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Title
Author(s)
Post-UN Withdrawal: An Assessment of Peacekeeping in Chad
Murphy, Ray
Publication
Date
2011
Publication
Information
Ray Murphy (2011) ' Post-UN Withdrawal: An Assessment of
Peacekeeping in Chad '. Irish Yearbook Of International Law,
Vol. 4-5 (2009-2010 (2011)):3-28.
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Post-UN Withdrawal: An Assessment of Peacekeeping in Chad.
Ray Murphy* corrected version Final Version
[I]n Darfur, in north-south Sudan, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Chad, scale
and politics multiply the challenges and dilemmas that peacekeepers face. Across vast terrains
and amidst ongoing conflict, the UN is called upon to protect civilians and provide stability,
often without critical capabilities at hand. The political processes that these missions
accompany are troubled, stalled or simply absent, and in some cases missions operate with
limited consent from key parties on the ground.1
Recent international peacekeeping efforts in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)
are a consequence of the long term unstable situation in both countries and the region as a
whole. The conflict in Darfur has been a destabilising factor and the combined effect of the
overall insecurity has created a humanitarian crisis that exacerbated tensions among the
region’s communities.2 The deployment of parallel UN and European Union peace operations
to Chad and CAR’s borders with Sudan in 2008 was reported to have done little to improve
the overall security and humanitarian situation in both countries.3 The security situation in the
eastern part of Chad and parts of the CAR did not improve significantly during 2010. Despite
this, the mission of the UN peacekeeping force, MINURCAT4, was revised in early 2010 as a
prelude to withdrawal.5
UN peacekeeping missions may be established in accordance with Chapter VI or VII of the
UN Charter.6 The two most important characteristics that distinguish traditional
peacekeeping under Chapter VI from the more robust peace enforcement operations under
Chapter VII are the use of force and the issue of host state consent. The issues of host state
consent to a UN military presence raises difficult questions in the context of internal conflicts or civil
wars. There were reservations about UN involvement in the Congo, Somalia, Lebanon and Kosovo
for these very reasons.7 Despite invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN/African Union
* Prof. Ray Murphy, Irish Centre for Human Rights, School of Law, NUI Galway, Ireland.
1
UN, A New Partnership Agenda, Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York, UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009) iii.
2
See: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/background.shtml. See also L Ploch, Instability in
Chad, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 25 January 2010.
3
Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2009 (Boulder, Lynne
Rienner, 2009), 32. See also UN Doc S/2010/409, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, 30 July 2010.
4
The UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), see
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/
5
S/RES/1923, 25 May 2010.
6
See B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2002) 648-700; N White, Keeping the Peace, 2nd edn (Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1997) 207-284; United Nations, The Blue Helmets- A Review of United Nations
Peacekeeping 3rd edn (New York, United Nations, 1996) 3-9.
7
See generally R Murphy, UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Legal and Operational Issues
in Practice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2
THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
mission (UNAMID) to Darfur requires the consent and cooperation of the government of Sudan.8 The
situation was similar in respect of MINURCAT.
The past decade has witnessed the prioritizing of the protection of civilians in statements
and resolutions emanating from the Security Council. The Secretary-General has issued
regular reports on the issue9 and the mandates of peacekeeping operations have included
express provisions dealing with civilian protection. This is expressed usually as being
mandated to ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger.’10 Any failure to
fulfil this role undermines the purpose of the peace operation and the credibility of the UN as
a whole.11 This article examines the challenges confronting peacekeeping in Chad, in
particular with regard to the protection of civilians, and the lessons to be learned from recent
and past peace operations. It asks if the withdrawal of MINURCAT rendered refugees,
internally displaced persons and humanitarian agencies on the ground more vulnerable. How
will the UN ensure the security of these vulnerable groups in the aftermath of the withdrawal
of its military component?
In early 2010, the government of Chad informed the UN that they wanted the military
component of MINURCAT reduced and that Chad was ready to assume responsibility for the
protection of civilians pending a complete withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission by the
end of 2010.12 However, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the
humanitarian situation in Chad was expected to remain precarious.13 The security situation in
eastern Chad continued to be ‘unpredictable’, while the situation in the MINURCAT area of
operations in north eastern CAR were said to be ‘volatile.’14
The security and protection of the civilian population was a central element in this mission from the
start. 15 In September 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1778 approved the establishment of a
multidimensional presence intended to create conditions that would facilitate a return of refugees and
8
UNSC Res 1769 (31 July 2007) S/Res/1769 (2007), para 15.
UNSC resolutions on the protection of civilians include UNSC Res 1267 ( 15 October 1999) S/RES/1267, UNSC
Res 1296 (19 April 2000) S/RES/1296, UNSC Res S/RES/1674 (28 April 2006), and UNSC Res 1738 (23 December
2006) S/RES/1738. The President of the Security Council has issued statements on the protection of civilians: UNSC
Presidential Statement 6 (2000) UN Doc S/PRST/1999/6; UNSC Presidential Statement 6 (2002) UN Doc
S/PRST/2002/6; UNSC Presidential Statement 41 (2002) UN Doc S/PRST/2002/41; UNSC Presidential Statement 27
(2003) UN Doc S/PRST/2003/27; UNSC Presidential Statement 46 (2004) UN Doc S/PRST/2004/46; UNSC
Presidential Statement 25 (2005) UN Doc S/PRST/2005/25 and UNSC Presidential Statement 1 (2009) UN Doc
S/PRST/2009/1. The Secretary-General has submitted periodic reports on the protection of civilians, on 8 September
1999 (S/1999/957); 31 March 2001 (S/2001/331); 26 November 2002 (S/2002/1300); 28 May 2004 (S/2004/431); 28
November 2005 (S/2005/740), 28 October 2007 (S/2007/643), 29 May 2009 (S/2009/277) and 28 September 2010,
(S/2010/498, on women, peace and security).
10
UN missions where this terminology was adopted include UNAMSIL (where it was expressed for the first time);
MONUC; UNMIL; ONUB; MINUSTAH; UNOCI; UNMIS; UNIFIL; UNAMID; and MINURCAT. The UN
Security Council also used similar language when approving missions approved under lead nations.
11
According to the Brahimi Report, ‘[n]o failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of
United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its failure to distinguish between victim and aggressor.’
UNGA, ‘Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report)’ (21 August 2000) UN,
Doc A/55/305–S/2000/809, ix.
12
Ibid, at 2 and UN News Centre, ‘Chad and UN officials agree on major downsizing in peacekeeping force,’
23 April 2010 and ‘Security Council consults on cutting UN military force to Chad,’ 7 May 2010
13
See www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226. There are an estimated quarter of a million
refugees from Sudan, over 60,000 from the Central African Republic and a further 68,000 displaced Chadians
living in eastern Chad, UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central
African Republic and in Chad (MINURCAT)’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/217.
14
See also UN Doc S/2010/409, UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
the Central African Republic and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/409, paras 2 and 5.
15
On the question of protection of civilians and vulnerable groups generally, see V Holt, G Taylor and M
Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations Successes, Setbacks and Remaining
Challenges: Independent Study jointly Commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York, United Nations, 2009).
9
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
displaced persons.16 A European Union force (EUFOR) was authorized ‘to take all necessary
measures, within its capabilities and its area of operations’ to contribute to protecting civilians in
danger.17 The UN Security Council also reaffirmed the obligation of all parties to implement fully the
rules and principles of international humanitarian law.18 Later, UN Security Council Resolution 1861
provided for the withdrawal of EUFOR and the creation of a military component of MINURCAT that
would take over from EUFOR. It also provided for the security and protection of civilians, and
decided that MINURCAT should be authorized to take all necessary measures within its capabilities
and area of operations to fulfil this role.19 In 2010, the government of Chad called for the withdrawal
of MINURCAT. After negotiations, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1923 extending the
mandate until 31 December 2010 when the mission ended.20 In this way, the Chadian authorities
assumed full responsibility for the security and protection of the civilian population in eastern Chad
from May 2010.
Amnesty International expressed concern about the uncertain security situation that the
reduced strength of MINURCAT would create.21 It cited the heightened risks for
organisations delivering humanitarian aid into some areas and increased the risk of children
being abducted and recruited as child soldiers. It was also critical of the UN Security Council
resolution which transferred responsibility for the protection of civilians in Eastern Chad to
the Chadian authorities.22 The resolution outlined the phased withdrawal of MINURCAT
from 15 July, with full withdrawal starting in mid-October and scheduled to be completed by
the end of 2010. It was planned that MINURCAT would have the capacity to protect civilians
until October, but only if they are under imminent threat of violence and this was happening
in the immediate vicinity of MINURCAT's bases.23 Amnesty International was deeply
concerned about the Security Council compromise that would see the force reduced to 1,900
troops and pass responsibility for protecting refugees to the Chadian Government despite the
inability of the Chadians authorities to adequately protect the many thousands of vulnerable
people in the region.24
BACKGROUND AND KEY CHALLENGES
A fundamental underlying problem was finding a comprehensive solution to the conflict in
eastern Chad, which would allow a sustained return of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
and refugees.25 Such a solution depends on the management of local conflicts between ethnic
groups, improved relations between Sudan and Chad and improved security in Darfur.
16
UNSC Res 1778 ( 25 September 2007) S/RES/1778, para 1.
Ibid, para 6.
18
Ibid, para 17.
19
UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) S/RES/1861, paras 3 and 6.
20
UNSC Res 1923 (25 May 2010) S/RES/1923, para 1. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/
21
‘UN hands protection of civilians over to Chad’, Amnesty International Press Release, 31 May 2010 and
‘UN pullout puts achievement of Irish troops in Chad at risk’, Press Release, 10 May 2010.
22
Ibid and UNSC Res 1923 (25 May 2010) S/RES/1923, paras 10 and 11.
23
Ibid, at , para 10.
24
Ibid, see also, Amnesty International, No Place for Us Here – Violence Against Refugee Women in Eastern
Chad
(London,
Amnesty
International
Publications,
2009)
available
at
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/02EC0A96B39EF37B49257641000BC49DFull_Report.pdf. See also Amnesty International, Chad: ‘We too deserve protection’ – Human Rights challenges
as
UN
mission
withdraws
(London,
Amnesty
International,
2010)
available
at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR20/009/2010/en/ec05e3c9-67f9-4a0e-8338e8d405b0e36e/afr200092010en.pdf.
25
See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, National Outrage – Violence against Internally Displaced
Women and Girls in Eastern Chad (Geneva, Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010).
17
3
2
THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
However, MINURCAT did not have a mandate to address the underlying political issues that
precipitated the crisis. The absence of any comprehensive regional policy to deal with the
inter-linked causes of instability in the Horn of Africa and surrounding region is the most
significant impediment to achieving a sustainable solution to the situation in Chad.
The violence in Chad has its origins in the misrule, corruption, ethnic divisions, culture of
impunity and disparities in levels of development from one region to another. It is
characterized by clashes between government forces and rebel groups, combined with
shifting alliances.26 The conflict in eastern Chad has the capacity to destabilise the whole
country and region.27 However, the biggest threat to the civilian population, including
refugees and displaced persons, is the widespread banditry and general lack of law and
order.28
In August 2006, the regional implications of the conflict in Chad were acknowledged when
the UN Security Council recognized the need to create a ‘multidimensional presence
consisting of political, humanitarian, military and civilian police liaison officers in key
locations in eastern Chad, including in internally displaced persons and refugee camps.’29
It took a further year before the Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 authorizing the
establishment of a multidimensional force to be deployed in eastern Chad and neighbouring
CAR.30 The UN mission, MINURCAT, would operate for an initial period of twelve months
alongside a European Union military force, EUFOR, which would protect civilians in danger,
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and protect UN agencies. 31Even in the planning
stages, it was evident that the EUFOR exit strategy was predicated on a handover to the UN
after twelve months.32 Unfortunately, this did not seem to impact on those responsible for
planning the UN military component. The UN wanted EUFOR to remain and tried to create
the scenario where it might do so. It took the UN Security Council until January 2009 to
adopt Resolution 186133 approving the deployment of a UN military component to follow up
EUFOR. As this was a mere two months from the date for the transfer of authority, the time
frame was too short for force generation and related issues. Following its initial deployment,
MINURCAT’s military component struggled to achieve full operational capability.34 On 15 April
2010, the border between Chad and Sudan reopened after seven years. The two countries agreed on 5
26
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2010, above n 3, at) 35. Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre, Internally Displaced in Chad: Trapped Between Civil Conflict and Sudan’s Darfur Crisis (Geneva, 11
July 2007). See generally JD Fage, A History of Africa, 3 rd edn (London, Routledge, 1995); M Meredith, The
State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London, Free Press, 2006); J Tubiana, The Chad–
Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality (Geneva, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, 2008).
27
International Crisis Group, Chad: Powder Keg in the East, African Report No 149 – 15 April 2009 (New
York, 2009) and P Berg, The Dynamics of Conflict in the Tri-Border of Sudan, Chad and the Central African
Republic (Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2008).
28
Interviews by author during May 2010 with Irish Defence Forces personnel returned from duty with
MINURCAT. See also UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central
African Republic and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/409, paras 2-5.
29
UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706, para 9(d).
30
See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurcat/
31
UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) S/RES/1778.
32
EUFOR, Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Mid Mandate Review, Report of the Operation Commander, 7
July 2008. Reference #1028 EU – OHQ, 2007 and UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad’ , (2008) UN Doc S/2008/601).
33
UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) S/RES/1861, para 4.
34
UN
Security
Council
Report
Chad/CAR,
May
2010
accessed
at
www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5968921/k.8C00/May_2010brChadCAR.htm
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
February 2010 to deploy some 3,000 troops in a Joint Border Force along the frontier to end crossborder rebel attacks from both sides.35
France has close relations with the Chadian government of Idress Déby and it took the lead
in the Security Council on Chad-related issues. Other members of the Council were cautious
about any change in the mandate that might lead to deterioration in the overall security
situation.36 The government of Chad indicated that it wanted an end to the military
component of the mission.37 It argued that the force had served its purpose and that it had
been a failure.38 In addition, Chad concluded new agreements on border security with
neighbouring Sudan and it claimed that MINURCAT did not possess sufficient strength to
provide complete security in eastern Chad. In the changed circumstances, it was better for
Chadian forces to take over and for the mission's mandate to be adjusted accordingly.39 This
self serving analysis by the Chadian government reflected a changed security environment.
The question is whether the decision to ‘downsize’ the military component as a prelude to
withdrawal was justified? Does the UN have any choice when a government withdraws its
consent? An orderly handover and transition from MINURCAT to Chadian authorities was
essential. What was the plan for the handover and did the Chadian government provide any
plan for the security of displaced persons and refugees? A High Level Panel and Joint
Technical Working Group of UN officials and Chadian security forces were established.40 If
the Chadian security forces could be relied upon, it made sense to transfer responsibility for
the security of vulnerable groups to them. However, it was by no means clear that Chad had
the capacity or commitment for such a role. Even the veiled language of the SecretaryGeneral’s report refers to the involvement of Chadian security forces and officials in criminal
activities, including kidnapping and carjacking.41 In the circumstances it is reasonable to ask
what hope there is that these forces will protect civilians.
The Chad mission was regarded by many Irish personnel who served there as the most
physically challenging mission Ireland has participated in to date. The security challenges
were compounded by significant logistical issues. Getting enough water, food and fuel were
major challenges to the day to day operations of the force. Could the UN have done more to
sustain the military component, or was the time ripe for withdrawal? The UN and European
Union peacekeeping efforts in Chad/CAR are not the first time a peacekeeping mission has
been established there. Earlier efforts by the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU) were
unsuccessful but the lessons of the past remain relevant today.
EARLY OAU’S INTERVENTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPERS
The security situation in Chad is characteristic of the overall level of political instability in
that region of Africa. Although Chad became independent in 1960, the situation has remained
35
Ibid. See also UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central
African Republic and Chad’ UN Doc S/2010/409, para 23.
36
UN
Security
Council
Report
Chad/CAR,
May
2010
accessed
at
www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5968921/k.8C00/May_2010brChadCAR.htm
37
UN News Centre, ‘Chad and UN officials agree on major downsizing in peacekeeping force,’ 23 April
2010 and ‘Security Council consults on cutting UN military force to Chad’, 7 May 2010.
38
J Karlsrud and R Solhjell, An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT (Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs, 2010) 1.
39
Security
Council
Report,
Chad/CAR,
May
2010
available
at
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.5968921/k.8C00/May_2010brChadCAR.htm>.
40
UN Secretary General Report, above note 35, at paras 25-27.
41
Ibid, at para 28.
5
2
THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
volatile and unpredictable.42 Similar to conflict zones elsewhere on the continent of Africa,
the roots of the conflict can be traced to its colonial past under French control.43 However,
ethnic conflict predated colonialism and was exacerbated by socio-economic and political
marginalisation of peripheral regions.44 Chad, like its neighbour Sudan, is divided between a
deeply ‘African’ south and an Arab-influenced north. The underpinning of the conflict is
similar to that of neighbouring Sudan and is evidence of their common historical context.
In 1979 a peace accord led to the deployment of a Nigerian peacekeeping force. The
challenges confronting the Nigerian military presence was a precursor to what the OAU’s
subsequent peacekeeping force experienced. It seemed that none of the parties to the conflict,
and the Nigerians themselves, understood fully the role of peacekeepers. In particular, the
factions failed to appreciate the constraints of peacekeeping and the implications of adopting
a neutral role. 45 This was exacerbated by ambiguity surrounding the mandate and the issue of
consent to the presence of foreign forces in Chad. The issue of host state consent was always
likely to prove problematic in a civil war situation. Unsurprisingly, the peacekeepers became
embroiled in the conflict and came to be perceived as part of the problem.46 Over time
relations between Nigeria and some of the factions deteriorated to the extent that the Nigerian
contingent was viewed as an ‘occupation army’ and asked to withdraw.47
A further reconciliation conference provided for an OAU neutral force to supervise the
ceasefire and oversee the peace process.48 In the event, only 500 Congolese troops arrived in
January 1980 and these had to be withdrawn soon after when fighting escalated. 49 The troops
had little impact on the ground and fighting continued unabated. Finding a solution under the
framework of the OAU was proving increasingly difficult. Part of the reason for this may be
that Nigeria was setting the agenda and the Nigerian and OAU efforts in Chad became
indistinguishable.
During this period, Libya continued its involvement in Chad and in January 1981, both
governments announced their decision to work towards achieving a merger of the two
countries. This plan was greeted with hostility and Chad ultimately succumbed to pressure
from other African leaders who made deployment of peacekeepers contingent on a Libyan
withdrawal.50 A further summit in Nairobi during 1981 provided for the deployment of
African peacekeepers.51 From the earliest days of deployment, however, the peacekeeping
operation was beset with problems stemming from financial and logistical weaknesses that
42
S Amoo, Frustrations of Regional Peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad 1977-82 (Atlanta, The Carter Center,
2004).
43
V Thompson and R Adloff, Conflict in Chad (Berkeley, University of California, 1981) 3-5, 11 and 21-22
and S Decalo, ‘Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad’ (1980) 18 (1) The Journal of Modern
African Studies 25.
44
B Neuberger, Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Ghadafi's Libya and Chad 1969-1981: Occasional
Paper No 83 (TelAviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1982) 12. G Prunier, ‘Chad, the
CAR and Darfur: Dynamics of Conflict.’ OpenDemocracy, April 17 2007. Available at:
www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa_democracy/chad_conflict_4538.jsp
and
‘Chad’s
tragedy’,
OpenDemocracy, September 7 2007; www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/africa/chad_tragedy
45
H Wiseman, ‘The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution’ in Y El-Ayouty and I William Zartman
(eds), The OAU After Twenty Years (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984) 131-32. On neutrality and impartial
see D Donald, ‘Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century’ (2002) 9 (4)
International Peacekeeping 21.
46
According to Alex Rondo, Nigerian troops ‘had to be withdrawn when it became obvious that they would
be at even greater physical risk than the belligerents,’ West Africa, 29 September 1980.
47
Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London, Cartermill International, 1980) 30066.
48
In August 1979, Nigeria hosted another reconciliation conference within the framework of the OAU,
Keesing's, above n 47, at 30067.
49
Ibid.
50
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad’ (1983) OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX) Part I, 2 and 3.
51
Nairobi Summit Resolution AHG/Res 102(XVII), para 5.
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
that had a serious detrimental effect on the operational capacity of the mission.52 Efforts to
obtain UN funding were unrealistic and unsuccessful.53 In 1982, the OAU peacekeeping force
withdrew.54 It had little option, apart from the inadequate logistical and financial support, the
mandate was ambiguous and the parties to the conflict were unable or unwilling to reach any
resolution.
The earlier OAU mission to Chad proved too ambitious for the limited resources of the
Organization. The already impoverished troop contributing countries were burdened with the
financial costs of the operation. This undermined logistical support and command and control
mechanisms within the force. The net effect was to undermine the overall effectiveness of the
force and its morale. Many of the weaknesses represented significant failures to adhere to
best practice. These included too broad a mandate and loose terms of reference, lack of
consent from the parties, and no real peace to keep compounded by a divided OAU. 55 When
this was combined with an ill-conceived negotiation process56 that did not take account of the
reality on the ground and the root causes of grievance, the mission failed. This proved a
significant blow to the prestige and authority of the OAU.57
The OAU's peacekeeping attempt failed to have any positive impact on the conflict in
Chad. It also resulted in institutional frustration and regional disillusion with the initiative.58
The efforts at achieving a resolution were too piece meal. Chad would have benefited from a
peace-building strategy and an integrated and multi-dimensional approach to the peace
operation. The OAU missions in Chad demonstrated the failure of regional peacekeeping.
Had the mission been led by the UN and supported by the OAU with troop contributions
from African states, then a sustained operation within the framework of the UN might have
been possible
EUFOR59 AND UN INTERVENTION IN CHAD IN 200860
A deteriorating security environment prompted the UN Secretary-General in December 2006
to propose the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to monitor movements along the
border areas, protect civilians under imminent threat and improve security by facilitating
political dialogue.61 This was rejected by Chadian president Déby, who feared the real focus
was Darfur. He wanted a UN civilian police force but no UN military presence, however,
after protracted negotiations it was agreed that an EU ‘bridging force’ of military personnel
would deploy in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. In essence,
52
Letter to the Security Council, 2 Dec 1981, circulated in Security Council Doc S/15011, 29 April 1982.
The Security Council did adopt a consensus resolution calling on the UN Secretary-General to establish a
voluntary fund to assist the mission, UNSC Res 504 (30 April 1982) UN Doc S/Res/504.
54
See UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Chad’ OAU Document AHG/109(XIX) Part I, 12-13; and
OAU Document AHG/ST/CTTEE/CHAD/Res 1(III).
55
Keesing's, above n 48, at 31159-31163.
56
See IW Zartman, The Negotiation Process (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications Inc, 1978) Chapter 4.
57
See A Sesay, ‘The Limits of Peacekeeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in
Chad’ (1991) Conflict Quarterly 21.
58
Amoo, above n 42, at 22.
59
European Union Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA) approved under Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP, 15 October 2008 and UNSC Res 1778 (25
September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778. The mandate authorised a mission for one year from date of reaching
Initial Operating Capacity (March 2008). It reached full Operating Capability in September 2008.
60
B Charbonneau, ‘What Is So Special about the European Union? EU–UN Cooperation in Crisis
Management in Africa’ (2009) 16 (4) International Peacekeeping 546.
61
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009, above n 3, at 32. ‘Chad: Relying on Outsiders’, The
Economist, 31 May 2008, 52.
53
7
2
THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
EUFOR was established to provide the military component of the UN mission
(MINURCAT).
The combined UN EU mandate was described as a ‘new beast’. 62 The
EUFOR and MINURCAT were two separate bodies, both mandated under the same UN
Security Council resolution. This was the first occasion that EU/UN cooperation adopted the
model whereby a European Union military force and a United Nations mission were
combined under a single UN mandate. A major risk in the circumstances was the likelihood
of confusion in the eyes of the local Chadian population. This was exacerbated by the fact
that although French troops had been stationed in Chad for more than two decades and
supported the regime of President Déby, France would provide the bulk of the troops for
EUFOR.63
The deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT indicated a renewed interest in
the region. Maintaining stability in Chad was an integral part of the strategy to protect
Sudanese refugees located there and other displaced persons in the region, including CAR
and Darfur. UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), which was adopted under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, mandated EUFOR to contribute to the protection of civilians in
danger, establish wider security to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and
contribute to the protection of UN and humanitarian personnel. 64 Such a mandate was bound
to bring EUFOR into conflict with both the Chadian authorities and rebel groups. It was not
long before Déby accused it of cooperating with rebel forces that had seized towns in the east
of the country.65 Irish forces were involved in confrontations with rebel forces. An incident in
June 2008 led to criticism of the alleged failure of Irish troops to protect UNHCR staff and
premises from rebel forces.66 Although later withdrawn, it is a good example of the uneasy
relationship that sometimes exists between UN and other humanitarian workers and military
personnel on the ground to protect them.67 Unfortunately, such incidents and accusations also
make headline news, but the retraction or correction receives much less attention.
FRANCE PLAYS LEAD ROLE IN EU FORCE
The EU deployment of a rapid reaction force in Chad/CAR marked the evolution of EU
policy in relation to sub-Saharan Africa.68 The appeal of the EU emanates from its political
legitimacy, economic clout and perceived neutrality. It is also an established civil–military
62
Acting head of MINURCAT, Ousseni Compaoré, quoted by Integrated Regional Information Networks
(IRIN), UN, 14 January 2008.
63
See comments by Lt Col J Vall, Deputy Chief of the Military Liaison Officers, MINURCAT, quoted by
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), United Nations, 14 January 2008.
64
UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778, para 6 and EUFOR Op EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA – Concept of Operations and the Provisional Statement of Requirements, 7 Nov 2007, Reference
#19749/07, 4. After a considerable delay EUFOR had deployed 3307 troops by October 2008. Annual Review
of Global Peace Operations 2009, above n 3, at 34.
65
Aljazeera.net, Tuesday 17 June 2008 and Mary Fitzgerald, ‘Clashes in Chad under control, O’Dea told’,
Irish Times, 17 June 2009, p 7.
66
C Lally, ‘Irish troops criticised for failing to protect staff’ The Irish Times, 18 June 2008.
. The UNHCR subsequently apologised for the staff members remarks and ‘misinformation’ about the incident.
See P Cullen, ‘Matter of UN Chad remarks “closed”’, The Irish Times, 21 June 2008 and C Lally, ‘O’Dea says
troops in Chad face greater risk’ The Irish Times, 27 August 2008.
67
M Fitzgerald, ‘Aid agencies and EU Chad force learn trust in tense security zone’ The Irish Times, 26
November 2008.
68
G Lee, ‘The EU and Conflict Management in African Emergencies’ (2002) 9 (3) International
Peacekeeping 87.
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
actor with a wide spectrum of its available means at its disposal giving it the potential to
dominate integrated crisis management in the future.69
The EU is seen as a unique organization, something more than what was envisaged under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.70 This uniqueness bestows on it an enhanced status and
legitimacy. However, this can be overstated. The political interests of the EU will always be
the driving force behind foreign policy decisions and a decision to deploy forces must be seen
to serve the interests of the Union as a global actor.71 At the very least, ‘the EU’s conflict
management policy towards Africa has first and foremost been motivated by European
concerns, which consist of both common interests and French national interests in
particular.’72 The French role is central to EU military operations on the African continent,
both in terms of political leadership and the willingness to project military power. Nowhere
was this more evident than in Chad, where France had to work hard to convince EU partners
to support an initiative that all knew was in French interest.73 A French led operation was
viewed with less suspicion by the Déby regime. Rebel forces did not see EUFOR as an
impartial mission.74 Having France play a lead role suited the Chadian leadership. EUFOR
provided Déby with some respite by shouldering part of the security burden of the Chadian
military and allowing them to concentrate their efforts in defeating rebel forces.
CHALLENGES FOR EUFOR
The political expectations for EUFOR did not match the military capacity of the force and the
range of obstacles that confronted it on the ground.75 Although it did have adequate military
capability, this was intended for deterrence, not combat. Deterrence became a key concept in
the underlying strategy of the operation. The overall objective was to create a safe and secure
environment in the area of operations. This is an undefined concept that presupposes the
existence of a functioning state.
EUFOR was a bridging operation to facilitate the
simultaneous deployment of a UN police mission and other elements under MINURCAT.
The concept was developed from previous UN/EU cooperation in crisis management. The
premise seemed to be based on the assumption that Chad was a functioning state. However,
the rule of law and related issues of governance within Chad were dysfunctional. 76
Unfortunately, MINURCAT was much slower becoming operational than originally
envisioned. This was a significant impediment as EUFOR was configured for dealing with
military threats while MINURCAT was intended to train police to deal with criminality and
banditry. In the circumstances, it was hard for the refugees or internally displaced persons to
see any tangible benefit from the presence of EUFOR.
Apart from the delay in
69
B Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality (London,
International Institute for Security Studies, 2008) 24.
70
K Graham and T Felìcio, ‘Regional Organisations and Collective Security: The Role
of the European Union’ in M Ortega (ed), The European Union and the United Nations:Partners in Effective
Multilateralism (Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005) 92.
71
Lee, above n 68, at 87-102.
72
G Olsen, ‘The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?’(2009)
16 (2) International Peacekeeping 257.
73
Charbonneau, above n 60, at 556.
74
P Fletcher, ‘Chad rebel attack aimed to spoil EU mission’ Reuters, 4 February 2008.
75
A Mattelaer, The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations – The Case of EUFOR TCHAD/CAR, IES
Working Paper 5/2008 (Brussels, Institute for European Studies, 2008) 6.
76
Personal interview, former senior EUFOR officer, Dublin 2010.
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THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
deployment, EUFOR was considered a success.77 It would have been preferable had EUFOR
not announced its date of deployment in advance, thereby undermining its impact and
precipitating a rebel offensive. Although operational capability was declared somewhat
prematurely in mid-March 2008, it was mid-September when EUFOR was fully operational.
Once on the ground, patrolling, destroying unexploded ordnance and showing a military
presence around sensitive areas contributed to the civilians feeling safer. Despite this, many
NGO’s did not perceive EUFOR as adopting a high visibility role and a policing deficit, with
a consequent culture of impunity, still reigned.
The EUFOR operation built on the premise that the UN would assume its role within a
relatively short time frame. The bridging operation concept has much to recommend it from
an EU perspective. There are the obvious public relations benefits of intervention during a
crisis, but avoiding the long term danger of trying to formulate an exit strategy before the
crisis has been resolved. The main danger is that spoilers, aware of the time frame, will just
sit it out until the force withdraws. This presented the UN with the burden of ensuring the
follow up operation has sufficient deterrent capability to assume responsibility for the
security situation.
The EUFOR operation highlighted shortcomings in EU common security and defence
policy. The EU did not deploy an existing Battle Group. The Nordic Battle Group had
become operational from 1 January 2008 and was well placed to fill the role of the EU
expeditionary force. While a number of states expressed reservations, Sweden refused to
participate.78 In Ireland, there was some opposition to the participation of defence force
personnel in a ‘French dominated’ international force and there were calls to deploy with the
AU/UN force in Darfur.79 Eventually a number of member states agreed to contribute troops
to make up this force. Each contributing state assessed the training requirements for
participation and then completed the training programme in their respective national territory.
In this way, there did not appear to be a European Union assessment exercise or training
programme for this operation. The planned strength of EUFOR had to be reduced from 4000
referred to in the crisis management concept to 3700 when no more troops were made
available despite five force generation conferences.80 Furthermore, unlike pre-existing Battle
Groups, the contingents involved did not complete training exercises beforehand and, in some
cases, may not have worked together in an operational environment before deploying. In the
case of the Chad mission, this does not appear to have caused any significant operational or
other problems on the ground. However, it does mean that European Union integrated
training for crisis management operations has a long way to go before it becomes a reality.
Furthermore, it is not the optimum way to conduct an operation and makes an EU integrated
training programme more virtual than real.
An unfortunate consequence of any military intervention is that it can preserve the status
quo and indirectly assist those with most power. This may be unavoidable, but awareness of
the unforeseen and often unintended consequences should guide the tactics and strategy of
any such operation. The EUFOR mission did help to create a secure environment in the east,
but it did not create conditions sufficient to see internally displaced persons and refugees
return home. Its presence, dominated by France, facilitated the Chadian military in dealing
77
Oxfam Briefing Paper, Mission Incomplete: Why Civilians Remain at Risk in Eastern Chad (London,
Oxfam International September 2008) 2 and 12-15.
78
Interview, EU military official, Brussels, June 2010.
79
See E Horgan, ‘Army tied into questionable peace missions’ The Irish Times, 8 August 2008. In contrast
see T Kinsella, ‘Chad Mission to EU military’s peaceful role’ The Irish Times, 9 March 2009.
80
HG Ehrhart, Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR (Hamburg, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy,
2008) 1 and A Mattelaer, above n 75, at 17.
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
with rebels and compromised the impartiality of the force.81 The absence of government
forces compounded EUFOR’s inability to deal with criminal gangs.82 Most of all, EUFOR
was a vehicle for French policy that suited other states as it disguised the inadequacy of the
international response to the regional issues at the heart of the conflict in Chad, CAR and
Sudan.83
PLANNING DEFICIENCIES
The planning process for the joint, multidimensional presence of EUFOR and MINURCAT
was described as ‘instructive, as separate planning processes were said to have yielded
different points of concern and challenges to creating shared objectives.’84 Owing to the
simultaneous deployment of both EUFOR and UN in Chad and the CAR, joint planning and
close coordination was required between the two organisations.85 This proved more difficult
than anticipated. First, the EU priority was internally displaced persons, while the UN
focused on the security of refugees. This led to different priorities on the ground and
differences in risk assessment. Second, differences in organisational structures and planning
exacerbated contrasting expectations. Another lesson for EUFOR is that force generation and
planning should be simultaneous and part of a single process. Concurrent activity is not
enough if the processes are separate.86
EUFOR operational planning had set an end date from the outset.87 In contrast to that of
EUFOR, planning, or the lack thereof, was seen as a major flaw in the UN
operation.Nowhere was the lack of planning more apparent than in the logistical
arrangements for the follow up UN military force.88 Given the remoteness of the location and
the harsh climate and environmental conditions, this was a serious flaw.
Threat assessment and obtaining accurate intelligence also proved problematic. Initially
rebel groups and Janjaweed89 forces were deemed to pose the greatest threat, while on the
ground banditry and criminality presented the greatest threat to security. Although well
81
See generally D Donald, ‘Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peacekeeping at the Beginning of the 21st
Century’ (2002) 9 (4) International Peacekeeping 21.
82
Human Rights Watch, The Risk of Return: Repatriating the Displaced in the Context of Conflict in Eastern
Chad (Human Rights Watch, 2009) and ‘Aid groups face dilemma over EU protection’, Integrated Regional
Information Networks (IRIN), 16 May 2008.
83
H Van Dijk, ‘Briefing: Political Deadlock in Chad’ (2007) 106 African Affairs 697 at 699. S Massey and R
May, ‘Commentary: The Crisis in Chad’ (2006) African Affairs 106, 420 and 443–9. An analysis of the French
role in the Chad/Darfur crisis can be found in B Charbonneau, ‘France’ in D R Black and P D Williams (eds),
The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur (London, Routledge, 2009).
84
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2010, above n 3, at 19 citing Internal UN Document, After
Action Review: UN-EU Planning for EUROR Chad/RCA, 29 April 2008. On the logistical challenges see B
Seibert, African Adventure? Assessing the European Union’s Military Intervention in Chad and the Central
African Republic: Working Paper (Cambridge, MIT Security Studies Program, 2007). On the EU’s military
planning process, see Council of the European Union, EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and
Strategic Level, Doc 110687/08, 16 June 2008.
85
EUISS Report, Lessons from EUROR TChad/RCA, EUISS Seminar, 18 March 2010, IESUE/SEM(10)02
14 April 2010, 3.
86
Mattelaer, above n 75, at 32.
87
UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778, paras 6 (a) and 6(b) indicated a one year
duration.
88
Interview by author, senior Irish army officer who served in Chad at the time, 27 April 2010.
89
Ibid.
11
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THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
resourced and trained, the EUFOR mission did not have the mandate to deal with the day to
day realities of criminality that were prevalent. The force was configured for a military role in
the protection of vulnerable civilians and was not organised for internal security or policing
operations.90 An assessment in 2008 indicated that the security situation required an
international military presence with the capacity for rapid deployment and the ability to
project itself quickly and effectively to deal with the continuing cross-border violence. The
strategy involved deterrence, a long established principle of UN deployment. The harsh
environment and size of the area of operations meant helicopter support and threat
assessment or intelligence gathering capability was needed. Close coordination with NGO’s
who have been on the ground for a prolonged period can help in this regard. Good civil
military relations (CIMIC) can facilitate exchange of information and enhanced cooperation.
The UN force was to comprise some 6000 personnel with reserve or ‘over the horizon’ forces
for emergencies.91
The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, claimed that
the operation demonstrated how the EU has become a global provider of security and stability
and how deployment was achieved ‘quickly and decisively.’92 The EU did prove a valuable
partner to the UN in providing a bridge to facilitate the deployment of the follow-on UN
peacekeeping force. It was another example of the EU’s ability to mount an autonomous
military operation without United States support. The deployment also gave substance to the
EU’s commitment in the joint EU-Africa Strategy.93 Although contributions from non-EU
states were welcome, these are often agreed after protracted negotiations and delays. For this
reason, reliance on EU contributions are preferable, at least in the short term until more
structured arrangements are put in place for third state participation.
The logistical achievement of building major camps and construction at airports to
facilitate deployment was considerable. It can also be said to have been an efficient and cost
effective operation. However, EUFOR was not a showcase for EU rapid deployment.
Furthermore, when EUFOR withdrew, civilians in eastern Chad were still in need of the same
protection as before.94
DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY COMPONENT OF MINURCAT95
The prevailing security situation in Chad involved a complex mix of banditry and attacks by
armed groups.96 In many cases it is difficult to identify those responsible; they may be armed
opposition groups, soldiers, armed groups from Sudan, ordinary criminals or even members
of the local police.97 Communal tensions can also spill over into violence. While the military
are trained to deal with internal security and related issues, soldiers are generally not suited to
90
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’ UN Doc S/2008/601.
91
UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1861.
92
J Solana, ‘Chad mission shows EU is effective in giving stability’ Irish Times, 13 March 2009.
93
Ibid.
94
E Ford, Head of Oxfam, quoted in ‘EU mission in Chad ends amid tensions’ euobserver.com, 12 March
2009.
95
‘Refugee Women Raped and Assaulted Despite UN Presence,’ Amnesty International Press Release, 2
October 2009 and ‘No Place for Us Here – Violence Against Refugee Women in Eastern Chad,’ Amnesty
International September 2009, Index: AFR 20/008/2009.
96
The UN reported that there were at least 152 security incidents against humanitarian workers in eastern
Chad in the first five months of 2009. UNGA ‘Report of the UN Secretary-General’ 14 July 2009, para 19.
97
Personal interview, former humanitarian aid worker, Dublin, Ireland, June 2010.
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
tasks involving policing. With this in mind, the Security Council decided that there should be
a significantly increased national and international police presence in eastern Chad.98
In his report to the UN Security Council in December 2008, the Secretary-General outlined
the continuing precarious security situation and the previously reported trend in banditry, and
crimes targeting humanitarian workers, refugees and Chadian citizens.99Recognising this, the
Security Council decided to transfer the military component of the mission from the EU to
MINURCAT with effect from 15 March 2009.100
MINURCAT encountered other significant obstacles in becoming fully operational. From
the outset, Chad sought to dictate the strength, force structure and composition of the force.101
Transfer of critical assets was delayed when the Chadian authorities prevented direct transfers
from EUFOR to the UN and insisted on separate agreements with the government. The Force
Commander and Deputy Force Commander were appointed late in the day and had no input
into the formulation of the MINURCAT concept of operations (CONOPS).102 From an early
stage there was evidence of a lack of commitment to the UN’s concept of operations and that
it might prove problematic generating the necessary personnel. 103 The UN seemed wholly
unprepared for assuming responsibility and some members of the Core Planning Team were
too inexperienced for the job.104 While the Office of Military Affairs at the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations made a real effort, it was hampered by a lack of a common
Operational Planning Design. Geographic diversity and varying standards of training are
familiar challenges on such missions. The adoption of the EUFOR Guidelines to Operational
Planning Module and NATO Combined Task Force (CJTF) procedures put non-European
troop contributing countries at a disadvantage. Even the Rules of Engagement were copied
from those of MONUC. These referred to the militias and other groups in the DRC and were
not amended for Chad. This was inexcusable for something so fundamental to military
operations. Similarly, the initial strategic military documents of MINURCAT Force were based on
98
UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778, para 5. The intended force was initially called
the Chadian Police for Humanitarian Protection, Police tchadienne pour la protection humanitaire (PTPH) but
was later officially named the Integrated Security Detachment, Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS).
99
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General into the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and
Chad’ (2008) UN Doc, S/2008/760, paras 11-15.
100
UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1861. Paragraph 7(a) provided, inter alia, that
MINURCAT
shall be authorised to take all necessary measures, within its capabilities and its area of operations in
eastern Chad to fulfil …(i) to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and
internally displaced persons, (ii) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement
of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations, (iii) to protect
UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensure the freedom of movement of its
staff and associated personnel.
101
UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’ S/2008/760 (4 December 2008) para 42.
102
UN, Military Strategic Concept of Operations for the United Nations Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), Number 0269, 5 February 2009.
103
HG Ehrhart, Assessing EUFOR Chad/CAR (Hamburg, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy,
December 2008) 3.
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THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
EUFOR precedents, with the necessary amendments. By June 2009, it had still not reached 50%
of its authorised strength of 5,225 and member states were slow to make pledges of more
troops.105 Where it is envisaged that the UN will take over the mission, provision for such an
event should be included in the UN mandate. Troop contributing states can be identified at
the outset and other key appointments made well in advance. Obtaining essential military
equipment also proved problematic.106
Like EUFOR, MINURCAT also encountered problems deploying helicopter support. In
mid-April 2009, the Secretary-General reported that the mission had only received ‘pledges’
for six of the 18 military helicopters deemed necessary.107 Helicopters are essential for
tactical airlift and medical evacuation. They also provide visibility, mobility and flexibility to
cover a large area of operations, and where appropriate, fire support. MINURCAT lacked 14
of the required 18 military utility and reconnaissance helicopters called for in the concept of
operation. Consequently, the Force lacked the ability to monitor incidents as they occurred
and was unable to deploy a reserve force that possessed the necessary mobility to react
swiftly to events on the ground.108 Helicopters also act as force multipliers, crucial when
there are too few troops to cover a large area with a poor or non-existent infrastructure. UN
air assets were also civilian led and constrained by regulations which significantly restricted
operational capacity.109
A core activity of MINURCAT was the commitment to strengthening and training the
Chadian police and reform of the justice sector, especially in the east. 110 This reflected the
threat assessment from criminality and banditry on the ground. However, the UN and
EUFOR did not have the right to investigate crimes or arrest suspects. Resolution 1861
directed that MINURCAT ‘select, train, advise and facilitate support to elements of the
Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS).’111 The UN was to train 850 DIS police whose task
was to provide security in refugee and displaced persons camps and key towns.112 The UN
had no authority or command over the police force and did not oversee recruitment. 113 The
DIS received mixed assessments. Some reports found that they had a positive impact on
104
The Core Planning Team is usually comprised of personnel from the major staff cells within a force
headquarters, eg Personnel (J1), Intelligence/Information (J2), Operations including Air Operations (J3),
Logistics (J4), and Plans (J5). Delays meant the Core Planning Team was also too late in forming up.
105
UNGA ‘Report of the UN Secretary-General into the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic
and Chad’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/359, para 22. UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1861, para.
4 provided that ‘MINURCAT shall include a maximum of 300 police officers,25 military liaison officers, 5,200
military personnel, and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.’
106
UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’(2009) S/2009/359 (14 July 2009) para 71. In mid-April 2009, the Secretary-General reported that the
mission had only received ‘pledges’ for six of the necessary 18 military helicopters.
107
UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General into the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and
Chad’ (2009) UN Doc S/2009/199, para 30. The Force strength was 2079, 40% of its authorised strength of
5200.
108
UN Security Council, 6121st meeting, 8 May 2009, Doc S/PV 6121.
109
Capacity to fly at night was important and lacking. This also created deficiencies in medical evacuation
capacity. The latter was resolved when an aero-medical team from Sri Lanka and a Bangladeshi aviation unit
deployed into the mission area. UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the
Central African Republic and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/217 29 April 2010. Interview by author with senior
MINURCAT officer, Dublin May 2010.
110
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/409, paras 29-56. MINURCAT mandate also provided for human rights,
gender, child protection, civil affairs, HIV/AIDS and mine action.
111
UNSC Res 1861 (14 January 2009) UN Doc, S/RES/1861.
112
UNSC Res 1778 (25 September 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1778.
113
The DIS was under the command of the Coordination Nationale d’Appui à la Force Internationale à l’est
du Tchad (CONAFIT) which was the responsibility of the Chadian Ministry of the Interior.
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
camp security, while others argued that a false picture of their training and expertise was
presented in order to make the UN look good.114 In reality, many were not up to the task and
contained criminal elements that were responsible for attacks on refugees and displaced
persons.115 Furthermore, most people did not distinguish between the DIS and the UN, and
consequently the UN was tarnished by the unprofessional conduct of the DIS. This ranged
from extortion, abuse of power, and general lack of discipline. Rule of law and judicial
reform remain major hurdles that compound the policing deficit. Security Sector Reform
remains a serious challenge and a pre-requisite for the creation of a sustainable secure
environment. The major funders, including the EU, are reluctant to finance such activities
given the level of corruption in the country.116
CONCLUSIONS
The early interventions in Chad provide some important lessons for contemporary operations.
Peacekeeping efforts are more likely to achieve positive results in Africa if they are UN
initiatives planned as integrated multilateral missions within the framework of the UN, with
the African Union or other regional organizations playing a complementary but subordinate
role.
The earlier OAU's attempts at peacekeeping failed and resulted in regional disillusion with
the initiative. Interventions by the UN, African Union or EU demonstrate that piece meal
efforts will not resolve such intractable conflicts. Chad would have benefited from a UN
peace-building strategy and an integrated multi-dimensional approach to the peace operation.
Had the mission been led by the UN in the early stages and supported by the OAU with troop
contributions from African states, then the outcome might well have been different.
While the EU can claim qualified success, in reality it set itself limited goals and did not
commit to the long term mission in Chad/CAR. Similar to Operation Artemis in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, EUFOR did succeed in improving the overall security
situation in its area of operations pending relief by UN forces. The delays in deployment by
both EUFOR and MINURCAT did undermine operational effectiveness. This in turn had an
adverse impact on the work of humanitarian agencies who considered the force was there to
serve their interests and ensure humanitarian assistance was delivered. 117 The EU needs to
address the strategic mobility deficit apparent in the deployment of EUFOR. The operation
did not have an impact on the proxy war between Chad and Sudan, nor the border area
between both countries as this was outside the EUFOR area of operations. The largest
security gap remained inside the refugee camps, where the UN trained Chadian police were
supposed to deploy. EU bridging was a good idea. However, it was premised on the
subsequent deployment of a credible UN military force that could maintain a safe and secure
environment. Even a relatively uninformed observer should have appreciated the political and
military challenges that a follow up UN operation would confront. Nor can any intervention
114
Personal interviews, military and NGO personnel who worked or were deployed in Chad during this
period, Dublin, July 2010.
115
Interviews by author with Irish Defence Forces officers, Curragh Camp, 22 April 2010. For a contrary
view see J Karlsrud and R Solhjell, An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT: Policy Brief (Oslo: Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs, 2010) 2.
116
Karlsrud and Solhjell, An Honourable Exit for MINURCAT, above n 115, at 3.
117
Interview, former UN Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) officer with the Irish battalion during 2009
and 2010, Galway, December 2010.
15
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THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
be truly impartial.118 Like the UN force that succeeded it, EUFOR did not improve the overall
political and security situation in the region. The fact that this was not part of the mandate is
irrelevant. The EU, its member states and others should have taken the opportunity to address
the fundamental issues at the heart of the conflict. The lack of planning and mechanisms for a
smooth transition from EUFOR to the UN proved a serious handicap. The experience
demonstrated the need to implement the UN’s principles and guidelines for integrated
planning outlined in the ‘Capstone’ and ‘New Horizon’ doctrines. 119Logistics, administration
and lack of coordination between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and
Department of Field Services proved especially problematic. Training and experience still
count for a great deal among the military, and some UN staff failed to appreciate the concept
of ‘force projection’ involving high visibility patrols and mobility required by the
MINURCAT concept of operations.120
Déby’s unwillingness to co-operate with the UN in a meaningful way was a major
obstacle.121 MINURCAT found its freedom of movement restricted as Chad began to
withdraw cooperation. The UN sought to address the Chadian concerns and it sent a number
of teams to examine options.122 UN officials are on record as opposing withdrawal. UN Head
of Peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, was reported to have said it was ‘very hard to imagine at that
moment’ that Chadian forces could protect civilians.123 The UN plan to train the Chadian
police force does not appear to have worked. A more comprehensive institutional and
security sector reform programme was required. An EU police mission and security sector
reform mission in Chad could have complemented UN efforts. The EU has a particular
responsibility to foster reform and support for civil society. It should also be at the forefront
of UN efforts. France has a special relationship with the regime in Chad. As a member of the
EU and the Security Council it had an onerous responsibility to use diplomatic leverage to
secure concessions from Chad.
The UN Secretary-General emphasised the mandate of EUFOR and MINURCAT dealt
with the consequences but not the root causes of the conflict.124 What is most needed is a
comprehensive plan to deal with Chad and the region as a whole. Such a regional strategy
must engage national, regional and international actors. The International Crisis Group
recommended revival of political dialogue to facilitate a national pact to deal with
comprehensive reform of the whole body politic, including decentralisation and distribution
of oil revenue.125
A precursor to any meaningful dialogue is a cease fire agreement between
government and armed opposition. The history of the region points to the UN being the only
118
R K Betts, ‘The Delusion of Impartial Intervention’ (1994) 73 (6) Foreign Affairs 20.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (New York, United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, 2008) 53-57. UN, A New Partnership Agenda, above note 1, at 24-25.
120
Personal interview, Irish officer serving with MINURCAT, December 2010.
121
Note verbale from the Chadian government dated 15 January 2010 requested that the UN commence
negotiations to determine the modalities for a withdrawal. Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and in Chad (MINURCAT), UN Doc S/2010/217, 29 April
2010, para 12.
122
UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/217. Three missions to Chad were led by the former military adviser to the
Secretary-General, Major General (retired) P Cammaert.
123
P Worsnip, ‘UN wants to keep Chad peacekeepers, gov’t says no’ Reuters, 17 February 2010.
124
UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad’ (2008) UN Doc, S/2008/444.
125
See International Crisis Group, Chad: A New Conflict Resolution Framework, Africa Report No 144, 24
September 2008.
119
POST-UN WITHDRAWAL: AN ASSESSMENT OF PEACEKEEPING IN CHAD
3
organization with the capacity to put in place the mechanics to make this successful. 126
However, the UN is overstretched and it is likely that the debate will be dominated by
financial and personnel issues while the primary causes of instability remain unaddressed.
When a host state such as Chad calls for withdrawal, does the UN have many options? A
narrow legal interpretation might well refer to the provisions of the UN Charter establishing
and deploying the force. A resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter may be
sufficient justification for intervention in the internal affairs of a state. However, the political
realities in the Security Council and the military reality on the ground required the adoption
of a more consensual approach. This is essentially what happened in relation to UNAMID,
where despite adopting a resolution under Chapter VII, the UN was reliant on the government
of Sudan in order to be able to deploy the peacekeeping force. It is not at all evident that the
UN Security Council took sufficient account of the needs of displaced persons and refugees.
There has been much written in recent years about the responsibility to protect civilians at
risk.127 The international response is in contrast to the responsibility to protect principle
outlined, inter alia, in the Brahimi Report, the High Level Report on Threats, Challenges and
Change128 and endorsed in less forthright terms at the World Summit in September 2005.129
Although the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine on principles and guidelines adopts the protection
of civilians as a ‘cross cutting’ issue, it offers no definition or insight to inform planning and
preparation for specific missions.130 A further issue is how to secure the humanitarian
workers on the ground and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Despite protestations to the
contrary, the international community under the guise of the UN effectively abandoned
vulnerable groups and humanitarian workers in Chad. In CAR, there was concern that the
withdrawal would embolden armed groups and increase lawlessness and insecurity.131
MINURCAT had not lived up to expectation in CAR and was seen as risk averse.132
The situation presented a challenge for the Security Council and constituted something of a
‘Hobson’s choice.’ It had no option and needed to reach agreement on a revised resolution
that accommodated the Chadian government's demands while also responding to the realities
of the security situation. Linked to this was the question whether the Chadian government
possessed the will or capacity to protect civilians given the security challenges in the east.
National forces are more likely to concentrate on fighting rebels than on protecting
126
These should include an international multi-dimensional peace operation to create a joint monitoring
system, a process of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR).
127
See S Wills, Protecting Civilians – The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2009) and V Holt, G Taylor and M Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations
Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges: Independent Study Jointly Commissioned by the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York, United
Nations, 2009). UN, A New Partnership Agenda, above n 1. International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001). W Zartman, Preventing Identity
Conflicts Leading to Genocide and Mass Killings (New York, International Peace Institute, 2010); and JL
Holzgrefe and R O Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003).
128
United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Brahimi Report), UN,
A/55/305–S/2000/809 of 21 August 2000, and ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’, Report of
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc A/59/565, 2 December 2004.
129
A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 139.
130
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (New York, United Nations,
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008) 16 and 24.
131
UN Doc S/2010/409, UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the
Central African Republic and Chad’ (2010) UN Doc S/2010/409, para 68.
132
Ibid, at para 70
17
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THE IRISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2010
civilians.133 Humanitarian actors providing assistance to displaced persons and refugees are
also vulnerable and in need of protection.
It is difficult to see the result as other than a failure. The UN was handicapped from the
start and even before the mission was established the government of Chad set clear
limitations on what could be undertaken and ultimately demanded its premature termination.
Noble principles in UN reports and the provisions of the UN Charter itself took second place
to ‘realpolitik.’ Overall, the UN mission was not characterised by good planning and this was
reflected in the withdrawal and handover to Chadian forces. A joint senior level Working
Group or so called ‘humanitarian dialogue forums’ was unlikely to address, let alone resolve,
the inept and corrupt Chadian security apparatus to protect civilians. In the absence of an
international military presence, who will provide security? It is difficult to obtain reliable
information on the plight of the internally displaced and refugees. An independent
international monitoring presence is needed.134 The UN should continue to engage with the
issue and provide support while the Security Council puts pressure on Chadian authorities to
put in place a viable plan for civilian protection.
133
‘Developments in Chad have international analysts, aid groups and the UN on the edge’, Diplomacy and
Power Politics, 6 February 2010.
134
Amnesty International, Open Letter to all members of the Security Council- Protection of Civilians in
Eastern Chad: Security Council must remain ‘ actively seized of the matter’, AFR/20/005/2011, 20 April 2011.
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2011- Chad (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2011).