Diamond Intelligence Briefing
By Chaim Even-Zohar
Vol.32  No.873 N7 April 2016
EXCLUS
Inside: A
IVE
convers
Betrayal of Trust
a t io n w
it h N a n
ava
ti
Uncovering Police Corruption
in the Belgium Diamond Sector
I
n every society there are some who commit crimes. An
investigative free press will not hesitate to expose those
individuals and companies. All of us trust and rely on
law enforcement institutions to make sure that those
who violate laws are held accountable – and pay the
price (including removal from society through prisons or
death penalty). The police are there to ensure that the
law is upheld – in fact, they represent the law, they are
the face of the law. If the police themselves violate laws,
fabricate evidence, make false arrests, use their power
to extort, society cannot function. People start to fear the
police – they may even feel compelled to take the law
into their own hands.
In recent years, many diamantaires in Antwerp have
lost their trust in those whose sole task it is to police the
diamond sector. One sensed that there were corrupt
elements in the diamond police. That there were policemen
who broke their social contract and abused their power
for personal gain. Some diamantaires and companies
became victims – some went bankrupt as their inventories
had been arbitrarily and unnecessarily seized.
Writing about this police corruption is seen as “taboo”
– lest it might badly reflect on the industry. But keeping
silent makes matters worse – by being open and honest
about it, the fear of “coming forward” will evaporate, the
discussion will be moved to seeking remedies and on how
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 1
Uncovering Police Corruption
to go forward. Seeing that the police are not considered
above the law will restore the trust that has been lost and
renew the social contract between citizens and the police.
The sole purpose of this article is to somewhat advance
that objective – and make sure it remains on our agenda
until trust is fully restored. Or, as one Antwerp diamantaire
reflected: “to make sure that we preserve Antwerp as
the most attractive diamond center for our children.”
J
ust a few days before the horrendous
Brussels terrorist attack, which
captivated the public worldwide, there was –
totally unrelated, of course – another shocking
event that escaped the limelight: the longstanding Antwerp Federal Police Commissioner and Head
of the Diamond Squad, Agim De Bruycker, suspected of
various alleged corruption and falsification of document
charges, was arrested for a second time. He is currently
held in custody.
Flemish newspapers referred to him as the “Horror of
the Diamond Sector” (Verschrikking) or the “Fright” of
diamantaires. The federal diamond squad he heads
employs some 16 investigators, some of which have been
questioned as well.
Questions without Answers
Why did the government fail to adhere to the best
“practice of rotation”? Why does such a highly sensitive
position not have term limits? Is it possible that the alleged
crimes now attributed to De Bruycker could have been
committed without cohorts? If lower police officers see
that “their boss” gets away with it, isn’t this seen as a
“license” to do likewise?
What troubles most is the question of whether this
is a situation of a lone cop that allegedly strayed, or
is De Bruycker a symptom of a much wider systemic
institutional or societal problem. There is an
overriding concern that nobody wants to
raise in public – and even my sources whisper
when they talk about, as if they themselves
are afraid to hear it out loud: How much
has law enforcement corruption potentially
damaged the Belgium diamond sector over time and
in what ways? How often has there been miscarriage
of justice, if at all? What has it done to the traditional
integrity of the sector in Antwerp and beyond? With
some hesitations, some of these issues will be addressed
here – though answers may not be conclusive. Maybe
they never will.
The ‘Horror of the Diamond Sector’
Pressures to Get Convictions –
Rather Than the Truth
De Bruycker’s first arrest took place in March 2015
– and he remained in prison for three months. He was
released on certain conditions and suspended from
the police force for the duration of the investigation. His
lawyer, advocate Gert Warson, said at the time that his
client was innocent and that there was no incriminating
evidence against him.1 Now, exactly a year after his first
arrest, De Bruycker is again behind bars. Around the same
time as De Bruycker’s second arrest, four other Antwerp
policemen were jailed on suspicions of theft and extortion
of foreigners in Antwerp, not necessarily diamond-related.
In terms of hierarchy, Agim De Bruycker holds the
second highest rank in the Belgium Federal Police Corps.
Only the Chief Commissioner is above him. De Bruycker
has been involved, or initiated, virtually every criminal
case in Belgium involving diamonds for the past 22 years!
As an investigative journalist in the diamond sector, I
myself have more than once been in contact with Agim
De Bruycker. He was always helpful and correct – we
had some frank discussions. Not so
long ago there was a court case
involving fraud at the HRD grading
lab in Antwerp. The principals of
three innocuous small Indian-owned
Antwerp firms quickly confessed,
signed convictions, and, I gather,
they are now either in jail or awaiting
sentencing.
Agim De Bruycker
It has always been my belief,
based on my own journalistic sleuthing, that these
companies merely acted as straw intermediaries, almost
like “couriers” between major (criminal/industry) players
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 2
Uncovering Police Corruption
and the lab. The three companies were ostensibly buying
and selling the stones submitted to the lab to create a
smoke screen and distance the real perpetrators.
At the time, I remember a conversation with De
Bruycker from which I understood that he may have had
his own reservations, but he dismissed these concerns. He
basically said (and I quote from memory): Chaim – I am
a policeman. I have three signed confessions. This rarely
happens. I don’t need more. End of story.
I realized then that De Bruycker was under tremendous
pressure to deliver, to bring cases to court that lead
to convictions. The thought crossed my mind that
these “couriers” may actually have been, or will be,
compensated for taking the fall. I still think so.
The Questionable Diamond
Investigative Mechanism
However, De Bruycker is not a “one man show.” The
decision-making process is shared. In the complex judiciary
system, police investigations are accompanied and guided
by an “investigative magistrate” or “investigative judges.”
(One must differentiate between judges adjudicating
cases in court and the law officers who work in the
Question marks around the entire
diamond investigative mechanism are
anything but new.
Prosecutor’s Office, who essentially bring prosecutions.)
In recent years, one investigative “diamond magistrate”
has been Peter van Calster, who has a reputation of being
a relentless (and feared) investigator in the diamond
sector. In recent months, he has not been in the news,
but Van Calster’s own office also faced some kind of
investigation a few years ago. Question marks around
the entire diamond investigative mechanism are anything
but new. This is alarming indeed.
It’s a strange system, at least to outsiders. A few
years, ago DIB published an exposé on an allegedly
fraudulent bankruptcy in Canada, with links to a diamond
conglomerate with offices in New York.
We reported that a Belgian insurance
company, Coface, had insured the
diamond company that had supplied
diamonds that remained unpaid and/
or had gone missing.
What I later found out was that
Coface had actually made an official
payment to the Prosecutor’s Office
to finance a police investigation.
(Something like €50,000 or €75,000.)
rePeter
tslaC van
nav Calster
reteP
With this money, Commissioner De
Bruycker and an Investigative Judge
could travel to New York and Canada to collect additional
evidence of a possible insurance fraud.
It’s puzzling. In what justice system must a victim of
crime finance the criminal investigation conducted by
the police? At the time of Commissioner De Bruycker’s
arrest, March 2015, his investigation into the insurance
case was about to be completed. Just a coincidence?
The file apparently remains open…
De Bruycker’s and Abhay Nanavati’s Arrests
The timing of the arrest was bewildering. In January 2015
and before, Commissioner De Bruycker had reportedly
exchanged some $12,000 at an official currency exchange
at the Falcon Square in Antwerp.2 (Apparently, he had
frequented that exchange before, and reports suggest
a total money exchange of €70,000.3] Nobody should
have known better that such transactions, especially if
they seem suspicious, would be reported to the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) – called CTIF-CFI in Belgium – which
investigates money laundering suspicions. Indeed, they
reAntwerp
tslaC navDiamond
reteP
Bourse Trading Floor
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 3
Uncovering Police Corruption
were. These currency transactions constituted a formal
excuse to conduct a search of De Bruycker’s home, where
€50,000 in cash and about half a million euros worth of
diamonds and gold were discovered and confiscated.
But as these reports had been made a considerable time
earlier, why did they wait until late March to conduct
the search?
When interrogated, and after giving at first some clearly
unconvincing explanations, De Bruycker then declared
that he was keeping these diamonds on behalf of a
friend, Abhay Nanavati, a member in
good standing of the Antwerp Diamond
Bourse. Nanavati was then arrested and
parts of his stocks were seized. He was
released from jail after a month – and
no charges were filed. Some newspaper
articles reported at that time that some
of Nanavati’s stocks were held by De Bruycker, ostensibly
because Nanavati feared that banks might seize his goods,
or because he dreaded a raid by tax authorities. The
reports say that the police don’t consider this explanation
plausible. So far Nanavati has remained silent. Today he
spoke up and talked to DIB. [His views appear on page 7.]
Encouraging Industry Reaction to Exposures
Over the years, diamantaires complained that seizure
of diamonds by Agim De Bruycker and his colleagues is
a scary and destructive process. Says one interviewed
diamantaire: “Literally or figuratively at gun-point, all
diamonds are wiped from the tables, are emptied from
a diamantaire’s vaults, all put together in large bags
which then are closed. Often there is no precise weighing
– or precise recording of each stone. Essentially, any
Antwerp Diamond Bourse
investigation may start with seizing the stocks. Questions
will be asked later…. At that very moment, the diamond
company ceases to operate. One will go bankrupt even
if, a few years later, the case is totally dismissed by the
court.”
The resolute actions by law enforcement against
one of their own most favorite sons – and the apparent
determination to get to the bottom of this – have
resounded positively throughout the Antwerp industry.
Many diamond industry players lost their “fear” of the police
and had the courage to break the “code
of omerta” – a code of honor that places
importance on silence, non-cooperation
with authorities, and non-interference in
the illegal actions of others.
This – and the fact that De Bruycker’s
case is now being thoroughly investigated
– is possibly the best thing that has happened in the
Antwerp diamond sector in the last few years – and may
be a turning point decisive for its future.
This has led to a myriad of new revelations (or has
given renewed impetus to earlier suspicions) to advance
police investigations in the possible switching of seized
diamonds while in police custody. While the Commissioner
was behind bars, police investigators carefully checked
the seized diamonds still held in the vaults of the Diamond
Squad. According to published reports, irregularities were
found in the procedures applicable to safe-keeping, and
at least one seized parcel has raised questions.4
The positive reactions ought to be seen as just another
momentum in a steady “mentality change” trend. The
adoption of anti-money-laundering and anti-terroristfinancing (AML/CFT) laws made the reporting of suspicious
activities in the diamond sector mandatory. But the Belgian
diamantaires – and maybe not only them – feared getting
involved with the police. To put it bluntly, many in the
industry feared the Belgian police.
Diamond Dealers Rarely Reported
Suspicious Activities
In 2011, the CTIF-CFI received a total of just over twenty
thousand disclosures from financial and non-financial
enterprises, professions and entities subject to suspicious
reporting requirements. Of these, there were only six (i.e.,
0.03%) directly from diamond dealers. In the two previous
years, there had been one report annually. In the seven
years between 2005-2012, the CTIF-CFI reported that a total
of 10 reports were received from diamond dealers. This is
next to nothing. (Of course, there were more diamondDiamond Intelligence Briefing 4
Uncovering Police Corruption
related disclosures, as banks, money exchangers, and
foreign FIU’s also report suspicions involving diamonds.)
The Antwerp World Diamond Centre (AWDC)
management recognized that, and devised a system
to give comfort to an informer while ensuring that the
information would reach the appropriate authorities.
They correctly read the mood of the industry: They want
to assist in fighting corruption – if they trust the mechanism
with which to do so.
Explains AWDC’s Head of Communications Karen
Rentmeesters: “In 2013, together with police authorities,
we took the initiative to set up a dedicated SPOC – Single
Point of Contact – within AWDC, aimed at lowering the
threshold for people in the Antwerp diamond community
to report all sorts of suspicious activities, ranging from
security awareness, (cyber-)crime, unusual behavior,
fraud, etc. The SPOC functions as a trusted go-between,
and information gathered through this SPOC can be
forwarded to the relevant authorities. This approach has
proven to be successful.”
No More Tolerance for Fraud
Its success rate can only be understood if it is realized
that SPOC basically started from a zero base. Says Karen
Rentmeesters: “The number of reports increased from 83
in 2013 to 257 in 2014, and no less than 490 reports were
filed last year [by diamond dealers]. This initiative and
the exponential increase in reports demonstrate that the
Antwerp diamond community is committed to increase
the level of transparency.”
It is hard to argue otherwise. One must add, however,
that out of these reported cases, only a few actually
lead to a referral to the judiciary.
And some of the cases that are
being adjudicated are eventually
dismissed by the court.
But it does indicate that
the overwhelming majority of
the industry itself clearly has no
tolerance any more for fraud
and is willing to take active steps
to protect themselves and their
AWDC’s Head of Communications
colleagues. The AWDC has taken
Karen Rentmeesters
additional welcome initiatives
(seminars, AML helplines, compliance education, etc.),
but that’s for a different story at another time.
De Bruycker’s Expanded Investigation
Let’s get back to the De Bruycker investigation. It has
recently been expanded to
the United Nations in New
York, probing his activities
while serving on the UN
Panel of Diamond Experts
for Ivory Coast. His recent
arrest seems to be related
to discrepancies between
the amounts of moneys he
actually received from the
reAWDC
tslaC naCEO
v retAri
eP Epstein
UN and the amounts he
said he was paid. More about that later. De Bruycker is
apparently not cooperating with his interrogators.
He seems to be the only one sticking to the code of
omerta. Who is he protecting? Or, worse, of whom is the
“Horror of the Diamond Industry” himself afraid?
Economic Impact of Police Corruption
What is more important to us is wondering what all of
this means for the Belgian diamond sector. Past and Future.
A popular Belgium best-seller is a 231-page book titled
“Everybody Does It!” It’s about tax evasion in Belgium.
The author, Professor (and fiscal expert) Michel Maus in
a quite humoristic way explains that “the cheapest way
to paint the facade of your house white is in black.”5 He
The resolute actions by law enforcement
against one of their own most favorite sons
– and the apparent determination to get
to the bottom of this – have resounded
positively throughout the Antwerp industry.
estimates that 20% of the Flemish labor force works wholly
or partly in the black. The hotel and restaurant business,
the construction sector, the harbor work, are cited among
the principal participants in the black (shadow) market.
According to European Union research reports, Belgium’s
shadow economy amounts to €61 billion – or 16.8% of
GDP.6 In fact, that isn’t bad. In the 27 euro members,
fourteen states have larger black economies measured
in terms of their respective GDP.7 The diamond sector is no
better or worse than the rest of Belgium from a taxation
perspective.
Tax evasion is defined by the EU paper as “any paid
activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not
declared to public authorities.” Corruption, the way the
public perceives it, refers to bribery, extortion, fraud,
smuggling, etc.
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 5
Uncovering Police Corruption
Fundamentally, Belgium is not seen as a corrupt
country. Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI), which relates to the degree
to which corruption is perceived to exist among public
officials and politicians by business people and country
analysts, ranks Belgium as the 15th cleanest out of 174
rated countries. CPI scores range between 100 (highly
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Belgium gets a score of 76.
From a diamond world perspective, Belgium is followed
by Hong Kong, United States and the UAE. (South Africa
ranks as the 44th country from the top (CPI 44) and India
far lower as number 85 (CPIU 38). Angola, Zimbabwe
and the DRC are rated as the highest corrupt countries.)
The scale of the scourge is huge. Sixty-eight percent of
countries worldwide have a serious corruption problem.
Half of the G20 are among them. Not one single country,
anywhere in the world, is corruption-free. So it’s important
keep things in perspective.
Corruption is generally associated with (illegal or
vulnerable) businesses that seek to operate securely
(“protection”) by paying off the police, politicians, and
judges (or to have “profit sharing schemes”) – but it isn’t
a one way street. Businesses – and, for various reasons,
especially the diamond sector – are also vulnerable to
extortionary demands. Law enforcement authorities,
ranging from the police to prosecutors and even judges
– can demand bribes to overlook criminal law violations
and limit penalties.
Businesses – and, for various reasons,
especially the diamond sector – are also
vulnerable to extortionary demands. Law
enforcement authorities, ranging from the
police to prosecutors and even judges –
can demand bribes to overlook criminal
law violations and limit penalties.
In the current situation, this certainly is something that
warrants considerable attention at the highest levels
of government. In a wider context, writes an expert,
“corruption is a symptom that something has gone wrong
in the management of the state. Institutions designed to
govern the interrelationship between the citizen and the
state are used instead for personal enrichments and the
provision of benefits to the corrupt.”8
Extortion is different from what euphemistically are
called “facilitation payments” – moneys paid to expedite
a service one is legally entitled to. Not so long ago,
these (illegal) facilitation payments were a recognized
tax deductible expense in some countries. Extortion is
something else. It is paid to get the recipient of the money
to conduct a crime in return. In corrupt environments there
is a pervasive fear, also by good and decent companies,
of frivolous and false arrests. That’s reportedly the reason
why the other policemen were arrested in Belgium (around
the same time De Bruycker was locked up again.) In return
for payments, it is alleged, illegal foreigners would not be
arrested or deported. It’s a relief that these betrayers of
the public trust were caught.
The fear of illegal or unwarranted arrests is real,
especially in the diamond world – and not only in Belgium.
It may create reputational damage, panic among workers,
questions by banks, and many other nasty spillover effects.
The knowledge that one has “nothing to hide” gives little
comfort if there is no trust in either the investigation or
the legal process in general. In such situations, innocent
people can justify to themselves making a payoff only to
avoid greater damage and harm. But the moment they
do so, they are totally at the mercy of the “bribed official”
and he may come back demanding (extorting) more.
De Bruycker’s Impact Beyond Borders
Recently, in a public statement, largely ignored, the
OECD monitoring (working) group on the implementation
of anti-bribery measures found that Belgium is failing
in its “reform of the limitation period applicable to the
foreign bribery offence, private sector whistleblower
protection and the allocation of adequate resources to
law enforcement and judicial authorities to prosecute
transnational bribery, notably given the important
caseload linked to transnational corruption cases involving
European officials referred to the Belgian authorities by
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 6
Uncovering Police Corruption
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).”9
The OECD concerns are not really a newsworthy event
– it almost seems routine. Three years ago, the organization
bluntly concluded that “fighting foreign bribery is not
a priority in Belgium. Together with the flagrant lack of
resources for Belgian law enforcement authorities, this
has resulted in very few foreign bribery investigations and
prosecutions. In the 14 years since the entry into force of
the foreign bribery offence in Belgium, only one case of
bribery of foreign public officials has been concluded.”10
Transnational bribery is seen as an opaque reference
to the special relations between rough dealers and
heads of state, members of their family, the political
elites, military and other key officials – including Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) “gatekeepers” – in
various African countries. In the cases in which there were
sentences handed down within the diamond sector,
they often focused on “foreigners” – dealers from Afro-
Lebanese origins, some Indians and Israelis.
Call it pragmatism, hypocrisy or realism, depending
with whom one talks, looking “the other way” often seems
the preferred course – but even this comes at a price.
Commercial and economic interests need to be protected
as well – in this, Belgium is no different than many other
diamond countries.
In a way, that may have been inevitable. Belgium,
which is still seen as the world’s largest rough diamond
trading center, has a close relationship with virtually all
African diamond-producing countries. Historically, from
the world’s very first diamond discoveries up to 2015,
63.5% by volume, and 58.5% by value of all diamonds
ever mined have come from Africa. According to a
recent study, from the beginning of mining, some 5.15
billion carats were unearthed and the lion’s share of the
cuttable parts were historically – and still today – marketed
through Antwerp.11
- continues on next page
Abhay Nanavati: “I helped De Bruycker with diamond valuations.”
A
bhay Nanavati apparently is a man who likes to keep his finger on the pulse of
what is happening in the world and how it impacts the global diamond industry.
He is administrator and one of the most active participants on a closed group chat
on social medium “Telegram” where some 200 industry members share news and
information on a daily basis. Following are extracts from a spontaneous conversation.
DIB: Some newspapers hinted that you may have been a corruption victim yourself
who was pressured to do certain things. Your name appears on the CD-ROM disk with
the names of account-holders with the HSBC bank. Agim de Bruycker was in charge
of the HSBC investigations. That made you vulnerable to pressures. Is there any truth to this?
Nanavati: Absolutely not. De Bruycker didn’t force me to do anything. The diamonds found in his house were all
mine, and I am glad that the police also realized that and that I was released without any charges being filed.
DIB: So why did you give him these goods?
Nanavati: Well at that point in time I had a family problem, this was all more than two years ago, and I thought
that this would be the best place for me to keep the diamonds. Obviously, I couldn’t keep them in the office
or give for safe-keeping to other family members. In Indian family situations many family companies are owned
jointly and that may cause problems. You know, everyone wants to have his own business. Family trouble.
DIB: So you were concerned that banks could seize these goods?
Nanavati: Yes, I had problems with my uncle, with my cousins, yes I was worried about that.
DIB: But didn’t you have your own issues with the banks?
Nanavati: It is true that many years ago I faced some financial problems. That was in a company called
Precidiam N.V. that was closed years ago. But I have overcome these problems and I have paid all my debts to
the banks. I had also guaranteed debts of my uncle with the Bank Leumi in New York, and I paid these as well.
DIB: Thus you have only a court case with ABN-AMRO?
Nanavati: No, nowhere in the world is there any court case outstanding against me. Not ABN-AMRO and no
other bank.
- continues on next page
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 7
Uncovering Police Corruption
- continued from previous page
DIB: But why did you pick De Bruycker, of all people, for safekeeping of your diamonds? How did you even know
him? Since when were you friends?
Nanavati: He was around in the market many years. Used to call me a few times for asking my help. For putting
prices on some goods. He would ask for market information. I knew him from long ago. You remember the Brenig
case?12 I was involved in that case. Then I got to know De Bruycker as I was detained for 4 or 5 days. He was very
aggressive to me at that time. But thereafter we got to know each other as we saw each other in the market.
DIB: Did the police return the diamonds found in De Bruycker’s house to you?
Nanavati: No, not yet. But my lawyer is very confident that we will get them. Some of these are my personal
belongings. You know, I am just hoping that everything will be all right.
DIB: It seems that De Bruycker isn’t talking. Is he afraid of something? Or of somebody?
Nanavati: I really wouldn’t know. I don’t really know anything about what he is doing. It’s now already a year
ago. I haven’t been in contact.
DIB: Do you think that De Bruycker switched goods?
Nanavati: I really don’t think so. You know, he is a straightforward Belgian guy. I really don’t think he would do
something like that.
This wasn’t a planned interview. Rather a spontaneous conversation in which Abhay Nanavati spoke from his
heart. He said what he felt. This is “his truth” and I sensed that he was genuine. The story is strange, actually, very
strange. But weirder things have happened in our industry and Nanavati deserves to get all the benefit of the
doubt.
The investigation will run its course. Before the conversation ended he asked me if I knew the meaning of
his name, Abhay. I didn’t. It means “fearless” in Hindi. If all he said will bear out then, indeed, Abhay Nanavati
should have no reasons to fear. Let’s hope so for him and his family.
- continued from previous page
Bruycker to the then-newly established Group of Experts
on Côte d’Ivoire. He was the acknowledged “diamond
expert” of the initial five (later only four) members. He
had become an internationally recognized expert, often
invited to international meetings on law enforcement
to showcase the Belgian model. De Bruycker worked
closely with the KPCS, especially with the KP Committee
of Technical Experts.
Searching for Conflict Diamonds
From documents we have seen, there was a close
and Corruption in Africa
(contractual) exchange of information agreements
The transnational corruption in diamonds is viewed as a
between Interpol and the UN experts. The intermingling
special expertise of Agim de Bruycker, who was “loaned”
of (simultaneously) holding functions at the Belgian Federal
at various periods between 2005 and 2008 to the United
Diamond Police and the Sanction Committees enabled De
Nations. In 2006, UN Secretary Kofi Anan appointed De
Bruycker to pursue prosecution in Belgium courts against
diamond companies. The two positions gave
Monitoring alluvial mining sites in West Africa
him unlimited access to data sources – which
others wouldn’t have. He was enormously
powerful and feared.
In some Antwerp courts cases, the defense
lawyers protested against “the dual role of the
investigator as an expert at the UN in the West
African conflict and secondly as investigator
at the Federal Police.”13 In a specific case,
Many of the special ties with Africa are rooted in its
old colonial days. There are many rough diamond dealers
that engage in jurisdiction shopping for their business,
though that trend is declining. The recently published
Panama Papers will undoubtedly underscore that there
is no way one can escape financial transparency and
corporate compliance. Back to De Bruycker.
- continues on page 10
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 8
Uncovering Police Corruption
IN THE KITCHEN OF DIAMOND-SANCTION COOKING
W
e interviewed a UN diamond expert serving in a later period. “The pressure exerted by the UN
Headquarters in New York to deliver cases is enormous. Contracts are signed for one year. Renewal
depends on a variety of factors, but the most important one is ‘results’. It takes considerable
time to develop contacts, to gain trust from local authorities and commercial entities, to ‘learn’ how the
alluvial diggings operate, who does what, etc. It’s anything but easy. Each expert develops his own way
of collecting evidence of sanction violators.”
“The ‘easy’ way,” continues my source, “is by paying informants for information. Then they come to
you – and you just wait. That costs money. Often not much, for a few hundred dollar one can get a lot.
But we are not supposed to work that way and, in any event, the United Nations will not reimburse you
for such expenditures. As salaries are low, some experts may also generate income for themselves. One
of the most despicable ways – hopefully occurring rarely but I know about these – is extortion. You say to
someone you have caught (or say you caught) ‘I will shame you on a U.N. sanction list, unless you take
care of me.’”
“Putting someone on a sanction list is easy; getting off the list is near impossible,” he explains. “When
experts report a name or company to New York, bureaucrats in various positions will review, investigate,
study, check and independently try to verify and validate the information. That’s however pure theory. In
practice, the recommendation of an expert is virtually always accepted. His power is enormous.”
Agim De Bruycker, on his own LinkedIn profile, notes that he worked as a UN Expert from January 2005
until November 2008 (3 years 11 months).14 Concurrently, he remained in his position with the Belgian
Federal Police. When it came to diamond-related sanctions in West Africa, he seemed omnipotent.
Peter van Calster
Access to All Sanction Working Files
United Nations headquarters in New-York
UN Experts are expected to come once a year to New York
and download all of their files into a computer network called
POEIMS, which is an acronym for Panel of Experts Information
Management System. The regulations state that “all material
related to the work of expert groups is the property of the United
Nations. Experts are required to submit all such material – properly
classified, categorized and, to the extent possible, in electronic
form in order to ensure continuity for future investigations and
to preserve institutional memory.”
More interestingly, and this points to the “power” of the
experts, “experts from all monitoring groups are able to use the
system to identify leads, patterns of investigation and alleged
sanctions violations that are relevant to the mandate of more
than one expert group. The system will therefore facilitate knowledge-sharing across separate expert
groups and also between former and current members of the same group.”
In practice, the POEIMS system is quite cumbersome. Papers need to be scanned in. Downloading
one’s files can take full days or more. A failure to download leads to losing one’s last salary, say the
rules, thus every departing expert gets to New York – even for no other purpose. Many experts, simply for
convenience reasons, may only download part of their files. In practice, most experts retain copies of their
files and also information they obtained from other experts or downloads.
If these files remain restricted and solely in the hands of trusted and honest parties, there is obviously
no problem. One can compare it to WikiLeaks and the U.S. Government files. However, if information
gets into unscrupulous hands, the consequences may be harmful and damage the integrity of the UN
sanction enforcement mechanism.
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 9
Uncovering Police Corruption
- continued from page 8
De Bruycker had argued that certain diamonds that he
had questionably labelled as “blood diamonds” by his own
expert testimony had, in fact, been a conclusion based on
deduction of statistical data rather than physical evidence.
DIB interviewed several individuals intimately
acquainted with the workings of the UN’s Panels of Experts.
In contrast to what some may believe, the monthly pay for
living in countries such as Ivory Coast, where De Bruycker
was an expert, isn’t high. In the years he was there, it would
have been in the range of $7,000-$8,000 a month. The
claim that he still has foreign currency from his UN days
seems rather unlikely, unless of course these activities
provided additional income. [See box.]
Ongoing Case
In Belgium, the investigation of Agim De Bruycker is still
ongoing. I repeat again that he has not been charged
yet with any crime, and one must assume his innocence.
But as time goes by and more information comes to
light, and past decisions and ongoing court cases are
reviewed, one can be sure that the government will
take the right remedial steps and restore the integrity of
the law enforcement community. It is positive that these
issues have finally surfaced and are being investigated…
better late than never.
Without jumping to conclusions, all relevant parties
should also urge to extend these reviews to decisions
and recommendations made by the relevant UN panels
in which De Bruycker participated. Just as a false arrest
can ruin one’s business, so can a mistaken listing on a
sanction’s list. The difference is that appeals on UN sanction
decisions are nearly impossible.
To quote the English historian, politician, and writer
Sir John Dalberg-Acton (1837 to 1869): “Power tends to
corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Let’s
hope for the best. 
Notes:
1. See: “Money Laundering Police Commissioner Freed from Jail”, HLN.BE, June 16, 2015 [in Flemish].
2. See: “Top-Cop: ‘I held the diamonds as a favor to friends”, by PLA, in HLN.BE news website, March 26, 2015 [in Flemish].
3. See: “Money Laundering Police Commissioner Freed from Jail”, HLN.BE, June 16, 2015 [in Flemish].
4. See: Patrick Lefelon, “Police Searches Vaults of Federal Diamond Squad”, HLN, April 25, 2015 [in Flemish].
5. Michel Maus, “Iedereen Doet Het!: Belasting Ontduiking in Belgie”, Borgerhoff & Lamberigts Publishewrs, Gent, Belgium, 2012.
6. See: Robyn Boyle, “Belgium’s black economy amounts to €61 billion,” The Bulletin, October 17, 2014.
7. See: Tax reforms in EU Member States, Taxation Paper 34 and European Economy 6/2012, European Commission 2012
8. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University Press, U.K., 1990, p. 9
9. From “Statement of the OECD Working Group on Bribery on Belgium’s limited implementation of the Anti-Bribery Convention,”
February 24, 2016, OECD Anti-Corruption Division, Paris.
10.OECD, “Belgium should address “flagrant” lack of resources for fighting foreign bribery”, statement dated October 17, 2013.
11.Mike de Wit, Tsodilo Resources Ltd,, University of Pretoria, “Southern Africa Diamond Resources: A Summary”, presented to at the PDAC, March 7,
2016, Toronto. [Presentation based on research by some 17 experts, published as “The Mineral Fields of Africa”,
35th International Geological Congress (IGC), Capetown, 2016.
12.This was in 2008. Gerald Brenig ran a scheme involving falsified invoices. Thirteen diamond companies
(including six DTC sightholders) were said to be involved.
13.This is in reference to the Peri Diamonds case, but also Limo Diamonds, Lion’s Diamonds, and Erkadiam cases.
See: Jan Heuvelmans, “Peri Diamonds: Smuggling in Blood Diamonds not Proven,: in Politics.be (the political website) [in Flemish].
14.https://www.linkedin.com/in/agim-de-bruycker-710b5559.
DIAMOND INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING (formerly Diamond Intelligence Briefs) is published on
an occasional basis (between 12-20 issues a year, depending on the subjects) to provide significant news,
background information and research indispensable to executives in the diamond and diamond jewelry business.
While the information herein is carefully compiled from sources believed reliable, no responsibility for its accuracy
can be assumed and no representation of warranty expressed or implied is made as to their completeness or correctness. Diamond
Intelligence Briefing may not be reproduced, distributed, published or used otherwise for any purpose but for the personal information
of the subscriber without the prior written consent of the publisher.
1 year subscription - US$590 * Individual issues of DIB are available for purchase online at:
www.diamondintelligence.com
Editorial and Research Management:
Editor: Chaim Even-Zohar, Graphics: Anat Hod, Subscription and Circulation: Jacqueline Reardon
CEZ Holdings Ltd. PO Box 68, Caesarea 3088901, Israel
Tel: 972-3-5750196, Fax: 972-3-5754829 | [email protected] | www.diamondintelligence.com
© Copyright 2016 by CEZ Holdings Ltd.
Diamond Intelligence Briefing 10