The Price of Promotion: Political Careers and
Marriage Stability
Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne
Women’s Lobby Conference, Kungälv 2015
Gender and Career Di¤erences
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Women lack power, economic resources, and status - why?
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Gender equality in career attainments is the "last chapter of
the grand gender convergence" (Goldin 2014)
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In politics, descriptive evidence shows that women are trading
o¤ family life for appointments
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women politicians are less likely to be married and more likely
to be childless (Childs 2014, Dodson 1997, Carroll and
Sanbonmatsu 2013)
Our Paper
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Analyze how a promotion impacts on the probability to remain
married
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Empirical focus on political promotions, corroborate with
evidence from the private sector
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analysis by gender and parenthood (0-17 yrs)
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Descriptive evidence that women combine dual earner family
with top job, men do not
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Results show that mothers divorce rate doubles, while the risk
falls among men
Economic "Intuition" about Promotion and Divorce
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Promotions (more work hours and higher wage) trigger role
cycling/re-negotiation of tasks
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Renegotiation to buy home production from the
non-promoted spouse
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Easier to re-negotiate for promoted men
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gender norms on relative earnings reduce scope of negotiation
(Brines 1994, Coltrane 2000, Akerlof and Kranton 2000,
Greenstein 2000, Bittman et al. 2003, Bertrand et al. 2013)
Divorce if bargaining fails, especially in families with children
(role overload) (Skinner 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981,
Breen and Cooke 2005)
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outside option gives more utility than the relationship
Our Case: Political Promotions
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Mayors (KSO) vs. Opposition Leaders in 290 municipalities
and 6 election periods
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top individuals in largest majority and opposition party parties
20% higher wage, plus higher status
strong power concentration in the Mayor (Nilsson 2001,
Nilsson 2008, Jonson 2003)
mayor works more (52 hrs/week vs. 38 hrs/ in 2014)
no gender di¤erences in work load and self-rated in‡uence
Work conditions become more "extreme" (Hewlitt and Luce
2006)
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unpredictable work ‡ow; large work burden; events outside of
regular o¢ ce hours; 24/7 availability; budgetary and employee
responsibilities
Extreme Top Job
"Many mayors have a problem in viewing the appointment as a
job, in particular with regard to the limits on what needs to be
done. The work load is limitless. Work time is only bounded by
your family situation and your own health" (Nilsson 2001, 181).
Our Data
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Balanced yearly panel data for both politician and spouse
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Connect to register data
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list placement and soc.sec # on ballot
earnings and sickness absence
number of children and their age
no missing information, highly reliable, not self-reported
Additional data from the whole private sector, including CEO
variable
Summary Statistics, Full Sample (1991-2010)
Elected
Women
Men
Mayors
Women
Men
Share
Married
Divorced
Children (0-17)
Children (0-3)
Parental leave share
Earnings (100’s SEK)
Politician's earnings share
Age
0.41
0.61
0.17
0.36
0.08
0.75
2112
0.53
50.28
0.59
0.71
0.10
0.36
0.08
0.22
2392
0.61
52.68
0.25
0.61
0.21
0.28
0.03
0.82
4500
0.67
52.52
0.75
0.78
0.09
0.33
0.05
0.13
4578
0.73
53.62
Observations
32149
46150
376
1106
Summary Statistics, Main Estimation Sample
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Sample restrictions
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no previous experience as mayor
"with children" = children under 18
drop if age > 65 during the election period
Mayors
Opposition Leader
Women
Men
Women
Men
Share
0.23
0.77
0.25
0.75
Divorce during period
0.26
0.07
0.11
0.08
Children (0-3)
0.09
0.12
0.08
0.12
Parental leave share
0.85
0.13
0.73
0.14
Earnings (100’s SEK)
4703
4735
3703
3577
Politician's earnings share
0.61
0.73
0.59
0.67
Age
44.84
47.01
45.39
48.10
43
147
66
198
Observations
Individual Level "Event Study"
Divorced
Empirical Speci…cation
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Address selection into positions by exploiting uncertain
elections
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close (2.5 or 5 percentage points of vote share) to either the
left or right bloc winning a seat majority in the municipal
council
in close elections, the promotion is a toss up (randomization
–> we can estimate a causal e¤ect!)
compare the promoted individual to their non-promoted, but
identical, equivalent
Use simple regression to compare the probability of remaining
married
Yit = bMpt + γt + ept
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Mpt is a binary indicator for becoming mayor
Remain Married During Election Period
Women
Treatment
Obs.
Men
Treatment
Obs.
Full
Sample
5%
window
2.5 %
window
-0.152**
(0.073)
-0.111
(0.121)
-0.189
(0.190)
109
45
28
0.010
(0.028)
0.074**
(0.036)
0.124**
(0.057)
345
169
96
Remain Married During Election Period: Interaction E¤ect
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Combine the samples and add interaction term
With Children
Treatment
Woman
Treatment
*Women
Obs.
Full Sample
5 % window
2.5 %
window
0.012
(0.028)
-0.015
(0.043)
-0.163**
(0.081)
0.076**
(0.037)
-0.040
(0.080)
-0.218*
(0.129)
0.127**
(0.057)
0.017
(0.115)
-0.347**
(0.174)
454
214
124
CEOs
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Do we see the same gender di¤erence in the private labor
market?
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Examine internal promotions to CEO in …rms with more than
100 employees
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Use graphical event study
CEOs: Proportion of Divorced
Possible Mechanisms
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Role overload from partner’s failure to adjust labor supply
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Two alternative outcomes
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partner’s earnings
partner’s sick leave
Compare key descriptive statistics for those who divorce with
those who remain married
Partner’s Earnings
Partner’s Sick Leave
Descriptive Statistics Prior to Promotion
Women
Men
Divorced
Married
Divorced
Married
Previous Election
Period Outcomes
Make more
82 %
45%
100 %
94 %
Earnings share
0.63
0.51
0.71
0.72
Partner´s earnings
7.65
7.78
7.35
7.13
Share of parental leave
0.91
0.83
0.08
0.13
Conclusions
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Study women’s promotions to top post in Swedish local
politics with goal to understand gendered consequences of
promotions
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Women who make it to the top have dual earner families, men
do not
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Political promotions have a di¤erential e¤ect on politicians’
marriage stability
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women with children su¤er increased risk of divorce
men with children bene…t from lower divorce risk
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New clues to women’s absence from top positions and men’s
incentives to seek them
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Demonstration e¤ects constrain the candidate pool
Conclusions
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Mechanisms, why do women divorce and men do not
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no evidence of "husband should earn more" break-point (but
possibly for status?)
divorcing women made more before promotion, suggests lack
of "happy divorce" e¤ect
politician husbands do not reduce work hours
likely role overload in women politicians’families, husbands’
health deteriorates
Address requirements of top jobs to facilitate combination
with dual-earner family structure