MUNUC XXIX
INTERNATIONAL
FEDERATION OF RED
CROSS AND RED CRESCENT
Topic A: Politicization of Aid
Topic B: Building a Localized Response to Crises
EXECUTIVE LETTER
Delegates,
It is my pleasure to welcome you to both this special meeting of the International Federation of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, and to MUNUC XXIX. My name is Jakob Solheim and I will be serving as your
committee chair. I am looking forward to a wonderful weekend with all of you.
To introduce myself a little bit, I am a third year in the undergraduate college at the University of Chicago,
double majoring in Economics and Public Policy. I was born in Rome, but currently hail from Vermont after
living in most of Western Europe at one point or another (although never in England or Norway, where I
would be an actual citizen). Outside of MUNUC, I am also an active participant in ChoMUN, UChicago’s
college MUN conference. Further outside of Model UN, I enjoy reading a good book, debating American
and International politics, listening to interesting people at the IOP, or acting in an inevitably silly play with
University Theater.
As a representative of a national chapter of the IFRC, you will be tasked with solving very nuanced challenges
related to how humanitarian organizations should operate. The issue of politicization of aid is very closely
related to the ethical considerations of humanitarian organizations like the IFRC. Meanwhile, the problem of
establishing a local response to crises has far-ranging implications for how humanitarian organizations might
respond to different disasters or crises in the future.
While prepping for conference, please feel free to contact me with any questions you might have. I would be
happy to talk to you about any questions you have about your delegations, the committee, MUNUC, or the
University of Chicago.
I am looking forward to seeing you all in February.
Sincerely,
Jakob Solheim
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HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was founded upon an ideal that those
negatively impacted by crisis and those who are going through a period of suffering require assistance without
discrimination. (IFRC fundamental principles) In the aftermath of the First World War, the international
community came together to form a coalition to combat human suffering. Led by the American Red Cross,
the League of Red Cross Societies was formed in 1919 (IFRC History) which later became the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 1991.
The IFRC is, at its core, a dual system which oversees both the IFRC and the International Committee of the
Red Cross. While both operate independently at times, they mutually support one another in their mission to
alleviate human misery. Traditionally, the IFRC has the lead role in all situations that do not involve combat
e.g. natural disasters and the ICRC takes lead for humanitarian assistance in combat zones (Red Cross Book).
Together, the overarching brand of the IFRC has conducted many missions in the past, aiding millions of
people worldwide.
As early as its founding in 1919, the IFRC has already been acting on behalf of the world. In August of 1919,
the IFRC was able to raise 99 million Swiss francs to aid Poland which was devastated by hunger (90 years
document). During World War II, the IFRC and the ICRC created joint commissions to aid those affected
by war (ibid). Throughout the rest of the century, wherever disaster struck, the IFRC had some presence from
natural disasters like typhoons in the Indian Ocean, aiding refugees from the Chernobyl disaster, to the
current crises in the Middle East and Africa. As a result of these and other actions, the IFRC was accorded
two distinct honors. In 1963, the ICRC and the League of Red Cross Societies – what the IFRC was known
as then – was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its services and in creating a “cooperation between Red Cross
Societies of different races, creeds, and color [which advances] international understanding and peace” (Nobel
commendation). In October of 1994, the IFRC was granted the status of observer in the United Nations
General Assembly which increased its esteem and power in advancing the interests of the IFRC. (90 years
document)
The IFRC is guided by several principles in its actions. These include impartiality, neutrality, independence,
humanity, unity, and voluntary service. (IFRC principles) These serve to make the IFRC applicable in almost
all situations by not taking a formal position on conflicts and remaining fully autonomous. Each constituent
Red Cross and Red Crescent Society has the responsibility to aid each other in relieving any crisis that occurs
in the world (ibid). This mutual support has been a direct contribution to the success of IFRC and ICRC
missions worldwide. Due to its inherent independence, the IFRC can do almost anything that it desires within
its logistical constraints. If the IFRC has the resources do conduct some action, and as long as the action does
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not contradict a core IFRC principle or produce a net harm, the IFRC is not restricted from carrying out any
substantive course of action.
Apart from its current missions, the IFRC is undergoing a strategic adjustment as it prepares for the future.
To accomplish this, the IFRC holds several strategic aims. First, the IFRC is formulating new assessments to
determine how to prepare and react towards disasters so as to better aid those in need. Second, the IFRC is
endeavoring to increase its food and basic necessity assistance as well as address climate change to increase the
livelihoods of citizens worldwide. Third, the IFRC seeks to increase worldwide autonomy and international
peace such that those who are disadvantaged and those facing crises are able to resolve their issues so as to have
better lives. (IFRC 2020 plan). It is the goal of the IFRC Governing Board to assess these aims as well as all
other aspects of the IFRC to see if they are efficacious and necessary to achieve the IFRC’s mission to eliminate
suffering and misery on a global scale.
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TOPIC A: POLITICIZATION OF AID
Statement of the Problem
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) is founded on seven fundamental principles:
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality1. However, in
recent years the tenants of impartiality, neutrality, and independence have been repeatedly threatened by the
growing perception that the international humanitarian community is an extension of the traditional western
powers, with such a conflation having potentially severe consequences as captured by Walker and Maxwell
when discussing the Canal Hotel bombing—which led to the withdrawal of UN humanitarian workers from
Iraq—with “The attack on the UN compound in Baghdad in August of [2003] … seemed to underline
the widespread perception that the international humanitarian community had sided with Western powers,
making it suspect as well as a legitimate target”2.
This idea that some of the fundamental tenants of traditional humanitarian action are being undermined by
the modern humanitarian system clearly has dire consequences, although it is important to remember—and
this will later be returned to in more detail—that much of the modern political side of humanitarian action
has grown organically from the kinds of crises that humanitarian actors have faced in the last twenty years.
However, before diving into the nature of the proper, an understanding of the current humanitarian model is
needed.
The relevant fundamental principles of the IFRC—which have been adopted by many other major humanitarian
actors—are3:
Impartiality – It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political
opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and
to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.
Neutrality – In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in
hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
Independence – The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the
humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must
1
2
3
“The Seven Fundamental Principles,” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.ifrc.
org/en/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-fundamental-principles/.
Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World (New York: Routledge, 2009), 75.
“The Seven Fundamental Principles”
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always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the Movement.4
In addition to these founding principles, the IFRC are the creators of the 1994 Code of Conduct for The
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, which serves as the most
widely used guide for humanitarian action.5 Items three and four of this code of conduct states that “Aid
will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint” and “We shall endeavor not to act as
instruments of government foreign policy”6.
Clearly, the IFRC—and due to the global leadership of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—and the
humanitarian sector at large, have a strong institutional commitment to neutrality and separating them and
their actions from any political goals. This Statement of the Problem covers each of the ways that humanitarian
neutrality is threatened, exploring how this impacts humanitarian effectiveness through risk to aid workers in
addition to the distrust of humanitarian actors in both the state and local spaces.
Risk to Aid Workers
The IFRC’s humanitarian missions often require their aid workers to be deployed to areas of great danger.
Whether it is a natural disaster crisis response that requires the IFRC’s aid workers to go areas recently affected
by some sort of catastrophe, or a humanitarian crisis that may even put the lives of these aid workers in danger,
there is a significant amount of risk posed to aid workers. This latter situation with a humanitarian crisis can
be incredibly tangled with the problem of the politicization of aid. Parties may be involved in conflicts where
the IFRC has deployed aid workers to carry out their mission of “providing assistance without discrimination
as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions”7. The IFRC has faced difficulties calling on
“all parties to respect the work of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and guarantee the safety of aid workers
and their unimpeded, immediate access to people in need across the country”8. Because the IFRC is often only
involved in the relief efforts of a humanitarian crisis rather than the diplomatic efforts, these aid workers are
often left exposed to the dangers of the situation.
4Ibid.
5
“Code of Conduct,” International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, accessed July 27, 2016, http://www.ifrc.org/en/
publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/.
6Ibid.
7
“Our Vision and Mission.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed November 16. http://media.ifrc.org/
ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
8
“Syria: Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement Deplores Aid Worker Deaths.” 2014. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
November 11. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
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However, this situation also gets complicated when the IFRC or national Red Cross or Red Crescent
organizations involve themselves in the conflict and violate their impartiality, neutrality, and independence. In
these situations, these chapters may take the side of one actor, and endanger themselves and their Red Cross or
Red Crescent aid workers to retaliation from any opposing actors. Despite the humanitarian goal of the IFRC,
the organization must maintain these three guiding principles to minimize the risk to aid workers.
State and Local Distrust of Humanitarian Actors
The state distrust of humanitarian actors is a significant consequence of the politicization of aid because the
effectiveness of humanitarian intervention and disaster relief that is so crucial to the IFRC’s mission is incredibly
reliant on the ability of humanitarian organizations to work independently of state actors. It is therefore
important for humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC to maintain a stable yet distant relationship with
state actors.
Recently, the ICRC itself has had internal reviews, which stated that “military force… as an instrument for
gaining peace is for the Red Cross not applicable”9. One such review by international law expert Jamie A.
Williamson “contends that the integration of humanitarian assistance in efforts to ‘win hearts and minds’
in counter-insurgencies has not been successful”10. In essence, humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC
have struggled to gain the support of local actors in conflict situations, in part because the Red Cross and Red
Crescent (have, in some instances, become associated with western military forces11. These associations have
led to difficulties for the IFRC in maintaining their neutrality, and the IFRC should emphasize that “the focus
should not be on who provides the assistance,
but rather on ensuring that the identified
social, political, and economic programmes are
effectively implemented”12.
Much of the state distrust of the IFRC comes
from the organization’s background with
western countries. As Simon Jenkins of The
Guardian argues, “How can a British NGO
be safely neutral in Syria when Britain’s prime
minister has called for war against the Damascus
9
Williamson, Jamie A. 2011. “Using Humanitarian Aid to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’: a Costly Failure?” International Review of the Red Cross 93 (884).
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-williamson.pdf.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
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government?”13. The IFRC must find ways to distance itself from such politically charged and possibly
inflammatory remarks, or risk further damage to its reputation and the lives of humanitarian aid workers.
Similarly, local distrust of humanitarian organizations stems from a similar issue, where these humanitarian
organizations can seem foreign or otherwise unreliable.
As the IFRC writes in its mission statement, “the only priority that can be set in dealing with those who require
help must be based on need”14. There is an enormous need for the IFRC to avoid the politicization of aid, or
even any suspicion of being politically influenced. The IFRC’s work would be severely impeded if they were to
lose any pretense of impartiality, neutrality, or independence, which explains why the politicization of aid has
become such a problem.
13
14
Jenkins, Simon. 2013. “The Red Cross Needs to Reclaim Its Hijacked Neutrality.” The Guardian, November 1, sec. Opinion. https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/01/red-cross-get-back-hijacked-neutrality.
“Impartiality.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed November 17. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/
ifrc-responsive-footer/.
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History of the Problem
As mentioned in the Statement of the Problem, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC) has a commitment to fundamental principles, including impartiality, neutrality,
and independence. In recent years this commitment has been threatened by a number of things, including (1)
the moral responses of the humanitarian sector, (2) a conflation of military and humanitarian action, and (3)
the modern system of humanitarian financing.
Moral Responses of Humanitarian Sector
“The principles of neutrality. It is a means to an end, a way to bolster impartiality and maximize the possibility
of getting access to those who are suffering. However, it comes at a price. If one side in a conflict is committing
mass atrocities […] is it morally defensible to claim neutrality and not take sides?”15. This is the question facing
all humanitarian actors. When atrocities are witnessed, can humanitarians speak out? How does humanitarian
assistance play into the creation of further crises, especially within the lens of armed conflict—the focus of
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC). From the major traditional actors,
the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement have most strongly advocated for complete neutrality, while major
actors like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) grew out of the desire to speak out more freely.
The MSF is also an international humanitarian organization that operates in disaster relief situations, just like
the IFRC. However, in 1985, the MSF created a political think tank, the Fondation Liberté sans Frontières16. The
creation of the Fondation threatened the neutrality of the MSF by associating the humanitarian organization
with a political actor, even if the think tank was not necessarily linked to any one government17. In the 1990s,
MSF led the way for more politically active humanitarian actors as they called for military action in Somalia,
the Balkans, and the African great lakes region18. These issues only complicate the debate over the role of
humanitarian organizations. Is it more important for such organizations to simply come to the aid of civilians
in conflicts, or should these organizations take up a greater role in addressing the problem behind the conflict?
Conflation of Military and Humanitarian Action
Perhaps the most notable threat to humanitarian aid workers in disaster relief situations are military conflicts.
It is important to consider the role of humanitarian organizations in war-stricken areas, as the role of an
organization like the IFRC is to provide much-needed aid to civilians, rather than take sides in the conflict.
15
16
Peter Walker and Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World, 2-3.
Davey, Eleanor. 2011. “Famine, Aid, and Ideology: The Political Activism of Medecins sans Frontieres in the 1980s.” French Historical Studies 34 (3):
529–58. doi:10.1215/00161071-1259157.
17Ibid.
18Ibid.
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However, a conflation of military and humanitarian action has arisen due to the politicization of aid, a troubling
development for international humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC.
The Syrian Civil War has raged on over the course of the last few years, prompting several humanitarian
organizations to go to the region in order to provide assistance. The IFRC is one of these organizations. From
the onset, there have been several different players in the Syrian conflict, including the Syrian government,
multiple rebel groups that are often divided along religious lines, and the Islamic State in Syria and the Levant
(ISIL). The IFRC has had several issues trying to provide assistance over the course of this conflict, and ICRC
President Peter Maurer has expressed that “it is necessary to create a humanitarian space before negotiating
a ceasefire”19. He has also said that creating safe spaces for humanitarian workers has been difficult and
unsuccessful, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the current system20.
Moreover, it has not just been difficult to create safe spaces for humanitarian workers in Syria, but humanitarian
workers there have encountered many dangerous situations that have impeded their abilities to carry out dayto-day tasks. In September 2016, a military air strike in Syria hit relief trucks, a warehouse, and a hospital in
Aleppo, killing “at least one aid workers and around 20 civilians”21. Subsequently, the ICRC held off further
relief activities in nearby cities, citing the danger towards the humanitarian workers22.
Even worse are the situations where humanitarian aid workers are targeted specifically because of their
backgrounds. In 2014, ISIL carried out a series of kidnappings and graphic beheadings of American and
British journalists and aid workers23. The aid workers, British citizen Alan Henning and American Peter
(Abdul-Rahman) Kassig, were in Syria working for non-IFRC humanitarian organizations24. These incidents
show the high-stakes situations that humanitarian workers can be involved in, where belligerent on either side
of a war can target specific humanitarian organizations or aid workers simply because of their background, in
spite of the work they are carrying out.
The Modern System of Humanitarian Financing
Lastly, the modern system of humanitarian financing often leads neutral and independent humanitarian
organizations to lose that neutral and independent status because of the policies and agendas of their benefactors.
19
Timmins, Joanie. 2014. “Red Cross Official Describes Challenges Facing Humanitarian Organizations.” The Harvard Crimson. April 24. http://www.
thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/24/humanitarian-aid-syria/.
20Ibid.
21
Nebehay, Stephanie, and Tom Miles. 2016. “U.N. Suspends Aid Convoys in Syria after Hit, ICRC Warns on Impact.” Reuters, September 21. http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aid-idUSKCN11Q0W1.
22Ibid.
23
BBC News. 2014. “Alan Henning ‘Killed by Islamic State,’” October 4, sec. UK. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29485405.
24Ibid.
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This is closely tied to the state and local distrust of humanitarian actors, as mentioned in the Statement of the
Problem.
The director general of DARA, “a nonprofit group that monitors the efficacy and quality of Western aid given
to people in developing countries suffering from conflict, disasters and climate change,” said in 2011 that
“Western aid is no longer perceived as neutral, impartial and independent”25. Along the same lines, another
DARA official stressed the importance of separating humanitarian aid and efforts from national security and
foreign political objectives26. In the past, countries have shown a refusal to work with national chapters of
the IFRC that they have not deemed to be politically neutral27. The neutrality of these national branches can
also go too far – the North Korean Red Cross supposedly has 100,000 local members and 300,000 youth
members, and no matter how many members they actually have, infiltration of the North Korean branch by
North Korean secret police is highly suspect28.
Some often perceive humanitarian organizations as funded and driven by the “Christian West”, especially
by those in crisis-stricken regions where Christians do not make up a majority of the population such as the
Middle East29. The repercussions of the “war on terrorism” declared by the United States in the early 2000s
along with significant funding of the IFRC by American sources have eroded the humanitarian space30. As a
consequence, attacks by those non-state actors the United States opposed took place against ICRC delegations
across the Middle East, with one such incident occurring as early as October 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq31.
Given that the politicization of aid has already had a history spanning a few decades, we have enough evidence
to detail the problem at hand. The moral responses of the humanitarian sector, the conflation of military
and humanitarian actions, and the modern system of humanitarian financing have all played some role in
impeding humanitarian actions that the IFRC would like to take. These problems must be addressed in an
effective manner.
Past Actions
A number of actions have been attempted by humanitarian organizations in an effort to minimize the effects
and consequences of the politicization of aid. While many international humanitarian organizations have
identified the politicization of aid as an issue, not all have tried to address it in an effective manner, and even
25
Lee, Young. 2011. “Changing Landscape of Donorship: The Politicization of Aid.” Medill DC. May 25. http://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/
blog/2011/05/25/changing-landscape-of-donorship-the-politicization-of-aid/.
26Ibid.
27
The Economist. 2009. “How Much Evil Can You Not See?,” December 10. http://www.economist.com/node/15066135.
28Ibid.
29
Hazan, Pierre, and Jean-François Berger. 2004. “Humanitarian Action, From Risk to Real Danger.” The Magazine of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement. http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2004_1/4-9.html.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
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fewer have been able to implement useful solutions. It is therefore crucial for the International Federation of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as leaders of the international humanitarian movement, to take the
lead in learning from past successes and obstacles in order to introduce new ideas into the humanitarian space.
ICRC President Peter Maurer, in a discussion with Harvard Kennedy School of Government Professor
Michael Ignatieff, mentioned that it has been difficult for humanitarian organizations to put enough pressure
on countries to create humanitarian spaces in conflict-riddled areas such as Syria32. It has even been difficult
for these organizations to put this sort of pressure on the neighbors of crisis-stricken countries. Historically,
it has been difficult to engage governments involved in conflict to actively participate in discussions around
humanitarian aid, which presents
a major obstacle in trying to make
progress around the coordination in
providing humanitarian aid. While
putting pressure on governments has
not been effective enough to serve as
a reliable solution for humanitarian
organizations, it may be worthwhile to
pursue the idea further.
One politically neutral humanitarian
funding mechanism is the Central
Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
and the country-based pooled funds
(CBPFs) operated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)33.
The UNOCHA solicits funds via voluntary contributions from over 126 countries and private-sector donors,
and creates these two types of pooled funds34.
The CERFs take these pooled contributions and distribute the funds as necessary to humanitarian organizations
that jointly apply for money in times of emergency35. The benefits of CERF include its emphasis on rapid
response, and a structure that prevents humanitarian organizations from being directly associated with aid
until an emergency or crisis actually occurs, and the money is needed to address some issue right away36.
32
33
“Red Cross Official Describes Challenges Facing Humanitarian Organizations.”
“Humanitarian Financing - Overview.” 2016. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Accessed November 18. http://www.
unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/overview.
34Ibid.
35
“Who We Are.” 2016. United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. Accessed November 18. http://unocha.org/cerf/about-us/who-we-are.
36Ibid.
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However, adding an additional layer of bureaucracy whereby humanitarian organizations must be approved to
use this money may lead to a reduction in the efficacy of aid.
On the other hand, CBPFs allocate money towards specific countries that are prone to crises – the first CBPF
was established in Angola in 199537. By 2015, 18 different CBPFs had been established, with 19 member
states contributing to the fund38. The four guiding principles behind the use of CBPFs are the inclusiveness
of partner organizations, flexibility of organizations in addressing sudden crises, timeliness in an effective
response, and efficiency of the response in the transfer of funds in a quick and cheap way while upholding
transparency39. While it is good that not many member states contribute to the fund in the sense that this
avoids strong overtones of the politicization of this fund, there are difficulties involved in the ability of the
CBPF to then have enough money to dispense in times of crises and generate a sufficiently impactful response.
Many of their donations may come from private donor organizations, but these types of single-purpose funds
have many benefits and drawbacks that should both be considered.
These three types of humanitarian funding and action that could potentially decrease the politicization of aid
are by no means perfect solutions. They do, however, provide some sort of structure upon which the IFRC can
begin thinking about ways to avoid associating themselves with political causes and messaging. The important
end goal is to be able to maintain a high level of humanitarian aid available to use in relief situations, which is
yet another task that must be juggled.
Possible Solutions
Now that we have broadly described the problems related to the politicization of aid in the humanitarian space,
we can think about possible solutions to address the issue. These solutions are only guidelines that may assist
in crafting a full resolution, and provide a framework for further ideas to be built.
First of all, it is necessary to address the problems with the modern system of humanitarian financing by
creating alternative funding structures or funding streams. A significant perception problem for the IFRC and
other international humanitarian organizations is that many receivers of aid associate the aid as coming from
traditionally western sources40. However, this bias can lead to a rejection of aid or, worse yet, very dangerous
situations for humanitarian workers. Therefore, the IFRC should consider increasing the usage of some sort
of neutral, third party organization to hold the humanitarian funding for disaster relief situations where their
37
“Country-Based Pooled Funds.” 2016. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Accessed November 18. http://www.
unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40
“Changing Landscape of Donorship: The Politicization of Aid.”
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impartiality, neutrality, and independence are most clearly threatened or compromised41. The problem that
comes with this type of aid is that too much money could be reserved in the fund, creating difficulties in
accessing the resources with immediacy once a disaster or crisis occurs. These alternative funds would never
be able to fully replace the operational funds that international humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC
typically use for their disaster relief situations, but they could instead be used in parallel with these traditional
funds.
Increasing awareness and transparency on the side of both donors and aid recipients could also alleviate
any allegations of unfair play. The natural problem there would be that not all donors would be willing
to be featured so transparently, and this may add an additional layer of bureaucracy for the IFRC to deal
with. A campaign that tries to raise awareness for the IFRC’s apolitical humanitarian aid system could draw
uncomfortable comparisons with military operations that try to the “win hearts and minds” of civilians42.
Because the conflation of military powers and humanitarian actors have already grown to levels that the IFRC
would prefer to be significantly lower, it would be difficult to raise awareness in any traditional methods.
Instead, alternative methods would have to be taken in order to convince governments, on a higher level, and
locals, on a case-by-case basis, to cooperate with the IFRC in their humanitarian missions.
Furthermore, the IFRC needs to establish some way to be able to establish humanitarian safe spaces in conflict
zones in order to maintain safety as well as neutrality over the course of any conflict. The national IFRC
societies must consider several different approaches to allow these spaces to be set up. As established in the
past actions, it has been difficult to pressure governments or even governments of neighboring countries where
conflict is occurring to take action and allow humanitarian workers to avoid the dangers of a conflict43. Given
that the Asia-Pacific and Middle East & Africa regions are where these types of conflicts most often take place,
this committee must create some sort of safeguard for their humanitarian actors.
These are, again, merely some initial considerations that the IFRC should think about when trying to address
the issue of the politicization of aid. Special attention should always be paid to the fact that the countries in
this committee comprise a special subset of the national IFRC chapters that are especially crisis prone, which
means that this issue is especially problematic and complex.
41
42
43
“Humanitarian Financing – Overview.”
“Using Humanitarian Aid to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’.”
“Red Cross Official Describes Challenges Facing Humanitarian Organizations.”
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Bloc Positions
Fragile states44
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Kiribati, Libya, Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Yemen
The nations above have all been categorized as “fragile states” by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD), an alliance of governments dedicated to promoting “policies that will improve the
economic and social well-being of people around the world”45. These fragile states are those that the OECD
has decided are most in need of international aid from both governments and humanitarian organizations.
Some countries are fragile because they are “in crisis, struggle with conflict, or face urgent and critical threats
to human well-being”46. Others are fragile due to “natural disasters and extreme weather events,” which “have
long-lasting impacts on countries with weak institutions”47. Regardless of why they are considered fragile,
these states must utilize the resources of the IFRC but be sure to leverage their need for aid in order to enact
change with the process by which aid comes in. Namely, they should push for processes that leave politics out
of aid and other forms of humanitarian donations.
Once-Fragile States48
Cambodia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Tonga
This bloc consists of those countries that were at one point on the annual list of fragile states compiled by the
OECD. Because these countries have been able to overcome and get past their fragile status, it is important
for them now to guide existing fragile states and use their experiences to ensure propriety in the humanitarian
aid process. Although these countries likely do not give out large proportions of aid, they may still be receiving
humanitarian aid or have experience dealing with the politicization of aid. Therefore, they can inform the body
about how the politicization of aid affected their recovery process.
Western Powers
Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States
These wealthy western nations are often some of the biggest contributors to humanitarian organizations, but
also likely to use humanitarian aid as part of their foreign policy plans. For example, the United States Army has
44
45
States of Fragility 2015. 2015. OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/states-of-fragility-2015_9789264227699-en.
“About the OECD.” 2016. OECD. Accessed November 18. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/economics/
secretary-general-s-report-to-ministers-2016_sg_report-2016-en.
46
States of Fragility 2015.
47Ibid.
48Ibid.
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a Humanitarian Relief branch that addresses earthquakes, explosions, floods, hurricanes, medical emergencies,
snowstorms, tornados, tsunamis, and wildfires49. This clear conflation of the military establishment with
humanitarian aid can sometimes cause problems with how the IFRC deals with neutrality and independence.
Although each of these national chapters of the IFRC have varying levels of involvement with their national
governments, there is an implicit association that could be made simply by virtue of the what these national
chapters represent.
Very Highly or Highly Developed Countries in Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa50
Bahrain, Brunei, People’s Republic of China, Fiji, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Palau, Qatar, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates
The largest and most diverse bloc by far, the countries that constitute this bloc are those that are very highly
or highly developed, according to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2015 Human Development
Index. Looking at their level of development gives some insight into the capabilities and needs of these countries’
national IFRC chapters. Whereas there are some countries in this bloc that are major humanitarian donors,
such as Japan, there are others that are deeply in need of aid as well. These countries can therefore give multiple
different perspectives on how aid should be given in relation to foreign policy, and to what degree the IFRC has
an obligation to morally respond to crises in fragile states or those that are otherwise developing.
Developed Countries in Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Africa51
India, Indonesia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Philippines, Viet Nam
These countries are not yet developed, but at the same time not in a fragile state either. This makes them very
susceptible to receiving insufficient amounts of aid during times of crises, since they are unable to address the
problems themselves, nor are they on the immediate radars of humanitarian organizations. With regards to
the politicization of aid, these countries need to lobby for an effective system in place for them to receive aid
if necessary, but find ways of doing so that avoid any sort of political influence on their developing economies.
49
“The United States Army Humanitarian Relief.” 2016. U.S. Army. Accessed November 18. https://www.army.mil/humanitarian/.
50
“2015 Human Development Report.” 2015. United Nations Development Programme. http://report.hdr.undp.org/.
51Ibid.
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Works Cited
“2015 Human Development Report.” 2015. United Nations Development Programme. http://report.hdr.undp.org/.
“About the OECD.” 2016. OECD. Accessed November 18. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
economics/secretary-general-s-report-to-ministers-2016_sg_report-2016-en.
BBC News. 2014. “Alan Henning ‘Killed by Islamic State,’” October 4, sec. UK. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk29485405.
“Code of Conduct.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed November 18.
http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
“Country-Based Pooled Funds.” 2016. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Accessed
November 18. http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds.
Davey, Eleanor. 2011. “Famine, Aid, and Ideology: The Political Activism of Medecins sans Frontieres in the 1980s.”
French Historical Studies 34 (3): 529–58. doi:10.1215/00161071-1259157.
Hazan, Pierre, and Jean-François Berger. 2004. “Humanitarian Action, From Risk to Real Danger.” The Magazine of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2004_1/4-9.
html.
“Humanitarian Financing - Overview.” 2016. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Accessed November 18. http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/overview.
“Impartiality.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed November 17. http://
media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
Jenkins, Simon. 2013. “The Red Cross Needs to Reclaim Its Hijacked Neutrality.” The Guardian, November 1, sec.
Opinion. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/01/red-cross-get-back-hijacked-neutrality.
Lee, Young. 2011. “Changing Landscape of Donorship: The Politicization of Aid.” Medill DC. May 25. http://dc.medill.
northwestern.edu/blog/2011/05/25/changing-landscape-of-donorship-the-politicization-of-aid/.
Nebehay, Stephanie, and Tom Miles. 2016. “U.N. Suspends Aid Convoys in Syria after Hit, ICRC Warns on Impact.”
Reuters, September 21. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-aid-idUSKCN11Q0W1.
“Our Vision and Mission.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed November
16. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
States of Fragility 2015. 2015. OECD Publishing. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/states-of-fragility2015_9789264227699-en.
“Syria: Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement Deplores Aid Worker Deaths.” 2014. International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies. November 11. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
The Economist. 2009. “How Much Evil Can You Not See?,” December 10. http://www.economist.com/node/15066135.
“The Seven Fundamental Principles.” 2016. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Accessed
November 18. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
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“The United States Army Humanitarian Relief.” 2016. U.S. Army. Accessed November 18. https://www.army.mil/
humanitarian/.
Timmins, Joanie. 2014. “Red Cross Official Describes Challenges Facing Humanitarian Organizations.” The Harvard
Crimson. April 24. http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/24/humanitarian-aid-syria/.
Walker, Peter, and Daniel G. Maxwell. 2009. Shaping the Humanitarian World. Global Institutions Series. Milton Park,
Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.
“Who We Are.” 2016. United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. Accessed November 18. http://unocha.org/cerf/
about-us/who-we-are.
Williamson, Jamie A. 2011. “Using Humanitarian Aid to ‘Win Hearts and Minds’: a Costly Failure?” International
Review of the Red Cross 93 (884). https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-884-williamson.pdf.
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TOPIC B: BUILDING A LOCALIZED RESPONSE TO CRISES
Statement of the Problem
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) is an international body that
looks to “promote at all times all forms of humanitarian activities by National Societies”52. Given the centralized
nature of the IFRC, it is especially pertinent for the body to consider allocating its resources effectively and
towards the most necessary causes at any given time. Within the realm of the humanitarian sector, addressing
issues with crisis response in crisis-prone areas seems to be a logical step in preventing large-scale consequences
from disasters. However, it has proven difficult to coordinate such a response given the limited number of
options international organizations have had in addressing such crises and the overly centralized nature of
many of these organizations53. It is therefore important for an organization such as the IFRC to lead the way in
reforming how it addresses disaster relief in crisis-prone areas, and how to create a sufficient system of localized
responses that utilizes the resources of the central organization while maintaining enough flexibility to quickly
respond to problems as they arise.
This special joint meeting of Asia Pacific and Middle East & North Africa Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies is especially pertinent to this problem of localized responses to crises because these two regions often
require significant attention for disaster relief 54. Due to the structure and organization of the IFRC, these
regional levels oversee the operations of the country-level IFRC societies. Such operations often include the
aforementioned coordination of aid in addition to financial and technical support for the nations under the
umbrella of the overarching regional level55.
On a higher level, the problem with building a truly localized response to crisis in crisis-prone areas begins
with the organization of the IFRC and other humanitarian organizations. The IFRC divides its “customer”
– essentially those bodies and organizations that it services – into two distinct categories: internal customers,
and third party customers56.
These internal customers are comprised of the national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, other offices within
these countries, and country cluster support teams that provide a range of humanitarian aid and development
services57. When considering the problem of building up a localized response to crises, a significant burden lies
upon these internal, individual-facing organizations that carry out much of the actual humanitarian activity
52
“Our Vision and Mission.” 2016. IFRC. Accessed November 13. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
53
Bajoria, Jayshree. 2011. “Improving UN Responses to Humanitarian Crises.” UN Chronicle, December.
54
“Where We Work.” 2016. IFRC. Accessed November 14. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
55
“IFRC Asia Pacific.” 2016. IFRC. Accessed November 14. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
56
“Our Customers.” 2016. IFRC. Accessed November 14. http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc-pages/ifrc-responsive-footer/.
57Ibid.
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that the IFRC funds. It is often difficult to ensure consistency between the different country-level IFRC
organizations, especially when funding is linked to the countries themselves.
The third party customers of the IFRC include government organizations and non-government organizations
(NGOs), United Nations agencies, and other humanitarian agencies58. While interacting with third party
organizations generally increases the amount of resources that can be directed towards a crisis, there is
often a coordination problem involved in that there is a lack of overarching leadership, a lack of effective
communication, and poor operational efficiency59. That being said, attempts have been made to research
methods of decentralizing humanitarian aid in order to avoid the coordination problem and introduce some
level of self-sufficiency60. One such attempt is the increased usage of the Cluster Approach, which designates
a lead agency to organize the logistics behind aid and crises operations in order to reconcile the unity of
government agencies and the diversity of NGOs and other third parties61. The IFRC, one of the largest
humanitarian organizations in the world, must consider the potential impacts and benefits of these third party
organizations when trying to build an effective way to allow for localized responses to such crises.
Furthermore, the United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) itself
detailed a few key issues regarding the modern humanitarian aid system in 201262. The UNOCHA noted
that the number of impactful natural disasters that aid organizations have been responding to have risen
over time, with the number of humanitarian aid workers and the amount of humanitarian aid funding also
increasing63. Perhaps most importantly, the UNOCHA mentions that with the increased number of actors
in the humanitarian aid space, it was important for such organizations to improve the relevance of their aid
and to better address and understand crises in a local context, and to increase communication with people
receiving aid in these contexts64.
Modern day crises include natural disasters such as the devastating typhoons that affect the Asia Pacific region
annually, but also the humanitarian problems seen with the Syrian refugee crisis. Although an organization
such as the IFRC has the resources and broad reach to attempt to address all of these crises, it is difficult to
make a substantial impact across the board without the help of local organizations and the development of a
localized response. Decentralizing aid and investing in or partnering with local organizations has proven to
be a popular solution in recent times, although there are several different issues with local organizations that
58Ibid.
59
Humphries, Vanessa. 2013. “Improving Humanitarian Coordination: Common Challenges and Lessons Learned from the Cluster Approach.” The
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. April 30. http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/1976.
60
Dolinskaya, Irena, Zhenyu Shi, Karen Smilowitz, and Michael Ross. 2011. “Decentralized Approaches to Logistics Coordination in Humanitarian
Relief.” In 61st Annual IIE Conference and Expo Proceedings. Reno, NV, United States.
61Ibid.
62
Petroza, David. 2012. “Humanitarian Issues: How Effective Is the Humanitarian Aid System?” United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs. September 12. http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/humanitarian-issues-how-effective-humanitarian-aid-system.
63Ibid.
64Ibid.
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must be addressed65. Most notably, these local organizations are underutilized as much of the money given
for aid goes towards large international NGOs such as the IFRC66. Without the financial capital necessary
to implement contingency and response plans during a crisis, local organizations struggle to meet their full
potential when they could be most useful. For example, during the 2010 Haitian earthquake, only 0.6% of aid
went towards local aid organizations and NGOs, despite their expertise of the region and local conditions67. In
fact, this 0.6% is still higher than the 0.2% of humanitarian aid given to local NGOs and aid organizations
out of the entire global aid budget68.
Clearly, larger humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC must look towards building up local response
capabilities in order to have a greater impact in crisis-affected regions. The empowerment of local groups that
have an intimate knowledge of crisis-stricken areas is a worthwhile investment for these relatively resource-rich
humanitarian organizations. Sizable organizations such as the IFRC often lack the specialization that these
local organizations have, and bringing them under the fold pays massive dividends when a crisis eventually
strikes.
65
Omar, Manal. 2016. “To Improve Humanitarian Aid, Go Local.” United States Institute of Peace. September 14. http://www.usip.org/
publications/2016/09/14/improve-humanitarian-aid-go-local.
66
Mosselmans, Michael. 2016. “Only a Fraction of Humanitarian Aid Goes through Local Organisations. Why?” The Guardian, February 5, sec. Global
development. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/feb/05/aid-directly-to-local-organisations-more-effective-more-timely.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
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History of the Problem
The need to establish a localized response to crises has arisen through a number of difficult humanitarian
situations. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has been an active
participant in several humanitarian crises and disaster relief situations across the world throughout its history.
By evaluating the problems and inefficiencies involved in these situations, we are able to better understand
some of the underlying problems with an international humanitarian organization such as the IFRC not
actively and effectively cooperating with local humanitarian organizations to respond to a crisis.
One recent humanitarian crisis that necessitated an international response was the 2010 Haitian earthquake.
The effects were devastating, with the earthquake claiming between 230,000 and 300,000 lives69. As such, an
immense amount of resources went into the relief effort: there were $9 billion pledged for aid through both
69
Ramachandran, Vijaya, and Julie Walz. 2013. “Haiti’s Earthquake Generated a $9bn Response – Where Did the Money Go?” The
Guardian, January 14, sec. Global development. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/
haiti-earthquake-where-did-money-go.
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public and private sources70. Official bilateral and multilateral organizations – those that “obtain their funding
from multiple governments and spend it on projects in various countries”71 – pledged $13 billion72.
Despite this incredibly positive and charitable reaction, there were still several operational problems with
how these humanitarian aid organizations attempted to help the people of Haiti. A report by the OECD
noted that “most individual agencies conducted their own needs assessments, but each followed different
standards, methodologies and focus, thus limiting the usefulness of the results for an overall analyses or
strategic planning”73. It is clear that a coordination and communication problem between these large-scale
humanitarian organizations impedes the amount of aid that these organizations can actually provide, even
when they are given the massive amounts of financial resources to address such a problem.
More interestingly to an international humanitarian organization such as the IFRC, the OECD report mentions
that these large organizations often lacked the “contextual analyses (particularly on political and economic
issues) and capacity assessments of Haitian stakeholders (most notably the Haitian government) which would
have allowed the humanitarian community a greater understanding of Haitian social and political dynamics”74.
Identifying that large-scale humanitarian organizations often overlook the details when trying to assess these
different crisis situations, it is incredibly important for the IFRC to create solutions and avoid these sorts of
mistakes in the future by establish some sort of comprehensive system to gain this understanding of social and
political dynamics in affected areas. Naturally, one would imagine that the local and national humanitarian
organizations that normally serve crisis-prone areas like Haiti would have a very nuanced understanding of
such issues, but perhaps lack the resources of a major international organization like the IFRC. Also noted in
the report is that the massive humanitarian organizations that carry out these assessments failed in the Haitian
crisis to consider “the capacities of their natural Haitian partners across government and civil society to engage
with and even lead recovery”75. The prospects of these local and national organizations leading some aspect
of recovery when such large, international players are involved may seem absurd at first thought, but crisis
response and disaster relief efforts rely heavily on information and an understanding of the problem in order to
address the disaster and create a comprehensive, effective solution. While it is extremely important to consider
the speed of responses to these sorts of disasters, “inclusiveness is not necessarily a barrier to speed”76.
The problem of how to involve local disaster relief organizations and respond to these disasters by building
local response capabilities is not limited to developing countries; rather, it is a significant problem in developed
countries as well. Within the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a
70Ibid.
71
“Multilateral & Bilateral Organizations.” 2016. Unite for Sight. Accessed November 16. http://www.uniteforsight.org/global-health-careers/module5.
72
“Haiti’s Earthquake Generated a $9bn Response”
73
Patrick, Jonathan. 2011. “Haiti Earthquake Response: Emerging Evaluation Lessons.” Evaluation Insights 1 (June): 14.
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
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government organization that, as its name suggests, responds to domestic natural disasters and emergencies77.
In recent years, FEMA has seen significant criticism from certain organizations for their failure to sufficiently
respond to domestic crises. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank, described the “increasing
tendency since 9/11 to look to Washington for every answer regarding disaster response” as “troubling”78.
There are striking similarities as well as vast differences between federal government’s disaster relief agency and
an international, non-governmental humanitarian organization such as the IFRC. However, these examples
involving FEMA can be useful for understanding the overarching problem of building a localized response to
crises because they can detail how local disaster relief organizations can be effective in their specializations.
One Heritage Foundation report attributed the success of responding to the 2007 California wildfires to “the
proactive nature of the state and local response”79. There is an analogue to their argument that this smallerscale approach was successful because state and local leaders “took charge of the situation early instead of
waiting for federal officials to address the problem” in a more humanitarian context80. Rather than relying on
these massive international humanitarian organizations to mobilize, there must be some sort of local response
that can provide some level of relief early on.
Similarly, in the aftermath of Hurriance Katrina in 2005, officials throughout all levels of government
were criticized for their slow reaction and lack of effective response on multiple levels81. Another Heritage
Foundation report describes the three-tiered approach to emergency management that the different levels of
government operated on82. The first tier includes local authorities, the second is composed of state authorities,
and the final level is composed of the federal government’s authorities83. It is suggested that a fourth level
of authority be added to this chain, in between the state authorities and federal government’s authorities,
in order to address those crises and disasters that necessitated a more significant response than could be
provided on the state level, but could remain more agile than the overarching federal government84. Again,
we can draw parallels to humanitarian organizations such as the IFRC. The first tier here would be the local,
specialized disaster relief organizations. The federal government or national organizations would be the second
tier. Lastly, international humanitarian organizations like the IFRC would make up the overarching third tier
of humanitarian aid. An emphasis and empowering of regional level organizations, whether through alliances
77
78
“About the Agency.” 2016. FEMA. May 11. https://www.fema.gov/about-agency.
Mayer, Matt A., Richard Weitz, and Diem Nguyen Salmon. 2008. “The Local Role in Disaster Response: Lessons from Katrina
and the California Wildfires.” The Heritage Foundation. June 4. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/
the-local-role-in-disaster-response-lessons-from-katrina-and-the-california-wildfires.
79
Mayer, Matt A., Richard Weitz, and Diem Nguyen Salmon. 2008. “The Local Role in Disaster Response: Lessons from Katrina
and the California Wildfires.” The Heritage Foundation. June 4. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/06/
the-local-role-in-disaster-response-lessons-from-katrina-and-the-california-wildfires.
80Ibid.
81
Rhodes, Jill D., and James Jay Carafano. 2006. “State and Regional Responses to Disasters: Solving the 72-Hour Problem.” The Heritage Foundation.
August 21. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/08/state-and-regional-responses-to-disasters-solving-the-72-hour-problem.
82Ibid.
83Ibid.
84Ibid.
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of second-tier organizations or a subdivision of third-tier organizations, could be a possible implementation
of these problems. The IFRC itself is already divided among regional lines; this committee is organized as a
special meeting of the Asia-Pacific and Middle East & Africa regions. Therefore, the problem here mainly lies
in how to better support these regional-level bodies.
The traditional humanitarian structure has seen its fair share of problems throughout the history of humanitarian
aid, as we have discussed. Looking at certain situations in which the traditional structure has not been fully
successful in the local sphere allows us to identify where these problems come from, and how the IFRC can
address these issues.
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Past Actions
The humanitarian sector has attempted to address operational inefficiencies and improve the quality of crisis
responses in the past. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, in their
coordination with other humanitarian organizations, has participated in a number of initiatives as well as
internal reform in an effort to better address these problems. These past actions vary widely in terms of success.
Given that localized responses and local organizations still face rampant funding and executional issues, there
is much more to be addressed.
One relatively recent method devised to improve coordination amongst humanitarian organizations is cluster
coordination. Also known as the Cluster Approach, cluster coordination tries to emphasize a needs-based
approach to target specific parts of problems in any crisis situations85. This is a significant departure from the
capacity-driven response typically found in disaster relief situations, where several organizations with the same
capabilities broadly try to address each part of the problem.
As it relates to building a localized response to crises, the Cluster Approach offers an alternative to traditional
disaster relief methods by creating “clusters” of different humanitarian organizations that each specialize in
a certain portion of the relief effort86. Because these clusters are created when clear humanitarian needs are
85
“Cluster Coordination.” 2016. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Accessed November 15. http://www.unocha.org/
what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination.
86Ibid.
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required within a certain sector, there is a clear role for local or regional organizations to play a role within
humanitarian aid and crisis response87.
Oxfam International, a fellow humanitarian aid organization, has identified the importance of empowering
local leadership as an effective route to empower smaller-scale humanitarian organizations88. Oxfam has done
so to some degree of success, noting that they try to work with these smaller partner organizations to reinforce
their causes and activities and make them more resilient. Such programs have taken place with small-scale
organizations in Peru, Haiti, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, and the Philippines89. The types of causes range
from flood prevention to emergency relief following a natural disaster, and even drought and climate change
problems90. Because less than 2 percent of global humanitarian assistance goes to these local organizations, it
is critical for larger organization such as Oxfam and the International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red
Crescent Societies to be able to reallocate their resources to provide this assistance91.
Christian Aid, a British humanitarian organization, also noted the importance of working closely with partner
organizations to build resilience on a local and regional level. Notably, they warn “working through partnerships
can only build on and benefit from local capacity when there is a genuine commitment to cooperation and
shared responsibility,” emphasizing that partnerships are not a catch-all, perfect solution92. In fact, they claim
that insufficient investment and collaboration between partner organizations can actually impair disaster relief
and crisis response efforts93. They cite their organization’s experiences in India, the Philippines, Kenya, Burkina
Faso, Malawi, and Burma, and create a framework of three main changes to address: a change in practice, a
change in global perspective, and a change in funding, coordination, and attitude94. A change in practice would
involve the establishment of guidelines and best practices for collaboration between humanitarian organizations.
A change in global perspective would require buy-in from higher-level international organizations such as the
United Nations, in order to make more sweeping reforms. Finally, a change in funding, coordination, and
attitude requires donor awareness of inefficiencies in the operations across humanitarian organizations.
Oxfam and Christian Aid jointly worked on a report about the role of state actors in the humanitarian conflict in
South Sudan, along with fellow British humanitarian aid organizations CAFOD, Trócaire, and Tearfund95. The
87Ibid.
88
“Rethinking Humanitarian Aid: The Power of Local Leadership.” 2016. Oxfam International. Accessed November 15. https://www.oxfam.org/en/
rights-crisis/rethinking-humanitarian-aid-power-local-leadership.
89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
92
Nightingale, Katherine. 2012. “Building the Future of Humanitarian Aid: Local Capacity, Partnerships in Disasters and the Future of Emergency Aid.”
Christian Aid.
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95
Tanner, Lydia, and Leben Moro. 2016. “Missed Out: The Role of Local Actors in the Humantarian Response in the South Sudan Conflict.” Christian
Aid, CAFOD Trócaire, Oxfam GB, Tearfund. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rr-missed-out-humanitarian-response-southsudan-280416-en.pdf.
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consortium of organizations mention in their recommendations that the most successful partnerships between
humanitarian organizations are those where the local and the international organizations have complementary
specializations, and those that have seen long-term investments from both parties96. Their research also found
that having national or local actors involved in the disaster relief process was fundamental to “improving the
sustainability of interventions and resilience,” further emphasizing the importance of building a localized
response to crises97. In the case with South Sudan, the report noted that despite targeted efforts to encourage
a localized response, the imbalance of power between large, international humanitarian organizations and
local organizations has created significant problems in the relief space98. Furthermore, they also address the
importance of complementary work (similar to cluster coordination and the Cluster Approach) rather than a
broad, catch-all response. However, they note the difficulties in getting organizations to participate in this type
of approach because humanitarian organizations too often prioritize immediacy and “the short-term value of
money”99.
These past efforts to improve the coordination between international humanitarian organizations such as the
IFRC and smaller, national or local humanitarian organizations have, again, seen varying levels of success.
Clearly, these attempts at rectifying such a complex problem have at the very least provided some sort of
baseline from which future actions can be developed.
Possible Solutions
Several possible solutions are in play to address the lack of structure put in place for the humanitarian
organizations dedicated to specific local or regional crises. A large humanitarian organization with an
international footprint like the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies comes
with a significant amount of resources and leadership. However, this wealth of resources must be reconciled
with the dearth of resources and small scale of current localized responses to crises.
A successful resolution will address partnerships between the IFRC and the regional and local organizations,
but also note the problems of these existing partnerships. It is extremely difficult for an organization like the
IFRC to establish enough local branches in crisis-prone areas that can sufficiently provide an effective response
in a disaster – that would require the IFRC to spread itself and its resources too thin, even with the scale of the
organization. Nevertheless, the IFRC would possibly be able to establish a presence in these local areas through
a combination of major local branches and partnerships with reputable local humanitarian organizations. As
mentioned before, it is important for these partnerships to remain effective. Doing so might require some sort
96Ibid.
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
99Ibid.
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of long-term investment between the partner organizations, and ineffective partnerships in name only should
be avoided100.
Additionally, the IFRC could be partnering with a number of different organizations across multiple countries
and regions, so it is important to establish a framework on which these partnerships are built. Some sort of
consistency should be built into a partnership structure, so that some minimum expectations can be met
by all partner organizations. Although it is easy to say that there are expectations the IFRC should have
from all partners, the final resolution should be careful to consider the relative lack of resources many local
humanitarian organizations have compared to the IFRC to figure out what arrangements would best utilize
the resources of the IFRC with the specialized knowledge of the local institutions.
Furthermore, the IFRC itself should consider how to provide itself with the institutional knowledge that
these smaller, local humanitarian and disaster relief organizations have. These local organizations are far more
agile than the IFRC, which may have to go through much more bureaucracy to carry out the same tasks.
Similarly, knowledge may be acquired and distributed across the distribution more slowly for an international
100
“Building the Future of Humanitarian Aid”
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humanitarian organization than for a specialized local organization. Delegates should attempt to address
bridging this gap and lessening this discrepancy to allow the IFRC to react to different crises in the appropriate
ways.
Lastly, the IFRC should also take a targeted approach, rather than a blanket approach, and discuss how to
decide which crisis-prone areas should be prioritized when using these new processes of building resilient local
responses to crises, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific and Middle East & Africa regions.
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Bloc Positions
Bloc 1: Acceptors of Aid
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Samoa,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tuvalu, Tonga, Vanuatu, Yemen
As countries that have suffered recent natural disasters or on going armed conflict, the members of this block
are in greatest need of aid from the IFRC. The countries that have been crippled by continued armed conflict,
such as Syria, are unlikely to be in a position to institute any reforms in how they accept foreign aid; the
governmental infrastructure just doesn’t exist. Instead, Syria would look to the IFRC proper and other NGOs
in order to ensure that their populace finds the proper care; a third party costumer would be able to avoid
much of the governmental bureaucracy and still be effective. By working with third party humanitarian
organizations unstable governments would also be scrutinized much less, which has distinct advantages in a
time of war.
Other countries in this bloc are not faced with war, but are often ravaged by natural disasters. Thus, they tend
to be more stable politically and can be at liberties to set up regional relief organizations. For example, the
Solomon Islands have a long-standing agreement with Caritas Australia to provide, along with disaster relief
aid, education, and sanitation and water101. Similar countries would also be interested in setting up their own
disaster response teams and coordinating local response.
Bloc 2: Regionally Significant Countries
Bahrain, Cambodia, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Kiribati, Laos, Maldives, Micronesia, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Timor Leste
Members of this bloc are in regions where natural disasters or armed conflict have happened or are ongoing.
Some, such as Micronesia, are often ravaged by typhoons and tsunamis, while others, such as Iran, are in
regions of extreme political instability. Still, these countries are stable and, though they may still receive
significant amounts of aid, have taken on the burden of refugees themselves. Their proximity to violence and
disaster would likely force members of this bloc to think critically about setting up local disaster relief. Indeed,
making emergency responses as effective as possible should be their top priority. Specifically, they would ask
for funding and collaboration on local non-profit organizations to prepare for any possible disasters.
101
Caritas Australia, “Solomon Islands,” accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.caritas.org.au/learn/countries/solomon-islands.
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Bloc 3: Major Aid Donors
Australia, Belgium, Brunei, China, France, India, Japan, New Zealand, RoK, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE,
UK, USA
On the other side, the countries that give the most aid would be the ones that push most aggressively for an
efficient structure to administer the relief. As is previously discussed, allowing local agencies to administer the
aid provides a framework for eliminating corruption and the expertise of local programs makes it so that the
aid has a wider effect. Historically, the IFRC has been the medium between foreign governments and local
relief organizations and these countries will be looking for ways to make that connection stronger. For example,
Australia has already been strengthening ties between its local red cross and others, such as in Kiribati102. This
has allowed funding and aid to go directly to that island nation when it is in need. Other countries should look
to establish similar connection or at least develop an infrastructure facilitation the establishment of regional
support.
Bloc 4: Neither Receiving Nor Giving Aid
DPRK, Fiji, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam
The final block consists of countries that are not in a position to dedicate much of their budget to aid but
have also not been in recent need of aid. Thus, their opinions on the matter will be less cohesive and would
likely just align with their closest allies. On the other hand, these countries would surely benefit from a more
effective system of aid and would likely look to create ties with third party organizations that could help them
in times of need.
102
Australian Red Cross, “Kiribati,” accessed November 17, 2016, http://www.redcross.org.au/kiribati.aspx.
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