
and a resident of Ottawa, was added to Canada’s list of terrorist
entities and subsequently had his financial account frozen.
Hussein was eventually cleared of any wrongdoing, but lost
his house and business in the process.34
The psychological impacts stemming from prejudice
and racism loom large. According to Robert Carter, “Racial
discrimination can cause people to suffer psychological distress such as clinical depression, anxiety disorders, PTSD, or
personality disorders.”35 However, the effect of racial discrimination does not stop at the deterioration of mental health;
studies show that racial discrimination affects mental health,
which contributes to lower economic, social, and political
status.36 In other words, racial profiling and its negative externalities can impoverish, socially exclude, and politically
disempower targeted groups.
Conclusion
As was illustrated above, the usefulness of racial profiling, in terms of efficiency and deterrence, is largely baseless.
Beyond this paper, the scholarly consensus is that racial profiling is not an effective tool for combating crime. Moreover,
the potential consequences of racial profiling can be grave; it
may undermine the Charter, act to further stigmatize Muslim
and Arab communities, and cause an immense amount of
psychological, physical, and financial misery.
Nevertheless, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, will only
serve to increase the use of racial profiling by giving law enforcement officers greater autonomy over preventive arrests.
However, law enforcement officials should not be singled
out and shamed for these preconceptions. Due to the way
the media has framed 9/11 and the War on Terror, a majority
of Canadians associate terrorism with Muslims and Arabs.
10
SITREP
Due to the expansion of discretionary power, however, racial
profiling may only decline in concert with public opinion and
political support. Whereas profiling that affects a majority
of Canadians would suffer from political pressure, profiling
that targets marginal groups, such as Muslim and Arab communities, will remain politically convenient until the public
condemns this brutal practice. As Justice Robert Jackson
historically argued, “guilt is personal and not inheritable.”37
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Authorities
Alexander, Daktari A. “Should Profiling be used to Prevent Terrorism?” in Criminologists on Terrorism and homeland security, edited by Brian Frost, Jack Greene
and James Lynch, 300-322. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, section 17.
Bah, Abu. “Racial Profiling and the War on Terror: Changing Trends and Perspectives.” Ethnic Studies Review 29.1 (2006): 76-100.
Bahdi, Reem. “No Exit – Racial Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism.”
Osgood Hall Law Journal 41.2/3 (2003): 293-317.
Bahdi, Reem, Olanyi Parsons and Tom Sandborn. “Racial Profiling: B.C. Civil
Liberties Association Position Paper.” Racial Profiling: A Special BCCLA Report
on Racial Profiling in Canada, edited by Richard Marcuse, 31-54. 2010.
Carter, Robert. “Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury.” The Counseling
Psychologist 35.1 (2007): 13-105.
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1 and s. 15(1).
Choudhry, Sujit. “Protecting Equality in the Face of Terror: Ethnic and Racial
Profiling and s.15 of the Charter.” In The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s
anti-terrorism Bill, edited by Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach,
367-381. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar. “Report of Events Relating to Maher Arar.” Her Majesty the Queen in
Right of Canada, 2010.
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c C-46, section 83.2(2).
Geddes, John. “Canadian anti-Muslim sentiment is rising, disturbing new poll
reveals.” Maclean’s, October 3, 2013. Accessed August 15, 2015. Http://www.
macleans.ca/politics/land-of-intolerance/.
Haggerty, Kevin and Amber Gazso. “Seeing Beyond the Ruins: Surveillance as a
Response to Terrorist Threats.” The Canadian Journal of Sociology 30.2 (2005):
169-187.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Moeckli, Daniel. “Terrorist Profiling and the Importance of a Proactive Approach
to Human Rights Protection.” Racial Profiling: A Special BCCLA Report on Racial
Profiling in Canada, edited by Richard Marcuse, 99-122. 2010.
Ontario Human Rights Commission. “Paying the price: The human cost of racial
profiling.” Accessed August 15, 2015. Http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/paying-price-human-cost-racial-profiling/what-racial-profiling.
Papacharissi, Zizi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira. “News Frames Terrorism: A
Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in US and UK
Newspapers.” Press and Politics 3.1 (2008): 52-74.
Reddick, Sharon. “Point: The Case for Profiling.” International Social Science
Review 79.3/4 (2004): 154-156.
Robles, Frances, Jason Horowitz and Shaila Dewan. “Dylann Roof, Suspect in
Charleston Shooting, Flew the Flags of White Power.” The New York Times, June
18, 2015. Accessed August 16, 2015. Http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/us/
on-facebook-dylann-roof-charleston-suspect-wears-symbols-of-white-supremacy.
html.
Ruby, Clayton and Nader Hasan. “Canada’s ‘Anti Terrorism’ Bill C-51: A Legal
Primer, Expands the Powers of Canada’s Spy Agency, Allows Arrest on Mere
Suspicion.” Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, February 7, 2015. Accessed
August 15, 2015. Http://www.globalresearch.ca/canadas-antiterrorism-bill-c-51-alegal-primer-expands-the-powers-of-canadas-spy-agency-allows-arrest-on-meresuspicion/5436727.
Said, Edward. Covering Islam. New York, NY: Vintage, 1997.
Continued on page 16
The Case against Regularizing Canada’s Irregulars
by Paul Pryce
D
uring the recent 2015 federal election campaign in
Canada, the second longest to date in the 148 years
since Confederation, national defence issues did not
feature prominently. Although there some clashes among the
party leaders about Operation Impact, the Canadian contribution to the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS), military matters like the Royal Canadian Navy’s long
wait for new vessels or the replacement of Canada’s aging CF18 Hornet fighter jets remained off the agenda. However, an
interesting proposal was made at a Conservative Party campaign event in Regina on 26 September 2015, which deserves
further attention in the aftermath of the election.
Jason Kenney, who most recently served as Canada’s
Minister of National Defence, announced that the Conservatives, if re-elected, would expand the ranks of the Canadian
Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) by
35% over the next seven years, bringing the total strength to
almost 2,600 personnel by 2022.1 Setting the stage for such
an expanded recruitment of Special Forces personnel would
cost $75 million over the next four years and retention beyond
that period would cost an estimated $50 million each year,
according to the proposal.
CANSOFCOM is currently comprised of five main units.
Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) are well known, while Canadians may
be less familiar with 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (427 SOAS) or the Canadian Joint Incident Response
Unit (CJIRU), which is based in Kingston and Trenton. The
recruitment of an additional 665 soldiers to CANSOFCOM
would have likely expanded the ranks of these five existing
units rather than serving as the catalyst for the establishment
of a sixth. Had the proposed expansion of CANSOFCOM
been tied to the creation of a Canadian Marine Commando
Regiment (MRC), this would have been an opportunity for
the Conservative government to deliver on a promise laid
down in the Canada First Defence Strategy in 2006. It would
have also closed a capability gap for the Canadian Armed
Forces (CAF). Specifically, Canada lacks marine infantry and
so responsibility for boarding actions has generally fallen to
volunteers from Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and Canadian
Coast Guard (CCG) crews, while infantry units from the
Canadian Army have trained on beach assaults.
However, the Kenney announcement did not include
a commitment to establish an MCR that could take up the
Paul Pryce is a Research Analyst at the NATO Association of Canada
(formerly the Atlantic Council of Canada) where he is part of the Canadian
Forces Program. He is also Political Advisor to the Consul General of Japan
in Calgary. This is his third contribution to SITREP, the first being in Issue
#1, Jan-Feb 2014, “Pursuing Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea”, the second
being in Issue #1, Jan-Feb 2015, “Operation Barkhane: Is France Ready for
Fourth-Generation Warfare?”
responsibility for boarding actions, beach assaults, and other
related tasks. As such, it is likely the additional personnel was
intended for JTF-2, CSOR, and CANSOFCOM support for
these two units. This is concerning as it seems to suggest that
the American military establishment’s enthusiasm for the use
of Special Forces may have also found favour among some
Canadian policymakers as well. This notion of Special Forces
as the ‘weapon of first resort’ for the United States military is
perhaps most clearly reflected in the February 2012 statement
by Admiral William H. McRaven, at the time commanding
officer of the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC),
that he wished to see 12,000 Special Forces personnel deployed
permanently in hot spots around the world.2 A year later, now
retired US Admiral James Stavridis, wrote in his final days as
Supreme Allied Commander Europe of his vision for a new
strategic triad – replacing the conventional Army, Navy, and
Air Force with Special Forces, hackers, and drones.3
Such proposals are problematic because they ignore
the distinction between regular and irregular troops. Regular troops, which comprise the vast majority of personnel
available to CAF and other militaries, can be used in a variety
of roles both on and off the battlefield. In particular, CAF
personnel are well-trained and well-equipped to fulfil any
mission which might arise in the coming years, whether it be a
state-building exercise, counter-insurgency operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, or some combination thereof.
Although the term ‘adaptive dispersed operations’ (ADO) is
currently in vogue among Canadian defence planners, CAF
is prepared to fight the so-called ‘Three Block War’. A concept developed by US Marine Corps General Charles Krulak
in the 1990s and popularized in Canada by retired General
Rick Hillier during his service as Chief of Defence Staff. The
Three Block War envisions military personnel engaging not
only in combat operations and counter-terrorism in the field
but also civil-military relations and humanitarian assistance.4
This oftentimes requires the commitment of robust numbers
of regular troops, such as was seen during the US’ 2007 troop
surge in Iraq.5
Special Forces, on the other hand, are irregular troops
best suited to asymmetric warfare. JTF-2 and CSOR are not
simply highly trained infantry—a kind of PPCLI Plus. Avoiding large-scale combat, Special Forces function best as small,
nimble teams that can pursue hit-and-run engagements and
are not well-suited to the humanitarian or civil-military tasks
expected of regular troops fighting the Three Block War. How
Special Forces fit into ADO, meanwhile, is not clear as the
details of this doctrine are worked out. CANSOFCOM certainly has a vital role to play in preserving national security
and promoting Canadian interests, but it seems inconsistent
Continued on page 15
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
11
The Royal Canadian Dental Corps: A Century of Service
by BGen (ret’d) Victor J. Lanctis MB, SBStJ, CD, BA, DDS, MFICD, FADI, FPFA
J
ust a few short months ago, the Royal Canadian Dental
Corps marked its centennial with an extensive program
of activities and events taking place across the country
and including, among other noteworthy undertakings, an impressive Royal Banner presentation and retrospective exhibit
at the Canadian War Museum, a dental Guard of Honor and
memorial ceremony at the National Cenotaph, a magnificent
gala at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa, and the publication of a
splendid commemorative volume highlighting major happenings and achievements over the first 100 years of its history.
The origins of Canada’s Dental Corps can be traced back
to the Boer War in South Africa from 1899 to 1902, where
two civilian dentists, Dr.
David Baird of Ottawa
and Dr. Eugene Lemieux
of Montreal, volunteered
their services in response
to alarming reports of
poor oral health among
the troops that seriously
undermined recruitment
efforts and caused significant problems in the
field. Word of that sad situation soon attracted the
attention of leaders of the
newly established Canadian Dental Association
(CDA) who immediately
lobbied authorities for a
more formal dental presence within the Canadian
military. As a result, on 1
July 1904, a general order
was issued, creating what
was essentially a militia
contingent of 18 dental
surgeons assigned to the
Army Medical Corps.
When WWI was declared in August 1914, it was realized
that a more robust dental capability was needed to deal with
increasing oral health issues affecting the build-up of the
Canadian Expeditionary Force Overseas. On 13 May 1915,
BGen (ret’d) Victor J. Lanctis MB, SBStJ, CD, BA, DDS, MFICD, FADI,
FPFA is a former Director General of the Canadian Forces Dental Services as
well as a Past President of the International College of Dentists. He is currently
serving as Colonel Commandant of the Royal Canadian Dental Corps. BGen
(ret’d) Lanctis has been a non-resident member of RCMI for well over two
decades and has made his home in Ottawa since retiring from the CAF in 1996.
12
SITREP
thanks again to repeated and determined interventions by the
CDA, a full-fledged Canadian Army Dental Corps (CADC)
was formally authorized and established as a separate corps
within the Canadian Army. The first military dental clinic in
the British Empire was opened at the Exhibition Grounds in
Toronto the following month!
Upon demobilization, units of the CADC were disbanded and, until 1939, the Dental Corps became little more than
a few dental officers dispersed within units of the Medical
Corps. With the dark clouds of WWII looming on the horizon, the CDA again pressed the Federal Government of the
day into accepting a new proposal designed to replace the
CADC with an autonomous organization to be renamed the
Canadian Dental Corps (CDC), to more accurately reflect
its tri-service obligations. The CDC indeed provided dental
services throughout Canada in support of recruitment and
training, to the United Kingdom for RCAF and Army training
camps, to North Africa, Sicily and Italy, as well as in support
the Normandy invasion and across northwest Europe. With
the introduction of the Mobile Dental Van (quite ironically,
a welcome respite from harsh field conditions for many a
combat-weary soldier!), Dental Corps personnel were able
to provide comprehensive dental treatment closer to the
front lines than any other nation. The use of dental records
to identify war casualties and confirm the identity of fraudulent enrollees and deserters became an additional role for
the Dental Corps, which was also one of the first professional
military bodies to employ women, as dental assistants, when
the Canadian Women’s Army Corps was formed in 1941. A
news story appearing in the Armed Forces magazine Maple
Leaf at the time described it best:
“Canada’s Dental Corps is second to none in any army in
the world in personnel, equipment and operation. These professional men and their assistants have been through the mill
from Caen, Vaucelles, Falaise and the long run across France,
Belgium into Holland and finally the Nijmegen salient. They
take the latest in dental attention to the fighting men and know
what it’s like to work under shell and mortar fire. Throughout
the Canadian push in Europe, they’ve handled the Canucks,
English, Yanks, Czechs, Dutch, Belgians, Poles, civilians and
many others. They’ve made and repaired enough false teeth to
keep a nation chewing and kept many a good set fit for hardtack!
They handle battle casualties of a dental nature either on the
spot or through medical channels, for every operator is familiar
with the surgical method of dealing with facial injuries”.
In January 1947, the Canadian Dental Corps was granted
a Royal Warrant by His Majesty King George VI in recognition
of its exceptional wartime service and thus became the Royal
Canadian Dental Corps (RCDC).
Active participation in the Korean War (1950–1957)
further cemented the RCDC’s well-deserved reputation as
a professional organization second to none, and notable
contributions during the Cold War in Europe (1951-1993)
as well as in support of United Nations Forces in the Middle
pated in forensic operations with RCMP or NATO partners
to identify casualties of aviation disasters such as the SwissAir and FirstAir crashes, of earthquake victims in Haiti and
of other similar tragedies where medical and dental teams
worked together to complete autopsies and post-mortem
examinations and accurately
chart human remains. The recent identification of Private
Albert Laubenstein, a WWII
soldier who was killed during
the Battle of Kapelsche Veer
in the Netherlands in 1945, is
another tangible example of
Dental Corps commitment
in this very specialized field.
Maintaining close ties
with the profession at large,
the RCDC has been acknowledged as a key contributor
in all aspects of organized
dentistry on the local, provincial, national and international levels, where its highly trained and experienced
personnel continue to play
dominant roles. Today, with
its coveted royal designation
fully restored in recognition
of noteworthy contributions
to operational support and
reconstruction efforts in Somalia, Bosnia, the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia and
most notably Afghanistan
where it assumed an import— VICTOR J. LANCTIS COLLEC TION ant mentoring and continuWorld War Two: Dental treatment in the field
ing education role and, along
with the CDA, assisted in
East and in Cyprus during the period of 1956 to 1994 fully establishing an Afghan dental association, the RCDC continconsolidated that status.
ues to garner accolades and commendations from the highest
In addition to fulfilling its primary clinical treatment quarters, both domestically and internationally, as one of the
and rehabilitation mission for CAF members at home and most competent and respected military dental organizations
abroad, the Dental Corps (known as the Canadian Forces in the world.
Dental Services (CFDS) in 1969, as a result of unification)
A relatively small but mighty battle-hardened and operhas been recognized for its active part in a wide spectrum of ationally-focused organization made up of much more than
national assistance roles, including support during natural your average ‘drillers and fillers’, the Royal Canadian Dental
disasters (floods, forest fires, ice storms, etc.), aid to civil power Corps is capable and ready to resolutely march forward into
operations such as the Oka Crisis, humanitarian and outreach the next challenging century with well-deserved pride and
activities on behalf of refugees and indigenous people, and in well-tested confidence.
other situations where timely and effective help was critically
‘Sanitas in Ore’ 
needed. More recently, it has been praised within the international medico-legal community for its forensic identification
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
capabilities, as a core element of the Canadian Forces Forensic
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
Odontology Response Team (CF FORT), which has particior its members.
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
13
Response to Terrorism: A Vicious Cycle?
by Tannuva Akbar
(Editor’s comment—This article was submitted before
the latest attacks: Paris, November 14th, Ankara, Sinai and the
downing of the Russian airliner all claimed by IS. It answers her
rhetorical question of ‘where’s the next attack?’)
A
fter the incidents in Ottawa, Sydney and Paris, one
cannot help but think, where’s the next attack? The
threat of terrorism has spread like an epidemic and
the brutal truth is there’s no safe place on earth anymore. All
these sporadic events have raised so many questions in general
civilians’ minds. One question that I have been struggling with
is has the approach of the West to countering terrorism caused
an increase in terrorism? Do we truly understand why these
attacks are occurring in developed and very safe and secure
Western cities? After 9/11 it was hoped that we would never
experience future catastrophic
terrorist attacks. The governments around the world have
been very active in deterring
any future attacks. But I want
to go back to some underlying
questions before I start analyzing policy recommendations.
Are we doing anything wrong
in responding to these attacks?
How agile and prepared are
we to deal with new emerging
threats such as ISIS and most
importantly, are there any faults and incongruences about
the Western responses to fight these new threats? What are
the gaps between our responses and policy implications? I
think these are important questions to ask before we begin
analysis on homegrown terrorism, radicalization or ISIS for
that matter.
To keep the scope very focused, let me touch on a few
examples to demonstrate how the West’s anti- terrorism efforts
may not bring the best result because of how we have reacted
to certain measures. First, the Patriotic Europeans Against
the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) movement in Germany—an organization dedicated to restricting immigration. Is
it a productive or counter-productive to what we are trying to
achieve? “No sharia law in Europe!”—as banners like this fly
freely at a PEGIDA march in Dresden, Germany, one cannot
help but wonder whether these organizations are crossing the
line between patriotism, nationalism and anti-secularism?
Tannuva Akbar is a recent graduate and earned her Masters of Art degree
from the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. Her
interests are focused on counter terrorism, deradicalization and financial
intelligence. Currently she is working as a Compliance Analyst at the AML/
ATF business unit for Manulife Financial.
14
SITREP
What are the consequences of anti- immigration and anti-Islamism sentiment? Although the German leaders condemn
the xenophobia associated with the PEGIDA movement, the
growing support for it is dangerous and can be fuelling the
tension even further. Xenophobia fuels the Neo-Nazi Aryan
movement that is still is present in Germany. Movements such
as PEGIDA and anti-immigration laws in Europe may have
long –term impacts on societies and the policy makers and
leaders of the world needs to assess the their policy implication
more carefully.
Another example of how we act might not be received
in good faith is the event in Boko Haram that took place right
after the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. Many journalists and media had alluded to the fact that Paris received
overwhelming attention from the West where in the same
week 2000 people were killed
by the terrorist organization—
Boko Haram. The asymmetric
treatment by the West towards
the Boko Haram was noticed
worldwide. The West was accused by the media of having
ignored the attack in Nigeria
and showed stronger support
for #jesuisCharlie. Perhaps
it is time for the leaders to
—IRISH MIRROR understand that every action
and inaction leads to a consequence and every terrorist attacks deserve the same degree
of attention and criticism.
Another way our image in the world has diminished is by
lacking our assistance in the humanitarian efforts. For example, the efforts made by the U.S. and Europe to accommodate
the Syrian refugee influx has been very minimal in comparison
with those made by Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The Obama
administration has decided to take action very strategically
in this crisis given the complexities driven from the Assad
regime and the US led airstrikes to destroy ISIS. Nevertheless,
the asymmetric attention and treatment to this refugee crisis
may trigger growing tensions and anger towards the West.
Being the largest resettlement program in the world, the U.S.
has settled only 121 Syrians since 2011.1 Similarly, with few
exceptions, most EU members including UK, France, Italy,
Spain, and Poland are mostly concerned with shutting their
borders than accepting Syrian refugees. We want to isolate
ourselves from the terrorist threats by closing our borders
and not helping refugees but would that really help? Can we
still be saved from homegrown terrorism?
With respect to homegrown terrorism, former Prime
Minister Harper and Defence Minister Jason Kenney have
said, homegrown terrorism in Canada is a reality now. After
the deadly attack on Canadian soil on Warrant Officer Patrice
Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo, it is fair to assume that
Canada is not immune to terrorist threats that have been
spreading around the globe. The nature and dynamics of
terrorism has shifted with the rise of technology and social
media and we need understand and adjust to these threats
accordingly. According to former CSIS agent Michel Juneau-Katsuya, the targets are now normal people and terrorist
groups such as ISIS are recruiting people from the privacy of
the nation’s homes. Therefore, our strategy needs to be prioritized to increase greater awareness about radicalization,
foreign fighters, psychology and internet etc. among general
public to fight homegrown terrorism. One great examples
of such effort is the Kanishka Project-which was created in
2011 to “invest in research on pressing questions for Canada
on terrorism and counter-terrorism, such as preventing and
countering violent extremism.”2 At the same time, the same
rule applies to Canada, the way we portray ourselves and the
way we have dealt with terrorist attacks. Recently, there has
been widespread controversy about the Bill C-51 and as the
debate unfolds we can see there are pros and cons for the bill.3
The notion of fighting terrorism while protecting individual
freedom and civil liberty has been exposed to widespread criticism.4 It might be wise to focus on the roots of the problems
than trying to handle it on the surface level. Emphasis on deradicalization, education and mental health on a community
level can contribute effectively to understand the core of the
problem. As the world-renowned political scientist and activist
Noam Chomsky argued “while mass surveillance has been
ineffective in stopping terrorism, programs like the global
U.S. drone war have helped spread it to areas all around the
world.”5 With regards to terrorist threats in Canada, we can
definitely take lessons from this statement.
It is very difficult to find a ‘one size fits all’ solution for
these increasing terrorist threats in today’s world. The matter
in which the West has been executing the anti-terrorist campaign may aggravate the situation even more. That is not to say
that we should not take harsher measures to deter any terrorist
organizations but perhaps minimize risk by being increasingly
sensitive to how we are being viewed in the greater world. 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Notes
1
Eleanor Acer, “Human Rights First” The Guardian, Last accessed April 2,
2014. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/02/america-syria-refugee-resettlement-do-better-now
2
“Kanishka Project” Public Safety Canada, last modified February 10, 2015.
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/r-nd-flght-182/knshk/
index-eng.aspx
3
“With support from Liberals, Conservatives pass controversial anti-terror bill” CTV News, last modified May 6, 2015. http://www.ctvnews.ca/
politics/with-support-from-liberals-conservatives-pass-controversial-anti-ter-
ror-bill-1.2362432
4
“Bill C-51 poses a serious threat to free expression in Canada” Canadian
Journalists For Free Expression, Last modified April 14, 2015. https://cjfe.org/blog/
bill-c-51-serious-threat-free-expression-canada
5
“Chomsky on Snowden & Why NSA Surveillance Doesn’t Stop Terror
While the U.S. Drone War Creates It” Democracy Now, last modified 3 March,
2015. http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/3/chomsky_on_snowden_why_nsa_
surveillance.
Irregulars: cont’d from page 11
with Canada’s recent missions abroad, such as the significant
state-building efforts in Afghanistan, to pursue a serious expansion in Special Forces units.
Alternatively, the proposal to expand CANSOFCOM
may have been based not only on an understanding of the
regular/irregular troop distinction but also a willful rejection
of it. Like Adm Stavridis’ ‘new strategic triad’, this is problematic because it reflects a fundamental shift in American
foreign policy toward deniable operations and promotion of
what could be styled ‘shadow war’. For example, when a wave
of cyber-attacks paralyzed the Estonian economy in 2007,
accusations were initially levelled against the Russian Federation. Since then, there remains ample debate as to whether the
denial-of-service attacks were perpetrated by domestic actors,
non-state actors in Russia, the Russian government itself, or
some other entity entirely.6 The advancement of American or
Canadian foreign policy objectives via irregulars – whether
they be Special Forces, cyber warfare units, or drones – would
allow for considerable uncertainty in any future conflicts as
to who the aggressors were.
Furthermore, this reliance upon Special Forces reflects
a decidedly unilateral approach to defence policy. Whereas
mounting operations with the traditional strategic triad has
tended to require state actors like the US to undertake at least
some token efforts to gain the support of the United Nations,
some other international body, or a ‘coalition of the willing’,
the new triad proposed by Stavridis would largely discourage
such entreaties. After all, one of the principal advantages of
Stavridis’ triad, aside from limiting the exposure of American
military personnel to the dangers of combat, is surprise. If
the advantage of surprise is to be preserved, it would be less
desirable for American officials to present proposals for military intervention to such bodies as the UN Security Council
or the North Atlantic Council.
As such, the proposed new strategic triad runs the risk
of undermining the stability of the international system. No
longer constrained by public opinion or multilateralism, the
United States and other countries seeking to harness the
advantages of Stavridis’ triad would be less accountable for
their actions on the international stage. While this would
not necessarily mean a return to the multipolar world of the
early 20th century, it would contribute to a kind of Hobbesian
anarchy—‘the war of all against all’, where every other actor
Continued on page 16
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 15
15
Irregulars—continued from page 15
in the international system is to be distrusted and could very
well present a security threat.
The current role of CANSOFCOM within Canadian
foreign and defence policy should be maintained. Units like
JTF-2 and CSOR have unique skills that are best utilized
fulfilling specialized functions on the battlefield, including
special reconnaissance, hostage rescue, and counter-terrorism. Trying to regularize Canada’s irregulars would very
likely prove disastrous and undermine the capacity for CAF
to contribute meaningfully to future multilateral operations.
Thinking creatively about the future of CANSOFCOM and the
Canadian military as a whole is commendable, and a deeper
discussion on the future of CAF on the campaign trail would
have been of enormous benefit. Hopefully that conversation
Profiling: cont’d from page 16
Schnuck, Peter, Karin Martin and Jack Glaser. “Racial Profiling.” In Debates on
U.S. Immigration, edited by Judith Gans, Elaine Replogle and Daniel Tichenor,
401-509. Sage Publications, 2012.
Notes
1
Edward Said, Covering Islam (New York: Vintage, 1997), p. xxi.
2
Reem Bahdi, “No Exit – Racial Profiling and Canada’s War Against
Terrorism,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 41.2/3 (2003): 293.
3
Reem Bahdi et al., “Racial Profiling: B.C. Civil Liberties Association
Position Paper,” in Racial Profiling: A Special BCCLA Report on Racial Profiling
in Canada, ed. Richard Marcuse (2010), 32.
4
Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Paying the price: The human cost
of racial profiling,” 2003.
5
Abu Bah, “Racial Profiling and The War on Terror: Changing trends
and perspectives,” Ethnic Studies Review 29.1 (2006): 80.
6
Sujit Choudhry, “Protecting equality in the face of terror: ethnic and
racial profiling and s.15 of the Charter,” in The Security of Freedom: Essays on
Canada’s anti-terrorism Bill, ed. Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2001), 367.
7
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar,” (Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2006), 9-13.
8
Bahdi, “No Exit,” 297.
9
Ibid.
10
Racial profiling ‘works’ if it can be proved that the legitimate aim
(capturing and preventing criminal activity) outweighs the potential negative
externalities of difference in treatment.
11
Daniel Moeckli, “Terrorist profiling and the importance of a proactive
approach to human rights protection,” in Racial Profiling: A Special BCCLA
Report on Racial Profiling in Canada ed. Richard Marcuse (2010), 107.
12
Ibid.
13
Frances Robles et al., “Dylann Roof, Suspect in Charleston Shooting,
Flew the Flags of White Power,” The New York Times, June 18, 2015, accessed
August 16, 2015.
14
Kevin Haggerty and Amber Gazso, “Seeing beyond the ruins: Surveil-
16
SITREP
will not be postponed much longer. 
The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute
or its members.
Notes
1
Nathan Liewicki. “Kenney pledges expansion of Canada’s special forces”
Regina Leader-Post, 28 September 2015
2
Eric Schmitt et al, “Admiral seeks freer hand in deployment of elite forces” New York Times, 12 February 2012
3
James Stavridis, “The New Triad” Foreign Policy, 20 June 2013
4
Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block
War” Marines, January 1999
5
United States Institute of Peace, The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way
Forward – a New Approach, December 2006
6
Charles Clover, “Kremlin-backed group behind Estonia cyber blitz”
Financial Times, 11 March 2009
lance as a response to terrorist threats,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 30.2
(2005): 181.
15
Peter Schnuck et al., “Racial Profiling,” in Debates on US Immigration
ed. Judith Gans et al. (Sage Publications, 2012), 503.
16
Sharon Reddick, “Point: The case for profiling,” International Social
Science Review 79.3/4 (2004): 154.
17
Ibid, 155.
18
A. Daktari Alexander, “Should Profiling be used to Prevent Terrorism?”
in Criminologists on terrorism and homeland security ed. Brian Frost et al.,
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), 312.
19
Bahdi, “Racial Profiling,” 39.
20
Clayton Ruby and Nader Hasan, “Canada’s ‘Anti Terrorism’ Bill C-51:
A Legal Primer, Expands the Powers of Canada’s Spy Agency, Allows Arrest
on Mere Suspicion,” Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives (2015), accessed
August 16, 2015.
21
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c C-46, section 83.2(2).
22
Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, s. 17.
23
Bahdi, “Racial Profiling,” 35.
24
John Geddes, “Canadian anti-Muslim sentiment is rising, disturbing
new poll reveals,” Maclean’s, October 3, 2013, accessed August 15, 2015.
25 Zidi Papacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, “News Frames Terrorism: A comparative analysis of frames employed in terrorism coverage in US
and UK newspapers,” Press and Politics 13.1 (2008): 54.
26
Ibid.
27
Bahdi, “No exit,” 305.
28
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15(1).
29
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1.
30
The Oakes test is an analysis of s.1 of the Charter that allows limitations on the rights and freedoms if it can be “demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society.”
31
Bahdi, “No exit,” 309.
32
Ibid, 301.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid, 310.
35
Robert Carter, “Racism and Psychological and Emotional Injury,” The
Counseling Psychologist 35.1 (2007): 16.
36
Ibid, 14.
37
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).