THE USE OF THE EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER PROGRAM IN BRAZIL:
A SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF AN ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL
FUNDING SYSTEM IN BRAZIL
a thesis presented to
the faculty of
the Center of International Studies of Ohio University
in partial fulfillment
of requirements for the degree
Master of Arts
Thiérs Hofman do Bom Conselho
June 2005
This thesis entitled
THE USE OF THE EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER PROGRAM IN BRAZIL:
A SOCIO-ECONOMIC STUDY OF AN ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL
FUNDING SYSTEM IN BRAZIL
BY
THIÉRS HOFMAN DO BOM CONSELHO
has been approved for
the Department of Latin America Studies and
the Center for International Studies by
Ariaster Chimeli
Professor of Economics
Josep Rota
Director, Center for International Studies
Abstract
BOM CONSELHO, THIÉRS H. M.A. June 2005. Center for International Studies.
The Use of the Educational Voucher Program in Brazil: A Socio-Economic Study of an
Alternative Educational Funding System in Brazil (113 pp.)
Director of Thesis: Ariaster Chimeli
This study analyzes the potential probability of an implementation of a voucher
program in Brazil and its states. By comparing 31 experiences of educational voucher
system around the world, a success/failure index was created to estimate the variables
which are determinants for the success or failure of those existing voucher programs. The
central question asked is whether an educational voucher system is likely to be successful
in improving Brazilian education. The research hypothesis is that Brazil fulfills the
conditions for a successful voucher system. Probit regression analysis was used to
estimate a regression model. Using the estimated model and the corresponding socioeconomic variable for Brazil, the present study estimates the probability of success of a
voucher system in the country and its states. The results indicate that Brazil seems to
fulfill the requirements for the successful implementation of a voucher program.
Approved:
Ariaster Chimeli
Professor of Economics
Table of Contents
4
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... 6
List of Figures ..................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 8
1.
Educational Voucher Programs and their effects on Education ............................... 11
1.1
Public Education............................................................................................... 11
1.2
Educational Vo uchers ....................................................................................... 12
1.3
Voucher Objectives and Principles................................................................... 14
1.4
Kinds of voucher ............................................................................................... 15
1.5
The Effects of Vouchers ................................................................................... 16
1.6
Supporters of Voucher System ......................................................................... 18
1.7
Arguments against Vouchers ............................................................................ 19
1.8
Designing vouchers........................................................................................... 21
1.9
Financing, Regulating and Implementing vouchers ......................................... 22
2. Evaluating experience around the world ................................................................... 25
2.1
Experiences from Developed Countries ........................................................... 28
2.1.1
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States ....................................................... 28
2.1.2
Cleveland, Ohio, United States................................................................. 30
2.1.3
New York City, New York, United States.................................................. 31
2.1.4
Sweden ...................................................................................................... 33
2.1.5
Canada...................................................................................................... 34
2.1.6
United Kingdom........................................................................................ 36
2.1.7
Netherlands ............................................................................................... 36
2.2
Experiences from Developing Countries .......................................................... 37
3.
2.2.1
Chile .......................................................................................................... 37
2.2.2
Colombia................................................................................................... 39
2.2.3
Bangladesh................................................................................................ 40
Institutional and Educational Environment in Brazil................................................ 42
3.1
Historical Background ...................................................................................... 43
3.2
Organization and Hierarchy.............................................................................. 45
3.3
The Context of Brazilian Educational System.................................................. 47
3.4
Educational Funding and Finance Assistance Programs .................................. 51
3.5
Quality versus quantity ..................................................................................... 54
3.6
Evaluations for the Educational system............................................................ 56
4. Educational Voucher in Brazil .................................................................................. 58
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Research Question and Scope ........................................................................... 58
Data ................................................................................................................... 59
Method .............................................................................................................. 65
Estimation ......................................................................................................... 67
5
4.5
Results and Implications ................................................................................... 71
4.6
Educational vouchers in Brazil ......................................................................... 74
4.7
Assumptions and Limitations ........................................................................... 78
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 80
References ......................................................................................................................... 83
Appendix........................................................................................................................... 95
Appendix A................................................................................................................... 96
Appendix B................................................................................................................... 98
Appendix C ................................................................................................................... 99
Appendix D................................................................................................................. 109
Appendix E ................................................................................................................. 112
6
List of Tables
Table 1: Vouchers and Voucher- like Programs in European and OECD Countries ........ 26
Table 2: Vouchers and Voucher- like Programs in Deve loping Countries ....................... 27
Table 3: Brazilian Educational System............................................................................. 46
Table 4: Success/Failure index for voucher programs around the world (Failure=0 and
Success=1) ................................................................................................................ 63
Table 5: Output Results from Probit regression ............................................................... 70
Table 6: Marginal effects of each explanatory variable.................................................... 71
Table 7: Probability of success of voucher programs by state.......................................... 76
7
List of Figures
Figure 1: Probability of Success of Voucher Programs by Brazilian States..................... 78
8
Introduction
In this thesis, I study whether an educational voucher system is likely to be
successful in improving Brazilian education. The present study aims primarily at
investigating the determinants of success and failure of educational voucher programs. In
order to answer my central question, this thesis attempts to develop a benchmark model
for success or failure of voucher programs, us ing information from 31 educational
voucher experiences around the world.
Alternatives for education are a very interesting subject to discuss. Education has
been acknowledged as a fundamental success factor for individuals as well as for entire
nations. Education has played an important role in most countries around the current
globalized world. It is also well known that investment in human capital pays
considerable returns even in the short term (Becker, 1993). The demand for education has
increased sharply for nations and individuals. The interest in education has also attracted
the attention of governments and societies. Governments have been the main responsible
for deliveries education to the population. Since governments have often not been able to
fully provide and manage the educational system to attend society’s demand, discussions
about alternatives to finance education have gained much importance around the world.
Furthermore, for most countries, education has been mainly managed and
financed by the public sector. As educational public institutions have a large share of the
educational market, government actions toward education have a significant impact in
society. Therefore, national educational reforms have been implemented in several
countrie s in order to address society’s needs. A recent alternative method to manage and
finance education has spurred substantial debate around the world: the educational
9
voucher.
Education in Brazil relies on a centralized and highly complex system of
educationa l institutions. Brazil is an economically emergent country, and because of its
continental dimensions, the problem of providing quality education for the entire
population has concerned politicians and society. In addition, the country is known by its
significant large income distribution disparities. Thus, in order to have a more egalitarian
society, Brazil has tried several programs to improve its educational system. As the
problem seems to persist, alternative proposals for public education have again been
debated in the country. In this debate, vouchers have gained ground among Brazilian
politicians, academics and the population as well (Barros et al., 2000; Zinder, 1998).
To define an ideal educational program, policymakers must address both financial
and quality aspects correctly and carefully. As Brazilian education faces difficulties in
both financing and providing quality education, voucher has been considered among
politicians and academics as a possible alternative.
Educational reforms through vouchers need to consider and adapt to each
country’s characteristics (e.g.: culture, legislation, economy, etc). The design of a model
for a voucher system must take all these different factors into consideration. Therefore,
the development of a universal model is perhaps highly improbable and undesirable. On
one hand, vouchers are said to efficiently allocate public resources for education.
Vouchers increase market competition for educational institutions, which may improve
the quality of the services provided for the population. On the other hand, equivocated
implementation of educational reforms might reinforce segregation.
In order to investigate the potential of educational vouches to be successful in
10
Brazil, the present study intends to draw a ‘big picture’ of how successfully vouchers
have been implemented around the world. By analyzing a recent literature, I aim at
understanding the determinants for success and failure of 31 voucher programs
implemented around the world. The present study estimates a probit model to measure
the probability of successful implementation of vouchers. Based on this model, I assess
the probability of success of a voucher program in Brazil, as well in each of its states.
This thesis is divided into four mains sections. In Chapter 1, I review the
complexity of the issues involving educational vouchers by explaining their history, their
characteristics and their implications to education. This section aims at discussing the
main reasons why vouchers have been a hotly debatable subject around the world. In
Chapter 2, I assess the educational voucher experiences around the world by discussing
some important cases of educational vouchers implemented in recent years in developed
and developing countries. In Chapter 3, the Brazilian institutional and educational
systems are presented. This chapter provides a historical background of the educational
system in Brazil, and discusses its main characteristics and current problems. In Chapter
4, the model, and the analysis of the data and the results are shown in the light of my
research question. This section presents my findings and interprets them in light of the
literature. Finally, the last chapter is the conclusion, where I discuss the results and
problems encountered, and indicate how this work may contribute to policymaking to the
extent that future implementation of a voucher system in Brazil might be considered.
11
1.
1.1
Educational Voucher Programs and their effects on Education
Public Education
Public education is one of the main government responsibilities in most of the
countries around the world. Like free public health care and habitation, public education
with quality is a common good that nations want to provide for their population. For
centuries, governments have tried several ways to finance education for the population,
and several alternatives to do so have emerged. However, financing common public
goods has proved to be complex for it is difficult to find a consensus point among social,
economic and political interests. Conflicts of interests in addition to the increase of
population number and income inequalities permeate the problem of financing education
(Gradstein, 2003).
Governments have provided public education by allocating tax revenues paid by
the population to the educational system. Gauri and Vawda (2003) argue that public
education is usually centralized, has a national curriculum, and the government finances
the system paying costs of operation, maintenance, and capital structure. This formula
has proved not to be efficient, leading some citizens to find alternative ways to finance a
better education for their children. Since taxpayers have become more conscientious
about their rights along the years, the population has claimed their rights, pressuring
representatives and legislators to find a solution and provide free education with quality.
In some countries, public education is still not available for the entire population. For
these countries, the problem of education is lager and aggravates along the years
12
(Gradstein, 2003).
In this thesis I will investigate a relatively unexplored and often controversial
means of financing education, namely the educational voucher system. I will investigate
the determinants of success of the voucher system using experiences around the world
and explore its potential in Brazil. However, before doing so, it is instructive to describe
this system in more details.
1.2
Educational Vouchers
In general terms, vouchers for education can be any kind of governmental subsidy
given to students, who in turn, will be able to choose their school in accordance to their
preferences (Friedman, 1962). The term “voucher” originated from real physical
vouchers given directly to families, which could be used to pay for food, education or
health services. The term “educational voucher” was associated with the use of physical
coupons given to parents to fully or partially compensate them for the cost of their
children’s education at public or private schools (King et al, 1997). Governments
regulate, manage and distribute vouchers for the population through educational voucher
programs. In fact, most voucher programs do not use physical coupons. Nevertheless, the
idea of portability and freedom of choice gave this name for programs with a similar
concept. Consequently, some voucher programs are usually categorized as a kind of
portable scholarship.
Vouchers represent a direct transference from public funds to educate a child.
13
Each country has adopted techniques which best fit its cultural, social, economic and
political structure. For that reason, modern vouchers use different ways to transfer funds
to parents. In reference to different authors (Patrinos, 2001; West, 1997; Weidrich, 2003;
and King et al, 1997), this funding system can be classified in different categories such as
voucher, quasi- voucher or subsidy programs. The fine line of distinction of each category
depends on the definition for voucher program used by the author. Thus, educational
vouchers could be broadly defined as direct transference of educational funds to the
parents of the child being educated as opposed to public schools (Weidrich, 2003).
According to King et al (1997), the main purpose of educational vouchers is to
increase parents’ freedom to choose the school they prefer for their children, where the
government transfers its autonomy to parents and students by allowing them to choose
among schools. Most educational voucher programs are government subsidies designed
to provide education for low- income students. The use of taxpayer money to finance
education in private institutions is highly controversial and creates hot socio-economic
and political debates.
There are several kinds of voucher programs, and consequently many ways to use
public money for financing public education. Many scholars qualify the existing
programs in different categories according to their own features and specifications. Even
though the idea emerged in the 1960s, the educational voucher programs are relative new,
and most of them started in the 1990s. For that reason, considerable research and
academic work on the subject is still in progress and with inconclusive information,
leaving space for questions and debates about the advantages and disadvantages of
voucher schemes. There is also no specific formula or design for a voucher program
14
because each country has adapted the initial voucher idea of Friedman (1962) to their
reality, structure and culture of that population.
1.3
Voucher Objectives and Principles
Despite of the number of different voucher schemes around the world, the main
goal of all voucher systems is to provide an efficient, high quality and competitive system
of education with a higher level of freedom of choice.
According to King et al (1997) and West (1997), voucher programs are designed
to provide parental choice, reinforcing the parental authority over their children’s
education. Based on the idea that public schools are monopolies, voucher programs
instigate and stimulate competition among educational institutions, pressuring public
schools to compete with each other, and also with private schools. The pressure of market
competition challenges schools to increase quality, to reduce costs, and to produce
innovation in teaching and management. Moreover, human beings usually aspire for
shaping their own fate. They want to have opportunities to achieve personal objectives of
which education is one of them. Thus, voucher schemes may help promote equality of
opportunity, providing the marginalized population access to better schools.
1.4
Kinds of voucher
15
Vouchers are flexible instruments and can assume different forms adapting to
each country, state or city. As specified by Milton & Rose D. Friedman Foundation
(2005), vouchers can be divided into groups in accordance to the way that funds are dealt
with. Most common kinds of vouchers are universal, targeted, tax-funded, and
independent schools.
Universal vouchers allow parents to directly use the educational fund per student
provided by the government in schools of their choice. All students receive an amount
corresponding to their age group and the cost of education. Parents may choose any
educational institution including public, private, independent or religious. In this
modality, government assumes the responsibility of financing education rather tha n
operating schools.
Targeted vouchers are widely used around the world. They have the same
characteristics of universal vouchers but targeted vouchers are applicable only to a
minority group or a small part of the population. Targeted vouchers have been created to
correct inequalities of the educational system or other disparities found in that particular
country, state, or city. The government transfers funds to minority groups such as lowincome families, allowing them to have access to the same education of privileged
groups.
Tax- funded schemes are used when the government subsidizes education by
repaying parents through income tax, deduction or credit. Parents are allowed to claim a
deduction, credit or refund for educational expenses including those with tuition, books,
supplies and transportation. These schemes allow claiming for a full or partial refund
16
for approved expenses.
Independent and charter schools represent another type of voucher program.
These schools receive a certain amount of money from the government according to the
number of students enrolled. “Failing school” programs allow parents to use vouchers
transferring their children to better schools when public schools are identified as failing
schools. Finally, there are also privately funded vouchers, which are common (for
example, the Florida’s McKay voucher program).
1.5
The Effects of Vouchers
According to Guari and Vawda (2003), public educational systems are structured
to be centralized under the education ministry department, which formulates and
regulates a standardized national curriculum. Such systems pay high costs for
constructing, maintaining and operating public schools, as well managing teachers and
other staff. The government has to evaluate the performance of those schools and
students. It has to control the attendance of the students and participation of the parents
and family into the learning process.
In general, public education represents a monopoly and is plagued with several
inefficiencies. Oftentimes, public schools have problems with teachers and staff without
motivation to improve, administrators not interacting with students’ families, excessive
costs and parents not participating in their children’s education.
One idea behind the introduction of voucher programs is the simple fact that
17
public schools enjoy a monopoly status in terms of enrollments in the educational sector.
In reference to Becker (1993) and some microeconomic principles, monopolies
institutions are not efficient because they do not allocate resources so as to minimize
social costs and do not provide high quality services. Voucher programs allow students to
choose their educational services, thus introducing competition into the educational
market.
Consequently, the family’s choice of schools is expected to lead to improved
quality in both public and private schools. Furthermore, with the voucher program,
parents have the opportunity to choose the kind of education provided for their children.
The discussion about vouchers involves the management of public money coming
from income taxes and allocated to education. Parents receive one voucher with a specific
amount and give this voucher directly to the school they choose to enroll their children.
This school will receive the money from the government through this voucher. The
proper management and disbursement of this fund gives the incentives for schools in both
sectors to invest in quality education in order to compete for more students and more
vouchers.
Levin (2000) argues that the advent of educational vouchers has generated
considerable controversy. Advocates argue that citizens need the right of choice. This
right can be given by educational vouchers, which would stimulate the educational
market to compete, and consequently, improve school’s efficiency in spending public
money. Detractors claim that educational vouchers would be primarily used to generate
business profits for private institutions. Since the government has the obligation to fund
public schools, government expenditures on education would also increase because of 18
an extra cost to maintain the voucher for private institutions would result. This additional
cost represents a reduction of the amount that could be used to provide better public
educational services, increasing the inequities of educational outcomes.
1.6
Supporters of Voucher System
Friedman (1962) presented the idea that vouchers would bring efficiency to the
educational market because voucher programs would create competition among schools.
Educational voucher programs are one of the most controversial school-choice
alternatives. However, public support has increased along the years. Parental choice is a
strong argument toward this alternative, especially when vouchers allow their children to
enroll into private or religious schools.
Supporters of voucher systems argue that voucher programs will allow poor
families to have access to better education. Such right of choice is enjoyed only for
families with higher income levels. Voucher programs allow poor families to send their
children to better schools escaping from low-quality schools. Advocates claim that an
increase in competition caused by voucher schools would lead public institutions to
improve their quality of education or they would leave the education market when they
fail to do so. Other believers in voucher plans argue that private school are more efficient,
and aggregate other values not found in public institutions, such as family or religious
orientation. As a consequence, they claim that private institutions would teach
appropriate values and improve academic achievement.
Advocates claim that vouchers can contribute to personal development.
19
According to West (1997), this principle is based on the conviction of people aspiring to
control their own destiny. The possib ility of choice stimulates their interest, participation,
motivation and commitment. The right of choice challenges the schools pressuring them
to innovate, reduce costs, increase quality of education and improve the dynamics of
professional innovation. They believe that public and private schools have the same
potential to grow with the introduction of vouchers.
Moreover, advocates also highlight the potential to equalize opportunities, which
are very restricted for the poor population in developing countries. Equality in
opportunities is a logical consequence of all other arguments presented before. Usually,
supporters are referring to opportunities in accessing private education. They assert poor
students in private schools tend to achieve better results and demonstrate more motivation
in learning.
1.7
Arguments against Vouchers
One of the arguments against vouchers is the assumption that money drained from
public schools increases the inequalities between public and private. As a consequence,
higher cost students, such as those who are less able, disruptive or with mental or
physical disabilities will be relegated to public schools, which in turn, will have fewer
resources to deal with such students. They argue that voucher programs will be selective
in favor of most highly motivated students, and will avoid high cost students. Other
critics claim that vouchers violate church-state separation. However, some of the biggest
concerns are the capacity of private institutions, their selective admission policies and 20
government influence in institution’s issues.
According to Barros et al. (2000), vouchers can eliminate the autonomy of the
government. They also eliminate the government’s responsibility in redistributing public
goods, and create a more complex system with multiple people in the process of decision.
The parental choice will increase the rivalry between public and private sector. Some
suspect that parental choice is not a rational process and usually is made based on
emotions. For that reason, parental choice could be inefficient, allocating resources to
schools with dubious quality. Asymmetric information about school services may also
cause distortions in the choice process.
Other assumption is the flexibility of time and financial resources of parents to
take their children to schools at distant places. Most poor families do not have available
time and money to take them to school or to distant neighborhoods. Thus, they tend to
choose schools near their houses, even though these schools are inefficient and provide
bad quality education.
A related argument by opponents of vouchers is that a free market would lead to
discrimination on grounds of race or disability. West (1997) argues that voucher
programs would lead to racial or social segregation because of the selective entering
exams of private schools. Such exams will select only the good students, and will exclude
high cost students, or those with real problems of learning.
1.8
Designing vouchers
21
Policymakers should design and evaluate voucher programs taking into
consideration aspects such as equity, productive efficiency, social cohesion and freedom
to choose. Government and society should also be able to finance, regulate and support
voucher programs (Belfield & Levin, 2002). Policy issues around educational voucher
plans are complex and should reflect the balance of all those criteria, especially when
they are intended to be implemented in developing countries where economic resources
are not abundant.
According to Belfield and Levin (2002), policymakers must design voucher
programs aiming to achieve maximum efficiency in the educational system in order to
improve student academic results. An educational system is efficient when the
government can provide education with the best quality possible given the available
resources. This assumption implies increasing educational productivity through market
competition among schools created by the use of vouchers.
As public common goods, educational systems must be an egalitarian and uniform
system (Gradstein, 2003). However, it is not the reality faced among public schools
around the world. Voucher opponents claim that such a program will reinforce
inequalities and segregation because most private schools are selective in terms of new
students’ admission. Voucher proponents suggest that voucher flexibility should help
families to transfer their child from bad or failing schools to better institutions with
qualified education. The ability to choose will help more students to access some
opportunities and resources available for only part of the society. Voucher design and
policy must be careful creating an instrument to bring equitable education instead of
22
increasing inequalities in society (Belfield and Levin 2002).
Das (2004) reinforce the necessity of achieving an egalitarian system to lead
education to a better level by efficiently allocating available resources. Equity on
education should be a democratic process incorporating social, economic and political
participation of society. Voucher policies must be democratic where every student has the
right to have access to the same education, without discriminatory regulations or limited
alternatives. Social unity and public support is an important factor to increase success of
any educational reform.
One of the main issues surrounding voucher policies is the degree of freedom
created by this instrument. Voucher proponents emphasize the freedom of choice as the
main idea of vouchers, and educational choice will bring equilibrium to an unbalanced
and inequitable educational system introducing competition among schools. Another
argument is that vouchers allow parents to choose education according to their values,
culture, race or ideology. Furthermore, Guari and Vawda (2003) alert policymakers about
the implementation of other important issues about vouchers, such as student
performance evaluation, regulation a curriculum, establishment of a financial strategy,
and management and control of the system.
1.9
Financing, Regulating and Implementing vouchers
Belfield and Levin (2002) list several questions that policymakers should ask
before creating voucher programs. Policymakers should weigh each criterion above
according to the real purpose of such educational reform and the characteristics,
23
structure and culture of the country, region, state or city.
As to the financing of vouchers, policymakers must determine the correct amount
of money which can maximize the results of the program. The amount should be in
accordance with the desired objective. The financial support provided to families should
ensure enough money to address equity and to stimulate schools and families
participation. Also, the value of the voucher should not be excessive because it would be
costly to administer, monitor and evaluate. Increase in costs wo uld not be efficient.
Vouchers could finance tuition partly or fully, with standard values per student or special
amount according to child necessities such as disabilities. Governments should also
decide whether it will allow schools to charge parents additional fees for special services.
Successful voucher programs should be well regulated. Regulation must address
financing in detail, specifying the main issues such as the value of voucher, who is
eligible to receive it, admission rules, and participating schools. Policymakers must also
regulate the basis of a common or flexible curriculum, selective or lottery admission
procedures, and the rights of families, students and schools. Regulation must define the
administrative processes, as well as performance evaluations of students and schools.
To complete regulation, government should ensure the existence of support
services in order to promote effective of voucher programs. Services of transportation,
administration, evaluation and inspection of schools are very important to create
conditions for fair market competition.
According to Belfield and Levin (2002), the design of a program is a crucial
factor of success, but does not guarantee continued success. After implementation of the
program, control and evaluation must be done. However, voucher schemes must be
evaluated not only by student performance, but also by the public support, the degree of
freedom, the social integration and the egalitarian opportunities provided during the use
of the program.
24
25
2.
Evaluating experience around the world
In this chapter, I summarize several experiences with voucher programs around
the world in order to gain knowledge about the implementation and operation of these
programs. Most of these experiences started to be impleme nted in the 1990s. My research
focuses on voucher programs for primary and secondary education. I collected data for 31
different experiences around the world. In this chapter I describe some of the most
remarkable experiences in some detail to give to the reader the opportunity to understand
how voucher programs have been used in different situations 1 .
According to Patrinos (2000), an increased demand for alternatives in funding of
educational systems (e.g.: demand for private schools) has indicated that market for
education is not considerable large relative to what is socially desirable especially
because of education regulations and national policies. In fact, Sheehan (1974) observed
that most countries have the government as the main provider of education funds, leaving
a small portion of the market to private institutions, churches, NGOs, and even parents.
Such market for education is easy to be identified in developing countries, where the
government cannot supply education for all, and private institutions step in to fill the
demand gap. A market for education also exists in developed countries, where the
population demands more sophisticated services such as quality of the institution
(Sheehan, 1974).
Demand for education is also pushed by both global businesses and modern
markets, which require increasingly more qualified employees. Therefore, the private
1
Appendix C contains a summary about what explains success or failure in each of the 31 cases of voucher
programs investigated in this thesis.
sector has become an important player in the education market, especially in
26
developing countries. As stated by UNESCO (2002), the relationship between the
educational level of the labor force and national economic growth is very significant in
developing countries. Investment in human capital could represent a return of more than a
half point percent increase in the annual GDP 2 growth rates of those countries. Impressive
results can be achieved by investment in education as the 1980 Chilean experience
shows.
Table 1: Vouchers and Voucher-like Programs in European and OECD Countries
Country
Australia
Belgium
Mechanism
Assistance to private schools
Students choose among public schools and "free" schools
(Catholic)
Canada
Capitation grants and assistance to private schools
Czech Republic
Assistance to private schools
England
Assistance to private schools
France
Private schools (Catholic) receive subsidies from government
Holland
National, universal voucher
Hungary
Parental financing to their choice of public and private schools
Japan
Assistance to private schools
Netherlands
Capitation grants
New Zealand
Higher unit level of funding for poorer students
Poland
Assistance to private schools
Scotland
Students choose among public schools
Spain
Pre-school voucher experiment
Sweden
Capitation grants, school choice in some municipalities
United States
Voucher experiments: public, private, charter schools
Source: PATRINOS (2000)
Patrinos (2000) states that several countries have used demand-side financing
mechanisms to minimize the potential for thin market for education, or markets that are
2
Gross Domestic Product
too small relative to what is socially desirable. According to him, the use of these
27
mechanisms in the education sector is common in developed and developing countries.
The voucher system is one of these mechanisms, which has an important characteristic
for efficiency in a competitive market: the ability of the consumer to choose. In reference
to Table 1 and 2, the list of countries using voucher or voucher- like programs shows us
that such demand-side financing mechanism has been used in different ways in several
countries including members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as well as some developing countries.
Table 2: Vouchers and Voucher-like Programs in Developing Countries
Country
Bangladesh
Belize
Chad
Chile
Mechanism
Stipends for girls, public or private schools
Government partnerships with churches
Community financing
Voucher system for poor students, capitation for grants for all
students
China
Matching- grant schemes, and target bursary for poor and minority
children, free textbooks.
Colombia
Targeted bursary, voucher system
Côte d’Ivorie
Government sponsorship of students at private institutions
El Salvador
School choice for the poor
Guatemala
Targeted stipends for girls in thirteen communities
Ghana
Matching- grant schemes
India
Matching- grant schemes and numerous incentives
Lesotho
Government partnership with churches
Mexico
Targeted bursary for poor and indigenous populations
Mozambique
Scholarship for rural girls
Senegal
Scholarship for students to attend private and public schools in
Dakar
Source: PATRINOS (2000)
2.1
Experiences from Developed Countries
28
Experiences with the voucher system in developed countries are not rare. Several
experiences have been made in a small scale by governments or by private parties. Since
information about some voucher programs is scarce, I have selected some experiences
from developed countries using vouchers according to their degree of importance and
with relevant impacts on the country, region, state or municipality. These programs are
described below:
2.1.1
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States
Considered as one of the most important experiences involving a voucher system,
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is an example of successful voucher
implementation in the United States often found in the literature. According to Rouse
(1998), the voucher scheme implemented in Milwaukee in 1990 was one of the first
publicly funded programs. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program is a targeted voucher
system focused on low- income families.
The Wiscons in Department of Public Instruction (2005) reports that the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program began its operation providing vouchers to a limited
number of low- income families with 300 children using vouchers worth $2,446 per year
each at six private non-sectarian schools. In the 2003-2004 academic year, the voucher
amount increased to $5,882 supporting 12,950 low- income families paying for tuition in
participating schools. The low- income families aided by voucher are randomly selected.
Families with vouchers can use them in any school regardless whether the chosen
29
school has a religious orientation.
According to Rouse (1998), and Greene, Peterson and Du (1999), the academic
results achieved by students using the Milwaukee voucher program are significantly
better than those for students attending public schools. In contrast, Witte (1999)
highlights that the Milwaukee Choice Program score test has not shown neither an
improvement nor a setback, but the freedom of choice can present better results in inner
cities or poor communities. When academic achievement in reading and math tests is
measured, voucher users have presented statistically superior results, supporting voucher
proponents such as Friedman (1962) and West (1997), who claim that market
competition in education could increase the quality of the educational system.
As to the cost per pupil, Greene et al. (1999) claim that the difference between
cost per pupil in public schools and cost per pupil for students using a voucher has
declined since the beginning of the program. However, the cost per pupil of the
Milwaukee Choice Program is still lower than the cost of students attending public
institutions, even including costs of transportation. This contradicts the argument by
voucher opponents, who claim that vouchers would increase the costs of public
education. In fact, according to the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (2005),
the advent of the voucher has reduced public expenditures along the years.
Even though voucher opponents claimed in 1997 the unconstitutionality of these
programs for violating the First Amendment's separation of church and state, Witte
(1999) points out that surveys have shown that besides academic performance, students
acquired more discipline and moral values when they chose their schools. He also found
high parental involvement in their children’s education process and high parental
30
satisfaction with the institution chosen. On the other hand, he found out that there is high
dissatisfaction among parents of children in Wisconsin public schools.
Finally, Witte (1999) and West (1997) analyze the overall Milwaukee experience
as successful because it was able to contest the main concerns about implementation of a
voucher program. Their findings show that vouchers were used by poor families,
contradicting the concern that vouchers would not be provided for poor families. Other
concerns have been the increase of social segregation and selective admission. According
to their studies, voucher users have diversified the predominance of white students in
some schools and students facing academic difficulties were aided by the opportunity of
attending private institutions with better quality of education.
2.1.2
Cleveland, Ohio, United States
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program (CSTP) began in 1996 and is a
targeted voucher program provided to low-income families. The recipient families are
selected through a lottery selection process giving priority to poor families and
supporting their freedom to choose where to enroll their children at private schools. The
amount provided by the voucher corresponds to 90 percent of student tuition up to a
maximum of $2,250 per year.
According to Greene, Howell and Peterson (1998), student achievement has
improved for those using voucher programs. Like in the Milwaukee experience, the poor
student participating in the Cleveland voucher program tends to take advantage of the
better conditions offered by the schools that they choose. The Cleveland voucher
31
program registered high levels of parent al satisfaction with respect to the program, safety,
discipline and moral values of private schools. For Metcalf (1999), the level of
satisfaction for a student using the Cleveland voucher program is greater than that for
students in public schools.
Furthermore, Weidrich (2003), and Greene, Howell and Peterson (1998) observe
that the Cleveland program faced strong opposition to its operation since the beginning,
especially from the American Federation of Teachers. The Cleveland voucher program
was considered by the Ohio Supreme Court as unconstitutional because of the violation
of the First Amendment's separation of church and state. Later the program was reauthorized legally to provide educational assistance through vouchers. These events,
according to Witte (1999), weakened the initial parental support and caused some
confusion among the population. Finally, on June 27, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the voucher program in Cleveland is constitutional and does not infringe the
separation of church and state.
2.1.3
New York City, New York, United States
The School Choice Scholarship Foundation (SCSF) in New York City entered in
operation in 1997 providing 1,300 scholarships to low- income families who came from
New York City public schools. The dollar amount given by the voucher was worth up to
$1,400 annually covering tuition expenses at private educational institutions. This
voucher program has also been targeted and its selection criteria has been based on a
lottery and once selected, the voucher recipients could use it up to three years choosing 32
any kind of private school including those with a religious orientation.
Peterson and Howell (2003) present the New York experience with a voucher
program as an interesting case, where the poor African American students have achieved
higher academic results as they have used the voucher more than other minorities under
the same process. According to them, score tests of other minorities, such as Latinos,
showed no statistically significant improvement when they were using the voucher and
attending private schools.
Peterson, Myers and Howell (1998) affirm that the overall New York voucher
program performance registered academic improvement for student participants in both
math and reading tests. Another important outcome from their studies was the high level
of satisfaction of students and their families with the academic program, location, safety,
religious traditions, parental support, discipline, staff, sports and content provided by the
schools they had chosen.
Furthermore, Daniel P. Mayer et al (2002) and Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
(MPR, 2004) found that the New York voucher program is a unique experience because
of the racial and ethnical variety as well the size of the school system, the largest in the
United States. The high level of parental satisfaction using the vouchers contrasting to the
high level dissatisfaction for those using public system is strong evidence that this
program had a positive impact even though such an impact was more relevant for African
American students.
33
2.1.4
Sweden
According to Patrinos (2001), the Swedish educational system was predominantly
centralized in the 1980s, offering public schools for more than 99 percent of the students.
The private sector was inexpressive, but the population was not satisfied with the
educational services provided by the state. Such dissatisfaction pressured the government
to implement a series of educational reforms in the 1990s allowing more parental
influence over funding and management decisio ns.
The educational reform allowed public funds to follow students to the schools
they chose through the Swedish voucher, which pays 90% of the public cost per student.
The Swedish system is one of the few experiences on education that really uses physical
vouchers. The main example in Sweden is the Nacka municipality voucher system.
Weidrich (2003) points out that the Swedish voucher system has helped to decentralize
the highly centralized educational system, regulating independent schools which give
freedom for citizens to choose the education of their children. The first independent
schools started their operations providing free schooling to low-income families and now
they have accepted other students.
Although free choice is given to all Swedish children at compulsory education,
only a percentage of the population exercises that freedom. According to West (1997),
the use of the voucher has increased sharply in the country. Moreover, evaluations about
the success of the program are confirmed by high parental satisfaction and better student
performance on standardized tests compared to parental satisfaction and academic
performance of those students in public schools. Patrinos (2001) evaluated the Swedish 34
voucher program and concluded that vouchers improved the freedom of school choice
and the efficiency of allocation of the available resources. He also found that the
introduction of competition for available resources improved the quality of the public
educational system, as well as the participation of parents on the education of their
children.
2.1.5
Canada
The Canadian experience has showed important progress towards educational
freedom of choice including religious oriented schools. This voucher system is based on
independent schools, for which the government provides enough funds according to
enrollment, on other alternative systems for education provided by charter schools, and
on direct provision by parents through home schooling. Since the Canadian educational
system is extended to the entire population and there are no specific studies about
academic achievement under the voucher program, I measure success of each program in
a given province by comparing its performance to those of other provinces in the country.
Robson and Hepburn (2002),and Hepburn and Belle (2003) claim that Alberta,
British Columbia and Quebec have been successful in using educational vouchers with
respect to educational freedom and academic improvement. The province of Alberta is
the most successful example of a voucher system in the country. The level of educational
freedom3 in Alberta measured in 2002 was 64%. This experience produces better student
3
The Canadian Education Freedom index measures the freedom that parents in different provinces have to
educate their children using home, independent or charter schools (Hepburn and Belle, 2003 p. 3)
performance in Canada, with more than 60% of student tuition costs financed by the
35
state.
According to Hepburn and Belle (2003), British Columbia ranks second in the
education freedom index, with 46% of freedom for school choice. The results achieved in
this province have demonstrated that educational freedom and the educational voucher
impacted positively on student performance compared to Canadian and OECD standards.
Following the same pattern, the province of Quebec has produced similar levels of
educational freedom to those of the province of British Columbia: 42%. Student
performance improved dramatically in this French-speaking province, surpassing
Canadian and OECD standards. In the last few years, the increasing enrollment in schools
using the voucher system is also considered an important indicator of success the
program.
Hepburn and Belle (2003) expected that the province of Manitoba would achieve
results similar to those of Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec because they had
similar levels of freedom on education. However, the impact of the voucher system in
Manitoba was not as remarkable as the impact in the comparable provinces. Nevertheless,
it is still a reasonable system, providing the entire population with higher quality
education than many countries in the world.
According to Robson and Hepburn’s (2002) and Hepburn and Belle’s (2003)
findings, the province of Saskatchewan was not as successful as the other provinces in
the implementation of the voucher program. This was so because they did not provide as
much educational freedom for parents as the other provinces. As a consequence, the
Saskatchewan students’ performance was below the Canadian average and OECD
36
standards.
2.1.6
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has provided vouchers to poor student, through subsidize
enrollment in independent schools since 1981. This voucher program has increased the
number of students supported by those selective vouchers since the beginning of the
program. Nevertheless, the number of students in the program still represents a small
percentage of the student population (7%).
According to West (1997) and Weidrich (2003) the United Kingdom vo ucher
program differs from other selective vouchers such as the Milwaukee program, because
the selection is based on the student potential for high academic achievement. This
program can also be extended to higher education. The new voucher system incorporated
with the “learning agreements” between college and students allows government funding
to follow the student to college.
2.1.7
Netherlands
According to the recent literature (Patrinos (2001); Weidrich, 2003), the
Netherlands has a complete free choice educational system, and it is a reference school
choice system. Although students attending public or private schools have had a similar
academic performance, the level of parental satisfaction is higher among those who
37
used the voucher to finance private education.
According to Patrinos (2001) and Weidrich (2003), the Dutch educational system
has a long time tradition of decentralization and demand driven management:
administration and governance of approximately 70% of the schools in this country are
run by private school boards. Parental intervention has pressured schools to improve their
services, especially because the government equally funds private and public schools and
allows parents to choose their children’s schools.
2.2
Experiences from Developing Countries
Some authors suggest (Patrinos, 2001; Belfield & Levin, 2002) that, developed
countries have struggled to implement voucher systems because the quality differences
among private and public schools are not extremely high. Most of the discussion ove r
vouchers in developed countries is about choice and the autonomy of the state on
educational issues, and their educational systems are characterized by significant
differences between private and public institutions with respect to their quality, especia lly
where wealth unequally distributed (Belfield & Levin, 2002).
2.2.1
Chile
The Chilean voucher system is one of the most successful voucher systems in the
developing world, and it is the only one providing universal vouchers. The universal
voucher system first introduced in the 1980s helped to equalize the huge differences
38
between public and private schools in the country. The Chilean educational system is
highly democratic and has produced similar results in student academic performance in
both private and public schools.
Schools registered to receive vouchers are called subsidized private schools, and
voucher systems pay these schools according to the number of enrollments. Patrinos
(2001), Weidrich (2003), and West (1997) report that since the beginning of the Chilean
voucher program in 1980, the demand for this service has increased and in 2002 the
number of enrollments in subsidized private schools represented more than 40% of all
Chilean students.
Since 1988, national standard tests, called Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de
la Educacion (SIMCE), are taken to evaluate the quality of these subsidized schools.
Mizala and Romaguera (2000), Quiroz and Chumacero (1997), and Aedo and Sapelli
(2001) found out that the results from subsidized private schools are higher but not
significantly enough to endorse a clear advantage of one over the other. However, their
studies have found that the cost effectiveness of subsidized private schools is higher than
public schools.
Moreover, Weidrich (2003) argues that municipal public schools are less efficient
than subsidized- private schools because the latter have more flexibility to manage
teachers and employees, thus better allocating the available resources and minimizing
costs. According to West (1997), Chile faced some setbacks due to an economic
recession which pushed down the real value of vouchers. For that reason, government
allowed subsidized schools to charge fees for their services, while municipal public
39
schools are still not allowed to charge such fees.
2.2.2
Colombia
The Colombian voucher system, Plan de Ampliación de Cobertura de la
Educación Secundaria (PACES), is a targeted program for low- income secondary
education students. According to King et al. (1997), Colombian vouchers were
introduced to increase the transition rate from primary to secondary education. The main
problem detected was the shortage of secondary education public schools, and
consequently, the difficulty of poor students to have access to this level of education. At
the same time, private schools operated with excess capacity in the country.
This shortage of vacancies in public secondary schools pressured the government
to present an alternative solution for providing education to the population. West (1997)
and Weidrich (2003) state that 40% of the secondary schools are privately owned and the
Colombian voucher system helped poor families to enroll their children in private
schools. According to him, the use of vouchers allowed students to access better
education, and simultaneously, the reduction of students in public secondary schools
improved the quality of the educational service provided by these institutions.
Furthermore, King et al (1997) observed that after five years of implementation,
the voucher program was implemented in more than 20 percent of the country’s
municipalities, aiding more than 100,000 poor secondary students at over 2,000 private
schools. The government has provided vouchers to low- income families selected
40
through a lottery system. Such numbers give this program the status of the largest
targeted voucher program for education in the world.
According to Calderón (1995), the use of a targeted voucher system in Colombia
successfully fulfilled the demand for secondary education with lower costs than those
costs incurred into construction of new schools. Besides the cost effectiveness of this
program, his studies also show higher academic achievement, lower grade repetition,
higher test scores and higher satisfaction among those parents and students using
vouchers.
2.2.3
Bangladesh
Seeking to address gender disparity in secondary education in Bangladesh, the
Female Secondary School Assistance Project (FSSAP) started in 1993 aiming at
increasing the number of women with education and capable of fully participate in the
economic and social development of the country. This voucher program provides enough
resources to cover direct costs of girls’ secondary education. The project also gets
involved into school infrastructure by providing conditions for women to teach and
offering professional training to girls leaving schools.
According to West (1997) and Weidrich (2003), the Bangladesh voucher system
is a remarkable effort to reduce differences among male and female schooling, and it is a
pioneer program in supporting female secondary education. The voucher project succeeds
in its main objective of increasing girls’ enrollment at secondary education. Even though
girls' enrollment increased, the failing rate is still high among girls, raising questions of 41
quality of education. The problems of quality of education provided were not addressed
in the first phase of the project. The second phase has not been evaluated yet, and it will
be completed with a series of four phases. Since education is a long term process, it will
take time to eva luate the real impacts of the entire Bangladesh voucher program.
42
3.
Institutional and Educational Environment in Brazil
Since colonial times, the educational system in Brazil has failed to achieve the
basic goal of providing the right of a free education to every citizen, a goal explicitly
included in the current Federal Constitution (Brasil, 1988). On December 20, 1996, the
Brazilian government passed a new law to regulate the educational system. This law on
the Guidelines and Bases for National Education (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação
- LDB) marks an important period to promote better education in the country and reduce
social inequalities, trying to make up for the years of education when the education was
not a government priority (Souza, 2001). Although LDB has made significant changes in
the Brazilian educational system, the government has failed to provide free education
with quality. One of the main reasons for this failure is the current legal structure which
is still a complex system.
The Brazilian educational system is complex for several reasons. First, it is
divided into two important sectors: private and public. According to the Brazilian federal
constitution (Brasil, 1988), it is the government’s priority to provide high quality
educatio n for the entire population. However, the government has not been able to
provide such level of quality education for the population through public schools. Thus,
private schools came to fulfill this market demand. In general, the private sector has
presented better numbers in terms of quality and professional achievements. In contrast to
the qualitative aspect where the quality of the private sector has been well known to be
better than that of public schools, around seventy percent (70%) of Brazilian students
have been attending public institutions (IBGE, 2004).
Second, the Federal, State and Municipal governments regulate all educational 43
services provided by both public and private institutions. The quality of these institutions
may vary from higher to lower levels depending on the sphere of responsibility.
According to Souza (2001), the educational system of Brazil is diversified, decentralized,
and predominantly public, with the exception of the higher level. The entire system has
approximately 58 million students enrolled in different levels of education, around one
third of the entire population of Brazil. These numbers stress the challenge and
responsibility of political leaders. Wrong decisions would probably increase the social
inequality already exiting in Brazilian society.
3.1
Historical Background
Ferreira and Litchfield (2001) observed that from 1981 to 1995, Brazil showed
significant political, social and economic improvement. The educational system in Brazil
went through serious problems in the early 1980s, and structural reforms have reduced
inequalities, economic stagnation, the debt crisis and poverty, especially in the period of
1990 to 1995 (Blom, Holm-Nielsen & Verner, 2001). After the military regime stepped
down from the government and the reformulation and promulgation of the new Brazilian
federal constitution in October of 1988, as well as popular movements, new national
laws, policies and regulations have allowed Brazil to implement considerable structural
changes in the country (Lucas & Leher, 2001).
In the 1990s, three administrations, elected by popular vote, took over the
maximum authority command in the country (Castro & Menezes, 2003). According to
Ferreira and Litchfield (2001), Brazil also went through considerable economic changes 44
along with political transformation in the period, reducing levels of inflation, stabilizing
the national currency and opening the national economy to international market. These,
changes had a direct impact on the educational system. Castro and Menezes (2003)
pointed out that the Brazilian educational system went through a series of transformations
during the 1990s. During each administration in the last decade, educational policies were
carefully restructured in favor of better public education, allowing the country to proceed
into qualification and expansion of its educational system.
As pointed out by Castro and Menezes (2003), in the early 1990s, the incapability
of the government to address the social demand for quality educational services has been
diagnosed by the Brazilian population as the failure of educational system. Castro and
Menezes (2003) argue that the administration of Fernando Collor (1990-1992)
implemented complementary programs to assist students, regionalizing and
decentralizing resources and the production of didactic material. Even though Collor’s
educational programs had visibility on the media, the effectiveness of these programs did
not achieve their proposed objectives (Castro & Menezes, 2003).
Furthermore, during the 1992 – 1994 period, Itamar Franco assumed the Brazilian
presidency with an urgency to improve the supply of educational services. Castro and
Menezes (2003) observed that Franco followed similar actions toward education,
focusing on management decentralization of complementary programs but taking
regional differences into consideration. Such programs resulted in important
improvements on education by allowing more entities to participate in the educational
system.
The administration of Fernando H. Cardoso (1995-2002) elevated national
45
education to be one of the top fives priority goals of governmental actions (Castro &
Menezes, 2003l; Lucas & Leher, 2001; Souza, 2001). In relation to Cardoso’s educational
policies, Castro and Menezes (2003) emphasized positive results in improving the
process of educational decentralization with respect to financing and execution.
3.2
Organization and Hierarchy
The present educational system in Brazil is divided into three spheres of
responsibility according to the Federal constitution and LDB: Federal, State, and
Municipal (Brasil, 1988; 1996). As presented by Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE, 2004), the Brazilian government is responsible for the coordination of
all levels of education and also for the regulation and allocation of funds for a high
quality education for the entire population.
The educational system in Brazil is divided in two large groups: Basic education
and Higher education. As is shown in Table 3, the Brazilian Basic education is comprised
of elementary, primary and secondary education. At the federal level, the federal
government maintains public universities, and some public secondary technoprofessional schools. The states are in charge of public education at the state level. The
states provide basic education and in some states they also provide higher education. The
municipal administrators are responsible for guaranteeing public elementary and primary
education of the population.
Table 3: Brazilian Educational System
Brazilian Structure
Terminology
Grade
46
Legal Responsibility
Ensino Elementar
Elementary Education
K-pre Shared between
(Basic Education)
school Municipality and State
Ensino Fundamental Primary Education
1-8
Shared between
(Basic Education)
Municipality and State
Ensino Médio
Secondary Education
9-11
State
(Basic Education)
Ensino Superior
Tertiary Education
12-17 Federal
(Higher Education)
Source: Brazilian Federal Constitution (Brasil, 1988) and LDB (Brasil, 1996)
According to article 212 of the current Federal Constitution (1988), a national
educational plan determines the percent amount of municipal, state, and federal budget
which will be allocated to education. Thus, the Federal government must spend 18% of
the amount collected from federal taxes on education in addition to the amount colleted
from complementary programs. Likewise, municipality and state administrators must also
apply 25% of their amount collected from municipal and state taxes to education (Brasil,
1988; Castro & Sadeck, 2003). However, each entity is responsible for separate levels of
education. The education from kindergarten to 4th grade (10 year-old children) is under
municipal and state jurisdiction. The municipalities and states are also responsible for
education from 5th grade (11 year-old children) to 8th grade (14 year-old children). The
states are also responsible for the entire high school period. Finally, the federal
government is in charge of tertiary education.
The entity that is responsible for the educational system is the Ministry of
Education and Culture (MEC – Ministério da Educação e Cultura) 4 , which delegates
4
MEC is the highest entity in the Brazilian educational system, and all educational institutions must be
regulated and supervised by it. (Brasil, 1988)
power to states and municipal units and regulates national education. If any state fails to 47
provide public education according to their responsibilities, MEC has to intervene and fill
that gap. Likewise, if municipal units fail, the state or federal government may act to
remedy the situation. In this situation, secondary education may be provided by all three
entities. Such structural aspects create barriers to efficient resource allocation, especially
in a country where such resources are limited and not well-distributed. According to
IBGE (2004), the current educational system is complex because it includes educational
institutions providing the same level of education with different sources of funding.
3.3
The Context of Brazilian Educational System
According to Pinto (2002), on December 20, 1996, the Brazilian government
under the presidency of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso approved the new
LDB, which can also be called the new “Constitution of Education”. Such law was meant
to improve the educational system in Brazil which seemed to have been forgotten for
several decades by many politicians. Pinto (2002) pointed out that the LDB took eight
years to pass into congress due to the excess of bureaucracy in the national judicial
system and the complexity involved. At that time, the expectations around the potential
law’s outcome were considerably high among educators, government and all
professionals of the sector.
The implementation of the LDB law is a ten year process which will be evaluated
at the end of 2006, when the LDB should be in full operation. According to the LDB, all
institutions, including the government, have a maximum of ten years from the
announcement date of the law to adjust to all requirements designated by it. Most
48
requirements are already in use, and some have short term applications. Up to now, the
results are impressive, such as the decline of illiteracy rate and the increase of children at
school (IBGE, 2004; Souza, 2001).
Although the LDB has changed some paradigms of national education, it seemed
to bring to light some concerns about itself. One apparent concern is the observation of
the law by all participants of the system. The demand for education in Brazil is
enormous, and the population is eager to have access to quality education. To assure
proper operation of the LDB law, the government created organizations responsible for
the implementation of the law on different levels of jurisdiction, such as the Municipal
Councils for Education (Conselhos Municipais de Educação).
In the current Brazilian Federal Constitution, article 4, paragraph 5, it is stated
that if any entity responsible for providing compulsory education fails; to do so, the entity
may be charged for this criminous act before court5 . According to this and the LDB law
(Brasil, 1996), the government is responsible to provide free quality education. Failing to
do so would result in punishment. In addition, parents may also receive the same
punishment if they do not send their children to school. However, such rigor has not been
put into practice frequently.
According to Zinder (1998), the Brazilian educational system is socially unfair
and is becoming economically unviable. Without education, Brazilians will never have
real opportunities to achieve a fair income. Consequently, citizens are led to the exclusion
of society, consuming only the basic needs, paying no taxes, and without good
5
“comprovada a negligência da autoridade competente para garantir o ferecimento do ensino obrigatório,
poderá ela ser imputada por crime de responsabilidade" (Brasil, 1988 Article 4 Parag. 5).
employment opportunities. That means individua ls will not have future prospects in
49
society.
One visible consequence of this distorted situation is the difficulty of access to
public federal universities by the poor. All universities in Brazil, public and private, must
conduct an entrance admission test called vestibular. Students are admitted according to
their performance on this test. Since the quality of public federal universities is
recognized by the Brazilian population, there is a significant competition to be admitted
in federal institutions. However, most of the students enjoying the privilege of public
federal universities come from private high school institutions. Thus, poor students have
to quit schooling or have to try private universities because their education level is not
good enough to pass in public university’s entrance exams (vestibular).
Furthermore, it might be unrealistic to believe in free education. Any kind of
educational institution must be paid to provide their services. Just as private institutions,
public schools have to be paid for. These educational institutions are paid for by the
population through taxes. Castro and Sadeck (2003) observed that the burden of these
taxes represents more than 20% of individual’s income, which is given to the government
with the objective of providing public services to the community. However, the same
citizens who pay all their taxes are penalized with the absence of good public schools,
having to pay private institutions for quality. Zinder (1998) argues that it is not fair to pay
for something which should be provided for free according to the federal constitution.
According to Becker (1993), Brazil has a tremendous potential to provide better
health and education to the poor population, and thus, become a more equitable country.
For Becker (1993), education is considered one of the bases for economic growth and
social development, being one powerful tool to reduce inequalities. Education is not
50
only an important human ideal, but a necessary condition for the development of the
country. It requires the government to use a more efficient approach toward education.
One of the alternatives is to use the current capacity of the private sector to
provide quality education to poor communities. One of the tools able to help to achieve
such aims is the voucher system.
According to UNESCO (2002), investing in secondary and higher education – and
not just primary education - pays rich dividends, and by raising the level of postsecondary educational attainment, increased human capital can translate into steady
economic growth. This statement reinforces the need for financing education at all levels,
which will lead to an improvement of the country. Though this perspective was put forth
several decades ago, Brazil has been slow to implement it.
Moreover, the private sector has become an important contributor to financing
education, especially in developing countries such as Brazil. As stated by UNESCO
(2002), the positive relationship between the educational level of the labor force and
economic growth is very significant in developing countries. This investment in human
capital could represent a return of more than a half point percent (0.5%) increase in the
annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates of countries. Investment in
secondary or higher education creates impressive results, such as the 1980 Chilean
experience. During the 1960s, Chileans spent an average of 6.19 years at school, and
GDP per capita was $4,000.00. In 2000, these numbers increased considerably through
important investments in education: The average time at school rose to 10 years and GDP
per capita to about $7,000.00.
Education from the private sector has also achieved a substantial acceptance
51
level in emerging countries. According to UNESCO (2002), in Chile, China and
Paraguay more than 40 percent of the total amount comes from private sources, while the
average in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries6 is 12 percent. Private enrollment rates increased at higher levels in these three
countries as well as in Brazil, where the independent private institutions account for 63
percent of college students. In contrast, in other OECD countries this figure is ten percent
of the total. UNESCO also states that education has become a key factor for economic
growth in these countries. Thus, UNESCO (2002) asserts that without effective and
continuous investment in human capital, all efforts for sustained development will be in
vain or will result in small returns.
3.4
Educational Funding and Finance Assistance Programs
There are considerable financial disparities among each level of education in
Brazil, and they are reinforced by the lack of political efforts to consolidate the
educational system so that all levels of education are equally funded and supported by
programs and governmental actions. Governmental actions and assistance programs
should be implemented providing support to guarantee free access to education and to
improve the status and qualification of the teachers and assure a continuous improvement
of educational quality at all levels, but especially at the primary and secondary levels,
6
The OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. (UNESCO, 2002)
which are considered a key factor for a successful educational system (Becker, 1993;
52
UNESCO, 2002).
The government program called National Fund for the Development of Primary
Education (FUNDEF- Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação Fundamental),
is responsible for distributing resources linked to basic education. Created in September
of 1996, FUNDEF is considered an important financial source among the educational
programs in Brazil (Brasil, 1996; Pinto 2002; Souza, 2001). However, most of this fund
is applied to primary education, where FUNDEF has been successful in the promotion of
better education. The remaining small amount goes to secondary education, whose
demand FUNDEF has not been able to successfully meet (Pinto, 2002). For that reason,
funding the secondary education level, or high school level, is considered one of the
greatest challenges confronting the Brazilian educational system.
According to the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research
(Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais – INEP, 2004), elementary
schools only have 16% of children between the ages of 1 and 6, which represents 4.4
million of the Brazilian population. Moreover, 97% of children between the age of 7 and
14 are enrolled in primary education in accordance to their age level. This amount
represents 32 million individuals. Although the number of children attending high school
is 8.3 million, which means that 40% of these students are not in the appropriate ages
group of 15 to 17 years of age, the overall statistics about education in Brazil had shown
significant improvements, such as illiteracy rate.
According to Pinto (2002), Lucas and Leher (2001), Souza (2001), Castro and
Menezes (2003), it was the Cardoso administration (1994-2002) that made great strides
toward improving the Brazilian educational system. Pinto (2002) argues the Cardoso
53
policies will be remembered for a long time as the starting point of improvement in the
educational system. He also argues that it was the minister of education’s free access to
former president Cardoso, international institutions, and the national communication
media that allowed an easy passing of the new set of education laws and policies by the
congress and by the population. Such governmental actions allowed the minimization of
differences of funding and quality of school at the state, federal, and municipal levels in
the country (Castro & Menezes, 2003; Ferreira & Litchfield, 2001).
In contrast to the Collor and Franco administrations, Cardoso’s regime
implemented a set of actions toward education which had a strong impact on national
educational funds as Castro and Menezes (2003) observed. The main actions were the
approbation of LDB law in 1996, the introduction of FUNDEF, and definition of the
National Education Plan (Plano Nacional de Educação – PNE). These projects created a
pathway to insert Brazilian education into the dynamics of globalization, responding to
the increased demand for qualified education (MEC, 2004).
Despite the creation and implementation of these programs, the bulk of the
government’s attention has been and still is placed on primary and higher education
(Pinto, 2002). Recognizing this, the Ministry of Education and Culture is developing a
new program to improve secondary education (MEC, 2004). The program is called Fund
for Development of Basic Education (Fundo de Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica –
FUNDEB), which presents a more effective distribution of funds among the three levels
of basic education and provides mechanisms to improve the quality of education, the
quality of the professionals of the sector, and to guarantee access to this level of
54
education for the people.
Another main concern is the reliability of this new program and its impact on the
educational system. However, it is important to note that FUNDEB is still a project in
congress and needs to be approved to become effective. In the political sphere, it depends
on the federal government to coordinate the national educational policy, by managing and
interconnecting all levels and systems through regulations and redistribution of funds and
activities, in addition to providing technical and financial support to the Brazilian states
(Brasil, 1988; 1996).
In recent years, the lack of financial assistance for secondary institutions pushed
the Ministry of Education to get assistance from the Inter-American Bank of
Development (MEC, 2004). This financial assistance, which ha s been redistributed
among federal units, has become another program called Program to Expand and
Promote Secondary Education (Programa de Expansão e Melhoria do Ensino Médio PROMED) (Souza, 2001). However, the distribution of funds among the states and
municipalities is still considerably centralized and the use of this money has not been
efficient. The problem here relies in the structural constitution of the Brazilian public
sector, which it is well know for its inflexibility and considerable bureaucracy.
3.5
Quality versus quantity
The organizational situation of the public educational system in Brazil has
prevented the improvement of quality in several levels of education. The expenditures in
the educational sector are diffuse and correspond mostly to payroll expenditures. Some 55
states such as Minas Gerais have more than 70% of the educational budget comprised by
payroll. However, the individual average salary of teachers in the public sector is low,
reducing incentives for continuous specialization of teachers (IBGE, 2004). In addition to
that, the absence of reinvestment in infrastructure and equipment is very common in
public schools. All this directly affects the quality of education provided by public
schools.
Therefore, the public system has found it difficult to keep up with the dynamics of
the private sector. This dynamic factor is perhaps more evident at the high school level
and especially in techno-professional education (Souza, 2001; UNESCO, 2002). Despite
the fact that public institutions enjoy a relative monopoly in the educational system with
more than 70% of all enrollments, the private sector apparently has the lead in the quality
race mainly because of its flexibility toward the labor force. Brazilian laws are
protectionist and considerably inflexible for public employees, who enjoy relative
stability. This stability seemed to create a sense of accommodation among public
employees, reducing the amount of professional turnover due to the lack of competition.
On the other hand, there is evidence that the private sector may act more dynamically in
the educational business and has flexibility to hire. Perhaps, this flexibility in private
schools is in part a consequence of the high rate of unemployment in the country, which
pushes employees to work hard to keep their job (IBGE, 2004; UNESCO, 2002).
According to Barros et al. (2000), the new policies adopted during Cardoso’s
regime and the current conditions of the public system generated merely quantitative
improvements without appreciable improvements in quality. As presented by IBGE
(2004), the numbers of enrolled students in public education rose incredibly after
56
stabilization of the national currency and the implementation of the new law of education.
The level of illiteracy went down sharply and more children are attending school – an
evidence of quantitative improvements on the educational system. However students’
academic attainment in public institutions has not improved significantly in secondary
and higher education relative to previous years (Barros et al., 2000).
3.6
Evaluations for the Educational system
According to the Brazilian Federal Constitution, article 206, item VI (Brasil,
1988), the government must provide education with quality to the population, and assure
that quality is maintained. Castro and Menezes (2003) emphasize the importance of an
efficient evaluation system for Brazilian education, and in the 1990s the government
implemented important programs in order to guarantee the level of quality of national
education. In addition to that, Souza (2001) highlights the necessity of a reliable and
autonomous instrument to measure efficiency of public policies.
According to Abicalil (2002), the evaluation of Brazilian national education needs
considerable efforts due to the size and complexity of the subject. In order to evaluate the
educational system, the Brazilian government counts on the National Institute for
Educational Studies and Research (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas
Educacionais - INEP), which is responsible to collect and evaluate information in respect
to all aspects of Brazilian education (Souza, 2001). For student performance evaluation
Souza (2001) and Abicalil (2002) observed that Brazil has the System for the Evaluation
of Basic Education (Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica - SAEB), the National 57
Secondary Education Examination (Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio - ENEM), and the
National Degree Course Examination (Exame Nacional de Cursos Superiores “Provão”). In addition, international instruments are used to evaluate the educational
system such as World Educational Indicators (WEI) prepared by UNESCO in
combination with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD).
The SAEB evaluates performance of students attending primary and secondary
education. The ENEM evaluates the students’ performance of secondary education. The
students who take the ENEM may use their results on this exam either alone or in
conjunction to traditional entrance examination to enter higher education institut ions
(Souza, 2001). Finally, “Provão” evaluates students after higher education graduation in
order to evaluate the quality of tertiary education. Controversially, Abicalil (2002)
observed that the autonomy of INEP and the standard exams is not clear, whic h may
result in biased results. He also pointed out that evaluation based on comparison between
students’ academic performances may not be the best instrument because students are, by
human nature, different from one another.
58
4.
Educational Voucher in Brazi l
4.1
Research Question and Scope
This study attempts to answer the question of whether a voucher system is likely
to improve education in Brazil. The research hypothesis is that Brazil fulfills the
conditions for a successful voucher system. By answering this research question, I hope
to contribute to policy making by identifying socio-economic attributes of the states that
may contribute to or hamper the successful implementation of a voucher system for
education in Brazil.
In order to answer the question I investigated the socio-economic characteristics
of voucher programs around the world and explored their potential in Brazil. I studied 31
voucher programs around the world and investigated the causes for their success or
failure. This analysis was used to create a benchmark for the determinants of successes
and failures of the voucher system. Comparing this benchmark to Brazilian
characteristics, I estimated the potential for a voucher system in Brazil.
At first, the scope of the present study was restricted to voucher programs for
secondary education only. Since this scope was considerably limited in terms of data, I
extended the scope of this research for voucher programs for primary and tertiary7
education. Thus, the scope of the study is comprised of the Brazilian educational system
and the educational voucher experiences in Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Canada, Chile,
7
The Australian voucher program is only one voucher program for tertiary education included in this
study’s scope.
Colombia, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Japan, Lesotho, Netherlands, New Zealand,
59
Poland, Puerto Rico, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.
4.2
Data
One of the greatest challenges was to elaborate a data set comprising information
from those 31 different localities into a standardized and comparable information set. The
availability of information was one significant obstacle to construct a standardized
information table. The lack of undisclosed information for some countries impeded this
research to have a wider scope of study. The main sources of data for this research were
the World Bank database, OECD database, the national statistical office and the
education department of each country.
Based on current studies about each voucher program, I tried to point out the main
variables used by these studies to estimate, measure, and analyze the use of voucher
systems. I found a number of important variables for my research. One set of variables
was defined in accordance with the variables that authors have used to explain success
and failure of each program. The other set of variables comprehends those that describe
the socio-economic characteristics of the countries in which voucher programs have been
implemented.
The first set is comprised of the variables used by the literature and selected to
explain success or failure of each program. These variables are: overall academic
performance in standardized tests for students using vouchers and for those using public
schools; student performance in math, reading and science standardized tests; the level of
parental satisfaction for those parents with children using vouchers and for those using 60
the public system; the qualification of the population for the use of voucher; voucher
coverage; regulations and practices of voucher programs; restrictions of voucher use in
religious oriented schools; scope of vouchers’ operation; initial enrollment rate; current
enrollment rate; number of participating schools; admission and selection method;
number of schools and their capacity available for students; age and ethnic compositing
of the population and of the students in the program.
The second set is the comprised of variables selected to characterize the country
where the voucher program was implemented. These variables are: total public
expenditures on education; percentage of GDP spent in education; governmental public
expenditures per student; cost of voucher per student in dollars; per capita income; Gini
coefficient for income; age and ethnic composition of the population; percentage of
majority and minority groups in relation to the population; level of education attainment
for adult population (25 years and above); average number of years of schooling; number
of student per teacher (student/teacher ratio); democracy index (economic freedom); and
index of transparency level (corruption level) 8 .
Based on the authors’ evaluation about each program and using the first set of
variables as complementary information, I constructed a binary variable indicating failure
(0) and success (1) of each voucher experience. This index is the dorsal spine of this
research. In order to ensure analysis reliability, this index was elaborated carefully and in
complete accordance to the studies that provide an in depth evaluation of each voucher
program separately.
8
Appendix B shows the description and sources of the explanatory variables.
Furthermore, I evaluated each voucher program in relation to its respective
61
literature, trying to use similar factors that authors had used to evaluate the success or
failure of each program. Since there were different outcomes for the same program, I
looked at the main explanatory variables considered by the recent literature to estimate
the success or fa ilure of each voucher system. Afterwards, I compared and contrasted the
studies and these variables in order to determine only one outcome for each voucher
scheme: success or failure.
Hoping to construct a comparable index, I considered variables used in each
program to examine the success of other programs. Nevertheless, voucher programs
around the world have been implemented with different methods, such as through the
definition of goals, structure, and scope. Consider, for example, the method of voucher
program in Bangladesh. Differently from other programs, vouchers in Bangladesh were
established to reduce significant gender differences among the population. The women’s
access to education in Bangladesh had been substantially restrictive, and women were
excluded from socio-economic participation in that society. The failure of this voucher
scheme was attributed to the fact that the first phase of the program increased women
participation in schools but did not increase their participation in society.
In addition to that, success and failure is often attributed to one voucher program
in relation to a referential point. For instance, the success or failure of the voucher
program used in each Canadian province was measured in relation to the other Canadian
provinces and to the entire country. Even though the Canadian educational system has
been highly efficient and qualified in comparison to most systems in the world, my
research in accordance to the studies identified failure in using voucher programs in some
Canadian provinces (e.g.: achievements in the province of Saskatchewan compared to 62
those in other provinces in terms of student academic performance and degrees of
freedom of school choice).
Furthermore, I found that most voucher programs share similar explanatory
variables for success and failure. One of the most commonly used variables to explain
success of voucher programs is the student academic performance under voucher
schemes compared to that under the public educational system. I pointed out that in most
cases, academic performance of students using vouchers has been higher than the
performance of students in public schools, especially taking into account long term
results (even when this superiority was not statistically significant in the short term). This
result can be explained because students in disadvantage tend to give more importance
for the opportunity given to them. Thus, they usually concentrate more efforts in order to
take advantage of opportunities which are not often offered for them.
Moreover, student and parental satisfaction played another significant role in the
evaluation of educational vouchers. As has been pointed out earlier, parental
dissatisfaction about public schools has been one of the common findings about the
educationa l system in each country. Parental dissatisfaction has been mainly related to
the poor quality of education provided in public schools. Parental dissatisfaction also
refers to the lack of security, the absence or limited pedagogical innovation, the low level
of teachers’ motivation, the low quality of the classroom environment, and socioeconomic segregation. In addition to that, parental satisfaction about the voucher program
helped to measure the success of the program.
In relation to the other explanatory variables for success and failure of voucher 63
programs, I found that authors attach different levels of significance to each of them. In
places where the scarcity of vacancies in public education at a certain educational level is
a problem, as in the Colombian experience, the number of spots available in private
schools was considered an important factor of success or failure. In places where social
segregation played a relevant role in the educational system, such as in Bangladesh and in
Guatemala, the rate of enrollment, the range of coverage, and participating minority
group were examined as determinants of success or failure.
By looking at the studies for each voucher program, I came up with the
success/failure index presented on the Table 4, where success is represented by ones (1)
and failure is represented by zeros (0).
Table 4: Success/Failure index for voucher programs around the world
(Failure=0 and Success=1)
Voucher Program
Success/
Failure
index
Australia
0
Bangladesh
0
Belize
1
Canada: Province of British Columbia
Canada: Province of Quebec
Canada: Province of Manitoba
Canada: Province of Saskatchewan
Canada: Province of Alberta
1
1
0
0
1
Source
Albrecht and Ziderman (1992);
Boyd (1989); Dohmen (2000);
West (1997)
Bhatnagar et al. (2002);
Weidrich (2003); West (1997)
Perroitt (2003); West (1997);
Wolff and Castro (2001)
Center for Education Reform
(2003); Hepburn and Belle
(2003); Robson and Hepburn
(2002); West (1997)
Table 4: Continued
Voucher Program
64
Success/
Failure
index
Chile
1
Colombia
1
Denmark
1
France
0
Guatemala
0
Japan
0
Lesotho
1
Netherlands
1
New Zealand
1
Poland
Puerto Rico
0
0
Spain
0
Sweden
1
United Kingdom
1
Source
Aedo and Sapelli (2001);
Belfield and Levin (2002);
Cosse (2003); Hoxby (2003);
Mizala and Romaguera (2000);
Quiroz and Chumacero (1997);
Patrinos (2001); Weidrich
(2003); West (1997)
Angrist et al. (200);
Calderón (1995); King et al
(1997); Weidrich (2003); West
(1997)
Danish Ministry of Education
(2000); Doyle (1997); Patrinos
(2001)
EURYDICE (1997); Fowler
(1991); Fowler (1992); Mason
(1992);
Montenegro (1998); Parker
(1999); Santiso (2001); West
(1997)
Coulson (2002); West (1997)
Mokitimi and Nieuwoudt
(1995); West (1997)
EURYDICE (1997); Justesen
(2002); Patrinos (2001); Mason
(1992); Weidrich (2003); West
(1997)
Hirsch (1994); Ladner (2001);
Patrinos (2001); West (1997)
Glenn (1994); West (1997)
West (1997)
EURYDICE (1997); Granell
(2002); Mason (1992)
Anggard (1994); Patrinos
(2001); Weidrich (2003); West
(1997)
Lambert (2002); Mason (1992);
Weidrich (2003); West (1992,
1997)
Table 4: Continued
Voucher Program
65
Success/
Failure
index
United States: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
1
United States: Cleveland, Ohio
1
United States: New York, New York
1
United States: Washington D.C.
1
United States: Dayton, Ohio
1
United States: Indianapolis, Indiana
0
United States: Florida
0
United States: Vermont
1
United States: San Francisco,
California
1
Source
Cosse (2003); Greene, Peterson
and Du (1999); Hoxby (2003);
Greene (2000); Rouse (1998);
West (1997); Witte (1999)
Greene, Howell and Peterson
(1998); Hoxby (2003); Metcalf
(1999); Weidrich (2003); West
(1997)
Cosse (2003); Hoxby (2003);
Mayer et al (2002); Peterson,
Myers and Howell (1998);
Peterson and Howell (2003)
Greene (2000); Hoxby (2003);
Wolf (2000); Wolf, Howell,
Peterson (2000)
Greene (2000); Hoxby (2003);
Howell (2000)
Boaz and Barrett (1996);
Dougherty and Becker (1995);
Hudson Institute (1992); Molnar
(1999)
Center on Education Policy
(2000); Greene and Winters
(2004)
Sternberg (2001)
Boaz and Barrett (1996);
Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer
(2001)
Source: Prepared by the author
4.3
Method
I used probit regression analysis to determine how many different socio-economic
characteristics contribute to the success of a voucher system.
Once I constructed the success/failure index, the next step was to investigate the 66
socio-economic variables which determined the success or failure of each voucher
implementation. Since the variable to be explained in this model is a binary variable
(ones and zeros), a simple linear regression analysis by OLS estimation would not be
appropriated. Thus, in my research, I used probit regression analysis in order to achieve
more reliable results.
Probit analysis is an algorithm to estimate the probability of the outcome of
interest being equal to 1 (y=1), given a set of explanatory variables (x, x1, x2 … xn):
P( y = 1 | x) = P( y = 1 | x1 , x 2 , x 3 ,..., x n ) .
In the context of this study, the probability investigated was the probability of
success (e.g.: success/failure index = 1) given a set of socio-economic independent
variables, such as per capita income, gini coefficient, and percentage of minority group in
relation to the entire population.
P( success = 1 | socioecon ) = P ( success = 1 | x icome , x gini , xmin ority ,..., x n )
or
P( success = 1 | x ) = F ( β 0 + β icome xicome + β gini x gini + β min ority xmin ority + ... + β n x n )
,
Where F is the standard cumulative normal distribution function.
Therefore, applying probit analysis in the data set collected from the 31 different
voucher programs, I estimated a regression model. Using the estimated model and the
corresponding socio-economic variable for Brazil, I aim to estimate the probability of
success of a voucher system in the country and its states.
4.4
Estimation
67
In my primary estimations, I conducted probit regression including the maximum
number of explanatory variables for success or failure. This attempt was made in order to
find whether all variables fitted in the equation model. Thus, I derived the following
equation for success:
Success = f (per capita income, income distribution, corruption level, economic
freedom index, public cost per student, total expenditure on education, percentage of
GDP spent on education, education level of adult population, average of schooling years,
age composition of the population, ethnic composition of the population, available
capacity of schools, cost of voucher per student)
Estimating this equation, I found multicollinearity9 problem in the data, which
means that some variables were highly correlated. I also found indication of
heteroskedasticity10 , which violates the assumption that the variance of the error terms
must be constant.
Variables for corruption level, income distribution, and average school years were
highly correlated with several other variables (appendix A). In order to avoid
multicollinearity, I purged common variation among those variables by regressing them
9
One the assumptions of the regression analysis is that there is no exact linear relationship between
explanatory variables. Multicollinearity is a violation of that assumption, where there is some degree of
collinearity among some or all explanatory variables in the regression equation. Thus, the presence of
Multicollinearity makes the interpretation of estimated coefficients difficult (Gerald et al., 2004; Gujarati,
2002).
10
Another assumption of classical regression analysis is that the probability distributions for the residuals
have same variance for all values of the explanatory variables, which means I am equally uncertain about
how disperse values of the explained variable deviate from their mean values. The violation of this
assumption is known as heteroskedasticity. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the regression outputs
may mislead the interpretation (Gerald et al., 2004; Gujarati, 2002).
on common determinants and using the residuals of these auxiliary regressions in my
68
final model.
Since income distribution, corruption, transparency and expenditures on education
are all correlated with income per capita, the effect of the latter was eliminated from these
variables through an auxiliary regression. For example, in the case of income distribution,
I adopted the following procedure:
Income Distribution or Gini coefficient = f (per capita income)
The linear regression equation for income distribution (Gini coefficient) is:
Gini coefficient = ß0 + ßincomepercapita .Xincomepercapita + residual
Estimating the above equation regression, I get the following output, where
“incomecap” stands for per capita income:
Gini coefficient = 0.4980017 + (-0.00000567)*incomecap
Thus, the residual term to be used in the final regression is:
Gini Residual = Gini coefficient – (ß0 + ßincomepercapita .Xincomepercapita )
Using the estimated coefficients into the above equation I obtain:
Gini Residual = Gini coefficient - (0.4980017 + (-0.00000567)*incomecap)
A similar procedure was used for average school years, since this variable is
correlated with the age composition of the population:
Average of schooling years = f (population between 5 and 19 years old)
The estimated residuals were given by:
Avg Residual = Avgschyr – (16.33343 + (-29.00326)*age0519)
Finally, the estimated residuals for corruption or transparency index were:
Transp Residual = Transplev – ((-5.470393) + 0.0000755*incomecap +
69
1.486813*democindx)
Using the residual variables, I selected other relevant explanatory variables 11 for
success or failure of voucher programs and elaborated the model function. The following
equation represents the regression model to explain success of voucher programs.
Success = f (per capita income, income distribution residual, corruption level
residual, economic freedom index, public cost per student, total expenditure on
education, percentage of GDP spent on education, education level of adult population,
average of schooling years residual, aging composition of the population, ethnic
composition of the population, available capacity of schools, cost of voucher per student)
To avoid the heteroskedasticity problem, I estimated robust standard errors with
the Hub ler-White weight matrix. Running a probit regression according to the last
equation, I got the results displayed in Table 5. According to the estimation outputs, total
public expenditure on education (totpubexp) and the cost of voucher (costvouc) have
small explanatory power in the model. In contrast, Democracy (democindx), Corruption
(tres), Average number of years of schooling (avgres), and Income distribution (gres)
were estimated to have significant explanatory power.
11
Appendix B shows the description of all explanatory variables used in my model regression in addition to
the terminology adopted in all equations and estimations in this research. Appendix B also shows the
source of these variables.
Table 5: Output Results from Probit regression
Explanatory Variable
70
Coefficient of estimation
(P_values are in parenthesis)
Totpubexp
Pubexpgdp
Gres
Tres
Age0519
Minority
Avgres
Democindx
Teacstud
Costvouc
_constant
0.0000000232
(0.990)
30.8062900000
(0.330)
15.5341200000
(0.061)
0.9747546000
(0.064)
8.2316610000
(0.121)
2.3477440000
(0.249)
-0.5883461000
(0.022)
1.0197900000
(0.074)
-0.1127698000
(0.293)
0.0000117000
(0.960)
-9.4494580000
(0.072)
Source: prepared by the author
As a result, replacing the estimated coefficient s from the regression estimation
output into the regression equation model for success or failure, I found the following
equation for educational voucher programs:
P (Success) = F (-9.449458 + 0.0000000232*totpubexp + 30.80629*pubexpgdp
+ 15.53412*gres + 0.9747546*tres + 8.231661*age0519 + 2.347744*minority 0.5883461*avgres + 1.01979*democindx - 0.1127698*teacstud + 0.0000117*costvouc)
As stated earlier, the probability of voucher programs to achieve success or failure
is given by a standard normal cumulative distribution function.
4.5
Results and Implications
71
Although I have estimated the equation with information about the 31 voucher
programs and extracted the regression output provided in Table 5, the analysis of the
coefficients from probit regression is not simple and requires some extra calculations. In
order to estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the probability of success of
the voucher program, I calculated the marginal effects of each independent explanatory
variable. Marginal effects measure the change in the probability of success for an
infinitesimal change in each independent continuous variable. Table 6 contains these
marginal effects:
Table 6: Marginal effects of each explanatory variable
Explanatory Variable
Marginal Effect (dF/dX)
(P_values are in parenthesis)
Totpubexp
Pubexpgdp
Gres
Tres
Age0519
Minority
Avgres
Democindx
Teacstud
Costvouc
Source: Prepared by the author
0.00000000826
(0.990)
10.97869
(0.330)
5.536021
(0.061)
0.3473813
(0.064)
2.933584
(0.121)
0.8366847
(0.249)
-0. 2096737
(0.022)
0.363431
(0.074)
-0. 0401887
(0.293)
0.00000418
(0.960)
According to the marginal effects form Table 6, I can investigate the effect of
72
each explanatory variable in the probability of success of an educational voucher system.
First, I observed that Total public expenditure on education (totpubexp) and cost of
voucher (costvouc) have positive relationship with the probability of success. However,
this relationship is not statistically significant, implicating that these variables have no
sufficient explanatory power in my model.
The second variable, the percentage of GDP spent on education, has the expected
positive impact on voucher success (UNESCO, 2002; Becker, 1993). An intuitive reason
it that as government increases the share of GDP on education, more resources are
available for the educational system. However, the coefficient for this variable is not
statistically significant.
The percentage of population at the school age (between 5 and 19 years old)
(age0519) has a strong positive impact on the success of the voucher program. An
intuitive reason is that the larger the percentage of the population between 5 and 19 years
of age, the higher the number of students who would benefit from the vouche r program.
Another variable is the percentage of the population which represents the minority
group in the country (minority). As shown in Table 6, the coefficient for minority groups
has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically significant.
Additionally, the democracy index (democindx) has a significant explanatory
power and positively affects the probability of success of the voucher programs. This
result indicates a small increase in the democracy index causes the probability of success
of voucher programs to increase by 0.36. An intuitive reason is that more democratic
countries may better allocate resources toward educational sectors. In addition to that, 73
freedom of school choice through vouchers reinforces the conditions for democracy.
On the other hand, the student per teacher ratio (teacstud) negatively affects the
probability of success of voucher programs, but the coefficient for this variable is not
statistically significant. As the number of students per teacher increases in schools, the
probability of success decreases in 0.04 percent. Accordingly, fewer students per teacher
may increase the quality of education services, and vouchers used in places where
teachers already have several students seem less likely to succeed.
The three residual explanatory variables seem to be highly significant in
explaining the success of voucher programs. The Gini coefficient residual (gres) is
positively related to the probability of success. This important outcome suggests that the
bigger the inequality in income distribution of the country, the larger the probability of
success of the voucher program. This evidence can be confirmed by recent literature
about Colombian and Chilean voucher experiences and highlights the potential of the
voucher system to contribute to a more egalitarian society.
According to Table 6, transparency has a positive impact on the probability of
success of voucher programs. As the transparency level of the country increases, the
probability of success increases by 0.35. Alternatively, as corruption level increases, the
probability of success of voucher programs decreases. A possible explanation for this
result is that high levels of corruption might contribute to inefficient allocation of
resources for education. Thus, voucher programs may fail due to corruption, which does
not allow proper assistance to the needed population.
Finally, the average number of years of schooling (avgres) negatively affects the 74
probability of success of voucher programs. This output result indicates that as the
average number of years of schooling of the population increases, the probability of
success decreases by 0.2. An intuitive reason is that as the population becomes more
educated, there is less of a need for alternative methods to address education to the
excluded population.
4.6
Educational vouchers in Brazil
The previous section helped us to identify the impact of different variables on the
success or failure of voucher programs. By using the estimated impact from the previous
section and the socio-economic information for a specific country, I can estimate the
probability of success of the voucher program in that country. In order to analyze the case
for voucher in Brazil, I used the estimated equation with socio-economic data from the
country12 . In addition, I repeated this process for each Brazilian state 13 .
In the Brazilian case, I found that there is a 97.57 percent probability of success in
the implementation of voucher programs. This is an impressive result, which should
nevertheless be taken with caution, because of the existence of other significant factors
not covered by my model (e.g.: single parent household, crime rate and religion). Based
on the results, there is significant a probability of success of voucher program in Brazil
because of its high inequality of income distribution (high Gini coefficient), low levels of
12
The cost of voucher for Brazil used in the regression was the amount per student that government spent
on public education.
13
The cost of voucher for Brazilian states used in the regression was the amount per student that each state
government spent on public education.
schooling for population (aveschyr), large portion of young population (age0519), and 75
high variety and mixture of population ethnicity (minority). After all, voucher programs
were designed to address such types of problems in education. The drawbacks for the
Brazilian case may be the high level of corruption (transplev), the low democracy index
(democindx) and the high student-teacher ratio (teacstud).
Since Brazil is a considerably large country in terms of population, economy and
area, a more precise analysis should take regional differences into account. For that
reason, I investigated the case for a voucher system in each Brazilian state. I assume the
cost of a potent ial voucher equals to the amount spent by the government per student.
Table 7 shows the probability of success of a voucher program in each state.
Table 7: Probability of success of voucher programs by state
State
Piauí
Tocantins
Roraima
Acre
Alagoas
Rio Grande do Norte
Paraíba
Sergipe
Ceará
Maranhão
Mato Grosso
Pernambuco
Espírito Santo
Mato Grosso do Sul
Rondônia
Amapá
Bahia
Minas Gerais
Paraná
Goiás
Distrito Federal
Rio Grande do Sul
Pará
Rio de Janeiro
Santa Catarina
Amazonas
São Paulo
Source: prepared by the author
Abbreviation
of State
PI
TO
RR
AC
AL
RN
PB
SE
CE
MA
MT
PE
ES
MS
RO
AP
BA
MG
PN
GO
DF
RS
PA
RJ
SC
AM
SP
76
Probability of success of voucher
program (in percentage)
0.9999998
0.9999994
0.9999982
0.9999972
0.9999927
0.9999917
0.9999811
0.9999714
0.9999567
0.9999548
0.9996185
0.9992433
0.9991845
0.9988793
0.9988664
0.9982945
0.9977262
0.9956059
0.9948487
0.9883428
0.9863696
0.9553327
0.9117926
0.8703273
0.8173925
0.8088760
0.6231219
As observed in Table 7, I found that the Brazilian states with the highest
probability of success of voucher program are Piauí, Tocantins, Roraima, Acre, Alagoas,
Rio Grande do Norte and Paraíba. An intuitive reason for this is that these states have a
considerably high number of individuals at student age, high inequality in income
distribution and low average number of years of schooling of the population. Four of
these states are located in the northeast region, one of the poorest regions in the
77
country. Hence, governmental aid such as vo uchers is more likely to improve the needed
education in these locations.
In contrast, the Brazilian states with the lowest probability of success are São
Paulo, Amazonas, Santa Catarina, Rio de Janeiro, Pará and Rio Grande do Sul. This
result can be explained by the low percentage of GDP spent on education in these states,
relative low inequality in income distribution, low percentage of population considered as
minority group, high average number of years of schooling of the population, and high
level of corruption (except Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul). Four of these states
are located in the South or Southeast regions, one of the wealthiest regions in the country.
Thus, fewer efforts are necessary to address the problems of education in these locations.
Interestingly, the state of Amazonas produced the second lowest probability of
voucher success, which can be explained by the low level of public expenditure on
education, low level of GDP spent on education, and the low public expenditure per
student. All results combined highlight the significant differences among the Brazilian
states and the importance of a careful analysis of the characteristics of each state. As
Brazil has continental dimensions, the differences among states are observed by the
diversity in levels of corruption, income distribution, per capita income, ethnicity of the
population and level of schooling for each region. In order to make better decisions about
possible voucher programs, policymakers must carefully look the main determinates of
success or failure of the program in each region.
105%
100%
95%
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
78
Brazil
Probability
PI
TO
RR
AC
AL
RN
PB
SE
CE
MA
MT
PE
ES
MS
RO
AP
BA
MG
PN
GO
DF
RS
PA
RJ
SC
AM
SP
Probability of Success of the Voucher
Programs
Figure 1: Probability of Success of Voucher Programs by Brazilian States
Brazilian States
Source: prepared by the author
As a final point, I highlight that Brazil seems to fulfill the requirements for the
successful implementation of a voucher program. As mentioned earlier, the
implementation of voucher programs in some regions would perhaps present better
results. Thus, policymakers should take into consideration regional differences in order to
implement a successful voucher program in Brazil.
4.7
Assumptions and Limitations
Like any econometric model, my model made use of various assumptions.
Consequently, violation of these assumptions implicate in limitations of the model
conclusions. First, because of limited information in some countries and the relatively
small number of existing programs, I included different kinds of vouchers for different 79
levels of education, and with different goals and objectives in my data set. Thus, the
results for programs targeted to secondary education are probably different from primary
and tertiary education.
Second, the assumption that the cost of a voucher program in Brazil and its states
must be equal to the value spent by the government for each student restricts the
application of vouchers which cover partial tuition. As I observed in the literature, several
countries applied partial vouchers in order to promptly address the emerging problems
with the educational system.
Finally, I did not consider the legal aspects involved in a possible educational
reform in Brazil. The bureaucracy and the conflicts of political interests are perhaps the
two main relevant factors that would most certainly affect such reforms.
80
Conclusion
The present study aimed to investigate a relatively unexplored and often
controversial means of financing education, namely the educational voucher system. I
investigated the determinants of success of the voucher system using experiences around
the world and explored its potential in Brazil. In this context, the central question asked
was whether a voucher system is likely to improve education in Brazil. In light of this
question, I stated a research hypothesis that Brazil fulfills the conditions for a successful
voucher system.
This is an interesting point to be examined because problems of government
provision of equally asserting quality public education for the entire population are often
central features of economic and political debates, but, most importantly, because Brazil
is one of the most unequal countries in the world. For that reason, it is necessary to
promote equity and quality in the Brazilian educational system, both at national and
regional levels.
In the first chapter, we discussed the characteristics of a voucher system and its
implications for education. By doing so, we expected to describe how voucher system are
designed and implemented in order to better explain educational voucher programs. In
the following chapter, in order to understand how voucher programs have been used, we
discussed some remarkable cases of the voucher system in the world in more detail. With
this information, I focused on the main determinants of success or failure of these
experiences. In the third chapter, I contextualized the Brazilian educational system and
pointed out its main concerns and problems.
Next, based on the existing literature, I constructed a benchmark index for
81
success and failure for 31 voucher experiences around the world. Along with this index, I
selected the determinants of success or failure for voucher programs, based on all the
factors considered by authors in their evaluation of educational vouchers. With this
information, in chapter four, I elaborated an econometric model to estimate the
probability of success of a voucher program in Brazil conditional on its socio-economic
characteristics.
In light of the central question, I found significant evidence that Brazil fulfills the
conditions for a successful educational voucher system. For instance, developing
countries like Brazil had produced better results with the implementation of a voucher
program. In other words, educational vouchers have a great potential both for improving
institutional educational quality and for reducing social inequalities. Thus, I conclude that
there are considerable evidences that an educational voucher system may improve
education in Brazil.
Based on those results, some considerations could be done about the Brazilian
case for vouchers. First, the Brazilian government should carefully analyze regional
differences in order to efficiently implement voucher programs, especially because of
significant inequality in income distribution across regions of the country. Another
important aspect to be considered is the corruption level of the country, which is
considerably high in relation to other developing countries. Legislation and government
regulation should also be considered since the law, and bureaucracy can render voucher
programs unviable.
The present study helps to pose interesting questions for further investigation.
82
Further research includes the investigation of the potential for voucher programs in Latin
American countries and in the most important metropolitan areas of each Brazilian state.
I would also investigate other important determinants for success of voucher programs
such as single parent household, crime rate, religion and social violence. I consider these
determinants to be as relevant as the explanatory variables used in this study and would
be interesting to investigate in future models.
83
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95
Appendix
96
Appendix A
Correlation table of all explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. Values ranges between 1 (perfect positive correlation)
and -1 (perfect negative correlation)
totpubexp pubexpgdp expstud incomecap
gini
ageun05 age0519 age2024 age25ov transplev
totpubexp
1
pubexpgdp
-0.0453
1
expstud
0.23956
0.25987
1
incomecap
0.123
0.10681 0.64655
1
gini
0.00958
-0.1106 -0.4566
-0.6698
1
ageun05
-0.1475
-0.1092 -0.6377
-0.7567 0.56785
1
age0519
-0.153
-0.1298 -0.7223
-0.762 0.57374 0.91983
1
age2024
0.1363
0.22581 0.0181
-0.1291 0.40864 0.18052 0.28226
1
age25ov
0.12565
0.08516 0.67053
0.75498 -0.6151 -0.9411
-0.986 -0.3942
1
transplev
0.10275
0.18045 0.6323
0.76231 -0.4827 -0.8048 -0.7292 -0.1674 0.75336
1
majority
0.2098
-0.0948 -0.0916
-0.0555 -0.2121
-0.04 0.00555 -0.3958 0.06831
-0.0435
minority
-0.2098
0.09475 0.0916
0.05551 0.21207 0.03999 -0.0055 0.39585 -0.0683 0.04355
eduprima
-0.2287
-0.3206 -0.7029
-0.6517 0.5326 0.77319 0.76634 0.13923 -0.7644
-0.7041
edusecond
0.23374
0.22743 0.46285
0.37503 -0.3975 -0.5723
-0.588 -0.2432 0.60092 0.44081
eduhigher
0.11978
0.31608 0.74568
0.77127 -0.4959 -0.7269 -0.6898
0.076 0.66677 0.78068
avgschyr
0.20388
0.21396 0.69445
0.61514 -0.3372
-0.862 -0.8202 -0.0802 0.81802 0.80158
democindx
0.22139
0.23511 0.70924
0.5905
-0.228 -0.6394 -0.6508 0.08679 0.61288 0.81715
teacstud
-0.1957
-0.1439 -0.5154
-0.4522 0.42043 0.61988 0.55719 0.17226 -0.5838
-0.5772
costvouc
-0.1774
0.23227 0.64205
0.59675
-0.604 -0.5264 -0.5468 -0.3828 0.58083 0.60829
97
Continued Appendix A
majority minority eduprima edusecond eduhigher avgschyr democindx teacstud costvouc
totpubexp
pubexpgdp
expstud
incomecap
gini
ageun05
age0519
age2024
age25ov
transplev
majority
minority
eduprima
edusecond
eduhigher
avgschyr
democindx
teacstud
costvouc
1
-1
0.133
0.01666
-0.2951
-0.1135
-0.0849
0.00313
0.03927
1
-0.133
-0.0167
0.29506
0.11352
0.08492
-0.0031
-0.0393
1
-0.8851
-0.7261
-0.7518
-0.6341
0.73698
-0.5697
1
0.32265
0.53215
0.41313
-0.6552
0.447
1
0.74275
0.67918
-0.5309
0.49828
1
0.77308
-0.5143
0.51722
1
-0.3082
0.44313
1
-0.4825
1
98
Appendix B
Description of Explanatory Variables
Variable
Description
Totpubexp
Total Public Expenditure on Education in
Millions of Dollars.
Pubexpgdp
Total public expenditure on education as
percentage of GDP per year.
Gini
Gini coefficient. Level of Income Distribution.
Value ranges between 0 and 1. The higher the
coefficient, the large the inequality of income
distribution.
Political transparenc y level. The corruption
level perceived by the population. The lower
the transparency level, the higher the level of
corruption.
Percentage of the population between 05 and 19
years old. Young population. Potential student
population.
Percentage of the population representing the
minority groups.
Transplev
Age0519
Source
National Education
Departments. OECD.
World Bank. IBGE.
National Education
Departments. OECD.
World Bank. IBGE.
World Bank. World
Development
Indicators. IBGE.
Transparency
International. Lima
(2004)
Avgschyr
National census.
OECD. World Bank.
IBGE.
National census.
OECD. World Bank.
IBGE.
UNESCO. IBGE.
Teacstud
The Heritage
Foundation
UNESCO. INEP. MEC
Minority
Average number of schooling years of the
population.
Democindx Democracy index. Economic freedom.
Costvouc
Students-teacher ration. Average number of
students per teacher.
Cost of the voucher per student. Nominal value
of voucher per student.
Source: prepared by the author
World Bank. National
Education
Departments.
99
Appendix C
Brief Explanation for Success or Failure of Each Program based on the literature
Program
Australia
Brief Explanation
This failure is given by the resistance of the Australian population in
implementing the voucher system. In addition to that, the Australian
government fears to lose private contributions due to competition,
and consequently has the administrative costs increased.
Bangladesh
The Bangladesh voucher system is a remarkable effort to reduce
differences among male and female schooling, and it is a pioneer
program in supporting female secondary education. The voucher
project succeeds in its main objective of increasing girls’ enrollment
at secondary education. Even though girls' enrollment increased, the
failing rate is still high among girls, raising questions of quality of
education.
Belize
Belize provides vouchers for primary and secondary education. The
strong government partnership with churches has compromised the
consolidation of voucher programs in the country.
Canada:
British Columbia ranks second in the education freedom index, with
Province of
46% of freedom for school choice. The results achieved in this
British
province have demonstrated that educational freedom and the
Columbia
educational voucher impacted positively on student performance
compared to Canadian and OECD standards.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
100
Brief Explanation
Canada:
The province of Quebec has produced similar levels of educational
Province of
freedom to those of the province of British Columbia: 42%. Student
Quebec
performance improved dramatically in this French-speaking
province, surpassing Canadian and OECD standards. In the last few
years, the increasing enrollment in schools us ing the voucher system
is also considered an important indicator of success the program.
Canada:
One might expect that the province of Manitoba would achieve
Province of
results similar to those of Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec
Manitoba
because they had similar levels of freedom on education. However,
the impact of the voucher system in Manitoba was not as remarkable
as the impact in the comparable provinces.
Canada:
The province of Saskatchewan was not as successful as the other
Province of
provinces in the implementation of the voucher program. This was
Saskatchewan
so because they did not provide as much educational freedom for
parents as the other provinces. As a consequence, the Saskatchewan
students’ performance was below the Canadian average and OECD
standards.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
101
Brief Explanation
Canada:
The province of Alberta is the most successful example of a voucher
Province of
system in the country. The level of educational freedom in Alberta
Alberta
measured in 2002 was 64%. This experience produces better student
performance in Canada, with more than 60% of student tuition costs
financed by the state.
Chile
The Chilean voucher system is one of the most successful voucher
systems in the developing world, and it is the only one providing
universal vouchers. The universal voucher system first introduced in
the 1980s helped to equalize the huge differences between public
and private schools in the country. The Chilean educational system
is highly democratic and has produced similar results in student
academic performance in both private and public schools.
Colombia
This shortage of vacancies in public secondary schools pressured the
government to present an alternative solution for providing
education to the population. The use of a targeted voucher system in
Colombia successfully fulfilled the demand for secondary education
with lower costs than those costs incurred into construction of new
schools. Besides the cost effectiveness of this program, his studies
also show higher academic achievement, lower grade repetition,
higher test scores and higher satisfaction among those parents and
students using vouchers.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
Denmark
102
Brief Explanation
Denmark has a long tradition (since 1814) in providing free private
education by government subsidies. The freedom of school choice is
given to every student in Denmark. Teachers' unions are not
opposed to this system of free choice. In addition to that, the
students performances on standardized test has been greater than the
OECD average and the performance of the other countries.
France
The public education system is heavily funded by the government,
which imposes several restrictive regulations to voucher programs.
The government subsidy is considerable linked to religious
institutions in this country. Thus, educational regulation is not
sufficient flexible to consolidate a voucher program.
Guatemala
The allocation and distribution of financial resources and materials
perhaps have not been timely. In addition to that, the program has
not received sufficient parental support. High level turnover and
bureaucratic intransigence have reduced impact of organizational
changes.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
Japan
103
Brief Explanation
Japan has a very well organized and quality educational system. The
government finances compulsory school up to 15 years old. The
voucher system is used to give opportunities to poor students to
continue their education after that point. Vouchers represented only
40% of the tuition, whic h creates restriction for their use by poor
population.
Lesotho
This program has a strong partnership with the churches and covers
most schools in the country. The government provides training for
teachers, and appoints them for the position in the schools. High
corruption level and bureaucratic intransigence have reduced the
impact of educational reforms, compromising the allocation and
distribution of financial resources and materials.
Netherlands
The Netherlands has a complete free choice educational system, and
it is a reference school choice system. Although students attending
public or private schools have had a similar academic performance,
the level of parental satisfaction is higher among those who used the
voucher to finance private education.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
New Zealand
104
Brief Explanation
Although New Zealand provides free education to children at
compulsory age at secondary education, the level of satisfaction and
academic performance in public school is considerable low. In
addition to that, parents’ satisfaction with government subsidy for
private institutions is considerable high, over 97%.
Poland
Only 50% of the educational cost is covered by the government
through vouchers. Thus, the amount subsidized by government was
not enough to consolidate the voucher program.
Puerto Rico
The voucher program for low- income families provided subsidy for
public and private school. The voucher program was terminated in
1995 by court decision supporting the idea of unconstitutionality.
Sweden
The educational reform allowed public funds to follow students to
the schools they chose through the Swedish voucher, which pays
90% of the public cost per student. The Swedish system is one of the
few experiences on education that really uses physical vouchers.
The use of the voucher has increased sharply in the country.
Moreover, evaluations about the success of the program are
confirmed by high parental satisfaction and better student
performance on standardized tests compared to parental satisfaction
and academic performance of those students in public schools.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
Spain
105
Brief Explanation
There are no considerable differences between public and private
schools. Thus, government is responsible for controlling and
financ ing the larger portion of the educational system in the country.
United
This voucher program has increased the number of students
Kingdom
supported by those selective vouchers since the beginning of the
program. Nevertheless, the number of students in the program still
represents a small percentage of the student population (7%).
United States:
Considered as one of the most important experiences involving a
Milwaukee,
voucher system, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) is
Wisconsin
an example of successful voucher implementation in the United
States often found in the literature. When academic achievement in
reading and math tests is measured, voucher users have presented
statistically superior results. MPCP achieved high parental
involvement in their children’s education process and high parental
satisfaction with the institution chosen. In addition to that, students
acquired more discipline and moral values when they chose their
schools.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
106
Brief Explanation
United States:
The poor student participating in the Cleveland voucher program
Cleveland,
tends to take advantage of the better conditions offered by the
Ohio
schools that they choose. The Cleveland voucher program registered
high levels of parental satisfaction with respect to the program,
safety, discipline and moral values of private schools. In addition to
that, student achievement has improved for those using voucher
programs.
United States:
The New York experience with a voucher program is an interesting
New York
case, where the poor African American students have achieved
City, New
higher academic results as they have used the voucher more than
York
other minorities under the same process. The overall New York
voucher program performance registered academic improvement for
student participants in both math and reading tests. Another
important outcome from their studies was the high level of
satisfaction of students and their families with the academic
program, location, safety, religious traditions, parental support,
discipline, staff, sports and content provided by the schools they had
chosen.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
107
Brief Explanation
United States:
Similarly to the New York voucher program, the poor African
Washington
American students ha ve achieved higher academic results as they
D.C.
have used the voucher more than other minorities under the same
process. Even though math performance had no significant change,
the satisfaction is considerable higher for parents with children
under voucher program than those under public education.
United States:
The success of this program is given by the high parental
Dayton, Ohio
satisfaction and the academic results of African American students.
The parental dissatisfaction about public school considerable high,
and reflects directly in the increasing demand for vouchers in this
region.
United States:
The population reported 63% frustration with public educational
Indianapolis,
system. Educational Choice Charitable Trust Program has achieved
Indiana
no significant differences in student’s performance.
United States:
In this state, there are two major programs of educational vouchers.
Florida
However, the voucher provided by the state is highly controversial
because students attending failing schools (which have grade F)
receive a vo ucher. The overall voucher program was not successful
because the opposition of teachers’ unions, public opinion and some
legal aspects regards to constitutionality of the program.
Appendix C: Continued
Program
108
Brief Explanation
United States:
The Vermont experience recalls that of Colombia, where the
Vermont
voucher system was introduced first and foremost to respond to the
shortage of places in public secondary schools. 95% of the state has
no public secondary school. Vermont’s experience with vouchers
indicates that towns, parents, and private schools can creatively
work together, providing access to high school education for
students without causing the expense of building their own public
schools. There is no data for satisfaction or voucher results, but
success is given by the long duration of this program (132 yearsold).
United States:
Covering only 50% of tuition of a private institution, the voucher
San Francisco,
program opened new options even for parents and students unable to
California
contribute additional funds.
109
Appendix D
Voucher programs around the world – Data Set
Country / City
Australia
Bangladesh
Belize
Canada: Province of British Columbia
Canada: Province of Quebec
Canada: Province of Manitoba
Canada: Province of Saskatchewan
Canada: Province of Alberta
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
France
Guatemala
Japan
Lesotho
Netherlands
New Zealand
Poland
Puerto Rico
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
United States: Cleveland, Ohio
United States: New York, New York
United States: Washington D.C., Maryland
United States: Dayton, Ohio
United States: Indianapolis, Indiana
United States: Florida
United States: Vermont
United States: San Francisco, California
ID
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Y Success(1)
Failure(0)
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
Total Public
Expenditure in
Education US$
Millions
27,327.04
1,246.00
61.44
59,782.40
59,782.40
59,782.40
59,782.40
59,782.40
1,252.00
8,051.20
12,889.90
87,248.00
851.20
127,785.00
326.78
21,452.20
5,409.60
19,033.20
1,500.44
39,132.20
16,379.70
76,400.00
2,735.80
670.00
11,217.53
7,334.49
14,927.11
491,150.00
15,535.00
975,884.00
47,408.87
Total % Public
Expenditure of
GDP in
Education
0.052
0.013
0.048
0.064
0.064
0.064
0.064
0.064
0.039
0.032
0.083
0.056
0.016
0.035
0.064
0.049
0.069
0.051
0.033
0.046
0.071
0.050
0.458
0.047
0.047
0.047
0.047
0.047
0.047
0.060
0.047
Government
Spending per
Student
5,830.00
62.50
676.28
6,985.00
7,097.00
7,432.00
6,277.00
6,871.00
667.28
350.00
7,200.00
6,605.00
231.11
6,266.00
450.17
5,304.00
3,539.01
642.94
2,376.00
4,274.00
5,648.00
5,230.00
8,718.00
11,121.00
11,640.00
11,489.00
7,977.00
4,678.00
6,116.65
9,798.00
4,489.00
income per
capita
21,650.00
400.00
3,190.00
27,967.00
30,290.00
29,500.00
32,790.00
47,530.00
4,390.00
1,800.00
33,750.00
24,770.00
1,910.00
34,510.00
590.00
26,310.00
15,870.00
5,270.00
10,950.00
16,990.00
28,840.00
28,350.00
19,939.00
14,291.00
22,402.00
28,659.00
15,547.00
21,640.00
21,557.00
20,625.00
34,556.00
GINI
Coefficient
0.352
0.340
0.510
0.302
0.302
0.302
0.302
0.302
0.580
0.560
0.236
0.327
0.560
0.249
0.563
0.248
0.362
0.316
0.526
0.325
0.252
0.345
0.375
0.396
0.427
0.361
0.374
0.424
0.470
0.423
0.475
Corruption
Level
(10=clean
0=corrupt)
8.600
1.200
4.500
9.000
9.000
9.000
9.000
9.000
7.500
3.600
9.500
6.300
2.500
7.100
4.800
9.000
9.500
4.000
7.700
7.100
9.300
8.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
7.700
Democracy
Index 2002
7.9
5.9
6.3
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.9
7.3
5.3
7.6
6.8
6.4
7.0
6.8
7.7
8.2
6.4
8.2
7.1
7.3
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
8.2
110
Appendix D: Continued
Country / City
Australia
Bangladesh
Belize
Canada: Province of British Columbia
Canada: Province of Quebec
Canada: Province of Manitoba
Canada: Province of Saskatchewan
Canada: Province of Alberta
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
France
Guatemala
Japan
Lesotho
Netherlands
New Zealand
Poland
Puerto Rico
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
United States: Cleveland, Ohio
United States: New York, New York
United States: Washington D.C., Maryland
United States: Dayton, Ohio
United States: Indianapolis, Indiana
United States: Florida
United States: Vermont
United States: San Francisco, California
Under
5 years
0.064
0.159
0.143
0.039
0.039
0.048
0.049
0.049
0.082
0.102
0.059
0.061
0.162
0.046
0.127
0.056
0.070
0.049
0.072
0.048
0.052
0.055
0.071
0.065
0.049
0.061
0.066
0.074
0.059
0.056
0.041
05 - 19
years
0.205
0.357
0.376
0.170
0.168
0.197
0.202
0.193
0.273
0.286
0.120
0.173
0.379
0.157
0.384
0.168
0.223
0.203
0.232
0.153
0.191
0.185
0.192
0.184
0.118
0.173
0.181
0.184
0.169
0.186
0.105
20 - 24
years
0.066
0.079
0.094
0.097
0.094
0.098
0.104
0.107
0.084
0.083
0.056
0.066
0.091
0.066
0.124
0.055
0.072
0.084
0.076
0.071
0.058
0.063
0.105
0.080
0.102
0.081
0.097
0.100
0.083
0.093
0.091
25
years
and
over
0.664
0.405
0.387
0.694
0.699
0.657
0.645
0.651
0.561
0.530
0.765
0.700
0.368
0.730
0.365
0.721
0.636
0.663
0.620
0.728
0.699
0.697
0.632
0.671
0.731
0.685
0.656
0.642
0.689
0.665
0.763
Majority
0.920
0.980
0.487
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.950
0.580
0.970
0.932
0.550
0.990
0.997
0.830
0.791
0.989
0.805
0.744
0.700
0.921
0.671
0.685
0.567
0.907
0.526
0.717
0.799
0.980
0.519
Minority
0.080
0.020
0.513
0.338
0.338
0.338
0.338
0.338
0.050
0.420
0.030
0.068
0.450
0.010
0.003
0.170
0.209
0.011
0.195
0.256
0.300
0.079
0.329
0.315
0.433
0.093
0.474
0.283
0.201
0.020
0.481
White
0.920
0.020
0.000
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.662
0.950
0.200
0.970
0.932
0.020
0.000
0.001
0.830
0.791
0.989
0.805
0.249
0.700
0.921
0.671
0.685
0.567
0.907
0.526
0.717
0.799
0.980
0.519
AfroAmerican
0.000
0.000
0.487
0.022
0.022
0.022
0.022
0.022
0.020
0.210
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.997
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.080
0.000
0.000
0.020
0.251
0.279
0.181
0.078
0.432
0.246
0.150
0.005
0.081
Hispanic
Latinos
0.000
0.000
0.249
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.024
0.000
0.580
0.000
0.004
0.550
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.744
0.000
0.012
0.043
0.015
0.148
0.005
0.016
0.020
0.031
0.002
0.068
Asian
0.070
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.032
0.032
0.032
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.025
0.000
0.990
0.001
0.090
0.074
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.040
0.026
0.018
0.098
0.008
0.013
0.015
0.017
0.009
0.322
Other
0.010
0.980
0.106
0.260
0.260
0.260
0.260
0.260
0.030
0.010
0.030
0.039
0.430
0.008
0.001
0.080
0.135
0.011
0.109
0.007
0.300
0.007
0.008
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.013
0.003
0.004
0.004
0.010
StudentTeacher
ratio
17.00
42.60
15.50
16.59
14.98
15.78
16.20
18.43
20.00
22.00
9.60
12.00
25.73
14.20
23.10
17.10
15.70
15.40
29.67
8.50
15.30
17.20
17.60
17.30
16.80
14.90
14.40
20.00
18.90
11.70
24.00
111
Appendix D: Continued
Country / City
Australia
Bangladesh
Belize
Canada: Province of British Columbia
Canada: Province of Quebec
Canada: Province of Manitoba
Canada: Province of Saskatchewan
Canada: Province of Alberta
Chile
Colombia
Denmark
France
Guatemala
Japan
Lesotho
Netherlands
New Zealand
Poland
Puerto Rico
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States: Milwaukee, Wisconsin
United States: Cleveland, Ohio
United States: New York, New York
United States: Washington D.C., Maryland
United States: Dayton, Ohio
United States: Indianapolis, Indiana
United States: Florida
United States: Vermont
United States: San Francisco, California
Primary/un
der H.school
0.390
0.987
0.360
0.194
0.244
0.284
0.283
0.219
0.510
0.711
0.323
0.180
0.720
0.267
0.810
0.120
0.240
0.180
0.636
0.320
0.080
0.160
0.050
0.170
0.214
0.162
0.170
0.196
0.201
0.136
0.232
Secondary/
High school
0.300
0.010
0.420
0.380
0.381
0.356
0.378
0.380
0.353
0.204
0.427
0.580
0.210
0.465
0.160
0.640
0.470
0.700
0.147
0.430
0.590
0.565
0.570
0.619
0.313
0.524
0.619
0.560
0.575
0.570
0.502
Higher/
College / BA
0.310
0.003
0.220
0.426
0.375
0.360
0.339
0.401
0.137
0.085
0.250
0.240
0.070
0.269
0.030
0.240
0.290
0.120
0.216
0.250
0.330
0.275
0.380
0.211
0.474
0.315
0.211
0.244
0.224
0.295
0.266
Average
Number of
years of
Schooling
13.10
3.30
6.00
11.60
11.60
11.60
11.60
11.60
10.00
8.00
9.70
10.90
3.50
9.50
4.20
9.40
11.70
9.80
12.00
10.30
11.40
9.40
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
12.00
Cost of voucher
per student in
Dollar
4,664.00
36.00
500.00
2,095.50
4,258.20
7,432.00
3,452.35
3,435.50
22.32
143.00
5,400.00
6,605.00
4.00
2,369.32
450.00
5,304.00
3,539.01
321.47
1,500.00
4,274.00
6,676.00
3,500.00
4,894.00
6,507.00
1,400.00
7,500.00
2,600.00
800.00
4,100.00
1,204.00
2,600.00
112
Appendix E
Brazil and its states – Data Set
Country / City
Brazil
Acre
Alagoas
Amazonas
Amapa
Bahia
Ceara
Distrito Federal
Espirito Santo
Goias
Maranhao
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso do Sul
Minas Gerais
Para
Paraiba
Parana
Pernambuco
Piaui
Rio de Janeiro
Rio Grande do Norte
Rio Grande do Sul
Rondonia
Roraima
Santa Catarina
Sao Paulo
Sergipe
Tocantins
Total Public
Expenditure
on Education
US$ Millions
22,852.33
126.64
295.77
349.41
89.22
1,369.64
755.14
608.22
424.55
508.36
541.80
425.05
338.52
2,347.94
631.18
421.71
1,329.80
729.68
334.49
2,187.17
438.49
1,433.31
173.26
74.21
646.71
5,530.19
238.17
158.19
Total %
Public
Expenditure
of GDP on
Education
0.047
0.149
0.084
0.041
0.103
0.060
0.071
0.050
0.041
0.052
0.125
0.067
0.057
0.046
0.069
0.097
0.040
0.051
0.130
0.035
0.105
0.035
0.063
0.166
0.033
0.030
0.080
0.138
Government
Spending
per Student
484.12
620.20
366.01
404.25
455.05
320.17
326.82
1,054.41
491.81
349.00
271.39
566.45
580.80
485.75
286.37
383.82
509.13
327.56
356.81
741.03
503.56
628.80
417.49
602.73
452.39
594.67
408.54
350.94
income
per
capita
2,710.00
1,844.31
889.45
1,276.40
1,361.53
1,228.16
1,178.65
3,579.26
1,834.82
1,708.97
843.33
1,828.81
1,867.47
1,734.20
1,434.95
1,092.72
2,114.38
1,336.05
982.35
2,435.88
1,150.34
2,444.26
1,682.37
1,242.34
2,163.99
2,611.94
1,126.07
1,113.20
GINI
Coefficient
0.611
0.580
0.605
0.592
0.583
0.602
0.614
0.630
0.598
0.611
0.593
0.611
0.616
0.599
0.601
0.586
0.599
0.611
0.603
0.590
0.597
0.581
0.588
0.569
0.568
0.578
0.607
0.608
Under 5
years
0.107
0.138
0.119
0.138
0.142
0.101
0.108
0.098
0.092
0.096
0.123
0.102
0.098
0.090
0.126
0.098
0.093
0.101
0.106
0.085
0.100
0.084
0.112
0.137
0.089
0.086
0.110
0.116
05 - 19
years
0.327
0.370
0.350
0.371
0.372
0.341
0.338
0.296
0.302
0.301
0.376
0.325
0.313
0.298
0.365
0.329
0.294
0.322
0.351
0.258
0.327
0.271
0.347
0.364
0.293
0.275
0.339
0.353
20 - 24
years
0.097
0.101
0.098
0.103
0.104
0.100
0.092
0.114
0.098
0.101
0.097
0.100
0.094
0.094
0.100
0.094
0.091
0.097
0.097
0.090
0.094
0.084
0.099
0.100
0.089
0.095
0.099
0.099
25
years
and
over
0.468
0.391
0.434
0.389
0.382
0.458
0.462
0.492
0.508
0.502
0.405
0.473
0.495
0.518
0.410
0.479
0.522
0.480
0.446
0.567
0.479
0.560
0.442
0.399
0.529
0.543
0.452
0.432
Corruption
Level
(10=clean
0=corrupt)
4.000
3.440
4.871
3.395
5.009
3.991
4.485
4.507
4.653
3.480
2.991
4.218
4.031
3.782
3.409
3.587
4.858
4.453
3.338
3.355
3.813
4.355
4.662
3.418
4.395
3.627
4.525
3.631
113
Appendix E: Continued
Country / City
Brazil
Acre
Alagoas
Amazonas
Amapa
Bahia
Ceara
Distrito Federal
Espirito Santo
Goias
Maranhao
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso do Sul
Minas Gerais
Para
Paraiba
Parana
Pernambuco
Piaui
Rio de Janeiro
Rio Grande do Norte
Rio Grande do Sul
Rondonia
Roraima
Santa Catarina
Sao Paulo
Sergipe
Tocantins
Majority
0.550
0.622
0.595
0.669
0.657
0.601
0.575
0.492
0.488
0.507
0.623
0.479
0.547
0.536
0.664
0.523
0.772
0.529
0.646
0.547
0.524
0.866
0.506
0.615
0.893
0.707
0.608
0.606
Minority
0.450
0.378
0.405
0.331
0.343
0.399
0.425
0.508
0.512
0.493
0.377
0.521
0.453
0.464
0.336
0.477
0.228
0.471
0.354
0.453
0.476
0.134
0.494
0.385
0.107
0.293
0.392
0.394
Primary/under
H.school
0.769
0.831
0.845
0.769
0.749
0.822
0.839
0.589
0.769
0.795
0.852
0.805
0.785
0.794
0.826
0.835
0.769
0.799
0.859
0.685
0.803
0.768
0.843
0.791
0.785
0.717
0.824
0.834
Secondary/
High school
0.163
0.131
0.116
0.197
0.210
0.148
0.124
0.258
0.174
0.157
0.129
0.144
0.147
0.145
0.141
0.112
0.161
0.146
0.117
0.215
0.150
0.160
0.127
0.168
0.154
0.184
0.138
0.136
Higher/
College / BA
0.068
0.038
0.039
0.034
0.040
0.031
0.036
0.153
0.056
0.048
0.019
0.051
0.068
0.061
0.033
0.053
0.070
0.055
0.025
0.101
0.046
0.072
0.030
0.041
0.061
0.098
0.038
0.030
Average
Number of
years of
Schooling
6.2
4.4
3.7
5.5
6.0
4.1
4.0
8.1
5.7
5.5
3.6
5.4
5.7
5.4
4.7
3.8
6.0
4.6
3.5
7.1
4.4
6.3
4.9
5.7
6.3
6.7
4.3
4.4
Democracy
Index 2002
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.2
StudentTeacher ratio
22.4
22.9
28.5
20.3
29.3
25.5
26.1
22.1
20.0
23.1
23.4
23.0
20.1
19.4
29.8
22.8
19.8
25.9
20.5
18.9
23.8
17.7
25.8
18.8
20.5
22.8
24.9
23.9