Threat Convergence Profile Series
The Haqqani Network
October 2011
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The Fund for Peace Transnational Threats
Threat Convergence Profile Sheet Number 1
Series Editor
Patricia Taft
Report Written by
Kendall Lawrence
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The Haqqani Network
Overview
Background
The Haqqani Network is an insurgent
group1 that operates from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region of
Pakistan. The group has been active mainly in
the southeast of Afghanistan—in Paktia,
Paktika, Khost, Ghazni Wardak and,
occasionally, Kabul provinces. For the past
two years, the group has focused on gaining
support and control of Kurram Agency, a
province of Pakistan not far from Kabul,2
which is mostly beyond the scope of U.S.
drone activity. It is led by Siraj Haqqani, the
son of the network’s founder, the famous anti
-Soviet fighter and former CIA asset,
Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Network falls under
the larger umbrella of the Taliban, although
they maintain their own command and
control structures.
Under both Siraj and his father, the Haqqani
Network has maintained a national Islamic
objective, leaving the global jihad to their
partners. It is closely connected to al-Qaeda
and other jihadist and extremist groups in
Pakistan.3 The network’s goal of defeating the
U.S. and foreign forces is not only to take
control of Afghanistan, but also to bolster the
efforts and morale of global jihadists. The
Haqqani Network has been named one of the
largest threats to American operations in
Afghanistan. Despite the fact that it remains a
significant threat to both the U.S.-led
collation and the Afghan government, they
continue to receive thinly veiled support
from the Pakistani military.
Founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani during the
Russian invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the Network was been an integral part of
insurgent operations from the 1980s to the
present day,4 though Haqqani himself was
trained in Pakistan during the 1970s to
combat Prime Minister Mohammad Daud
Khan, an Afghan politician who overthrew the
monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah in 1973
to establish Afghanistan as a republic. The
group was supported by the United States as
well as Pakistan’s intelligence service, known
as the ISI, while fighting the Russians.
Haqqani excelled at coordinating and
organizing not only local fighters but also
foreign fighters from all over the Muslim
world. His organization came to be one of the
key outlets for American arms, supplies, and
money, distributed by the ISI.5 During the
1990s, Jalaluddin Haqqani agreed to join the
Taliban, eventually achieving the position of
Interior Minister.6 Prior to the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan after 9/11, the U.S. and Pakistan
held meetings with Haqqani in Pakistan in an
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attempt to get him to sever his allegiance to
the Taliban. He refused.7 Additional overtures
have been made to Haqqani and his sons
since Karzai’s administration came to power
and those have similarly been rebuffed.8
Largely the result of the connections and
contacts that Jalaluddin Haqqani made during
the 1980s, the Haqqani Network is today one
of the most well-connected insurgent groups
in the region. It is also known for providing
substantial monetary compensation in
exchange for assistance by the local
population.9 The Haqqanis also earn revenue
from criminal enterprises such as the illegal
sale of chromite, an iron oxide used in many
metal alloys, and timber smuggling and, to a
lesser extent, kidnapping and extortion.10
The Network also has a strong base within the
Zadran tribe (considered to be one of the
fiercest in the area), through family
connections, although it is not unilaterally
supported as the tribe is highly
fractionalized. Many Zadran elders who have
resisted Haqqani infiltration have been
assassinated, leaving elements of the tribe
open to exploitation in the absence of
effective leadership.11 There have been
clashes and feuds between the Haqqanis and
other Zadran warlords in the region.
The Haqqani Network
Challenges to
the United States
Since 2004, the U.S. has used drone
attacks to target the Haqqani Network inside
of Pakistan. However, because the use of
drones has not proved to be consistently
effective, the U.S. has begun exploring other
methods and strategies. One of the strategies
currently employed to counter the Haqqani
Network and other insurgent groups focuses
on building relations with the populations
that would support these groups. By putting
dev elopment resources i nto these
communities, the U.S. and its allies hope to
separate the terrorist group from its support
base. With infrastructure and security coming
from external aid, the communities would no
longer have to rely on the insurgents, thus
eroding the co-dependent relationship.
Currently, this strategy focuses too little
attention on population centers that the
Haqqani Network depends on for support and
aid has gone mainly to communities that are
easier to access. In addition, U.S. forces have
relied mainly on interdiction efforts and
targeted raids into Haqqani strongholds that
have achieved few enduring effects,
particularly when attempting to alleviate the
network’s popular support base in the tribal
areas.12
In attempting to counter insurgent groups
like the Haqqani Network, the U.S. leans on
allies in the region for both intelligence and
support. However, in the case of Pakistan,
they are faced with a continual challenge due
to the fragmented nature of the Pakistani
government, with various elements covertly
supporting groups that the U.S. has deemed
as terrorists. For example, the Pakistani
military continues to support the Haqqani
Network despite its relationship with the
U.S.13 In exchange for this support, the
Haqqani network serves as a proxy force and
trusted mediator for Pakistani interests in
Afghanistan, and within Pakistan itself. In
addition, the ISI relies heavily on Haqqani
Network to direct and communicate with
Pakistani terrorist organizations14 engaged in
attacks against Indian interests in Kashmir
and across the subcontinent, including the
attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July
2008.15 The Network has been alerted in the
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past by the ISI about impending U.S. drone
strikes, allowing them to take refuge and
shelter in the mountains surrounding the
Haqqani camps. The largest challenge for
Pakistan however, is that the main group it
relies upon to shape both Afghanistan’s and
the FATA’s political landscapes is the same
actor that has incubated al-Qaeda and served
as an enabler for other forms of militancy,
including threatening Islamabad.16
The threat that the Haqqani Network poses to
the U.S. has grown over the past decade. Its
role in attacks on U.S. interests has made it
clear and the U.S. understands the message.
In the fall of 2007, the U.S. offered a
US$50,000 reward for the capture of Siraj
Haqqani—today it is US$5million.17 The rapid
growth in the reward offered showcases the
importance the U.S. puts on fighting and
bringing down the Haqqani Network. The
increase also highlights how effective Siraj
Haqqani and the entire network have been in
their efforts to destabilize the U.S. effort in
Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network
Connections to al-Qaeda
and the Taliban
The Haqqani Network is tied closely
to both al-Qaeda and the Afghani Taliban,
having built working relationships with both
groups. During the 1990s, Jalaluddin Haqqani
and his network were instrumental in helping
Osama bin Laden set up al-Qaeda’s
infrastructure, including helping to create a
stronghold and cave network in the southeast
of Afghanistan. He has worked closely with al
-Qaeda field commander, Abu Zubaydah, to
establish an insurgent presence in Paktia
province. The network’s connection to alQaeda has also given them access to new
resources. As al-Qaeda’s connections have
grown since 2006, Haqqani has benefited.
The publicity and notoriety that al-Qaeda has
garnered over the past decade has increased
the number of jihad fighters heading to
Afghanistan, as well as to the Haqqani
Network. Foreign fighters play a significant
role in the Haqqani Network, with the group
facilitating the entry of foreign militants into
Afghanistan from Pakistan in substantial
numbers, beginning in 2007. Throughout
2008 and 2009, the Haqqani Network
increasingly took advantage of Paktika’s
mountainous terrain, its proximity to its North
Waziristan strongholds, and the absence of a
pronounced Afghan or Coalition presence to
establish support infrastructure and camps.18
When foreign fighters arrive in Afghanistan
to fight with or be trained by al-Qaeda, they
are assisted by facilitators from the Haqqani
Network. These facilitators act as guides and
liaisons for the outsiders and provide access
to everything the fighters require, including
transportation, weapons, supplies and
shelter. In this capacity, they offer protection
to other insurgent and terrorist groups
operating in the area. The Network is the
backbone of terrorist operations in the FATA
region, focusing its attacks in Afghanistan
while letting other groups take charge of
international attacks. The Network’s ability to
execute deadly, high-profile attacks in Kabul
and the ensuing international press coverage
further reinforces foreign patronage of the
Haqqani network.19 The defeat of U.S. forces
in Afghanistan is seen as the boost that the
wider international jihad needs, as it is
believed such a defeat would confer more
legitimacy for the group.
The Network’s unique role in the region has
grown as it is not only is it facilitating foreign
fighters coming into the area, but also
managing communication between the
different insurgent and terrorist groups. “The
Haqqani network has long been an essential
operational partner for both Pakistan and al-
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Qaeda, and that both Islamabad and the
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, also known as
“the Pakistani Taliban”) often rely upon the
Haqqanis’ good offices to negotiate with one
another.”20 It has turned the region into a
melting pot of international jihadists. The
territory comprising North Waziristan has
arguably become the most important safehaven for al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban
(TTP), Kashmiri groups such as Jaish-eMohammed (JEM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), as
well as others. In essence, it has become the
major nexus for international terrorism.21 The
Network is also responsible for the capture of
the only American solider currently held
captive. Taken in June of 2009, he last
appeared on video in May of 2011.22
The Haqqani Network believes that the
international military commitment to
Afghanistan is only short-term. Since security
is the primary requirement for any
governance or development progress, they
believe that maintaining an unstable security
environment will prevent effective and
lasting progress on any and all fronts.23
The Haqqani Network
Timeline
1970s
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Prime Minister Mohammad Daud Khan overthrows
of the monarchy of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in
Afghanistan. J. Haqqani and his followers, many of
whom were royalists supporting the king, traveled
to Pakistan to receive military training to combat
Daud’s new regime.
1979
1980
The Soviet Union moves into
support a communist government
after the assignation of PM Daud.
Jalaluddin Haqqani establishes a
presence in North Waziristan’s
Miram Shah.
1980s
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
After moving between several anti-Soviet groups, Haqqani becomes
the key Hizb-I Islami-Khalis commander for the Southeast. Jalaluddin
Haqqani’s role and that of Hizb-i Islami-Khalis grew significantly
between 1981 and 1984. Haqqani manages to maintain a great
degree of control over the complex tribal regions of Loya-Paktia, and
extended his control beyond Zadran tribal areas.
1988
1989
1990
Haqqani’s forces seize the
cities of Khost and Urgun from
the Soviet-backed People's
Democratic Party of
Afghanistan forces in 1983
1990s
1991
1992
In 1991 Haqqani is the
first resistance leader to
capture a city, Khost,
from the Najibullah
government.
1993
1994
1995
1996
After the fall of Kabul to
the Mujahideen in 1992,
Haqqani appointed
justice minister in the
first Mujahideen
government.
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1997
1998
1999
2000
Just prior to the Taliban's occupation of Kabul,
Jalaluddin Haqqani switches his allegiance and
goes on to serve as a Taliban military commander
north of Kabul. During the Taliban years in
power, he serves as the Minister of Borders and
Tribal Affairs and governor of Paktia Province.
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Timeline
2000s
2001
2002
2003
2004
In October, 2001, Haqqani
named the Taliban's military
commander. There is
speculation over his role in
expediting the escape of
Osama Bin Laden.
Assassination attempt on
Hamid Karzai on April 27. Three
people killed and eleven
injured at an open-air military
ceremony in Kabul. This is the
fourth attempt on Karzai’s life.
2005
2006
By mid-2005,
reports surface
that Siraj Haqqani
was spearheading
the insurgency in
Loya-Paktia
2007
The Haqqani
network
assassinates
Paktia Governor
Hakim Taniwal in
September.
2009
2010
Kabul bombing on May 18. Eighteen
people including five U.S. soldiers and a
Canadian soldier killed and fifty-two
injured when a NATO convoy is targeted
by a suicide attacker. Attack allegedly
carried out by the Haqqani network.
Bombing of Indian Embassy in
Kabul, July 7. A suicide bomber
kills 41 and injures over 130 at
the Indian Embassy in Kabul. At
least four Indian diplomats
killed in the attack.
Kidnapping of British journalist Sean
Langan in March. Under the guise of
a meeting with the Sirajuddin
Haqqani, Langan is captured and
held in captivity by members of the
Haqqani network for three months.
2008
Attack on Forward Operating Base
Chapman, December 30. Seven Americans,
including four CIA officers killed in a
suicide attack by a double agent claiming
to have information on the whereabouts
of senior Haqqani leadership.
Kidnapping of journalist David
Rohde, November 10. New York
Times journalist David Rohde
kidnapped while on assignment
outside of Kabul and eventually
transferred to Haqqani control.
Attacks on Afghan Ministries of Justice,
Education, and Prison Directorate. February
11. Haqqani forces use a combination of
suicide bombers and gunmen attacked three
government offices in Kabul, killing at least
26 and injuring over 60.
2010s
2011
Kabul Bank.
February 19. Over
40 people killed
when seven armed
gunmen and suicide
bombers attack the
offices of a bank in
Kabul.
Attacks on U.S.-funded road
construction projects across
Afghanistan. In May, over 35
killed at a construction camp
outside of Gardez. In March a
similar attack against a
construction camp kills 24 and
wounds 50 in Paktia.
Hotel-Intercontinental Kabul. June
28. Twelve Afghans killed and eight
wounded during a brazen nighttime
attack on the Hotel-Intercontinental
Kabul. This raid is one of the first
times Taliban and Haqqani
insurgents engaged in a nighttime
commando attack.
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Combat Post
Sayed Abad,
Wardak Province,
Afghanistan
September 10.
Over 77 U.S.
soldiers and 17
Afghans injured.
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U.S. Embassy Kabul and
NATO Headquarters,
September 12. At least 16
people killed, including 5
Afghan police officers and 11
civilians, including at least 6
children on an attack against
the Embassy and NATO.
The Haqqani Network
Current Status
Recent Events
It was announced on October 1, 2011
by the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) that Haji Mali Khan,
who is also uncle to the Haqqani network's
leader, Sirajuddin "Siraj" Haqqani, was seized
during an operation in porous border of the
eastern Paktia province.24 Because of his
central roll to Haqqani operations, the fact
that he was taken alive makes his loss
potentially much more consequential for the
group. He is an example of how "capture" can
be more effective then "kill."25 It is believed
that the channels of communication have
already been opened between the Haqqani
Network and the United States. U.S. Secretary
of State, Hillary Clinton has publically
announced a willingness to talk stating, in
essence, that today’s enemy can as well be
tomorrow’s interlocutor in the search for
peace.
Future
Though the U.S. and ISAF have made
progress combating the Haqqani Network and
its allies, especially with the apprehension of
Haji Mali Khan, it remains a persistent and
imminent threat. It is not a threat that the U.S.
will be able to eradicate if Pakistan continues
to rely on the Network to shape events and
politics in Afghanistan although U.S. leverage
in this area is questionable. Being unable to
rely on allies in the region weakens U.S.
ability to effectively implement counter
insurgency efforts and continuing to pressure
Pakistan to cut ties with the insurgency
network should remain a priority, no matter
how difficulty realized.
The U.S. also needs to focus its efforts on
strategies that have proven to be more
effective. With the knowledge that Pakistan
military uses the Haqqani Network as a proxy,
the U.S. needs to work with other partners to
counter the threat it poses. The infrastructure
and security development that the U.S. has
begun to implement has not been effective in
reaching the communities that support the
Haqqani Network and should be targeted,
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through reliable international and local aid
groups to reach those most in need This
could go a substantial way in eroding popular
support for the network although the ability
of the U.S. and its allies to bolster or shore up
legitimate government support is an illadvised strategy. Until these strategies are
implemented correctly and expanded
appropriately, the Haqqani Network will
continue to serve as a major force of
radicalization and destabilization to U.S.
efforts in Afghanistan and the region at large.
References
Endnotes
Introduction
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Institute for the Study of War. “Haqqani Network” http://
www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani-network
Dressler, Jeffrey, and Jan Reza. “The Haqqani network in the Kurram.”
Dressler, Jeffrey “The Haqqani Network : From Pakistan to Afghanistan”
2010 http://www.understandingwar.org/files/
Haqqani_Network_Compressed.pdf
For a brief historic overview of the Haqqani network, see Anand Gopal,
“The Most Deadly U.S. foe in Afghanistan.” The Christian Science
Monitor. June 1st, 2009.
Gall, Carlotta. “Old-Line Taliban Commander Is Face of Rising Afghan
Threat.” The New York Times. June 17th, 2008.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
“Return of the Taliban.” Frontline. Martin Smith. PBS. October 3rd,
2006.
Dressler, Jeffrey “The Haqqani Network : From Pakistan to Afghanistan”
“Part 3: Through the Eyes of the Taliban.” Asia Times Online. May 5th,
2004.
ibid
ibid
Dressler, Jeffrey “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan”
http://www.understandingwar.org/files/
Haqqani_Network_Compressed.pdf
Challenges to the United States
12.
13.
14.
Ibid
Greene, Brandon “Relationship between the Haqqani network and
Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence” http://kirk.senate.gov/?
p=blog&id=303
such as Lashkar e-Taiba and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
15.
16.
17.
18.
Ibid
Dressler and Reza
Dressler, Jeffery “The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan to Afghanistan”.
Ibid
22.
Miller, John. “Bowe Bergdahl’s Father Seeks Pakistan’s Help for Son’s
Return.” The Associated Press. May 7th, 2011.
ibid
Connections to al-Qaeda and the Taliban
19.
20.
21.
Ibid
Dressler and Reza “The Haqqani network in the Kurram.”
Ibid
23.
Current Status
24.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
afghanistan/8800926/Senior-Haqqani-figure-is-captured.html
www.fundforpeace.org
25.
9
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/10/
the_capture_of_mali_khan
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Conflict Early Warning
and Assessment
Transnational
Threats
Sustainable Development,
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independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and educational organization
that works to prevent violent conflict and
promote sustainable security.
We promote sustainable security through
research, training and education, engagement
of civil society, building bridges across
diverse sectors, and developing innovative
technologies and tools for policy makers.
A leader in the conflict assessment and early
warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on
the problems of weak and failing states. Our
objective is to create practical tools and
approaches for conflict mitigation that are
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•
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