Nuclear Safeguards Culture: The IAEA’s Nuclear Safeguards Culture: ‘Candy Concept’ or
Powerful Prism?
Findlay, T.
Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
and Senior Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
Abstract.
This paper considers safeguards culture at the IAEA through the lens of organizational culture theory and
developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. It outlines organizational culture
theory, suggests a working definition of safeguards culture and seeks to identify the creators, purveyors
and guardians of the culture. After examining the wider cultural context, including the Agency’s own
culture, that of the United Nations and individual national cultures, the paper seeks to identify the key
characteristics of the Agency’s safeguards culture and how it has changed since 1991, as well raising the
issue of the impact on various safeguards sub-cultures. Recommendations are made as to how the Agency
might handle the safeguards culture issue.
1. Introduction
In 1991, as IAEA inspectors began the first of what would become years of intensive inspections in Iraq,
it became clear that that country had come closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than anyone had
imagined. It had done so by assembling a parallel nuclear infrastructure ‘over the berm’ from that which it
had declared to the IAEA and which had been subject to nuclear safeguards. The credibility of the 40-year
old safeguards system was at risk. As Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director General has put it [1]:
The Agency was only expected to verify what a country declared. We had little authority,
and few mechanisms, to search for undeclared nuclear materials or facilities. If this
sounds frighteningly naïve, it was.
Since then the IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system, partly by reasserting rights and authorities
that it had always had, partly by developing new approaches and techniques and partly by inviting
member states to provide it with new powers and responsibilities. It has also attempted to change the
safeguards culture within the Agency, both indirectly by changing structures, procedures and processes,
and directly through inculcation of new norms and attitudes through training and other means.
2. Why take a cultural approach to safeguards?
The term ‘safeguards culture’, despite being used periodically by Agency personnel, member state
representatives and experts, remains vague, often little understood and even contested. Reactions to it
range from puzzlement to derision to apprehension. Those who recommend cultural change or
strengthening of the culture often provide no ideas on how this might be done. Unlike safety or security
culture, there is no agreed definition, official or unofficial, of safeguards culture. Nor is there an IAEA
study or other documentation on the issue and no in-house research devoted to it (at least none publicly
available). The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) has not tackled the
issue. Outside experts or academics have also not specifically researched the Agency’s safeguards culture
(although some writing on the Agency as a whole [2] and on the safeguards mission specifically does
touch on cultural issues without necessarily employing the term). Others have researched member states’
safeguards cultures [3].
Meanwhile, advances in our understanding of nuclear safety culture and nuclear security culture, and the
importance increasingly attached to them, suggest the need for comparable attention to be paid to
safeguards culture. In any event it seems unwise in any field of endeavour to use a term without
understanding what it means. Moreover, member states naturally look to the Agency to shape their own
safeguards culture and would expect to find a model worth emulating. A final reason for studying
safeguards through a cultural lens is that it can be revealing and hence useful to those managing and
seeking to improve safeguards.
3. Organizational Culture Theory
Organizational culture theory emerged in the 1980s as a way of better understanding how organizations
actually behave (‘the way we do things around here’), in contrast to the way they officially say they
behave. With its intellectual roots in the anthropological study of native cultures beginning in the 19th
century, the notion of culture implies significance and meaning beyond what can be seen in plain view
[4]. Studies of the organizational culture of corporations and other types of organizations, including nonprofit organizations, have become established practice [5]. Case after case indicates that ‘culture matters’,
not just to tribes, societies and nations, but to any type of organization. The language of ‘culture’ has,
meanwhile, made its way steadily into corporate managerial discourse and practice and everyday parlance
to the point where Best Western hotel staff sport t-shirts proclaiming ‘Safety is our culture’ and
professional football teams speak of changing their ‘cultural’ attitudes towards violence and women.
Edgar H. Schein, a pioneer in organizational culture studies says that culture matters because ‘it is a
powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective
behavior, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values’. It is a group property, based on social
learning through common experience. Organizational culture, specifically, matters because ‘cultural
elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating’ [6]. In his classic work Organizational
Culture and Leadership [7] he sets out three levels of culture from the ‘very visible to the very tacit and
invisible’, designated as: Artifacts; Espoused Values; and Underlying Assumptions.
Table 1. Elements of Organizational Culture (Schein)
Artifacts
Visible organizational structures and processes
Espoused values
Strategies, goals, philosophies
Basic underlying assumptions
Unconscious thoughts, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, habits
2
Since culture is deep, broad, stable and hard to decipher it is also difficult to change. Yet a failing
organization may mean that elements of the culture have become dysfunctional and must change. Often
cultural change is forced on an organization due to some ‘discomforting’ external event, such as a
scandal, a merger or a disaster. In the IAEA case that event was clearly Iraq. Change involves people
having to unlearn beliefs, attitudes, values and assumptions as well as learn new ones, which makes many
uncomfortable. Corporate history is littered with cases where cultural change was attempted and failed or
resulted in unintended consequences.
Leadership and incentives are key to cultural change. Yet Schein cautions about treating organizational
culture as if it were just a managerial tool, like a new form of organizational structure that can simply be
imposed. He warns never to start with the idea of changing culture, but rather with addressing the issues
the organization faces and only then seeking to change culture.
Schein also cautions that culture may not be the problem. The cultural perspective, while potentially quite
powerful, is just one of three recognized by organizational theorists as being ‘lenses’ through which to
analyze an organization. The other two are: the strategic design or institutional perspective and the
political perspective. While the institutional lens sees action occurring through planning and the political
lens discerns action occurring through power, the cultural lens sees action through habit.
4. Towards a definition of safeguards culture
Unlike safety and security culture there is no agreed international definition of a desirable or optimal
safeguards culture (or any other agreed definition of the term). Neither the IAEA Secretariat, IAEA
member states or advisory bodies like SAGSI have attempted to create one. How then might a desirable
nuclear safeguards culture for the Agency be defined?
One can, in the first instance, turn to models from nuclear safety and nuclear security that have been
agreed internationally. Safety culture, for instance, has been defined by the IAEA as the ‘assembly of
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding
priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance’ [8]. Security
culture, in similar vein, is considered to be that ‘assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of
individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear
security’ [9].
In the interests of standardization, to facilitate understanding across the three areas of nuclear governance
(safety, security and safeguards) and to be inclusive of all stakeholders, a definition of safeguards culture
should preferably follow the safety and security models closely. Hence safeguards culture may be defined
as ‘that assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions
which supports and enhances nuclear safeguards’. Given that ‘safeguards’ is a technical term that does not
have a self-evident meaning to the uninitiated (and in fact is widely confused with safety), it is probably
preferable to include in the definition a reference to the purpose of safeguards―to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a definition would be: ‘that assembly of characteristics, attitudes
and behavior of individuals and organizations that supports nuclear safeguards as a critical means of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons’. This definition, like the others, naturally begs the
question of what specific ingredients the culture should comprise.
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5. Creators, purveyors and guardians of safeguards culture
One of the challenges in studying safeguards culture is the wide variety of agents that shape, transmit and
have the potential to change it (see figure 1 below). These include member states and their various
agencies, the non-governmental and expert community and regional safeguards organizations, notably
EURATOM and the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC). The IAEA itself
should, however, rightly be seen as the main custodian and shaper of safeguards culture. Yet within the
Agency there are several players with differing degrees of responsibility for safeguards who may or may
not share the same cultural assumptions, but who are able to affect its form and content. These include the
General Conference, the Board of Governors, the Director General and various Secretariat departments,
including management, legal, human resources and public relations. Above all, though, the Department of
Safeguards and its staff should be the true repository of safeguards culture since safeguards are, or at least
should be, their entire professional preoccupation. This paper will focus on them.
Figure 1 Creators, purveyors and guardians of safeguards culture
states
•
•
•
•
nongovernmental,
scientific
community
foreign ministries
safeguards
authorities (State
Systems of
Accounting and
Control)
atomic energy
authorities and labs
nuclear industry
regional
organizations
EURATOM, ABACC,
nuclear weapon-free
zone organizations
e.g. INMM, ESARDA,
VERTIC, MTA
IAEA
•
•
•
•
General Conference, Board of
Governors, member states
Director General and Deputy
DGs
Department of Safeguards
(policy, management,
analysts, labs, inspectors)
other departments (Legal,
Public Information)
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6. The wider context: the IAEA, the United Nations and national cultures
One of the challenges in studying safeguards culture is the difficulty of extracting it from the wider
cultural context of the Agency itself, the broader UN culture in which the Agency is situated, and at the
other extreme the national cultures that international organizations necessarily subsume. As an
organization that is almost 60 years old, the IAEA has had decades to institutionalize its own culture.
One of the most prominent aspects that has a defining effect on safeguards culture is the Agency’s selfproclaimed identity as a science and technology-based body, independent of the UN but still a part of the
UN family of organizations. Hence safeguards are themselves science and technology oriented, objective
and non-discriminatory. Safeguards violations are dealt with by the Agency’s own Board of Governors
which may or may not decide to refer them to the UN Security Council. The Agency’s culture is to
interact mainly with member states, not with industry. In contrast to EURATOM, the IAEA’s safeguards
system strongly reflects this culture. The UN, somewhat older than the IAEA, has an embedded culture
inherited in part from its predecessor, the League of Nations (1920-1946), that is process-oriented
(emphasizing diplomatic procedures, conferences, documentation, interpretation/translation); deferential
to member states; favours a semi-permanent international civil service and takes into account
geographical balance and politics when recruiting personnel. The IAEA’s safeguards culture is affected
by all of these, most notably by UN recruitment practices (the rotational policy). Finally, since
international organizations recruit widely among their member states, individual national cultures can
affect the working culture, especially as they interact with (or react against) the overall Western cultural
framework (notably legal, bureaucratic and management aspects) of international organizations.
7. IAEA safeguards culture and its evolution since 1991
The IAEA has clearly attempted to change the safeguards system and its attendant culture since the case
of Iraq in the early 1990s revealed the shortcomings of the existing system. Taking Schein’s 3-part
cultural schema as the basis for analysis, Tables 2-4 set out the differences between the pre-1991 situation
and the current situation to the extent that it can be ascertained by an external researcher.
Artifactual change has occurred in the legal, planning and process areas, essentially by adding new
artifacts to supplement existing ones.
Table 2: Cultural change: Artifacts
Pre-1991
Now
Legal artifacts
IAEA Statute; NPT; INFCIRC/153
agreements; SQPs
+ Strengthened safeguards;
Additional Protocols;
revised SQPs
Planning artifacts
Programme and Budget
+ Strategic Plan
Process artifacts
inspectors reports; safeguards
conclusion;
special inspections
+ State-Level Concept;
state evaluation groups;
country officers; integrated
safeguards; ‘broader
conclusion’; open source
information; intelligence
5
In terms of espoused values many of the changes relate to the new emphasis given to ‘correctness and
completeness’, consequent to the awareness that diversion is not the only likely non-compliance scenario,
and that a whole-of-state approach is necessary, drawing on a wider range of information sources. For
inspectors the new espoused values emphasize a more inquisitive, investigatory approach that employs
enhanced negotiation skills and analytical techniques.
Table 3: Cultural change: Espoused values
Pre-1991
Now
safeguards non-discriminatory; technically based; effective;
efficient as possible
no change
diversion the most likely non-compliance scenario
all acquisition paths worth considering
emphasis on declared materials, activities and facilities
emphasis on correctness and completeness; undeclared
materials/activities/facilities important
inspectors focused on nuclear accountancy; prescriptive,
criteria-driven approach
inspectors expected to be more inquisitive, investigatory,
innovative
only declarations and inspection information valid for
drawing safeguards conclusions
all sources of information useful to draw ‘broader
conclusion’
safeguards can only do what states allow
the Agency has more rights
effectiveness depends on state cooperation
states have increased obligations to provide information,
access, effective SSACs
effectiveness depends on adequate funding (zero real
growth a constant refrain)
no change
safeguards personnel are professional, trained, dedicated
safeguards personnel are better trained than ever
special inspections a right in case of undeclared activities
special inspections reaffirmed as Agency right in special
cases
The most critical elements of culture and the most difficult one to analyze, because they are often
unspoken (at least publicly), are the underlying assumptions. These truly reflect ‘the way we do things
around here’. If mismatched to the artifacts and espoused values they can indicate organizational
dysfunction. In the case of safeguards culture, the pre-1991 underlying assumptions have become evident
as cultural change has proceeded. In particular the assumption that the Agency did not concern itself with
undeclared nuclear materials, facilities or activities has been well exposed and was a key motivation for
seeking to change the culture. Although not the original intent of safeguards, it had become ingrained as a
‘habit’ through intensifying attention over time to declared activities and the verification means required
to ensure they were correct. Some member states, wary of the level of intrusiveness that would result
from the Agency seeking evidence of undeclared activities, actively encouraged this trend. Even at senior
levels of the Agency there was growing presumption that detecting undeclared activities was not part of
the Agency’s remit (legal documents to the contrary notwithstanding), paraphrased in the expression ‘we
don’t go on fishing expeditions’.
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Today, the Agency clearly has in mind the underlying assumptions that it believes desirable in the
changed culture and seeks to embed those as firmly as possible. These are outlined in the right-hand
column of Table 4 below. What is unclear, though, is the extent to which this has been achieved. There is
anecdotal evidence of a certain ‘overhang’ of the old culture among certain staff, but the extent of this is
not clear. Some of this may be simply generational and will resolve itself with the retirement of the ‘old
guard’. Without a proper study by qualified organizational culture experts, however, based either on
questionnaires and/or extensive group and/or individual interviews, it is impossible to assess the extent of
cultural change. This study had neither the time, resources or access to undertake such research.
Table 4: Cultural change: Underlying Assumptions
Pre-1991
Now (desirable)
detecting undeclared material/facilities not part of the job
(‘we don’t go on fishing expeditions’)
correctness and completeness vital (‘still no expeditions, but
we now worry about all types of fish’)
inspectors dominate data collection, analysis, planning &
management
close collaboration between inspectors, analysts, planners,
labs & managers; all make valuable contribution
tick the boxes, replace the batteries and go; be deferential
to states; ‘don’t rock the boat’
inquisitiveness, resourcefulness, initiative will be rewarded
safeguards findings not always taken into account
‘upstairs’
all safeguards findings taken seriously
inspectors not always well recruited, trained or dedicated
inspectors well recruited, trained and imbued with new
culture
Organizational theorist John Carroll sets out a series of questions that should be addressed in assessing a
culture [10]. They include:
•
•
•
•
how strong and pervasive is the culture? What do people think of as right, proper, moral and fair?
what do the mission, strategy, goals and rewards mean to people?
what subcultures exist across groups or between managers and workers?
What are the consistencies and contradictions in work practices, norms, rituals, role models,
symbols, stories, training programs, rules, incentive plans?
Some of these questions can be answered readily, while others require much more investigation. In the
case of IAEA safeguards the culture is clearly strong and pervasive. Cultural change has demonstrably
occurred since 1991 and is observable in terms of both artifacts and espoused values. It is the prevailing
underlying assumptions, either old or new, where further research is required.
One area of potentially useful research is the impact of cultural change on the various safeguards subcultures, since they have, inevitably, different value sets as a result of different professional backgrounds,
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job descriptions and expectations and individual and collective experiences at the Agency. The following
charts seek to identify some of the elements of the safeguards sub-cultures.
Table 5
Safeguards Sub-cultures
Inspectors





traditional ‘star performers’
scientific/technical, fact-oriented, individualistic
‘professionalism marked by tenacity and respect’ (ElBaradei)
closely-knit due to shared experiences & member states’ criticism
wish to preserve status and benefits
Analysts


relatively new in safeguards; injecting themselves into a 50-year old culture
also technical and fact-oriented, but desk-bound and with varied backgrounds
(political science, intelligence, IT), more accustomed to collaborative work
value all information, not just inspection data, including qualitative (subjective?)

Managers





may not have safeguards/inspector backgrounds, but managerial or other
concerned with effectiveness, efficiency and strategic planning
must take all factors into account in assessing compliance
operational divisions may have their own cultures, as may Concepts & Planning;
Information Management and Technical & Scientific Services
management leadership (personality) key to cultural formation/change
7. Conclusions and recommendations
The IAEA’s safeguards culture is robust. Significant cultural change has undoubtedly occurred in terms
of artifacts and espoused values since 1991 and these seem generally in line with each other. What is not
clear is the extent to which underlying assumptions, unspoken norms and beliefs, have been bought into
line with the artifacts and espoused values. One particular area of concern is the different effects of
changes in safeguards on the sub-cultures within safeguards culture―those of the managers, analysts and
inspectors.
It is recommended that the Agency:
a) Seek agreement on a definition of safeguards culture
b) Commission a baseline study of the state of the culture, including the interaction of sub-cultures
with the main culture, and
c) Monitor the health of the culture periodically, as in the nuclear safety and security fields.
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REFERENCES
[1] ELBARADEI, M., The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times, Metropolitan
Books, New York (2011), 10.
[2] CLARK, R. “Setting the culture from day one”; DESSON, K., “Organizational culture – why does it
matter?” and DAHLGREN, K, “Having the right organizational culture” , papers presented to the 2010
IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Session 21 on “Enhancing the organizational culture to prepare for future
missions”. http://www.iaea.org/safeguardssymposium2010).
[3] See for instance FRAZAR, S.L. and MLADINEO, S.V, “Safeguards culture: lessons learned”,
ESARDA Bulletin, 44 (2010).
[4] GEERTZ. C., The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York (1973)
[5] SCHEIN, E. H., The Corporate Culture Survival Guide, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (1999)
[6] SCHEIN, E. H., Ibid., p. 14.
[7] SCHEIN, E. H., Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed., Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (2004).
[8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in
Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, Vienna (2007), 175, http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1290_web.pdf
[9 ] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Culture: Implementing Guide,
IAEA Security Series, 7, Vienna (2008), 3.
[10] CARROLL, J. S., “Introduction to organizational analysis: the three lenses”, unpublished class
paper, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, revised
June 2006, 10.
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