TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY vs. Nine Hundred

University of Tennessee, Knoxville
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Tennessee Department of State, Opinions from the
Administrative Procedures Division
3-17-2009
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY vs.
Nine Hundred Seventy-One Dollars $971.00 in
U.S. Currency Samsung Cell Phone One 2004
Pontiac Grand Prix VIN No.:
2G2WP522041304025, Seized from: Ricky L.
Williams, Jr. Dates of Seizure: October 17, 2008,
Claimant: Karen Glimps, Lienholder: N/A
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This Initial Order by the Administrative Judges of the Administrative Procedures Division, Tennessee Department of State, is a public document made
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Law
BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
IN THE MATTER OF:
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) DOCKET NO. 19.01-102217J
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TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT
OF SAFETY
v.
Nine Hundred Seventy-One Dollars
($971.00) in U.S. Currency
Samsung Cell Phone
One 2004 Pontiac Grand Prix
VIN No.: 2G2WP522041304025
Seized from: Ricky L. Williams, Jr.
Dates of Seizure: October 17, 2008
Claimant: Karen Glimps
Lienholder: N/A
INITIAL ORDER
This matter was heard on March 17, 2009, in Nashville, Tennessee, before
Mattielyn B. Williams, Administrative Judge, assigned by the Secretary of State,
Administrative Procedures Division, and sitting for the Commissioner of the Tennessee
Department of Safety. Ms. Cynthia Gross, Metropolitan Attorney, Government of
Nashville and Davidson County, represented the State. Claimant Karen Glimps was
present and represented by Mr. Patrick G. Frogge, of the Nashville bar.
The subject of this matter was the proposed forfeiture of the subject 2004 Pontiac
Grand Prix. The State contended that this vehicle was used to transport illegal drugs,
used as a container, obtained in an exchange, was used to facilitate, or was proceeds, or
was otherwise involved in an exchange, in violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act,
thus making the subject vehicle subject to forfeiture, pursuant to T.C.A. §53-11-451.
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Claimant Glimps did not file a claim for the U.S. Currency or the cell phone that
were also seized.
After consideration of the record, it is DETERMINED that the subject vehicle is
co-owned – 75% by Claimant Glimps and 25% by Driver/Seller.
Both
Driver/son/Seller’s 25% ownership interest and Claimant Glimps’ 75% ownership
interest should be FORFEITED to the seizing agency.
This decision is based upon the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Metro Nashville Police Department Detective Broderick Jones testified that
“Little Bit,” a Confidential Informant (CI) who had been reliable in providing
information that led to arrests and convictions in the past, informed him that she was
aware of a person from whom illegal drugs could be obtained. On October 17, 2008,
female Detective Morgan Ford searched the CI, but not her “cavities,” for both money
and contraband and found the CI to be free of both. The CI was then wired and provided
with Buy Money, which had earlier been photocopied. Detective Jones followed the CI
to the location where the illegal drug transaction was to take place. Hidden from view,
Detective Jones heard the transaction over the wire.
2.
Detective David Lane set up surveillance at the location where the October
17, 2008 illegal drug transaction was expected to take place. Detective Lane heard both
the CI and the Driver/Seller over the wire. Detective Lane was positioned close enough
to observe the hand-to-hand exchange between the CI and the Driver/Seller. Later,
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Dilaudid was obtained from the CI, who obtained it from the Driver/Seller; the Buy
Money was recovered from the Driver/Seller, as verified by the serial numbers on it.
3.
When Detective Jones arrived on the scene, immediately after he heard the
illegal drug transaction take place, he recognized the Pontiac with tinted windows that the
Seller was driving, namely the subject 2004 Grand Prix. Detective Jones remembered the
vehicle from its use in an illegal drug transaction in May 2008. The subject vehicle was
not seized, as a result of the May 2008 illegal drug transaction, because the tags showed
that the vehicle belonged to someone other than the Seller.
4.
Officer Ronald Kumrow, like Detective Jones, met Driver/Seller Williams
during the May 2008 transaction, recalled that Dilaudid was one of the illegal drugs
involved in the May 2008 transaction, heard the October 17, 2008 transaction over the
wire, saw the October 17, 2008 transaction, then pursued the 2004 Grand Prix, which left
the scene at a high rate of speed.
5.
Officer Jason Wong was on patrol when he saw the speeding vehicle with
Tag Number 123 SHB. Officer Wong saw the Driver/Suspect/Seller face-to-face, and
confirmed that the individual who ran from the subject vehicle, after leaving it on the side
of the road, was the same person that was subsequently apprehended by Detective Lane,
who hand-cuffed the Driver/ Seller.
6.
The Driver/Seller Seller in both the May 2008 illegal drug transaction that
Detective Jones remembered and the October 17, 2008 illegal drug transaction was Mr.
Ricky L. Williams, Jr., Claimant Karen Glimps’ son. The tag numbers on the subject
vehicle in May 2008 and on October 17, 2008 were the same. The subject vehicle was
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seized as a result of the October 17, 2008 transaction, for being involved with an illegal
drug transaction, a second time. The seized vehicle contained clothing for a large male
and Dilaudid pills.
7.
The Detectives and Officer’s reports differed regarding whether or not the
seized vehicle was gray v. brown in May v. October; however, the time of day was
different on the two (2) occasions, but the tag number was the same.
8.
Detective Ford noted that the Driver/Seller was arrested for the sale of
seven hundred (700) to nine hundred (900) Dilaudid pills, as a result of the May 2008
transaction. Detective Ford also recognized both the subject vehicle and the Driver/Seller
in the May and October 2008 transactions as the same person.
9.
Detective Ford was involved with the further investigation of the October
17th transaction. Detective Ford and a Detective Morton visited Williams’ home to
interview Williams’ mother and grandmother.
Claimant Karen Glimps, Williams’
mother, was “yelling that she wanted (her) car back.” Claimant told Detective Ford that
Williams was “not generally allowed to drive it” (the subject vehicle) and was “supposed
to be going to the store.” Claimant told Detective Ford that her son “promised her he
wasn’t going to sell from it anymore.”
10.
Detective Ford ran a Ticket Query and learned that the Driver/Seller
received a traffic ticket, in the subject vehicle, on October 10, 2008, for speeding.
11.
Driver/Seller Williams was incarcerated when the instant hearing was held.
12.
Claimant moved for a Directed Verdict because there was no evidence that
Claimant Glimps engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. The State countered that the issues
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here are whether or not Claimant Glimps is the registered owner v. the actual owner and
whether or not Claimant Glimps had knowledge or a reason to believe her vehicle would
be used in violation of the Act. Claimant’s motion was DENIED.
13.
Claimant Glimps testified that she purchased the subject vehicle for $1,500
with a settlement from the Nissan Plant, and now works at Wal-mart and a Day Care
Center. Claimant candidly admitted that she permitted her son to drive both the subject
vehicle and her Mitsubishi “whenever he wanted,” …, after telling “Ricky not to sell
drugs out of her car,” and since her “son told her he was no longer selling drugs.”
Claimant continued that her Mitsubishi is smoking, in need of repair, and that she “needs
her Grand Prix returned.” Claimant testified that she pays for the insurance, gas, repairs,
etc., for the seized Grand Prix.
14.
Claimant estimated that she did 50% of the driving and her son did the
other 50%, during the May to October 2008 period. Driver/Seller has his own set of car
keys because Claimant relinquished her own set and gave it to her son/Driver/Seller.
15.
Driver/Seller lived with his grandmother, not his mother, during the May to
October 2008 period. Claimant, the Driver, and the Grandmother all live in Antioch,
Tennessee, a small suburb of Nashville.
16.
Claimant admitted that her twenty-three (23) year old son was not working
during the May to October 2008 period. Claimant and the Grandmother both supported
the Driver/Seller financially.
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17.
Claimant indicated that her son kept his clothes in the subject vehicle
because he works out often. Claimant testified that she does not keep her personal
belongings in any vehicle, as a matter of personal preference.
18.
Claimant continued that her son was less involved with gangs, helped his
grandmother (Claimant’s mother) more with household chores, and was not as “smartmouthed” during the May to October 2008 period, so, she thought that the Driver/Seller
had reformed and was no longer selling illegal drugs. Claimant further testified that she
thought the May 2008 arrest had had a positive impact on her son’s future.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
The State must carry its burden of proof, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the subject vehicle was used to facilitate, was used as a container, was used
to transport, is proceeds or was obtained in an exchange in a manner that violated the
Tennessee Drug Control Act. Such violation subjects property to forfeiture pursuant to
the provisions of T.C.A. §53-11-451.
2.
It is CONCLUDED that the State MET its burden.
3.
It is undisputed that Claimant Glimps was not present during the illegal
drug transactions of May 2008 and October 17, 2008, involving the subject vehicle.
Further, the State offered no testimony and made no suggestion that Claimant Glimps
was involved directly with the illegal drug transactions of May or October 17, 2008.
4.
Based on Claimant Glimps paying for the subject vehicle, its repairs, its
insurance, its gas, doing 50% of the driving, yet, decision to give her personal set of keys
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to the Driver/Seller, it is CONCLUDED that the vehicle is co-owned. Claimant Glimps
is the 75% owner of the seized vehicle; Driver Williams’ owns the remaining 25%. By
giving her son her own keys to the subject vehicle, and based on Claimant’s testimony
that she “let” him use it freely, while living at another residence, it is CONCLUDED that
Claimant gave a significant portion of her ownership and control over the subject vehicle
to her son, who did not live with her.
5.
In light of his extensive, uncontrolled usage, and access to the subject
vehicle, including control over its keys, Driver/Seller/Son’s 25% ownership is hereby
FORFEITED to the seizing agency, based on Driver/Seller/Son’s use of the subject
vehicle as a container, to facilitate, and as transportation, in violation of the Tennessee
Drug Control Act.
6.
The remaining question is whether or not co-owner Claimant Glimps is an
innocent owner.
7.
The State emphasized that Claimant Glimps never ridded herself of the
Mitsubishi, thus suggesting that Glimps bought the second car, the subject vehicle, for
her son’s use, and that Glimps was on notice as to how Driver would use the subject
vehicle, based on its use just months before in May. Therefore, the State contended that
Claimant Glimps was not an innocent owner.
8.
Claimant contended that she thought her son/Driver/Seller had reformed,
after the May 2008 incident and that she did not know he was continuing to or had
resumed engaging in illegal drug transactions. In the alternative, Claimant argued that
the subject vehicle was co-owned 50/50.
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9.
It is unclear whether or not Claimant Glimps was aware of Driver’s/son’s
October 10, 2008 speeding ticket and had the opportunity to restrict Driver’s/son’s ability
to drive “her” vehicle, on that basis. Whether she knew, but did not act, or, whether she
did not know, as a result of her lack of control over the subject vehicle’s use, is unclear,
but indicative of Driver/son’s free access to and control of the subject vehicle.
10.
Although surely Claimant Glimps should not have been surprised when her
son, the Driver/Seller, was caught a second time, using the quasi-family vehicle to sell,
transport, and contain illegal drugs, Claimant’s argument that she thought he had
reformed, that her son was helping his Grandmother more, that he was receiving financial
support from both Claimant and the Grandmother and presumably had no need to sell
drugs for money, is entitled to some consideration.
11.
However, considering the entirety of the record, in light of the combination
of Claimant Glimps retaining the “smoky” Mitsubishi and giving her son/Driver/Seller:
A. Her (Claimant Glimps’) set of keys,
B. Unrestricted access to the subject vehicle,
C. The ability to live with his Grandmother, at a residence other than Claimant Glimps’,
which meant that Claimant Glimps would not have the opportunity to observe, monitor,
control, and direct her son’s use of “her” vehicle,
D. With A-C above, based solely on son/Driver/Seller’s promise to not sell drugs from
the vehicle anymore,
it is CONCLUDED that Claimant Glimps DID HAVE a reason to believe and know,
and, that a reasonable person could and would foresee that her son/Driver/Seller would
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use the subject vehicle, again, in violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act. Yet,
despite being on notice of the manner in which Driver/son would possibly use “her”
vehicle, Claimant Glimps took no concrete steps to prevent its use in such a manner.
Thus, Claimant assumed the risk of how “her” vehicle would be used, when she chose to
exercise so little control over it, notwithstanding the vehicle’s use in her son’s May 2008
incident.
12.
Therefore, it is CONCLUDED that Claimant Glimps 75% interest in the
seized vehicle is NOT INNOCENT.
13.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Claimant Glimps’ 75%
ownership interest is FORFEITED to the seizing agency.
14.
It is NOTED that had Claimant Glimps retrieved the keys from the
son/Driver/Seller that she relinquished earlier, restricted his free access to the subject
vehicle, required that the son/Driver/Seller notify her and obtain her permission, each and
every time he drove “her” (majority share) vehicle, after the May 2008 illegal drug
transaction incident using “her” vehicle, the decision in this matter, with regard to
Claimant’s 75% ownership interest, would have been reversed.
15.
It is must be also NOTED that in most drug asset forfeiture cases, the
parent/co-owner is not given “one free bite” at the apple, i.e. not given a pass by not
having the vehicle seized as a part of a first incident, the “favor” that Claimant Glimps
received when “her” vehicle was not seized as a result of the May 2008 illegal drug
transaction.
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This Initial Order entered and effective this 15th day of June, 2009.
________________________
Mattielyn B. Williams
Administrative Judge
Filed in the Administrative Procedures Division, Office of the Secretary of State
this 15th day of June, 2009.
________________________________
Thomas G. Stovall, Director
Administrative Procedures Division
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