MEANS OF WARFARE :
THE PRESENT AND THE EMERGING LAW *
by
A ntonio CASSESE
P rofessor o f In te rn a tio n a l O rganization,
U niversity o f F lorence
I. T H E P R E S E N T LA W
1. T W O A P P R O A C H E S . T H E G E N E R A L P R IN C IP L E A P P R O A C H
So far States have ad o p ted two different approaches to the b an n in g o f
weapons. T hey have either laid dow n général principles concerning broad
and unspecified catégories o f w eapons, o r they have agreed u p o n restraints
on the use o f spécifié w eapons (1).
* T his p ap er,su b m itted in M arch 1976, is p a rt o f a research p ro ject o n « R e sp ect for H u m a n
R ights in A rm ed C onflicts : the E xisting an d the E m erging L aw », d irected by A. C assese. T he
pro ject has b een m ad e possible b y a g ran t fro m the Italia n « N a tio n a l C ouncil for R esearch »
(C N R ).
A lth o u g h the w riter h as b een a m e m b er o f the Ita lia n D élég atio n to the G en ev a D iplom atie
C onference o n th e R e affirm atio n a n d D ev elo p m en t o f In te rn a tio n a l H u m a n ita ria n Law A p ­
plicable in A rm e d C onflicts, the views expressed h erein are his ow n a n d do n o t reflect those o f
any G o v ern m en t agency.
(1)
O n the p ro h ib itio n o f w eapons in in te rn a tio n a l law , see above ail : Z o r n , K riegsm ittel und
K riegsführung im Landkriege nach den B estim m ungen der H aager C onferenz 1899, 4-34 (1902);
M c D o u g a l a n d F e l i c j a n o , L a w a n d m inim um W orld Order 614 ff. (1961); M a l l i s o n , « T he
Laws o f W a r an d th e Ju rid ical C o n tro l o f W eap o n s o f M ass D estru ctio n in G éneral a n d L im ited
W ars », 36 George W ashington L a w R eview 308 ff. (1967-68); B in d s c h e d l e r - R o b e r t , D ., « A
R eco n sid eratio n o f the L aw o f A rm e d C onflicts », in The L a w o f A rm e d C onflicts (C arnegie
E n d o w m en t fo r In te rn a tio n a l P eace) 28-37 (1971); F a r e r , « T h e L aw s o f W a r 25 Y ears A fter
N u rem b erg », 583 International Conciliation 18 ff. (1971); B a x te r , R .R ., « C riteria o f the
P ro h ib itio n o f W eap o n s in In te rn a tio n a l L aw » , in Festschrift fu r U. S cheuner 41-52 (1973);
H a r r i s , « M o d e m W eap o n s an d th e L aw o f L an d W a rfa re », 12 R evue de D roit p én a l m ilitaire et
de D roit de la guerre 9 ff. (1973); F l e c k , « V ölkerrechtliche G erich tsp u n k te fiir ein V erb o t dér
A n w en d u n g b estim m ter K riegsw affen », in Fleck (ed.), B eitrage zu r W eiterentw icklung des
H um anitaren Völkerrechts fiir B ew affnete K onflikte 43 ff. (1973); S ipri, The P roblem o f C hem ical
a nd B iological Warfare, vol. III, C B W a n d The L aw o f W ar (1973); M a l in v e r n i , « A rm e s
conventionnelles m o d ern es et d ro it in tern atio n a l » 30, A nnuaire suisse de D roit in tern a tio n a l23
ff. (1974); B lix , « C u rre n t E fforts to P ro h ib it the U se o f C ertain C o n v e n tio n al W eap o n s », 4
In sta n t R esearch on Peace and Violence, 21 ff. (1974); R ô l in o a n d S i i k o v i e , The L a w o f W ar and
Dubious Weapons, Sipri (1976).
144
A N TO N IO CASSESE
T he form er approach is the less satisfactory one. It has led to the fo rm u ­
lation o f three m ain principles prohibiting w eapons.
A rticle 22 o f th e H ague Régulations, w hich has passed into custom ary
international law, provides th a t « Belligerents have n o t got an unlim ited right
as to the choice o f m eans o f injuring the eneniy ». A t first sight this rule can
appear to b e pointless, fo r it does not give any indication as to the w eapons
which can n o t be « chosen ». It can n o t be presum ed, how ever, th at in te rn a ­
tional legislators in ten d ed to lay dow n in an in tern atio n al treaty a provision
devoid o f any significance. T h e interprétative principle o f effectiveness (« ut
res m agis valeat q u am p e re a t »), i^iust induce as to try to give som e m eaning
to th at article. A ccording to a learned au th o r A rticle 22 « im poses on the
belligerents the général obligation to refrain from cruel o r treacherous behaviour » (2). N eith er in the p rep arato ry w orks (3) n o r in the subséquent
practice o f States is there any evidence corroborating this view. A m ore
correct view seems to be th a t A rticle 22 m ust be construed to the effect th at it
rules o u t any argumentum a contrario; it excludes the inference th a t w eapons
which are n o t p rohibited by the H ague R égulations are ipso facto allowed.
Such w eapons are b an n e d o r perm itted according to w h eth er o r n o t they are
prohibited by other rules o f in tern atio n al law. This in terp rétatio n is also
supported by som e M ilitary M anuals (4).
A no th er général principle is the one laid dow n in Article 23 e o f the H ague
R égulations, w hereby « it is particularly forbidden... to em ploy arm s, p ro ­
jectiles or m aterial ap t to cause unnecessary suffering ». T his provision aims
at turning into an autonom ous rule the ratio nale b e h in d the spécifié p ro h i­
bition o f som e m eans o f com bat (explosive projectiles w eighing less th a n 400
gram m es, d u m d u m bullets and asphyxiating and deleterious gases). W hile
those specifîc bans hinged, as it w ere, on the indication o f the objective
(2) B i n d s c h e d l e r - R o b e r t , D ., « A R e co n sid eratio n o f th e L aw o f A rm e d C onflicts », cit. 28.
(3) A rt. 22 w as substantially tak en over, w ith o u t an y discussion o r co m m en t, from A rticle 12
o f the Brussels D éclaratio n o f 1874 : see The Proceedings o f the H ague Conferences, p rep ared ...
u n d e r th e S u p ervision o f J.B. Scott, The Conference o f 1899, 491, 424, 58 (1920). In B russels the
p articip atin g S tates h a d su b stan tially accepted the w ording p ro p o se d in th e R u ssian d ra ft A ctes
d e là C onférence de B ruxelles, 1874, 4(1874) w hich sta te d in A rticle 11 th at « L es lois d e la gu erre
n e reco n n aissen t p as au x parties b elligérantes u n po u v o ir illim ité q u a n t au x choix des m oyens de
se n u ire récip ro q u e m e n t » an d w ent o n to say in A rt. 12 th at « D ’ap rès ce principe, so n t
in terd its : A) l’em p loi d ’arm es em poisonnées », etc. In th e discussion o n d ra ft A rticle 11 the
Italia n d eleg ate p o in ted o u t th a t it w as usefu l to insert a t th e b e g in n in g o f A rticle 12 the w ord
« n o tam m en t » (especially), otherw ise o n e could h av e th o u g h t th a t the list in A rticle 12 w as
exhaustive an d n o o th e r m ean s o f c o m b a t w as p ro h ib ite d b y A rticle 11 (« L ’article 11 com biné
avec l’article 12, sem ble in d iq u e r q u e les seules lim ites im posées a u x p o uvoirs des b ellig éran ts
so n t celles signalées d an s le second d e ces articles. Il croit q u ’il se ra it p réfé rab le de p o ser com m e
principe g én éral q u ’il y a des m oyens q u e la civilisation rép ro u v e , puis d ’in d iq u e r q u els so n t
notam m ent les m oyens in terd its a u jo u rd ’h u i » ibid., 198). T h e Ita lia n suggestion w as su p p o rte d
by the B elgian delegate (w ho sta te d th a t « o n p o u rra it croire, sans cela [scil. l’in se rtio n d u m o t
notamm ent] q u e to u t ce q u i n ’est pas com pris d an s l’é n u m é ra tio n est licite » ibid.'). C onsequently,
the w ord « n o ta m m e n t » w as a d d e d in d ra ft A rticle 12 (ibid. 199).
(4) See e.g. th e British M a rn a i (T he L a w o f W ar on L a n d (\9 5 Z ), 40 p a ra 107; th e U.S. M a n u a l
(The L a w o fW a n d W arfare 17, p a ra 33 b (1956).
M EAN S O F W ARFARE
145
properties w eapons m ust possess for being prohibited, m ention is no longer
m ade in Article 23 e o f these objective properties. T he focus is instead on a
test (w hether or not the injury caused is « necessary »), for the use o f which
the Article itself provides no indication w hatsoever. T aken on its face value,
the provision is couched in such vague and u n certain term s as to be barren of
practical effects. F urtherm ore, as I have tried to d em onstrate elsewhere (5),
neither the prep arato ry works n o r the subséquent practice o f States shed any
light on the p u rp o rt o f the rule. Also, the w ay States have attem pted to
im plem ent Article 23 e, either in m ilitary m anuals or in the few cases where
the rule was invoked, shows th at no com m on consent has ever evolved
am ong States as to the actual norm ative value o f the principle. Each State has
interpreted the principle in its own way and intern ational disagreem ent over
w hether a given w eapon fell u nder the prohibition o f the principle has never
resulted in the reaching o f a com m on view. It is therefore my opinion th at
Article 23 e as it stands now plays in practice a norm ative rôle only in extrem e
cases (such as cases w here the cruel character o f a w eapon is so m anifest th at
nobody would deny it, or w here evidence can be produced o f gross, repeated
and large-scale violations o f the principle). It stands to reason th a t Article 23
e can also play a rôle as a m oral and political stan d ard by which w orld public
opinion assesses how belligerent States behave or m isbehave. This m eta-legal
value o f the principle u n d er considération should not be u n d erestim ated; it
could turn out to be m ore im p o rtan t than the m erely légal value, for the
im pact that public opinion can have, through m ass-m edia, on governm ents.
Furtherm ore, Art. 23 e can serve as a very significant source o f inspiration
inasm uch as it sets forth one o f the général h u m an itarian grounds on which
States should en deavour either to refrain from developing new w eapons or to
ban their use. This is m ost clearly borne o u t by the stand taken in 1973-1975,
both in the U N G eneral Assem bly and at the G eneva D iplom atie C onfe­
rence on H u m an itarian Law o f A rm ed Conflicts, by a n u m b e r o f States
which agreed that one o f the reasons for forbidding through conventional
rules new w eapons was their causing unnecessary suffering (6). Even from
this point o f view, then, A rt. 23 e constitutes b u t a réitération o f w hat was
already spelled o u t in the 1868 St. Petersburg D éclaration (which, even in this
respect, still rem ains the best illustration o f a p ro p er and realistic approach to
the question o f w eapons) (7).
A third général prohibition on w eapons follows from the général principle
whereby « distinction m ust be m ad e at ail tim es betw een persons tàking p art
in the hostilities and m em bers o f the civilian p o pulation to the effect that the
latter be spared as m uch as possible » from the horrors o f w ar (8).
(5) See my p a p e r « W eapons C ausing U nnecessary S uffering : A re T h ey P ro h ib ited ? », 58
R ivisla di D iritto Internazionale 16 ff. (1975).
(6) C p. my p a p e r q u o ted a t n. 5, 30 ff.
(7) See o n this D éclaratio n infra, Sect. I, p ara 3.
(8) T he w ords q u o ted above w ere used by the U .N . G e n e ra l A ssem bly in its resolution 2444
(X X III), ad o p ted u n an im o u sly on D ece m b e r 18, 1968. In 1972 th e G en eral C ounsel o f the U.S.
146
A N TO N IO CASSESE
T he argum ent can be m ade that a belligerent who know ingly m akes use o f
a w eapon which by its very natu re cannot but cause injuries both to com batants and civilians, intended to hit civilians or a t any rate consciously bro u g h t
them u n d er his attack. This belligerent would thus be violating the rule
forbidding deliberate attack on civilians — a rule th a t signifîcantly spécifiés
the aforem entioned général principle. This argum ent, however, can hold true
only for som e extrem e cases. W e should consider, for exam ple, th at there are
certain catégories o f « blind » w eapons such as the V .l and V.2 used by
G erm ans in W orld W ar II, which lack précision to such an extent th at they
cannot be aim ed at any spécifié target. Such w eapons are therefore very
likely to strike civilians o r civilian objects only. F o r this reason their use can
be equated to the deliberate use o f w eapons against civilians, an d is as such
unlaw ful. This contention is born e o u t by State practice : suffice it to recall
that resort to V. 1 an d V.2 by G erm any was considered illégal in substance, by
the British Prim e M inister, W. Churchill, in 1944 (9); the sam e stand is
ultim ately taken by the M ilitary M an u al o f the F édéral R epublic o f
G erm any which considers, however, th at those w eapons, although inherently
illégal, were not illégal w hen they were actually used, since they were
em ployed by way o f reprisai for Allied delinquencies (10).
F a r m ore relevant and frequent is the case o f w eapons th at are not so
« blind » and, while they also h it civilians, are prim arily aim ed at m ilitary
objectives. T he use o f these m eans o f w arfare necessarily falls u n d er the rule
w hereby if belligerents resort to m ethods or m eans o f w arfare which resuit in
incidental civilian. losses, such losses m ust not be o u t o f proportion to the
m ilitary advantage gained. This rule o f p roportionality represents an im ­
p o rtan t developm ent and spécification o f the général principle on the dis­
tinction to be m ade betw een com batants and civilians. It has, how ever, been
widely criticized. Thus, it was contended that this standard « calls for comparing two things for w hich there is no standard o f com parison. Is one, for
example, com pelled to think in term s o f a certain n u m b e r o f casualties as
justified in the gaining o f a specified n u m b er o f yards ? Such précisé relationship are so far rem oved from reality as to be unthinkable... O ne rebels at
the tho u g h t that hundreds o f thousands o f civilians should be killed in order
to destroy one enem y soldier who m ay be in their midst. But u n der m ore
D ep artm en t o f defense stated th a t the U .S. regards this principle « as d eclarato ry o f existing
custom ary in tern atio n a l law » (67 « A m erican Jo u rn a l o f In te rn a tio n a l Law », 1973, 122).
See also the G .A . résolution 2675 (XXV), ad o p ted on D ece m b e r 9, 1970, (« Basic P rinciples
fo r the P rotection o f C ivilian P o p u latio n in A rm ed C onflicts »).
(9) In a sta te m e n t m ad e in the H ouse o f C om m ons on July 6, 1944, C h u rch ill said inter alia :
« A very high p ro p o rtio n o f these casualties I have m entioned... h av e fallen upon L o n d o n , w hich
presents to the enem y... a tar'get 18 m iles w ide by over 20 m iles deep. It is, th erefore, th e u n iq u e
target o f the w orld for the use o f a w eapon o f such proved inaccuracy. T h e flying b o m b is a
w eap o n literally an d essentially indiscrim inate in its n atu re, p u rp o se an d effect. T he in tro d u c­
tion by the G erm an s o f such a w eapon obviously raises som e grave questions upon w hich I do
not propose to trench to-day » (« K eesing’s C o n tem p o rary A rchives », 1943-1945, 6536-6537).
(10) « K riegsvolkerrecht, A llgem eine B estim m ungen des K rieg sfü h ru n g srech ts u n d L an d k riegsrecht », Z D v 15/10, M ârz 1961, p a ra 90.
M EAN S O F W A R FA R E
147
reasonable circum stances, how can a p ro p er ratio be established betw een loss
o f civilian life an d the destruction o f railw ay carriages ? » (11). A dm ittedly,
the proportionality rule is vague and contains loop-holes. Still, it provides a
standard for at least the m ost glaring cases. M oreover, criticisms o f this rule
are w arranted, provided they are aim ed a t suggesting m ore w orkable and
safer standards, th at b etter m eet h u m an itarian dem ands. O therw ise attacks
on th at rule could paradoxically resuit in even belittling the protection o f
civilians it currently provides.
2. M E R IT S A N D IN A D E Q U A C IE S O F G E N E R A L P R IN C IP L E S
T he principal advantage o f général principles lies in their covering vast
catégories o f w eapons. They do n o t affect only those agencies o f destruction
existing at the tim e w hen they were laid down, b u t can work also w ith respect
to future m eans o f com bat. C onsequently, they have a continuing force o f
espansion and a reach that can b roaden w ith the passage o f time. Two
elements, however, go hand in h and to erode the value o f général principles.
First, they are couched in very vague term s; accordingly, they do not am ount
to safe standards o f conduct b u t are susceptible to divergent interprétations.
Their im plem entation calls for the existence o f international bodies capable
o f verifying im partially w hether a given w eapon falls w ithin their prohibitory
scope, and o f enforcing them . It is com m on know ledge th at at present such
bodies do not exist in the intern atio n al society. This is precisely the second
elem ent eroding the norm ative force o f the principles u n d er considération.
T heir application is left to the belligerents concerned. T he resulting picture is
distressing. W hen a belligerent considers th at the adversary is using w eapons
violative o f one o f the aforem entioned principles, he can stop the enem y
from such use either by resorting to reprisais o r by announcing th at he will
prosecute as w ar crim inals ail those involved in the em ploym ent o f the
weapon. N eedless to say, w hether this kind o f reaction can produce any real
effect actually depends on how strong the belligerent resorting to it is.
U ltim ately, therefore, the im plem entation o f the général principles on
w eapons turns o n the m ilitary strength o f belligerents : strong States can
dodge the bans w ithout fear. T he only « sanction » against them is to resort to
world public opinion.
3. S P E C IF IC BANS. T H E IR R A T IO N A L E
So far spécifié w eapons have been prohibited, either through the evolving
o f custom ary international rules or by international agreem ents, for one or
more o f the following grounds : a) they have been considered cruel or such as
to cause unnecessary suffering; b) they have been deem ed treacherous; c)
(1 1 )
48-49.
Ba x t e r , R .R ., « C riteria o f the P rohibition o f W eapons in In te rn a tio n a l Law », cit. 46,
148
A N TO N IO CASSESE
they have been regarded as indiscrim inate, in that they affect com batants
and civilians alike. These three h u m an itarian grounds on w hich w eapons
have been prohibited have never b een accurately defined. It is how ever
possible to find som e général descriptions o f them . Thus, the « unnecessary
suffering » criterion was set out in the 1868 St. Petersburg D éclaration, w here
it is stated that for the purpose o f achieving the legitim ate object o f w ar it is
sufficiënt to disable the greatest possible n u m b er o f enem ies; consequently
« this object w ould be exceeded by the em ploym ent o f arm s w hich uselessly
aggravate the sufferings o f disabled m en o r ren d er their death inévitable »
(12). A sim ilar général form ulation can be found in the 1877 Serbian In ­
structions, w here m ention is m ade o f « the général rule th at in time o f w ar the
depth o f suffering an d the extent o f the losses inflicted upon the enem y
should n o t be in excess o f th a t w hich is necessary to defeat his forces and th at
ail persons should abstain from cruel an d inhum ane acts » (13).
T he criterion o f treachery has never been defined in term s. M ilitary m anuals, how ever, give num erous illustrations (14) from w hich one can infer
that com batants behave perfidiously or treacherously w henever they abuse
the good faith o f the enem y. M ore exactly, acts o f treachery or perfïdy are
those which invite « the confidence o f the adversary w ith in tent to betray th at
confidence » (15).
Finally, as to the criterion o f indiscriminateness, it is at first sight self-evident, an d seems to n eed no explanation. O n d o se r considération, though, it
also proves to be uncertain, for it is not clear w hether a w eapon is considered
indiscrim inate for the m ere fact o f not being selective (i.e. capable o f hitting
com batants only) or because it can entail civilian losses which are out o f
p roportion to the m ilitary advantage gained through the use o f the w eapon.
(12) T e x t in S c h i n d l e r a n d T o m a n , The Law s o f A rm e d Conflicts 96 (1973).
(13) P ara 6. T ext in 14 International Review o f the R ed Cross (n. 157) 173 (1974).
(14) See e.g. the British M a n u al (The L aw o f W ar on L and) : p a ra 311 n. 1 (« F o r exam ple, by
c a llin g o u t ” D o n ot fire, we are friends ” 'and then firing; o rsh a m m in g d isa b le m e n t o r death and
then u sin g arm s... »); p ara 314 (« In général, itis c o n tra ry to m o d e m practice to a ttem p t to o b ta in
adv an tag e o f the enem y by delib erate lying, for instance, by declaring than an arm istice has been
agreed u p o n w hen in fact th a t is n ot the case... »); p ara 316 (« T o d em an d a suspension o f arm s
and th en to break it by surprise, o r to violate a safe conduct o r an y o th er agreem ent, in o rd e r to
o b tain an ad v an tage, is an act o f perfidy and as such fo rb id d en »); see also p aras 317 and 318.
See fu rth erm o re the exam ples given in the S wiss M anuel des lois et coutum es de la guerre (u n d er
p ara 36) an d in p aras 50 an d 493 o f the U.S. M anual (T h e 'L a w o f L a n d Warfare). Interesting
exam ples are also given in o ld er m an u als o r m ilitary instructions : see e.g. p a ra 13 o f the 1877
Serbian Instructions an d p a ra 57, su b p a ras 9 an d 10 o f the F re n ch L ois de la guerre continentale
(1913).
(15) See A rt. 35 p ara 1 o f the IC R C D raft A d d itio n al Protocol to the fo u r G en ev a C o n v e n ­
tions.
It is stated in p a ra 307 o f the British M an u al (T he L aw o f W ar on L and) th at « B elligerent
forces m ust be constantly on th eir guard against, an d p rep ared for, legitim ate ruses, b ut they
sho u ld be ab le to rely on th eir ad v ersary ’s observance o f prom ises an d o f the laws o f w ar ». P ara
308 th en lays dow n th at « G o o d faith, as expressed in the observance o f prom ises, is essential in
war, for w ith o u t it hostilities could n o t be term in ated w ith an y degree o f safety sh o rt o f the total
d estruction o f one o f the co n ten d in g p arties ».
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
149
One m ust not believe, however, that any m eans o f com bat exhibiting one
o r m ore o f these features has been banned. In fact, only those w eapons have
been proscribed which, in addition to having one or m ore o f those characteristics, have not been regarded as decisive from a m ilitary point o f view. In
deciding w hether to prohibit a given w eapon account has always been taken
o f their m ilitary effectiveness. A nd this factor has indeed always overriden
h um anitarian grounds. W henever it has tu rn ed out th at a m eans o f destruc­
tion was really effective, States have refrained from outlaw ing it. T he in ter­
play o f h u m an itarian and m ilitary dem ands was tellingly spelled out in 1899
by the delegate o f the U nited States to the H ague Peace Conference.
Speaking in the Subcom m ission o f the C onference concerned w ith m eans o f
w arfare, he stated :
T h e général spirit o f the proposais th at h ave received the fav o u ra b le su p p o rt o f the
S ubcom m ission is a spirit o f tolerance w ith regard to m ethods ten d in g to increase the
efficacy o f m eans o f m aking w ar an d a spirit o f restriction w ith regard to m ethods
w hich, w ith o u t being necessary from the sta n d p o in t o f efficiency, have seem ed
needlessly cruel. It has been decided not to im pose any lim it on the im p ro v em en ts o f
artillery, pow ders, explosive m aterials, m uskets, w hile p ro h ib itin g the use o f explosive
o r e x p an d in g bullets, discharging explosive m aterial from b allo o n s or by sim ilar
m ethods. I f we exam ine these décisions, it seem s that, w hen we have n o t im posed the
restriction, it is the efficacy th at we have w ished to sa feg u a rd , even at the risk o f
increasing suffering. were lluil indispensable » (16).
The sam e idea had already been expressed in 1868, at St. Petersburg, w hen
several States m et in o rd er to ban explosive projectiles (17). T he St. P e ­
tersburg D éclaration is also the best illustration o f how h u m an ita rian d e ­
m ands are balanced against m ilitary exigencies. Explosive projectiles w ere
banned at the request o f the R ussian E m peror, w ho th ought that such
w eapons cause inhum ane sufferings w hen they hit m en, w hereas they are
militarily useful to destroy am m unition cars (« caissons d ’artillerie »,
« voitures à cartouches et m unitions d ’artillerie ») (18). A lthough som e States
advocated a général and com plete b an (19), the R ussian proposai was eventually adopted an d it was therefore decided to outlaw explosive projectiles
only insofar as they are fired by rifles and m achine-guns (« fusils ordinaires,
mitrailleuses, m itraille à canon ») (20), and are thus aim ed at hitting com ­
batants individually (21). T he sam e projectiles were instead allow ed if fired
(16) Prnceedings on the H ague Peace Conference, cit., 354 (em phasis ad d ed ).
(17) See the statem en ts to this effect m ade by various delegates a t St P etersburg, « P rotocoles
des C o n féren ces ten u es à S t-P étersburg », in N ouveau recueil général de traités, co n tin u atio n du
Grand recueil de G. F r. de M artens p a r S a m w e r , C h., et H o p f , J., 452 ff. (1873).
( 18) See the R ussian « M ém oire su r la suppression de l’em p lo i des balles explosives en tem ps
d e guerre » (ibid., 458 fT.).
(19) See e.g. the statem en ts m ad e by the rep résen tativ es o f A u stria (ibid., 455) an d F ran ce
(ibid.). C p. also the sta te m e n t o f the delegate o f Prussia (ibid., 454), w ho, how ever, subsequently
took a d ifferen t sta n d (ibid.. 456 ff.).
(20) See th e rem ark s m ad e by the R ussian rep résen tativ e (ibid., 455 an d cp. 462).
(21) « Il s’ag it de proscrire se u lem en t ceux (projectiles) q u i o n t p o u r b u t d ’a tte in d re isolém ent
les hom m es e t n on des projectiles d ’artillerie » (statem en t by the rep résen tativ e o f Prussia, ibid.,
455).
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A N TO N IO CASSESE
by artillery. T he w eight o f 400 gram s was chosen as « a m inim um for artillery
projectiles and as a m axim um for the projectiles to be prohibited » (22).
Plainly, the fact that an explosive artillery projectile by hitting a m an or a
group o f com batants can inflict horrible w ounds on them , was n o t considered
so decisive as to outw eigh the m ilitary im portance o f those projectiles.
A few w eapons w ere b an n e d on one g round only. T he « unnecessary
suffering » criterion was the only rationale b ehind the prohibition, in 1868, o f
projectiles weighing less than 400 grams w hich are either explosive o r charged
w ith fulm inating or inflam m able substances (23); and o f the prohibition, in
1889, o f « bullets w hich expand or flatten easily in the h u m an body, such as
bullets w ith a h ard envelope w hich does not entirely cover the core, or is
pierced with incisions » (24). F urtherm ore, the desire « to safeguard the life
and interests o f neutrals and non-com batants » lay beh in d som e basic p ro ­
visions o f the V III H ague C onvention o f 1907, on the laying o f automatic
submarine contact mines (25).
M ost w eapons, instead, were b an n e d on several grounds. Thus som e
m eans o f com bat were p rohibited both because they affect com batants and
civilians alike and because they were regarded as perfldious. This applies, in
particular, to the 1899 and 1907 H ague D éclaration on the discarge o f pro­
jectiles from balloons (26). Poison and poisoned weapons were prohibited
(22) T he R u ssian delegate observed th a t « l’essentiel lui p a ra ît être de tracer u n e ligne de
d ém arcatio n nette en tre les projectiles d ’artillerie et ceux affectés au x arm es portatives. Le
chiffre de 400 gram m es a été choisi parce q u ’il p e u t être considéré com m e le m in im u m p o u r les
p rem ières e t le m ax im u m p o u r les secondes. T outes les pièces d ’artillerie de m oins d ’une livre
d o iv en t être reco nnues inefficaces » (ibid., 469 a n d cp. also 457).
(23) See the « M ém oire sur la suppression de l’em ploi des balles explosives en tem ps de
guerre » sen t by the R ussian E m p e ro r to the S tates invited to the St. P etersburg C o nference, ibid.,
458-467, as well as the statem en ts m ad e at St. P etersburg by the various S tates (ibid. 451 ff.), in
p articu lar the sta te m e n t by the R ussian représentative (ibid., 451) : « Il y a là d ’a b o rd une
qu estio n de prin cipe sur laquelle nous som m es tous d ’accord, un p rin cip e d ’h u m a n ité qui
consiste à lim iter a u ta n t q u e possible les calam ités de la g u erre et à interdire l’em ploi d e certaines
arm es, d o n t l’effet est d ’aggraver cruellem ent les souffrances causées p a r les blessures, sans
utilité réelle p o u r le b u t de la g uerre »).
(24) F o r the p e rtin e n t citations see m y p a p e r W eapons Causing U nnecessary Suffering etc.,
cit., 16 ff.
(25) See th e sta te m e n t by the British delegate in the Ist Subcom m ission o f the IIIrd C om m is­
sion, in The Proceedings o f the H ague Peace Conferences, edited by J.B. Scott, The Conference o f
1907, vol. III, 523 (1921). See also, inler alia, the sta te m e n t o f the Ita lia n delegate (w ho spoke o f
the n eed to elim inate from the use o f « these terrible contrivances » ail the fatal conséquences
th at they could h ave « for the peaceful com m erce o f neu trals a n d for fishing », ibid., 522). See
also the rep o rt su b m itted by the Ist to the IIIrd C om m ission (ibid., 459 : em phasis is placed on
« the very w eighty responsibility tow ards peaceful sh ip p in g assum ed by th e b ellig eren t th a t lays
m ines », as well as on « the principle o f the liberty o f the sea »).
(26) See the statem en ts m ad e a t T h e H ague, in 1899, by the rep ré sen tativ e o f the U n ited
States, w ho insisted on the fact th at those w eapons h it co m b atan ts a n d n o n -co m b atan ts alike
(Proceedings o f the H ague Peace Con ferences, The Conference o f 1899, cit., 354, 280), a n d the
sta te m e n t b y the delegate o f the N eth erlan d s, w ho stressed instead th a t the lau n ch in g o f
explosives fro m balloons w as « perfidious » (ibid., 341-342; see also 288).
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
151
because they were regarded as perfidious (27) an d cruel (28), as well as —
according to the 1877 Serbian Instructions — because « the em ploym ent o f
poison... is not only dishonourable b u t is also a double-edged w eapon th at
can easily turn against those who resort to it » (29). A spyxiating gases were
banned in 1899 because they were considered cruel (30), indiscrim inate (31)
and because they cause unnecessary suffering (32). Bacteriological means o f
warfare were b an n ed in 1925 and then in 1972 for two reasons : they are
« savage » and « horrible » (33), « so revolting and so foui that (they) m ust
meet with the condem nation o f ail civilised nations » (34); furtherm ore, they
are indiscrim inate : as was p u t by the Polish delegate to the 1925 G eneva
Conference, « it is im possible to lim it the field o f action o f bacteriological
factors once introduced into w arlike opérations. T he conséquences o f bacte­
riological w arfare will thus be felt equally by the arm ed forces o f the belli­
gerents and the whole civilian population, even against the desire o f the
belligerents, who w ould be unable to restrict the action o f the bacteriological
weapons to an area decided upon beforehand » (35).
4. M E R IT S A N D IN A D E Q U A C 1E S O F T H E S P E C IF IC - BAN A P P R O A C H
This approach has three m ajor advantages. First, as a resuit o f draw ing up
précisé rules which p rohibit specific w eapons by pointing to their objective
features, a high degree o f certainty is provided about the kind o f w eapon
(27) See e.g. the statem ents m ad e at T he H ague, in 1899, by the rep résen tativ e o f the U nited
States (Proceedings o f the H ague Peace Conferences etc., cit., 356) an d o f T h e N e th e rla n d s (ibid.,
356 an d 296). See also p ara 40 o f the A ustrian M ilitary M an u al [(« G ru n d sa tz e des K riegsvôlkerrechts », in Bundesm inisterium fiir Landesverteidigung, T ntppenfühntng 253 (1965)].
(28) See e.g. the diplom atie notes sent in 1868 by the G o v ern m en t o f P ortugal an d Prussia,
respectively, to the R ussian E m p e ro r (w ho had proposed to outlaw explosive bullets). T ext in
Nouveau recueil généra! de traités, etc. cit., 464 an d 465. See also the statem ents m ad e in 1899 at
T he H ag u e by the d elegate o f R ussia (Proceedings o f the Hague Peace Conferences, cit., 366 and
296) and o f the U n ited S tates (ibid., 366). See fu rth erm o re m any m o d em m ilitary m anuals, such
as T he N eth erlan d s Rules o f the L aw o f ^ / - [ ( V R 2-1120/11, M inisterie van O orlog, V oorlopige
R ichtlijnen n r 2-1120, V elddienst-D eel 11 - Oorlogsregelen. C h a p t. III, p ara 14, a t 7 (1958)]as
well as T h e N e th e rla n d s M anual fo r the Soldier[(V S 2-1350, K oninklijke L an d m ach t, H andboek
voor de Soldaat, C h ap t. 7, p a ra 10, at. 7 /3 (1974)].
(29) P ara 12, in In ternational Review o f the R ed Cross, cit. 174.
(30) See e.g. the statem ents m ad e in 1899 a t T he H ag u e by the rep résen tativ es o f R ussia and
o f A u stria-H u n g ary (Proceedings o f the Hague Peace Conferences, cit. 366).
(31) See e.g. the sta te m e n t m ade in 1899 a t T h e H ague by the rep résen tativ e o f D en m ark
(ibid., 366) an d by the d elegate o f the N eth erlan d s (ibid., 283).
(32) See e.g. the statem ent m ad e in 1899 a t T he H ag u e by the représentative o f R ussia (ibid.,
283).
(33) See th e sta te m e n t m ade by the delegate o f P o lan d in th e 1925 G en ev a C o n feren ce :
League o f N atio n s, Proceedings o f the Conference fo r the Supervision o f the International trade in
A rm s and A m m u n itio n and in Im piem ents o f W ar 340.
(34) See th e sta te m e n t m ade in 1925 by the delegate o f the U n ite d States, 1925 Geneva
Conference Proceedings, cit., 341.
(35) Ibid., 340.
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A N TO NIO CASSESE
which is outlaw ed. Secondly, certain instrum ents o f destruction are proscribed in any circumstance, regardless o f the quality and qu an tity o f the m édical
or relief resources o f the belligerents or o f the degree o f their technological
developm ent (36). T hirdly, thanks to its specific and précisé form ulation
which m akes reference to objective connotations o f the forbidden w eapons,
the prohibition is capable o f providing a safe norm ative guidance w hich is
effective even though no enforcemeni authoritv exists : this is clearly evidenced by the fact that the existing prohibitions o f specific w eapons have
been norm ally respected even though they w ere at tim es violated by one o f
the belligerents.
T he draw backs o f this approach, however, are no less ap p a re n t th an its
merits. Specific bans can be easily by-passed by elaborating new and m ore
sophisticated w eapons w hich, while they are no less cruel th an the proscribed
ones, do n o t fall u n d er the prohibition owing to their new features. It was
rightly noted that « since we cannot always predict context and technological
change, the effort to b an specific w eapons is an effort geared to the past »
(37). W hat can turn out to be m ore im p o rtan t is th at the States m ore likely or
capable o f dodging the ban are the m ore industrialized ones, for they possess
the technological resources which are needed to m anufacture m ore sophis­
ticated w eaponry. As a resuit, the gap betw een technologically developed
States and less advanced countries could be w idened also in this field.
5. S T A T E P R A C T IC E
O n m any occasions States have claim ed, in recent years, th at some
w eapons used by the adversary, o r at any rate by o ther States, w ere unlaw ful
as violative o f général principles o f the laws o f war. As in this p ap e r I cannot
enter into details (38), I shall confine m yself to pointing to som e général
conclusions which can be draw n from a survey o f practice.
First, State practice is indicative o f the fact th at in the view o f a n u m b er o f
States som e w eapons are contrary to international law, because they are
indiscrim inate or perfidious, or cause unnecessary suffering. As even those
States that opposed this view did n o t go as far as to reject the général
principles on w eapons, the clear inference is that ail States have up h eld those
général principles. T he im portance o f this conclusion is som ew hat belittled,
however, by the second and third conclusions to be draw n from State prac­
tice. T he second conclusion is that w hen it was contended by a State that a
(36) M ay I refer to m y p a p e r on W eapons Causing Unnecessary S u fferin g etc. cit., 18 ff.
(37) Paust, « R em arks on H u m a n R ights an d A rm ed C onflicts », in Proceedings o f the 67tlte
A n im a l M eeting o f the A m erican Sncietv o f International L aw 163 (1973).
(38) F o r the p ractice o f States concerning th e application o f th e prin cip le on unnecessary
suffering, see m y p a p e r W eapons Causing Unnecessary S u ffering etc. q u o ted above at nt. 5, p. 23
ff. F o r the practice relatin g to the principle on indiscrim inate w eap o n s, see m y p a p e r The
Prohibition o f Indiscrim inate M eans o f Warfare, in « L iber A m ico ru m D isc ip u lo ru m q u e B.V.A.
R ôling » (forthcom ing).
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
153
certain w eapon ran co u n ter to a général principle, in no case did the State
against which that contention was m ade acknow ledge the violation. This is
only natural, because no State is ready to openly adm it violating in tern a­
tional law. W hat, however, is lacking, at least in the case o f conventional
weapons, has been the répétition o f protests by a great number o f States and
the affirm ation bv some international body représentative o f the world comm unity that the w eapons at issue are contrary to international law. Criticism
and protests against the use o f certain w eapons have rem ained therefore
« unilatéral » moves and have not been able to elicit the agreem ent o f a vast
num ber o f States. T hirdly, no State has thus far discontinued the use o f any
w eapon as a resuit o f allégations by other States th at w eapon is illégal. I f in a
few instances (39), charges resulted in the State accused dropping the use o f
the w eapon, this was m ainly due to the surrounding circum stances o f the w ar
(i.e., the State accused was about to lose the w ar) and to the w arning th at
m ilitary personnel using those w eapons w ould be tried as w ar crim inals, if
captured.
In short, a survey o f State practice proves that while no State déniés the
existence and the binding value o f the général principles, no agreem ent
(outside treaty stipulations) has as yet evolved on the concrete application of
those principles to specific w eapons. This am ounts to saying th at the prohibitory intent o f those principles has proved scarcely effective.
II. T H E E M E R G IN G LAW
1. G E N E R A L
The present légal situation is no d o u b t very unsatisfactory. Since the last
world war, States have constantly been developing and occasionally using
new and very cruel w eapons : suffice it to m ention incendiary w eapons
containing napalm an d phosphorus, which produce dreadful burnings, and
other conventional w eapons such as fragm entation and cluster bom bs, as
well as hypervelocity bullets, which becom e com pletely unstable on im pact,
tum bling in the w ound and producing a large cavity. In addition, States have
steadily been perfecting nuclear w eapons o f various sizes and have been
m anufacturing new chem ical w eapons o f increasing effectiveness. T he existing rules o f international law are obviously in adequate to cope with these
(39)
T hus, it m ay be reealled th a t on A pril 24, 1975, the P rovisional G o v e rn m e n t o f S outh
V ietnam an d the D em o cratie R epublic o f V ietnam protested the use by the S aigon au th o rities o f
CBU 55 bom bs. T h ey claim ed th at these w eapons w ere contrary to in tern atio n a l law because
they were in h u m an e, in discrim inate an d terrorized the p o p u latio n ; they therefore w arn ed S outh
V ietnam th at they w ould b rin g to trial as w ar crim inals those pilots w ho w ould n o t refuse to use
such w eapons. It seem s th at a fter this stern w arning, the Saigon au th o rities d isc o n tin u ed reso rt to
CBLTbom bs (L ’Unilà, A pril 25, 1975, a t 20; cf. L e M onde, F e b ru a ry 5, 1975, a t 6 an d A p ril 24,
1975 a t 3).
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A N TO N IO CASSESE
new agencies o f destruction. It is therefore legitim ate to ask w hat the IC R C
and the international com m unity are doing to outlaw or at least to curb the
use o f such w eapons.
T hree m ajor trends are discernible, First, a wide tendency has em erged to
reafftrm and develop the existing général principles referred to above [supra,
para 1(1)] and, by the sam e token, to b ro ad en their scope. Secondly, both the
States participating in the G eneva D iplom atie C onference and the IC R C
have suggested extending the application o f those principles to non-international arm ed conflicts. Thirdly, m ost States have expressed doubts about
w hether conventional m eans o f w arfare, such incendiary w eapons, delayed-action w eapons, fragm entation bom bs, high-velocity bullets etc. com e
u nder the purview o f the existing général principles proscribing w eapons.
C onsequently, a large m ajority o f States strongly press for the form ulation o f
specific bans on som e o f these w eapons.
In the following pages I shall expatiate on each o f these trends (40).
2. T H E R E A F F IR M A T IO N A N D D E V E L O P M E N T O F G E N E R A L P R IN C IP L E S
M ost States have deem ed it advisable to reiterate the existing général
prohibition on w eapons causing unnecessary suffering. C onsequently, D raft
Protocol I includes a provision to th at effect (article 33 para 2) (41). The
reaffirm ation o f the général rule restricting the choice o f m eans of com bat
has also been regarded as appropriate, and to this end a provision was
included in the sam e Protocol (Article 33 p ara 1) (42).
This approach, however, was not considered sufficiënt. The aforem entioned provisions were eventually adop ted in 1975, by C om m ittee III, after
being supplem ented in three »ravs. First, they were expanded so as to include
other général prohibitions, nam ely the prohibition o f indiscriminate m eans o f
(40) O n the cu rren t efforts to enact new in tern atio n a l rules on w eapons see in g én éral : B l i x ,
« H u m a n R ights and A rm ed C onflicts, R e m a rk s » , Proceedings o f the 67th M eeting o f the
A m erican Society o f International Law 152 ff. (1973); B a x t e r , « P erspective : T he Evolving
Laws o f A rm ed C onflicts », 99 M ilitary L aw Review 99 ff. (1973); B a x t e r , « C riteria o f the
Pro h ib itio n o f in tern atio n a l Law », cit. 46 ff.; K a l s h o v e n , « H u m a n R ights a n d A rm ed C o n ­
flicts, R em ark s », Proceedings o f the 67th M eeting o f the A m erican S ociety o f International L aw
160-162 (1973); K a l s h o v e n , The L aw o f Warfare. A S um m ary o fits recent H istory and Trends in
development 87 ff. (1973); B l i x , « C u rre n t E fforts to P rohibit the U se o f C e rta in C o n v en tio n al
W eap o n s », 4 Instant Research on Peace and Violence 21 ff. (1974); C a s s e s e , « C u rre n t T ren d s in
the D ev elo p m en t o f the Law o f A rm ed C onflicts », 24 Rivista Trim estrale di D iritto Pubblico
1426-1429 (1974); M a l i n v e r n i , « A rm es conventionnelles m o d ern es et d ro it in te rn a tio n a l », cit.
39 ff.; B a x t e r , « H u m an itarian Law or H u m an itarian Politics ? T h e 1974 D ip lo m atie C o n fe­
rence o n H u m a n ita ria n Law », 16 Harvard International L aw Jo u rn a l 22-24 (1975).
(41) « It is fo rb id d en to em ploy w eapons, projectiles, substances, m eth o d s an d m eans w hich
uselessly aggravate the sufferings o f disabled adversaries o r re n d e r their d e a th inévitable in ail
circum stances ».
(42) « T h e rig h t o f P arties to the conflict an d o f m em bers o f th eir arm e d forces to a d o p t
m eth o d s an d m ean s o f co m b at is n ot unlim ited ».
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
155
w arfare and o f m eans o f ecological warfare. As for the first category, the
IC R C proposed a provision (Article 46 para 3) stipulating that
« the em ploym ent o f m eans o f com bat, an d any m ethods w hich strike o r affect
indiscrim inately the civilian p o p u latio n an d co m b atan ts o r civilian objects a n d m ili­
tary objectives, are pro h ib ited ».
This suggestion received wide support, and elicited proposais for im provem ents by various States (43). A fter lengthy debates, C om m ittee III adopted by consensus, in 1975 (44), a text (Article 46 para 3), w hich reads as
follows :
In d iscrim inate attacks are p ro h ib ited . Indiscrim inate attacks are those w hich are
not directed a t a specific m ilitary objective; o r those w hich em ploy a m eth o d or m eans
o f co m b at w hich can n o t be directed at a specific m ilitary objective, o r the effects o f
w hich can n o t be lim ited as req u ired by this Protocol, and consequently are o f a n atu re
to strike m ilitary objectives an d civilians or civilian objects w ith o u t distinction.
A m ong others, the follow ing types o f attacks are to be considered as indiscrim inate :
ta) A n attack by b o m b ard m en t by any m ethods o r m ean s w hich treats as a single
m ilitary objective a n u m b er o f clearly se p ara te d an d distinct m ilitary objectives
located.in a city, tow n, village, or o th e r area co n tain in g a co n cen tratio n o f civilians or
civilian objects; and
<b) An attack o f the type pro h ib ited by A rticle 50 (2) (a) (iii)
+ u n d er this provision, in conducting m ilitary o p ératio n s, those w ho p la n o r décidé
u p o n an attack, « shall refrain from d eciding to lau n ch any attack w hich m ay be
expected to cause incidental loss o f civilian life, in ju ry to civilians, d am ag e to civilian
objects, or a com b in atio n thereof, which w ould be excessive in relation to the concrete
an d direct m ilitary ad v an tag e an ticip ated ».¥=.
This rule am ong oth er things elaborates the p rohibition o f indiscrim inate
w eapons, in two respects : (1) by specifying w hat m ust be understood by
« blind » w eapons; (2) by developing the rule o f proportionality. As far as the
first point is concerned, the provision is no d o u b t a great im provem ent over
the existing law, for lett. (a) spécifiés in clear and unam biguous term s the
circum stances u n d er which a m eans o f com bat is illégal for its indiscrim inateness. T he first and clearest inference from this provision is th at non « tactical » atom ic and nuclear w eapons (provided o f course th at « tactical » ones
are capable o f hitting m ilitary objectives only) are prohibited. T here could,
however, be some elem ents pointing to a contrary conclusion (45).
Less felicitous appears to be the second p art o f the provision, which
elaborates the rule o f proportionality. It seems th at the m ain focus is placed
on the subjective évaluation, by belligerents, o f the destructive effects of
(43) See above ail doc. C D D H /I I I /8 ; D C C H /II I /2 7 and C D D H /II I/4 3 .
(44) See C D D H /1 II/S R .2 4 , at 3-4; C D D H /1 II /S R .3 1, at 2-3.
(45) In its in tro d u ction to the D raft A dditional Protocols, the IC R C states : « It should be
recalled th at, a p a rt from som e provisions o f a général nature, the IC R C has not in clu d ed in its
drafts any rules g o v erning atom ic, bacteriological and chem ical w eapons. T hese w eapons have
either b een the subject o f in tern atio n a l agreem ents such as the G eneva P rotocol o f 1925 o r o f
discussions w ithin in tergovernm ental organizalions » IC R C , « D raft A d d itio n al Protocols to the
G eneva C onventions o f A ugust 12, 1949, C o m m en tary », G en ev a , O cto b er 1973, at 2.
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A N TO N IO CASSESE
attacks or o f the use o f m eans o f w arfare. F o r it is stated there th a t a
belligerent m ust refrain from launching attacks which m ay be expected to
cause dam ages to civilians d isproportionate to the m ilitary advantage anticipated by th at belligerent. Instead o f establishing th at the possible dispro­
portion m ust be objective (i.e. th at the actual incidental dam age o f civilians
m ust not be out o f propo rtio n to the m ilitary advantage actually gained), the
provision hinges on how a belligerent perceives and anticipâtes the effect o f
its attack. It w ould seem that the provision therefore lends itself to subjective
interprétations. T hus, for instance, faced with a glaring disproportion o f
civilian loss to the m ilitary advantage, a belligerent could claim th at w hen he
planned the attack he did n o t expect or anticipate such a great disproportion.
How could one assess the decision-m aking process o f belligerents and the
m anner by which they weigh the various alternatives and m ake the final
choice ? The difficulty o f looking into such im pondérable elem ents to dé­
term ine w hether a belligerent should have expected d isproportionate d a m a ­
ges to civilians could resuit in rendering the practical application o f that rule
very difficult.
Besides developing and specifying the général principles on indiscrim inate
w eapons, the G eneva D iplom atie C onference has taken another significant
step. A w are o f the fact that in m o d em wars belligerents (or, m ore appropriately, technologically advanced belligerents) tend to use w eapons
which eventually affect civilians in th at they bring about severe dam age to
the environm ent, the States assem bled at G eneva adopted Article 33 para. 3,
a provision which prohibits m eans o f ecological w arfare (46). It reads as
follows :
It is fo rb id d en to em ploy m ethods o r m eans o f w arfare w hich are in ten d ed or m ay
be expected to cause w idespread, long-term , an d severe dam age to the n atu ral
environm ent.
This provision is o f necessity ra th e r vague. Especially the tim e elem ent
(« long-term ... dam age ») can lend itself to subjective interprétations. Some
light is shed, however, by the debates preceding its adoption. As is stated in
the R ep o rt subm itted by C om m ittee III to the Conference,
It was generally agreed th at battlefield d am ag e in cid en tal to conventional w arfare
w ould not norm ally be proscribed by this provision. W h at is proscribed, in effect, is
such d am ag e as w ould be likely to prejudice over a long-term the continued survival
o f the civilian population o r w ould risk long-term , m ajor health p ro b lem s for it (47).
(46) W hile the IC R C had m ade no proposais on the m atter, som e S tates p u t forw ard at
G eneva p ro p o sais aim ed a t strengthening the protection o f the en v iro n m en t from the dam ag es
o f w ar : see the am en d m en ts by F in lan d (C D D H / I I I / 9 1), by Egypt, A u stralia, C zechoslovakia,
F in lan d , G D R , H u n gary, Ireland, N orw ay, Y ugoslavia, S udan ( C D D H /III/2 2 2 ), by the D e ­
m ocratie R ep u b lic o f V ietnam (C D D H /III/2 3 8 ).
(47) C D D H /III/2 8 6 , at 9.
P rotection o f the n a tu ra l en v iro n m en t against dam ages o f w arfare is also p ro v id ed in A rt. 48
bis, w hich reads as follow s : « 1. C are shall be taken in w arfare to p ro tect the n a tu ra l en v iro n ­
m ent ag ain st w idespread, long-term an d severe d am age. Such care includes a p ro h ib itio n o f the
use o f m ethods o r m eans o f w arfare w hich are intended o r m ay be expected to cause such
dam ag e to the n a tu ra l en v iro n m en t an d thereby to prejudice the health o r survival o f the
p o p u latio n . 2. A ttacks against the n a tu ra l en v iro n m en t by w ay o f rep risai are p ro h ib ite d ».
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
157
T he second way o f supplem enting and strengthening the existing général
principles consists in linking them with the enactment o f specific bans. This
link was stressed by various States, which pointed out th at the reform ulation
and expanding o f général principles would be o f little value w ithout their
being im plem ented through the élaboration o f specific bans. M any States
therefore underscored the close relationship existing betw een the works o f
Com m ittee III o f the D iplom atie C onference on H u m an itarian Law (concerned interalia with the général principles on m eans o f com bat) and the A d
Hoc C om m ittee on conventional w eapons, o f the sam e Conference. By
taking such a stand, States intended to bring o u t that specific bans are the
indispensable corollary o f général principles — or to p u t it differently, that
général principles per se can prim arily serve as guidelines for outlaw ing
single w eapons through specific provisions. This position is illustrated, inter
alia, by the following statem ent o f the delegate o f M auritania, m ade in 1975 :
His d élégation eonsidered th a t the provisions o f A rticle 22 an d 33 (e) o f the
R égulations respecting the Laws and C ustom s o f W ar on Land, w hich a p p e a re d in
T h e H ague C onventions o f 1899 (II) and 1907 (IV ) an d w ere to be found in the
P ream ble to the S aint P etersburg D éclaration o f 1868, as well as the re p o rt o f the
S ecretary -G en eral o f the U nited N ations, clearly show ed th at the use o f certain
catégories o f w eapons should be generallr prohibited for the w ell-being o f ail m ankind
(48).
A nother statem ent which is w orth citing was m ade in 1975 by the delegate
o f Algeria, who observed in the A d H oc C om m ittee on C onventional
W eapons that
W hile o th e r com m ittees w ere trying to draw up provisions w hich w ould take
account o f the legitim ate req u irem en ts o f th e in tern atio n al com m unity w ith respect to
h u m an itarian law in situations o f m o d em arm ed conflicts, il w as n atu ral th at C o m ­
m ittee IV sh o u ld be given the task o f harm o n izin g the use o f certain w eapons with
those req u irem ents. W ould it not, in fact, be useless to include such provisions as
those co n tained in article 33 a b o u t the p rohibition o f u nnecessary injury and in article
34 ab o u t new w eapons if the C om m ittee proved to be too h ésitan t in taking a concrete
ap p ro ach to those provisions ? T he C om m ittee had an exceptional o p p o rtu n ity to
carry o u t a truly h u m a n ita ria n task in the trad itio n o f the St P etersburg D éclaratio n o f
1868 an d T h e H ague R ules o f 1907, w hich had resulted in the p ro h ib itio n o f the
d u m -d u m b ullet and poison gases (49).
T he third way o f m aking général principles effective lies in im posing on
States the duty o f verifying' w hether new w eapons, th a t they develop or
m anufacture, are in keeping with international standards. T o this end, the
(48) C D D H /IV /S R .I I at 4 (em phasis added).
(49) C D D H /IV /S R .1 6 , at 6. See also the sta te m e n t m ade by the delegate o f N ew Z ealan d
(« A ccording to those principles (scil. certain long-established principles o f law) — w hich w ere
also b eing eonsidered in the T h ird C om m ittee — the use o f w eapons apt to cause unnecessary
suffering o r to have indiscrim inate effects w as p ro h ib ited . T h e co n cep t o f perfidy o r treachery
m ust also, how ever, be borne in m ind. T h e élab o ratio n an d ap p licatio n o f those principles
required a process o f a p articu lar kind : a d ialogue in w hich there w as a close assessm ent o f the
effects a n d ad v an tag es o f the catégories o f w eapons. T h e N ew Z ealan d D élégation... w elcom ed
the fact th a t dialo g u e was now well u n d e r way » (C D D H /IV /S R . 10, at 4). See also the statem en t
by the représentative o f S u d an (C D D H /IV /S R .1 5 , at 21).
158
A N TO N IO CASSESE
IC R C proposed a new rule, Article 34, w hich provides th at « In the study and
developm ent o f new w eapons or m ethods o f w arfare, the H igh C ontracting
Parties shall determ ine w hether their use will cause unnecessary injury ».
After considering various am endem ents, C om m ittee III o f the D iplom atie
Conference on H u m an itarian Law adopted by consensus, in 1975, the following text (Article 34) :
In the study, developm ent, acquisition, o r ad o p tio n o f a new w eapon, m eans, or
m ethod o f w arfare a High C o n tractin g P arty is u n d e r an obligation to determ in e
w h eth er its em ploym ent w ould, u n d e r som e or ail circum stances, be p ro h ib ited by
this Protocol o r by any o th er rule o f in tern atio n a l law ap p licab le to the H igh C o n ­
tracting Party.
U n d er this provision contracting States are not bound to disclose anything
about the new w eapons they are studying o r developing. T hey are therefore
not required to assess publicly the legality o f new w eapons. It follows that
other contracting States have no possibility o f verifying w hether the obliga­
tion laid dow n there is com plied with. It could be argued, however, that
Article 34 actually im poses both the duty to set up dom estic procedures for
exploring the issue o f legality o f new w eapons and the duty to concretely use
these procedures w ith respect to each new m eans o f com bat. W hile com ­
pliance with the form er duty can be m ade subject to international scrutiny by
other contracting States (which could request to be inform ed ab o u t these
procedures) (50), im plem entation o f the latter duty is left — in actual practice
— to the discrétion o f the contracting State which studies or elaborates a new
m eans o f warfare.
3. T H E E X T E N S IO N O F G E N E R A L P R IN C IP L E S
T O N O N -IN T E R N A T IO N A L A R M E D C O N F L IC T S
T he text o f D raft Protocol II proposed by the IC R C contains several
provisions (to be found in A rticles 20 and 26) extending to civil strifes the
application o f général principles on the use o f w eapons. Article 20 para 1
states :
T h e right o f Parties to the conflict an d o f m em bers o f th eir arm ed forces to ad o p t
m ethods and m eans o f co m b at is not unlim ited. •
Para 2 o f the sam e article provides :
It is fo rb id d en to em ploy w eapons, projectiles, substances, m eth o d s an d m eans
w hich uselessly aggravate the sufferings o f disabled adversaries o r re n d e r th eir death
inévitable in ail circum stances.
(50)
It can be m entioned th a t som e S tates have already set up procedures for verifying
w h eth er new w eapons com ply with in tern atio n a l sta n d ard s (see e.g. the U S D e p a rtm e n t o f
D efense Instruction n° 5500.15 o f O ctober 16, 1974 on « Review o f L egality o fW e a p o n s u n d er
In tern atio n al L a w » . R eference to such instruction w as m ad e by the U S delegate in 1975 at
G en ev a : C D D H /IV /S R .1 5 , at 14). O th e r S tates could always req u est a certain S tate to disclose
in g én éral term s w h at procedures it has set up.
M EANS OF W A R FA R E
159
The im portance o f these provisions should not be underestim ated. The
only treaty rules concerning civil strifes at present in force, nam ely A rticle 3
com m on to the four 1949 G eneva C onventions, do not cover the behaviour o f
com batants. This m atter is only governed by a few rules o f custom ary inter­
national law which evolved during the Spanish Civil W ar (1936-1939) (51).
Such rules, however, are m ainly concerned with the protection o f civilians.
and do not affect directly the use o f m eans o f warfare. If the two aforem entioned provisions proposed by the IC R C will be adopted by the D iplom atie
Conference, for the first tim e treaty rules w ould cover an area o f civil strifes
which so far has not been directly governed by international law. H ow ever
vague and général these rules may be, their extension to internai arm ed
conflicts w ould no d o u b t constitute a step forw ard, in this area. A lthough
only a few States have pronounced them selves on the text o f A rticle 20
proposed by the IC R C , it would seem th at the général tendency is to accept
its substance (52).
W hile Article 20 still awaits considération, the G eneva D iplom atie C on­
ference (m ore correctly, C om m ittee III o f the C onference) has already
adopted two very im p o rtan t provisions. O ne is Art. 26 para 3, w hich states :
T h e em p lo y m en t o f m eans o f co m b at, an d any m ethods w hich strike o r affect
indiscrim inately the civilian po p u latio n an d com batants, o r civilian objects an d m i­
litary objectives are prohibited.
A n attack by b o m b a rd m e n t by any m ethods o r m eans w hich treats as a single
m ilitary objective a n u m b e r o f clearly se p ara te and distinct m ilitary objectives located
in a city, town, village o r o th er area co n tain in g a co n cen tratio n o f civilians or civilian
objects is to b e eonsidered as indiscrim inate.
W hile the first p art o f this p arag rap h m erely extends to civil wars the
général principle on indiscrim inate w eapons, the second part spécifiés and
develops it in a very im p o rtan t respect, thereby m aking the général principle
more effective (although it eventually proscribes, m ore than single m eans o f
warfare as such, the indiscrim inate way they are used). It is to be regretted
that the G eneva C onference did n o t take up an o th er provision proposed by
the IC R C (Article 26 p ara 3, litt. b o f D raft Protocol II), which laid down the
principle o f proportionality, thus usefully supplem enting the rule prohibiting
target area bom bings. F urtherm ore, one m ay hope that the adoption o f the
aforem entioned provision by a w eak m ajority (44 votes to none, with 22
51) M ay I refer to m y p a p e r « T h e Spanish Civil W ar and the D ev elo p m en t o f C ustom ary
Law C o n cern in g In tern atio n al A rm ed C onflicts », in Cassese (éd.), Current Problem s o f In te r­
national L a w 298 ff. (1975).
(52)
Tw o S tates (F inland an d Brazil) subm itted am en d m en ts prim arily aim ed a t a technical
im p ro v em en t o f those provisions (C D D H /III/9 1 a n d C D D H /III/2 1 5 , respectively). T he
G erm an D em ocratie R epublic, on its p art, p roposed an a m e n d m e n t ( C D D H /I II /8 7 ) th at w ould
greatly ex p an d the scope o f the A rticle, by ad d in g three p ro hibitions : 1) o f « o th er particularly
cruel m eans and m eth o ds » o f w arfare; 2) o f indiscrim inate w eapons; and 3) o f m eans o f w ar
that « destroy n a tu ra l h u m a n environm ental conditions ». T his am en d m e n t w as strongly supported by the Soviet U n io n ( C D D H /III/S R .3 2 , p. 6).
160
A N TO N IO CASSESE
abstensions) will not resuit in this provision being changed in the plenary, or
in the entering o f a large n u m b er o f réservations, once the Protocol is
adopted.
T he other im p o rtan t provision concerning m eans o f w arfare adopted in
C om m ittee III is Art. 28 bis, on protection o f the natu ral environm ent. It
states :
It is fo rb id d en to em ploy m ethods o r m eans o f c o m b a t which are in te n d e d or m ay
be expected to cause w idespread, long-term an d severe d am ag e to the n a tu ra l envi­
ronm ent.
This provision is alm ost identical to Art. 33 para 3 o f D raft Protocol I,
referred to above. T he rem arks m ade with respect to th at provision hold
therefore true for Art. 28 bis as well. It is w orth stressing th at while Art, 33 as
a whole was adopted by consensus, Art. 28 bis was adopted by 49 votes to 4,
with 7 abstentions.
4. T H E E L A B O R A T IO N O F S P E C IF IC BANS
a) Different Catégories o f Weapons. The Question o f the Forum Competent for
their Banning
M ost States agree that there are two catégories o f w eapons — nuclear and
chem ical — which call for special solutions. O w ing to their stratégie im por­
tance, their possible banning or restriction can only be discussed in a disarm am ent forum , w here m anufacturing and stockpiling are also eonsidered
as well as procedures for verifying w hether possible prohibitions are complied with. T he international forum which is now being used to this effect is
the G eneva C onference o f the C om m ittee for D isarm am ent (C C D ) in which
a lim ited nu m b er o f States, including the Soviet U nion, the U nited States and
the U nited K ingdom , take part.
T he opinions o f States are divided about incendiary and o ther conven­
tional w eapons, as well as any future types o f w eapons. A group o f States,
m ade up o f A fro-A sian countries, a few Latin A m erican countries and some
W estern States (such as Sweden), strongly advocate that an ad-hoc diplo­
m atie conference should ban at least some incendiary and other conventional
weapons. A t the 1974 Session o f the G eneva D iplom atie C onference sixStates, nam ely Egypt.JViexico, N orw ay, Sw eden, Sw itzerland and Y ugoslavia, subm itted a w orking p ap er proposing that the use o f som e o f those arm s
be restricted or prohibited, because they are either indiscrim inate in their
effects or cause unnecessary suffering, and also because they have no great
m ilitary value (53). Som e W estern countries took — at the outset — a rather
cautious stand on the subject; they pointed o u t that, should the possible
banning o f those w eapons be discussed, the only ap p ro p riate forum would be
(53)
See C D D H /D T /2 , at 311. T his d o cu m en t w as revised an d u p d ated in 1975 (see doc.
C D D H /IV /2 0 1 ).
M EANS O F W A R FA R E
161
the CCD (54). T he Soviet U nion and o th er socialist countries strongly supported the T hird W orld requests that napalm and new conventional w eapons
be prohibited. They tended to jo in , however, the m ajor W estern countries in
m aintaining that the exam ination o f this m atter should be taken up by an
international forum directly concerned with disarm am ent, such as the CCD
(55).
The im plications o f the adoption o f either solution are evident. In an ad
hoc diplom atie conference those States which at present oppose the C C D
solution would com m and a solid m ajority, and would fairly easily succeed in
adopting sw eeping bans on several w eapons despite any possible résistance
or opposition by great powers. T he ensuing treaty or treaties would, however,
run the risk o f rem aining a dead letter if they are not acceded to by great
powers. T he C C D , on the other hand, would be likely to take a m ore cautious
and realistic stand. N onetheless, the fact that it is com posed o f a lim ited
num ber o f States and that its wary attitude could cause great delays in
reaching any agreem ent on the subject is looked upon adversely by T hird
W orld countries.
b) Considérations
Weapons
Underlving the Possible
Outlawing o f Conventional
It is ap p aren t from the debates at the G eneva D iplom atie C onference th at
two sets o f m otivations guide States w hile considering which conventional
weapons should be forbidden : a) the traditional in tent to reconcile h u m a ­
nitarian dem ands with m ilitary effectiveness; b) the need to carefully consider how the m ilitary balance presently existing am ong various groups o f
States could be affected by new bans.
T h at the first category o f considérations is constantly borne in m ind by
States as m uch now as it was in the past, is inter alia dem onstrated by several
statem ents o f States. It is w orth quoting here a statem ent by the delegate o f
Sweden, which is ail the m ore significant because this neu tral State is am ong
the m ost outspoken advocates o f strict and wide bans on conventional
weapons. T he Swedish delegate stated in 1975 that
« w here a w eapon could cause a high deg ree o f suffering an d w as show n to b e o f
relatively little m ilitary value, the case for a b a n on use w as obviously stro n g » (56).
(54) See e.g. the C o m m en t by C a n ad a an d D en m ark on the R eports o f the UN S ecretaryG en eral on R espect for H u m a n R ights in A rm ed C onflicts, UN Doc. A /8313 (15 Ju n e 1971).
respectively a t 13 and 22, 24-25. T h e sam e sta n d w as taken in 1974 by som e L atin A m erican
countries, such as Brazil (C D D H /S R .IO , at 11).
It w ould seem , how ever. that m any W estern countries are g rad u ally ch an g in g th eir attitu d e,
and ten d now to favour co nsidération o f new w eapons by o th er in tern atio n a l fora th an the C C D .
(55) U k rain e ( C D D H /S R .ll, a t 19), H ungary {ibid., 22), U S S R (ibid., SR .12, at 8), Byelorussia (ibid.. SR.14, at 14).
(56) See C D D H /IV /S R .9 . at 12.
A N TO N IO C A S S E S E
162
T he second order o f m otives lying b ehind the attitude o f S ta tes tow ards the
possible banning o f w eapons is but a coroUary o f the first one. States w ant to
ensure that the outlaw ing o f specific conventional w eapons do n o t affect
adversely the m ilitary effectiveness o f p articular groups o f States. This atti­
tude is best illustrated by the statem ents o f such differing States as the Soviet
U nion and Sw itzerland. Speaking o f incendiary w eapons, the Soviet delegate
observed in 1975 that
In te rn a tio n a l relations w ere based on the seeurity o f nations. Som e countries
m an u factu red low -cost in cendiary w eapons for th eir ow n defence. I f the use o f such
w eapons was b an n ed , a sm all country w ould becom e u n ab le to defen d its territory
and w ould be in a position o f w eakness vis-à-vis large countries w hich produced
costlier an d m ore efficient w eapons. H e therefore felt it was difficult to b a n a
p articu lar category o f w eapons and he ap p ealed to the A d Hoc C o m m ittee to co-ord in ate and d raw up fair rules to go v em the p ro h ib itio n and restriction o f certain
w eapons (57).
Also in 1975, the Swiss delegate observed :
As to w eapons not subject to the p rohibition (p a ra B .l), ... sm o ke-producing
w eapons co n tain ed w hite p h osphorus, w hich caused extrem ely pain fu l burns; there
could be no q uestion o f b a n n in g them , how ever, since to do so w ould place sm all
arm ies a t a d isadvantage to large ones (58).
c) Trends Em erging in the Current Efforts for the Outlawing o f Specific
Weapons
F o u r m ain aspects o f the debates in the G eneva D iplom atie Conference
should be stressed.
First, although no State challenges the binding force o f the existing général
principles prohibiting w eapons, m any States tend to consider that the new
conventional w eapons currently u n d e r discussion, such as incendiary
weapons, anti-personel fragm entation weapons, etc. are not forbidden by
those principles. They m aintain that, at the m ost, those général principles can
point to the criteria (causing unnecessary suffering, indiscrim inateness, etc.)
for enacting new prohibitions; they, however, do not actually have such a
wide and précisé scope as to forbid or restrict the use o f new weapons.
C onsequently, for m ost States (59) the only realistic and proper approach to
such w eapons consists in considering w hether it is feasible to elaborate new
rules forbidding or restricting their use.
Secondly, the overw helm ing m ajority o f States agree upon the légal crite­
ria for b anning conventional w eapons. These criteria are : 1) the causing o f
unnecessary suffering; 2) the indiscrim inateness o f a w eapon; 3) the treacherous character o f a weapon. T here is agreem ent that any m eans o f de-
(57) See C D D H /IV /1 0 , at 20.
(58) See C D D H /IV /S R . 10, at 17.
(59) F o r citations, see my p ap er « C u rren t T rends in the D evelopm ent o f th e Law o f A rm ed
C onflict », cit.,
M EANS O F W ARFARE
163
struction that m eets at least one o f such criteria should be prohibited —
provided, o f course, th at this does not ru n counter to overriding m ilitary
exigencies.
Thirdly, it is app aren t, however, that the consensus am ong States no longer
ëxists w hen the question arises o f how the three légal criteria referred to
above should be applied to new w eapons, and w hich w eapons should accordingly be forbidden. W ithout entering into the details o f the G eneva
debates, it can be observed th at at least som e m ajor W estern countries as well
as the Soviet U nion tend to stress the difflculty o f concretely determ ining
w hether or not a specific w eapon m eets one o f the aforem entioned légal
criteria. They therefore suggest th at m ore study and thought should be
devoted to these problem s (60). By contrast, a few W estern countries led by
Sweden, and a n u m b er o f A fro-A sian States claim th a t sufficiënt considéra­
tion has been given to the technical, m ilitary, and m édical aspects o f the
weapons concerned, for the States to be able to m ake up their m inds and
agree u p o n rules for b an n in g some o f those w eapons, o r restricting som e o f
their uses. In this connection em phasis m ust be placed on the aforem en­
tioned w orking p ap er (C D D H /D T /2 ) subm itted in 1974 by six countries
(Egypt, M exico, N orw ay, Sweden, Sw itzerland and Yugoslavia) for the
pitrpose o f concretely indicating som e conventional w eapons whose use
should be p rohibited or restricted. This docum ent was som ew hat revised in
1975 in the light o f the discussions o f the L ucerne C onference on W eaponry,
and resubm itted as doc. C D D H /IV /2 0 1 . A lthough it elicited m uch support
am ong various States, which even decided to co-sponsor it (61), so far no
agreem ent has been reached on it. F o r the tim e being it therefore seems very
arduous to foresee w hether any m ajor breakthrough will ever be achieved on
this m atter.
A fourth trend is discernible in the G eneva debates. States becom e increasingly aw are that, even assum ing th at it is possible to arrive at the
enactm ent o f specific bans, such bans could be easily dodged by m anufacturing new and even m ore in h u m an w eapons. A growing n u m b er o f States
therefore suggest that m achinery should be set up for the purpose both o f
keeping new developm ents in conventional w eapons u n d er review and o f
assessing new w eapons in the light o f h u m an itarian principles. Such m achi­
nery should thus ensure that States do not devise new w eapons capable o f
by-passing existing bans. In the aforem entioned working docum ent
C D D H /IV /2 0 1 the need for such a continuous scrutiny was forcefully spelled out, although no actual m echanism s for review were suggested (62). In
the course o f the debates in C om m ittee IV, in 1975, the A ustrian delegate p u t
forward som e very interesting suggestions. H e proposed th a t ail States parties
(60) See e.g. the sta te m e n t by the delegates o f the Soviet U nion (C D D H /IV /S R .1 0 , at 20, and
SR. 15, at 20) an d o f the U n ited S tates (C D D H /IV /S R . 10, at 10-12 an d SR. 13, at 7-8).
(61) S u d an , A lgeria, L eb an o n , M a u ritan ia, V enezuela, M ali (C D D H /IV /2 0 1 , A dd. 1-6).
(62) See C D D H /IV /2 0 1 , at 6.
164
A N TO N IO CASSESE
to A dditional Protocol III (on w eaponry), should be entrusted with the task
o f collecting the necessary inform ation concerning scientific and technolo­
gical developm ents in the field o f conventional w eapons. T he study o f this
inform ation for the purpose o f determ ining w hether any new w eapon causes
superfluous injuries or has indiscrim inate effects should be entrusted to a
C onference o f governm ents experts. Subsequently, a plenipotentiary confe­
rence — to be convened at the request of one-third o f the parties to the
Protocol or after a specified n u m b er o f years has passed — could enact
provisions for the banning o f any new w eapon found to be contrary to the
aforem entioned basic requirem ents (63).
This suggestion received wide support in the A d Hoc C om m ittee (64) and it
is not unrealistic to believe that, after being som ew hat im proved, it can
eventually be adopted by the C onference.
III. C O N C L U D IN G R E M A R K S
T he present international law on m eans o f w arfare no d o u b t greatly
benefits major powers. It includes only a few général principles, w hich are so
vague that they have little value as a yardstick for the assessm ent o f the
conduct o f belligerents. In addition, the lim ited n um ber o f specific bans at
present in force only covers m inor w eapons, o r arm s (such as bacteriological
w eapons) which were prohibited m ainly because they could also affect the
belligerent using them . Instead, really im p o rtan t w eapons such as nuclear
bom bs or new conventional w eapons, do not fall — in the opinion o f most
States — u n d er any prohibitory rule o f international law.
C an it be argued th at the tendency o f favouring, in this area o f the laws o f
war, m ajor powers, is in the process o f being reversed ? Small and medium -sized States are no d o u b t stronger now than before, if only because
they are very vocal in international gatherings and passionately advocate
new and m ore sw eeping bans. They are, however, aware th at any new treaty
in this area w ould be pointless if it were not endorsed by m ajor m ilitary
powers. They are therefore com pelled to narrow the range o f their dem ands.
In addition, ail those States which are d ép en d en t for their m ilitary security on
arms supplied by great powers are not eager to see possible bans im posed on
(63) See C D D H /IV /S R .1 5 , at 2-6.
See also the « inform ai proposai » on a review m echanism su b m itted by the A ustrian experts
to the 1976 L ugano C onference o f G o v ern m en t E xperts (doc. C O L U /G G /L E G /2 0 1 ) . T his
proposai w as discussed at L ugano by the W orking G ro u p on G en eral an d Légal Q uestions (see
the R ep o rt o f this G ro u p . C O L U /G G /L E G /R e p /1 Rev. l,a t.6 - 8 ) .
(64) See in p articular the statem ents by the représentatives o f S w eden (C D D H /IV /S R .1 5 , at
7-10), V enezuela (ibid.. a t 11-13). S u d an (ibid.. at 21), E gypt (SR.16, at 3), Sri L anka (ibid.. at 3),
the N eth erlan d s (ibid. at 13-14). C p. also the cautious rem arks o f the Soviet d eleg ate (SR .15, at
19).
M EANS O F W ARFARE
165
those very arm s they need for their self-preservation. F u rtherm ore, any new
prohibition or restriction on arm s cannot b u t affect the present world m ilitary
balance (or inbalance).
It can be safely said, however, th at ail trends o f the G eneva w orks identified above are highly com m endable from a h u m an itarian view point. T he
m ajority o f States have chosen the right approach for m aking w ar — both
international and civil wars — less inhum ane. In short, they have realized
that the battle, as it were, m ust be fought on several fronts : w hat is needed is
both to resta te and develop général prohibitory rules and to enact new bans
concerning specific w eapons; by the sam e token, it is necessary to set up
supervisory m achinery to ensure that such bans are not evaded and fu rt­
herm ore to extend the bans to internai arm ed conflicts, to take account o f the
fact that these conflicts are m ore and m ore w idespread in international
society.
The choice o f the right path does not necessarily m ean, however, th at it will
be easily trodden ; it rem ains to be seen, for instance, if it will be possible to
achieve satisfactory restraints on the use o f som e specific w eapons an d if, in
addition, review m echanism s will actually be established. M any States still
resist any m ajor lim itation on their m ilitary strength. It will be useful to recall
what was tellingly stated in 1973 by the head o f the U.S. délégation to the
G eneva ConferëFce, M r G .H . A ldrich : « States which rely m ore on massed
m anpow er for m ilitary strength than on firepow er and m obility would be
likely to see security advantages in prohibiting m any w eapons ». How ever,
« m any governm ents — and particularly those o f the technologically m ost
advanced States — hesitate to subm it questions o f fundam ental im portance
to their national security to negotiations designed to supplem ent and improve the 1949 R ed Cross C onventions » (65). A lthough som e m ajor States
seem now less reluctant to m ove the discussion o f w eaponry from the C on­
ference o f the C om m ittee on D isarm am ent to other international fora there is
still m uch opposition to the enactm ent of new bans. It is therefore to be
hoped th at those countries which m ore strenuously advocate the need to
strengthen and expand the outlaw ing o f indiscrim inate, cruel or trechearous
w eapons will persevere in their efforts, how ever diffïcult their task m ay be.
(65)
S tatem en t m ad e by M ' G .H . A ldrich in the H ouse o f R ep résen tativ es : see Hearings
before ihe S u b co m m in ee on International O rganizations a n d M ovem em s o f the C om m ittee on
Foreign A ffairs, H ouse o f R eprésentatives, N in ety -th ird C ongress, F irst Session, W ashington
1974, at 99.