Métropoles
7 | 2010
La nouvelle critique urbaine
The Politics of City Regions in Comparative
Perspective
Paul Kantor and H.V. Savitch
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ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux
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ISSN: 1957-7788
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
The Politics of City Regions in
Comparative Perspective
Paul Kantor and H.V. Savitch
1
History has a way of reversing grand expectations. Instead of reducing the appeal of cities
globalization and free markets have enhanced many of them. The turn of fortunes has
been unpredictable. Cities that were only «big» have gone «global» with vibrant central
business districts that connect them to all parts of the world. While suburbs and exurbs
have grown significantly, they also are connected to central cities in myriad ways.
Economically, suburbs and exurbs often serve as commuter sheds for central city
employment or as back office locations for central city headquarters. Sociologically, the
residents of small hamlets outside the central city often identify with it, frequent its
theaters, museums, restaurants or visit friends. At the political level, some central cities
have combined with those living outside of it in different forms of metropolitan or
regional governments or are joined to their central city cousins through special
functional authorities or public benefit corporations.
2
The fact of the matter is that cities, suburbs and proximate rural areas could not escape
each other. Indeed, they have grown closer because of globalization and its attendant
effects. Emerging from that closeness is the rise of the city region – described socioeconomically as «dense, polarized masses of capital, labor and social life that are bound
up in intricate ways» (Scott, 2001). Other writers see city regions more politically as a
field of power spreading out from a municipal area, and containing a range of
institutions, exercising some form of governance (Ache, 2000 ; Tewdwr-Jones,
McNeil, 2000). Still others envision city-regions as encompassing a broad policy net over
which common decisions can be made for economic betterment (Barnes, Ledebur, 1994,
1998).
3
Our own definition synthesizes the political, economic and sociological aspects of city
regions. We see the city region in terms of a diverse set of interactions between a central
city and a bounded area around it (often identified by commuter sheds, socio-economic
interdependence and shared institutions). Some of the most important interactions
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1
The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
within city regions entail (i) the integration of production, employment and
transportation between central cities and outlying areas (ii) the existence of human
settlements and flows that occur within and around central cities and outlying areas, and
(iii) the generation of political, planning and policy linkages between central cities and
outlying areas.
4
City regions are by no means perfectly formed. They may not be commensurate with
economic realities and their policy nets often are incomplete. Citizens may not identify
with their regions and still hold onto the names of their smaller villages, townships,
boroughs or communes. Political institutions which purport to cover a region may only
be partially intact or engage in a destructive rivalry with other levels of government.
Nevertheless, city regions continue to have standing, they can be influential and they
have achieved both domestic and international recognition. This alone makes them
worthy of extended examination. Moreover city regions should not only be examined in
terms of their holistic properties (as a single regional entity) but in terms of how their
components operate and relate to one another (central business districts, municipal
areas, suburbs, exurbs). This interaction is often informal and piecemeal but it is very real
and manifests itself in city regions accounting for a contribution to their respective Gross
National Products. As a final note to this section, we should also add that city regions
continually change and were not brought about in one stroke. Far from an instant birth,
city regions have gone through a continual evolution, decomposition and re-invention.
The Twists and Turns of City Regions
5
Three basic factors shaped the shifting fortunes of city regions. These consisted of (i) an
increasing spatial complexity that enveloped cities and the territories around them (ii) the
larger forces of globalization and free markets as they penetrated government at all levels
(iii) efforts by government at all levels to initiate adjustments to unforeseen challenges (
socio-economic and environmental).
Increasing Complexity Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s
6
The period after World War II saw a massive decentralization of industry and people into
the hinterlands. As industry and people spread from central cities they evolved into a
network of specialized and non specialized centers. Much of this was made possible by
cheaper land, labor and extended transportation (highways, rail systems). In some cases
factories, assembly plants and light industry moved either because of government action
(Western Europe) or market forces (North America). Businesses chose concentrated
locations – called «industrial poles» in France, «central areas» in the United Kingdom and
«office parks» in the United States. Shopping malls, schools, housing subdivisions and
sports/cultural facilities arose to service burgeoning populations. Government helped
build new towns in Western Europe and Japan while in the North America private
enterprise took the lead in rapidly constructing a new suburban landscape. Throughout
the advanced industrial growth machines were in full force, either led by government
planners in Europe and Japan or left to its own devices in the United States.
7
This new movement was accompanied by a demographic revolution. At a domestic level
more people left farms and assimilated into manufacture and service industries in and
around central cities. At an international level, advanced industrial societies saw
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
unprecedented levels of immigrants. Most of the newcomers settled in working class
sections of central cities (London, New York and Tokyo) or in suburban factory towns
(Paris). Typically, immigrants were put up in massive, anonymous blocks of public
housing. Ethnic and social segregation became an endemic part of the regional social
order.In Tokyo the labor shortage was filled by rural to urban migration.
8
What has often been described as fragmented regions can also be seen as a rich, complex,
patch-quilt of different functional spheres that extended well beyond the central city.
Despite, the seeming separateness of these spheres, they were all profoundly
interdependent. Production and consumer outlets required a substantial residential base;
capital needed labor (including immigrant workers), much as labor needed capital to
survive. All of these actors needed services, infrastructure and public support. One way or
another, this dense, highly different, often polarized and intricate society needed to be
connected. The more varied and complex the social order, the greater was the need for
coordination.
9
The city region became the indispensable device, though which connections and
coordination could be achieved. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s they were legitimated
as «reformist institutions» that would embrace comprehensive planning, rationalize
better government and enhance overall efficiency. In the American literature city regions
were characterized by the word «reform» while in Europe terms like «functional urban
regions» or FURs described the phenomenon (Wallis, 1994 ; Cheshire et al. 1988 ; Savitch,
Vogel, 2009).
10
City regions would be governed in many different ways and their scope of operations
would differ from place to place, but their introduction as a functional entity was quite
widespread. These city regions grew by increments, and as they took root their
manifestations differed; first in the form of statistical designations by government
agencies and gradually metamorphosing into various institutional forms.
11
The labels for city regions often changed and sometimes they were informally or partially
governed. During the 1960s New York’s city region was referred to as the Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) and its larger region was called the Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA). For a time this city region was led by the Tri State
Regional Commission while other specific functions were conducted by public benefit
corporations (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey).
12
By 1964 London was designated as Greater London and it was led by a strategic body
known as the Greater London Council (GLC) ; its larger area was referred to as the South
East Region. Likewise during the 1960s Paris and its surrounding areas went through a
decisive change. The city of Paris was also designated as a «departement» and along with
seven other departements, the region took on the appellation of the Île-de-France»
(Island of France). During this time crucial decisions were made by a state agency called
Délégation à lAménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale or DATAR, and later
joined by a regional council. In Tokyo wards, towns and villages merged with the City of
Tokyo and created the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) in 1943. This was largely
an effort to rationalize government and administration against the background of WWII.
13
Taking a broad perspective on the 1960s and early 1970s this was a period of optimism
about the ability of government to comprehensively plan larger regions. Across North
America, Western Europe and parts of Asia, nation/states promoted city regions as a way
to tackle economic and social transition. City regions arose in the milieu of government
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3
The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
intervention, during a time when the welfare state was ascendant and neo Keynesian
solutions to economic challenges were popular (Brenner, 2004; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008).
Generally, the government of these regions tended to be hierarchical, command centered
and formal. Policies were made from relatively broad perspectives (national or regional)
and implemented from the top down. This too was an age of mega-structures where
bigger was better and housing projects, auto routes and stadia were built to mammoth
proportions.
14
All this changed during the mid and late 1970s. By then de-industrialization had set in
and factories had begun to move from the suburbs of city regions to other parts of the
world. The optimism that comprehensive planning, better governance and public
investment could stop the decline had waned. Parts of Asia profited from this transition,
and for this reason the Tokyo city region remained an exception. In contrast to New York,
London and Paris, the Tokyo region prospered. Indeed, Eric Vogel (1979) was able to write
a book with the title «Japan as Number One» which conveyed the sense of the time.
The Impact of Globalization and Free Markets by the 1980s
15
In North America and Western Europe the stagnation of the previous era was penetrated
by globalization and free markets. The injection of digital technology radically changed
economic conditions and open borders radically affected social conditions. The
immediate impact was negative, though the longer run would show some positive results.
Capitalism had struck North America and parts of Western Europe.
16
By the 1980s manufacture moved out of cities in search of cheaper labor. Vibrant ports
fell into disuse because they could not accommodate large container ships. As jobs were
lost people moved from inner cities into outer parts of the city region or beyond. In the
United States, Great Britain and France there was a discernable migration from north to
south or mass movements into what became known as «sunbelt regions». Economic
decline had profound implications for the built environment, as inner city neighborhoods
and even central business districts crumbled. In the wake of de-industrialization
competition between cities became especially sharp. What once had been celebrated as a
popular call for every city region to seek its «comparative advantage» (city regions
specializing in what they could do best, but trading with other city regions for mutual
benefit) was now replaced by a call for «competitive advantage» (city regions situating
themselves to beat out rivals). Localities of all types did what they could to attract
business investment.
17
In the United States cities offered innumerable «supply side incentives» to attract
business, including tax abatements, free land, workforce training and the like
(Kantor, 1995 ; Savitch, Kantor, 2002). New York supplied grants and interest free loans to
developers and offered multiyear tax reductions for the conversion of abandoned
industrial lofts into residential space (Zukin, 1989). In the United Kingdom and France
development corporations joined with private developers to regenerate urban spaces.
London saw efforts to rebuild its abandoned ports through the London Docklands
Development Corporation (LDDC). Paris witnessed a massive effort to construct a new
central business district in La Défense (Savitch, 1988). In Japan government and business
collaborated to make its resurgent industrial base still stronger. In Tokyo the CBD of
Shinjuku emerged as a major commercial hub while Shibuya became a fashion and media
center. The Tokyo waterfront was also developed on reclaimed land.
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
18
The response to these larger forces from national government and ultimately city regions
was also significant. The elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan changed the
political economies of Great Britain and the United States and led to similar changes
elsewhere in the world. Promoted in different ways, a new movement of neo liberalism
advocated less government intervention, more private enterprise and the facilitation of
an already strong impetus toward a global market economy. America, Great Britain and
to a lesser extent Japan became champions of globalization. France and much of
Continental Europe remained skeptical.
19
Rather than markets doing away with the state, neo liberal ideology pushed political
authority down to the regional or local levels. National governments began to de-regulate
and shed responsibility for social welfare. Thatcher’s Great Britain and Reagan’s America
cut national support for localities and shifted fiscal responsibility downward. Though it
retained the welfare state, even Socialist France inaugurated a wave of political
decentralization, presumably to allow localities greater democracy, but also to enhance
their ability to compete in the global economy. Japan relaxed planning restrictions and
made it easier to access private capital for development.
20
Frequently the recipient for neo liberal initiatives was the central city or the city region.
A new territorial scaffolding was erected to accommodate the tremendous influence of
global markets (Brenner, 1999, 2004). City regions were positioning themselves to better
compete in these new conditions and they tried to adapt. What had once been the
purview of the national state was now closer to the city region, though with a new lexicon
that reflected the change. Instead of «regulation» and «re-distribution», city regions
pursued «public-private partnerships» to promote «economic development». Rather than
formal governments, operating vertically to carry out comprehensive planning, city
regions adopted a form of flexible «governance» which was incremental, more attuned to
private enterprise and operated laterally (Savitch, Vogel, 2000). City regions were
thought to be more autonomous, de-centered and anxious to «unleash the pent up forces
of capital» (Stoker, 1998 ; Jessop, 2000). As such they were more capable of enabling
rather than directing private capital.
21
During the 1980s city regions became one of the platforms upon which neo liberal policies
were launched. One of these policies involved the urban enterprise zone, which struck a
chord in Great Britain (where it originated) and the United States (where individual states
adopted it). Sometime later a modified version of enterprise zones was introduced in
France under the rubric of zones franches or «free zones». The idea for urban enterprise
zones was grafted from Hong Kong, where a flourishing economy had been nurtured by
unregulated markets, practically no taxes and the availability of cheap labor. Transferred
to depressed areas of city regions, urban enterprise zones were supposed to significantly
reduce taxes, relax environmental protection, speed up the acquisition of licenses and
permits for conducting business and minimize other regulations. In the United States
urban enterprise zones were used in depressed city regions of New York and Detroit. In
the United Kingdom they were applied in run down areas of Glasgow and London. In
France they were used in depressed suburbs around Paris and parts of Marseilles, where
industry and labor were excused from some government restrictions and received public
funding to stimulate development (Savitch, Kantor, 2002). These zones often covered vast
stretches of territory. Booming Japan, led by the Tokyo city region had no experience
with urban enterprise zones but they did eventually reach it. In the 1990s similar ideas
were introduced into the Tokyo region.
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
22
The 1980s ushered in a period of expansion for city regions. New York saw a maturation
or proliferation of public benefit corporations (PBCs) like the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey (PANYNJ) the Empire State Development Corporation (ESD) and the Times
Square Redevelopment Corporation. The extension of highways and bridges spurred still
more growth in the suburbs as the city region expanded at their northern, southern and
western limits. London and its Greater South East Region also grew around its Heathrow
Airport and the expansion of motorways that led into the suburbs. During this period the
Thatcher government made considerable use of quasi government autonomous agencies
(QUANGOS) to stimulate development. The Thatcher government also tried, without
success, to compromise the much cherished Green Belt that surrounded Great London
and prohibited development within its range. As it turned out, developers did a leap-frog
over the Green Belt and built beyond it. New towns like Milton Keynes continued to grow
and areas around ancient university towns like Oxford and Cambridge blossomed. In the
Île-de-France five new towns planned more than a decade earlier took root and became
part of a larger urban corridor surrounding Paris (connected by rail and auto-routes). The
Tokyo city region also expanded. As property prices in the central city kept rising,
development pressures displaced local residence and residents settled into more distant
suburbs and exurbs.
Adjustments to Unforeseen Challenges and the New Regionalism in
the 1990s
23
By the 1990s both the successes and the excesses of neo liberalism had become apparent.
On the one hand, globalization and free markets had created new generators of wealth,
often built on financial services. Some central cities and their regions had «reinvented»
themselves as international commercial hubs, global service centers and as headquarters
for trans-national corporations (TNCs). The new wealth had rebuilt existing Central
Business District cores with skyscrapers, upscale boutiques, hotels and restaurants.
24
This period saw a burgeoning of development around existing CBD cores and, in some
cases, the construction of new CBDs. As New York’s financial district boomed it gave birth
to a new neighborhood in lower Manhattan called Battery Park City. The spinoffs in other
boroughs of the city were considerable as CBDs were rejuvenated in downtown Brooklyn,
Fordham Road in the Bronx and Jamaica, Queens. London’s relaxation of financial
regulations brought about its «Big Bang» and invigorated its CBD with a new influx of
bankers, traders and analysts. The new boom led to the construction of taller buildings
throughout parts of Central London and a change in its historic skyline. London also saw
the creation of a new CBD near its docklands at Canary Wharf. Paris’ CBD was too small to
accommodate international demand and La Défense, located on the western outskirts of
the city, took on that role. The growth continued and by the 1990s La Défense extended
into La Défense II, all of which is connected by rail to the center of the city. In Tokyo, the
waterfront area was targeted to accommodate the increased demand for office spaces. A
large sub-centre was built on the reclaimed island in Tokyo Bay, aimed at facilitating
international business.
25
Building up CBDs had become a strategic objective, designed to both position cities for
international competition and pump up the economy in their surrounding regions. In
New York this was dubbed the «Manhattan strategy» (Savitch, 1987). New York’s strategy
of replicating Manhattan in some of its other boroughs was matched by London’s own
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
version of «Manhattanization» amidst efforts to construct tall buildings in Central
London. Paris’ brand new CBD in La Defense was sometimes called «Manhattan sur
Seine». Even Tokyo’s future envisioned mega projects and was referred to as the
«Manhattan Plan». More often than not, the ramifications of the CBD into other parts of
the city region created still more CBDs and commercial sub centers. These sub centers
could also function on their own as points of business concentration in the rest of the
region. In effect city regions became strongly polycentric and extended in a latticework
of secondary CBDs throughout the region.
26
The social ramifications of booming CBDs have been profound. On the one hand, a new
class of managers, financial specialists, professionals and artists bought luxury
apartments close to these CBDs. The new class of «yuppies», as they were sometimes
called gentrified working class neighborhoods and they often moved into large, lavish
houses in the suburbs. Moreover, the sheer energy generated from CBDs often spread into
the rest of the city region, which accommodated back offices, warehouses, housing
projects, fancy townships and new universities.
27
On the other hand, the global market surge had exacerbated social disparities and
environmental problems. Differences in income between social classes continued to
worsen, and so too did social segregation as immigrants found themselves encased in
urban and suburban ghettos. These problems existed in central cities but also spread into
the rest of the region, especially the inner suburbs. Parts of the New York region (South
Bronx, Newark) were almost entirely reserved for the poor, while London experienced
similar segregation on its East End and South Bank (Tower Hamlets, Southwark). The
northeastern suburbs of Paris (La Courneuve, Clichy-sous-Bois) contained massive
housing projects and unassimilated immigrants where conditions equaled the stark
ghettos of its sister cities. Given these conditions and disparities it was hardly surprising
that riots broke out in Paris’ northern suburbs in 2007.
28
The level of disparity and segregation is lower in and around Tokyo compared to our
other cities. However, traditional blue collar areas in the northeast’s 23 wards (Kawasaki)
recently recoded higher degree of unemployment. Homeless and overnight sleepers have
become visible in everyday life. At the same time, gentrification transformed the
waterfront and once industrial area. New condos attracted well-paid professionals and
managerial classes. In the suburbs, some neighborhood experienced negative equity in
housing asset. Those who bought homes at the peak of bubble economy in the late 1980s
suffered from lower housing values in the 1990s. Above all, Tokyo region’s socioeconomic landscape, which was once quite homogenous, now shows sharp divisions.
29
While the 1990s was largely a period of growth and prosperity in advanced industrial
societies, it also posed serious problems within those same societies. Social disparities and
exclusion were not the only challenges to be faced. Economic growth within central cities
and gentrification of older, neighborhoods pushed out working class and poorer
households. In the rest of the region economic growth engendered a loss of green space
and wasteful sprawl (especially in the United States). At the same time globalization
brought Asian nations besides Japan into advanced industrial societies. India, China,
South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore now consumed more energy and used more
automobiles. Added to the consumption patterns of the West, the city regions of these
nations caused havoc with the environment (global warming, air pollution, soil erosion
etc.).
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
30
The era also ushered in new national leadership, which rejected the heavy handed
bureaucracy of the 1960s as well as the market fundamentalism of the 1990s. Tony Blair
and Bill Clinton were centrists and pragmatists who adopted a political «third way»
(Giddens, 1999). Given the accumulated challenges, the city region became the natural
repository for potential solutions. What became the «new regionalism» was supposed to
take the best of earlier practices and apply them toward the resolution of social and
environment problems. Government could be both lean and energetic and it could use
market practices to make the public arm more effective (Savas, 1987; Osborne,
Gaebler, 1992). Old priorities could also be given a new direction, so that «social welfare»
(the government dole) became «workfare» (more jobs) «urban development» (build to
market demand) became «sustainable development» (build for conservation and future
generations) and «suburban growth» (sprawled housing) was converted to «smart
growth» (compact communities).
31
Naturally, new regionalism worked differently in North America than in Western Europe.
In New York, new regionalism worked by increments and in functional terms. Thus, PBCs
coordinated development, or provided financed for airport or improved public
transportation. In the London region, a multiple array of smaller jurisdictions in the
South East was coordinated by either the central ministries, regional development
agencies or a consortium of local authorities (SERPLAN). In the Paris region, a regional
council (CRIF) has taken on some responsibilities but often finds itself in conflict with
other jurisdictions. Meanwhile the National Assembly has called for creating an
institution body (urban community) that might represent Greater Paris. The content of
«new regionalism» is not as in Tokyo However, the public discourse tends to emphasize
de-centralization, more local autonomy and less control by the national bureaucracy.
Coordination among the local government hardly surfaced as a public agenda, except for
specific transport and logistic issues.
32
Whatever might be the institutional variation for the new regionalism the fundamental
idea of using government (or governance) in altogether different ways became quite
popular. New regionalism is neither «right wing» nor «left wing». While it was
sympathetic to free markets and globalization, it has been aware of the possibilities for
market failure and global overreach. It may also be that the times have generated cityregions. If new regionalism were not present some form of it would have to be invented.
33
We should emphasize that new regionalism conceived of spatial politics differently. By
the 1990s it was theoretically embedded in globalization. Some writers saw it as «an
outcome of deeper political economic processes» (Storper, 1997, p. 3). As one scholar of
the subject put it, «city-regions are becoming increasingly central to modern life and all
the more so because globalization has reactivated their significance…» (Scott, 2001, p. 11).
Other writers saw city regions replacing center cities as a result of an historical evolution.
As they described the phenomenon, economic dynamics and social change did not
happen in cities as much as they did in larger regions (MacLeod, 2001; Saxenian, 1994).
34
The «new regionalism» also had an abiding faith in the ability to reorganize spatial
relationships so that more resources could be harnessed, more assets could be shared and
ultimately localities could be made stronger. In an age where competition is king, great
premiums are placed on the capacity to innovate and share costs. City regions are small
enough to operate flexibly and efficiently, yet large enough to knit together a diversity of
industries by furnishing extensive infrastructure, transportation and planning. In a
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
sense, city regions have become indispensable to modern capitalist economies because
they provide the territorial stages from which competitive advantage can be pursued.
Political Tensions and City Region Governance
35
Increasing economic regionalization has unleashed new political tensions. Economic
change invariably creates new political interests and threatens older ones, as Schumpeter
famously observed (1975). Thus, economic and political regionalization are quite different
processes. Although they may function in counterpoint, governmental responses are by
no means simple reflections of changing economic pressures. Rather, the politics of
regional governance is invariably a matter of contention. Throughout the industrial West
private and public interests are seeking to re-shape or preserve political institutions in
the course of using public power to manage urban economic change. Consequently,
regionalization is permeated by formidable obstacles at various governmental levels in
North America and in Western Europe.
Economic Obstacles
36
Some of these obstacles have their roots in the process of global economic change itself.
The globalization of urban economies has two faces (Kantor, 2006). One face has to do
with the rise of greater economic interdependence among businesses and governments in
city regions. These new urban interdependencies provide reasons for governments and
citizens to pull together more in order to improve their economic well being
(Orfield, 1998). As cities and suburbs recognize how much their economic fortunes are
interdependent, they may be more likely to collaborate politically on some issues,
facilitating regionalization of local governance.
37
The other face of globalization makes political cooperation more difficult because it
increases economic fragmentation within city regions. Globalization has made some
business sectors, such as international finance, certain kinds of wholesaling, and
advanced producer services, more connected to international markets and less anchored
in local or regional economies. For example, large swathes of the corporate services and
international finance sectors found in major global cities like London, New York or Paris,
have strong linkages to world economic networks, as described earlier (Storper, 1997 ;
Sassen, 2002). Although these linkages do not render purely local and regional ties
irrelevant, they engender competing priorities on regional economic issues for some
businesses and this, in turn, affects their local governments. For example, one study of in
American central cities found that many business groups having international ties were
not very engaged in local or regional political issues due to their compelling interests in
affairs outside of the metropolitan areas (Hanson et al., 2010). The selective sorting out of
business and job sectors within already politically fragmented metropolitan areas can
pull local governments further apart in responding to common problems (Kantor, 2010).
In sum, the dynamics of globalization work to divide governments in city regions at the
same time as it also unleashes forces bringing them more together. What matters is the
balance of these pressures in particular urban regions. In some metropolitan areas local
governments find more to share than in other regions if only because of differences in
economic interdependencies (Kantor, 2008 ; Crouch, Le Gales, Trigilia, Voelzkow, 2001).
Métropoles, 7 | 2010
9
The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
Consensus and contestation among governments can vary from region to region as the
mix of economic interests shifts.
Political Obstacles
38
Obstacles to regional governance also arise from the urban political process itself. Many
political interests, including entire governments, oppose political collaboration necessary
for regional governance because it threatens them with loss of power, status or wealth.
The political forces encouraging resistance at the local level tend to be somewhat
different in North America than in Western Europe, however.
39
North America. In North America city region politics is decisively shaped by political
tensions linked to federalism. Although Canada and the USA have very different federal
governmental systems as well as some different political traditions, both nations have
decentralized responsibility for urban development to lower governmental levels more
than have most West European nations in the EU. Further, partisanship does not afford a
very stable base for transcending urban governmental rivalries for regional approaches
in either the USA or Canada. Ideological political parties are mostly absent, and there is
usually weak party discipline at the local, state and provincial levels. Thus, political
tensions over regional governance primarily get played out outside of national politics at
the local, state or provincial levels. Proposals for regional cooperation among local
governments are easily challenged or frustrated by a multiplicity of interests.
40
This reality is particularly true in the USA. Decentralization of urban development
policies has been increasing since the 1980s as the federal government retrenched in
urban aid. National political-electoral realignments during this period further
marginalized central cities in urban policy. This has meant growing reliance by local
governments and states on their own revenue bases and a more limited federal
governmental presence in urban affairs generally. In turn, intergovernmental economic
competition and rivalry among cities, suburbs and state governments escalated. Thus,
just as pressures of economic regionalization have been increasing, national
governmental intervention to encourage political regionalization has been decreasing
(Savitch, Kantor, 2002). This convergence of politics and economics has left decisions over
city region governance more to local and state governments. It has often weakened
attempts by these lower level governments to bring about regional reforms, such as citycounty consolidation, as well as more limited programs of regional cooperation in urban
development (Dreier, Molenkopf, Swanstrom, 2001). In most, but not all, cases where
reform has succeeded in the USA the state capitals have usually played a role in imposing
it on recalcitrant local governments (Orfield, 1998 ; Rusk, 1999 ; Weir, 2000).
41
In Canada, regional governmental development has been more vigorous compared to
south of the border. Canadian provincial governments generally have been less willing to
decentralize fiscal and policy responsibilities compared to the American state
governments and some provinces have actively supported the creation of metropolitanwide governmental approaches, as in Ontario with Toronto. Although Ontario provincial
authorities have diminished their support for some forms of regional governance in
recent years, Canadian provincial intervention continues to be more supportive of
regional perspectives than in most American states (Savitch, Kantor, 2002 ; Rothblatt and
Sancton, 1993). Nevertheless, even in Canada federalist politics remains relatively
permissive of local obstruction by local as well as provincial officials.
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
42
Western Europe. In the UK and Western Europe more integrated unitary governmental
systems predominate (although there are obvious exceptions, such as Belgium), giving
national governmental authorities a comparatively stronger hand in reforming regional
governance to address economic changes. Compared with the USA and Canada, national
officials in these centralized systems have a number of advantages in promoting greater
lateral political cooperation among governments in metropolitan regions. National
systems of fiscal assistance and tax policies, together with more extensive national safety
net programs, relieve local governments of major dependency on their own tax sources.
Extensive national welfare states also limit local or provincial responsibility for most
social programs, such as housing, employment and income assistance. This limits tax
competition among local governments as a source of rivalry almost everywhere in
Western Europe, including Great Britain. In addition, the presence of more disciplined
and ideological political parties in Western Europe tends to foster political collaboration
between national and local authorities in forging programs that transcend the borders of
local government (Savitch, Kantor, 2002).
43
In some cases these advantages enable national governments in Britain and continental
Europe to stimulate local attention to the importance of the regional economy (Jouve,
Lefevre, 2002). It also allows national officials to use their authority to directly promote
efforts to consolidate or encourage intergovernmental cooperation in metropolitan areas.
For example, regional planning has been undertaken for decades in Holland’s Randstad
where Dutch authorities have promoted various measures to encourage political
cooperation within metropolitan areas. In Britain regional development authorities,
including some covering entire regions (such as Scotland and Wales) have been created to
give higher priority to the economic region in urban change. In France national
governments have created programs to encourage intergovernmental cooperation within
metropolitan areas (Lefevre, 2009).
44
Nevertheless, even these governments struggle to achieve political cooperation at the
local level and they often fail at this task despite their apparent political advantages
(Newman, 2000). The reason : Unitary-style political systems also have sources of political
fragmentation; these counterbalance their other advantages in supporting regional
political cooperation.
45
For one thing, regional governmental cooperation in Western Europe is often difficult
because of bureaucratic fragmentation (Salet, Thornley, Kreukels, 2003; Jouve,
Lefevre, 2002). The presence of large public sectors heavily financed by national
governments may relieve local governments of big financial burdens, but it does not
necessarily diminish political rivalry among governments at the local level. Rather, big
welfare state systems require very large bureaucracies organized at multiple levels. These
bureaucratic agencies and governments compete for funds, power and autonomy in ways
that are not unlike local governments in more decentralized polities. For example, in the
Netherlands local governments compete vigorously among themselves for national
grants by seeking to expand public services, populations and by seeking to maximize
their limited own-source revenues. This has weakened participation by Randstad local
governments in schemes for regional cooperation. For their part, Dutch voters have
rejected proposals to consolidate city and suburban service provision in part at least
because they fear losing their control over the mix and costs of community services
provided at the local level (Kantor, 2006).
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
46
Integrated political systems like Holland’s with a long history of national planning also
find it particularly difficult to induce local governments to join in programs of regional
intergovernmental cooperation. Local government bureaucracies and their elected
officials have invested enormous political capital in building national-local channels of
access; they do not easily give them up in favor of joining regional coalitions to settle
common problems. Dutch local officials in big cities are inclined to avoid team-playing
with other local governments in favor of using their own direct channels of influence to
get what they want from national governmental agencies (Kantor, 2006, 2008).
47
It remains true that European centralized governmental systems sometimes are more
successful in imposing regional government than in the USA. Yet once these regional
governmental institutions are created they do not necessarily suppress political rivalry or
bring about extensive political cohesion within economic regions. Regional governmental
institutions produce their own particular divisions and conflicts (Newman,
Thornley, 2005).
48
Sometimes this is because new systems of metro governance incompletely encompass the
actual functional economic region. This is the case in London where the creation of the
GLA in 2000 has provided much of metropolitan London with a single authority. But the
GLA has limited territorial reach, leaving out much of the Southeast of England which is
closely integrated economically with metropolitan London. Because of this, the planning
of strategic development in these peripheral areas has been organized directly by central
departments in Whitehall. Three different development agencies accountable to national,
but not local authorities, hold sway, making the London region highly fragmented
politically even after the reform (Thornley, 2009).
49
When the scale of regional governance is more encompassing, rivalry and fragmentation
among the various governments and interests can persist and even expand in new
directions. This reality emerged in urban Scotland after it came under the aegis of a
single development agency during the 1970s that was accountable to the Scottish Office.
Initially, the development agency sought to give priority to assisting declining urban
areas and evening out economic development opportunities across the parts of Scotland
to which it was responsible. By the 1990s, however, this agency, Scottish Enterprise (SE),
decided that its main priority was to stimulate economic renewal and growth anywhere it
could in Scotland. Its interest was to create jobs quickly in order to survive Whitehall
scrutiny and succeed politically in Westminster. Consequently, SE began to favor
promoting development projects in suburban areas most capable of attracting private
investment, rather than continuing to give priority to inner-city renewal in Glasgow and
other black spot areas. Glasgow and other declining parts of West Central Scotland
protested SE treatment, complaining of abandonment by regional officials who were once
there to help them (Kantor, 2000). As the scale of regional governance expands, the
potential for division and conflict among participants in the regional governmental
institutions also grows.
Economic and Governmental Regionalization in Counterpoint
50
In some respects, the age of the urban regionalism has arrived. Postindustrial capitalism
is evolving in ways that are giving agglomeration economies renewed importance. New
forms of economic interdependence, the rise of specialized flexible production, the
spread of new technologies, and other factors are making the city region a prominent
Métropoles, 7 | 2010
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
node in today’s globalized economy. The urban region has assumed new status. During
the last several decades governments at all levels have been responding to manage this
reality.
51
Yet political change does not automatically follow economic transformation. Although
there is increasing governmental attention to forces of urban regional development,
political regionalization remains a contentious matter. Regional economic development
has unleashed new political tensions over the governance of city regions. In Western
Europe and North America political responses have evolved in counterpoint to economic
change without yet resolving important sources of conflict over political regionalization.
Despite political differences, North American and Western European approaches afford
many opportunities for political challenges to regional governance.
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ABSTRACTS
An age of the urban regionalism has arrived. Postindustrial capitalism is evolving in ways that
give renewed importance to city regions. New forms of economic interdependence, the rise of
specialized flexible production, the spread of new technologies, and other factors are making the
city region a prominent node in today’s globalized economy. Although governments at all levels
have been responding to manage this reality, political intervention remains a contentious matter
because regional economic development has unleashed new political tensions over governance.
Some tensions arise from economic obstacles to regional political cooperation. Other tensions
arise from the urban political process in city regions. Many political interests, including entire
governments, oppose political collaboration necessary for regional governance because it
threatens them with loss of power, status or wealth. The political forces favoring resistance at
the local and metropolitan levels tend to differ in the North American and Western European
contexts, however.
L’âge du «régionalisme urbain» est arrivé. Le capitalisme postindustriel se développe avec des
modalités qui accordent une nouvelle importance aux villes-régions. De nouvelles formes
d’interdépendance économique, l’émergence d’une production spécialisée flexible, la diffusion
des nouvelles technologies, et d’autres facteurs font des villes-régions un nœud prédominant
dans l’économie globalisée d’aujourd’hui. Bien que les gouvernements de tous niveaux aient
fourni des réponses pour gérer cette réalité, l’intervention politique demeure un objet de conflit
parce que le développement économique régional a libéré de nouvelles tensions politiques.
Certaines tensions naissent des obstacles économiques à une coopération politique de niveau
métropolitain. D’autres proviennent de l’intérieur même du processus politique des villes. De
nombreux intérêts politiques, y compris ceux des gouvernements, s’opposent à une collaboration
jugée nécessaire au niveau des villes-régions parce que cette collaboration met en danger ceux
qui ont peur d’y perdre du pouvoir, un statut ou des ressources. Les forces politiques qui font de
la résistance aux niveaux local et métropolitain diffèrent cependant en Amérique du Nord et en
Europe de l’Ouest.
INDEX
Mots-clés: gouvernance, ville-région, globalisation
Keywords: city-region, governance, new regionalism, globalization
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The Politics of City Regions in Comparative Perspective
AUTHORS
PAUL KANTOR
Fordham University
H.V. SAVITCH
University of Louisville
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