GV958: Contemporary Political Theory, Part I: Philosophy of Science (Han Dorussen) Week 7: So What? Overview 1. Introduction: Against Method 2. The critique of falsifiability 3. The critique of the distinction between ‘context of justification’ and ‘context of discovery’ 4. The critique of the distinction between ‘science’ and ‘myth’ 5. Conclusions: So What? 1. Introduction: Against Method Last week’s topic was the supposed uniqueness of the social science. The two key arguments that I discussed were (a) that there are many similarities between the naturalistic and interpretative sides of the social sciences, most crucially in their claims to being scientific (Braybrooke), and (b) critical social science imposes additional ‘demands’ but still largely retains the scientific core of its enterprise—it may guide us in the selection of topics, in the full development of our theory (e.g., a theory of education and action), but it does not excuse us from unearthing relevant ‘laws’ and/or ‘rules’ (Braybrooke / Fay). This leaves us with some ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news: The ‘good’ news is that it should be possible, at least in principle, to compare the achievements of the natural science with those of the social sciences. Braybrooke, for example, mentions that some of the ‘problems’ of social scientific ‘laws’ (such as their conditionality) also apply to many natural laws. Along similar lines, Popper’s critique of the lack of falsifiable proposition in psycho‐analysis or the ‘poverty of historicism’ may not necessarily undermine the whole of social scientific activity. And finally, Kuhn’s description of the social sciences as pre‐paradigmatic is probably too harsh. Yes, simultaneously there exist different traditions and theories in the social sciences, but these traditions are not necessarily incommensurable. The ‘bad’ news is that the huge gap in progress in knowledge between the natural and social sciences becomes glaringly obvious. Take for example, the ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’ theories of depression. Even by the late 70s, many ‘nature’ theories were highly underdeveloped and consequently the therapies they suggested were little more than butchery. Nowadays our understanding of the brain (MRI/CT‐technology) has increased tremendously and therapies and medications have evolved accordingly. In comparison, the ‘nurture’ theories and therapies (psycho‐analysis, group therapy) seem to have remained largely stagnant. Bringing us back to the original questions: how to explain growth of knowledge? Can the scientific method explain the advances in brain science? Was Popper right in worrying about the lack of falsifiable statement in psycho‐analysis, and can this explain its relative lack of progress? What to make of multiple co‐existing theories? Is it acceptable to argue that both brain science and psycho‐analysis have something useful to add? If so, should we also allow for ‘religious’ cures of depression—‘saved by Jesus?’ (Try Google: Christian cure for depression). 1
Paul Feyerabend (Against Method) outlines an anarchistic (or ‘Dadaistic’) theory of knowledge which is indeed willing to entertain such radical conclusions: scientific progress has nothing to do with method; “the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes.” As long as we accept as a condition that science as we know it today exist and that its methods are permitted to allow its future development, “reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded” (Feyerabend 1975, 181). Neither method nor practice (applications) allows for a direct comparison of scientific and non‐scientific (myths) ideas, let alone for a hierarchical ordering. Science is not superior and accepting science as such is ultimately an ideological choice which should be left to the individual; hence, Feyerabend argues for a strict separation of state and science. 2. The critique of falsifiability In Week 22, I discussed Popper’s falsifiability criterion for deductive testing of theories: (Popper, Scientific Method, pp. 135 – 6) Four different lines along which the testing of a theory could be carried out: ‐ Internal (logical) consistency ‐ Investigation of the logical form of the theory: is the theory empirical/scientific or tautological? ‐ Comparison with other theories: scientific advance. ‐ By way of empirical applications of the conclusions. Regarding the latter: “Here too the procedure of testing turns out to be deductive. With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular statements – which we may call ‘predictions’ –are deduced from the theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory contradicts [HD: Feyerabend emphasizes that they contradict with our expectations which are based on ‘older’ theory]. Next we seek a decision as regards these (and other) derived statements by comparing them with the results of practical applications and experiments. […] But if the decision is negative, or in other words, if the conclusions have been falsified, then their falsification also falsifies the theory from which they were logically deducted.” On page 150: “We must clearly distinguish between falsifiability and falsification. We have introduced falsifiability solely as a criterion for the empirical character of a system of statements. As to falsification, special rules must be introduced which will determine under what conditions a system is to be regarded as falsified.” In other words: a theory is falsifiable if it allows for the derivation of statements that can (in principle) be falsified. Popper’s claim is that it is worthwhile to demarcate scientific theories on the basis of their falsifiability; since we cannot know on the basis of empirical evidence when a theory is true, it is at least helpful to know when empirical evidence suggests that a theory is false. We have already seen several objections: ‐ A single observation is unlikely to falsify any theory (Popper already stated that only a ‘reproducible effect’ could have such an effect). ‐ It is always possible to revise the experiment/observation in light of the ‘falsification’ (Conventionalism): e.g., all swans are white, observe a black swan, conventionalism: this black bird isn’t a swan. ‐ Blame the instrument or researcher (Kuhn). 2
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Alternatively, one can adapt the theory (ad hoc‐adjustment): e.g., all swans are white, observe a black swan, ‘new theory’: all swans are either white or black. Falsification will only be admitted (or even recognized) in light of (or even if we have) an alternative theory. (Kuhn but Popper admits this). Feyerabend: “No theory ever agrees with all the facts in its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress.” Feyerabend (also Lakatos): ‘new’ theories often have many anomalies and ‘ad hoc’ hypotheses. Any criterion based on falsification/falsifiability would have robbed us of many theories that turned out to be highly important. Empirical contents: Popper/Kuhn: new
old
[HD: Feyerabend (p. 177) emphasizes that this is an epistemological illusion: the empirical content of the old theory appears to have shrunk because most ‘facts’ are uninteresting and are dealt with by means of ‘ad hoc’ approximations and hypotheses, or simply by stating that they are explained by the new theory] Alternative/Lakatos a
b
c
a = admittedly unexplained part of old theory b = problems / facts of old theory that can be fit into the new framework c = new theory with facts Feyerabend: b
c
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3. The critique of the distinction between ‘context of justification’ and ‘context of discovery’ Popper: “I shall distinguish sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically.” Feyerabend (p. 167): “The activities which […] belong to the context of discovery are, therefore, not just different from what goes on in the context of justification, they are in conflict with it.” The criteria that allow us to ‘demarcate’ science are often useless in developing new ideas; e.g., you do not want to insist on falsifiability, or you want to revisit on old discarded idea. Basically, in the development of new ideas, everything is up for grabs, and anything that limits activities risks limiting creativity and thus the growth of knowledge. Previously, we have discussed Ziman’s arguments about the ‘sociology of science’, the link between academic ethos and the progress of science. What would Feyerabend make of this? I suspect that he would argue that (a) great scientific achievement have often been made by people who were unwilling to play by the rules, and (b) that any identification/institutionalization of such rules (CUDOS) is likely to be used to exclude academics and thus to hamper progress. 4. The critique of the distinction between ‘science’ and ‘myth’ Feyerabend argues against the distinction because (a) science operates in many ways like myths: ‐ Theories/myths are both quests for unity underlying apparent complexity, ‐ Both suggest a wider causal context than common sense, ‐ Both are dogmatic and have recognized ‘taboos’, and (b) myths often have highly practical relevance (they help people to effectively deal with their environment). I think that Feyerabend is quite consciously provocative here, but it is done for a very serious purpose, namely to argue against an institutionalized, sanctified image of science. The identification of state with science can easily lead to an oppressive regime (just like the earlier identification of church with science). 5. Conclusions: So What? Feyerabend concludes: ‐ Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs its critical power. ‐ There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge. ‐ The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes. One would be tempted to think that the current state of the social sciences is the pinnacle of human achievement. Yet…. 4
Department of Government
PhD Professional Development Handout 1:
Empirical Political Science Continuum
Range
Type of
approach
I
Hermeneutic/
thick
description
II
Discourse
analysis
III
Theorydriven
empirical
IV
Theorydriven
empirical
V
Theorydriven
empirical
VI
Theorydriven
empirical
VII
Nomothetic
Reasoning
Inductive
Inductive and
analytical
Inductive
and
analytical
Inductive
and
analytical
Inductive and
analytical
Inductive
and
analytical
Deductive
Evidence
vs.
Inference
‘Evidence
without
inference’
Meaning and
understanding
from language
and action
Qualitative
evidence
and
inference
Quantitative/
Qualitative
evidence
and
inference
Quantitative
evidence and
inference
Inference
with
confirmatory
evidence
‘Inference
without
evidence’
Nature of
knowledge
claim
Particular
Context
specific
Particular
Context
specific
Universal
with room
for
exceptions
Universal
with room
for
exceptions
Universal
with room for
exceptions
Universal
Universal
Scope of
coverage
Single
countries
Sub-national
units
Single
countries
Limited
comparison
Comparative
and singlecountry
analysis
Comparative
Global
comparative
Comparative
and singlecountry
analysis
Theoretical
constructs
and
mathematical
proofs only
Examples
from
political
science and
international
relations
Geertz
(1973) ‘Deep
Play: Notes
on the
Balinese
Cock Fight’
Norval (1996)
Deconstructing
Apartheid
Discourse
Wolf (1969)
Peasant
Wars of the
20th Century
Przeworski, et
al. (2000)
Democracy
and
Development
Mitchell
(2004)
Agents of
Atrocity
Downs
(1957)
Economic
Theory of
Voting
Campbell
(1998) Writing
Security
Risse, et al.
(1999) The
Power of
Human
Rights
Foweraker
and
Landman
(1997)
Citizenship
Rights and
Social
Movements
Womack
(1971)
Zapata and
the Mexican
Revolution
Allison
(1971)
Essence of
Decision
Putnam
(1993)
Making
Democracy
Work
Boix (2003)
Redistribution
and
Democracy
Russet and
O’Neal
(2001)
Triangulating
Peace
Mearsheimer
(2001)
The Tragedy
of the Great
Power
Politics
Olson (1965)
The Logic of
Collective
Action
Lichbach
(1994)
The Rebel’s
Dilemma
Source: adapted from Landman (2006) Studying Human Rights, London: Routledge, p. 60.
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