"JUST DO IT": PRAGMATISM AND PROGRESSIVE
SOCIAL CHANGE
LynnA. Baker*
IHAT use is pragmatismfor achievingprogressivesocial
vYv change? This questionhas been centralto the recentrenaissanceofpragmatism
withinthelegalacademy.Not surprisingly,
the
scholarswhohaveexaminedthisquestionhaveshareda coreconcern:
thepersistent
marginalization
and disempowerment
ofcertaingroups
in our society.'Morestriking,
however,
is thesubstantial
agreement
of thesescholarsthatpragmatism
is usefulforalleviating
oppression
in modemAmerica.2
In thisEssayI suggest,
despitethepopularity
ofclaimsto theconthatpragmatism
trary,
is ofscantuse forachieving
progressive
social
change.Myanalysisfocuseson thewritings
ofRichardRortyfortwo
reasons. First,he is the acknowledged
philosophical
leaderof the
recentrevivalof interest
in pragmatism.
Second,an examination
of
Rorty'sworkuncoversimportant,
and previously
undiscussed,
inconREX
* AssistantProfessor,Universityof VirginiaSchool of Law. Associate Professor,
University
ofArizonaCollegeofLaw (Fall 1992-). B.A., 1978,Yale University;
B.A., 1982,
OxfordUniversity;
J.D., 1985,Yale University.
I am grateful
to JessicaFeldman,Ken Kress,Dan Ortiz,Dick Rorty,GeorgeRutherglen,
and Bill Weaverforchallenging
conversations
and carefulreadings
ofearlierdrafts.
An earlierversionofthisessayappearedinPragmatism
in Law and Society(MichaelBrint
& WilliamG. Weavereds., 1991).
1 See, e.g.,MariJ. Matsuda,Pragmatism
Modifiedand theFalse Consciousness
Problem,
63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1763,1763-64(1990);MarthaMinow& ElizabethV. Spelman,In Context,
63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1597,1601(1990);Margaret
J.Radin,The Pragmatist
andtheFeminist,
63
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1699,1699-1700(1990);JosephW. Singer,Property
and Coercionin Federal
IndianLaw: The Conflict
BetweenCriticaland Complacent
Pragmatism,
63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1821, 1821-22(1990) [hereinafter
Singer,Property];
Allan C. Hutchinson,
The Three'Rs':
103 Harv. L. Rev. 555, 563-66,571 (1989) (reviewing
Reading/Rorty/Radically,
Richard
Rorty,Contingency,
irony,and solidarity
(1989)); JosephW. Singer,ShouldLawyersCare
AboutPhilosophy?,
1989Duke L.J.1752,1765-66[hereinafter
Singer,ShouldLawyersCare]
(reviewing,
interalia, RichardRorty,Contingency,
irony,and solidarity
(1989)).
2 See,e.g.,Matsuda,supranote1,at 1764-68;
Minow& Spelman,supranote1,at 1600-01,
1609-15,1647-52;Radin,supranote1,at 1705-19;Singer,Property,
supranote1,at 1822-24;
Hutchinson,
supranote1, at 566-73,583-85;Singer,ShouldLawyersCare,supranote1, at
1759-66.
697
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[Vol.78:697
usefulness
forproin his own assessment
of pragmatism's
sistencies
gressivesocialchange.
I beginby analyzingtwo distinct,but previouslyunseparated,
social change,whichI
strandsin Rorty'sdiscussionof progressive
termthe"prophetic"
andthe"processual."In PartII, I examinetwo
popularresponses
ofthelegalacademyto Rorty'sviews:criticism
of
his seemingdefenseof thestatusquo, and praiseof his concernfor
marginalized
people. I arguethat,in bothinstances,the response
if it failsto distinguish
may be problematic
betweenthe different
strandsin Rorty'sviewofprogressive
socialchange.
In PartsIII and IV, I evaluatebyRorty'sownpragmatist
termshis
claimsfora pragmatist
culture.PartIII exam("postmetaphysical")
ines whetherthe postmetaphysical
culturethat Rortyadvocates
wouldhave anyadvantagesoverour current
foundationalist
one for
socialchangeas Rortydefines
achievingprogressive
it. PartIV considerswhether,
regardlessof the backgroundculture,the prophets
who are necessaryforprogressive
social changeunderRorty'sview
would be better served by subscribingto pragmatismor to
foundationalism.
I.
RORTY ON PROGRESSIVE
SOCIAL CHANGE
LegalscholarshavediscussedRichardRorty'sviewson progressive
social changeas if theywereof a singlegenus. Close analysisof a
widerangeofRorty'sessaysand books,however,
revealstwodistinct
strandsin his work:the"prophetic"
and the"processual."Identifyingand separating
thesethreadsis necessary
forunderstanding
both
Rorty'sclaimsand legalscholars'(mis)conceptions
of them.
The propheticstrandin Rorty'sdiscussionof progressive
social
changecan itselfbe dividedintotwosubparts.One is hisvisionofa
betterworld. The otheris his suggestedvehiclesfortraveling
from
thepresentto thatbetterworld. The processualstrand,in contrast,
consistsof Rorty'sdescription
of theprocessor mechanism
bywhich
hisproposedvehiclesmoveus closerto thebetterworldhe imagines.
Thus,one mightagreewithRortyaboutthelikelyefficacy
of a suggestedvehicleforreachinghisutopia(prophetic
strand),butdisagree
aboutthemechanism
by whichthatvehiclewill moveus alongthe
routeof progressive
socialchange(processualstrand).
The centralelementofRorty'sprophetic
strandis hisdefinition
of
progressive
socialchange.Althoughhe frequently
eschewsthenotion
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699
of progress,Rortyis willingto employit in the contextof social
change.Accordingto Rorty,progressive
socialchangeis thatwhich
movesa societycloserto realizinghis threeinterrelated
aspirations:
thatsuffering
and crueltywillbe diminished;3
thatfreedomwillbe
maximized;4
and that"chancesforfulfillment
ofidiosyncratic
fantasies willbe equalized."5Rortyderivesthesehopesfromhis premise
that"the aim of a just and freesociety[is] lettingits citizensbe as
privatistic,
'irrationalist,'
and aestheticist
as theyplease so long as
theydo iton theirowntime--causing
no harmto othersandusingno
resourcesneededby thoseless advantaged."6
Rortydoesnotattempt
a theoretical
or metaphysical
defense
ofthis
premiseor of the hopesit embodies,"hav[ing]abandonedthe idea
thatthosecentralbeliefsand desiresreferbackto something
beyond
the reach of timeand chance."7 They are simply"ungroundable
desires"forwhichthereis "no noncircular
theoretical
backup.""8
Rorty'sprophetic
strandalso encompasses
hissuggestions
concerning the vehicleswe mightuse to moveto thebetterworldhe envisions. Rortyrepeatedly
asserts:"Thereis no methodor procedure
to
be followedexceptcourageousand imaginative
experimentation."9
he suggeststwo vehiclesby whichsocial progresshas
Nonetheless,
occurredin the past and mightoccurin the future:narratives
and
separatist
groups.Rortydoesnotmeanto imply,however,
thatthese
are the onlytwo vehiclesby whichsocial changehas occurredor
could somedayoccur;theyare simplythetwo thathe thusfarhas
chosento examineat greatest
length.
Thus,Rorty'sprophetic
strandconsistsofhis threehopesand the
premisefromwhichtheyarederived,
as wellas hissuggestion
ofnar3 RichardRorty,Contingency,
irony,and solidarity
at xv (1989).
Id. at 60 ("an idealliberalsocietyis onewhichhas no purposeexceptfreedom");
Richard
Rorty,Consequences
ofPragmatism
69-70(1982) (thereis "no better
cause"than"'enlarging
humanfreedom'") (quotingSidneyHook, Pragmatism
and the TragicSense of Life 25
(1974)).
5 Rorty,
supranote3, at 53.
6 Id. at xiv.
7 Id. at xv.
8 Id.
9 RichardRorty,Feminism
andPragmatism,
30 Mich.Q. Rev.231,242 (1990) [hereinafter
Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism];
see also RichardRorty,ThugsandTheorists:
A Replyto
15 Pol. Theory564, 565 (1987) ("Thereis nothingsacredabouteitherthe free
Bernstein,
marketor about centralplanning;the properbalance betweenthe two is a matterof
experimental
tinkering.").
4
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[Vol.78:697
rativesand separatist
groupsas thevehiclesforrealizingthesehopes.
Rorty'sprocessualstrand,in contrast,
consistsof his accountofthe
andsepaprocessesormechanisms
bywhichthevehiclesofnarratives
ratistgroupswouldtransport
us to his betterworld.
By narratives,
Rortymeansnovels,docudramas,ethnographies,
forexample,thatprovide"detaileddescripand journalists'reports,
to
ofpainand humiliation."10
According
tionsofparticular
varieties
Rorty,thenarrative
can be authoredby one of theoppressedor by
the situationof the
someoneelse, and is an attemptto interpret
increase
oppressedgroupto therestoftheirsociety.Suchnarratives
ofpersonswhoarenot
thesympathies
humansolidarity
byexpanding
membersof the oppressedgroup so that theycome to see the
oppressedas an "us" ratherthanas a "them."11Increasedhuman
a "them"
an "us" admitting
solidarity,
however,
does notconstitute
an act ofnoblesseoblige. Rather,according
to membership
through
encomto Rorty,the narrativeprocessof interpretive
description
as wellas theoppressed;it "is a matterof
passesthenon-oppressed
detailed descriptionof what unfamiliarpeople are like and of
of whatweourselves
are like."''2
redescription
Throughnarratives
we eachmaycometo knowbetternotonlypersonswithwhomwe do not(yet)identify,
to
butalso "thetendencies
in searchesforautonomy"thatwe ourselvesposcrueltyinherent
sess,'3the "sortsof crueltywe ourselvesare capableof.""4 In this
way,we each maybecomemoregenerally
awareof,and moresensitiveto, thesuffering
aroundus and our rolein causingit.'5 "Such
increasedsensitivity,"
to
accordingto Rorty,"makesit moredifficult
fromourselves
'Theydo not
marginalize
peopledifferent
bythinking,
feelitas wewould,'or 'Theremustalwaysbe suffering,
so whynotlet
"16 Solidarity,
themsuffer?'
then,is "theabilityto see moreandmore
Rorty,supranote3, at 192.
11Id. at xvi. "[O]ur senseof solidarity
is strongest
whenthosewithwhomsolidarity
is
are thought
expressed
of as 'one of us,' where'us' meanssomething
smallerand morelocal
thanthehumanrace." Id. at 191.
12 Id. at xvi(emphasis
added).
13 Id. at 144.
14 Id. at xvi.
10
15
16
Id. at 93.
Id. at xvi.
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701
traditional
... as unimportant
differences
whencomparedwithsimilaritieswithrespectto painand humiliation."'7
Amongexistingnarratives,
Rortyclassifiesthe workof Charles
Dickens,OliveSchreiner,
as detailing
the"kinds
and RichardWright
ofsuffering
whom
we
had
beingenduredbypeopleto
not
previously
attended."' The workof Choderlosde Laclos, HenryJames,and
VladimirNabokov,in contrast,
depictsthe"sortsofcrueltywe ourselvesare capableof."19
A secondvehiclethatRortysuggestsmightenablesocietyto progresstowardhisutopianvisionis separatist
groups.The creationofa
separatist
grouprequiresthatat leastone memberof theoppressed
grouphave"theimagination
ittakesto hearoneselfas thespokesperson ofa merelypossiblecommunity,
ratherthanas a lonely,and perhaps crazed, outcast froman actual one."20 That courageous
individual
willbeginto workouta newstoryaboutwhosheis,which
willrequirethatshehearherownstatements
as partofa sharedpracticein orderto achievesemanticauthority
overevenherself.2'Thus,
accordingto Rorty,she may persuade other membersof the
oppressedgroupto band together
withher in an exclusiveclub in
orderto "tryout new ways of speaking,and to gatherthe moral
to go out and changethe world."22As examplesof such
strength
clubs, Rortycites the contemporary
feministmovement,Plato's
Academy,theearlyChristians
whometin thecatacombs,theseventeenthcenturyunderground
Copernicancolleges,and the workers
who gatheredto discussTom Paine'spamphlets.23
Changingtheworldis a riskybusiness.The separatist
groupmay
be ruthlessly
itsmembers
suppressed,
thusdoublyoppressed.Preferaovergenerations
bly,however,
"thosein control[will]graduallyfind
theirconceptions
ofthepossibilities
opento humanbeingschanging"
and "[t]henewlanguagespokenbytheseparatist
group[will]graduallygetwovenintothelanguagetaughtin theschools."24Thatis,the
17
18
Id. at 192.
Id. at xvi.
19 Id.
20
21
22
23
24
Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 240.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248.
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702
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[Vol.78:697
formerly
oppressedgroupgraduallyachieves"'full personhood'in
theeyesofeverybody,
havingfirstachievedit onlyin theeyesoffelof theirown club."25Accordingto Rorty,thetestof
low-members
whether
has beenachievedis whether
fullpersonhood
powerful
people in the society(still)thankGod thattheydo not belongto the
(formerly)
oppressedgroup.26
To summarizeRorty'sprocessualstrand:Separatistgroupsmove
societytowardRorty'sutopianvisionthroughtheircreationof new
an expansionofindividlinguistic
narratives
do so through
practices;
is not intended,
ual empathy.This distinction
however,to obscure
theobviousinterrelatedness
ofthetwomechanisms:
The creationof
new linguisticpracticescan occur simultaneously
with,cause, or
resultfroman expansionof individualempathy.Thus,Rortyalso
describesnarrativesas "aimed at workingout a newpublic final
. . . , a vocabulary
deployedto answerthequestion'What
vocabulary
"27
sortsof thingsabout whatsortsof peopledo I need to notice?'
he portrays
Similarly,
separatist
to getpeopleto feel
groupsas "trying
indifference
or satisfaction
wheretheyonce recoiled,and revulsion
and ragewheretheyonce feltindifference
"28
or resignation.
At thecenterofboththenarrative
and separatist
processesofprogressivesocial change,as Rortydescribesthem,is a prophet-an
interpreter
or a leaderwitha visionofa betterworld.The author(s)
ofa narrative
musthavebotha visionand a senseofhowto translate
theexperiences
ofeithertheoppressed
groupor thecruelgroupintoa
languagethatis not onlyunderstandable
but transformative.
Similarly,theleaderofa separatist
groupmustnotonlybe ableto suggest
particular
waysin whicha society'slanguageand institutions
might
be changed,butalso musthavea visionthatincludes"somesortof
fortheresultsoftransformation
blueprint
(in thewayin whichJefferson and Adams,or Leninand Trotsky,
did,and AbbieHoffman
did
not)."29Aboveall else,then,boththenarrator
and theleaderof a
separatistgroupmusthave imagination-andsometimesa special
kindof courage.
25
26
27
28
29
Id.
Id.
Rorty,supranote3, at 143.
Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 233.
RichardRorty,Two CheersfortheCulturalLeft,89 S. AtlanticQ. 227,229 (1990).
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Giventheaboveanalysisoftheprophetic
and processualstrandsin
hiswork,whatuniquecontribution
maketo
doesRorty'spragmatism
his viewson progressive
social change?This issuecan be examined
withoutconfronting
thevastlylargerand less tractablechallengeof
on pragmatism's
anti-foundationalist
defining
pragmatism
byfocusing
core: the claim that "metaphysicalentities"such as "reality,"
In theconforcertitude."30
"truth,"and "nature"arenot"warrants
text of social change,this anti-foundationalism
more specifically
entails:(1) recognizing
thepervasiveness
ofcontingency;
(2) rejecting
notionswhenconceptualizing
metaphysical
or evaluating
processesof
socialchange;and (3) avoidingmetaphysical
notionswhenconstructingor evaluating
arguments
for(or against)socialchange.
Applyingthesecriteriato Rorty'sprophetic
strand,thereappears
to be nothingdistinctly
anti-foundationalist
abouthis
("pragmatist")
premiseconcerning
"theaimofa justand freesociety,"'31
or thethree
hopeshe believesthatpremiseembodies,or his choiceof narratives
and separatistgroupsas vehiclesforrealizingthesehopes. Indeed,
theonlyanti-foundationalist
aspectofRorty'sprophetic
strandis the
wayhe "justifies"
itsvariousaspects.Rorty'sclaimthathispremise
simplyembodies"ungroundable
desires"for which thereis "no
noncircular
theoretical
backup"32
is an exampleofpragmatism's
antifoundationalist
distrust
ofmetaphysical
entities
as warrants
forcertitude. Anotherexampleof this distrustis Rorty'ssuggestion
that
"[w]e shouldlearnto brushaside questionslike 'How do youknow
thatfreedom
is thechiefgoal of social organization?'"and instead
''shouldsee allegianceto social institutions
as no moremattersfor
justification
to familiar,
by reference
commonly
acceptedpremisesbutalso as no morearbitrary-than
choicesoffriends
or heroes."33
Pragmatism's
anti-foundationalist
acknowledgment
ofcontingency
dictatesthisapproachto justification:
Choicesof prophecies(and,
of social institutions)
therefore,
"cannotbe precededby presupposi30 JudgeRichardPosnerhas posited"three'essential'elements"
of pragmatism:
(1) "a
distrust
ofmetaphysical
entities
... viewedas warrants
forcertitude";
that
(2) "an insistence
propositions
be testedby theirconsequences,
by the difference
theymake"; and (3) "an
insistence
on judgingour projects. . . by theirconformity
to socialor otherhumanneeds
ratherthanto 'objective,'
criteria."RichardA. Posner,WhatHas Pragmatism
'impersonal'
to
OfferLaw?,63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1653,1660-61(1990).
31 Rorty,
supranote3, at xiv.
32 Id. at xv.
33 Id. at 54.
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[Vol.78:697
tionlesscriticalreflection,
conductedin no particularlanguageand
outsideofanyparticular
historical
context."34
Thus,Rortysuggests,
fromJohnRawls,thatthejustification
borrowing
forhis particular
visionofa betterworld" 'is notitsbeingtrueto an orderantecedent
and givento us,butitscongruence
withourdeeperunderstanding
of
ourselvesand ouraspirations,
and ourrealization
that,givenourhistoryand the traditions
embeddedin our publiclife,it is the most
reasonabledoctrineforus.'"'5 In the end, Rortyjustifiesvarious
aspectsof his prophecyby invokingan anti-foundationalist,
historically contingent
congruenceratherthana metaphysical
correspondenceto Truth.
Rorty's processualstrand,in contrast,is anti-foundationalist
throughand through.In his accountof the mechanisms
by which
separatistgroupsand narrativeseffectprogressive
social change,
Rortyportraysneithervehicleas reachingtowarda metaphysical
truthor an objectivereality.Separatistgroupsand narratives
'both
strivetoward"increasingly
usefulmetaphors
ratherthan... increasingunderstanding
of howthingsreallyare."36
For Rorty,separatist
groupstryto createnewlinguistic
practices
through
whichtheywillforgea moreusefulidentity
forpersonslike
themselves
withinthelargersociety.Narrators
can similarly
helpus
see theeffects
ofoursocialpractices,
institutions,
and privateidiosyncracies,and thereby
enableus usefully
to redescribe
bothothersand
ourselves.The worldis changednot as narratives
and separatist
groupsdiscoverand communicate
truths,
butas theyprovideuseful
oftheworldand itsinhabitants.
redescriptions
For Rorty,"a talent
forspeakingdifferently,
ratherthan forarguingwell, is the chief
instrument
of culturalchange."37
In sum, pragmatism's
anti-foundationalist
core contributes
two
important
aspectsof Rorty'sdiscussionofprogressive
socialchange:
the way he justifies
variousaspectsof his propheticstrand,and his
accountofthemechanisms
bywhichseparatist
groupsand narratives
willeffect
his visionof a betterworld(his processualstrand).
34Id.
Id. at 58 (quotingJohnRawls, Kantian Constructivismin Moral Theory,77 J. Phil. 515,
519 (1980)).
35
36
37
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
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II.
705
LEGAL SCHOLARS RESPOND
The above analysisof Rorty'sdiscussionof progressive
social
changeshedsimportant
on
two
light
popularresponses
bylegalacademicsto Rorty'sviews. Scholarshave applaudedRorty'sconcern
for "marginalized
people."38They have also, however,frequently
criticized
a "complacent
forprovidRortyforoffering
pragmatism,"
ing a conservative
"reaffirmation
of liberalinstitutions
and practices."39This Part argues that both of these responsesmay be
if theyfailto distinguish
problematic
betweenthepurelyprophetic
and theanti-foundationalist
(bothprocessualand prophetic)aspects
of Rorty'sviewson progressive
socialchange.
Legal scholarsinterested
in pragmatism
haveexplicitly
or implicitlypraisedRortyforhis statement
that"[w]e shouldstayon the
lookoutformarginalized
people-peoplewhomwe stillinstinctively
thinkofas 'they'ratherthan'us.' "0 JosephSinger,forexample,has
statedthat"Rortyis rightto adviseall ofus to be on thelookoutfor
peoplewho are oppressed.""4And scholarssuch as Mari Matsuda
and MargaretRadin have suggestedthat pragmatismcould be
improvedby explicitly
incorporating
a concernforoppressedpersons.42It thusseemsimportant
to examineRorty'sstatement
in the
largercontextofhis viewson progressive
socialchange.
Rorty'sexhortation
concerning
marginalized
peopleis onlyone of
his manysuggestions
abouthowto makeourworld"muchlesscruel
for a lot of people."43Elsewhere,for example,he suggeststhat
schoolsshouldassignstudents
booksthatwillhelpthem"learnabout
whatit has beenlike(and oftenstillis like)to be female,or black,or
38 See,e.g.,Singer,
ShouldLawyersCare,supranote1,at 1766;Hutchinson,
supranote1,
at 564-66.
39 Hutchinson,
supranote1, at 564; accordMinow& Spelman,supranote1, at 1611-12,
1650;Singer,
Property,
supranote1,at 1825-26;Singer,
ShouldLawyersCare,supranote1,at
1759-66.
40 Rorty,supranote3, at 196.
41 Singer,
ShouldLawyersCare,supranote1, at 1766.
42 See Matsuda,supranote 1, at 1764(arguingthatto improve
she "would
pragmatism,
weightthepragmatic
methodto identify
and givespecialcredenceto theperspective
of the
... add a first
principle
ofanti-subordination;
and ... claimthattheuse of
subordinated[j
pragmatic
methodwitha normative
firstprincipleis not inconsistent")
(footnote
omitted);
Radin,supranote1,at 1708-11(stating
thatpragmatism
shouldusethefeminist
methodology
ofincorporating
theperspective
oftheoppressed
to remedy
its"problemofbad coherence").
43 Rorty,
supranote29, at 233.
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[Vol.78:697
gay."" And in Contingency,
ironyand solidarity,
Rortydescribeshis
"liberalutopia" at substantiallength,and suggeststhatnarratives
mighthelpus getthere.45
Rortymakestheseproposalspurelyas a prophet,not an antifoundationalist.
He is simplysetting
forth
hisvisionofa betterworld
and suggesting
vehiclesforits realization.Whetherone considers
fora betterworldto be signsofhispoliticalradiRorty'ssuggestions
calismor conservatism,
it is important
to recognize
thatthesesuggestionsare not entailedby his anti-foundationalism.
Theyare simply
notinconsistent
withit. ShouldanyofRorty'sproposalsbe triedand
founduseful,we willhaveevidencethatRortyis a usefulprophetnot evidencethatRortyis a good anti-foundationalist
or thatantiis useful.Similarly,
foundationalism
whenMatsudaand Radin suggestimproving
pragmatism
by explicitly
a concernfor
incorporating
marginalized
as supplying
a
people,theywouldbe bestunderstood
prophecy;
and anti-foundationalism
mayor maynotproveusefulfor
effecting
theirvisionof a betterworld.
AlthoughlegalscholarshavelaudedRortyforhis concernforthe
himforhisseemingpoliticalconoppressed,
theyalso havecriticized
servatism.For example,JosephSingerwritesthatRorty's"versionof
pragmatism
is inherently
conservative
becauseit equates'democracy'
and 'freedom'with establishedinstitutions.
"46
Allan Hutchinson
accusesRortyof failingto considerthat"liberalinstitutions"
have
helpedto createand sustainsocial ills such as "patriarchy,
racism,
economicinequality,
and the continualthreatof nuclearholocaust
and environmental
destruction."47
BecausetheyperceiveRortyto be
a defender
ofexisting
Americanpoliticalinstitutions
and a proponent
of liberalism,
such scholarshave concludedthathe is a complacent
apologistforthesocialand politicalstatusquo.48
To be sure,Rortydoesexplicitly
advocate"theprotection
ofsomethingliketheinstitutions
ofbourgeoisliberalsociety,"49
and he does
repeatedly
describehimselfas a "liberal."50But his criticsimpor44 Id.
45 See Rorty,
supranote3.
46 Singer,
Property,
supranote1, at 1825.
47 Hutchinson,
supranote1, at 564.
48 See sourcescitedsupranote39.
49 Rorty,
supranote3, at 84.
50 See, e.g.,id. at 47, 84, 198.
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707
tantlyoverlookthelargercontextin whichRortymakesthesestateis
ments.The preservation
ofexisting
Americanpoliticalinstitutions
notthefocusofRorty'sutopianvision.Nor is hisadvocacyoftheir
preservation
evidencethatRortyhas no utopianvision.Rather,those
institutions
are yet anothervehiclefor the realizationof Rorty's
vision,whichhe has chosenlargelybydefault,
and whichoperatesin
conjunction
withnarratives
and separatist
groups.
Rorty'sprophetic
strandincludestheinstitutions
ofliberalsociety
forthreereasons.First,Rortyreads"thehistorical
facts"to suggest
thatwithoutthe protection
of something
like thoseinstitutions,
a
societymovesfarther
awayfromrealizinghisthreehopes:5"thatsufand crueltywillbe minimized,52
freedom
willbe maximized,53
fering
and "chancesforfulfillment
of idiosyncratic
willbe equalfantasies
ized."54 Second,he believesthatthe institutions
of "contemporary
liberalsociety"willaffirmatively
enablethatsocietyto improveitself
in thedirection
of his vision.55Third,Rortyfeelshe can suggestno
alternative
to thoseinstitutions
thatwouldbetterenablesocietyto
movein thedirection
of his vision.56
Thus, the existingAmericanpoliticalinstitutions
play a role in
Rorty'sdream ultimatelyby default. Indeed, Rorty repeatedly
to reexamine
expressesa willingness
thevalueofthoseinstitutions
in
lightof "practicalproposalsforthe erectionof alternative
institutions."57He further
concedesthathisownfailureto generate
sucha
proposalis due to his ownlack ofprophetic
imagination.58
Or, perhapsmoreaccurately,
Rorty'squitesubstantial
prophetic
imagination
simplydoes notextendthisfar.
Criticsalso have misunderstood
Rorty'sseemingpraiseforand
advocacyof liberalism.Rortydoes not meanthe termto signify
a
complacent
acceptanceofthepoliticalstatusquo (or theunquestioningadoptionofan extantpoliticalideology),
buttypically
usesit as a
shorthand
forcertainaspectsofhis prophecy.The societythatreal51 Id. at 84-85.
Id. at xv.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 53.
55 Id. at 63.
56 Id. at 197;Rorty,
and Pragmatism,
supranote29,at 229;Rorty,Feminism
supranote9,
at 253 n.15.
57 Rorty,
supranote3,at 197;Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 253 n.15.
S8 Rorty,
Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 253 n.15.
52
53
54
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708
[Vol.78:697
izes Rorty'sthreehopesis one thathe terms"a liberalutopia"'59
or
or
"an idealliberalsociety,"'notsimplya "utopia" "idealsociety."
Rortyalso uses "liberal"to describepeoplewho sharethehopesat
thecoreofhis prophecy."[T]hatcrueltyis theworstthingwe do,"
forexample,he repeatedly
describesas "theliberal'sclaim."'61
Most importantly,
however,Rortyuses theterm"liberal"to help
establishthe historicalrootsof his dreamof an "ideal liberalsociety."62Rortyconsidershisthreehopesforsocietyto be importantly
with"a historical
consistent
narrative"
aboutexisting
institutions
and
customsthathe also describes
as "liberal":"theinstitutions
and customswhichweredesignedto diminish
makepossiblegoverncruelty,
ment by the consent of the governed,and permitas much
domination-free
communication
as possibleto takeplace."63Rorty's
criticsmay be confusingthis anti-foundationalist
historicism
and
of contingency
acknowledgment
withpoliticalconservatism.
In discussingthe threehopesat the core of his prophecy,
Rorty
repeatedlyacknowledgeshis inabilityto escape the past entirely.
Rortyreminds
us,invoking
Neurath'simage,thatwe arepeopleon a
shipat sea,prevented
fromrealizingourmostradicalvisionsofa new
and bettershipby our inability
to replaceall of the existingship's
planksat once.4 Propheticimagination
freedcompletely
fromhistoryis perceivedas madness. Thus, to be effective,
any prophecy
(includingRorty's)mustbe the productof varyingdegreesof both
imagination
and history.
It is in thiscontextthatone mustconsiderRorty'sacknowledgmentthat"thecontingencies
ofhistory"
makeitdifficult
forhim(and
us) to "see thekindof individualfreedom
whichthemodemliberal
59
Rorty,supranote3, at xv.
60 Id. at 60.
See, e.g.,id. at 197,xv,63-68.
Id. at 84.
63 Id. at 68.
64 [W]e can understand
therevolutionary's
thata sailableboatcan'tbe made
suggestion
outoftheplankswhichmakeup ours,and thatwe mustsimplyabandonship. Butwe
cannottakehissuggestion
seriously.... Ourcommunity-the
oftheliberal
community
intellectuals
ofthesecularmodemWest-wantstobe abletogiveapostfactum
account
of any changeof view. We wantto be able,so to speak,to justifyourselvesto our
earlierselves.Thispreference
is notbuiltintous byhumannature.It isjustthewaywe
livenow.
RichardRorty,Solidarity
or Objectivity?,
in Objectivity,
and Truth21,29 (1991).
Relativism,
61
62
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709
stateoffers
its citizensas just one morevalue."65Similarly,
Rorty
attributes
his (our) ideal of a societyin whichpain and crueltyare
minimizedto his (our) historically
socializationprocess
contingent
and "thesenseofhumansolidarity
whichthedevelopment
ofdemocraticinstitutions
has facilitated."66
But the past neitherwholly
norwhollyconstitutes
determines
Rorty'sprophecy.Historysimply
providesthe inescapablerootsof Rorty'sown imaginative
flower:a
"poeticized"culture.67
In sum,scholarswholaud Rorty'sconcernformarginalized
people
praisehis prophecy,
not his pragmatism.In contrast,
scholarswho
findfaultwithRorty'sdefenseofexisting
Americanpoliticalinstitutionsdisapproveof partof his prophecy,
and/ordisagreewithhis
assessmentof the constraints
anti-foundationalism
imposeson the
currentpursuitofhis betterworld.
III.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROPHECY
FOUNDATIONALISM
AND ANTI-
In theirhasteto criticizeRortyforcomplacently
defending
thestatus quo, legal scholarshave failedto raisea potentially
muchmore
issue. Theyhaveneverundertaken
devastating
to evaluate,byRorty's
ownpragmatist
hisclaimsfora postmetaphysical
terms,
culturein the
contextof progressive
socialchange.Whatuse is anti-foundationalismforachieving
progressive
socialchangeas Rortydefines
it? Or,in
otherwords,whatis therelationship
betweenprophecy,
whichRorty
suggestsis necessaryfor progressive
social change,and the antifoundationalism
that he advocates? Despite the centrality
of this
issue,Rorty,likehis critics,neverdirectly
confronts
it.
a societythathas givenup metaphysics
Certainly
foranti-foundationalismwouldstillneedprogressive
social change(and, therefore,
prophetssuchas narrators
and separatist
groupleaders).To suggest
otherwisewould be to hold out anti-foundationalism
as the Truth
towardwhichtheworldhas beenconverging-and
Rorty,as an antifoundationalist,
explicitlyrejectsthe metaphysical
notionthat the
worldis "converg[ing]
towardan alreadyexisting
Truth."68
65
Rorty,supranote3, at 50.
66 Id. at 197.
67 Id. at 53.
68
Id. at xvi.
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710
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[Vol.78:697
Wouldthepostmetaphysical
culturethatRortyadvocateshaveany
advantagesoverour current
one forachievingprogresmetaphysical
sivesocial change?To begin,thereare severalpertinent
differences
betweenan anti-foundationalist
as Rortydescribes
culture,
it,and the
existingmetaphysical
one. First,members
ofan anti-foundationalist
culturewouldunderstand
thateverything-"our
language,our conscience,our community"-isa productof contingency,
time,and
chance.69Theywouldtherefore
be "peoplewho combinedcommitmentwitha senseof the contingency
of theirown commitment."70
Second,theirpervasive
senseofcontingency
wouldmakethemskeptical that any statusquo was eithernecessaryor the best possible
world.71Third,members
ofan anti-foundationalist
culturewouldnot
employ,or be receptive
to, foundationalist
vocabularyand formsof
argument.72
Theywouldnotuse wordslike"truth,""nature,""reality,"and "reason" as warrantsforcertitude.Their "arguments,"
therefore,
would moreoftenbe suggestions
thatotherssimplytry
thinking
of thingsin a different
(and perhapsmoreuseful)way,or
suggestions
thatit mightbe moreeffective
to stopdoingsomethings
in favorof doingothers.73Fourth,a postmetaphysical
culturewill
have made "a generalturnagainsttheoryand towardnarrative."74
Accordingto Rorty,"[s]ucha turnwouldbe emblematic
ofourhavinggivenup theattemptto hold all thesidesof our lifein a single
vision,to describethemwitha singlevocabulary."75
Finally,membersofan anti-foundationalist
culturewouldconceiveofprogressive
socialchangeas a seemingly
endlessprocessof"therealization
ofutopias and theenvisaging
of stillfurther
"76
utopias.
Assuming,
arguendo,
thata postmetaphysical
culturewillhavethe
characteristics
Rortyascribesto it,whatwillthatmeanforprogressive social change? Consider,first,the membersof the societyin
whicha prophetsuchas a narrator
ora separatist
groupleaderwillbe
working.Willa postmetaphysical
culturebe morelikelytojoin with
Id. at 22.
Id. at 61.
71 Id. at xv-xvi,
61.
72 Id. at 79.
73 Id.
74 Id. at xvi.
75 Id.
76 Id. Thisprocesswouldyield"a history
ofincreasingly
usefulmetaphors
ratherthanof
increasing
ofhowthingsreallyare." Id. at 9.
understanding
69
70
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1992]
JustDo It
711
a prophetin realizinghervisionofa less cruelworld,or morelikely
than presentsocietyto be movedby a narratortowardincreased
humansolidarity?There seemslittlereasonto believeso, despite
Rorty'sinconsistent,
claims.
butoftenhopeful,
and
At hismostoptimistic,
Rortyassertsthatfor"thepreservation
progressof democratic
societies,"an anti-foundationalist
vocabulary
centered
on "notionsofmetaphor
and self-creation"
is preferable
to a
metaphysical
vocabulary
basedon "notionsoftruth,rationality,
and
moralobligation.""7Indeed,he claimsthatthislattervocabulary
of
In a
Enlightenment
hasbegunto hindersocialprogress.78
rationalism
similarlyenthusiastic
the
vein,Rortyassertsthat "reformulat[ing]
hopesofliberalsocietyina nonrationalist
andnonuniversalist
way...
ofthem
[will]further[
] theirrealization
betterthanolderdescriptions
did.s79
At othertimes,however,
Rorty'sclaimsforan anti-foundationalist
cultureare substantially
weakerand moretentative.Withregardto
progressive
social change,Rortystatesthatan anti-foundationalist
culture(in whichthe"nonintellectuals"
are "commonsensically
nominalistand historicist")
could "be everybitas self-critical
and every
bitas devotedto humanequalityas ourownfamiliar,
and stillmetaphysical,liberalculture-ifnot more So." 8O More tentatively,
he
assuresus thatthepublic'sadoptionofanti-metaphysical,
anti-essentialistviewsat leastwillnot"weakenand dissolveliberalsocieties."8
Rortyadds,withevenlessoptimism,
thatindividuals
whoselivesare
givenmeaningby themodern,liberalhope "thatlifewilleventually
be freer,
lesscruel,moreleisured,
richerin goodsandexperiences,
not
"82 are
just for our descendantsbut for everybody's
descendants,
to be interested
unlikely
in,muchless adversely
affected
by,philosopherswhoare questioning
metaphysics.83
At hisleasthopeful,
Rorty
concedesthepossibility
thatshifting
to an anti-foundationalist
culture
"wouldweakenand dissolveliberalsocieties.
"84
Id. at 44.
Id.
79 Id. at 44-45.
80 Id. at 87.
81 Id. at 85.
82 Id. at 86.
83 Id. "The idea thatliberalsocieties
are boundtogether
beliefsseemsto
byphilosophical
me ludicrous."Id.
84 Id. at 85.
77
78
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712
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[Vol.78:697
Rortyneversupportshis moreoptimistic
claimsforanti-foundationalismwith explanationsof how or why anti-foundationalist
vocabularyand reformulations
of social hopeswouldbe superiorto
metaphysical
onesforachieving
socialchange.Can a perprogressive
suasivecase nonetheless
be madethatanti-foundationalism
wouldbe
moreusefulthanmetaphysics
forachieving
socialchange
progressive
as Rortydefinesit? Rortyseemsto implythatone advantageof an
anti-foundationalist
cultureis its potentially
greaterrevisability.
In
thepresent
anchorsthebulkofourbeliefs,
culture,
metaphysics
some
of whichmayimpedesocialprogress.So, theargument
goes,eliminatingthose metaphysical
anchorsmightyield a more revisable
culture.
There are severalproblemswith this reasoning.First,greater
revisability
alonedoesnotincreasethelikelihood
thatchangesoccurringin societywillbe in anyonedirection.Revisability,
afterall,is as
mucha precondition
fora societymovingawayfromRorty'svisionof
a betterworldas itis formovingtowardit. Second,anymetaphysical
notion,suchas religion
or truth,
thatmightimpedeprogressive
social
changealso mightexpediteit. MartinLutherKing,Jr.,forexample,
had a utopianvisionnotunlikeRorty's.Thathe was a minister
and
frequently
invokedreligiousconceptswhenadvocating
socialchange
did notdiminishhis influence
as a prophet,
butratherwas muchof
thesourceofit. Similarly,
an anti-foundationalist
societymaybe less
inclinedto followa prophetpromising
onlya contingent
visionof a
betterworldthana metaphysical
societywillbe to followa prophet
thatmoraltruthor God is on herside. The latterprophet,
asserting
forexample,maybe relatively
betterat inspiring
and motivating,
at
capturingthe imagination
of hersociety.Thus,it is farfromclear
thatan anti-foundationalist
culturewouldbe morerevisablein the
direction
ofsocialprogress,
or thatitwouldhavemore(or moreinfluential)prophetssharingRorty'svisionofa betterworld.
In theend,Rortypersuadesone onlyofthatforwhichno persuadingwasnecessary:
An anti-foundationalist
culturebydefinition
willbe
different
fromour foundationalist
one. Notwithstanding
his general
claimthata postmetaphysical
culturewouldbe preferable
to ourmetaphysicalone, Rortydoes notconvincingly
establishthata cultural
shiftto anti-foundationalism
would be advantageousfor realizing
evenhis ownutopianvision.
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JustDo It
1992]
IV.
713
PRAGMATIC PROPHETS
If ourculturedoes notmovefromfoundationalism
to anti-foundationalism,
wouldsubscribing
be ofgreater
to thelatternonetheless
use
to prophetsthana beliefin metaphysics?
his writings,
Throughout
Rorty'sanswerto thisquestionseemsto waiverbetween"no" and
"yes,quitea bit."
At one extreme,
has nothing
to offer
Rortystatesthatpragmatism
thosewitha visionofa betterworld:"[I]t seemsto methatifyouhad
theprophecy,
In addition,Rorty
youcouldskipthepragmatism."85
has describedpragmatism
in thecontextofprogressive
socialchange
as "something
a setofanswers
comparatively
smalland unimportant,
to philosophicalquestions-questionswhicharise only forpeople
who findphilosophical
ratherthansilly."86Thus,
topicsintriguing
Rortynotesthat"pragmatism
bitesotherphilosophies,
butnotsocial
problemsas such-and so is as usefulto fascistslikeMussoliniand
conservatives
likeOakeshottas it is to liberalslikeDewey."87
At theotherextreme,
is thebulkofRorty'srecentTanner
however,
Lecture,"Feminismand Pragmatism."88
Therehe statesthatfeminist prophetswitha visionof a betterworld,such as Catherine
MacKinnonand MarilynFrye,mightprofit
from"thinking
withthe
pragmatists."89
Withseemingmodesty,Rortyclaimsthat"All we
[anti-foundationalists]
can do is to offer
feminists
a fewpiecesofspecial-purposeammunition-for
example,some additionalrepliesto
chargesthattheiraims are unnatural,
theirdemandsirrational,
or
theirclaimshyperbolic."90
Rortygoes on, however,to detailthree
much more important
ways that he believesanti-foundationalism
mightbe usefulto feministprophets.First,anti-foundationalism
affords
theseprophets
a wayto conceptualize
theprocessofprogressive social changeand, therefore,
theirjob.91 Second,and related,
anti-foundationalism
equipsthemwitha rhetoric-avocabulary
and
formof argument-for
use withthosetheyare trying
to persuade.92
63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1911,1917(1990).
Afterword,
Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 238.
Id. at 255 n.23.
Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9.
Id. at 237.
9 Id. at 238.
91 Id. at 233-36,238,240-41,246-49.
92 Id. at 236-42.
85
86
87
88
89
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[Vol.78:697
Third,anti-foundationalism
offers
feminist
prophetsa kindofmoral
support.93
Both of Rorty's ratherextremepositionscannot be correct.
claimsfor
Indeed,closeexamination
ofRorty'sthreemoreambitious
anti-foundationalism
findsthemunpersuasive.
First,Rortystatesthatpragmatist
philosophy
mightaid feminist
because
of
and redescribes
politics
thewaytheformer
conceptualizes
social progress:"by substituting
metaphors
of evolutionary
developmentformetaphors
and
of progressively
less distorted
perception,"
theappearance-reality
infavorofa distinc"bydrop[ping]
distinction
tion betweenbeliefswhichservesome purposesand beliefswhich
serveotherpurposes."94
can easilyfittheir
Rortyadds thatfeminists
claim thata new voice is neededintoa pragmatist
view of moral
progress.95
But will prophetsreallyprofitfromconceptualizing
the societal
changetheyadvocateas partofa larger,endlessevolutionary
process?
Not necessarily.For sucha conceptualization
to be useful,it should
somehowmakethe prophet'sworkeasieror moreeffective.
Rorty
does not make a case that this conceptualization,
withoutmore,
wouldbe usefulin thisway. Nor is suchan argument
easyto generate. Indeed,an anti-foundationalist
conceptionof social changeas
evolutionmaydiluteboththeprophet'sbeliefin herownvisionand
hermotivation
to effect
socialchange.It is one thingto believe,as a
prophet
bydefinition
does,thatthestatusquo is neither
necessary
nor
thebestpossiblestateofaffairs;
butit is quiteanotherto believethat
thebetterworldone envisionsand wouldworktowardachievingis
also a contingency,
a mererestingpointin a largerevolution.
Rortyclaimsthatthe recognition
of contingency
underlying
the
anti-foundationalist
conceptionof social changeneednot dilutethe
prophet'ssenseof conviction
in hervision.He arguesthat"a belief
can stillregulateaction,can stillbe thought
worthdyingfor,among
people who are quite aware that thisbeliefis caused by nothing
"96 Perhaps.But the
deeperthancontingent
historical
circumstance.
questionstillremainsas to whetherthisrecognition
of contingency
Id. at 235-36,241-42.
Id. at 234.
95 Id. at 236. This is one pertinent
advantagethatRortyclaimspragmatism
has over
universalism
and realism.Id. at 235-36.
96 Rorty,
supranote3, at 189.
93
94
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1992]
JustDo It
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in anyway. Rortymakesno case
makestheprophetmoreeffective
thatit does.
Rorty'ssecondclaim is thatanti-foundationalism
offers
feminist
prophetsusefulrulesof rhetoric.He suggeststhat feminists
quit
invoking
"an ahistoricist
realism"through
theuse ofphraseslike"in
truth"and "in reality,"
and insteadsee themselves
as creating
a new
languagethroughwhichtheywould simultaneously
be fashioning
whattheydidnotbeforehave:"a moralidentity
as women.
"7 Rorty
promises
thatwithnew,anti-foundationalist
linguistic
practicescome
newsocialconstructs.98
In additionto abandoning
theirold universalist
and realistrhetoric,
Rortysuggeststhatfeminists
shoulduse substantively
different
argumentsin attempting
to persuadeothersto theirview. Feminists,
he
argues,should"drop[] thenotionthatthesubordination
ofwomenis
intrinsically
abominable,drop[] the claim thatthereis something
called'right'or 'justice'or 'humanity'
whichhas alwaysbeenon their
side,makingtheirclaimstrue."99Instead,theyshould"just make
invidiouscomparisons
betweenthe actualpresentand a possible,if
inchoate,future."10This is the onlyformof argument
left,Rorty
notes,when"one seestheneedforsomething
morethanan appealto
rationalacceptability
bythestandards
oftheexisting
community."101
Thereare twoproblemswithRorty'ssuggestions.
As Rortyhimselfacknowledges,
anti-foundationalism
cannotprovideprophets(or
anyoneelse)witha methodforsellingtheirvisions(or doinganything
else): "Thereis no methodor procedure
to be followedexceptcourageousandimaginative
experimentation."102
And,as Rortyalso notes,
theextentto whichmetaphysics
holdsswayin ourworldmeansthat
''practicalpoliticswilldoubtlessoftenrequirefeminists
to speakwith
theuniversalist
vulgar.... 9"103 Indeed,anti-foundationalist
rhetoric
and arguments
wouldseemto be ofquestionable
use to prophets
who
are sellingtheirvisionto a foundationalist
society.
97
and Pragmatism,
Rorty,Feminism
supranote9, at 236-37(emphasisadded).
98 Id. at 236.
99 Id. at 237.
00 Id. at 242.
101 Id. at 239.
102
103
Id. at 242.
Id. at 237.
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[Vol. 78:697
whoarefeeling
discourThird,Rortywouldhavefeminist
prophets
fora kindofmoralsupport.Rorty
agedlookto anti-foundationalism
claimsthatanti-foundationalism
and variantsof politicalradicalism
such as feminism
are compatibleand mutuallysupportive
"because
pragmatism
allowsforthepossibility
ofexpanding
logicalspace,and
thereby
foran appealto courageandimagination
ratherthanto putaIn
tivelyneutralcriteria."1" addition,Rortyurgesfeminists
to have
as we [pragmatists]
faithin theirvisionofa betterworld:"Prophecy,
see it, is all thatnon-violent
can fallback on
politicalmovements
whenargument
fails."105
femiTo be sure,some(ratherintellectual)
nistprophets
maybe bolstered
byRorty'sexhortation.
Butthenwill
notanti-foundationalism
havebecomefortheprophetwhatRortyhas
claimed,withsomedisdain,thatmetaphysical
entities
arefortherealistand universalist:
"something
largeand powerful"
thatis on one's
side and enablesone to keeptrying?"10
In sum,neitherthe visionary
nor the persuasive/political
partof
everyprophet's
job appearsto be aidedbya beliefin anti-foundationalism.107 Certainly
a beliefin anti-foundationalism
seemsneither
necessarynor sufficient
foractuallybecominga prophet.Even Rorty
disclaimsitsnecessity:
arewherever
Prophets
youfindthem.The greatheroes-thepropheticleaders-ineasternEuropenoware a facelessbureaucrat,
anda playwright,
Gorbachev,
Havel.
....
I don'tknowwho our [American]analoguesof Havel and
Gorbachevaregoingto be. ButI doubtverymuchthattheywilltake
theirinspiration
either
fromdeconstruction
orfromneopragmatism.
108
In addition,alreadyimplicit
in Rorty'snotionoftheprophet's
dream
are two of the contributions
that a beliefin anti-foundationalism
mightbe ableto make:skepticism
aboutthestatusquo,andan understandingthatsocialprogress
is notaboutreasoning
fromfirstprinciples,but about responding
to humanneeds,about whatworks(or
mightwork).
104Id. at 242.
105
Id. at 235.
106 Id. at 254 n.21.
107 As Rortydefines
her,a prophethas twochiefcharacteristics:
a visionofa betterworld
and a voiceto describethatdream.Id. at 232.
108Afterword,
supranote85,at 1917-18(emphasisadded).
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JustDo It
1992]
717
forbecominga
Nor is a beliefin anti-foundationalism
sufficient
prophet:Afterall, notall oftheexisting
self-proclaimed
pragmatists
are prophets.
Thus,despiteRorty'sbroaderclaims,he persuadesone ultimately
thatanti-foundationalism
mightbe usefulonlyto especiallyintellecthemselves
tualprophets,
and onlywhentheyneedto extricate
from
philosophical
or theoretical
hassles.Rortyconvincesone onlythatif
highlyintellectual
feminists
and theirprojectin
redescribe
themselves
fromthe"philanti-foundationalist
terms,
theymightfreethemselves
osophical"demandfora "generaltheoryofoppression."109
V.
CONCLUSION
theclaimsofmanylegalscholars,and sometimes
Notwithstanding
RichardRorty,pragmatism
is ofscantuse foralleviating
oppression
in Americansociety.Rorty'sown discussionof progressive
social
on thisscorebecauseit containsbotha prophetic
changeis deceptive
and a processualstrand.And pragmatic
anti-foundationalism
entails
thesubstanceofonlythelatterstrand.Thus,Rorty'sexhortation
to
lookoutformarginalized
as dictatedbyhis
peopleis bestunderstood
prophecy,not his pragmatism.In contrast,Rorty'sdefenseof
Americanpoliticalinstitutions
existing
indicatesneither
conservatism
northeabsenceofa utopianvision;rather,
it is theresultofhispragmatisthistoricism
and acknowledgment
of contingency
in contemplatingthevehiclesforrealizinghisprophecy.
The centralissuethatneither
Rortynorhiscriticshasconfronted
is
whether,
byRorty'sownpragmatist
he showsanti-foundationterms,
alismto be usefulforrealizinghisownutopianvision.I haveargued
in thisEssay thathe does not. EvaluatingRorty'sclaimsforantifoundationalism
by his own pragmatistcriterionof "usefulness"
pointsup twodistinctstrandswithinpragmatism:
anti-foundationalismand instrumentalism.
Andtherewouldnotseemto be anynecessaryconnection
betweenthetwostrands.
As I haveshown,Rortydoes notsupporthis morehopefulclaims
foran anti-foundationalist
culturewithconvincing
explanations
of
how or whythatculturewillbe moreusefulthanour current
metaphysicaloneforachieving
socialchange.Norhas he proprogressive
vided persuasiveevidencethat subscribing
to anti-foundationalism
109Rorty,Feminism
and Pragmatism,
supranote9, at 238.
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718
Virginia
Law Review
[Vol.78:697
willbe ofgreateruse to prophets
thana beliefin metaphysics.
As a
goodpragmatist,
Rortycannottherefore
be surethatanti-foundationalismis preferable
to metaphysics
forrealizinghis-or any otherutopian vision.
In theend,pragmatism
appearsto be usefulin achievingprogressivesocialchangeto theextentthatone profits
fromstatements
such
as, "Thereis no methodor procedureto be followedexceptcourageousand imaginative
experimentation."110
Or, as the Nike people
say,"Justdo it."
110
Id. at 242.
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