Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives),
Volume 29, December, 1983 Chad, Page 32591
© 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved.
Civil war in north-Libyan, French and Zaïrean involvement
Summary and key dates
Border clashes with Nigerian forces (April to May1983 Capture of Faya-Largeau by northern-based rebel
forces of Mr Goukouni Oueddei (June 24 French and Zaïrean aid to Chadian Government (June) Government
counter-offensive and recapture of Faya-Largeau (July). Fall of Faya-Largeau after Libyan air strikes (Aug. 10
Formation of French defensive line (August). 10th Franco-African summit conference (Oct. 3–4).
Renewed fighting broke out in northern Chad in mid-1983 between government troops of the Forces armees
nationales tchadiennes (FANT) and Libyan-backed rebel forces loyal to Mr Goukouni Oueddei, the former
President until June 1982 [see 31677 A] and leader since October 1982 of a rival “National Peace
Government” set up in the northern town of Bardai [see 32104 A].
A series of rebel successes in June and July took Mr Oueddei's forces as far south as the town of Abéché [see
map on page 31677], but President Hisséne Habr`'s government forces then launched a successful counterattack, driving the rebels north towards the Libyan border. In early August, however, the rebels (with Libyan air
support) recaptured the town of Faya-Largeau and again advanced southwards. The fighting subsided in August
after French troops, who had moved into Chad at President Habrè's request, assisted government forces to
establish a series of strongpoints across the country, in a line running from Mao in the west to Abéché in the east.
The question of Libya's continuing support for Mr Oueddei was discussed when a Libyan delegation visited
Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, at the beginning of March. The discussions, the first contact between the two
Governments since President Habrè assumed power in 1982, continued later in the month when a Chadian
delegation flew to Tripoli see 31935 A, the Libyan capital; the Tripoli— see 32419 A talks were reportedly also
concerned with Libyan occupation of the uranium-rich “Aouzou strip” on the border between the two countries,
which had been annexed by Libya in 1973 [see 28136 B; 31677 A; 32104 A]. These talks having proved
inconclusive, reports of fighting in northern Chad (where rebel forces captured Ounianga-Kebir) were followed
by Chadian complaints against Libya at the United Nations.
The Government of Chad complained on March 17 of Libyan “aggression and occupation” and demanded an
urgent meeting of the UN security Council; the Libyan Government, however, rejected these accusations and
claimed that President Habrè was attempting to divert attention from “fighting between rebel forces controlling
the capital and the forces of the legitimate Government led by Mr Goukouni Oueddei”. The security Council on
April 6 called on the two sides to reconcile their differences “without delay and by peaceful means” on the basis
of the charters of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). After more fighting in mid-April, the
Chadian representative at the UN accused Libya of “violating the spirit and the letter” of this declaration.
The situation in Chad was also discussed at a meeting in Paris on April 11 between Mr Abdullah Obeidi, the
Libyan Foreign Secretary, and French government officials.
United States State Department officials reported “an upsurge of Libyan military activity in northern Chad” during
May, and on May 17 the Chadian Government claimed to have defeated a rebel assault on Faya-Largeau. A
government spokesman announced on June 22 that rebel columns “with the active logistic support of the Libyan
Army” were advancing on Faya-Largeau, and after two days of conflicting claims the Government admitted on
June 25 that the town had fallen to the rebels the previous day, and that FANT units were making a “tactical
withdrawal” south-east towards Abéché.
While rebel spokesmen admitted receiving arms and supplies from the Libyans, they repeatedly denied
allegations that Libyan personnel were involved in the fighting. Mr Soumalia Mahamat, the Chadian Information
Minister, nevertheless insisted on June 24 that government units were being engaged directly by Libyan soldiers.
On the same day M Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister, warned that France would not remain
indifferent to Libyan involvement in Chad (which was a French colony until 1960—see 17569 A; 17612 A).
A dispute over the ownership of a number of islands in Lake Chad led to a series of clashes between Chadian
and Nigerian troops during April and May.
Over 70 soldiers were killed in fighting in the islands in late April, and on May 16 the New Nigeria newspaper
claimed that over 300 Chadian troops had been killed in a Nigerian counter-attack. Although an agreement to
end the hostilities was signed by representatives of both Governments in Lagos (the Nigerian capital) on May 17,
the fighting continued and on May 19 the Nigerian press reported that Chadian soldiers, supported by French
mercenaries, had launched a major offensive, while Chadian sources later the same month claimed that Nigerian
MiG fighter aircraft were bombing Chadian lakeside villages.
At a meeting in Ndjaména between President Habrè and President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria on July 11, the two
sides agreed to end the fighting and to reopen the border, which had been closed for several months.
The fall of Faya-Largeau led to decisions by the French and Zaïrean Governments to provide military aid to the
Habrè regime. President Mitterrand of France accused Libya on June 28 of directly supporting the rebel forces,
and stated that France would supply military aid to Chad under the terms of the 1976 co-operation agreement.
The French Air Force began airlifting supplies, including anti-tank guns and rockets, to Ndjaména on June 27,
and 250 Zaïrean soldiers also arrived on July 3 together with three Macchi MB-326 K counter-insurgency
aircraft of the ZaïreanZaïrean Air Force.
The Libyan Government continued to deny that it was involved in the fighting. Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, the
Libyan leader, sent a message on June 28 to Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian head of state and
current President of the OAU, stating that Libya “remained neutral in the power struggle between the Chadian
factions”; he also said in an interview with the French newspaper Le Matin (published on July that Libya “would
not intervene a second time” in Chad, although he added that “any foreign intervention in Chad will be
considered by us as a war against Libya”. [For Libyan intervention at the invitation of the then President Oueddei
in 1980,see 31159 A; 30693 A.]
Mr Oueddei claimed on June 30 that the French Government was aiming to “recolonize Chad”, and on July 7 the
rebel-controlled Tibesti radio broadcast an appeal by Mr Oueddei for Libyan aid against “Franco-American
imperialism”.
Rebel forces continued their advance in early July, reaching Kalait and Oum Chalouba (80 miles north of Biltine)
on July 5 and Abéché on July 9; however, their overstretched supply lines to Abéché were severed by
government forces, and after four days of heavy fighting the rebel units were driven out of the town.
A spokesman for President Habrè's Government, reiterating accusations that Libyan troops were directly
involved in the battle, appealed on July 11 for “as many French troops as can be sent”. In an interview with Le
Matin published on July 12, Mr Oueddei cautioned France against sending troops, warning that “if war breaks
out between us and France, it will go beyond Chad, beyond Africa… we will take the war to the heart of Paris”.
AZAP, the official Zaïrean news agency, reported on July 12 that 1,750 Zaïrean troops and three Mirage aircraft
were due to be sent to Chad. The US State Department announced on July 19 that US military and food aid
worth US $ 10,000,000 would shortly be flown to Ndjaména.
The nine-member OAU bureau met on July 15 to discuss the fighting in Chad, and issued a declaration appealing
for a ceasefire, non-intervention by foreign forces, and the opening of discussions on national reconciliation
between the rival factions. Mr Mahamat rejected this call, insisting that the Habrè Government would never
agree to a ceasefire until all Libyan personnel had left Chad. [For disagreement among member states of the
OAU in 1982 as to whether Mr Habrè's or Mr Oueddei's delegation should represent Chad, and the consequent
failure in November 1982 of a second attempt to hold the OAU's 19th Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Tripoli, The 19th OAU Assembly was ultimately held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June 1983]
FANT units rapidly consolidated their victory at Abéché by pursuing the rebel forces northwards, recapturing
Oum Chalouba and Biltine on July 14, Fada on July 21, and Faya-Largeau on July 31. A government
spokesman claimed that over 800 rebels had been killed in the FANT advance and 26 Libyan personnel taken
prisoner-10 men identified by the Government as Libyan soldiers were paraded through Ndjaména on July 31.
In the first week of August, Libyan aircraft carried out a number of air strikes against FANT positions in the
vicinity of Faya-Largeau, Oum Chalouba and Kalait. The raids were condemned by the US State Department as
“open aggression” and “overt intervention which is dangerous to the stability of the region”. The Chadian
Government made a formal complaint about the raids to the security Council on Aug. 9.
According to US intelligence and eyewitness reports from European residents of Faya-Largeau, the raids, which
were carried out by Sukhoi-22 bombers using napalm as well as phosphorous and fragmentation bombs,
resulted in several hundred casualties, including a large number of civilians, many of whom were left to die
without treatment as the FANT forces retreated. The Libyan news agency JANA denied that Libyan aircraft had
carried out any bombing; however, a man identified by the Chadian Government as a Libyan Air Force major,
who was said to have been captured after his aircraft was shot down, stated in Ndjaména on July 8 that Libyan
bombers had raided Faya-Largeau, and confirmed that both napalm and fragmentation devices were used.
The US Government responded to the raid by (i) increasing military aid to Chad, (ii) placing the aircraft carrier
Dwight D Eisenhower on a state of alert in the Gulf of Sirte, off the Libyan coast, and (iii) ordering airborne
warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft into the area, together with an escort of F-15 fighter aircraft, so
as to provide the Chadian Government with intelligence data on rebel and Libyan troop and aircraft movements.
The Libyan Government reacted by threatening to shoot down the AWACS aircraft “whenever they affect
Libyan territory”.
A US Government spokesman announced on Aug. 2 that a quantity of Redeye anti-aircraft missiles would be
supplied to the FANT, and on Aug. 4 several US military advisers flew to Chad to provide training in the use of
these missiles. The State Department revealed on Aug. 5 that President Reagan had authorized a further grant of
US $ 15,000,000 in aid for Chad, to be drawn from the special fund set aside for emergencies under the
provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. While acknowledging that the US and French Governments were in
“constant consultation” over developments in Chad, President Reagan insisted on Aug. 11 that he saw “no
circumstances which call for military intervention” by the US.
In a confrontation over the Gulf of Sirte on Aug. 3, two US Navy F-14 fighter aircraft from the Dwight D
Eisenhower made contact with two MiG-23s of the Libyan Air Force, pursuing them southwards towards the
Libyan coast. [For previous confrontations between the USA and Libya over the Gulf of Sirte, which Libya
claimed as territorial water,see 31181 A; 31680 B;] The Libyan Government sent a message to the UN security
Council on Aug. 9 in which it complained of “US provocation”.
M Charles Hernu, the French Defence Minister, stated on Aug. 9 that 250 French troops were to be sent to
Ndjaména from their base in the Central African Republic.
M Hernu stressed that the soldiers would not take part in any combat operations, and that their role would be
limited to that of training and instruction. The following day it was announced that a further 500 French soldiers,
including 300 paratroopers, would be deployed in Chad. The Zaïrean Government declared that a further 700
troops would be sent to assist the FANT forces, thereby bringing the total Zaïrean contingent in Chad to 2,500.
Taking advantage of the disorder in the FANT positions caused by the Libyan air raids, rebel forces struck south
on Aug. 10 and captured Kalait; they also reinforced their advanced units at Oum Chalouba, which they had
reportedly captured several days previously, but on Aug. 11 the town was retaken by FANT units. FayaLargeau came under a two-pronged assault on Aug. 10 from other rebel units as well as, according to Western
analysts, regular Libyan Army contingents; FANT troops were forced to abandon the town, although they
apparently succeeded in withdrawing with their equipment intact. Libyan aircraft on Aug. 12 reportedly bombed
Oum Chalouba and Koro Toro, and strafed the FANT columns retreating from Faya-Largeau.
The French forces in Chad launched “Operation Manta” on Aug. 13 when a detachment of 180 paratroops
moved up to Abéché; the following day an estimated 1,000 paratroops and marines, equipped with helicopters
and anti-aircraft guns, took up positions at Salal, Ati, Moussoro and Mao with the stated purpose of forming a
defensive line which, observers noted, lay at the southern limit of the range of Libyan aircraft operating from
bases in southern Libya and northern Chad. French military sources reported the same day that a squadron of
Jaguar fighter aircraft were “standing by for any eventuality” at a base in the Central African Republic.
Although all French military personnel in Chad were officially described as “instructors”, they were authorized to
defend themselves if attacked. In this connexion President Mitterrand warned on Aug. 25 that “if threatened our
troops will riposte and in order to defend themselves effectively, they will not limit themselves to purely defensive
retaliation”. M Cheysson stated on Aug. 14 that “French support for Chad will be developed according to the
circumstances”; it was also reported that French troop transporters were currently ferrying Zaïrean soldiers to
the front line.
A number of unofficial diplomatic contacts were reported to have taken place at this time between the French
and Libyan authorities, while in the USA Mr Larry Speakes, deputy White House press secretary, confirmed on
Aug. 14 that the Libyan leadership had recently been in indirect contact with US officials over the situation in
Chad.
A number of JANA reports in mid-August claimed that French and Libyan officials were currently discussing a
proposed “peace initiative” for Chad. M Roland Dumas, a French lawyer and personal friend of President
Mitterrand, who had previously undertaken unofficial diplomatic missions for the French Government, met on
Aug. 16 with Col. Kadhafi, who confirmed the meeting the following day and stated that unofficial discussions
between the two Governments were continuing.
President Habrè stated on Aug. 16 that he was willing to meet Col. Kadhafi but that he refused to consider
entering into negotiations with Mr Oueddei, whom he described as only one “of the mercenary elements”
recruited by Libya to fight in Chad.
French troops continued to consolidate their defensive positions, with advanced units moving up to Arada (50
miles north of Biltine) on Aug. 17, and it was announced on Aug. 19 that six Jaguar fighter aircraft, four Mirage
fighters and one in-flight refuelling aircraft had arrived at Ndjaména airport (which had recently been repaired by
French logistics units). Brig.-Gen. Jean Poli (54), a veteran of the Algerian war who had also seen service in
Djibouti and Zaire, assumed overall control of all French forces in Chad on Aug. 20.
The US State Department claimed on Aug. 17 that, during the lull in the fighting which followed the fall of FayaLargeau, the Libyans had moved a further 2,000 troops into Chad, although many of these were believed to be
Chadian and Sudanese nationals recruited into the “Islamic Legion” while working in Libya.
French troops were put on a state of alert on Aug. 23 after the Chadian Government claimed that Libyan and
rebel armoured columns were advancing on Salal and Oum Chalouba, and Mr Mahamat urged the French to
“wage war” until the Libyan forces had been driven out of Chad. No clashes were reported, however, and on
Aug. 23 the US State Department announced that the AWACS aircraft had been recalled from the region having
“achieved their goals”.
The possibility of OAU-sponsored negotiations to end the crisis was raised during discussions on Aug. 24
between Lt.-Col. Mengistu and M Maurice Faure, president of the foreign affairs commission of the National
Assembly (the French parliament). Lt.-Col. Mengistu subsequently met with representatives of the Libyan
Government. Talks on the possibility of a negotiated settlement continued in Paris on Aug. 31, when French
officials met with an OAU delegation (led by Mr Peter Onu, the acting Secretary-General) and with Mr Acheikh
Ibn Oumar, a member of Mr Oueddei's rebel National Peace Government and the former head of the Conseil
democratique revolutionnaire in Chad [see page 32104]. President Mitterrand held talks on Sept. 2 with Lt.Col. Goshu Wolde, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, who declared that the French Government had an important
role to play in ending the hostilities in Chad.
President Mitterrand stated on Aug. 25 that he favoured a federation of Chad as the best way to solve the
dispute between Mr Oueddei and President Habrè. This proposal was discussed at a meeting in Ndjaména on
Aug. 26 between M Hernu and President Habrè, but on the same day a spokesman for Mr Oueddei rejected
federation as a solution, and asserted that rebel forces would continue fighting until they controlled all of Chad.
The spokesman also invited representatives of the OAU to visit rebel-controlled areas in order to verify his
assertion that there were no Libyan troops in Chad.
Tibesti radio on Aug. 29 reported a statement by Mr Oueddei in which he offered to open reconciliation talks
under OAU auspices with the Habrè administration (which he described as illegal, reactionary and pro-Zionist),
but the offer was rejected by Mr Mahamat. Mr Oueddei held a press conference in Bardai (the “capital” of his
National Peace Government) on Sept. 4, in which he insisted that the conflict would continue so long as French
forces remained in Chad, but affirmed that “if there are any Libyans in Chad, then as Africans they have every
right to be involved in what is an African conflict”. He repeated on Sept. 21 his willingness to enter negotiations,
adding that he would be prepared to form a government of national unity with President Habrè.
Meanwhile further fighting had broken out on Sept. 2, when rebel forces attacked FANT positions at Oum
Chalouba and Kalait.
Rebel sources subsequently claimed that, during the battle, French Jaguar aircraft had carried out a series of
attacks on rebel positions, although this was denied by a French military spokesman. FANT sources also
claimed to have defeated another rebel assault on Oum Chalouba on Sept. 6. Chad Government radio on Sept.
9 criticized the French for failing to take part in the fighting and for leaving the FANT to stand alone against
“Libyan tanks and aircraft”.
The situation in Chad was a major topic of discussion at the 10th Franco-African summit conference, which was
held in Vittel, France, on Oct. 3–4. (Chad was also discussed at the ninth conference, held in Zaire in October
1982)-see 31886 A.) The summit agreed to a suggestion from President Mitterrand that the OAU should
resolve the problem, and rejected a partition of the country as a solution, calling instead for an end to hostilities
and for reconciliation between the Government and the rebels. (Le Monde - International Herald Tribune Times - Guardian - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - New York Times - UN Information Centre,
London)9Prev. rep. 32104 A)
© 1931- 2011 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved.