World Policy Institute
Grenada as Theater
Author(s): Eldon Kenworthy
Source: World Policy Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1984), pp. 635-651
Published by: The MIT Press and the World Policy Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208958
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GRENADAAS THEATER
Eldon Kenworthy
We have taken this decisiveaction for three reasons.First,and of overridingimportance, to protect innocent lives. . . .
President Reagan, on announcing the invasion of Grenada
. . . our days of weaknessare over. Our military forces are back on their feet and
standing tall.
President Reagan, six weeks later
"Today, not only is an actor President of the United States ," noted Louis
Auchincloss in 1983, but "a President of the United States has become an
actor."1Although Auchincloss was referring to Gerald Ford'scameo appearance in the television series "Dynasty" there is a larger truth to his words.
The American presidency, it seems, has passed from the "bully pulpit" of
Theodore Roosevelt to center stage in a theater called foreign affairs.
Instead of being preached at, the American public is now being drawn
into carefully scripted docudramas designed to persuade it of the soundness of U.S. foreign policy by playing on its fears and frustrations, its pride
and patriotism. In place of analysis, persuasion, and debate, we are given
docudrama: reality processed into images that the public can easily absorb
while the Executive proceeds with whatever it planned to do all along.
Grenada is a case in point. Confronted by public doubts regarding U.S.
military involvement in the Third World- the legacy of Vietnam- the
Reagan administration pulled off an end run. It did not try to educate its
audience- to make real to Americans its assertion that "our vital interests"
are at stake in such places as Grenada and Lebanon. Instead, with great
skill, it presented Grenada to the American people as another Entebbe (the
Israeli strike at Uganda in 1976)- that is, as an action both humanitarian
in purpose and brilliant in execution. At the same time, it demonstrated
to the world that it was capable and willing to use the mobile military
strike forces in which it has invested so much.
That was no small accomplishment in the eyes of an administration that
1 Letter,New YorkTimes, December 25, 1983.
Eldon Kenworthy teaches Latin American politics at Cornell University
and has written widely on U.S.-LatinAmerican relations.
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Eldon Kenworthy
has ascribed the failure of U.S. policy in Indochina to U.S. public reaction,
not to limits inherent in the real world. "Vietnam syndrome" and the
"credibility gap" are not, in its view, sensible lessons in caution but irksome
restraints on the president's ability to project U.S. power abroad. Alexander
Haig foresaw an easy victory for the new administration in Central America
if it could erase these "incorrect" public perceptions and convince the
American public that "we mean what we mean and that we are going to
succeed and not flounder as we did in Vietnam."2 The Grenada invasion,
and the public reaction to it, was central to this effort.
As the administration was well aware, no demonstration of U.S. military
force, however effective, would impress U.S. friends and enemies abroad if
it were met at home by public censure. By keeping the press off the island
during the critical first few days of the invasion, the administration was able
to insure that the right images of Grenada would take shape in the public
consciousness. "If you get the news people into this you lose support of
public opinion" is how one White House official relayed the views of top
military brass, including the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3
The production was highly successful. The images of the invasion that
remain with most Americans consist of repatriated students kissing the
earth, Marines being welcomed, and the U.S. military showing all the right
stuff. When the New York Times finally pieced together what had actually
happened on the island- "In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light"- who was still listening?4 The American
public had gotten its rush of self-confidence; its self-doubts arising from
Lebanon and the lingering humiliation of Iran were largely assuaged. More
important, it seemed, the administration had broken the psychological
barrier left by Vietnam by employing American soldiers in combat abroad
without the pretense of advising or peacekeeping.
But in comparing the administration's version to what actually happened in Grenada, certain key discrepancies become apparent. The hostage
scene, for example, was written into the script while U.S. threats to the island were skillfully written out. This rewriting completely changed the
meaning of the intervention, allowing what in reality was a planned demonstration of military prowess to be presented as a spontaneous, humanitarian response. And almost no one noticed.
As the election approaches, then, the U.S. invasion of Grenada stands
out as the sole foreign policy "success" of the Reagan administration. Over
2
"Excerptsfrom Testimonyby Haig,"New YorkTimes, March3, 1982. LaurenceBarrett, Gambling
With History (Garden City: Doubleday, 1983), p. 207.
3 "New Frontsin the Old War Against Leaksand Disclosure,"WashingtonPost National WeeklyEdition, November 28, 1983.
4 "In the Wake of Invasion,"New YorkTimes, November 6, 1983.
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half a year since it was first performed, this docudrama deserves to be scrutinized with several broad questions in mind. Whether we did the right
thing in Grenada may be less important at this point than our assessment
of where the invasion's "success" leads us. Why was the administration able
to manipulate so successfully our perceptions of Grenada? Has the invasion
finally exorcised the "Vietnam syndrome" from the American consciousness, as the administration hoped? What are the implications of this attempt to cure that syndrome? Will docudrama become to the American
citizenry what miracle plays were to their medieval ancestors: entertaining
"explanations" of all one needs to know about the world?
Saving American Lives
Eighteen Americans died in Grenada, 116 were wounded. Grenadian
casualties were three times as great. The American dead were soldiers sent
to rescue nearly a thousand U.S. citizens on the island, two-thirds of them
medical students, many of the remainder tourists and retirees. From the
day of the invasion to the present, the Reagan administration has claimed
that it acted primarily to insure the safety of these Americans. To be compelling, the script required that American lives be in imminent danger.
But the script did not accord with the facts. Following the October 19
killings within the New Jewel Movement, there was no further violence in
Grenada. The official curfew was lifted on October 24; classes at the medical school resumed. On that day, Grenada was as safe for Americans as two
dozen other nations one might name. The next day, the Marines landed.
Officials who argue that the American students were in danger appeal
to a powerful image: that of Americans living under an unpopular government that had gunned down members of its own party and imposed a
stringent curfew. But this image is built on distortions and hypothetical
threats- threats that can never be disproved, especially after the source of
danger has been removed.
In reality, no hostages were taken in Grenada prior to the invasion, no
such action was threatened, and only one day before the invasion White
House spokesman LarrySpeakes said that there was no indication that any
Americans were in danger, an appraisal repeated nine days later by Deputy
Secretary of State Kenneth Dam to a House committee.5 The head of the
U.S. medical school in Grenada, Charles Modica, was in frequent contact
with administration officials over the two days preceding the invasion. Plans
were under way, he reported, to have that 10 percent of the students who
wanted to leave the island evacuated. The day after the invasion, Modica
flatly termed it "unnecessary" as a measure to save American lives, an
5 Ibid.
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Eldon Kenworthy
opinion voiced by other administrators at the school.6 This opinion was reinforced by one of the Congressional fact finders sent to Grenada soon
thereafter: "Our delegation could not find one confirmed instance in
which an American was threatened or endangered before the invasion."7
"Thugs" the Revolutionary Military Council that replaced Maurice
Bishop may have been, but as leaders of a nation dependent on tourism
they had strong disincentives to threaten U.S. citizens. Tourism aside, the
taking of U.S. hostages involves no small risk for any nation, especially for
one within the U.S. sphere of influence. Let us remember that the students
who seized the American embassy in Tehran did so apparently on their own
initiative and with the intent of exchanging U.S. personnel for the Shah,
then in New \brk. Events in Grenada did not parallel those in Iran.
It was not conditions in Grenada that put the students' lives at risk, but
the U.S. invasion itself. It took two days of fierce fighting for soldiers to
reach the students at one of the medical school campuses. It is not surprising, then, that many students were grateful to be extricated. But the invasion, and thus the threat it posed, was the work of the United States, not
of Grenada. Even though Grenadian authorities saw the intervention
coming- a U.S. navy task force loaded with Marines had been diverted to
Grenada five days before - they made no attempt to take hostages or to
prevent foreigners from leaving. On the eve of the invasion, four chartered
airplanes left the island, one carrying the former chair of President Reagan's
Commission on Social Security. He and his wife reported no difficulties in
leaving the island. "There were just the usual customs officials. Nobody
with a rifle."8
Other foreigners wishing to leave Grenada could easily have been flown
out or taken off by ship. During the political turbulence following the assassination of Bishop, in fact, Canada and Britain sensibly sought to fly out
those of their citizens who wished to leave. This was the response of the
administrators of the U.S. medical school as well. As Robert Pastor, the
National Security Council's senior adviser on Latin America under Carter,
later told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. military forces
"got there just in time" to prevent the orderly evacuation of foreign nationals. An orderly evacuation would have robbed the administration of its
principal rationale for invading.9
To lend credibility to that rationale, the administration made much of
6 "School'sChancellor
SaysInvasionWas Not Necessaryto Save Lives,"New YorkTimes, October 26,
1983. "Americansin Grenada Calling Home," WashingtonPost, October 26, 1983.
7 Ronald Dellums, "ThatFact-findingMissionto Grenada:4," WashingtonPost National WeeklyEdition, November 28, 1983.
8 "Ex-US. Official Cites Ease in
LeavingGrenada,"New YorkTimes, October 29, 1983.
9 "Statement by Dr. Robert A. PastorBefore the Committee on ForeignAffairsof the U.S. House of
Representatives,"November 3, 1983.
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the claim that the island's only airport had been closed on October 24, the
day before the invasion. This turned out not to be the case. Charter flights
leaving the island were not impeded. As for regular commercial flights,
they had indeed been interrupted, but their cessation was the work not of
Grenadian authorities, but of authorities on surrounding islands who, in
collusion with Washington, had already decided on an invasion.
The only commercial airline serving Grenada, Leeward Islands Air Transport, is co-owned by the governments of CARICOM, the Caribbean
Common Market. Two of these governments (Barbados and Jamaica), over
Canadian objections and in violation of the carrier's charter, invoked
owners' rights to shut the carrier down. Instrumental in halting Leeward Islands flights was Tom Adams, the conservative prime minister of Barbados.
Members of Adams's government apparently were approached by U.S.
officials a week before the White House claims it "received" a request from
Grenada's neighbors to intervene. The U.S. ambassador to the Eastern
Caribbean, Milan Bish, participated in the October 21 meeting of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which issued the invitation to the United States to invade- an invitation that had been drafted
in Washington.10 Given the dependence of these governments on Washington for a solution- they have no military capability of their own- it is inconceivable that the United States could not have kept the airline flying
had it chosen to do so. Failing that, it could have provided U.S. planes or
ships to evacuate U.S. citizens.
Nonetheless, it might be argued that if Washington had made arrangements for Americans to leave the island it would only have alerted
Grenada's rulers to the possible advantages of holding U.S. citizens
hostage. Again, this is a hypothetical "worst case" assumption that cannot
be disproven. But recall: Five days lapsed between the diversion of a
Lebanon-bound task force to Grenada and the actual invasion. Word that
Barbados and Jamaica were involved in an invasion plan had spread, by
newspaper and by radio, two days before the invasion. "Grenada Puts Military on Alert, Warns of U.S. Threat to Invade" began a Washington Post
story written on October 23. Were the Grenadian authorities bent on using
hostages to stave off an American attack, why did they not act during those
critical two days before the arrival of U.S. Marines, or during the two days
it took for U.S. forces to fight their way to the second campus?
What both the Grenadian and the Cuban governments did, in fact, was
just the opposite: instead of threatening to take U.S. hostages, each reassured Washington that foreign nationals on the island would neither be
harmed nor prevented from leaving. Administrators of the U.S.-run med10 Cathy Sunshine and Philip Wheaton, "Death of a Revolution,"mimeographed (Washington, DC:
EcumenicalProgramfor InteramericanCommunication and Action, 1983).
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Eldon Kenwortby
ical school confirm that such assurances were made. In a cable to
Washington on October 22, three days before the invasion, Fidel Castro
acknowledged Washington's "concern about the numerous U.S. residents
there," which paralleled his own about the "hundreds" of Cubans on the
island. "It is convenient to keep in touch on this matter," the cable continued, "so as to contribute to a favorable solution of any difficulty that
may arise or action that may be taken relating to the security of these individuals."11The next day, Grenadian authorities cabled U.S. officials on Barbados, guaranteeing the safety of foreigners on the island and their property. The invasion was under way before Washington replied to either
message.12
Thus, in several crucial respects, Grenada in 1983 was a replay of Santo
Domingo in 1965, another intervention widely remembered in Washington as a success. In both invasions, U.S. troops were introduced onto a
Caribbean island, purportedly to protect U.S. citizens. In both, the real
purpose seemed to be to prevent leftists from establishing rule and to
repair U.S. "credibility"- damaged, in both cases, by a previous failed intervention. Santo Domingo was to the Bay of Pigs what Grenada was to Iran.
In both undertakings, the United States extended the scope of its military
operations spatially and temporally far beyond what was needed to extricate U.S. citizens. In both, "undesirable" leftists were exiled while U.S.
forces remained in place.
There are, however, important differences between the two episodes. In
Santo Domingo, the American public witnessed the fraying of America's
stated goals. The media stayed with a crisis that could not be resolved for
weeks. In time, even President Johnson would abandon the rationale of
"saving American lives." Six weeks after the Grenada invasion, however,
President Reagan still referred to it as a "rescue operation." In an address
to the Congressional Medal of Honor Society on December 14, he cited the
invasion as proof that the United States would do whatever is necessary to
protect its citizens.
Another difference: the city of Santo Domingo was in a state of civil war
when Johnson intervened. The threat to foreign nationals on the island was
palpable, even if inflated by the president. In Grenada, on the other hand,
whatever threat did exist was largely the creation of U.S. actions. By staging
its performance in Grenada, not in a messier situation more comparable
to Santo Domingo, the Reagan administration was better able to keep the
complexities of the real world within the confines of its script.
The OECS played as nominal a role in the Grenada invasion as the Orga11 Castro read excerpts of this cable at his
press conference for foreign journalistsheld in Havana,
October 26, 1983- The Center for Cuban Studies in New Yorkdistributed transcriptsin English.
12 Sunshine and Wheaton (fn. 10).
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nization of American States (OAS) did in Santo Domingo. Both sent in a
token contingent of soldiers; both took over clean-up duty in the wake of
the U.S. operation. To be seen acting swiftly and competently on its ownthat waswhat the White House wanted. This image alone could reestablish
both the credibility of U.S. mobile military forces and the willingness of
the White House to use them to rid its sphere of influence of leftist
regimes. The failure of the United States to consult with its allies and to
work through diplomatic channels before using military force was more
likely to be excused if its own nationals were in danger. The purported
threatto Americanlives wasthereforean indispensablepart of the preparation for an intervention that was to be military and largely unilateral.
Toplay up the liberationof Grenadians,especiallyfrom the start, would
have invited the awkwardquestion: why not elsewhere?As Guatemalaand
Haiti attest, this hemisphere does not lack in "thuggish"governmentssusceptible to a U.S. intervention.But these "thuggish"regimes are invariably
rightwing; they serve as friends of the United States. Moreover,no other
maneuverwould deliverso decisivea coup de grace to U.S.-LatinAmerican
relations as Washington'sblatant resurrectionof its right to bring "good
government"to this hemisphere, a right openly practiced by U.S. presidents from the firstRooseveltto the second. That Grenadianswere initially
pleased to have the United States intervene made things easier. (In time,
they would have second thoughts.) As a pretext for going in, however,it
was American lives in jeopardy that were needed- especially young
Americanson the island for a purpose as innocent as medical training.
The Soviet-Cuban Threat
Soviet-Cubandesigns on Grenada constituted the second element of the
administration'sscript. In speeches and press conferencesimmediately following the invasion, the president and other high officialsimplicated the
Soviet Union and Cuba in the assassinationof MauriceBishop and in the
reputed attempt to turn Grenada into a base for exporting "terrorism"
throughout the hemisphere. As the administrationrealized, a worldpower
earns few points for subduing a country that in area and population is
scarcelya match for Columbus, Ohio. By presenting Grenada as a Soviet
asset, however,the administrationwas able to cast itself as protectorof a
free world besieged by the powerful forces of world communism.
Its initial evidence of Soviet-Cubanties was Grenada'sconstructionof a
larger airport at Point Salines, which the administrationclaimed was to
serveas a Cuban-Sovietmilitarybase. Forthis, the administrationrelied on
public ignoranceof the Caribbean,an ignorancelargelysharedby the press
and Congress. Before the invasion, members of Congress solemnly
inspected aerial photographsof Grenada'snew airfield- another triumph
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of U.S. intelligence- apparently unaware that American tourists were
taking snapshots of this same facility from the ground. During the invasion, the administration claimed that Grenada was harboring over a thousand Cuban soldiers "impersonating construction workers."But when the
dust settled, Washington admitted that there were no more than 800
Cubans on the island, and that of these fewer than 200 were combatants.
The Cubans put the number at 43.
In reality, Grenada's construction of a larger airport was evidence not of
Soviet-Cuban designs on the island but of Grenada's desire to end its costly
reliance on a single regional airline. As things stood, Grenada-bound
tourists had to transfer, usually at Barbados, to the smaller craft that the
only existing Grenadian airport could accommodate, and then only during
daylight hours. Grenada is too dependent on tourism- half of its foreign
exchange earnings come from this source- not to have an airport that can
accommodate direct flights from the United States and Canada by major
carriers. A dozen neighboring islands already have such a capability.
The link between the new airport, improved tourism, and foreign
exchange earnings was so clear that the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
agreed to finance the project over Washington's protests. Work on the new
airport began in 1979. Britain underwrote part of the construction; one of
its firms served as a major contractor. In considering the possible military
uses of this airport, Plessey Company representatives point out that plans
for the new facility lacked several features commonly found in military airports. Two close observers of this part of the world note that "There are two
kinds of airports in the Caribbean: new airports and old airports."13Today,
the U.S. taxpayer underwrites the completion of the new airport ($19 million), which together with the other economic aid requested by the
administration ($53 million over two years) and those military costs for
which the Pentagon seeks reimbursement ($75 million) brings the shortterm price of the invasion to $147 million, or nearly $1500 per Grenadian.
What exactly did U.S. forces find when they occupied the island?
Weapons, secret military aid agreements, and foreign advisers, the White
House claimed. A training camp for terrorists also supposedly existed,
according to one early official report, but it was never found.14 The muchtouted "secret" documents that were discovered - are not most bilateral
military aid agreements secret?- revealed plans for the dispatch of 27
Cuban military advisers to the island and for $38 million in military equipment from East Bloc nations over a period of five years. (By way of comparison, the United States provides Honduras- a similarly threatened
country- with 150 military advisers, thousands of troops "on maneuvers,"
» Sunshine and Whcaton (fn. 10).
14 "In the Wake of Invasion"(fn.
4); Reagan'sspeech on national television, October 27, 1983.
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and some $40 million a year in military aid.) Principally implicated in
these military aid agreements were Cuba, the Soviet Union, and North
Korea, a coterie that permitted Reagan to exclaim that "we got there just
in time," that Grenada was stocked with "weapons and ammunition . . .
to supply thousands of terrorists."
There always is an area of indeterminacy regarding weapons and advisers;
one country's defense appears to its neighbors as a potential offense. Even
exploring the worst case, however, it is hard to see what the Kremlin might
have hoped to gain by stockpiling weapons or by building bases on
Grenada. It already has a more reliable partner in Cuba, which lies closer
to Central America and is no less strategically located with respect to U.S.
sea lanes. Can the Soviet Union afford redundancy in a part of the world
it has never defined as vital to its interests?
Perhaps Cuba was trying to establish control over the new airfield in
order to facilitate supplying its troops in Africa. But Cuba has resupplied
its troops in Angola for nine years now without using Grenada. Did Grenadian authorities themselves have designs on nearby islands? Grenada's
influence in the area had declined since the 1979 revolution. Its neighbors
were wary, alen, and organized into a regional pact- the OECS - backed
by Britain and the United States. Grenadian expansionism would have
been suicidal; nothing in its weapons arsenals pointed to such a strategy.
In an article in the Caribbean Review, the ranking Pentagon official for
Latin American affairs, Nestor Sanchez, considers the implications of what
was found on the island. He estimates that the equipment pledged by East
Bloc nations would have permitted Grenada to field an infantry of "10,800
men under arms." To Sanchez, this would have constituted a "formidable
military machine" for so "peaceful" and "small" an island. The white paper
released by the Departments of Defense and State on December 16, however, casts a different light on Grenada's plans. It indicates that only a
quarter of this projected army seemed destined for active duty. The rest
were to be trained reservists. By 1986, the white paper suggests, the Grenadian army would have totaled around 2,000 men in arms- or twice its total
size in 1983.15Costa Rica, in contrast, which is often cited as a small country
that entrusts its defense to international agreements, has a "civil guard" of
5,000.
An army heavy on reserves is an army intended for defense. Nothing in
the weapons lists or in the agreements Grenada had signed with East Bloc
governments suggests any offensive purpose whatsoever. Camps for training
15 Nestor Sanchez, "What Was Uncoveredin Grenada,"CaribbeanReview,Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1983),
p. 59- Grenada:A PreliminaryReport (the white paper), pp. 18-20. An analysiscorroboratingmine
was provided by Douglas Mathews of the Center for Defense Information, Washington, DC; see
"GrenadianDocuments Do Not ShowWhat ReaganClaims,"In These Times, November 16-22, 1983.
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terrorists were not found. Conjecture is the best Sanchez can produce. He
argues that the projected quantity of supplies "raises the question of
whether all of this material was destined for the militia, or whether a portion might be for actions elsewhere in the Americas." Neither Sanchez nor
the white paper makes any reference at all to hostile U.S. actions over the
preceding years that might explain why tiny, "peaceful" Grenada would
want to build up its armed forces.
Grenada's alliances and armaments take on one meaning when viewed
in isolation, and another altogether when seen within the context of
Washington's menacing words and actions over preceding months.
"Grenada," as presented by the White House, however, was a drama devoid
of flashbacks, of background. No mention was made of Washington's
hostility toward the Bishop government or to the administration's elaborate
preparations for the invasion.
Between September 23 and October 2, or some three weeks prior to
Bishop's assassination and a month before the invasion, one of the regiments of the U.S. Army Rangers that eventually parachuted onto the Point
Salines airstrip practiced a similar operation at a small rural airport in
Ephrata, Washington. Obstructions were placed on the landing strip; the
Rangers parachuted in, cleared the runway, and secured the surrounding
area. The exercise was not routine. The only other time this airport had
been used for such drills was in 1981. Moreover, the regiment that practiced
at Ephrata was based in Georgia. "They didn't want a lot of publicity,"
recalled the manager of the agency that runs the airport. "They said they'd
like to be low profile."16
Square this information, if you can, with the carefully manufactured
image of a White House reacting spontaneously to a crisis it did not
foresee. "Last weekend I was awakened in the early morning hours," President Reagan told the American public two days after the invasion, "and
told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
joined by Jamaica and Barbados had sent an urgent request that we join
them in a military operation to restore order and democracy to Grenada."17
Nor did military preparations begin only a month before the invasion.
From August 1 to October 15, 1981, the United States coordinated the
largest naval maneuvers since World War II- in the Caribbean. As
part of "Ocean Venture '81," U.S. forces "liberated" Vieques Island, off
Puerto Rico, under a code name suggestive of Grenada: "Amber and the
Amberdines." (A glance at most maps reveals .Grenada and the Grenadines, the latter being small islands to the north.) In this mock invasion,
16 "RangerUnit PracticedMonth Before Invasion"
SyracusePost-Standard,November 3, 1983.
17 Reagan speech on national television, October 27, 1983.
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American hostages were rescued from Guantanamo while U.S. troops
remained on the targeted islands to "install a regime favorable to the way
of life we espouse." Taking part were Army Rangers who later entered
Grenada.18
In several major addresses before the invasion, such as that unveiling the
Caribbean Basin Initiative in February 1982, Reagan included Grenada in
the select company of Cuba and Nicaragua: states that "have turned from
their American neighbors" to serve as agents of "a new colonialism" that
"threatens our independence." No one could mistake the language of the
Monroe Doctrine in such statements or ignore the action they portended.
Washington has traditionally reserved the right to intervene in this hemisphere to forestall the intrusions of extra-continental "colonialism."
The leaders of Grenada got the message. How to react to it, in fact, may
have contributed to the split within the New Jewel directorate that eventually led to Maurice Bishop's demise. In the spring of 1983, Bishop wrote
to Washington, seeking ways to improve relations between the two governments. He received a noncommittal letter from the American Embassy in
Barbados, which had handled U.S.-Grenadian affairs since Washington
withdrew U.S. diplomatic representation on the island in 1980. In June,
Bishop went to Washington hoping to see Reagan. He was given National
Security Adviser Clark and Deputy Secretary of State Dam instead. What
transpired at their meeting is not known. But there followed no diminution in U.S. hostility, as evidenced by administration attempts to block an
IMF loan to Grenada that August. Earlier in the year, there had been more
U.S. naval maneuvers in the Caribbean and rumors of a CIA plan to
destabilize Grenada.19
Bishop's less popular rival, Bernard Coard, began calling for tighter party
control and for a speeding-up of the "revolutionary process." The struggle
between the two men probably hinged on personality and power more
than on programmatic differences.20Yet Bishop was trapped between Reagan
and Coard. Moves to placate the United States, such as the planning of
elections, only exposed Bishop to attacks from Coard's faction, which
accused Bishop of being insufficiently Leninist. Coard eventually triumphed within the inner circle of the New Jewel Movement. His victory
underscored Castro's inability to control events in Grenada, for the Cubans
preferred the more popular and pragmatic Bishop.
18 Ecumenical
Program for Interamerican Communication and Action Task Force, Grenada: The
Peaceful Revolution (Washington, DC: EPICA, 1982), p. 122.
19 W. Frick Curry, "Grenada: Force as First Resort," International Policy Report, January 1984, Center
for International Policy, Washington, DC; Michael Massing, "Grenada Before and After," Atlantic
Monthly, February 1984.
20 "Behind the Revolution's Overthrow," Intercontinental Press, December 26, 1983. Edward
Cody, "A
Revolution Disintegrates," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, November 21, 1983.
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Eldon Kenworthy
Omitted from the administration's docudrama, then, are two crucial
aspects of the real story of Grenada. One is that a U.S. military solution
to the presence of a radical government in the Caribbean had been in the
works for some time. The second is that diplomatic alternatives to whatever
legitimate problems Washington may have had with the Bishop regime
were never seriously explored. Tip O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, captured what many Washington insiders sensed at the time of the invasion:
"For two years the administration has been looking for an opportunity to
get into Grenada."21
These calculated omissions permitted the president to present himself
as the Good Samaritan who had dropped whatever he was doing to rescue
a weaker nation in need. Flanked by Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of
Dominica in his first public announcement of the invasion, Reagan played the
White Knight. Congressman Jack Kemp provided the appropriate caption:
"God help the world if there was not a United States willing to take die responsibility of keeping the light of freedom, peace and democracy alive."22
The administration's white paper claims that the United States was merely
responding to a request from Sir Paul Scoon, governor-general of
Grenada, and from the OECS to invade the island. But Scoon, as
Washington realized, had no authority to issue such a request. Washington
had bypassed him the few times it dealt with the Grenadian government.
As a figurehead linking Grenada to the Commonwealth, Scoon could
appeal legitimately only to the Queen's government in England. Yet Prime
Minister Thatcher made it clear from the start that Britain saw no cause for
an invasion. This was a position shared by a majority of the Commonwealth
countries, including Canada, which is one of the NATO countries most
closely linked to the Caribbean. It is not even clear that Scoon's request to
Washington arrived before the invasion took place.
As for the OECS, its Charter sanctions collective action only in response
to external aggression, and then only when all seven members have
approved. As Pastor notes, "neither condition was met."23Only four OECS
governments approved the invitation to the United States, and a pivotal
role was played by two countries, Barbados and Jamaica, that are not even
members. CARICOM, the regional organization to which those two
nations do belong, turned down Jamaica's invitation to join in the invasion
and instead pursued a diplomatic solution on its own. Through Scoon,
CARICOM demanded that the Grenadian leaders provide for the safe
evacuation of foreigners wishing to leave and arrange for early elections.
The U.S. invasion was launched before the Grenadians had time to reply.24
21 As
quoted by Anthony
22
"Sampling of Opinions
23 Pastor's Statement
(fn.
24
Curry (fn. 19); Pastor's
Lewis, "Was Grenada Necessary," New York Times, November 3, 1983.
on Invasion of Grenada," New York Times, October 29, 1983.
9).
Statement (fn. 9).
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Although the claim that the United States invaded Grenada at the
lawful behest of proper authorities does not withstand scrutiny, it did
dampen criticismin Congress.With the U.S. public applauding the invasion, most Congressionalcriticsgraspedat whateverstrawsthey could find
that would allow them to overlookthis violation of internationaland U.S.
law. But justificationsof the U.S. action were not easy to come by. The
Constitution states that only Congresscan initiate war.The Charterof the
Organization of American States- to which the United States, Jamaica,
and five of the eight OECS countries belong- reads: "No State or group
of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,for any reason
whatever,in the internal or externalaffairsof any other State."The United
Nations Charterreaffirmsthis prohibition.
The Role of Docudrama
Grenada was theater, then, skillfully directed by a media-sawy administration. The ghost of Iran- of the botched 1980 attempt to extricateU.S.
hostages by a military strike- was exorcised.The humiliation of Vietnam
and, more recently,of Lebanonwas assuaged. "Atthis point, I really don't
give a damn what the rest of the world thinks,"said the host of a radio callin show."We'retired of getting kickedaroundand pushed around by those
little podunk countries down there."Back in his Midwesternhometown,
President Reaganproclaimed that the era of "paralyzingself-doubt" had
ended.25
If Americansdid indeed experience a national catharsisover Grenada,
it is not at all clear what this catharsiswill lead to. The administration
would like to think it will translate into public support for a military
response to comparablesituations in the future. But catharsissuggests a
purging followed by calmness. This is preciselyhow the American public
seems to have reacted. U.S. military maneuversin Honduras, previously
an obvious invocacalled "BigPine,"now bearthe code name "Granadero,"
tion of Grenada.But public opinion polls show that Americansare no less
resistant today to deeper U.S. military involvement in Central America
than they were before the Grenada invasion.
While public approvalof Reagan'shandling of foreign affairsdid rise in
the wake of Grenadaand Beirut- it is impossible to isolate the impact of
one from the other- a month later it had slipped back below the 50 percent mark. (Forty-twopercent approvedof the president'sperformancein
September 1983, 55 percent in November, and 47 percent in December.)
The percentageof Americanswho thought the president'shandling of for25 "Reagan,In Old Home" New YorkTimes, February7, 1984.
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Eldon Kenworthy
eign affairs had increased the chances of war remained above 55 percent
from November through January. Comparable majorities continued to disapprove of U.S. involvement in attacks on Nicaragua, the most clear-cut
case of American military action in Central America.26
Congressional opinion followed a similar pattern. The success of the
Grenada docudrama silenced critics, from Senator Edward Kennedy to the
Democratic leadership of the House, which moved quietly to bury an investigation into the invasion that had been urged by the Black Caucus. Yet
Grenada, like the administration's Kissinger Report on Central America,
failed to pave the way for bipartisan support of U.S. involvement in the
region. "Unfortunately," bemoaned the president half a year after
Grenada, "many in Congress seem to believe they are still in the troubled
Vietnam era."27
Thus, despite its apparent successes, docudrama seems to achieve
just about what one would expect: it overpowers the emotions without convincing the mind. It is at best a palliative, a sedative. Most Americansboth inside Congress and out- would like "the problem" in Central
America to go away. But the cheap victory in Grenada is not likely to be
replicated in Central America. The legacy of Vietnam, which is hesitation,
remains after all.
A more compliant Congress and public were not all the administration
was after, however. Reestablishing U.S. "credibility" in the post-Vietnam era
meant projecting an image of strength and competence abroad as well
as at home. This was the one administration goal that diplomacy simply
could not achieve. Only a display of U.S. military force could demonstrate
to the world both the effectiveness of U.S. military power and the willingness of the administration to use it.
With the subtlety that must accompany any such public admission,
Reagan stated that "military force, either direct or indirect, must remain
an available part of America's foreign policy." "But, clearly," he added,
"Congress is less than wholly comfortable with . . . the need for a military
element in foreign policy. . . "28The Sunday after the president's complaint, the New York Times reported that, official assertions to the contrary, U.S. forces were being readied for action in Central America.
The Reagan administration had assumed office believing that the
Western hemisphere offered both an immediate and a safe haven for a
demonstration of America's born-again militarism. If we can't get our way
26
Washington Post-ABC poll data as reported in the Washington Post National Weekly Edition, November 21, 1983, January 9, 1984, and February 20, 1984.
27
"Excerpts From President Reagan's Speech on Foreign Policy and Congress," New York Times, April
7, 1984.
28 Ibid
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in our own backyard, the president asked, where can we? "If the United
States cannot respond to a threat near our own borders," he told a joint session of Congress in April 1983, "why should Europeans and Asians believe
we are seriously concerned about threats to them? If the Soviets can assume
that nothing short of an attack on the United States will provoke an American response, which ally, which friend will trust us then?"29 "The triumph
of hostile forces in what the Soviets call the 'strategic rear' of the United
States," concluded the Kissinger Commission, "would be read as a sign of
U.S. impotence."30 These "hostile forces" may or may not be allied with the
Soviets. What matters is how they are "read."
Ideally, of course, the administration would like Washington to get its
way in this hemisphere without ever having to resort to military intervention. Our neighbors should want to follow our example, to accept our
leadership. In this "new world," the president never tires of saying, "we are
all Americans." But when neighbors stray, force must be used. Otherwise,
influential governments around the world may conclude that as a nation
we are over the hill.
Within the foreign policy establishment, this is an appeal for U.S.
"credibility"- a doctrine that holds that a world-class power ought to get
its way within its own sphere of influence; that if it does not, it must be
because it has lost its nerve; that in any case that is exactly how its inaction
will be perceived.31 "Credibility" is thus an unfed hunger, an unanswerable
doubt- or perhaps just a convenient rationalization.
To the extent that Washington's global leadership rests upon a demonstration of military force, that leadership required Grenada. Although the
Reagan administration talked initially of "going to the source" of its
hemispheric frustrations, meaning Cuba, it went to Grenada instead. Cuba
has had explicit Soviet protection since the 1962 missile crisis. It is the Soviet
Union's West Berlin. Getting our way in El Salvador or in Nicaragua, the
administration realized, was less likely to provoke a Soviet response. Yet
enough of the population in these countries so strongly opposes U.S. intervention as to threaten another Vietnam should American combat forces be
introduced. The solution was to work through local armies, but these have
turned out to be neither popular with their own people nor effective
militarily.
Grenada, in contrast, had all the makings of an ideal setting for a successful yet inexpensive display of American military prowess. The CubanSoviet presence on the island did not entail a commitment to defend
29 "President Reagan's Address," New York Times, April 28, 1983.
30 "Key Sections from Study of Latin Region by Reagan Panel," New York Times, January 12, 1984.
31 For an analysis of the "credibility" doctrine, see Eldon Kenworthy, "Central America: Beyond the
Credibility Trap," World Policy Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall 1983), pp. 181-200.
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Grenada. After Bishop was assassinated, the Grenadian regime was as
unpopular with its own people as it was with its Cuban allies. These factors,
along with the island's small size - there would be one U.S. soldier for every
18 Grenadians- promised a U.S. military operation that could be a fait
accompli before critics at home and abroad even had time to react. Finally,
there was the presence of the students- young, vulnerable Americans.
With all of these elements in its favor, was the invasion a "success"?
Did it restore U.S. "credibility"? In one sense, yes. To the extent that Washington's global leadership rests upon a demonstration of unilateral military
force, U.S. "credibility" was enhanced by Grenada. A country intent on
acting autonomously in the world needs to demonstrate, from time to
time, both the capacity and the will to get its way. To seem unpredictable,
even overreactive, is an asset to any government that prizes acting largely
on its own. After Grenada, one surmises, the United States appears to
much of the world to be fully capable of unpredictable military
intervention.
But there is another way of being effective in world politics, and hence
another way of measuring whether Grenada was a "success." That is by
acting through alliances, both those of nations acting in concert and those
built on broader concepts of international law and organization. By this
standard, U.S. "credibility" abroad actually suffered in the wake of
Grenada. Although such losses are difficult to document, Washington's
ability to act effectively through NATO or through the OAS must be considerably diminished. Recalling the 1965 invasion of Santo Domingo in
light of events in Grenada, Sol Linowitz cautions that: "As the representative to the OAS in 1966-69, I remember all too well the difficult months
spent trying to reestablish credibility for the United States among the Latin
American countries."32 Mexico and Britain, two allies prepared to share
responsibilities with Washington in the Caribbean, are now moving away
from such collaboration. For a country so financially in debt to the United
States, Mexico has been surprisingly blunt. Said its president in February:
"There is no doubt that the military interventions and naval maneuvers of
the United States have created a great deal of irritation in Latin America."33
Grenada subjected the United States to overwhelming censure in the
United Nations- in the Security Council no less than in the General
Assembly- and to strong criticism within the OAS. The most influential
Caribbean organization, CARICOM, kept its distance. Dismay was voiced
by France, Mexico, and Venezuela, and by such NATO allies as Great
Britain, West Germany, Italy, Canada, and Greece. What these govern32 "Grenada: Critical
Questions," Washington Post, October 31, 1983.
« "Mexico Asks U.S. to
Change Policies," New York Times, February 13, 1984.
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ments want in an alliance partner is restraint and versatility, as suggested
by Prime Minister Thatcher's comment, "\bu do not use force before you've
tried everything else."34 Following the Grenada invasion, a British poll
found 59 percent of that country "less likely to trust the U.S."35Thus an
act intended to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam at home aroused memories
of Vietnam abroad, negative recollections of a nation that for too long
believed it could end a nationalist insurgency in Asia by virtue of its
firepower and its ability to pressure Moscow.
If Grenada has sent a warning to our enemies abroad, it has, then, also
scared off the allies we need to achieve a negotiated solution in Central
America- allies essential to our efforts over the long haul. Moreover, it has
emboldened weaker clients all too willing to drag U.S. soldiers to their
defense. In Central America, Grenada/Granadero has become a reassuring
signal to the traditional military and economic elites of the region that the
United States will intervene militarily before seeing them defeated. These
elites therefore have little incentive to negotiate with new forces contending for political and economic power.
The pursuit of one kind of "credibility,"it seems, necessarily undermines
the other. In the long run, which kind of "credibility" contributes more to
our goals? Which does a better job of safeguarding U.S. lives, of achieving
peace?
The administration was not interested in asking these questions. It
was determined to demonstrate military capability- to rerun for public
viewing, at home and abroad, the botched rescue attempt of the hostages
in Iran, this time getting it right.
If Grenada should prove to be our Suez crisis- the last overreach of
empire - this article deserves oblivion. If not? If there is no sense within
America that this waning empire is overreacting, we must expect more
docudramas, more tragedy.
34 "Excerptsfrom Thatcher Interview,"New YorkTimes, January 22, 1984.
« "WeinbergerTakesOn E. P. Thompson,"In These Times, March 14-20, 1984.
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