Back to the Present: How the U.S. Continues to Learn the Lessons of Somalia
Prepared by Jerry Kenney for the Norman Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture
August 26, 2011-- The awful sight of young children wasting away is something a better world
should have long ago eliminated. Our world has not. Appalling images and stories continue to
come forward from Somalia as tens of thousands have starved, more are in the process of
starving, and millions remain at risk for starvation. Stories of women forced to abandon their
babies on the roadside are of a sort so unimaginable that it precludes empathy.1
Upon hearing this news, Americans may be forgiven for feeling an unsettling sense of déjà vu.
There was a time before when televisions showed us similar images from the same place. These
images were accompanied by buzzwords like conflict, poverty, drought, famine, refugees,
violence, multilateral intervention, logistics, and mandates. Some have credited the media
portrayals of the famine in Somalia and the ensuing public response with pressuring a reluctant
George H. W. Bush administration to act in 1992.2 The Bush administration did act and this
intervention was largely successful.3
Yet almost two decades on, the enduring memory from the U.S. intervention in Somalia is not
Operation Restore Hope which saved hundreds of thousands of lives4 but rather U.S. soldiers
being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. This image has since been reinforced by “Black
Hawk Down,” which functions as shorthand for describing and understanding the dangers of
America’s role in humanitarian interventions.5
The attitudes and popular narratives adopted by the American public following humanitarian
interventions shape the way elected leaders consider foreign policy. 6 It would follow then that
1
the perceived success of past humanitarian interventions would beget support for similar foreign
policy decisions while perceived failure would reduce the political will to intervene.7 Inevitably,
debate then focuses on the central issues of constructing the popular narrative and identifying the
proper lessons.8 The U.S. experience in Somalia from 1992-94 serves as a convoluted
benchmark for U.S. interventions abroad due to several factors: 1) its place in history as the
world searched for a new paradigm for international relations after the end of the Cold War, 2) its
management by two U.S. administrations with different objectives and interests, 3) its complex
coordination among multiple agencies, international humanitarian organizations, and multilateral
bodies, 4) and its shifting missions and mandates each resulting in respective successes and
failures.9 Some have blamed the outcome of the U.S. intervention in Somalia on the failure to
learn the lessons of previous U.S. interventions 10 and some have blamed the outcomes of more
recent interventions on the failure to adequately adopt the lessons of Somalia. 11 Therefore, each
U.S. humanitarian response is considered within the parameters of public attitudes about the
outcomes of previous interventions.12
For better or for worse, the lessons derived by the public and policymakers from the U.S.
intervention in Somalia in the early 1990’s has shaped debate about potential responses to this
most recent disaster in Somalia and humanitarian crises more generally. The most explicit
evidence of this impact is the continued absence of any call for a U.S.-led intervention in
Somalia to secure delivery of food assistance.
As the American public and policymakers continue to digest the current tragedy unfolding in
Somalia, the de facto response seems to be a tentative hope that multilateral organizations such
2
as the U.N. World Food Programme may be effective enough to allow the U.S. to be both
compassionate (by offering millions of dollars in support) and noncommittal (by remaining on
the periphery rather than on the ground). Prior to predicting the outcome of the current famine in
Somalia, it is useful to explore the trajectory of similar events and different decisions that
culminated in the commitment of U.S. ground forces to Somalia twenty years ago. Why did
President George H. W. Bush decide to send U.S. ground troops to establish a secure
environment for humanitarian relief? Equally important is an effort to understand how the
lessons from our previous encounter with Somalia continue to frame decision-making about the
current situation in Somalia.
Background:
Decades of colonial rule left Somalia without the institutional capacity to support democratic
self-governance following independence in 1960. In the aftermath of President Abdi Rashid Ali
Shermarke’s assassination in 1969, the Soviet-backed Somali military instituted rigid authority
under the leadership of Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. Clan identities served as the basis
for Somali society and Barre was a member of the Marehan clan. However, his regime initially
imposed Somali nationalism as an alternative to the clan structure. 13 As part of this effort the
Barre administration launched a literacy campaign centered on replacing the colonial languages
Italian and English with the newly created written Somali in all schools.14 Barre’s regime relied
upon the Soviet Union for military support and modernizing economic development strategies,
thereby souring relations with the West.
3
An indulgence of nationalist appeals and a miscalculation of military power and external support
led Siad Barre to declare war against Ethiopia to settle a border dispute in October 1977.15
Alliances quickly shifted, as the Soviet Union delivered equipment and advisors to the Marxist
Ethiopian regime. Lacking Soviet support, the Somali army was routed by March 1978.
Spurned by the Soviets, defeated militarily, and witnessing the collapse of the collectivist Somali
economy and agriculture base, Siad Barre decided to warm relations with the United States.16
From the desk of an American Cold War strategist, recent world events must have been
troubling: a resurgent Ethiopia was receiving Soviet backing, the Soviet military had surprised
the U.S. by invading Afghanistan, and the future of Iran after the overthrow of the Shah
remained uncertain. The larger picture revealed Soviet advances, U.S. vulnerabilities, and the
need to secure sea lanes and oil reserves. Within this larger picture, Somalia assumed strategic
importance to the United States. This assessment induced the U.S. to reorganize and expand its
military forces and infrastructure in the region.17 The U.S. initiated ambitious economic
assistance programs in Somalia in coordination with the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund, and European donors.18 In order to assure continued aid flows, Siad Barre made
guarantees to pursue future democratic and free-market reforms. In the mid-eighties economic
indicators and agriculture production had risen sharply.19
However, “[b]y the late 1980s it was clear that indications of long-term reform had turned out to
be deceptive.”20 The diffusion of power that accompanies economic and political reform
threatened to undercut the elites of Siad Barre’s Marehan clan. Somalia abandoned reform
initiatives as corruption and fraud reversed previous economic gains.21 After a coup attempt by
4
members of the rival Mijerteen clan following Somalia’s defeat to Ethiopia during the Ogaden
War, Siad Barre punished the entire clan, forcing them to flee into exile. In exile, the Mijerteen
clan joined fellow armed groups to form the basis of a future consolidated opposition.22
Siad Barre’s authoritarian regime had succumbed to the pressure of the clan system that it had
tried to uproot from Somali society. The regime’s shift spurred a corresponding rise in disputes
with other regional clans left outside the state’s patronage system. The mechanisms of Somali
state power were co-opted by one clan against a rising multi-clan insurgency. Thus began a
vicious cycle of repression and opposition that devastated Somalia. In fact, “[b]y the time
international attention focused on Somalia in 1992 through ghastly pictures of starvation and
death, the Somali state had ceased to exist and the people had fallen back on the only security
they could find, the clan system.”23
Civil war engulfed all of Somalia in the final months of 1990. Clan-based insurgent groups
pushed closer to Mogadishu. In January 1991 General Mohamed Farah Aideed and his branch of
the United Somalia Congress (USC) entered the city and assumed control of critical government
buildings. On January 27th Siad Barre plundered Mogadishu and fled south to his clan’s
homeland.24 Siad Barre’s forces continued operations against Aideed to retake Mogadishu until
they were resolutely defeated in May 1992. During this time Siad Barre’s forces decimated
Somali infrastructure as part of a scorched earth policy.25
As the clan leader who defeated Siad Barre, Aideed believed he was entitled to future leadership
of Somalia. Rather than form a united governing structure after Siad Barre’s defeat, opposition
groups exploited clan loyalties and perpetuated the civil conflict in Somalia. Only northern
5
Somalia enjoyed relative stability as the Isaaq clan consolidated the region and declared
independence in 1991 as the Somaliland Republic.26
In the capital of Mogadishu fellow members of the USC began an internecine battle that would
split the city. Ali Mahdi Mohamed assumed control of northern Mogadishu while Mohamed
Farah Aideed directed the south. The battle for Mogadishu inflicted terrible damage on the
infrastructure and citizens of the city beginning in November 1991.27
Context
The disintegration of state institutions forced Somali citizens to rely on clan identities for basic
security. As such, the concept of Somalia as a nation or a state in any technical sense was an
allusion to a disputed past or an unlikely future. While officials attempted to direct the U.S.
government’s attention to the plight of Somali civilians, “the violence and starvation remained ‘a
third tier issue’ for the administration.”28 After its rise to strategic significance during the end of
the Cold War in the 1980s, Somalia now possessed little interest to U.S. foreign policymakers.
With drought exacerbating an already critical humanitarian situation in which hundreds of
thousands of Somali refugees faced imminent death, the UN Security Council passed Resolution
751 in April 1992. Negotiations with the major clan factions limited the UN presence to fifty
observers who began to arrive in July to monitor a tenuous cease-fire in Mogadishu. The
resolution also agreed to the possible deployment of a peacekeeping force of 500 if conditions
allowed in the future. Humanitarian organizations working on the ground in Somalia
complained about the inadequacy of international measures as worsening conditions
overwhelmed their capacity to respond.
6
In July, vivid pictures of starving children displayed in the media and an emotional telegram
from the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya that highlighted the scale of suffering in Somalia prompted
President Bush to order a policy review and instruct his administration, “become ‘forward
leaning’ with regard to Somalia.”29 In August UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali announced
that the contingent of 500 peacekeepers would increase to 3,500 to deploy to Somalia to guard
humanitarian shipments and supplies. This force became United Nations Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM I). Over the hesitations of the Joint Staff, President Bush then approved the National
Security Council (NSC) Deputies Committee decision for the Department of Defense to
commence emergency airlifts of food aid for Somalia and provide transportation to the UN
peacekeepers.30 This initiative became Operation PROVIDE RELIEF.
After Bush’s announcement of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF the U.S. media enhanced its
coverage of Somalia and the American public perceived the administration as dedicated to
successfully alleviating the humanitarian crisis. 31 However, increased delivery of food aid in the
absence of security resulted in widespread looting of supplies and an informal Somali economy
based on the monetization of stolen goods. Even with rampant looting, warehouses were full of
food but distributing the items to the targeted population proved impossible.32 As the volume of
food aid increased, the percentage actually reaching the Somalis in most need declined
precipitously.33 The 500 man Pakistani peacekeeping force arrived in September but, due to
limited mobility and restrictive rules of engagement, were forced by armed factions to remain at
the Mogadishu airport.34
7
The inefficacy of U.S. current efforts to meet the demands of the security challenge in Somalia
and the mounting humanitarian crisis put pressure on the Bush administration to react more
forcefully. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, and National
Security Council staff called for increased U.S. engagement in Somalia, while the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted calls for U.S. involvement in a quagmire with no
“end-point” in which little U.S. interests were at stake.35 Overall momentum was moving
towards greater U.S. engagement. 36
NSC Deputies Committee meetings in August and September centered on the need to establish
“points of security” around critical infrastructure to secure ground convoys carrying food aid to
feeding centers.37 In October and November the administration assessed plans for the additional
UN peacekeeping force of 3,000, proposed by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in August and
approved through Security Council Resolution 775, to establish four security zones in Somalia,
each protected by a UN force of 750 peacekeepers.38 A Central Intelligence Agency report
indicate that the peacekeeping force was far too small to provide for food shipments to reach the
now millions of starving Somalis.39 Consensus emerged in the administration that more action
was needed.
Bush Administration Decisionmaking: Operation Restore Hope
As pressure mounted, the NSC Deputies Committee continued to meet through November to
flush-out U.S. response options. Separating information and ideas into what was likely Known,
Unclear, and Presumed40 by the officials involved in this process may better illuminate the
factors contributing to President Bush’s decision.
8
Known
The humanitarian crisis was exacting terrible suffering on the Somali people and President Bush
felt deeply for their suffering and was concerned about the legacy of Somalia on his presidential
record after failing in his recent re-election campaign. 41
The Bush Administration was under intense and mounting pressure from the American public,
the media, Congress, and international organizations to introduce U.S. military forces to provide
security for humanitarian relief in Somalia. In addition, President Clinton, as a presidential
candidate had criticized the Bush Administration’s lack of initiative.42 President Bush’s
Administration believed fully in the need to use decisive military force if force was to be
applied.43
Unclear
How would Somali armed factions respond to the introduction of U.S. combat forces?
How would the transition from Operation Restore Hope to UN command of peacekeeping forces
go forward?44
Presumed
Only the U.S. had the military and political clout to act decisively.45
Operation Restore Hope would be short.46
Intervening in Somalia would be less costly than in Bosnia and may placate criticism for lack of
engagement in the Balkans. 47
9
Available Options
After review by the NSC Deputies Committee, President Bush convened a meeting with senior
advisor’s on November 25th 1992 to consider the following options:
“Option 1: Continue the current course, although with more US air and sealift.
Option 2, which was favored by the State Department: Push the UN to move
more quickly and commit more troops (10,000 to 15,000 instead of 3,500). The
United States would provide logistical support units and deploy a Marine
Amphibious Ready Group to deter Somali attacks upon UN forces.
Option 3: Organize under UN auspices a US-led coalition, equal to a division in
strength and containing US ground forces.” 48
President Bush chose Option 3, the most forceful action presented. In a December address to the
American people President Bush outlined the objectives for Operation Restore Hope:
First, we will create a secure environment in the hardest-hit parts of Somalia so
that food can move from ships overland to the people in the countryside now
devastated by starvation. And second, once we have created that secure
environment, we will withdraw our troops, handing the security mission back to a
regular UN peacekeeping force. Our mission has a limited objective, to open the
supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN
peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will
not stay one day longer than is necessary.49
The Enduring Impact of Operation Restore Hope
Operation Restore Hope was largely successful in assuaging the security situation that prevented
the delivery of food supplies in Somalia and likely saved the lives of thousands of Somali
citizens.50 However, the operation’s limited scope may account for its success as well as the
failure of subsequent missions. Lack of economic or political progress contributed to a
10
deteriorating environment in which Somali resentment was exploited by clan leaders and
redirected towards international peacekeeping forces.51 Eventually dreaded “mission-creep” and
the horrific display of U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after an
October 1993 assault by Somali factions proved too much for the Clinton Administration to
stomach. A straightforward attempt to secure relief had gotten too messy. 52
The current crisis in Somalia differs in important ways from the crisis the resulted in the George
H. W. Bush administration’s decision to intervene. After a decade of avoidance, U.S.
engagement with Somalia has been defined by counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts. These
efforts differ from humanitarian missions in their motivation and logic.
Additionally, the media landscape has changed in the last twenty years. In our current era of
instant accessibility everything competes for the U.S. public’s interest, perhaps diminishing the
significance of each constituent issue. Consider the high-profile quagmires that currently
challenge U.S. foreign policy: Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Somalia,
and Yemen. These issues are nested within wider uncertainties, such as the Arab Spring, U.S.China relations, and the global economic system. Perhaps the images of starvation in Somalia no
longer hold the same power as before.
However, some things remain the same. The same cost-benefit calculations that the Bush and
Clinton administrations employed in Somalia continue to reverberate in contemporary foreign
policy debates. How to get food to starving people is a short-term logistical question for which
the instruments of U.S. foreign policy are well-suited. The questions of how to disseminate the
food and what happens after the people are fed to prevent starvation in the future assume
11
political dimensions which are more difficult and require more time. U.S. policy sometimes
reflects the more noble desires of the American people not to tolerate humanitarian catastrophes,
but only as the long as the intervention produces quick results and doesn’t get messy, which are
two qualities antithetical to nation-building and long-term development.53
As was evident in Somalia twenty years before, foreign populations are not homogenous and
intervention forces inevitably inject themselves as a powerful new player among numerous
existing factions in a constantly evolving political game. While each player has relative
strengths and weaknesses, the qualities of the U.S. as an intervention force are consistent and
easily identifiable: military and technological superiority paired with a lack of staying power or
strategic patience. This American impatience in humanitarian situations is the result of a process
in which U.S. goodwill spirals into resentment and demands for withdraw when the public
watches portions of the population they thought they were helping turn against their
benefactors.54
The fundamental equation for humanitarian interventions remains the same: adding ambitious
goals, limited resources, and risk aversion to a rapidly fluctuating and unknown environment
equals disaster. Examining the circumstances and decision-making that contributed to the first
U.S. intervention in Somalia provides insight into the current humanitarian crisis. As the U.S.
public continues to interpret the tragedy unfolding in the Horn of Africa and policymakers
attempt to formulate a response, the events in Somalia two decades prior serve as an indicator for
assessing how far we’ve come and how far we have yet to go to eliminate mass famine and
starvation.
12
Endnotes:
13
1
http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16049636
For a detailed analysis of the representation of Somalia in the news prior to the U.S.
intervention see: Ogundimu, Folu and Jo Ellen Fair. 1997. “Before ‘Hope was Restored’: News
Media Portrayals of Somalia Prior to the U.S. Intervention.” Northeast African Studies, Vol. 4, No.
2, 19-41.
2
“Although they did not carry out the more ambitious goals of U.N.-sponsored nationbuilding, U.S. forces sent to Somalia clearly did execute their missions successfully, relieving
untold suffering through humanitarian assistance and executing their military responsibilities
with skill and professionalism.” Kenneth Allard. “Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.” p.xviii,
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf And Chester A. Crocker, May/June 1995. “The
Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, 2-8.
3
“The intervention in Somalia was not a failure as measured by the standards first set by
President Bush. Much has been accomplished in humanitarian terms, and a larger tragedy has
been averted. How large a tragedy it is impossible to know, but, judging by the Somali death
toll of 1992, one could reasonably estimate that upwards of a quarter of a million Somali lives
were saved.” Chester A. Crocker, May/June 1995. “The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went
Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, 2-8. p.2-3
4
Put more bluntly, “the two main lessons that America absorbed from the Somalia debacle…1.
Nation-building is bloody, costly and futile. So if people in piddling third-world countries want
to tear each other apart, let 'em. 2. Casualties are completely unacceptable in American military
operations. At the first sign of blood, politicians abandon missions and generals are retired.”
Nicholas D. Kristof. February 5, 2002. “The Wrong Lessons of the Somalia Debacle.” The New
York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/05/opinion/the-wrong-lessons-of-thesomalia-debacle.html
5
“a mounting body of evidence suggests that the foreign policies of American presidents—and
democratic leaders more generally—have been influenced by their understanding of the public’s
foreign policy views.” Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin
Thompson Sharp. 2006. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of
Political Science. 9:477-502., p. 496.
6
The “halo” or “hangover effect” is a useful construct. See: Lyon, Alynna J. and Mary Fran T.
Malone. 2009. “Was Woodrow Wilson Right? Assessing American Attitudes towards
Humanitarian Intervention.” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, Issue 13.
7
Lessons derived by policymakers involve political pressure and will and thereby differ
importantly from operational lessons, such as after action reviews conducted by the actors
themselves. For a comprehensive example of operational lessons-learned see: Kenneth Allard.
“Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.” http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf
8
Over 15 years ago, in his Foreward for a book about the experience, Chester A. Crocker, who
served as Assistant Secretray of State for African Affairs from 1981-89, recognized then that,
“[c]ommentators, policymakers, and scholars will look back on America’s Somalia enterprise of
1992-94 as setting the tone of this transitional era.” Hirsch, John L. and Robert B. Oakley.
1995. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping,
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, p. vii.
9
14
“Based on the outcome of this disaster, it was apparent, the US political and military
leadership had not learned its lesson from previous, similar operations, namely Beirut.” Day,
Clifford E. 1997. “Critical Analysis on the Defeat of Task Force Ranger,” p. 37. http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc10.pdf
10
See: Dobbins, James. “Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond,” Testimony Presented before the United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on September 23, 2003. http://www.rand.org/
pubs/testimonies/2005/CT212.pdf
11
“Put simply, we cannot understand Rwanda without consideration of Somalia; likewise,
involvement in Kosovo is part of the Somalia and Rwanda legacies.” Lyon, Alynna J. and Chris J.
Dolan. 2007. “American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution.” Foreign
Policy Analysis. 3, 46-78. p.68.
12
Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, p. 5.
13
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid, p. 6.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid, p. 7.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid, p. 8.
21
Ibid, p. 7.
McMaster, Jeffrey. 1996-1997. “The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the
Cold War: Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti,” Academie universitaire Louvain, p.29.
22
Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, p. 9.
23
24
Ibid, p. 12.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid, p. 13-14.
27
Ibid, p. 15.
28Glanville,
Luke. 2005. “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian
Intervention.” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, p. 2-3.
29
Ibid, p. 3.
Poole Walter S. 2005. The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. Joint History
Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 9.
30
15
Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,”
p. 3.
31
32
Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. p. 10.
Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, p. 25.
33
34
Ibid, p. 27.
Ibid, p. 37. and Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. p. 8. And “As
Bush began to speak out on the crisis in Somalia, there was little enthusiasm in the Pentagon
for the employment of overwhelming force in the absence of vital material interests.” Glanville,
“Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 4.
35
“Although President Bush kept himself informed, NSC Principals did not meet about Somalia
until late November when a major decision had to be made. By then, incremental decisions
below that level had led the administration toward intervention.” Poole, The Effort to Save
Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. p. 8.
36
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid, p. 15.
This approach is based on a standard method to help categorize the factors that influence
decisionmaking proposed by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. See: Neustadt, Richard E. and
Ernest R. May. 1986. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers. New York: The
Free Press.
40
“By October 1992, an estimated 300,000 Somalis had died since the civil war began. A
further 4.5 million of a population of only 6 million were threatened by severe malnutrition and
disease. At least 1.5 million of these Somalis were deemed to be at mortal risk.” In: Glanville,
“Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 2.
41
“there was pressure from many quarters—Capitol Hill, the media, and presidential candidate
Bill Clinton—for greater action.” In: McMaster, “The United States and Humanitarian Intervention
after the Cold War: Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and Haiti,” p. 48. And “As public distress about the
situation in Somalia mounted, pressure on the Bush administration to act came from three main
sources—the media, Congress, and the humanitarian relief agencies operating in Somalia.” In:
Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and
Peacekeeping, p. 35. And “General Colin Powell and his doctrine advocating overwhelming force
and limited objectives so dominated both administrations that no other vision of the Somali
operation could be enunciated.” In: Clarke, Walter and Jeffrey Herbst. March April 1996.
“Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, p. 75.
42
See: Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian
Intervention,” p. 3-4. And Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994.
43
President Bush questioned, “whether conditions in Somalia would permit a smooth handoff to
a UN peacekeeping force after a relatively brief U.S. deployment…” In: Hirsch and Oakley,
Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p. 43.
44
16
“Only the United States possessed the capacity to act promptly.” Poole, The Effort to Save
Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. p. 20. And “The Bush administration was aware that only
the US could mount an operation, alone or leading a coalition, that could bring dramatic
improvement in a short space of time.” Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the
Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 3.
45
“The President wanted US troops to enter Somalia as soon as possible and then be replaced
by UN peacekeepers in the shortest feasible time.” In: Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August
1992-March 1994. p. 21.
46
See: Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking
and Peacekeeping, p. 42. And See: Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the
Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 6.
47
Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention,”
p. 18.
48
In: McMaster, “The United States and Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War: IraqKuwait, Somalia, and Haiti,” p. 47.
49
“The efforts of UNITAF could be rated a success in the sense that, when UNOSOM took over
on 4 May 1993, Mogadishu was calm, heavy weapons had been stored in cantonments, and
marauding gangs were suppressed. Food supplies were flowing, starvation practically had
ceased, drought eased, and seeds and livestock were being replenished. The clans still had their
customary arsenals of small arms, however, and the warlords showed little willingness to
compromise or negotiate in good faith.” Poole, The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March
1994. p. 2.
50
“Without a stable government, functioning police forces, and long-term economic aid,
Somalia would slide back toward disaster. As matters turned out, the humanitarian task was
accomplished, but security steadily eroded and political reconstruction was stillborn.” Ibid, p. 2.
51
“Never has this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in 1992 when
the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war in the east
African country of Somalia. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but
unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four
marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the impression of chaos and disaster.”In:
Richard W. Stewart. 2002. The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994. U.S. Army Center of
Military History. p. 5.
52
“The international community should discard the illusion that one can intervene in a country
beset by widespread civil violence without affecting domestic politics and without including a
nation-building component. Attention must be devoted to rebuilding the institutions whose
collapse helped bring on disaster. Stopping a man-made famine means rebuilding political
institutions to create order. No intervention in a troubled state such as Somalia can succeed in a
few weeks. Unless development aid and external assistance address the long-term political and
economic implications of an intervention, it is doomed.” Clarke and Herbst, “Somalia and the
Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 78.
53
17
“The American people gave their unqualified support for the intervention in Somalia initially—
when the mission was perceived as a quick, low-cost undertaking primarily aimed at providing
relief. After American forces began incurring casualties as a result of expanding the operation’s
objectives, however, the priority of the public became military withdrawal.” Klarevas, Louis J.
2000. “The Polls-Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, 64: 523-540. p.524. http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/64/4/523.full.pdf
54
18