Translation from the German original that was published in the 2016 May edition of “Die Bundeswehr”,
member’s magazine of “Bundeswehr-Verband”
Adaptation does not mean throwing everything overboard
By Hans-Dieter Lucas1
Only a few months ahead of the Warsaw Summit, NATO is facing a completely new and dual
strategic challenge – first, there is the conflict in eastern Ukraine and, second, there are
numerous security challenges along the Alliance’s southern periphery: Afghanistan, Syria,
Iraq, northern Africa, in particular Libya, as well as threats emanating from the so-called
“Islamic State”.
In addition, there are security challenges in the wider neighbourhood, such as the Sahel
region, the Horn of Africa, and Yemen. There are also transnational threats: cyber threats, and
– as was painfully and dramatically brought into focus by the attacks in Paris, Istanbul, and
most recently in Brussels – international terrorism. NATO is not equally engaged in all of
these domains. However, NATO nations are to some extent affected by all these threats, and
they will need to adopt a position on them in Warsaw.
From Wales to Warsaw
At Wales, in response to Russia’s aggressive action in Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea
in violation of international law, NATO refocused on its core task of collective defence.
While Wales did mark a turning point in terms of strategy, the process of realignment is not
yet complete, especially due to the rapidly-evolving security environment. In Warsaw,
answers will need to be found to difficult questions: Does NATO have sufficient capabilities
to ensure deterrence? What lies ahead in terms of NATO’s relationship with Russia? What
can NATO do to help tackle challenges along the southern periphery? What must NATO do
to address emerging challenges such as hybrid and cyber threats?
Even though much work remains to be done in the run-up to the summit, I believe three
aspects will be prominent: First, maintaining cohesion within the Alliance as a prerequisite for
effective action; second, full implementation of the decisions taken at Wales; and, third,
adapting NATO, in order to meet new challenges and safeguard the Alliance’s ability to act
and to shape its policy.
Challenges to the east
NATO has taken cohesive and decisive action in response to Russia’s challenge of our
European order. In particular the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) that was approved at Wales
sends a clear message: The security of the North Atlantic Alliance is indivisible. We are
bound by our commitment to protect one another.
Since the Wales Summit, we have made great progress on RAP implementation. Germany is a
key contributor: together with the Netherlands and Norway, we assumed a pioneering role in
establishing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), providing rotating
contributions to exercises and a water-borne, land and aerial presence in the Alliance’s eastern
territory. We have also transformed the Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters in
Szczecin into a hub designed for all NATO Article 5 activities in the Baltics and in Poland.
There is also Germany’s Framework Nations Concept, an initiative we are pursuing within
1
Ambassador Dr Hans-Dieter Lucas is Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on the
North Atlantic Council.
NATO, together with 16 nations. By developing capability clusters together, the Concept
substantially contributes to strengthening European capabilities and to enhancing transatlantic
burden-sharing.
In Warsaw, decisions will need to be taken on what other conclusions NATO must draw from
Russia’s actions. There is fundamental agreement on the need to strengthen the Alliance’s
deterrence and defensive capabilities: the Alliance has observed with concern not only the
conflict in Ukraine, but also Russia’s large-scale, unannounced “snap exercises”, its
problematic nuclear rhetoric, and its growing capabilities to dominate the air and sea domains,
thereby blocking access to, and denying operational activity in, certain areas (AntiAccess/Area Denial, or A2/AD).
NATO will have to respond in a way that ensures credible deterrence, but that is also in
keeping with the defensive character of the Alliance. Our fellow Allies expect Germany to act
in accordance with its significant political and economic role and to make substantial
contributions to all five core aspects of Alliance defence: the VJTF, the enhanced NATO
Response Force, enhanced forward presence in North-Eastern Europe, reinforcement assets,
and Host Nation Support.
Certainly, the answer to the question of how to deal with Russia cannot be purely military.
Ever since the Harmel Report was published in 1967, the dual-track policy of deterrence and
defence, on the one hand, and détente and dialogue, on the other hand, is ingrained in the
North Atlantic Alliance. The channels of communication with Moscow must be employed to
this end. That includes using the NATO–Russia Council as a forum for dialogue, also in
difficult times, as Germany has repeatedly advocated.
A complex security situation to the south
Today, the situation in the south is even more dramatic than it was two years ago at the time
of the Wales Summit. Not only the refugee crisis makes this all too clear every day. To the
south, the Alliance is facing threats that stem more from non-state than from state actors. The
causes – failing governmental structures, terrorism and fundamentalism – are highly complex
and multi-faceted. NATO’s traditional toolbox is only partially suitable for addressing these
threats.
However, as the key security organization, the Alliance must help contribute to more security
along its southern periphery. Intensive discussions are being held over what the possible
options are, and where the limits of NATO’s engagement lie. It is undisputed that the RAP is
also valid in the south. One aspect of NATO’s engagement in the south was the decision to
deploy a Standing Maritime Group to the Aegean Sea, which Defence Ministers took at their
February meeting. Transmission of information to the Turkish and Greek coast guards, as well
as to the EU’s border agency FRONTEX, is aimed at combating criminal networks of human
traffickers.
Ultimately, the problems of the south can only be managed through a comprehensive
approach. That is why NATO’s partnership policy, which is one component of cooperative
security, deserves special attention. Specifically, this means conducting political dialogue, as
well as supporting countries’ capacity-building efforts in the defence and security sector, and
assisting their training efforts, provided that support and assistance are desired and the
political landscape is favourable.
NATO will be all the more effective the more closely it cooperates with other important
actors, above all the European Union and the United Nations. The debate over hybrid threats
and warfare shows us that we can no longer strictly differentiate between civilian and military
threats. Only by acting in concert can NATO and the EU find ways to effectively respond to
the full range of threats we are facing. That is why the Warsaw Summit should make progress
on NATO–EU cooperation.
The renewed emphasis on collective defence does not make obsolete crisis management,
which is one of NATO’s core tasks. This is true in Afghanistan, where the Alliance will need
to remain engaged in the future. Events in Kunduz last year clearly demonstrated how fragile
security and development there can be. That is why, at the Warsaw Summit, a decision needs
to be taken on what support NATO will provide, including financial sustainment of the
Afghan security forces.
Long-term adaptation
Warsaw will also focus on the issue of long-term Alliance adaptation – that is, on how NATO
can prepare itself to meet future strategic challenges and ensure it remains capable of action.
For this, it must also have adequate levels of personnel, materiel and funding, so that it can
perform all of its tasks. At Wales, Allies pledged to pursue the objective of spending 2% of
GDP on defence and 20% of defence budgets on major equipment, as well as to increase their
“output” to NATO. Germany is still far removed from meeting the 2% Wales defence
spending pledge. However, because Germany has assigned nearly the entire Bundeswehr to
NATO, Germany ranks very well on “output”, compared to other Allies. Regarding
investments, too, we are on the right track. And with our 2016 defence budget, we have
achieved the long-overdue reversal of the trend.
Adaptation of NATO does not mean throwing everything overboard. The Strategic Concept
that was adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 remains valid. The three core tasks it assigns
to NATO – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security – reliably guide
our actions. If we succeed in maintaining consistent, balanced policy with respect to the three
core tasks, broad geographical scope, and the dual-track policy as it is set out in the Harmel
Report, then we will have created a framework for an Alliance that can continue to take
concerted and effective action.
***
NATO has proven its worth as a pillar of a stable European order. It is a unique forum of
transatlantic cohesion. In view of the variety and severity of crises and conflicts around the
world, that cohesion is more important than ever.
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, marking the 60th anniversary of Germany’s
accession to NATO
Only by acting in concert can NATO and the EU find ways to effectively respond to the full
range of threats we are facing.