Fu Jen Studies: Literature & Linguistics, 2004, Vol. 38, pp. 127-144
GRICE'S MAXIMS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
SELECTIVENESS:
AN ADVERTISING LANGUAGE PERSPECTIVE 1
Dr Grace Zhang
Curtin University of Technology
Email: [email protected]
The ability of being selective, i.e. saying the right thing at the right
time and place, is essential for successful interaction. This article examines
the dynamic process of expression and comprehension in language
interactions and deals with two issues. The first is that if selectiveness is
common and indispensable in language use it should be accepted as an
appropriate communication device. The other issue is how the selectiveness
principle fits in with Grice's (1975, 1989) four conversational maxims. This
study will be conducted primarily in the context of real estate advertising
language, by analysing how real estate agents use selectiveness to convey
their intended information and hearers work out the inferential meaning
based on their common knowledge and contextual cues. 2
Over the past three decades, there have been continuous debates on
Grice's maxims. This study will propose the inclusion of the selectiveness
principle into Grice's maxims. The proposal is based on an analysis of
advertising language which will show that language users tend to be
selective while still managing to fit in with Grice's framework. Being
selective is not an ad hoc characteristic of advertising language; it is a
pervasive, legitimate, tactful and effective communicative device used in
everyday language. Following the selectiveness principle is a matter of
following one's common sense. This research will argue that while
selectiveness doesn't violate Grice's maxims, it is different in that it is used
to achieve appropriateness in terms of cultural and social norms.
Differences are drawn between inferential meaning and Grice's
conversational implicature to justify the proposed modification of Grice's
maxims with the addition of the selectiveness principle.
I A Pervasive, Legitimate, Tactful and Effective Communicative
Device
Being selective in language use is to choose an appropriate utterance
suitable to the particular context. For example, a neighbour's teenage girl
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has a weight problem and is very self-conscious about it. When asked about
her weight, one may stop short by saying ‘she looks fine to me, no need for
everyone to have a supermodel figure’. Another example, commenting on a
fellow student's essay, one may say 'it reads well and has no typos'. Hearers
would be able to work out that the speakers are being selective about what
they say. They don't want to hurt their neighbour or fellow student but don't
want to lie either. Thus they have to choose words carefully, in order to
avoid talking about any negatives regarding the girl's weight or the student's
essay.
While it is not rare to see selectiveness in everyday language use, this
kind of language behaviour occurs most frequently in advertising due to its
commercial nature. Imagine that one is looking through a property press
and reads a description of a house as: “a house with character”. What
would the reader think of it? It would not be surprising that the reader infers
that the house is old, possibly in bad shape. From the advertiser's point of
view, he is not lying by being selective or skilful with his words. Instead of
using ‘old, not in good shape’ he chose ‘character’. Fortunately, readers are,
most of time, able to get the inferential meaning out of the literal meaning
of the text 3 .
This phenomenon demonstrates how people use language in reality. It
is common practice that language users are selective whenever necessary
and selectiveness is also part of language competence. The more skilfully
one uses the principle of selectiveness, the more tactful and effective one
becomes in language communication. This poses a challenge to linguists
and others to go beyond the semantic meaning when studying language and
work out the pragmatic meaning conveyed by utterances.
1.1 Advertising Language and Selectiveness
Let us analyse examples of selectiveness in real estate advertising,
extracted primarily from issues of Property Press, published in Auckland,
New Zealand.
a. ‘A classic villa/character charmer’
Probably a place falling apart, in any event an old house. The agent
uses 'classic' to avoid saying that the villa is aging and inferior. The
word 'classic' attracts people's attention more in its positive aspects:
stylish, creative, artistic and established.
b. “A first buyer's home/a great place to start/suit young
couple/affordable living”
Probably a cheap, run down place with not much space. However, the
right phrases are chosen to steer buyers' attention away from those
negative aspects to their own realistic situation, making the house
appear to be worth considering.
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129
c.
“A house with great potential/potential to redevelop and
renovate/do up/polish up & prosper”
Probably a house in bad shape. Agent selects the above descriptions to
lead people to think what they can do with the property in the future,
rather than focusing on the present state which is probably undesirable.
Providing the buyer a rosy picture for the future would certainly
increase the chances of selling the property.
d. “Needs tender loving care”
Possibly a pretty bad situation inside and out. The agent shifts attention
from the house to the potential buyer and places the responsibility of
taking care of the house on them. Someone might buy into it thinking
that he is the one who will be able to look after the property well.
e. “Easy living/care section”
Possibly a small outdoor area. The focus is on the positive side of a
small outdoor area, meaning there is no need to spend a lot of time
looking after the garden and mowing the lawn.
f. “No need for cars, walk to everywhere”
Most definitely no car park or garage. The agent knows very well that
people consider parking space something essential. He figures that if he
says that there is no need for a car then clients may be more likely to
accept the property. The logic is if there is no need for a car then it is
all right having no car park.
g. “Cosy and neat”
Probably a small house. However, since 'small house' would not go
down well with buyers, 'cosy and neat' would do a better job.
Advertised from the positive side of being cosy and neat would give
people a warm and comfortable feeling about the place, they may be
more inclined to buy the house.
h. “Investment opportunity”
May not be suitable for owner to live in, possibly due to the shabby
conditions of the house. Saying that it is for investment may open a
new opportunity for the property to sell. Buyers for investment would
certainly be interested in taking a look.
Examples like the above are everywhere in real estate advertising.
Agents need to think very hard in order to come up with the right thing to
say when advertising. They have to be skilful when it comes down to using
the principle of selectiveness.
1.2 Why Selectiveness
The above examples illustrate that agents select words carefully by
focusing on positives and avoiding negatives in order to maximize the
benefit of advertising. They know full well that at the end of day, many
buyers would figure out the contextual/pragmatic meaning 4 . The reason
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agents continue using selective language generation after generation is that
it may at least get people through the door. Once their prospective buyers
arrive, they can then have something to build from and hopefully their
skilful persuasion will result in a sale.
Therefore being selective in advertising is crucial in the real estate
business, and it is also a fact of life in the context of commercials: no one
would advertise the negative aspects of their products unless required to do
so.
Selectiveness is not unique to commercials. The strategies real estate
agents use are not very different from those we use in everyday speech. For
example, when describing a girl who is fat, we might select the expression
“a big boned girl”. When writing a recommendation letter, we tend to use
“with potential to become a good teacher/researcher” or “given time he will
thrive”, instead of saying “lacks teaching/research experience”. When asked
to comment on a lousy cook, we may say that the dish looks great, creative
and artistic in order to avoid commenting on the fact that the food tastes
awful. Similarly, when commenting on someone, we would be happy to
describe how great his personality is and how helpful he is to his elderly
neighbour, but stop short of saying that he is not very intelligent.
So, why are people selective in using language? One obvious reason is
that it is our society's norm to say the right thing at the right time. By
conforming to this protocol, one can fit nicely into our society; otherwise
one will not go very far nor have many friends. However, the most
important reason for being selective is that it is a tactful and effective
communicational device. As mentioned above in the real estate agent's
situation, it certainly serves his purpose very effectively. In everyday life,
being selective is also a more tactful way to communicate. Let us revisit the
case of commenting on the lousy cook. Imagine at a formal dinner if a guest
said straight to the cook's face that his food tasted awful, it would upset
others, especially the cook. Instead, one might tactfully praise the cook by
saying something like the presentation of dish is great.
One remaining question then is whether or not the selectiveness is
legitimate, i.e. if it is the right thing to do. Are we lying by being selective?
Probably not, because we do not deny the facts, e.g. saying food tastes good
when in fact it does not, or saying there are three bedrooms when in fact
there are only two. All we do is to utilize the principle of selectiveness to do
the right thing. The principle of selectiveness is used by just about every
profession and everywhere in daily life, although perhaps some may use it
more frequently and effectively than others. Commercials rely on it for
business profits, while in everyday life people use it for purposes of
showing politeness, keeping face, etc., as along as it is suitable at a specific
moment. Having argued that selectiveness is a pervasive, legitimate, tactful
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and effective communicational device, next we discuss where it fits in with
Grice's conversational maxims.
II. Grice's Conversational Maxims and Selectiveness
What has been discussed above raises a question of whether or not the
selective principle could be in line with Grice's cooperative principles and
conversational maxims, the focus of this section.
2.1 Grice's Maxims
Grice's cooperative principle is a principle of conversation, claiming
that participants expect that each will make a “conversational contribution
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose
or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1975:
45). The idea of Grice's maxims is to make it clear to language users what
good communication practice is and if we all make an effort to follow them
we can become more effective in talking to each other. The maxims are not
rules but rather conventions or right things to do.
A number of works have been done regarding Grice's framework, such
as Kasher (1976, 1982, 1986. 1987) and Keenan (1976). It has been argued
that Grice's maxims are not held by speakers of various cultures. For
example, Keenan (1976) stated that people in Madagascar tend not to give
information when required, which intentionally and systematically violate
Grice's Quantity Maxim. Keenan questioned the feasibility that the maxims
can apply universally and independently of culture, style and genre. Kasher
(1982) suggested that Keenan's and similar apparent counter-examples to
Grice's maxims could be better explained in terms of the rationality
principles and its consequences, if proper attention is paid not only to its
“most effective” component but also to its “at least cost” component. It was
observed that Malagasy speakers seemed to try to strike some balance
between being most effective in presenting their beliefs, while paying the
least cost in terms of commitments they wish to spare (Kasher 1982).
Clyne's (1994) revised maxims for intercultural analysis have more
regard for the communicative patterns of non-English cultures; however,
they don't altogether meet the needs of inter-cultural communication. The
universality of Grice's Co-operative Principle and Brown and Levinson's
theory of politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987) has been questioned
(Wierzbicka 1985, 1991/2003 and Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997) on the
basis of the cultural relativity and different cultural scripts. For example,
there would be different expectations and interpretations of sincerity and
relevance in a given communication, or the ranking of imposition when
making a request.
Wilson and Sperber (2002) question the view that verbal
communication is governed by a maxim, norm or convention of truthfulness
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which applies at the level of what is literally meant, or what is said. They
argue that verbal communication is governed by expectations of relevance,
raised by literal, loose and figurative uses alike. In addition, they state that
the notions of “literal meaning” and “what is said” play no useful
theoretical role in the study of language use, and that the nature of explicit
communication would have to be rethought.
A number of questions have been raised, including the source of the
cooperative principle and maxims (e.g. whether they are culturally specific
or universal), definition of terminologies (e.g. vagueness of 'relevance') and
adequate explanation of comprehension procedure (e.g. exactly how hearers
identify conversational implicatures).
In general, there have been three directions for the development of
Grice's original proposals:
a. To further develop Grice's maxims while remaining close to the
spirit of the original maxims, including Levinson (1983, 2000), Brown
and Levinson (1987), Horn (1973, 1984) and Clark (1996).
b. To propose alternative principles and maxims, including R. Lakoff
(1973, 1976), Leech (1983), Attardo (1997, 1999, 2000).
c. To substitute Grice's original proposal with a more general
cognitive principle, i.e. Sperber and Wilson's relevance-theoretic
framework (1986/1995, 1998, 2002, Wilson and Sperber 2004)
It should be pointed that Grice's maxims depict a rosy, idealised and
simplified language use, whereas reality is a much more complex and multidimensional. In actual conversations, telling the whole truth might be seen
as impolite or somehow inappropriate. There also tend to be cross-cultural
differences, not always following a universal principle. It seems that some
cultures/languages (e.g. Chinese) prescript their speakers quite frequently to
express things in an indirect manner, which means they are unable to follow
Grice's maxims. In such cases, there is a clash between Grice's maxims and
the pragmatic rules of conversation, which are culturally sensitive. For
example, when being offered a drink, a typical Chinese would habitually
say no the first time while expecting the offer would be made at least twice
or three times. This is a kind of phatic language communication, i.e. saying
no and not really meaning no. In this sort of situation, if someone doesn't
play by the cultural norm, then he would sound odd.
2.2 Grice's Maxims and the Selectiveness Principle
First, let us examine if selectiveness violates any of Grice's maxims.
Maxim of quality: “‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’...
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which you
lack adequate evidence’. (Grice, 1975: 46).
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Being selective is not necessarily untruthful. For example, an agent
says that a house ‘suits young couples or first home buyers’. While the
inferential meaning of the description could be that the house is small and
not luxurious, as far as the speaker is concerned, all he does is to select one
particular aspect of the house to suit his purpose. In any event, the agent is
telling the truth because he believes that the house does suit young couples
or first homebuyers. Only when the house has one bedroom but is
advertised as having two, does the agent violate the quality maxim. Here the
agent doesn't give false information, he is just being selective, and therefore
no rule has been broken as far as the maxim of quality is concerned.
Maxim of quantity: ‘1. Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your
contribution more informative than is required’ (Grace, 1975: 45).
One may think that selectiveness seems to violate this maxim, due to
its nature of being less informative. For example, real estate agents tend
only to touch on certain desirable aspects (character, great potential, suitable
to first home buyers, etc.), but do not provide negative information (old,
scruffy conditions, etc.). The same applies to situations in everyday life
when people only say what is considered to be polite.
However, it is not quite the case, because the maxim here says that we
should be as informative AS REQUIRED, giving NO MORE and no less
information. Required by what? For example, as far as the real estate
commercials are concerned, they are not required by their cultural protocols
to use words like ‘old’ and ‘scruffy’, they may, as they prefer, advertise in a
positive tone by using words like ‘character’ and ‘great potential’.
Similarly, in social situations we are also not required by our cultural norms
to tell someone straight to his face that he is ‘slow to learn and
incompetent’ 5 ; rather we would prefer to say something like he is ‘kind to
others’. So, going back to the question of whether or not selectiveness
violates the maxim of quantity, the answer is negative. The argument is that
although it may not give the full information from both positive and
negative sides, the reality is that in situations where selectiveness prevails,
there is probably no requirement for language users to give more
information than they want to.
There is a distinction between requirements from language itself and
requirements from the culture where the language is used. The requirement
could be the context at a specific moment, in which language consideration
alone may not be enough. In the case of the principle of selectiveness,
cultural considerations play a huge role. Very often language users behave
the way their cultural protocols require them to. For example, out of
politeness, not articulating someone's shortcomings unless it is necessary.
This is a cultural factor, which often supersedes the language factor itself.
That is to say, when there is conflict between language correctness and
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cultural correctness, the latter tends to prevail. It is also expected to be the
case that some cultures (e.g. Chinese) may embrace more indirectness than
other cultures, so we see more application of the principle of selectiveness
in these languages than in others.
Maxim of relevance: ‘Be relevant’ (Grice, 1975: 46).
This one is relatively straightforward. Selectiveness doesn't violate this
maxim. By applying the principle of selectiveness we usually try to avoid
talking about the negative side of things and focus on the positives. This
doesn't mean that the positive side of information is irrelevant. It could be
just as relevant as the negatives. So we are not breaking any rules on
relevance.
Maxim of manner: “‘Be perspicuous’... 1 Avoid obscurity of
expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4.
Be orderly’ (Grice, 1975: 46). 6
Being selective doesn't prevent one from being perspicuous.
It is interesting to note that maxim of quantity and maxim of relevance
may not accommodate the way the Chinese tend to communicate. For
example, when talking about sensitive issues (e.g. borrowing money), the
Chinese tend to beat about the bush, saying things seemingly superfluous
and irrelevant. The purpose of this indirectness is to prevent being totally
embarrassed by asking bluntly. Although this kind of language behaviour
may well violate Grice's maxims, it is the typical Chinese way to
communicate and the right way as far as the Chinese are concerned.
It seems that language use is just like driving a car; everyone on the
road must follow road rules. If someone doesn't follow the rules, then car
accidents may happen. However, the problem here is what rules are truly
appropriate to govern our language use. The rules for language use are not
as clear-cut as road rules. Grice's conversational maxims state what should
be said and how it should be said; however, without cultural considerations,
they would always remain as idealized conventions. While conversational
maxims like Grice's certainly help, it would be mistaken to think that his
maxims would be able to accommodate all the communicative devices
people use in reality.
The above analysis on selectiveness based on real estate advertising
language provides a similar observation as stated in Kotthoff (in press).
Based on an analysis of conversation humour, Kotthoff points out life-world
relevance is quite different from the cognitive relevance that Sperber and
Wilson (1986) focus on. In order to determine how specific jokes work, we
need knowledge of the social milieu with its social norms and normal ways
of speaking. Cultural relevance is particularly important in humour.
Along the same line, selectiveness is sensitive over different situations
(e.g. formal or informal, intimate or distant) and cultures (e.g. Chinese or
New Zealand, men or women, academic or corporate). An in-depth analysis
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135
and systematic classification of these situations and cultures would require a
separate research project.
Next, we will discuss selectiveness and Grice's maxims from a
different angle: the nature of inferential meaning derived from selective
utterances, helping us to understand more about the principle of
selectiveness.
III. Inferential Meaning and Implicatures
In this study, the concept of inferential meaning is defined in a more
specific way, different from Grice's conversational implicatures, in a bid to
show the uniqueness of the selectiveness principle.
3.1 Inferential Meanings
Prior to discussing the inferential meaning, let us first look at a related
concept: connotative meaning.
According to Crystal (1993: 74), a connotative meaning is the
‘emotional associations (personal or communal) which are suggested by, or
are part of the meaning of, a LINGUISTIC UNIT, especially a LEXICAL
ITEM.’ For example, the connotations of the word ‘Paris’ may include
‘romantic’, ‘luxurious’, ‘high class’, etc.
The similarity between inferential meaning and connotative meaning is
that both are not literal meanings, and both need recourse to
context/knowledge of interlocutors for a specific interpretation. However,
the two differ in a number of aspects.
a. Connotations tend to relate more to a lexical item, but inferential
meaning relates more to linguistic units broader than a lexical item,
such as phrase, sentence, utterance, etc.
b. Connotations could be part of lexical item's meaning. For example,
one of the connotations of ‘dog’ in Chinese is a person of
unquestioning obedience, typically to a gang leader or the like
(Xihua Dictionary, 1996: 152). This is unlikely the case for
inferential meaning. For example, the inferential meaning ‘old’
inferred from ‘(house with) character’ would not be any part of the
original item's meaning.
c. Connotations are intended meanings that the speaker wants the
hearer to know. For example, if someone looks unhappy during
Chinese New Year, and I say to him, ‘Come on, it's Chinese New
Year’, the connotative meaning of ‘New Year’ is ‘happy and
joyful’. I as a speaker certainly want the hearer to know the
connotative meaning, which is ‘you should cheer up during this
joyful season’. However, inferential meanings are not necessarily
intended to be recognised by hearers. In fact in the case of real
estate advertisements, agents rather hope that their readers are not
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able to work out the inferential meaning behind the advertisements
(see Section 3.2 for more discussion).
Take an example from real estate advertisement, a house ‘with great
potential’. The speaker's intended meaning in this case would be just the
semantic (literal) meaning; a house has an excellent opportunity to prosper.
However, thinking through the semantic meaning, a pragmatic (or
contextual) meaning that a hearer may infer is that the current condition of
the house is not that great, probably needing renovation of some sort. The
speaker would hope that the hearer stick to the focus (‘great potential’)
given in the advertisement and not work out that the house is in an
undesirable state at the moment. The type of meaning we are dealing with
here is inferential meaning inferred with resource to context or the hearer's
knowledge,
as
opposed
to
semantic
meaning
(cognitive/denotative/referential meaning).
Next, we shall discuss the characteristics of Grice's conversational
implicatures, which can also help us to understand more about the nature of
the principle of selectiveness characterised with inferential meaning.
3.2 Implicatures
Implied meaning usually refers to a meaning derived from the given
text. For example, John came back to his shared flat and turned his stereo
on. Mary said to John, ‘Someone has to study!’ The implied meaning is
obvious: she wants John to turn the volume down. Is this kind of implied
meaning similar to the inferential meaning?
They have one thing in common: being inferred from a certain
context. If it were not for the above specific context, the implied meaning of
the sentence ‘Someone has to study!’ could be something different. For
instance, if this is said by a teacher to a student, then the implied meaning
could be that the teacher is telling the student to study more; otherwise he
would fail exams and not be able to graduate. The inferential meaning is
also context sensitive. For example, a real estate advertisement refers to a
house ‘with great potential’; viewers may infer that the house is of little
worth in its present state. However, if a colleague says it, they may at least
take a look, because usually a colleague wouldn't have a hidden agenda.
However, the difference between implied and inferential meaning is
that, again, the inferential meaning is not intended to be known by the
hearer. By contrast, the implied meaning is. For example, for the sake of
politeness, someone says that a Ph.D. thesis ‘is interesting’ to avoid saying
‘it is poorly written’ or ‘it has no original ideas’, etc. It would be assumed
that the speaker does not want the hearer to know what he really thinks of
the thesis. The inferential meaning here would be entirely the hearer's
making, he would have to work it out by himself, without much help from
the speaker. The implied meaning, however, is usually intended for hearers
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137
to know. For instance, Mary would very much hope that John got her
message of ‘turn your volume down’ by saying ‘someone has to study’.
Otherwise, there is no point for Mary to utter that sentence at all. One other
example is irony. A stand-up comedian uses irony with the definite
intention of making his audience know the implied meaning of the irony. If
he doesn't, then he could expect a gloomy future.
The difference of whether or not the implied/inferential meaning is
intended for the hearer to know brings up another difference between the
inferential meaning and implied meaning: different purposes for
communication. The former is used often for the purpose of being selective,
focusing on one particular aspect in order to minimize some other
undesirable aspect(s). A typical case is real estate commercials. On the
other hand, the implied meaning serves somewhat different purposes. One
typical case is irony, in which the speaker overtly flouts Grice's maxims for
humorous effect.
One other related concept is fuzzy meaning, which is defined as a
semantic meaning that has no clear-cut meaning boundaries. For example,
how tall is ‘tall’ and how beautiful is ‘pretty’. The meaning of the two
varies from context to context, individual to individual. There are
differences among the four concepts of fuzziness, vagueness, generality and
ambiguity, see Zhang (1998) for a detailed discussion of the topic.
A similarity between fuzzy meaning and inferential meaning is that
they both contain an undetermined meaning. Fuzzy meaning has, needless
to say, grey areas and with inferential interpretation there is often a ‘maybe’
situation, not an absolute one. For example, when we see an ad with ‘needs
tender loving care’, what we infer from it can be different, due to different
contexts and our various backgrounds and knowledge of the world.
However, fuzzy meaning is part of a lexical item's denotative meaning,
which is different from inferential meaning because the latter is unlikely a
part of the original meaning of the utterance given. Also, fuzzy meaning can
hardly be resolved by context. For example, most likely we would not be
able to provide a universal standard for application of the word 'intelligent'
no matter what context we are in. However, inferential meaning could be
determined by a specific context. For example, in the context of a real estate
ad, the hearer would be able to infer ‘a shabby house’ from ‘house with
great potential’.
To sum up, while inferential meaning associated with selectiveness has
similar features to Grice's conversational implicatures, it differs primarily in
terms of the speaker's intended meaning. Below is an overall profile of the
similarities and differences of the four meanings discussed in this section.
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FU JEN STUDIES
Denotative
meaning
Inferential
Implicature
Connotative
Fuzzy
No
No
No
Yes
Speaker
intended
meaning
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sensitive to
context and
undetermined
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Part of
lexical
meaning
No
No
Yes
Yes
Implied
or
inferred
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Resolved
by
context
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
IV The Inference Process of Selectiveness
In this section, the focus is on the inference process of selectiveness
through a comparison with Grice's conversational implicatures. Grice
discussed during his 1967 lectures at Harvard University what he called
‘conversational implicatures’, concerning how hearers try to get the
complete message when speakers mean more than they say. It was first
proposed in the 1960s and later revised in Grice (1989).
Grice's maxims can be violated (intentionally or unintentionally) to
achieve certain conversational implicatures. Grice proposed that the
implicature could be worked out based on:
a. The literal linguistic meaning of what is said
b. Information indicated in the context
c. A belief that the speaker would follow the cooperative principle
Let us compare the following two examples:
Example 1 (conversational implicature): a teacher walks in a classroom and
said: ‘It is stuffy here’. He implies that the window(s) should be opened,
which would be inferred by students in the room.
Example 2 (inference in selectiveness): In Chinese, out of politeness people
tend to say someone's physical condition is ‘really strong’ when in fact this
someone is overweight. The hearer would normally be able to work out the
message of being ‘overweight’. Another example would be real estate
advertisements. The readers may get the sense of 'old or possible shabby'
from ‘a house with character’.
What, then, are the differences between Grice's conversational
implicatures and the inference guided by principle of selectiveness then?
They are as follows.
a. As previously mentioned, in Grice's conversational implicatures,
speakers would like their hearers to know the information that is
implied. In Example 1 above, the teacher would certainly hope that
his students in the classroom could get his hint and open the
windows. Interestingly, in the case of inference for selectiveness
speakers certainly do not intend hearers to work out any
information that is not good as far as the speaker is concerned.
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ZHANG—GRICE’S MAXIMS
b.
c.
d.
139
That is, usually the speaker does not mean to imply any different
meaning except the literal meaning. As shown in Example 2,
neither the Chinese speaker of the polite remark nor the real estate
agent wants their hearers to know anything other than what has
been said. In any event, the speaker, who knows hearers may work
out something more, would not be willing to disclose that
something more to hearers.
In Example 1, the speaker means more than they say. By contrast,
in Example 2 the speakers do not mean more than what they say.
They mean exactly what they say, and they want their hearers to
infer nothing more from it. In selectiveness, usually there is no
implicature from the speaker's end. If hearers get anything other
than the semantic meaning the speaker gives, it would not be the
speaker's intention.
In Grice's conversational implicatures, the speaker is supposed to
make an effort to let their hearers know what is implied by what
has been said. That is, the speaker is supposed to somehow manage
to make their flouting of maxims known to the hearer. But in the
case of selectiveness, speakers may have no such intention; they
would prefer that the hearers understand exactly what they tell
them. The reason is simple: these speakers don't intend to have any
implicatures from their utterances. If there are any, it would be
entirely the hearer's job to work them out by themselves. That is,
working out the inferential meaning depends solely on hearers'
ability to recognize the selectiveness.
Based on the above three, it is expected that the hearers in the case
of selectiveness have a tougher job working out the inferential
meaning. Although it is a tougher job, hearers are usually able to
work it out eventually. For example, in Example 2 above, hearers
are expected to be able to infer ‘old, scruffy’ from a real estate
advertisement of ‘a house with character’ or ‘a house with great
potential’. Similarly, hearers, given the specific context, should
also have no problem knowing that the person referred to is
overweight, through the semantic meaning of ‘really strong’.
Furthermore, let us examine the inference process of conversational
implicature and selectiveness:
Conversational implicature:
a. The speaker means more than he says; he says A but actually
means B.
b. Both speaker and hearer are aware that the speaker has, either
intentionally or unintentionally, violated a maxim.
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c.
The speaker assumes that the hearer will, one way or another (via
context, knowledge and common sense, etc.), manage to figure out
B from A.
It should be noted that one of the reasons for using conversational
implicature is that the speaker counts on the hearer being able to work out
what is implied.
Selectiveness:
a. Speaker is being selective in giving certain information and using
certain words to suit certain purposes (e.g. advertising or
politeness). They say A and mean A.
b. Both speaker and hearer are aware that the speaker, either
intentionally or unintentionally, is being less informative on certain
aspects (but not necessarily violating the maxims). Usually the
hearer is aware that the speaker may withhold certain information.
c. The speaker hopes that the hearer cannot work out the information
they are trying to withhold.
As shown, the inference process for selectiveness and the
conversational implicatures is not quite the same. In the former case, the
interesting thing is that the speaker probably knows at the start that the
hearer would eventually work out the unspoken part of the information
(although it is not their intention), but since being selective is common
practice and people from both ends master it well, we keep doing it. In the
case of being polite, both parties know that the speaker is just being polite
by not saying anything bluntly. It is not a matter of using a correct language
form to state the fact; but a matter of pragmatic requirement (not being
rude). Meanwhile, the hearer's inference has not come through systematic
logical reasoning; it is an informal inference/reasoning in an everyday
situation.
Finally, in terms of how the inferential process is made by the hearer in
the case of the selectiveness principle, two elements are crucial: common
sense and background knowledge shared with the speaker; and pragmatic
meaning of the linguistic items used in a specific situation. For example,
seeing the wording ‘a cosy and easy care house’ in a teal estate ad, readers
should normally be able to infer that this house is probably ‘small’ by using
their common sense and reading between lines.
V. Conclusions
The principle of selectiveness is discussed together with Grice's
conversational maxims. Based on what has been discussed, it is concluded
Fu Jen Studies: Literature & Linguistics, 2004, Vol. 38, pp. 127-144
ZHANG—GRICE’S MAXIMS
141
that the applicability of Grice's maxims is a matter of degree. The maxims
cannot be taken as absolute rules; this would be neither right nor
practicable. Language is not as clear-cut as mathematical formulas; it
integrates with culture, society, etc. As shown in this study,
cultural/pragmatic considerations tend to be a deciding factor for what
communicative principles to use in order to achieve a successful outcome.
Very often when language form and cultural norm clash, culture norm
supersedes language form, as in advertising and situations where politeness
is required. When communicating, people must follow certain cultural and
social conventions, suited to particular contexts.
The reason that communicators will make recourse to selectiveness is
because it is appropriate to do so for various purposes (personal interests,
business profits, cultural and social normality, politeness, etc). In the case of
real estate advertising, agents can benefit from not making the shortcomings
of houses so obvious. Similarly, in everyday conversations selectiveness is
very important in situations like socializing. If one doesn't master the
principle of selectiveness, one may not be able to fit into society
successfully.
It should be noted that language users would normally be as
informative as required except where this goes against their abilities, their
own interests or preferences. Whether or not we employ selectiveness is a
matter of need. It is in the communicator's own interests to make their
utterance as informative or otherwise as selective as possible; it all depends
on circumstances.
While the principle of selectiveness doesn't seem to violate any of
Grice's maxims, it is not adequately represented by any of them either. As
shown, inferential meaning associated with selectiveness is different from
Grice's conversational implicatures in that speakers do not want the hearers
to work out anything other than the literal meaning of the utterances. Based
on the fact that selectiveness in language use is a way of life and should
therefore be represented, it is proposed to add into Grice's maxims a maxim
of appropriateness governing pragmatic/cultural considerations. Practices
like the principle of selectiveness could be placed under this banner, which
could then compensate for a weak point of Grice's maxims, i.e. the lack of
cultural considerations.
The implication of this study is that we should never underestimate the
impact that cultural and other pragmatic factors have on our language use.
Any adequate study of language use should take into account the integration
of language and culture.
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Notes
1
I wish to thank Joe Murphy and Gretchen Lee of Fu Jen Studies and
the anonymous reviewers for their valuable help.
In this paper, for reasons of simplicity the term ‘speaker’ includes
‘speaker and author’; similarly, ‘hearer’ includes ‘hearer and reader’.
Pragmatic meaning is defined here as meaning conveyed in a certain
context. Context includes linguistic (the text where an utterance occurs) and
non-linguistic (shared and general knowledge).
2
The cultural setting from which the real estate advertisement data is
taken is the New Zealand English speaking community; the examples come
primarily from Property Press published in Auckland, New Zealand.
3
Please note that the advertising language discussed in this study has
no deceiving element in it. False advertising is not of interest in this project.
What is of interest here are advertisements that are selective yet not
deceptive.
4
Property ads normally come with a picture, which may help buyers to
see what a house looks like. However, usually the picture has been taken on
a selective basis too; probably it shows only what the agent wants us to see.
5
Of course in some cases we may be required to say these words, for
example when being asked by a potential employer or his parents.
6
One may be demanded to be more mannered in some situations like
teaching or a job interview, while in other situations, for example with
one’s family or best friend, the maxim of manner could be relaxed a little.
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Biographical note:
Dr. Grace Qiao Zhang received her Ph.D. from the Department
of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh in 1996. She is now a
senior lecturer at the Curtin University of technology,
Australia. She has published a number of books and papers in
linguistics.
Fu Jen Studies: Literature & Linguistics, 2004, Vol. 38, pp. 127-144