WebMemo
22
Published by The Heritage Foundation
No. 3006
September 9, 2010
Do Not Undermine the
U.S.–European Military Relationship
Sally McNamara
The Sustainable Defense Task Force report1 published in June 2010 has called for the number of
U.S. troops stationed in Europe to be cut by more
than 30,000, leaving a routine U.S. force presence
in Europe of just 35,000 servicemen. The report
also proposes ending an ongoing study to refurbish
the B61 tactical nuclear bomb—200 of which are
estimated to be stored in Europe. When presenting
the report, task force co-organizer Congressman
Barney Frank (D–MA) stated: “I do not know what
we are protecting Europe from—or why they can’t
defend themselves.”2
Frank’s statement is shortsighted and misplaced.
As The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring states,
curtailing America’s security commitments in the
ways suggested by the task force would see America
unable to prevent a hostile power from dominating
Europe—and the potential rise of the European
Union as a counterweight to American global power.3
The U.S. forward-deploys its troops for the purposes of defending America and its allies and to
deter potential aggressors. The task force’s recommendations would gut Washington’s defensive and
deterrent capabilities, undermine America’s commitments to its European allies, irretrievably damage the NATO alliance, and ultimately harm
American strategic interests.
Deterrence. U.S. servicemen and assets stationed
in Europe serve a genuine military purpose, including directly deterring those who seek to harm America and its allies. For deterrence to be truly effective,
assets and commitments must be clearly visible.
Conventional deterrence capabilities are especially important in reassuring America’s allies in the
Baltic States and the former satellites of the Soviet
empire. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 has
demonstrated that the threat of traditional military
confrontation in Europe has not disappeared.
America’s presence in Europe represents a willingness to stand with its NATO allies in the face of
intimidation, which undoubtedly factors into the
calculations made by NATO’s strategic competitors
and enemies.
Similarly, the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear
bombers in Europe deters the growing number of
aggressive actors that threaten the U.S. and its allies.
Furthermore, the vast majority of America’s allies in
Europe have not sought to join the club of nuclear
weapons powers precisely because they sit under
Washington’s nuclear umbrella. Unilateral nuclear
disarmament or an unreasonable degradation of America’s forward-deployed nuclear forces would change this
equation as European nations seek alternative security
insurance either in the form of nuclear weapons or alliances with other nuclear powers. The destabilization
brought to the European continent from a premature removal of American nuclear weapons, or an
unacceptable degradation of its force, would be a
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http://report.heritage.org/wm3006
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No. 3006
WebMemo
major setback to global security and stability—and
would undermine President Obama’s nonproliferation goals.123
Defense. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a
startling demonstration that many of America’s
most dangerous threats lie far beyond its borders
and require a proactive posture to defeat them.
Today’s strategic threat environment, including the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technologies, requires the deployment of missile
defenses capable of protecting the U.S. and its
NATO allies. U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
is pursuing the possibility of an interoperable missile defense architecture and has recently carried out
joint exercises with Germany and the Netherlands
to identify areas for future integration.
Furthermore, deploying American troops in
multinational contingents such as in Afghanistan
makes sense in practical and financial terms. Adequate joint training missions are critical to this function. The last place the U.S. wants to identify
shortcomings in multinational coordination is on
the battlefield. The number of joint exercises carried
out between America and its NATO allies has
already been vastly reduced since the war on terrorism began due to large numbers of Europe-based
U.S. troops being deployed to Afghanistan and
Iraq.4 Further cutting the number of troops available for substantial training exercises would only
undermine the prospects for future multinational
engagements.
Cost savings, as well as greater interoperability,
can also be realized through multinational procurement projects, such as NATO’s Strategic Airlift
Capability (SAC) consortium and its AWACS program. The primary obligation of SAC’s three C-17
military transport aircraft is to support the NATO
September 9, 2010
mission in Afghanistan, and NATO AWACS
patrolled the skies in the wake of 9/11. American
leadership was undoubtedly central to bringing
both of these projects to fruition. Unless Washington is willing to sacrifice future joint projects as well
as greater interoperability, it should not seek to
reduce its presence in Europe.
Building Enduring Alliances. America has
found its closest and most reliable allies in Europe,
specifically within the NATO alliance. Forged on
the beaches of Normandy and underpinned by the
Anglo–American Special Relationship, the transatlantic security alliance stands as the most successful
and lasting alliance structure of modern times. An
effective strategy for maximizing America’s national
security and reinforcing the indivisibility of transatlantic security should therefore emphasize U.S.–
European military relations.
America’s force structure and its nuclear forces in
Europe must be commensurate with its treaty obligations, including Articles IV and V of the Washington Treaty requiring NATO allies to stand ready to
protect the security of any threatened member and
to consider an armed attack against one member as
an attack against them all. It is impossible to
reconcile a degraded U.S. presence in Europe with
these treaty obligations.
Recommendations. The Obama Administration
and Congress should support:
• Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent capability. In consultation with its allies, the U.S. should
design its nuclear forces in Europe and in the
U.S. around holding at risk the means of strategic
attack on the U.S. and its allies.
• Modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S.
arsenal, including their delivery systems.
1. Sustainable Defense Task Force, “Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forward,” June 11, 2010, pp. 15–17,
at http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf (September 8, 2010).
2. William Matthews, “Bipartisan Panel Offers Ways to Cut U.S. Spending,” Defense News, June 11, 2010, at
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4667417 (September 8, 2010).
3. Baker Spring, “The 2011 Defense Budget: Inadequate and Full of Inconsistencies,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.
2375, February 22, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/the-2011-defense-budget-inadequate-and-full-ofinconsistencies.
4. Pauline Jelinek, “Army Rethinking Plan to Cut Forces in Europe,” Associated Press, February 17, 2009, at
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/02/ap_army_europe_021709 (September 8, 2010).
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• Deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses with European partners.
• Maintaining credible conventional deterrent capabilities, including adequate troop levels and assets
for pre-9/11 levels of joint training activities.
• Maintaining U.S. leadership in NATO by keeping
at least one alliance headquarters on American
soil and maintaining a four-star U.S. officer as the
supreme commander of the Allied Forces in
Europe (SACEUR).
Visible Manifestations of U.S. Commitment.
Former NATO SACEUR General Bantz Craddock
has stated that America’s forward-deployed troops
and installations are “visible manifestations of U.S.
commitment and enable us to apply influence,
assure access when and where needed, and preserve
a leadership role in NATO.”5 Since 2003, the U.S.
September 9, 2010
has already significantly reduced its military presence in Europe, and tens of thousands of Europeanbased servicemen have had to be deployed to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Any further reduction of U.S.
troop strength in Europe would significantly curtail
joint training exercises, joint procurement programs, and America’s strategic options in addressing
future threats.
EUCOM is responsible for America’s military
relations with NATO and 51 countries, and it is vital
that the Obama Administration adopts policies that
bolster U.S.–European military relations rather than
undermine them.
—Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in
European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for
Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation.
5. General Bantz J. Craddock, Commander, United States European Command, statement before the Armed Services Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives, March 13, 2008, p. 48, at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/TestCraddock070315.pdf
(September 8, 2010).
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