1
Knowledge Development Through War Games
Philosophical & Methodological Aspects
Yael Brahms1
Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israel Defense Forces
Abstract: In the different sciences, knowledge about the world is mostly developed using empirical
research that is based on discovering new empirical findings in the world. War games, in contrast,
usually take place in the minds of people who are sitting in closed rooms without receiving any new
empirical information about the “outside world”. The idea of developing new knowledge through war
games raises an epistemological problem that is composed of two questions. First, is it possible, in
principle, to develop new knowledge regarding actual reality by using a war game that is based on
imaginary scenarios? And second - how does this “magic” happen? The following article aims to
answer these questions based on the philosophical debate regarding scientific and philosophical
thought experiments and based on psychological theories of games and experiential learning. In
addition, it highlights some methodological aspects of war games that can be concluded from these
theories.
Key Words: War Games, Knowledge Development, Thought Experiments
Introduction
In the IDF Dictionary a “war game” is defined as “a bilateral (or multilateral)
simulation of a military activity that represents real or hypothetical situations. A war
game is designed to examine operational ideas, to assimilate plans and to analyze
concepts and systems according to defined rules”.2 In the same dictionary, “exercise”
is defined as “a simulated operation for practicing, training and evaluation of forces’
capabilities in planning, preparation and execution”.3
Both war games and exercises occur in a simulated reality that represents actual or
hypothetical situations by different ways and means. The main difference between
them lies in their objective: While the main objective of an exercise is to train the
participants in procedures and skills they will need in real time, the main goal of a war
game is to develop knowledge through the examination of ideas, plans, concepts and
systems and to develop thinking patterns and skills that are required by commanders
and decision makers at all levels — including criticism, skepticism and creativity —
1
The opinions expressed in this article are solely the author's personal view.
IDF-TRADOC, IDF Dictionary (1998) 401.
3
Ibid., 666.
2
2
so as to better deal with uncertainty and the unpredictable when confronting reality. 4 5
Knowledge and thinking skills can of course also be developed in exercises, for
example, when practicing an operational plan and exposing its limitations.
Conversely, a war game can be used for training, for example, when practicing
planning procedures in an educational setting. However – the difference between the
two tools, at least according to how they are commonly defined and understood, is
clear.
This paper deals with two types of war games: dynamic war games and
scenario writing and analysis.
Dynamic war games are usually played by teams that represent different sides
to a conflict and are managed by a control team that corresponds to relevant elements
not represented by the competing teams, like the political echelon, operational level
commanders, and international elements. The teams receive a scenario describing the
“game reality” at the outset, including the strategic environment that is relevant to the
game, the relevant operational arenas and the main events that preceded the game.
The game stretches over several “time steps”, each of which represents a period of
time within the game reality according to the control team’s definition. During each
time step the teams examine and evaluate the situation described in the scenario,
define their objectives, examine alternative courses of action and decide how to
proceed.
4
See for example, Garry D. Brewer & Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem
Solving (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); M. Herman, M. Frost and R. Kurz, Wargaming
for Leaders: Strategic Decision Making from the Battlefield to the Boardroom (NY:McGraw-Hill,
2009); Robert P. Haffa & James H. Patton, 'Wargames: Winning and Losing', Parameters (Spring
2001) 29-43; Robert B. Killebrew, 'Learning from Wargames: A Status Report', Parameters (Spring
1998) 122-35; G. J. H. Longley-Brown, 'The Value of Wargaming to the Army', The British Army
Review 129 (2002) 27-46;Perla (1990); Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, 'Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives', in Philip E.
Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical,
Methodological and Psychological Perspectives (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) 3-38.
5
Some differentiate between two types of war games according to two objectives – knowledge
development and thinking skills development. According to this distinction, war games that are aimed
to develop knowledge are called "research wargaming" and war games that are aimed to develop
thinking skills are called "training wargaming". See for example, Robert B. Killebrew, 'Learning from
Wargames: A Status Report', and G. J. H. Longley-Brown, 'The Value of Wargaming to the Army'. In
this paper I do not make this distinction mainly because I believe these two objectives exist in all war
games even if in different emphases.
3
At the end of each time step the control team creates a new game reality that follows
from the competitors’ courses of action and the direction in which the team wants the
game to develop. At the end of the game all the teams convene to analyze the game
and its results, to identify and conceptualize the new knowledge that was developed
during the game.
In games belonging to the second type, scenario writing and analysis, the
different teams do not confront each other within a given scenario or make decisions
that are being tested in relation to a dynamic reality. They write their own possible
scenarios, which are different in this or that way from actual reality, and analyze them
in order to raise and consider present and future challenges and possible ways to deal
with them.
What is in common to both types of war games is their objective to develop
new knowledge about reality, based on gaming and analysis of scenarios that
represent possible developments.
The Epistemological Problem of War Games
In the different sciences, knowledge about the world is mostly developed using
empirical research that is based on discovering new empirical findings in the world
and doing experiments in labs.
War games, in contrast, usually take place in the minds of people who are sitting in
closed rooms without receiving any new empirical information about the “outside
world”.
In
this
respect
they
are
a
kind
of
“thought
experiment”
(Gedankenexperiments), meaning that for some reason they cannot be conducted in
the lab and in actual reality, hence they are carried out in people’s minds, based upon
counterfactual scenarios.
Counterfactual scenarios describe an imaginary reality that in many ways resembles
actual reality but differs from it in other ways. For example, a scenario that describes
a situation within a specific operational arena, which resembles the actual operational
arena in most ways but differs from it in terms of the weaponry used by the rival, in
terms of the relations and linkages between the various rivals, or in terms of the rival's
course of action. The way in which the counterfactual scenarios differ from the actual
4
reality stresses and brings to the surface certain problems and challenges, present or
future, that the game is meant to clarify and point to possible solutions.
In dynamic war games the counterfactual scenario is given to the playing teams by the
control team and continues to develop during the game in accordance with the
competing teams’ decisions and the control team’s considerations. In scenario writing
and analysis war games the teams write and analyze their own counterfactual
scenarios.
War games as a tool for developing knowledge and thought have been
conducted in different forms for hundreds of years by militaries all over the world,
and; in recent decades they have also been playing an important role in developing
strategies in the business sector.6 The use of war games to develop thinking patterns
and skills for quickly and efficiently dealing with uncertainty and unpredictability
does not raise any special problem. However, the idea of developing new knowledge
through war games raises an essential epistemological problem that is composed of
two questions.
First, is it possible, in principle, to develop new knowledge regarding actual reality by
using a war game that is based on counterfactual scenarios and without any new
empirical data coming from the actual reality? “New” means knowledge that was not
there before the game and that was created as a result of the game. “Knowledge”
means “justified true beliefs”. It is not enough that, following the game, new beliefs
are being created in the heads of the players, but for these beliefs to be considered
“knowledge” they have to be true and the players need to have some sort of
justification to believe they are true.
For example, in a game that relates to a certain arena and a certain rival, the players
reached some new understanding of their rival that they did not have before the game,
but without getting any new intelligence information on that rival during the game.
One can rightfully ask whether this understanding is true and justified and thus
whether it has any practical use. In this sense, there is considerable room to doubt the
6
See, for example, Gilad, Buisiness War Games; Herman, Frost & Kurz, Wargaming for Leaders.
5
validity and credibility of the conclusions and new understandings that are created in
a game.
McCue asks, assuming that a game does not reflect actual reality in a precise
and realistic way, how can we hope to develop new knowledge using war games?
Aren’t war games just another case of “garbage in, garbage out”?7
Brewer and Shubik articulate the doubtfulness regarding war games results in the
following way: Either the information that was created is sparse and invalid (therefore
cannot be considered knowledge), or there is too much unsystematic information and
too few means to organize and analyze it in an efficient way (in order to turn it into
knowledge).8
Tetlock and Belkin relate skepticism towards thought experiments in the politicalmilitary realm to three main issues: psychological biases, theoretical biases and
motivational biases.
Psychological biases are hard to avoid and they make thought-experiment results
highly subjective.9 Theoretical biases cause people who accept a certain theory or
concept to always try to accommodate and adapt the counterfactual reality described
in the scenario to the theory they hold; it is very difficult for them to break free from
their previous conceptions.10 Motivational biases distort the thought experiment's
results because of the need for control and prediction capability; because of the fear of
taking blame; because of the need to get appreciation and because of the need for
consistency and compatibility with existing concepts and commonly accepted views.11
Even if the answer to the first question within the epistemological problem is
positive, meaning that new knowledge can be developed in war games, one can still
rightfully raise a second question - how does this “magic” happen? How does it
happen that people enter a closed room with the knowledge they already have, play a
7
McCue The Practice of Military Experimentation, 48-49.
Brewer & Shubik The War Game, 91-92.
9
Tetlock & Belkin 'Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and
Psychological Perspectives', 32.
10
Ibid., 34.
11
Ibid., 35-36.
8
6
game that occurs in an imaginary reality, do not get any new empirical data, and yet
come out of the game with new knowledge about actual reality?
The following article deals with war games as a tool for knowledge
development and will center on the epistemological problem.
Different Solutions to the Epistemological Problem – The Arguments Approach
and the Experiential Approach
The epistemological problem of war games has been raised in the philosophical
literature in relation to thought experiments in science and philosophy. 12 Thought
experiments in science and philosophy have been used by scientists and philosophers
from dawn of history to this day. Several examples from different research areas
include: Galileo’s thought experiment, in which he refuted Aristotle’s theory about
the velocity of falling bodies; Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s (EPR) thought
experiment regarding the existence of hidden variables in Quantum Mechanics 13;
Hilary Putnam's “Twin Earth” thought experiment that shows that the meanings of
terms in natural language are being determined based not just on what people have in
their heads but also on what there is in the environment that surrounds them14; and the
trolley dilemma, which exemplify the contradiction between the utilitarian and the
deontological approaches in ethics.
The various attempts to respond to the epistemological problem can be divided
into two main approaches15: the approach that claims that thought experiments,
including war games, create new knowledge because they are nothing but a
picturesque stories that represent logical arguments that derive true conclusions from
already known true assumptions (henceforth: the arguments approach); and the
approach that claims that thought experiments and war games create new knowledge
12
See, for example, Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind; Bunzl, 'The Logic of Thought Experiments';
Buzzoni 'Empirical Thought Experiments: A Transcendental-Operational View'; Gendler, 'Galileo and
the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiments'; Gendler, Thought Experiments Rethought and
Reperceived'; Gendler, 'Philisophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium';
McAllister, 'Thought Experiments and the Belief in Phenomena'; and Norton, 'On Thought
Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?'.
13
Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen, 'Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be
Considered Complete?'.
14
Putnam, 'The Meaning of 'Meaning''.
15
There are other approaches, like that of Brown, The Laboratory of the Mind, that I found to be less
relevant to the discussion of this article in relation to war games.
7
based on intuitions and “quasi-sensory” experiences which are created within the
players during the game (henceforth: the experiential approach).
Norton’s approach to scientific thought experiments represents what we refer
to as the arguments approach. According to him, thought experiments are nothing but
logical arguments, deductive or inductive, that are represented in a picturesque way
instead of in the language of formal logic. Further, he claims that any thought
experiment can be transformed into an argument in formal logic language and
therefore the source of the new knowledge that is created in a thought experiment and
its credibility lies in the assumptions of the argument and the derivation rules of logic
that lead, while preserving truth values, from true assumptions to true conclusions.16
Thought experiments create new knowledge about reality because the source of the
truth and justification of the assumptions is our empirical experience in the world, and
the logical derivation from these assumptions creates true and justified conclusions
about reality.17
Tetlock and Belkin deal with counterfactual thought experiments in the
politico-military realm (they do not deal with dynamic war games but with writing
and analyzing counterfactual scenarios). Although they do not explicitly say it like
Norton, the arguments approach can be easily identified in their writings. They call
thought experiments “counterfactual arguments”.18 They claim that in the many cases
in which thought experiments are aimed to examine a scientific theory (for example,
in history, political science or international relations), the structure of the
counterfactual argument is identical to the structure of Hempel’s DeductiveNomological scientific explanation – the assumptions of the argument are covering
laws, the counterfactual scenario describes antecedent conditions and from both one
can deduce counterfactual conclusions.19
In other cases, that less relate to scientific theories and more to perceptions and
opinions that are more freely and less formally formulated, thought experiments are
also aimed, according to Tetlock and Belkin, at examining the logical completeness
16
Norton, 'On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the Argument?', 2.
Ibid., 5.
18
Tetlock & Belkin, 'Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological
and Psychological Perspectives', 6.
19
Ibid., 8-9.
17
8
and inner coherence of these concepts and to reveal the underlying contradictions and
tensions within them.
Gendler argues against the arguments approach to scientific thought
experiments and represents an approach that we are calling the experiential approach.
According to this approach, thought experiments are real experiments, which create
new knowledge based on a quasi-sensory experience, experienced by the person who
conducts the experiment following her “quasi-observational” contemplation of a
mental image that the thought experiment creates. The person who conducts the
experiment “observes” the reality image of the scenario, asks herself: “what would I
say or do were I to encounter such circumstances?” and then supplies an answer to
this question.20
From where does this answer come and what is the basis for its credibility? Gendler
claims that inside our heads there are stores of unarticulated knowledge which is not
organized under any conceptual or theoretical framework. A thought experiment can
tap into it and give us access to information that was there all along, but we did not
know how to organize it and systemize it in a way that makes sense to us.21 This is
Gendler's explanation for how thought experiments provide new knowledge without
new empirical input – they make us conceptualize and articulate new knowledge or
reject shaky or even false theoretical commitments in light of newly systematized but
previously unarticulated knowledge that we already had.22
How does all this happen? The observation of imaginary scenarios stimulates quasisensory intuitions based on which we consolidate new beliefs about reality. These
beliefs are not created through a logical deductive process (like in arguments) but
through a quasi-observational process (similar to that which occurs in real empirical
experiments) that observes the mental image that the scenario creates in our minds.23
A similar approach to that of Gendler regarding scientific thought
experiments, can be identified in what other thinkers say about the experience in war
games.
20
Gendler, 'Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiments', 414.
Ibid., 415.
22
Ibid., 415.
23
Gendler, 'Thought Experiments Rethought and Reperceived'', 1162.
21
9
Herman, Frost and Kurz claim that a person cannot, using any meticulous
analysis or vivid imagination, create by herself understandings that she cannot
conceive of. A war game is a powerful tool that allows players to observe the
imaginary future that the scenario describes, experience through it the future in a
riskless environment, learn from what they experience and then apply what they
learned in order to shape actual reality.24 The players are usually experts in the
relevant areas, and their expertise and former rich experience is essential to this
process, since the construction of new knowledge is based on the encounter of the
player's prior knowledge and experience with the direct experience created in the
game.25
Brewer and Shubik claim that a war game should not be seen as a tool for
scientific proof, but as a process of discovery in which imagination and innovation
play an important role.26
Weber claims that writing and analyzing counterfactual scenarios can assist in
generating conceptual change by facilitating creativity, freedom of thought and
disentanglement from conceptual chains, and can focus thought and attention on the
unpredictable and surprising.27 Much like Gendler, Weber describes in a picturesque
way how this process of change occurs.
He asks the reader to imagine populations of ideas that live together. Some live in
harmony and cooperation and some compete with each other, some subside and
vanish while others suddenly emerge. This variety of ideas is necessary to the survival
of a human society that lives in an uncertain environment and faces an uncertain
future. Because innovations emerge rarely, the variety of ideas serves as a repository
of “solutions” and alternative courses of action, to which people have access to in
times of need.
A gradual change in the populations of ideas is interesting and important, yet
common. A more exciting phenomenon happens when there is a sudden and rapid
explosion in the size of a particular population. Weber calls this explosion “idea
24
Herman, Frost & Kurz, Wargaming for Leaders, 3-4.
Ibid., 18.
26
Brewer & Shubik, The War Game, 91.
27
Weber, 'Counterfactuals, Past and Future', 287.
25
11
takeoff” and says that when it happens it causes a dramatic conceptual shift that can
rapidly and unpredictably change the course of events in the world.
According to Weber, a creative use of war games can cause such dramatic changes.28
He, like Brewer and Shubik, claims that war games are not about scientific proofs.
Their role is to facilitate creative thinking and open minds to possibilities. Most
people carry with them a load of assumptions with regard to the future from which
they can only marginally deviate. War games and good scenarios challenge this fixed
thinking by focusing people on discrepancies, on events that they find it hard to
explain and give meaning to under their accepted conceptual frameworks, and on
everything that makes them feel uncomfortable.29
One can find similarity between the experiential approach to war games and
thought experiments, which accentuates experience as the main ingredient of
knowledge development, and between Wittgenstein’s approach to the meaning of
words or expressions in a language and to the process of learning and developing
language and perceptions.30
In his famous book Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein claims that the
meaning of an expression is determined by its concrete usage, that is, by the
“language game” in which it functions. Our language, and largely also our theories
and perceptions, are built and developed out of our experience with them and out of
our practical use of them. The meaning of words in a language is not determined by a
set of sterile rules that is detached from reality but by language games that are tools
for comparison, experimentation and friction with reality, and as such, they shed light
on the actual meaning of our words and of our theories and perceptions.
Of these two approaches – the arguments approach and the experiential
approach – it seems that the experiential approach gives the more plausible response
to the epistemological problem posed by war games.
First, it is hard to think that war games can be transformed into formal logical
arguments. They are mainly based on informal and intuitive human interaction,
28
Ibid., 273-275.
Ibid., 279.
30
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations.
29
11
among relatively large number of players that engage in a free discussion that is
mostly not articulated in a precise manner and cannot be systematically and formally
constructed.
Second, there are many who claim that even scientific thought experiments,
which rely on a relatively stable scientific theoretical background, can have fallible
results. How much more so when considering war games and politico-military
thought experiments, which rely on a much less stable and established background,
and especially when they deal with the strategic level, which is more abstract and
relates to a constantly changing and contextual reality.
Perla claims that one should not regard war games as a method for meticulous,
quantitative or logical analysis of a problem or for a precise definition of criteria for
comparing between alternatives because they are too abstract and their results are
impossible to duplicate.31 32 Even Tetlock & Belkin, whom we identified as belonging
more to the arguments approach, say that thought experiments in the politico-military
realm, even though they are very convincing and allow people to find within
themselves ideas that are otherwise would not have been discovered, are indecisive
and do not have the logical validity of scientific thought experiments.33
Third, Weber distinguishes between two categories of problems. Problems
from the first category are solvable within the commonly accepted perception.
Problems from the second category lie beyond the boundaries of the existing
perception – things we do not know that we do not know or that we do not understand
that we do not understand.34 The arguments approach doesn’t help deal with such
problems because, by definition, these problems cannot be constructed as formal
arguments.
The experiential approach, on the other hand, gives a better understanding of
the “magic” that takes place in war games and enables new knowledge to be
31
Perla, The Art of Wargaming, 164.
The chance that two independent games will give the same results is very low to negligible. The
ability to duplicate experiment results is considered to be very basic and necessary in scientific
research.
33
Tetlock & Belkin, 'Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological
and Psychological Perspectives', 12-13.
34
Weber, 'Counterfactuals, Past and Future', 269-270.
32
12
developed in them. This knowledge is not created out of nothing – it is created in the
confluence of three main elements: the experience that the game creates; the fabric of
existing conscious knowledge, including theories, conceptions, plans and personal and
organizational experience; and a raw knowledge that exists within the players, but that
has never been processed or organized in a clear theoretical or conceptual framework.
The competition between the teams, the informal intuitive discussions, the
imagination, the creativity and the inventive skills that are reflected in a game, create
an emotional, experiential reaction which allows for reflective, associative and
insightful thinking that is sometimes accompanied by an “Aha! effect”35.
This kind of thinking focuses the attention of the player on contradictions or
discrepancies in his conceptual framework, creates new links and connections in his
existing fabric of knowledge and draws the latent raw knowledge from the depths of
his mind. When the contradictions and discrepancies are identified, when the new
links and connections in the existing fabric of knowledge are created, and when the
road to the raw latent knowledge is paved, the players, as a group, can articulate and
formulate all this more intelligibly and reorganize the newly created knowledge in a
consistent conceptual framework.
Adopting the experiential approach to knowledge development in war games
is supported and reinforced also by psychological theories, such as that of Winnicott36
and Jung37, which emphasize the importance of play as a source of human creativity
and imagination; and by more recent works such as that of Kolb38 and Mainemelis &
Ronson39, which explore the relationships between play and learning. Psychological
aspects of war games deserve a separate article, but below are some insights from
35
An "Aha! effect" is commonly experienced as a sudden understanding of a previously
incomprehensible problem or concept as a result of bringing into working memory previously
unavailable knowledge. What helps make this knowledge accessible is the relaxation of constraints.
The environment of games allows such relaxation since it is distanced from real life and thus
facilitates temporary suspension of day-to-day limitations and constraints.
36
Winnicott, Playing and Reality.
37
Jung, Jung on Active Imagination.
38
Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development; Kolb & Kolb,
'Learning to Play, Playing to Learn'.
39
Mainemelis & Ronson, 'Ideas are Born in Fields of Play: Towards a Theory of Play and Creativity in
Organizational Settings'.
13
psychological research focusing on games as a space that encourages learning and
knowledge development.
According to Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory (ELT)40, “learning” is defined as
the process of grasping and transforming experience to knowledge. This
transformation is accomplished by a learning spiral of four steps -- experiencing,
reflecting, thinking and acting, where “experience is enriched by reflection, given
meaning by thinking and transformed by action”41.
Kolb & Kolb claim that play, in its different forms such as games and role plays, is a
significant source of creativity and imagination and as such is central to the practice
of experiential learning. 42
Mainemelis & Ronson also find play a source of creativity and claim that “more often
than not, creativity is born out of … play”43. According to them, play facilitates
creativity in different ways: play provides ample room for redefinition of a situation
which increases the possibility for reframing a problem in novel ways leading to
novel solutions; play gives relative freedom from external constraints, thus decreasing
the likelihood of conceptual fixedness; the range of emotions that the play stimulates
facilitates associations between concepts that are different in their cognitive
components but are similar in their emotional components and by that, cause mental
transformation of existing knowledge into new patterns; and, play encourages
experimentation with diverse ideas and possibilities that would not be tried under
other circumstances, as well as the generation of more creative solutions by
combining elements of different solutions.44
Methodological Principles for Successful War Games
How does one know that a war game was successful and justified the resources that
were invested in it? Brewer and Shubik claim that a game is successful if an idea or a
40
Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and Development.
Kolb & Kolb, 'Learning to Play, Playing to Learn', 27.
42
Kolb & Kolb, 'Learning to Play, Playing to Learn', 26-27.
43
Mainemelis & Ronson, 'Ideas are Born in Fields of Play: Towards a Theory of Play and Creativity in
Organizational Settings', 85.
44
Mainemelis & Ronson, 'Ideas are Born in Fields of Play: Towards a Theory of Play and Creativity in
Organizational Settings', 93-97.
41
14
new way of looking at things, that was not accepted before the game, end up being
accepted and continues to be so after the game.45 Weber claims that a successful game
is one that opens the minds of people to new possibilities that were not previously
considered, and should they be realized in the future the level of surprise would be
lower.46
For war games to be successful in such ways, a few conditions must be met.
The methodological aspects of war games also deserve a separate article, but below
are several methodological aspects that are necessary for a war game to develop new
knowledge.
1. Clear definition of objectives and thorough preparation
Most who deal with the subject of war games cite the necessity of clear
objectives and the importance of a thorough preparation process. 47 This
process starts with a series of discussions with the game’s “client", the purpose
of which are to identify the problem that the game is supposed to address and
to define the objectives of the game.
The next steps in the preparation process are to design the game's
methodology, to write the opening scenario and to prepare the players and in
particular, the team leaders.48 Most important is that the methodology be
tailored to each game according to its objectives and context.
In general, the game methodology includes: determining the composition of
the playing teams in terms of its members and leaders; defining the results
each team should produce during the game and sometimes even characterizing
the thinking process the teams should go through to produce these results; and
determining how to analyze the game and its results at the end.
The team leaders should be very familiar with the game objectives and
methodology ahead of time, so they can prepare for the game if necessary, but
45
Brewer & Shubik, The War Game, 95.
Weber, 'Counterfactuals, Past and Future', 287.
47
See, for example, Perla, The Art of Wargaming, 165; Herman, Frost & Kurz, Wargaming for Leaders,
13.
48
Herman, Frost & Kurz, Wargaming for Leaders, 15.
46
15
mainly so they can effectively lead their team to achieve the game’s
objectives.
2. Creating the experience during the game
As we’ve already seen, the experience created during the game is the most
essential element for developing new knowledge. Therefore, the game
organizers must make it happen. The central factors controlling the experience
in a war game are the scenario, the actions taken by the control team, the
composition of the teams and the environment in which the game is
conducted.
The opening scenario, which sets the stage for the events that follow, should
challenge the players to creative “outside-the-box” thinking that breaches the
boundaries of their existing conceptual framework. The control team needs to
preserve this challenge during the game through the evolving scenario, the
events that are introduced into it for the different teams, the tempo of events
and the alertness and competitive spirit that all these create for the teams.
The teams should be as diverse as possible in terms of professional
background, academic disciplines, gender, and learning styles49 to make a
broad variety of opinions and points of view available to the players. Herman,
Frost and Kurz claim that a war game involves experts who wish to solve a
problem they share but that no one can deal with or solve by himself.50
Moreover, they say, each team should have representatives of each area of the
organization’s knowledge, opinions and needs,51 so the problems can be
examined from different angles and the achieved solution be as complete as
possible. Multiple viewpoints in a team usually fosters disagreements,
skepticism and criticism, which fertilize and enhance the learning process. In
particular, games allow their participants to say things they might not say in
other contexts.
49
Kayes, Kayes, & Kolb, 'Experiential Learning in Teams'.
Ibid.,, 4.
51
Ibid., 13.
50
16
Indeed, the environment within which the game is conducted should allow free
and open discussions between the players among themselves, and between the
players and the control team, what Kayes et al. call “the conversational
space”52.
3. ‘Post Mortem’ analysis and summation
A war game provides many opportunities for learning, both during the
preparation process and during the game itself but also, perhaps especially,
during the post-mortem analysis and summation.53
During the preparation process, the learning and knowledge development are
done by the game organizers and are related mainly to understanding the
problem that will be the crux of the game. During the game, there is a lot of
unprocessed information flowing around the different teams’ rooms and some
initial sprouts of knowledge in the heads of the players. However, these must
be assembled, consolidated and formulated to turn them into real knowledge
that can be shared with all the game participants and later with the entire
organization.
One effective way to gather knowledge during the game and to examine it
from different points of view is having observers participate.54 The observers
sit with the teams but do not take an active part as players. They are preassigned by the game organizers and are given guidance as to the “spectacles”
they should be wearing while observing the game. These spectacles should
serve the objectives of the game and the methodology of the post-mortem'
analysis.
For the 'post mortem' analysis, all the game’s participants gather together, and
the teams’ and observers’ results are presented and analyzed and initial
understandings are conceptualized and formulated. The writing of the game
summary should complete the process of conceptualizing and formulating new
knowledge that was acquired as a result of the game.
52
Kayes, Kayes, & Kolb, 'Experiential Learning in Teams', 332-333.
Perla, The Art of Wargaming, 9.
54
See, for example, McCue, The Practice of Military Experimentation, 28.
53
17
Perla says that an analysis of a war game should not be based on quantitative
data of forces, victories and losses, but on a qualitative and comprehensive
observation and contemplation of the game process, the main assumptions that
were the basis of the players’ actions, the primary decisions that were taken
within the game and the rationale behind them.55
Haffa, Patton and McCue warn those who analyze and summarize the game
against forcing their own perceptions and preferred outcome on the analysis
and summary, and from trivializing or ignoring any of the game results.56
4. Knowledge distribution and assimilation
The summary of the game and the knowledge it helped develop should of
course be distributed throughout the organization to promote organizational
learning by transforming the knowledge that was developed by a small group
of players into part of the organization’s knowledge base.
One caveat must be mentioned in this regard. Under the experiential approach
that this article suggests, the most crucial and essential element that
encourages knowledge development in a war game is the experiences the
players have during the game. The players all undergo the experience
individually and as a group, and this shared experience provides them with
common ground for articulating and formulating the new knowledge. The
summary of the game they played and the knowledge they developed together
is thus very clear and coherent to them.
A problem might arise in the distribution of the summary to other people in
the organization who did not take active part in the game and did not share the
game’s experience. They might find it hard to understand the new insights that
often conflict with and even contradict the organization’s current
understandings. This problem might prevent the new knowledge from being
accepted and assimilated in the organization and in particular from influencing
the organization's decision makers.
55
Perla, The Art of Wargaming, 10.
Haffa & Patton, 'Wargames: Winning and Losing'; McCue, The Practice of Military Experimentation,
29-30.
56
18
To minimize this problem the summary of the game must be very clear,
coherent and well written, so it will effectively convey the new knowledge to
those who did not participate. In some cases, the distribution of the summary
should be followed by a face-to-face presentation, in particular when the new
knowledge is critical to the organization’s decision-makers.
Conclusion
The main thesis of this article is that war games are a valuable tool for developing
new knowledge. They allow the participants to experience and experiment with
problems and challenges, present and future, and to examine concepts and plans in a
relatively cheap, riskless environment before devoting the entire organization and its
resources to an action from which there is no turning back.57
A war game is not just brainstorming. The competition between the teams and the
experiential and emotional friction with the dilemmas and conflicts the game provides
enhance the learning process and allow the development of understandings and
knowledge that are hard to develop any other way.58
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, a war game is not an exercise because
its objective is not the practice and acquisition of abilities and skills, but an
examination and development of thought. As such, there is no reason that the game
has to simulate or reflect any particular organizational procedure.
What is important is that the game methodology and environment create the
experience required for developing the knowledge relevant to the game’s objective.
57
58
Herman, Frost & Kurz, Wargaming for Leaders, 13.
Ibid., 22-23.
19
Bibliography
Brewer, Garry D. and Shubik, Martin, The War Game: A Critique of
Military Problem Solving (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
Brown, J. R. , The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the
Natural Sciences, [2nd Edition] (London: Routledge, 1991 [2010]).
Bunzl, Martin , 'The Logic of Thought Experiments', Synthese 106 (1996)
227-240.
Buzzoni, Marco , 'Empirical Thought Experiments: A TranscendentalOperational View', in http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/4702/1/Empirical_Thought_Experiments._A_Transcendental
-Operational_View.pdf (2009).
Einstein, A., Podolsky, B., and Rosen, N., 'Can Quantum-Mechanical
Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?',
Physical Review 47 (1935) 777-780.
Gendler, Tamar Szabo, 'Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific
Thought Experiments', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49/3
(1998) 397-424.
Gendler, Tamar Szabo, 'Thought Experiments Rethought – and
Reperceived', Philosophy of Science 71 (2004) 1152-1163.
Gendler, Tamar Szabo, 'Philosophical Thought Experiments,
Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium', Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXI
(2007) 68-89.
Gilad, Benjamin, Business War Games (NJ: Career Press, 2009).
Haffa, Robert P., and Patton, James H., 'Wargames: Winning and
Losing', Parameters (Spring 2001) 29-43.
Herman, M., Frost, M., Kurz, R., Wargaming for Leaders: Strategic
Decision Making from the Battlefield to the Boardroom (NY:McGraw-Hill,
2009).
Huizinga, John, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971).
IDF-TRADOC, IDF Dictionary (1998) (in Hebrew).
Jung, Carl, Jung on Active Imagination, (Princeton, 1997).
Kayes, Anna B., Kayes, Christopher D., and Kolb, David A., 'Experiential Learning in
21
Teams', Simulation & Gaming 36 (2005) 330-354.
Killebrew, Robert B., 'Learning from Wargames: A Status Report',
Parameters (Spring 1998) 122-35.
Kolb, David A., Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning and
Development (NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).
Kolb, Alice Y. and Kolb, David A., 'Learning to Play, Playing to Learn: A Case Study of
a Ludic Learning Space', Journal of Organizational Change Management 23/1
(2010) 26-50.
Longley-Brown, G. J. H., 'The Value of Wargaming to the Army',
The British Army Review 129 (2002) 27-46.
Mainemelis, Charalampos and Ronson, Sarah, 'Ideas are Born in Fields of Play:
Towards a Theory of Play and Creativity in Organizational Settings', Research
in Organizational Behavior 27 (2006) 81-131.
McAllister, James W., 'Thought Experiments and the Belief in
Phenomena', Philosophy of Science 71 (2004) 1164-1175.
McCue, Brian, The Practice of Military Experimentation (Center for Naval
Analysis, 2003).
Norton, John D., 'On Thought Experiments: Is There More to the
Argument?', Philosophy of Science 71/5 (2004) 1139-1151.
Perla Peter, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobyists (US Naval
Institute Press, 1990).
Putnam, H., 'The Meaning of ‘Meaning',' in Philosophical Papers Vol 2: Mind,
Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Tetlock, Philip E., and Belkin, Aaron, Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and
Psychological Perspectives (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
Tetlock, Philip E., and Belkin, Aaron, 'Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and
Psychological Perspectives', in Tetlock & Belkin, Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and
Psychological Perspectives, 3-38.
Turing, A. M., 'On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem', Proceedings of the London Mathematical
21
Society 2/42 (1936) 230-265.
Winnicott, D. W., Playing and Reality (NY: Routledge, 1971).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (Basil Blackwell Publishing,
1953/2001).
Weber Steven, 'Counterfactuals, Past and Future', in Tetlock & Belkin, Counterfactual
Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and
Psychological Perspectives, 268-288.