Analysis
February 4, 2014
Summary: A fierce power
struggle between the governing
AK Party and the Gülen
Movement has dominated
Turkey’s political scene,
generating wide interest both
domestically and internationally.
Thus far, conjectural factors
have been largely blamed for
the crisis. Yet, it is the structural
factors that have facilitated the
feud and can better illuminate
it, specifically Turkey’s overly
centralized and identity-imposing
state and the Gülen Movement’s
inclination to attempt to
influence policy even while not in
government. This poses a grave
challenge to Turkey’s democracy
and civilian politics. Turkey needs
to address these structural
challenges by devolving power to
local administrations, eliminating
the state’s ability of social
engineering, and increasing the
transparency of religious groups.
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The Structural Roots
of Turkey’s Power Struggle
by Galip Dalay
Introduction
Turkey has been experiencing a fierce
power struggle between the governing
AK Party and the Gülen Movement,
a religious group headed by Islamic
cleric Fethullah Gülen, who has lived in
the United States since 1999. The first
public contest between the parties took
place in February 2012 when Turkey’s
intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, was
summoned to court for conducting
secret negotiations with the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) for a peaceful
resolution to the Kurdish issue, a
mission he had been entrusted with by
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The Movement was widely believed to
have been behind the summons since it
opposes a negotiated settlement.
Afterward, the discord was kept out
of public eyes, but it had not been
settled. The tension between both
parties simmered because of their
opposing stances on major domestic
and foreign policy issues. But, when
government officials announced
in November 2013 that they were
working on a draft proposal to close
down private tutoring schools, arguing
that the system in its current form
puts unnecessary pressure on students
and a financial burden on families, the
covert dispute was once again brought
to light. Since the Movement owns
one-quarter of all private tutoring
schools in Turkey, providing its main
source of revenue and recruits, it
viewed this decision as an attempt to
deal a calamitous blow to its organizational structure. The Movement has
employed an assortment of strategies
to prevent this proposal from moving
forward, with no effect yet.
When the sensational graft probe
of December 17 culminated in the
arrest of scores of people, given the
context and history, it was viewed by
many as a politically motivated power
struggle clothed in judicial investigations of corruption cases. That does
not mean, however, that all judicial
cases are ingenuous and premised
on fabricated evidence, nor does it
means the judicial aspect of the case
be overlooked. Nevertheless, it points
to the fact that the root of the charges
may not be corruption; rather, it may
be a power struggle between the sides.
A religious group initiating a struggle
of that kind and magnitude against a
highly popular government is not only
a novelty in Turkey’s political history,
it probably has few parallels, if any, in
other democratic countries.
The fact that this power struggle
is taking place between an elected
Analysis
government and a religious organization is intriguing
and unique. Wide media coverage has focused mostly on
conjectural factors. But a thorough understanding of the
issues requires a deeper examination of the events, with
a special focus placed on structural roots of the current
disquiet.
The structural features of Turkey’s highly centralized and
identity-imposing state renders it ripe for power struggles.
On the other hand, the Gülen Movement’s self-conceived
mission and its political activities illustrate the tendency that
the Movement has developed for political engineering or the
formation of an autonomous structure within the state.
Turkey’s Over-Centralized and Identity Imposing State
The state is over-centralized in Turkey, and has a huge influence even over local issues. In most indicators of centralization, Turkey is far above the OECD average. For instance,
the central government collects almost 70 percent of total
revenues, far more than the OECD average of 58 percent.1
Even more striking, 85 percent of public servants work for
the central government in Turkey, while only 15 percent
work in local administrations. This is not only the highest
among the OECD countries, but is also high for a unitary
state. For example, 45 percent of public servants work for
the central government in France, and only 15 percent
work for the central administration in Sweden, both unitary
states.2 This level of centralization creates incentives for any
group that wants to wield influence in Turkey and have a
presence within the state mechanism.
State-society relations during the republican period are
also useful to examine. From its inception, Turkey has been
structured not as a modern state composed of citizens,
but rather as an identity/ideology driven state composed
of groups. Public institutions weren’t regarded in neutral
terms; instead they were identified with certain ideologies.
While the army and judiciary were traditionally regarded
as defenders of Kemalism, a set of principles attributed to
the founder of modern Turkey, the police were deemed as a
nationalist hub, especially in the 1980-90s.
As a reflection of this, the state did not regard itself as simply
serving the public. Rather, it saw itself as having the duty to
steer the public in the right direction. In this context, social
1 http://www.oecd.org/gov/44126584.pdf
2 Guven Sak, “Turkey is a highly centralized unitary state,” TEPAV blog, July 2, 2013
2
groups whose world-views and identities did not conform to
that of the state were regarded as a possible threat.
Such exclusionist policies of the state encouraged members of
these groups to hide their identities when “infiltrating” state
institutions. Yet, this situation has partially changed in the
last decade. Coming from a particular religious socio- political background no longer poses a danger to a public servant’s
job security. As the state has changed, so should religious and
social movements in their approach to the state.
Old Wine in a New Bottle?
The Gülen Movement occupies a unique place among all
other socio-religious groups in Turkey. The Movement
commands a network of thousands of schools, business
conglomerates, and media empires, and has a huge presence
within the bureaucracy, especially in the judiciary/police.
Similar to all other Islamic-leaning groups, the Movement
encouraged members to hide their identities, especially
prior to 2000, when Islamic identity was most under scrutiny.
The Movement’s most contentious aspect pertains to its
activities within the bureaucracy. Kurds, liberals, secularists, and incarcerated former bureaucrats had voiced stern
criticisms about the Movement, claiming that it had come
to replace the erstwhile Kemalist tutelary and employ its
bureaucratic might to both benefit the group and eradicate any potential rivals, especially within the bureaucracy.
Previously arrested journalists, such as Nedim Sener and
Ahmet Sik, and incarcerated former bureaucrats contend
that they were punished because of their investigations into
the activities of the Movement and their opposition to the
malpractices and irregularities of its members within the
state. At the time, the government prioritized the struggle
against the tutelary, so it largely remained silent to these
criticisms. In fact, it benefitted immensely from the Movement’s presence in the fight against the old guards, and, as a
result of this alliance with the Movement, further facilitated
their consolidation of power within bureaucracy.
The feeling that the Movement has formed their own autonomous presence within the state cuts across the political
spectrum. The government is the final player to come to this
conclusion. A recently leaked phone conversation between
Fethullah Gülen and one of his followers only confirmed
this widely shared belief. During the conversation, the
Analysis
follower informed Gülen that if the government orders the
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency to take action
against Bank Asya, which is owned by the Movement,
Movement members working there will stifle it.
The Movement’s approach to the government’s policy of
settling the Kurdish issue through negotiations with the
PKK is another case in point. The Movement tried to derail
the process first by orchestrating their followers within the
police/judiciary to initiate mass arrests of Kurdish politicians and activists, and secondly by trying to arrest the chief
of intelligence for his role in the secret negotiations.
These activities show the Movement’s tendency to operationalize its presence within the bureaucracy to attain its
goals. Exercising power in such a way without accountability and without earning democratic legitimacy is
reminiscent of the old Kemalist guardianship system. This
endangers Turkey’s democracy and civilian politics.
groups. The Gülen Movement also has to decide whether
it will become a civil society organization or a new form
of tutelary, wielding power without acquiring democratic
legitimacy.
About the Author
Galip Dalay works as a researcher in the political research department
at the SETA Foundation in Turkey. He is also the book review editor of
Insight Turkey. His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion, AJE
Magazine, Huffington Post, World Politics Review, Fair Observers, and
in major Turkish dailies.
About GMF
The Way Forward
The current crisis needs both short and long-term
responses. Since the judiciary has been used for political
power bidding, its response has inevitably been political in
nature as well. That bodes ill for Turkey’s state structure and
democracy and creates a condition of exceptionalism. This
needs to be cut as short as possible. At the same time, the
government should not resort to actions that might result in
brushing aside the corruption cases. The public has justified
concerns regarding corruption and the government needs
to do more to alleviate them.
In the long run, the government needs to work swiftly on
a comprehensive reform package. It should aim to restructure public institutions in such a way that they will not be
dominated by any particular groups and will not serve as an
instrument of social/political engineering.
Turkey should devolve power to local administrations
in order to ease pressure on the central administration.
Removing Turkey’s veto power on the European Charter
of Local Self-Government could be a starting point. To
increase transparency, the government needs to legalize all
forms of religious groups by abrogating the law of “closure
of dervish lodges” adopted in1925, which banned such
3
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