WORKING PAPER SERIES
Working Paper No. 6
The Changing Face of Mekong Resource Politics in the
Post-Cold War Era: re-negotiating arrangements for
water resource management in the Lower Mekong
River Basin (1991-1995)
Abigail Makim
Australian Mekong Resource Centre
University of Sydney
August 2002
© Copyright: Abigail Makim 2002
No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author.
National Library of Australia Cataloguing Information
Makim, Abigail Gene.
The changing face of Mekong resource politics in the post-Cold War era : re-negotiating arrangements for water
resource management in the Lower Mekong River Basin (1991-1995).
ISBN 1 86487 192 X.
1. Water-supply - Political aspects - Mekong River Watershed. 2. Water resources development - International cooperation. I. Australian Mekong Resource Centre. II. Title. (Series : Working paper (Australian Mekong Resource Centre) ;
no. 6).
Call No. 363.6109597
Other titles in AMRC Working Paper Series:
Cornford, Jonathan (1999) Australian Aid, Development Advocacy and Governance in the Lao PDR
McCormack, Gavan (2000) Water Margins: Development and Sustainability in China
Gunning-Stevenson, Helen (2001) Accounting for Development: Australia and the Asian Development Bank in the
Mekong Region
Hashimoto, Takehiko ‘Riko’ (2001) Environmental Issues and Recent Infrastructure Development in the Mekong Delta:
Review, Analysis and Recommendations with Particular Reference to Large-scale Water Control Projects and the
Development of Coastal Areas
Linn, Alanna & Bailey, Doug (2002) Twinning Squares and Circles: the MDBC-MRC Strategic Liaison Program and the
Applicability of the Murray-Darling Basin Management Model to the Mekong River Basin
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Australian Mekong Resource Centre
University of Sydney (F09), NSW 2006 Australia
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 5
2. FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MEKONG REGIME, 1957-1991 .............................................. 6
3. A NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE MEKONG SUBREGION ........................................................................ 7
4. RENEGOTIATING THE MEKONG BARGAIN ................................................................................................ 9
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................16
NOTES .............................................................................................................................................................. 18
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 21
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................................................26
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AMRC Working Paper No. 6
Dachaoshan hydropower dam on the upper Mekong
(Lancang), Yunnan. (Source: Xiu Juan Liu)
Fishing at the Khone Falls on the border between
Laos and Cambodia. (Source: Phil Hirsch)
Ricefield drainage and irrigation canal in
Mekong Delta, Vietnam. (Source: Fiona Miller)
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
4
1. INTRODUCTION
The Lower Mekong River Basin is an internationally shared water resource system that crosses the territories of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. This catchment area is resource rich and is represented as
largely under-utilised. It also lies within a geopolitical region undergoing dramatic political, demographic
and economic change where pressures for resource development are considerable. Given this, the Mekong
stands out as one of Southeast Asia’s most pressing and large-scale resource and environmental management concerns.
Inter-state conflict vis-a-vis the use of the Mekong’s water resources emerged for the first time in the early
1990s. At this time, a protracted dispute centring on conditions for renewing Cambodia’s membership
within the intergovernmental arrangement erupted. This dispute was employed as leverage in a disagreement between Thailand and Vietnam over the “fair and equitable utilisation” of the Mekong’s water resources. At a deeper level, it reflected broader concerns regarding strategic shifts throughout Southeast
Asia and in Thai-Vietnamese relations, following the peaceful conclusion of the Cold War.
An analysis of this dispute and the form and practice of its resolution lies at the heart of this paper. This
analysis focuses on state action within the Mekong regime, an intergovernmental arrangement formalised
through the device of the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin
(Mekong Committee) and designed to coordinate the use of the Mekong’s resources since 1957. The
paper examines how states have managed issues of sovereignty, non-interference and conditions of interdependence and what they have sought to gain through their membership in the Mekong regime where it
transformed into a new arrangement, the Mekong River Commission in 1995.
The paper finds that agreements reached by the co-riparians at the conclusion to this period of dispute
largely favoured the preferences and sovereignty of Thailand. This outcome was secured through a brief
moment of opportunity in the post Cold War atmosphere in which the Indochinese states had limited
bargaining power. This was linked to Indochinese aspirations for regional accommodation, particularly
ascension into ASEAN, and Thailand’s willing capacity to obstruct this: the Indochinese states thus gave
ground on the Mekong – particularly through the dissolution of their longstanding coalition - where smooth
passage into post Cold War regional association could be secured. Given this, these arrangements were
mutually concluded and constituted a mutually arrived at commitment to ongoing Mekong political association by all co-riparians.
The new arrangements agreed to in 1995 further circumscribed four areas within which further collective
decision making was deferred and these matters have extended into the current setting. Hence, questions of
Greater Basin membership are unresolved in the cases of Burma and China. Specific rules on water sharing
contained in the new 1995 agreement remain undefined. Workable linkages for coordination with alternative and more recently evolved fora for Mekong association are yet to be devised. Appropriate roles for
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in securing sustainability remain incompletely established. In these
ways, Mekong politics will necessarily reflect an ongoing refinement of the principles, norms, rules and
decision making procedures for subregional association in sustainable Mekong development in forthcoming
years. Where this process is in train, the possible re-emergence of a deeper contention among the coriparians concerned with the balance of sovereignty norms over interdependence norms will be of substantial importance.
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2. FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MEKONG REGIME, 1957-1991
The Mekong River is amongst the great rivers of the world, flowing for 4200km from the Himalayas
southwards to the South China Sea.1 The river’s watershed is composed of an upper and lower basin,
which fall within the territories of China and Burma, and Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam respectively. This division is topographical and hydrological and since the early 1950s it has also been shaped by
geopolitical factors.2 Where these various factors have played an influential hand in subregional life, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam have sought to establish and maintain a Mekong resource regime. This
was formalised with the device of the Mekong Committee in 1957. From this time, the principles, norms,
rules and decision making procedures specifically concerned with the development of the Mekong’s resources have been maintained and changed through this regime.3 While exclusively concerned with the
functional activities of resource development, the Mekong regime has nevertheless been indelibly marked
by the broader and often more turbulent political context of its day (Makim 2002).
Early Mekong affairs (1950-1975) were substantially shaped by the difficult emergence of the new
Indochinese states following the withdrawal of France and the consequent intensification of American,
Russian and Chinese Cold War influence in the region. Ideological tension and conflict circumscribed these
matters where the great powers and their client states built a complex of alliances and the contending
capitalist and communist blocs played these out via the key problem of Vietnam’s re-unification. In response to these forces, the Mekong neighbours formalised alliances in ways not wholly compatible with
subregional cohesion and stability and in direct contraposition to their very substantial efforts at constructing
subregional association. In this, the South Vietnamese sought support from the US while the North gained
succour from China and the USSR. Patronage of the North was complicated in time by the Sino-Soviet
split and resulted in a gradual reduction of Chinese support, and eventually, in the Sino-Vietnamese split
(Duiker 1986; Karnow 1994). Thailand was closely allied with the US and South Vietnam (Girling 1981;
Wyatt 1984). Laos experimented with neutrality but was largely allied with the US and South Vietnam
(Stuart-Fox 1986). Cambodia maintained neutrality and enjoyed an especially strong association with
China. In 1970 however, the Lon Nol government tilted to the US side (Chandler 1993). Mekong
subregional accord was further undermined by longstanding disputes between the Thais and Cambodians,
Thais and Lao, and Cambodians and Vietnamese, regarding territories and border demarcations (Chandler
1993; Stuart-Fox 1986).
In this volatile context, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand made an unlikely agreement to pursue
opportunities for subregional resource development. They did so through the formation of the Mekong
Committee and its subsequent investigation of possibilities for coordinating development in the areas of
hydroelectricity, irrigation, flood control, drainage, navigation, watershed management and water supply. In
all of these areas, the regime served as an avenue down which financial and technical assistance for development (bilateral and multilateral) could be delivered (Browder and Ortolano 2000). This endeavour was
built upon a form of interdependence encouraging limited cooperation and able to support lasting
subregional association. Such assurance of longevity was essential if international finance was to be secured
for the regime and its activities. The regime was also underwritten by strong political objectives securing
mutual respect for mutual restraint - a necessary aspect of the Mekong regime’s character given the intense
conflicts of the subregion. This required a regime strongly supportive of sovereignty norms. This was
embedded in a veto rule that required that all activities in the Mekong sub-region must be approved by all
riparian states (this matter is detailed below).
To 1975, the regime secured three significant milestones where intergovernmental co-operation was concerned.4 These were: (i) the completion in 1971 of the Nam Ngum hydro-electric scheme, shared between
Laos and Thailand (Committee 1971, 2); (ii) the completion in 1970 of the Indicative Basin Plan, which
contained a comprehensive blueprint for the development of the entire river basin (Committee, 1970); (iii)
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
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and most significantly, the 1975 promulgation of the Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilisation of the
Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin, an agreement on specific principles and rules for water use. This
agreement held strong requirements for inter-governmental cooperation in the use of the Mekong’s water
resources when taken in conjunction with the regime’s 1957 arrangements for unanimity – requirements
that would come under dispute in the 1990s, as discussed below.
Further practical regime outcomes were severely limited by geopolitical shifts associated with communist
victory in 1975 in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. This victory brought final resolution to the Vietnam
question but it also laid the foundations for new and equally intractable problems for regional order and
stability (Leifer 1980). The emergence of the contemptible Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and Vietnam’s
consequent decision in 1979 to wrest the Khmer Rouge from power through invasion culminated in the
Third Indochinese War (Chandler 1994; Leifer 1980). Thereafter followed a period in which Cambodian
sovereignty was at issue and Vietnamese power under constraint. In this, hegemonic contention between
Thailand and Vietnam was especially virulent (Girling 1981; Karnow 1994; Wyatt 1984).
Given these disruptive events, the Committee nevertheless supported an unbroken dialogue among the coriparian states throughout this difficult period (1975-1991). Where the Third Indochina War culminated in
Cambodia’s inability to participate in Committee activity, Thailand, Vietnam and Laos successfully negotiated in 1978 to continue their riparian association through an Interim Mekong Committee (IMC). In the
absence of Cambodia, the focus necessarily shifted away from subregional development cooperation
towards projects within the territories of the remaining members and of national significance only. The IMC
was based on an agreement that Cambodia would resume full membership when able and that the IMC
would automatically revert to the Mekong Committee and its 1957 and 1975 arrangements (Secretariat
1989, 51). With these arrangements, the IMC also accommodated Vietnam in 1979 – a unique arrangement where Vietnam was otherwise altogether excluded from international life for its ongoing occupation of
Cambodia. Despite flexibility and durability, relevant parties would however have to wait until 1991 before
broader events were such that Cambodia was able to re-open the question of its participation in the
Mekong regime, as will now be discussed.
3. A NEW WORLD ORDER AND THE MEKONG SUBREGION
The enduring but flagging vision for Mekong subregionalism and its many possibilities was dramatically
revived in the early 1990s. This revival was intimately bound to the cessation of Cold War hostilities and
the broad-ranging restructuring of regional patterns of alliance and contention that had characterised Southeast Asian order since 1975. In this restructuring, new players were to enter into the regional milieu. At the
same time the consuming regional pre-occupations of the “Cambodia question” and the “Vietnam question”
were brought to peaceful and final resolution. An easing of these and related tensions and hostilities encouraged the Mekong co-riparians to comprehensively re-appraise the substance of their association for the
first time in sixteen years.
Change in Mekong politics depended first upon USA-USSR détente and the normalisation of Sino-Soviet
relations, processes commenced in the late 1980s and accelerated by the collapse of the USSR in December 1991. In Southeast Asia, this underpinned the emergence of a new regional order in which the role of
external powers came under review (Buzan 1994, 145). China emerged as the region’s most important
power.5 Japan’s role was also increasingly important although somewhat ambiguous.6 US influence declined relative to that of China and Japan although it remained unchallenged militarily.7 Europe remained
fairly detached from the region (although European association with Mekong politics gained strength
through increasing financial support of the Mekong regime).8 Finally, the influence of the former Soviet
Union dwindled considerably (within Indochina and especially Vietnam).9
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Where key players in Southeast Asian affairs thus began to shift, so too did their certain willingness to
engage in Southeast Asia’s local political matters. Détente and the collapse of ideological contention
opened up new possibilities for political solutions over military ones in local events. Thus, opposing frontline states Thailand and Vietnam entered into a delicate process of review and undertook a series of discussions concerning new opportunities for association – all of which hinged on Vietnam’s complete and
unconditional withdrawal of political and military influence in Cambodia. Vietnam’s agreement to Thailand’s
position and consequent action on this matter finally allowed the Cambodian factions to enter into peace
negotiation. Under the auspices of the Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC) the Paris Peace
Accord was signed in 1991. By May 1993 and with substantial international support, Cambodia was
ready for an election able to satisfy all relevant parties - other than the belligerent Khmer Rouge.10 Despite
discord among the contending political parties in the months immediately following the election, a new
constitution was promulgated on 24 September 1993 returning Cambodia finally to undisputed sovereignty
(Khathanya Um 1994, 71).11 s
The final resolution of the “Vietnam question” – the complete integration of Vietnam into the ASEAN
regional community after years of isolation and international censure - was a matter of equal and related
importance within Southeast Asia. This possibility was contingent first upon Vietnam’s complete withdrawal
from Cambodia. It was also linked to general improvements in the pattern of Hanoi’s external relations,
most especially with Thailand.12 Vietnam had to push hardest with Thailand in seeking regional accommodation because the Thais maintained strong resistance to Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN. According to
one source, “There was particularly active but covert opposition from Thai leaders who remain wary about
Vietnamese intentions in Cambodia and concerned about what is perceived to be Hanoi’s coolness toward
Thai businessmen and their investments” (Goodman 1996, 598). Despite a degree of mutual mistrust and
several specific bilateral problems, rapid improvements in Thai-Vietnamese relations eventuated.13 This in
turn brought about improvements in Vietnamese-ASEAN relations allowing for a hitherto impossible
exploration of true Southeast Asian regionalism – a regionalism finally able to embrace Vietnam.14
The impact of these shifts in the Mekong subregion was substantial, encouraging a general review of relations among the four co-riparians. Vietnamese-Cambodian relations, while cordial, were especially troubled in the wake of final resolution of the Third Indochina Conflict. There was a deferral of discussion of
any divisive issues pending the redefinition of relations but several disputes involving border demarcation,
ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and navigation on the Mekong emerged (Far Eastern Economic Review
1994a, 104; 1994c, 222). Vietnam’s connection with Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party – a party that
had disputed the election outcome - was further cause for considerable concern in Phnom Penh. Phnom
Penh also harboured a deep mistrust of Bangkok, as evidenced by Cambodian accusations that the Thai
military continued to support and supply the Khmer Rouge despite official Thai claims that Thailand had
observed UN-adopted sanctions. The Cambodians were also wary of the rapid expansion of Thai business
interests in gems and timber in Cambodia (Khathanya Um 1994, 81; Far Eastern Economic Review
1994a, 104). Thai-Lao relations were by contrast characterised by a general growing trust, especially in
the expansion of economic relations.15 This closeness grew despite unresolved border delimitation issues
and problems of repatriation of Lao refugees (Bangkok Post 10 February 1995; Dommen 1994, 85; Far
Eastern Economic Review 1994c, 155-159). Lao-Cambodian relations were also overwhelmingly warm
and marked by numerous official visits. Cambodia recognised Laos’ contribution to subregional and
Cambodian peacemaking, while Laos was firmly supportive of Cambodia’s election process and outcome
(Dommen 1994, 86). Finally, Vietnamese-Lao relations underwent considerable improvement (Far Eastern
Economic Review 1994c, 157).
Where these many subregional shifts represented broad and relative improvements in relations, they served
as a platform for increased talks on building regional links and establishing a framework for development
discussions – discussions that occurred outside the well established auspices of the Mekong Committee.
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
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These discussions resulted in six new initiatives for Mekong development cooperation. The most significant
of these was the Asian Development Bank (ADB) sponsored hexagon round of discussions (or Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS) discussions) among China, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam.
These discussions began in 1993 and dealt extensively with the development of infrastructure across a
range of sectors (transport, telecommunications, energy, environmental management, human resources,
trade and investment, and tourism) in the greater Mekong subregion.16 Other regional cooperation initiatives included: i) the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina (FCDI), which was a Japanese
initiative concerned largely with the creation of infrastructure and employment; ii) the Working Group on
Economic Cooperation in Indochina and Burma (AEM-MITI), which linked the Japanese Ministry of
Trade (MITI) with ASEAN nations and concentrated on the transition to a market economy with a working group on Cambodia, Laos and Burma; iii) ASEAN’s Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Initiative (ASEAN-MBDC), established at the ASEAN summit in December 1995 and dominated by Singapore and Malaysia with strongest interest in railways, and; iv) Thai proposals for a Mekong Development
Bank or an Indochina Fund (Hinton 1996, 49-50; Stensholt 1996, 201).17 A final round of discussions
known as the Quadrangle for Economic Cooperation (or the quadrilaterals) among China, Laos, Burma,
and Thailand were also significant. These discussions commenced in 1994 and dealt with issues of international commercial navigation and the transport of hazardous waste on the Mekong (Marisa Chimprabha
October 9 1994; Nusara Thaitawat October 18 1994).18 With the ferment of such dramatic change
throughout the Mekong subregion, the specific arrangements for cooperation and coordination in the use of
Mekong resources naturally came under review, as will now be discussed.
4. RENEGOTIATING THE MEKONG BARGAIN
The end of the Cold War and consequent changes in world and Southeast Asian orders brought significant
changes to the Mekong regime. As with broader matters, the resolution of the Cambodia question lay at
the heart of this process. This was in turn characterised by contention over membership and functional
resource issues. It also reflected political subtleties in the transitioning regional order, especially in ThaiVietnamese relations. Such matters arose within a context of a stronger Chinese presence and also alternative pathways to and increasing pressures for Mekong resource development. With this, an exploration of
subregional association was at last possible and also necessary.
The first indications that the re-formation of the full Mekong regime was imminent arose in association with
internal SNC discussions and the consequent signing of the Paris Agreement in mid 1991. At this time,
Cambodia’s SNC officially requested re-entry into the Mekong Committee (Nation July 24 1991). An
informal meeting of the four co-riparian states was held shortly thereafter (Voice of Free Asia 15 July
1991, 3). During this meeting the SNC’s preparedness for participation in Committee activity was made
clear. The meeting concluded with agreement by all parties to a draft joint declaration regarding the need
for amendment to the Committee’s basic documents (KPL News Agency 1991, 2; Nation 9 November
1991, 49).
With all parties in agreement as to the passage forward for Cambodia’s re-inclusion, events took a surprising turn with the emergence of a deadlock on November 2nd 1991 (Hong Kong AFP 8 November 1991,
39). Bangkok reported that the Cambodian representative could not sign the agreement because this
individual had not been officially appointed to the position by the SNC chair (Hong Kong AFP 1991, 39).
The Cambodians disputed Bangkok’s refusal to recognise their appointee and provided an alternative
explanation of the deadlock in commenting that: “The cause of the failure of the meeting was because the
Thai side imposed conditions for the admission of Cambodia that were not acceptable to the other members of the Mekong Committee: (Hong Kong AFP 1991, 39). These events indicated that a dispute had
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erupted between Thailand and other members of the IMC. They further indicated that Thailand had initiated this dispute.
At the base of this dispute was conflict over the draft joint declaration (agreed to only days beforehand)
and its requirement for amendments to the Committee’s basic documents regarding governance of water
resources. Indeed, Bangkok indicated at this time that it sought complete amendment of all basic documents. Claiming a desire to modernise arrangements, the Thais argued that current political and developmental needs – particularly “cooperation with China and Burma” - would not be served by these documents (Handley and Hiebert 1992, 16). Thailand argued that the regime’s 1957 and 1975 arrangements
must be scrapped prior to Cambodia re-joining and thus also prior to the full Mekong regime being reactivated. In this way, Thailand sought purchase through the issue of Cambodian membership to re-negotiate
all of the regime’s principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures (Puchala and Hopkins 1983,
55-56; Young 1983, 107). In order to better position itself within the context of the regime, Thailand was
pursuing a form of revolutionary change for the Mekong regime. These actions would result in either a new
regime or the disappearance of the regime altogether (Krasner 1983, 3).
Vietnam was opposed to the Thai position and sought instead immediate full membership for Cambodia
and a return to the regime’s 1957 and 1975 documents. The Vietnamese argued that the Thai position
contravened the 1991 Paris Agreement, which stipulated that the SNC represent Cambodia in all international fora. They also argued that the 1978 IMC agreement stipulated that the reconstituted group of four
would automatically revert to the 1957 and 1975 arrangements. In connection with these events a second
area of contention emerged in relation to the procedural rules to be adopted in the interim period of negotiation and despite a temporary compromise set of amendments being accepted pending further negotiation.
In this instance, Thailand insisted on continuing to use the 1978 IMC procedural rules. Vietnam wished to
return to the original 1957 text as agreed to by the IMC (Nation 9 November 1991, 49).
Thailand’s initiation of this dispute was linked to the specific requirements upon members of the Committee’s 1957 and 1975 agreements. In the case of the 1957 Committee Statute (and its re-affirmations in
1967 and 1975), contentions surrounded Article 5.3, which stated that “Decisions of the Committee shall
be unanimous.”19 Just as significant was Article 5 of the 1975 agreement. It was laid down as follows:
Individual projects on the mainstream shall be planned and implemented in a manner conducive to the
system development of the basin’s water resources, in the beneficial use of which each Basin State shall
be entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share. Each project shall be required to be
technically feasible, economically justified, socially desirable and consistent with the sovereign rights
of the Basin States.20
The Mekong regime’s original 1957 arrangements had established a unanimity rule. Article 5 from the 1975
arrangements stipulated that a “reasonable and equitable share” of the Mekong’s water resources be made
available to all parties.21 In conjunction with the 1975 definition of “mainstream” – a definition including
tributaries - this ensured that all water resource projects in the Mekong watershed required prior consultation and approval by all four riparian states. The 1957 and 1975 arrangements taken in combination
amounted to a veto rule. The re-activation of the original documents implied potential limitations imposed
by co-riparian neighbours on water use for upstream Thailand in particular. And, not only could potential
projects be vetoed, but pre-existing works could also be held over or even prevented from being completed.
These possibilities raised hitherto unexplored questions of sovereignty and interdependence within the
Mekong subregion and were linked to increasing domestic pressures to develop resources. Such pressures
were especially strong in Thailand where the demand for hydroelectricity and irrigation had reached unprecedented levels (Lohmann 1990, 62). The pace of economic development in Thailand was such that
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
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existing supplies of electricity would soon be unable to match demand. Furthermore, half of Thailand’s
arable land was located in the northeast (adjacent to the Mekong) but production was severely limited by
water scarcity (Hiebert 1991b, 24). This was also Thailand’s poorest region and it contributed to significant migration to Bangkok. Thailand sought to address these various problems through the Khong Chi
Mun scheme. This water diversion project was in the early stages of development when the dispute between Thailand and Vietnam erupted. It would channel Mekong water from near Nong Khai/Vientiane
along a 200km canal into arid northeast Thailand for irrigation. Ultimately, the water would drain into the
Chi and Mun rivers, tributaries with a confluence with the Mekong in Ubon Ratchathani province (Handley
and Hiebert 1992, 16). For Thailand, assured access to the Mekong’s water resources was a key matter
of sovereignty within the context of rapid economic expansion.
For Vietnam, the Khong Chi Mun scheme and similar activities held the potential for worsening environmental problems already present in the highly productive Mekong delta. Around 25% of the Mekong’s
flow fed Vietnam’s Mekong delta and 1.6 million ha of the delta suffered from salt-water intrusion from the
South China Sea. An additional 1.5 million ha was troubled with acid soils (Hiebert, 1991a, 28; 1991b,
24). Both problems required the assured flow of the river for flushing. Agricultural practices were well
adapted to these conditions but change to the flow would require major adjustment and investment. During
the period under consideration, half of Vietnam’s annual rice yield was grown in the delta region and based
on this, Vietnam was the world’s 3rd largest rice exporter (Hiebert 1991b; Lohmann 1990, 62; McAdam
and Le Nguyen Binh 1996; Nguyen Nham Quang 1996).
Though lesser players, the Lao and Cambodians also held economic and ecological concerns where the
development of the Mekong’s water resources were at issue. For relatively upstream Laos, dry season
navigability was essential as the Mekong served as Laos’ main transportation route. Downstream and
excluded Cambodia was more vulnerable to upstream alterations in river flow and was concerned that the
hydrological and ecological integrity of Tonle Sap be maintained (Browder and Ortolano 2000, 519).
Through these matters, the Thai-Vietnamese dispute over water use thus came to dominate the course of
events originally concerned with Cambodia’s re-entry into the Mekong Committee. While Thailand sought
“...flexibility and contemporary relevance...”, Vietnam “...advocated more binding clauses...” (Bangkok
Post 19 February 1992, 3). A “compromise solution” would be difficult to secure.22 The matter of Cambodia’s membership remained central to this dispute to the extent that its delay boosted Thai efforts to
change the general rules of cooperation among the co-riparians. This tactic found new expression on
February 18th 1992, when Thailand requested the postponing of the Committee’s plenary session despite
all delegations being assembled in Bangkok. Thailand further requested an informal session among members and urged all parties to participate “fully in this consultation with a view to forging a consensus on the
re-structuring of the cooperation among Mekong riparian states to make it relevant and mutually beneficial
to all (Bangkok Post 19 February 1992, 3).”
For the Vietnamese, Thailand’s move was a unilateral suspension and “obstructive”, since by implication,
Thailand’s postponement was also a refusal to accede to a communique prepared by the secretariat and
approved by Laos, the SNC and Vietnam “simply welcoming” Cambodia in rejoining the Committee
(Voice of Vietnam, 1992a, 3; 1992b, 1; Vietnam News Agency May 1992, 1). Based on this, Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, Vo Van Kiet corresponded with Thai Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun requesting that he use his prestige to aid the Committee in re-commencing its work and
welcoming Cambodia. In a related move, Vietnam met with ambassadors and representatives from international organisations informing them of the situation and asking that they help the Committee resume its work
and include the SNC. The Vietnamese also met informally with the Thais, arguing that while Thailand was
at liberty to propose amendments, this must be done on the basis of negotiation among the member countries - including Cambodia. Pointing to broader affairs, Vietnam further asked the Thais to bear in mind
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AMRC Working Paper No. 6
solutions that were compatible with the developing relations of cooperation among the riparian states and
the countries of Southeast Asia (Vietnam News Agency May 1992, 1). Thereafter, Vietnam boycotted
scheduled consultative meetings and informal ministerial sessions.
While the Thais sought to restate their case during these boycotted meetings it was immediately apparent
that little progress would be made in resolving the deadlock. Not only was Vietnam absent, but the Committee’s secretariat was excluded (Handley and Hiebert 1992, 16). This absence pointed to a growing rift
between the Thais and the secretariat – as events immediately following these meetings indicated. At this
time, Chuck Lankaster, the Committee’s Executive Agent (EA), was asked by Thailand to resign from his
position and was declared persona non grata. Throughout the dispute, Lankaster had assumed a strong
position of leadership.23 He had also been openly political. Lankaster had expressed a clear preference
that the Committee maintain the original arrangements and hence the veto rule (Geary 1996). He also
sought to shift the role of the Committee beyond coordination to regulation (Handley and Hiebert 1992,
16). Lankaster pursued NGO participation (Geary 1996). Finally, in relation to each of these matters, he
was routinely censorious of Thai conduct, especially regarding Vietnam. Lankaster felt that in the case of
the Khong Chi Mun project Thailand demonstrated a considerable lack of consultation with Vietnam and
let his opinion be known in no uncertain terms.
Lankaster’s activity was not unusual within the historical ambit of the Mekong Committee’s EA where the
knowledge of this bureaucratic elite and “practical actor” often predominated over that of other actors
(Makim 2002; Puchala and Hopkins 1983, 63). This influence was the result of the position’s location in
the decision making process and that role’s capacity to influence the regime’s agenda (Elliott 1992, 29). In
a new era of sub-regional association and for the Thais in particular, this over-stepped the bounds of
diplomacy. The power of the person and position of EA within the Mekong regime had become such that
sovereignty was under threat (Handley and Hiebert 1992, 16). (As an indicator of the potency of these
events, the position of EA remained vacant until 1995 and the finalisation of a new Mekong bargain.) Some
analysts interpreted this development as an effort by Thailand to neutralise the Committee, for this action
stripped the regime of its traditional source of leadership (Voice of Vietnam 1992a; Handley and Hiebert
1992, 16). It also indicated that Thai displeasure with the Committee was so severe that Thailand was
willing to scrap the organisation altogether. In issuing this threat of defection, the Thais sought to overcome
institutional inertia (Elliott 1992, 44). This calculated manoeuvre was employed to bring about the establishment of a new and discontinuous order (Kratchowil 1984, 708).
During this same period, the Thais explored proposals to convene an informal ministerial meeting among
themselves, China, Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Thailand hoped that these discussions would
lead to the formation of a 6-member organisation in preference to the existing Mekong Committee thereby
negating all existing documents and arrangements, and thus the original regime. Where these efforts proved
unproductive, Krit Kraichitti (1996), suggests that they are best understood as a diplomatic exercise arising
out of political concerns relating to Thailand’s geopolitical location “in the middle” of China and Vietnam.
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam were finally able to convene at a high level informally in Malaysia
in April-May 1992 (Kavi Chongkittavorn 27 April 1992). At this time there was accord that further
dialogue was needed to address the several problems facing the Mekong Committee. Vietnam signalled its
readiness to attend the next meeting of the Committee. It was agreed that a working group including foreign
ministry officials at the ambassadorial level be established (Kavi Chongkittavorn 27 April 1992; Nation
May 14 1992, 2). With Thailand and Vietnam thus in accord at least on a process for going forward, the
four co-riparians convened at a UNDP sponsored informal meeting in Hong Kong in October 1992. They
did so with Thailand continuing to push for extensive Committee re-structuring and Vietnam resisting this.
During this meeting it became clear that the UNDP was undertaking a leadership role in order to promote a
rapid and satisfactory resolution. This was unsurprising given the long and considerable history of UNDP
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
12
institutional and financial support to the Committee. The Mekong project had come to be the UNDP’s
single largest programme commitment “both in terms of the duration of its involvement and the magnitude of
resources committed” (IMC 1987, 8).24 It was however unprecedented where the UNDP now sought to
overtly support a process of bargaining and negotiation.
At this time an arrangement was arrived at in which two tracks of negotiation could continue simultaneously
within the Mekong regime (Mekong Secretariat 1993, 3). First, existing work was to continue uninterrupted under the 1978 arrangements. Second, the four states would commence negotiating the restructuring of the Mekong regime. These arrangements would accommodate the Cambodians. Thus the Thais
won a revision of the regime and the resumption of existing work under their preferred 1978 arrangements
while the Vietnamese won Cambodia’s inclusion - a tidy compromise.
In December 1992 the parties convened in Kuala Lumpur to sign a memorandum of understanding affirming the equal right of the four riparian states of the lower Mekong basin to participate in the Mekong regime
(Vietnam News Agency 22 December 1992, 3). The leadership role of the UNDP was especially salient at
this time. Where friction between Thailand and Vietnam re-emerged, the UNDP intervened, threatening
that donor countries would cease financing future projects that included only three members (Kulachada
Chaipipat 14 February 1993, 11-12). These Kuala Lumpar arrangements were ratified in Hanoi on February 5 1993. With this, Cambodia formally re-joined Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, and the IMC ceased to
exist. Project work could resume while the larger negotiation process under the guidance and leadership of
the UNDP continued to take place.25 The conflict between Thailand and Vietnam appeared abated in the
wake of “mutual accommodation” (Vietnam News Agency and Bangkok Post February 1993, 5). This
agreement was possible because Vietnam dropped its demand for full reformation of the Mekong Committee with its original governing documents. For Vietnam, this compromise would remain in place so long as
individual projects did not affect the flow of the mainstream (Vietnam News Agency and Bangkok Post
February 1993, 5). Thailand maintained an unspoken option to leave the Committee altogether should
progress prove to be unsatisfactory (Kulachada Chaipipat 14 February 1993, 11-12).
With the formation of this interim arrangement, the issue of Cambodia’s membership and that of satisfactory
water use arrangements were finally de-linked. The four co-riparians proceeded directly to addressing
matters associated with water sharing (Kulachada Chaipipat 14 February 1994, 11-12). The first set of
issues raised concerned institutional and management matters relating to mechanisms for cooperation. The
matter of the possible inclusion of Burma and China into the new framework for cooperation re-emerged.
Discussions with China began in April 1993. This matter was initiated by the Thais, who proposed to host
discussions concerning common uses of the upper Mekong among Burma, China, Laos and Thailand.
While these discussions were cordial and productive, neither Burma nor China joined the Mekong family at
this time. Internal difficulties and an unfavourable international climate (despite Thailand’s “constructive
engagement”) troubled Burma. China declined involvement until such time as conflict among the four lower
riparians was satisfactorily resolved. In this connection, China expressed the wish not to be seen in any
way partisan or to be meddling in the affairs and conflicts of its neighbours (Krit Kraichitti 1996). With
China and Burma thus remaining outside the Mekong regime, the Thais were unable to shift the balance of
power within the subregion with the inclusion of additional upstream co-riparians. Furthermore, they were
unable to force regime change through an apparent (and now thwarted) need to include new members. In
these ways, Thailand had conclusively failed to redress its bargaining power against that of the Indochinese
bloc.
These matters concluded, a working group proceeded to draw up a draft agreement consisting of 42
articles. Discussions became deadlocked however on four articles concerned with principles of prior
consultation and fair distribution vis-a-vis water diversion, thus returning the co-riparians to their original
deadlock. In this, Thai water development activities and practices came once again under Vietnamese
13
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
scrutiny with Vietnam arguing that the diversion of water from the mainstream during the dry season should
be subject to prior consultation in the Committee - and only following agreement by the four riparians could
any proposed use be undertaken.26 Thailand responded with greater insistence that these were matters of
national interest and remained unreconciled to the principle of prior consultation (Hanoi VNA 4 January
1994). In particular, Thailand argued that prior approval obligations to co-riparian neighbours were causing
problems in securing funding especially in the case of larger “national” projects (Krit Kraichitti 1996). By
January 1994 it became clear that the Thai-Vietnamese dispute was unresolved and a serious impediment
to the conclusion of these matters. Discussions stagnated and then returned to a deadlock. Participants
radically revised predictions as to a final agreement positing at least another 12 months of discussion
(Johnson 1993).
During this same period, Cambodia and Laos joined with Vietnam in an Indochinese coalition formally
opposing the Thai position (Johnson 1993). This coalition viewed the Thai position as one that sought
unilateral diversion of Mekong waters (Hanoi VNA 4 January 1994). The Indochinese proposed that talks
be raised from the working level to the ministerial level. Thailand opposed this proposal – and hence, the
efforts of the Indochinese coalition - intensifying ill feeling (Johnson 1993). Vietnam closed off negotiations.
The mandate of the drafting working group expired. Vietnam was required to call for its renewal from the
UNDP. While the UNDP sought to keep the process alive, Vietnam threatened defection expressing
preparedness to exit the Committee altogether (Kunlachada Chaiphiphat 1994, 42-43). The process was
again deadlocked. This persisted until March 1994. At this time, Vietnam shifted in accommodation of
Thailand while remaining steadfast in a commitment to exit the Committee should the course of events
prove to be unsatisfactory (Kunlachada Chaiphiphat 1994, 42). Vietnam agreed to Thai preferences
regarding the disputed Article 5 concerning the definition of mainstream and adopted a “...more flexible
stand...” regarding the diversion clause (Kunlachada Chaiphiphat 1994, 42). Vietnam continued however
to insist upon prior consultation. The process returned to a stalemate.
Final resolution in the Thai-Vietnamese dispute was reached suddenly and mysteriously in June 1994. The
available evidence suggests that this outcome was the result of a Thai fracturing of the Indochinese coalition
(Geary 1996; Krit Kraichitti 1996). Thailand achieved this fracture by securing Cambodian then Lao
agreement to the Thai position on the disputed principles: an outcome possible through the development of
stronger Thai-Cambodian relations (Krit Kraichitti 1996). This warming of relations in turn allowed Thailand to lobby Cambodia to persuade Vietnam to return to the negotiating table and also into accepting the
Thai position. For another observer, such an outcome was attributable to “confusion”: apparently this result
came about following Cambodian misperceptions that certain matters pertaining to retroactivity as it related
to the Khong Chi Mun project could be held over until after Mekong regime arrangements were finalised.
(Following the signing of the Agreement in 1995, Thailand successfully held that given a retroactivity clause,
all such matters were closed (Geary 1996)). The course of these events was further influenced by Vietnam’s imminent accession to ASEAN (Krit Kraichitti 1996) – a matter of some urgency in a regional
setting in which old patterns of alliance and contention, as symbolised by the Indochinese coalition, no
longer served Vietnamese interests. Stripped of support in the dispute and facing a need for accommodation in a new Southeast Asian order, Vietnam shifted its position in order to reflect Thai preferences.
In this way, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam finally agreed on new general principles for water
sharing and reached accord on the long disputed Article 5 – “reasonable and equitable utilisation” - as
contained in the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong
River Basin, on April 5 1995. According to their architect, these new arrangements were built upon the
concept of “superfairness” and the so-called “win-win” theory.27 Based on this, the contracting parties
agreed that Article 5 read as follows:
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
14
Article 5. Reasonable and Equitable Utilisation
To utilize the waters of the Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner in their respective
territories, pursuant to all relevant factors and circumstances, the Rules for Water Utilization and Interbasin Diversion provided for under Article 26 and the provisions of A and B below:
A. On tributaries of the Mekong River, including Tonle Sap, intra-basin uses and inter-basin diversions
shall be subject to notification to the Joint Committee.
B. On the mainstream of the Mekong River:
1. During the wet season:
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to the Joint Committee.
b) Inter-basin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at an agreement by the
Joint Committee.
2. During the dry season:
a) Intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint
Committee.
b) Any inter-basin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee through a specific
agreement for each project prior to any proposed diversion. However, should there be a surplus
quantity of water available in excess of the proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, verified and
unanimously confirmed as such by the Joint Committee, an inter-basin diversion of the surplus could
be made subject to prior consultation.
With this new commonly agreed upon definition of Article 5, the 1995 general arrangements for water
sharing in the Mekong were as follows. In the case of the mainstream only, a unanimity rule subject to
seasonal variation would hold, allowing any party dissatisfied with project proposals veto power. In the
case of tributaries, prior consultation and maintenance of the “natural minimum water flow” was required
during the dry season. During the wet season, projects concerning tributaries required “notification” only
(Malee Traisawasdichai 20 January 1995, 8). Through this definition of Article 5, conflict between Thailand
and Vietnam over the Mekong abated – although to the extent that these definitions are in fact to date
incomplete, they constitute only a temporary resolution, as will be discussed below.
In conjunction with this resolution of the dispute over Article 5, it was further agreed that all projects at that
time under construction or in the planning stages were outside the new unanimity rule of the Committee (as
it pertained to mainstream projects) in the absence of the much disputed (and comprehensive) veto-power
associated with the original arrangements. Hence, the new agreement was not retroactive. The agreement
also established the institutional framework to implement the Basin Development Plan for which the
Mekong River Commission (MRC) was established – and as a result of which the original Mekong Committee was decommissioned.28 Within the new MRC, the position of EA was recreated as Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) – a role with substantially reduced powers and scope for influence in the regime.29
Finally, this new arrangement formalised the concept of sustainable development in Mekong politics for the
first time. This came in with strong leadership exercised by the UNDP throughout the negotiation process.
In conjunction with that concept’s inception within regime form and process, formal and informal NGO
participation emerged. This occurred particularly within Thailand and brought the concluding moments of
the regime’s new so-called “pro-developmentalist” arrangements under sharp and often highly critical
review (Makim 33, 2002).
15
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The final outcome in the dispute between Thailand and Vietnam over commonly agreed upon arrangements
for water resource development represented a substantial change to the Mekong regime. This change
reflected shifts in functional and also political matters shared among the co-riparian states. These shifts
necessitated a revision of regime membership – most particularly that of Cambodia. A review of membership provided leverage in a more deeply significant review of arrangements for managing sovereignty, noninterference and interdependence in the development of shared water resources within the subregion. This
re-examination was strongly underwritten by a fundamental testing of Thai-Vietnamese relations, as they
evolved in the post Cold War context. This culminated in a revolutionary change in regime principles,
norms, rules and decision making procedures.
The long unresolved question of Cambodian membership in the Mekong regime was brought to a final and
successful conclusion during the period under consideration, with Cambodia returning to full participation
within the regime. The process of this resolution was however fraught with complexity and conflict because
it was repeatedly tied into broader political matters. In this connection, engagement in conflict over Cambodian membership by Thailand and Vietnam served as a brief and revolutionary moment of opportunity in
securing advantage in subregional relations. The extent to which Thailand made much of this opportunity, it
also made considerable gains in general Mekong politics.
While commonly agreed to, the new Mekong bargain strongly reflected Thai preferences for the structure
of political action in the Mekong subregion. This was broadly evidenced by the general requirements of the
new Article 5 upon signatories: where the original arrangements required prior notification for all projects
throughout the entire river basin without seasonal variation and contained a related comprehensive veto
power, the new and much weaker arrangements required prior notification and unanimity for the mainstream only and were also subject to seasonal variation. This change was particularly and relatively disadvantageous to the downstream Indochinese states. Not only did it limit obligations among the co-riparians,
it also circumscribed power within the regime, returning it instead to the sovereign states. While resource
development in upstream Thailand might have transboundary impacts, the downstream Indochinese states
held reduced capacities to know of or influence these activities through the auspices of the regime.
Likewise, the final agreement on retro-activity placed all existing and planned projects outside the regime’s
intergovernmental arrangements and clearly served the concerns raised by the Thais throughout the dispute
(with particular reference to the Khong Chi Mun project) over those of the Indochinese states. Furthermore, the complete reconstruction of the regime’s administrative apparatus from the Mekong Committee
into the MRC served Thai over Vietnamese interests because it constituted yet another weakening of the
regime’s capacities in promoting interdependence over sovereignty. And perhaps most importantly, the new
arrangement de-linked the MRC’s CEO from key decision-making functions and roles, thereby ensuring
that a traditional source of leadership within the regime was substantially weakened. Through this revision,
the regime’s capacity in managing the conditions of interdependence shared among the co-riparians
focussed strongly on sovereignty norms and in so doing greatly favoured the interests of upstream Thailand.
To the extent that the new agreement thus favoured Thai sovereignty norms over Indochinese sovereignty
norms and also subregional interdependence norms, some questioned whether this was a “fair” arrangement (Malee Traisawasdichai 1995, 8). This was also so where it was suggested that the Cambodians had
agreed to the new arrangements with an inaccurate understanding of the retro-activity clause as it related to
arrangements managing adverse transboundary impacts. Others suggested by contrast, that the outcome
was mutually agreed upon and reflected a common position on the Mekong regime (Samran
Chooduangnern 1996; Thanaporn Manathat 1996). Seen in this light, observers argued that the Mekong
regime remained a “very necessary” channel for negotiation and consultation for the co-riparians (Krit
Kraichitti 1996). Some went so far as to suggest that the new agreement was a major “political achieveAMRC Working Paper No. 6
16
ment” allowing the regime to continue to serve as a symbol of the “Mekong brotherhood” (Samran
Chooduangnern 1996). According to Thai sources, this was “the main objective” of the negotiations (Krit
Kraichitti 1996). Thai sources further commented that, “Despite different ways of thinking” the regime
served as a “confidence building measure” (Thanaporn Manathat 1996). This was especially so given that
its arrangements were finalised at such a high political level (Nillson 1996). For one source, this outcome
“heralds a new era of cooperation that had previously seemed impossible (Thanaporn Manathat 1996)”.
Such commentary largely reflects Thai preferences for and perceptions of the outcome, but it also hints at
the political subtext within which the functional issues of Mekong resource development were re-negotiated. This subtext turned on shifts in the patterns of interaction in Thai-Vietnamese, Thai-Indochinese and
Cambodian/Laotian-Vietnamese relations. This allowed for a complete fracturing by Thailand of the
longstanding Indochinese coalition. For Vietnam in particular, it was further linked to the crucial matter of
ASEAN membership and a general return to international life - something that Thailand sought to some
extent to obstruct. Thai actions here reflected a pre-occupation with curtailing Vietnamese hegemonic
power and also with a shattering of the bargaining power of the Indochinese bloc. In this setting, the
Mekong states sought to test the patterns of their interactions, re-appraise their subregional milieu and
agree upon a common understanding of this. The outcome of this testing suggested that the Indochinese
states acceded (for the time being) to Thai pre-eminence in the subregion. Given repeated but not activated
threats of defection throughout the dispute, its outcome further represented a substantial affirmation of
commitment shared among the four co-riparians to continuing subregional association through the Mekong
regime, in preference to unilateralism or coalition building.
In securing this outcome, the co-riparian states further agreed to defer collective decision making in at least
four key issue areas – areas, that in the current context, present large matters requiring resolution and that
are now shaping Mekong politics. The first of these is the issue of membership for the Upper Mekong
Basin riparians, China and Burma. Upstream China is an inscrutable yet major player in the subregion.
China holds especially extensive plans for the Upper Mekong’s development and has already built two
dams across the mainstream – a first for the Mekong.30 China tends towards unilateralism and has undertaken only cautious and very limited involvement with the MRC.31 By contrast, Burma suffers from long
term domestic and international political problems that preclude participation in Mekong politics. Second,
rules for water sharing, as contained in the 1995 agreement remain incompletely defined – an arrangement
arrived at in 1995 almost certainly in the interests of political expediency. A final definition of “low season
flow” has not been reached. Article 2.6 is vague in defining “minimum flow”. On these matters, Sokhem
Pech (2002) reports: ““Acceptable minimum monthly natural flow” at each hydrological stations (sic) along
the mainstream during the dry season is yet to be decided by the MRC countries. MRC programme on
water utilization is now assisting the four countries in agreeing on a set of rules, including water quantity,
water quality, and water use monitoring, and developing decision support framework (sic).” Third, significant questions concerning coordination loom over Mekong politics in connection with the many alternative
arrangements for subregional association that have emerged in the post Cold War era. Their presence and
likely activities place increasing demands on the Mekong regime for coordination and collaboration in
various forms. Fourth, the formal and informal participation of civil society within the regime emerged for
the first time during the 1991-1995 dispute and has gained strength since. Where Mekong NGOs are able
to position themselves effectively within the dialogue on sustainable development, it may prove to be
influential in processes of re-negotiating regime principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures.
The process of negotiation regarding water use in the Lower Mekong in the period 1991-1995, was in the
final analysis, a substantial review of the less functional and more political aspects of the Mekong regime.
This review culminated in revolutionary change of the regime but also left several key questions active. The
resolution of these matters will shape the forthcoming era in Mekong politics and raises the interesting
prospect of the re-emergence of contention among the co-riparians concerned with the balance of sovereignty norms over interdependence norms.
17
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
NOTES
1
The river is 8th largest in the world in terms of annual flow and 12th largest in terms of drainage
2
In the early 1950s the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and
the US Bureau of Reclamation argued that “...limited economic and social development possibilities...”
existed in the upper reaches of the Mekong (Secretariat 1989, 3). Both urged the hydrographic and topographic surveying of the main Mekong River, its bed and banks, from the China border to the South China
Sea. China was not at this time a member of the UN, and hence ECAFE due to exclusion by other states.
3
The Mekong regime is examined via the analytical framework of regime theory. The utility of regime
theory in exploring and explaining intergovernmental resource and environmental politics is well established
in the literature. See for example: Young (1977; 1982; 1989a; 1989b; 1991) See also Charnovitz (1996),
Choucri (1993), Elliott (1992), Haas (1989, 1990), Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993), Leeds and Davis
(1999), Majone (1986).
4
Dufournaud (1979, 185), Kirmani (1990, 200-205), Stensholt (1996, 201) and others are strongly
critical of the Mekong Committee’s successes pointing to the UNDP’s very considerable financial and
technical investment as contrasted with its limited practical achievements.
5
As the process of normalising relations continued, China’s growing role in regional diplomatic affairs also
became a key security issue (Far Eastern Economic Review 1994a, 73). For Buzan (1994, 145) China
was the region’s central actor and the security relations developed over the past few decades remained
important as the spectre of territorial revisionism loomed large. Harris (1994, 264-265) and Leifer (1993,
278) point also to China’s growing economic power as a key regional security concern.
6
While Buzan (1994, 194) argues that Japan failed to secure its role as a regional power, Camilleri (1994,
181) points out that 38% of Japanese aid went to Southeast Asia in the early 1990s which constituted two
thirds of all regional aid.
7
Furthermore, as Buzan (1994, 194) argues, US power extended also into a pervasive cultural influence
and the continuing dependence of many regional economies on the large US market.
8
Stallings (1997) argues that Europe’s influence is by contrast most strongly felt in Africa. According to
Forster (1999 ) despite the creation of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and its impact on relations
between the European Union and ASEAN countries, Asia will remain a marginal area of engagement for
the EU. In the case of the Mekong however, European nations predominate as donors.
9
Rapid economic and political restructuring had begun following the collapse of the USSR in 1990-1991.
This resulted in a substantial reduction in Russian assistance to its Indochinese clients; moves to secure a
balance of trade in hard currency; and the winding down of Russia’s military presence in Cam Ranh Bay
(Alagappa 1987; Hiebert 1990). This restructuring of USSR-Vietnamese was especially signficant as it
allowed for the final normalisation of Sino-Vietnamese relations.
10
A comprehensive peace settlement remained for some time elusive and it took over 12 months to full
deployment of UNTAC (Khathanya Um 1994, 72-73). UNTAC experienced considerable difficulty in
exercising effective control over political and administrative organs as efforts towards preparations for the
election were made (Khathanya Um 1994, 72-73). The decision by the Khmer Rouge to opt out of the
election process resulted in the further marginalisation of that group - an outcome largely accepted by all
other participants.
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
18
11
FUNCINPEC secured an overall victory. This result was however disputed by Hun Sen’s Cambodian
People’s Party which threatened civil war. Because of this a coalition government was necessarily formed
between the two.
12
Hanoi launched a campaign to end its international isolation with an especially vigorous diplomatic offensive targeting China and ASEAN. Hanoi’s broader re-inclusion into the international community was
marked by Mitterrand’s visit in February 1993. This was the first visit by a western head of state to Vietnam since 1954 (Far Eastern Economic Review 1994c, 221). Vietnam’s changing place in the new regional
order arose from changing domestic economic circumstance rather than an expansion of the formal bonds
of regional cooperation (Leifer 1993, 271, 278). Of particular concern for Vietnam was its international
isolation resulting from the US economic embargo. For over 10 years the US had maintained that the west
should not assist Vietnam in paying of arrears, forcing Vietnam to rely on its own resources. This policy
was finally changed - albeit a long process of piecemeal detachment - by Washington on July 2 1993 (Pike
1994, 64-71). In relation to this, Vietnam’s eligibility to receive IMF loans had been suspended since 1985
(Far Eastern Economic Review 1994c, 221). The situation was finalised in late 1993 with 23 countries and
agencies meeting in Paris and pledging $1.86b in loans for 1994 (Pike 1994, 64-71).
13
Other salient conflicts between the two concerned ambiguous sea borders and the reformation of the
Mekong Committee, as discussed below (Far Eastern Economic Review 1994c, 222). The influence of
the military in Thai politics became somewhat restricted during this era. This is significant to the extent that
the military traditionally held a particularly belligerent view of Vietnam and Indochina and this had once held
powerful sway over Thai foreign policy. Where military influence in foreign policy was curtailed, political
and economic foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis Thailand’s neighbours began to prevail. These changes
can be tied to the period of Chatichai Chunawan’s Prime Ministership (Buzynski 1994).
14
Stability in the new regional balance relied upon the quality of the ties between Vietnam and ASEAN
(Leifer 1993, 294).
15
For Laos, economic ties with Thailand were ever more important as its links with Moscow diminished.
16
For an outline of work developed through these discussions refer to: Asian Development Bank (1993;
1993b, 19; 1994).
17
For a range of views regarding these new regional arrangements refer to: McGovern (1996); Medhi
Krongkaew (1996) and; Filigogo Pante (1996).
18
See Mya Tan (1996) for an overview of trade activities on the quadrangle area.
19
Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (Cambodia, Laos, the
Republic of South Vietnam and Thailand) Statute 1957 (amended 31 October 1957, 2 August 1962 and
March 1972). In conjunction with this Article, the original statute also contained specific principles and
rules concerning the use of the Mekong’s water resources. These ensured that no state would obstruct the
mainstream discharge, navigability, or utilisation of the river (Nguyen Thi Dieu 1999, 201). The principles
asserted that:
(i) the existing low water discharge of the Mekong would not be reduced in any way at any site; and, (ii)
the supplies to be diverted for irrigation purposes would be met by some storage during high stages of the
river. Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (Cambodia, Laos, the
Republic of South Vietnam and Thailand) Statute 1957 (amended 31 October 1957, 2 August 1962 and
March 1972).
19
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
20
Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (Cambodia, Laos, the
Republic of Viet-Nam and Thailand) Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilisation of the Waters of the
Lower Mekong Basin, 1975. The requirements of Article 5 were strengthened and augmented by Articles
10, 17, and 21 in particular (Goh 2001, 499). These Articles were as follows:
Article 10: Mainstream waters are a resource of common interest not subject to major unilateral
appropriation by any riparian state without prior approval by other Basin States through the
committee.
Article 17: The Basin State … which undertakes the project shall present well in advance to other
Basin States for formal agreement prior to the project implementation a detailed study on all possible
detrimental effects including short and long term ecological impacts which can be expected within the
territory of other Basin States as a result of the proposed mainstream project. The procedures and
amounts of damages compensation shall be included in the above study.
Article 21: A tributary recognized by all basin States as a Major Tributary shall be … governed by the
provisions of the present Declaration of the Principles applicable to the Mainstream.
21
These articles were based on the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Waters of International Rivers (Vitit
Muntarbhorn 1994, 1-5).
22
A number of compromise solutions regarding Article 5b2 of the 1975 Agreement (prior approval for
water use from the mainstream during the dry season) had been proposed by Thailand and considered by
Vietnam. “A breakthrough” was almost reached with the insertion of the text “aiming at” into Article 5b2
(Krit Kraichitti 1996).
23
The centrality of the EA to Mekong regime function was unusual within the broader context of United
Nations bureaucratic organisation. In underlining the significance of the EA Takahashi comments that where
differences among members of the Mekong Committee arose, the EA typically served in “...closing the gap
or by finding acceptable solutions (Takahashi 1989, 60).”
24
By 1988, the UNDP – the Committee’s main source of financial support - had committed $US40 000
000 to the Mekong program (IMC 1988, 44).
25
Pending a final agreement, the four commenced operating as an interim committee under UNDP financial
support. These arrangements secured a place for the UNDP as chair of the Mekong Working Group in the
ongoing negotiation process (Mekong Secretariat 1994).
26
This was in particular reference to an incident where it was reported that Thailand was about to commence water diversion without informing Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency 20 March 1993, 8).
27
This comment was made by UNDP legal consultant George Radosevich - architect of the Agreement
(Malee Traisawasdichai 20 January 1995, 8).
28
This plan would differ significantly from the old cascade of 7 mainstream dams blueprint (as laid out in
the Indicative Basin Plan) and focus instead on both tributary and mainstream development as an “integrated package” (Malee Traisawasdichai 13 January; 20 January 1995, 8).
29
The role and function of the EA/CEO had not been definatively laid down in the 1957 or 1975 agreements, thus allowing for considerable scope. In Article 31 of the 1995 agreement it is stated, “The terms of
reference of the CEO shall be prepared by the Joint Committee and approved by the Council.”
30
China holds firm plans for 8 dams and proposals for 6 dams on the Upper Mekong (Hinton 1998).
31
China signed a data sharing agreement with the MRC in early 2002. China has also attended thriceyearly MRC meetings since 1996 (Mekong River Commission 2002).
AMRC Working Paper No. 6
20
REFERENCES
ALAGAPPA, M. 1987. “Southeast Asia in 1986: Year of change, continuity, and challenge.” In
Southeast Asian Affairs 1987, ed Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs: 3-24.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. 1993a. Subregional Economic Cooperation: Initial Possibilities
for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Burma, Thailand, Viet Nam and the Yunnan Province of China,
Manila: Asian Development Bank, (February).
— 1993b. “Subregional Projects to Strengthen Ties.” ADB Quarterly Review: 19.
—1994 July. Profiles of Proposed Subregional Projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Manila:
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Mekong Dateline
International geopolitical event
Entente manqueé in Anglo-French relations
Mekong geopolitical event
Franco-Siamese Treaty
1927
Entente cordial in Anglo-French relations
Revised Franco-Siamese Treaty
1930s
1939-1945
Diminution of colonial power and rising
nationalism in colonies
World War II
1947-1954
The First Indochina War
1950
1952
UNECAFE establishes itself in Southeast
Asia
1954
Geneva Accords: Conclusion to the First
Indochina War.
1955
ECAFE’s Tokyo session
A heightening of nationalist sentiment
emerges throughout Southeast Asia’s
colonies
The Vietminh establish an alternative
administration in Saigon and enter
into open hostilities with the colonial
administration.
The Pau Meeting of L’Union
Indochinese
Preliminary Report on Technical
Problems Relating to Flood Control
and Water Resource Development of
the Mekong
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are
accorded independence. Vietnam is
provisionally demarcated at the 17th
parallel.
Review of the Preliminary Report
US Bureau of Reclamation Report
(Reconnaissance Report – Lower
Mekong River Basin)
Implication for cooperation/resource politics
Agreement between Siam and French Indochina that the Mekong
presented shared interests in boundaries, trade, navigation and river
works. Through this and related arrangements, the Mekong comes to
constitutes an agreed upon boundary between French Indochina and
British Burma.
Revision of unfair treaty arrangements on territories and borders in
Siam’s favour. Agreement on common interests in the Mekong on
navigability. Agreement that a Franco-Siamese Permanent High
Commission of the Mekong be formed.
A hiatus in the exercise of colonial administration aspirations for
resource development in the Mekong.
French-Indochina and Thailand agree that the Mekong is common
property. Through these arrangements, France seeks to shore up its fast
flagging fortunes in Indochina.
The Mekong becomes a special interest area for ECAFE. The
Preliminary Report concludes that the economic and technical
feasibility and resource potential of the Mekong remains
undemonstrated so long as the First Indochina War continues.
The Geneva Accords contain provisions for navigation and re-affirm
that the Mekong presents questions of shared interests.
ECAFE proposes to continue its investigations of the Mekong.
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam respond favourably.
Cambodia rejects the US Bureau of Reclamation report claiming
concerns for neutrality. Co-riparians accede to Cambodia’s position.
ECAFE’s leadership in Mekong resource development established.
APPENDIX
Date
1893
1956
Sino-Soviet split
1957
ECAFE’s 10th anniversary
1964-1975
The Second Indochina War
Soviet influence in Southeast Asia
sharply curtailed. The roles of the
USA and China in Southeast Asia
expand.
Wheeler Report (Programme of
Studies and Investigations for
Comprehensive Development, Lower
Mekong River Basin, Report of the
United Nations Survey Mission)
Foundation of the Committee for
Coordination of Investigations of the
Lower Mekong Basin (Mekong
Committee)
Conflict in Vietnam increases
hegemonic contentions between the
USA and China.
China is increasingly involved in North Vietnamese, Cambodian and
Lao affairs.
The US lends support to Thailand and South Vietnam.
The co-riparians unanimously favour the findings and
recommendations of The Wheeler Report, including the formation of
an intergovernmental committee.
Precedents established in ECAFE’s Preliminary Report and The
Wheeler Report influence the composition of co-riparian members of
Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. China is located in the “upper
basin” and is not a member of the UN at this time. Burma is also
located in the Upper Basin and internal issues preclude participation in
a subregional intergovernmental arrangement.
Conflict in Vietnam also increases hegemonic contentions between
Thailand and North Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos caught between
hegemonic contentions.
Thailand and South Vietnam are allied with the US. Cambodia and
Laos experiment with neutrality. North Vietnam is allied with China.
The USSR lends material support in war to the North Vietnamese.
1964
Eruption of open conflict in Vietnam
between North and South over the
unresolved question of re-unification
Finalisation of intergovernmental arrangements shared among
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, including agreement on
veto power for all decisions and all activities.
Commencement of planning for hydro-industrialisation of Lower
Mekong Basin.
1967
Foundation of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
1970
Completion of The Indicative Basin Plan, a comprehensive and basinwide plan for Mekong water resource development
Completion of the Nam Ngum hydroelectric scheme in Laos. Laos
begins to export electricity to Thailand.
1971
1972
1973
Rapprochement in Sino-American relations.
Nixon visits Beijing.
Withdrawal of Western support of
South Vietnam and rightest regimes
in Cambodia and Laos.
The US discontinues financial support of the Mekong Committee.
1975
Intense triangular tensions amongst China,
USA and USSR
1978
1979-1991
The Third Indochina War
Late 1980s
USA-USSR détente
1991
Collapse of Soviet Union.
China continues to rise as Southeast Asia’s
most significant power. Japan plays a role in
economic development while the US focuses
on regional security issues.The Russian
presence in Southeast Asia, especially Laos,
is severely retracted.
Communist victory in South Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos (April).
Transition to communist regimes in
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
ASEAN and particularly Thailand
seek a new approach to communist
Indochina.
Vietnam invades Kampuchea,
deposing Pol Pot and installing a
puppet regime.
ASEAN opposes the communist
Indochina bloc under Vietnam’s
leadership.
Thailand and Vietnam begin a
process of broad review and
accommodation pending Vietnam’s
complete withdrawal from Cambodia.
Paris Agreement.
Cambodia’s waring factions finally
agree on a political solution for their
conflict.
ASEAN and particularly Thailand
begin to shift their position on
Indochina, pending the final and
complete resolution of the Cambodia
question and also the Vietnam
question.
November
1991
1992
Completion of The Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilisation of the
Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin (Early 1975).
Disruption of all Mekong Committee activities. Committee members
unwilling/unable to meet.
Mekong Committee’s Executive Agent successfully brokers an
agreement among Thailand, Laos and Vietnam to reform as an Interim
Mekong Committee (IMC). Kampuchea’ Khmer Rouge refuse to
participate in the arrangement.
Despite complete international censure of Vietnam’s actions in
Cambodia, opposing frontline state Thailand accommodates Vietnam
within the IMC.
Activity within the IMC continues on a strictly national basis. The IMC
is Vietnam’s only avenue into international life.
Cambodia’s provisional government, the Supreme National Council
(SNC) informs the IMC of Cambodia’s intention to re-join the Mekong
regime.
A deadlock emerges between Thailand and Vietnam on the issue of
Cambodia rejoining the IMC. Bangkok indicates that it seeks complete
amendment of all Mekong intergovernmental agreements prior to
Cambodia re-joining the regime. Vietnam opposes this position
seeking immediate Cambodian membership in conjunction with a
return to all original arrangements.
Vietnam and Laos accede to
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation.
Early 1992
ADB establishes the Greater Mekong
Subregion (Cambodia, China, Laos,
Burma, Thailand and Vietnam).
April-May
1992
Late 1992
1993
Japan proposes the Forum for
Comprehensive Development of
Indochina.
1994
China and Thailand promote
quadrilateral discussions on the
Mekong among China, Laos, Burma
and Thailand.
ASEAN establishes AEM-MITTI, a
working group on economic
cooperation with Indochina and
Burma linked to Japan’s Ministry of
Trade.
General improvements in ThaiCambodia and Thai-Lao relations.
ASEAN establishes ASEAN-MBDC
through Malaysian and Singaporean
initiative.
1995
July – Vietnam a full member of
ASEAN.
Vietnam boycotts IMC.
IMC Executive Agent, Chuck Lancaster, declared persona non grata by
Thailand and forced to stand down from IMC.
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam re-convene informally,
agreeing to continue discussions at the ambassadorial level.
UNDP undertakes leadership role in these matters.
2 tracks of negotiation established allowing for Cambodia’s reinclusion and the re-negotiation of Mekong intergovernmental
arrangements.
Thailand initiates discussions with China and Burma seeking their
participation in the Mekong regime. Both decline and Thailand fails to
gain a counterbalance to the Indochinese bloc.
A working group draws up a draft agreement but the dispute reemerges in relation to 4 articles concerned with prior consultation and
fair distribution.
The deadlock between Thailand and Vietnam re-emerges.
Cambodia and Laos formally join with Vietnam in opposing the Thai
position.
June 1994 – the deadlock is broken. Cambodia and Laos accede to the
Thai position. Vietnam in turn follows.
Thailand’s preferences for the form and process of intergovernmental
cooperation on the Mekong prevail.
April 5 – Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable
Development of the Mekong River Basin.
Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam agree to new arrangements for
managing the water resources of the Lower Mekong River Basin.