Perceptions of Power: Interest Groups in Local Politics
Author(s): Christopher A. Cooper, Anthony J. Nownes, Steven Roberts
Source: State & Local Government Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2005), pp. 206-216
Published by: Carl Vinson Institute, University of Georgia
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State and Local Government Review
Vol. 37, No. 3 (2005): 206-16
of
Perceptions
Interest
Power:
in
Groups
A. Cooper,
Christopher
is the
Anthony
extent
Local
J. Nownes,
of interest
group activity and influence in
local politics? Some claim that
What
groups are not very active or influen?
tial in local politics (Peterson
1981). Others
that
can
and
do
exert
influence in
suggest
they
interest
the local political arena (Fleisch-mann
1997).
a long history of research on power
Despite
in local politics on the one hand (Dahl 1961;
Hunter
1953) and interest group influence
on the other
(for a review of the literature,
see Cigler 1991), the answer to this question
remains elusive. This article examines interest
in 68 mediumgroup activity and influence
sized cities. The kinds of interest groups that
are active in local politics are cataloged,
and
the effects
terest
of institutional
behavior
group
about
potheses
structures
on in?
are determined.
interest
group
Hy?
activity are
presented.
Politics
and Steven
Roberts
Ever since the classic works on
ness interests.
and pluralism (e.g., Dahl 1961; Lynd
and Lynd 1937; Hunter 1953), scholars have
debated the role of business interests in local
elitism
work suggests that business
both individual business
interests?including
firms and trade associations?are
the most ac?
politics.
Recent
tive interest groups in cities (see, for example,
Abney and Lauth 1986; Elkins 1995; Logan
and Molotch
1987; Stone 1989). Moreover,
case studies of specific
show that
regimes
business
interests
citizens
to attend
are supremely
important
1996; Judd
players in city politics (Ferman
1983; Stone 1989). Recent research suggests
that neighborhood
are also very
organizations
active in local politics (Dilger
1992; Elkins
1995). They lobby public officials, mobilize
tently engaged
and Schwirian
and are consis?
meetings,
in local governance
(Mesch
and
1996). Berry, Portney,
Thomson
Background
and
Hypotheses
Scholars have identified
various types of in?
terest groups that exert influence in the local
arena. First among these are busipolitical
The authors thank Jennifer Cooper, Lynn Kaufman,
and Greg Neddenriep for their helpful comments on
previous versions of the manuscript.
206
or?
(1993) find that neighborhood
are
for
urban
ganizations
good
democracy,
although they are not a cure-all for the ills of
modern
urban politics. In addition to business
and neighborhood
groups, faith-based
orga?
nizations
and Wald 1997;
Rienzo,
(Button,
Sharp 1999; 2003), labor unions (DeLeon
1991) and minority
Regalado
groups
and Tabb 2003) seem
Marshall,
(Browning,
to be important
actors in local politics.
1992;
State and Local Government Review
Interest Groups in Local Politics
The
limited
in local
literature
politics
on interest
suggests
three
groups
specific
hy?
potheses:
1: Business groups are the
Hypothesis
most active and influential types of groups
in local politics.
2: Neighborhood
organiza?
Hypothesis
tions are very active and influential in lo?
cal politics.
3: Faith-based organizations,
Hypothesis
labor unions, and minority groups are also
active and influential in local politics but
somewhat
less so than business groups
and neighborhood
organizations.
to interest
than
group influence
mayors. Abney and Lauth (1985) ultimately
conclude that structure makes no difference.1
susceptible
there
is disagreement
among urban
the
extent
of
group activity
regarding
Clearly,
scholars
in manager
Another
governments.
reform structure
to
hypothesized
affect interest group activity is the nonparti?
san ballot. When party affiliation does not ap?
pear on the ballot, voters rely on other cues to
make decisions.
As a result, the incumbency
is
advantage
usually strongest in nonpartisan
elections (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001).
The effects of party do not end at the voting
booth.
Council members
use party identifi?
to identify like-minded
members
and
as a cue for their voting decisions.
If they do
not have party to guide their voting, they will
cation
Group
Activity
in Local
Politics
ture, culture, and the unique circumstances
of each locality produce
different
levels of
and
In
influence.
group activity
particular,
rely on other cues such as those from interest
groups. Research suggests that when parties
are not present, interest groups exert more
influence
and Fraga 1988). This
(Davidson
conventional
wisdom is widely accepted but
research
has not been
Interest
cities.
groups are not equally active in all
The literature suggests that the struc?
suggests
that three structures
interest
foster
and influence:
group activity
mayorelections,
governments,
nonpartisan
and the presence of direct democracy. The re?
council
search also suggests that relatively high levels
of interest group activity characterize
cities
with relatively high levels of citizen interest
in politics.
Scholars
of local politics have debated the
effects of governmental
structure for years but
have not reached a consensus
and
(DeSantis
Renner 2002). For example, there is an ongo?
Interest
verified.
empirically
have
groups
recently become ma?
in initiative and referendum
cam?
jor players
and Tolbert 1998;
paigns (Bowler, Donovan,
Bowler and Donovan
1998; Gerber
1999).
Most observers
of direct democracy
now
agree
that initiatives
and referenda
lead to
relatively high levels of interest group activity.
This hypothesis
dates from David Truman's
(1951) discussion of disturbance
theory more
than 50 years ago and has been confirmed
by
numerous
empirical studies. Research shows
the effects of structure
ing debate concerning
on spending patterns (Clark 1968; Lineberry
and Fowler 1967; Lyons 1978; Morgan and
Pelissero
1980). A similar debate considers
are put to a vote, inter?
policies
est groups mobilize
on both sides to try to
influence
voters. Cities in which there is a
the effects
higher levels
cities without
of structure
on interest
group ac?
Grimes et
Clark (1968),
tivity and influence.
al. (1976), and Lineberry
and Fowler (1967)
conclude
that reform governments
are less
to group activity
susceptible
than nonreform
governments.
and Dutton (1978)
Northrop
cause
mechanism
for direct
Structure
affect
which
In contrast,
argue that be?
est groups
environment.
democracy
likely have
of interest group activity than
initiatives
or referenda.
is not the only
interest
and influence
have different
mayors and managers
career ambitions,
are more
city managers
Vol. 31, No. 3, 2005
that when
factor
that may
in
In localities
group activity.
are active in politics,
inter?
likely will find a more hospitable
citizens
in politics
pothesized
citizen interest
Consequently,
and interest group activity are hy?
to be positively
correlated.
201
Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts
The literature
leads to four additional
hy?
potheses:
4: Levels of interest group
Hypothesis
are
activity
higher in cities with mayorcouncil or commission governments
than
in
are
cities
with
they
council-manager
governments.
5: Levels of interest group
Hypothesis
are
activity
higher in cities with nonpar?
tisan elections than they are in cities with
partisan elections.
6: Levels of interest group
Hypothesis
are
activity
higher in cities that have ref?
erenda and/or initiatives than they are in
cities that have neither.
Hypothesis 7: Levels of interest group ac?
tivity are higher in cities with relatively
high levels of citizen interest in politics
than they are in cities with relatively low
levels of citizen interest in politics.
substantial
attention
to interest
Despite
groups on the one hand and power in Ameri?
can cities on the other, a number of important
about interest
questions
tics remain unanswered.
groups
in local poli?
them are the
Among
(1) What sorts of interest groups
following:
are active in local politics? (2) In which policy
areas are interest
groups most active? and
(3) Does governmental
est group activity?
Data
and
structure
affect inter?
cent (see Table 1). This response rate is more
than double that considered
to be acceptable
in marketing research (Baldauf, Reisinger, and
Moncrief
1999). It also surpasses the response
rates of several other surveys of political elites
(see, for example, Abbe and Herrnson
2003;
Kedrowski
1996). In short, the response rate
was adequate for the purposes of this study.2
2 presents the major characteristics
sample cities and respondents3.
Three aspects of the research design
Table
worth
cities
are
than
noting. First, many
Scholars
of state
just one were examined.
the advantages
politics have long recognized
of comparative
research and have learned a
and
great deal about the effects of institutions
culture on behavior by examining
a number
of states that vary in theoretically
important
ways (Jewell 1982; Brace and Jewett 1995).
Scholars of local politics, however, have been
slower
to adopt a comparative
approach.
Much
of what is known about groups in lo?
cal politics is based on in-depth case studies of
one city and/or one policy area.4 Reflecting
a
and
in
case
time, single
particular place
point
studies are high in internal validity but low in
external
studies of many
validity. Conversely,
are higher in external validity but low
in internal validity. A comparative
approach
allows past research to be evaluated and sug?
cities
gests areas for further research
local politics.
Second, the research design
Methods
rather
of
on groups
relies
in
on the
To better
of city council
members
rather
judgment
than lobbyists or other group representatives.
determined
of city lobbyists
show that the city
is the most frequent
target of local
and
Lauth 1985). Moreover,
lobbying (Abney
research on interest group influence
and ac?
understand
the influence
and ac?
of
interest
in
local
tivity
groups
politics, city
council members in 68 medium-sized
Amer?
ican cities were surveyed.
The sample was
by identifying
every city in the
Directory of City Policy Officials and Resource
Guide (National
League of Cities 1998) that
had a population
of 100,000-300,000.
Eighty
cities within the larger list of medium-sized
cities were randomly
sampled.
A random
selected
number
of councilors
each city. Of the 477 surveys
161 completed
surveys were returned
mailed,
from 68 cities for a response
208
were
from
rate of 33.8 per-
Studies
council
is based
tivity at all levels of government
almost exclusively
on the opinions of lobby?
ists and/or group representatives
(Kollman
and Freeman
1998; Nownes
1998; Schlozman and Tierney
1983; 1986; Walker 1991).
This
some bias, as
approach may introduce
and group representatives
have an
but particular perspective
on their
important
own influence. Surveying the other side of the
lobbyists
State and Local Government Review
Interest Groups in Local Politics
Table I. Population
of Cities in Data Set
City
Population
City
Population
Huntsville,AL
Mobile, AL
Montgomery, AL
Anchorage, AK
Tempe, AZ
LittleRock, AR
Anaheim, CA
Bakersfield, CA
Berkeley, CA
Chula Vista, CA
Concord, CA
El Monte, CA
Escondido, CA
Fremont,CA
Glendale, CA
Hayward, CA
Huntington Beach, CA
Modesto, CA
Moreno Valley, CA
Oceanside, CA
Ontario, CA
Orange, CA
Oxnard, CA
Pasadena, CA
Pomona, CA
Santa Clarita, CA
Santa Rosa, CA
Stockton, CA
Sunnyvale, CA
Thousand Oaks, CA
Vallejo, CA
Aurora, CO
Colorado Springs, CO
Lakewood, CO
159,789
196,278
159,789
226,338
141,865
175,795
266, 406
174,820
102,724
135,163
111,348
106,209
108,635
173,339
180,038
111 ,498
181,519
164,730
118,779
128,398
133,179
110,658
142,216
131,591
131,723
110,642
113,313
210,943
117,229
104,352
109,199
222,103
281,140
126,481
Bridgeport, CT
Hartford, CT
New Haven, CT
Macon, GA
Savannah, GA
Boise, ID
Peoria, IL
South Bend, IN
Cedar Rapids, IA
Des Moines, IA
Kansas City, KS
Topeka, KS
Lansing, Ml
Livonia, Ml
Warren, Ml
Jackson, MS
Rochester, NY
Syracuse, NY
Yonkers, NY
Eugene, OR
Salem, OR
Allentown, PA
Erie, PA
Beaumont, TX
Corpus Christi, TX
Garland, TX
Irving, TX
Laredo, TX
Lubbock,TX
Mesquite, TX
Pasadena, TX
Plano, TX
Tacoma, WA
Madison, WI
142,546
139,739
130,474
106,612
137,560
125,738
113,504
105,511
110,000
193,187
149,767
119,883
127,321
100,850
144,864
196,637
231,636
163,860
188,082
112,669
107,786
105,090
108,718
114,323
257,453
180,650
155,037
122,899
186,206
101,484
119,363
128,713
176,664
191,262
Note: Numbersare populationsas reportedin the Directoryof CityPolicyOfficialsand ResourceGuide(National
Leagueof Cities 1998).
influence
exchange
yields
and oft-ignored
perspective
influence.
Third, this study focuses on medium-sized
cities, which have been largely ignored in the
literature.
Recent work suggests
scholarly
that city size is an important
variable
that can
help explain political
activity (Oliver 2000;
tens of millions
of Ameri?
2001). Because
cans live in medium-sized
cities and city size
has a substantial
medium-sized
substantively
impact on politics, work on
cities is both theoretically
and
important.
Vol. 37, No. 3, 2005
Results
a complementary
on interest group
Over 20 years ago Paul Peterson,
currently
of Govern?
Henry Lee Shattuck Professor
ment and Director of the Program on Educa?
tion Policy and Governance
at Harvard Uni?
"local
versity, claimed,
politics is groupless
scholars have
politics" (1981, 116). Although
frequently taken issue with this statement and
have identified
a few areas in which groups are
few
have
asked city council members
active,
about group activity in their city. To explore
group activity in local politics, respondents
209
Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts
Table 2. Sample
City and Respondent
Characteristics
Characteristics
Percent
Respondents who come from a city that
Allows direct democracy
Has mayor-council system
Has council-manager system
Has commission system
Has nonpartisan elections
92.0
33.0
67.0
1.0
85.0
Council members
Percent male
Percent white
Mean age
Mean number of members on respondent's council
N = 161 (Ns mayvaryfor individualsurveyitems).
Source:Authors'data.
67.0
81.0
53.3
9.2
were asked if the statement
"Interest groups
are active in my city" was a good description
of their city, a bad description,
or in between.
issues. Similarly, 58 percent per?
development
ceive that interest groups are very influential
in the area of economic
development
policy.
For a subsequent
multivariate
analysis, the
were
combined
to
form
a dichoto?
responses
=
mous variable (1
and 0
good description
Despite
= bad description
mately 52 percent
or in between).
Approxi?
of respondents
felt that the
was a good description.
Only 2.5
statement
percent chose the bad description
response.
This finding that interest groups are quite
active in local politics
calls into question
Peterson's
conclusion.
The
on which
issues
interest
are
groups
Table 3 presents
how active interest groups
active were then determined.
findings regarding
are on a variety of policy issues and how in?
fluential they are on the same policy issues.5
The third column in Table 3 presents a differ?
ential score (i.e., the difference
between the
of respondents
who indicate that
percentage
interest groups are "very active" in an issue
area and the percentage
of respondents
who
that interest groups are "very influ?
ential" in that issue area). The final column
indicate
standardizes
the differential
by dividing it by
the percentage
of respondents
who indicate
that interest groups are very active on that
issue. The variation
that interest
suggests
groups are not equally active on all policy
issues. The first row of the table shows that
over two-thirds
of respondents
perceive that
interest
210
groups
are very involved
in economic
the differential
ratio of. 15, economic
is
the
development
policy area in which city
council members
believe interest groups are
most active and influential.
The results in Table 3 are contrary to ex?
pectations.
Sixty-two
percent of city council
members
indicated
that interest groups are
enforcement
issues,
very active on police/law
and over half reported that interest groups are
very influential
issues. Although
on police/law
enforcement
there is little extant work on
interest
in this area,6 given
group influence
the increasing importance
of homeland secu?
fair
it
is
to
conclude
that interest
rity issues,
since the
group activity has only increased
data were collected.
The next five policy areas in which interest
groups were described as very active are landuse planning,
public safety, zoning, housing,
and recreation/parks.
Lobbying on roads does
not appear to be very widespread.
Despite the
that city council members
deal
perception
with
roads
do
not
mostly
"pothole politics,"
receive as much interest group attention
as
many other policy issues. Housing policy has
the largest absolute and standardized differen?
tial score. This finding indicates that although
councilors
perceive that interest groups are
extremely active in the area of housing policy,
they do not view them as particularly influenState and Local Government Review
Interest Groups in Local Politics
Table 3. Policy Areas
in Which
Interest Groups
Are Active
Level of Activity
Policy Area
Not at all
Somewhat
Economic development
Police/law enforcement
Land-useplanning
Public safety
Zoning
Housing
Recreation/parks
Fire
Art/culture
Traffic
Education
Taxes
Roads
Refuse collection
Personal social services
Health
Electricity
Public transportation
Vocational education
Level of Influence
Very
Not at all
Somewhat
Very
68
62
59
58
57
49
47
45
43
41
40
36
31
22
22
18
17
26
6
3
7
5
5
9
10
13
25
14
18
19
22
20
40
23
28
51
28
55
39
40
44
46
45
61
47
42
56
58
50
50
57
44
60
57
33
55
41
58
54
51
49
46
29
40
33
31
25
31
29
23
17
17
15
16
17
4
29
33
38
36
36
43
44
35
50
46
44
44
52
37
60
60
30
55
37
8
21
7
13
16
21
17
41
18
21
54
20
57
and Level of Influence
Differential Ratio
10
8
8
9
ll
20
7
12
12
16
9
7
8
5
5
3
1
9
2
.15
.13
.14
.16
.19
.41
.15
.27
.28
.39
.23
.19
.26
.23
.23
.17
.06
.35
.33
N = 161 (Ns mayvaryfor individualsurveyitems).
are active.Foreach of the issueareas, please
Surveyitemwording:"Belowyou willfindseveralissueareas in whichlocalgovernments
indicatewhetherlocal interestgroupsin yourmunicipality
are not at all active, somewhatactive,or very active. Inaddition,foreach
of the issueareas, please indicatewhetherlocal interestgroupsin yourmunicipality
are notat all influential,somewhatinfluential,or
very influential."
Notes:Numbersare percentages.Differential= percent"veryactive"- percent"veryinfluential."
Ratio= differential/percent
"very
active."Allentriesare roundedto the nearestwhole number.
Source:Authors'data.
rial. In general,
the proportion
there is a correlation
between
of respondents
who indicated
that interest groups are very active in a policy
area and the proportion
of respondents
who
indicated that interest groups are very influ?
ential in that policy area, (r = .970; p < .01
[two-tailed
Types
Level
test]).
of Groups,
of Influence
Level
of Activity,
and
Types of interest groups active in local poli?
tics and the levels of activity and influence of
these groups were then examined.
The first
row of Table 4 shows that councilors
view
neighborhood
and influential
associations
neighborhood
groups
as the most active
types of groups in local poli?
tics. The second row indicates that councilors
view business associations
as second only to
Vol. 31, No. 3, 2005
as important
players in
local politics. These are the only two types of
indicat?
groups that a majority of respondents
ed are very active in local politics. These find?
with Abney and Lauth's
ings are consistent
work (1985) on group influence
in city poli?
tics. Rounding
out the list of the five most
active types of interest groups are public em?
ployee unions, cultural/recreational
groups,
and ethnic/minority
groups. The data show
that councilors view professional
associations,
farm groups, and women's groups as the least
active and influential
types of groups.
The largest
absolute
ac?
gaps between
and
influence
exist
tivity
among antigrowth
groups, neighborhood
groups, business as?
environmental
sociations,
groups, single-issue
unions, all of
groups, and public employee
which
they
appear to be much more active than
are influential.
The standardized
ratio
211
Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts
Table 4. Types of Interest Groups,
Level of Activity, and Level of Influence
Levelof Influence
Levelof Activity
Not at all
Group Type
Neighborhood associations
Business associations
Public employee unions
Cultural/recreational groups
Ethnic/minoritygroups
Homeowner groups
Environmentalgroups
Antigrowth groups
Private-sectorunions
Single-Issue groups
Utilities
Taxpayer groups
Religious/church groups
Business firms
Women's groups
Farmgroups
Professional associations
0
3
17
12
16
21
17
36
35
15
34
34
25
15
32
87
73
Somewhat
37
38
41
54
56
52
48
34
38
59
48
48
58
69
63
12
26
Very
Not at all
Somewhat
Very
64
59
42
35
28
27
35
30
27
26
18
18
17
16
6
1
1
2
2
19
16
22
22
23
44
40
22
34
36
23
14
35
86
70
49
52
50
57
51
52
54
44
38
65
47
53
60
70
61
ll
28
49
46
31
27
27
26
23
12
22
13
19
ll
18
16
4
3
2
Differential
15
13
ll
8
1
1
12
18
5
13
-1
7
-1
0
2
-2
-1
Ratio
.23
.22
.26
.23
.04
.04
.34
.60
.19
.50
-.06
.39
-.05
0.00
.33
-2.00
-1.00
N = 161 (Ns mayvaryfor individualsurveyitems).
Surveyitemwording:"Belowyou willfindseveraltypesof interestgroupsthatare activeat the local level.Foreach type, please specify
whether,in youropinion,thattype of group is not at all active, somewhatactive, or very active. Also, for each type, please specify
somewhatinfluential,
or very influential."
whether,in youropinion,thattype of groupis notat all influential,
= percent"veryactive"- percent"veryinfluential."
Notes: Numbersare percentages.Differential
Ratio= differential/percent
"very
active."Allentriesare roundedto the nearestwhole number.
Source:Authors'data.
measure
indicates
that cultural/recreational
groups and taxpayer groups also have fairly
To determine
the overall
high differentials.7
fit between
activity and influence, the correla?
tion between the proportion
of respondents
who suggested
that a type of interest group
was very active and very influential
was cal?
culated. Once again, it appears the two are
highly correlated (r = .946; p < .01 [two-tailed
test]). In general, it appears that the types of
interest groups that are most active are also
most
influential.
Factors
Associated
with
Group
Activity
and cities with high
manger governments,
levels of citizen interest
were expected
to
have relatively high levels of group activity.
To test these hypotheses,
were
respondents
asked whether
interest groups are active in
their
city. In the subsequent
logistic regres?
sion model, the dependent variable represents
whether interest groups are active (= 1) or not
(= 0) in the respondent's
city. Independent
variables were included for whether the city
has direct democracy
(1 = direct democracy;
0 = no direct democracy),
whether
the city
has council-manager
(1 = coun?
government
Finally, the factors that lead to varying levels
of interest group activity across cities were
considered.
several cities with
By examining
0 = other type of
government;
whether the city is in California
government),
(1 = California
city; 0 = not California
city),
and to what degree citizens in the city take
varied
an interest
that
institutional
lead
to active
the variables
structures,
and influential
interest
Cities with initia?
groups may be discerned.
tives and/or referenda,
cities with council212
cil-manager
in politics.8 Also included
were
individual-level
variables for each re?
sex (1 = female; 0 = male),
spondent?age,
three
and race (1 = white;
0 = nonwhite).
These
State and Local Government Review
Interest Groups in Local Politics
variables were included to de?
demographic
termine whether different types of city coun?
view interest group activity in
cil members
at their mean
different
ies with
ways.
Table 5 presents
The table presents
standard
errors
the results of this analysis.
the odds ratios and robust
for each variable.
better
of the results,
To gain a
Table 5
understanding
for
also presents the predicted
probabilities
the significant
variable. These probabilities
initiatives
and/or
and Wittenberg
and King 2003).
indicate
that cit?
referenda
do not
have higher relative levels of interest group
activity. This finding suggests that the pres?
in
is less important
ence of direct democracy
local politics than some scholars suggest.
Second, the results suggest that city struc?
interest
ture does not influence
group ac?
Cities
in
the
direction.
tivity
hypothesized
with
for the low and high values of the indepen?
dent variable while holding all other variables
or-council
are not
council-manager
governments
see
levels
of
less
to
high
substantially
likely
interest group activity than cities with may?
dence
who
The increased inci?
governments.
officers (CAOs)
of chief administrative
of
oversee
the day-to-day
operations
structure
may have rendered
government
in
local
less important
politics.
Third, the data suggest that neither the
Results for
Table 5. Logistic Regression
Interest Group Activity
City
Direct democracy
Tomz,
2000; Tomz, Wittenberg,
The results of the model
were computed using CLARIFY, software for
statistical results,
and presenting
interpreting
and they represent the predicted probabilities
Factors
(King,
Odds Ratio
(SE)
1.710
Council-manager government
(.924)
.805
Nonpartisan elections
(.397)
.504
nor the
of nonpartisan
elections
of
characteristics
respondents
demographic
of interest group activity.
affect perceptions
presence
The
that cities
with nonpartisan
see higher levels of group
activity than cities without partisan elections
The demographic
was not confirmed.
char?
hypothesis
would
elections
"Citizens take an interest in politics"0
(.257)
2.38*
California city
(.689)
1.710
of respondents
do not appear to
affect perceptions
of interest group activity.
Fourth, the analyses suggest that cities with
high levels of citizen interest in politics are
(.854)
more
Individual
Age
Female
White
.992
(.017)
1.850
(.836)
.711
(.328)
Percent correctly predicted
Proportional reduction in error (PRE)b
chi-square
N
67.9
31.4
20.74*
140
*p< .01 (two-tailedtest).
Note:Standarderrorsare robuststandarderrorswithclustering
on city.
Source:Authors'data.
aThelow-highprobabilityforthisvariableis .41 - .79. lt refers
to the predictedprobabilitiesof high interestgroupactivityfor
the low and highvalueof the independentvariable,holdingall
othervariablesat theirmeans.
bPREis calculatedper Hagleand Mitchell(1992).
Vol. 31, No. 3, 2005
acteristics
likely than cities with lower levels to
have active interest groups. Specifically,
the
data show that cities with high levels of citizen
interest
in politics
of being
have a 79 percent chance
as having active interest
perceived
groups, whereas cities with low levels of citi?
zen interest have a 41 percent chance of being
described as having active interest groups.
is overrepre?
Finally, because California
sented in the sample, an independent
vari?
able indicating
whether
a respondent's
city
is located
in California
odds ratio indicates
was included.
that California
cities
The
are
almost twice as likely as cities in other states
to experience
high levels of interest
group
the
because
coefficient
is
However,
activity.
not significant,
it cannot necessarily
be con213
Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts
eluded that California
different
cities are, ceterisparibus,
states.
than cities in other
is,
politics also is called into question?that
in cities in which parties are less important,
interest groups "pick up the slack." The pres?
ence of nonpartisan
no effect on levels
Conclusion
In all, the data provide mixed support for Hy?
pothesis 1 and unqualified support for Hypoth?
eses 2 and 3. While the data suggest that busi?
ness organizations
are indeed active in local
also
indicate
that other types of
politics, they
interest groups are quite active and influential
as well. As for the effects of city characteristics
and governmental
structure, there is support
for Hypothesis
7. Structure does not seem to
affect levels of interest group influence
and
activity.
In addition
to providing support for many
of the hypotheses,
the data also provide new
insights into the nature and extent of inter?
est group activity in localities.
The findings
show that a multicity approach to the study of
local politics is worthwhile.
In order to move
and develop more broaddescription
of local politics in general
ranging theories
and interest group activity in local politics in
beyond
particular, case studies must be supplemented
with comparative
research. Table 3 suggests
that issues that are heavily lobbied
for are
in political science and urban
In particular, issues of police and law
enforcement
engender
extremely high levels
Scholars
using
should
elections
appears to have
of interest
reexamine
a more
group activity.
this issue, possibly
measure
of interest
objective
activity, such as the number
of regis?
group
tered groups per city.
This study highlights
a paradox of local in?
terest groups. Specifically, it shows that some?
that citizens seem to like (an informed
is associated
with something
that
citizenry)
citizens claim not to like (interest group in?
thing
fluence).
consider
Political
reformers
should
therefore
increasing social capital (i.e., the so?
cial networks
and norms of reciprocity
and
Putnam (2000) discusses the
trustworthiness).
social capital,
ability of groups to promote
but he does not differentiate
between politi?
Americans
cally active interest groups?which
claim not to like?and
other types of groups.
If groups and participation
go hand-in-hand
as Putnam suggests,
then increased
interest
group activity is a natural feature of cities that
are high in social capital.
understudied
studies.
of interest
group activity. Scholars who wish
to understand
the influence
and behavior of
groups in local
cus on this understudied
interest
politics
should
fo?
area. Table
policy
3 highlights
a number of other policy areas
in which interest groups are active but about
which little is known, including
recreation/
parks, fire, and art/culture.
Recent
research
suggests
of the rise of CAOs
and other
that
because
of?
"hybrid
fices," city structure
may be less important
than it used to be (MacManus
and Bullock
A. Cooper
is an assistant profes?
Christopher
sor of political science and public affairs and faculty
fellow at the Center for Regional Development
at Western Carolina University. His research
on state and local politics, political communica?
tion, and interest groups has been published in
American
Politics
Political
Re?
Research,
search Quarterly,
Social Science Quarterly,
State Politics
and Local
and State
is an associate professor
J. Nownes
science
at
the
of political
University of TennesHis
research
see-Knoxville.
focuses on organized
Anthony
interests in American politics and has appeared in
Politics Research, British Journal of
Political Science, and Journal of Politics. He
and Renner 2002; Freder?
2003; DeSantis
ickson and Johnson
2001). The findings of
this study indicate that city structure is not
American
an important
of interest group
determinant
Conventional
wisdom
about local
activity.
Interests
214
and Policy Quarterly,
Government
Review.
is author 0/Pressure
in American
and Power:
Politics
Organized
(Houghton Mif
flin 2001).
State and Local Government Review
Interest Groups in Local Politics
is an instructor of political sci?
College in Greenville, Tennes?
see. His research interests include urban politics,
Steven
Roberts
ence at Tusculum
public administration,
and interest groups.
Notes
1. Abney and Lauth (1985) do find, however, that inter?
est groups in manager cities have less influence over
the bureaucracy.
2. For a review of surveys of state legislators, see Maestas, Neeley, and Richardson (2003).
3. The sample is not identical to the overall population;
specifically, California is overrepresented. While 27
percent of the population of medium-sized cities is
in California, 37 percent of the sample cities are in
California. This limitation is inherent to the study
design, but California is controlled for in the multi?
variate model.
4. Many other studies employ this approach (for ex?
ample, Oliver 2001; Clingermayer and Feiock 1995).
The case studies are much more common in the
urban politics literature.
5. The data used in this study can be found at paws.
wcu.edu/ccooper and web.utk.edu/~anownes.
6. An exception is Abney and Lauth's (1985) work on
interest group influence in cities. Their results are
dissimilar to those of this study.
7. Although the standardized differentials are instruc?
tive, they are not definitive. Some groups that have
very low levels of activity and influence have elevated
ratios. For the types of groups near the bottom of
the list, the differential may provide a better guide.
8. Respondents were presented with the following
statement: "Citizens take little interest in politics in
my city." They were then asked to indicate if this was
a good description, bad description, or in between.
The responses were recoded to make a higher value
consistent with a more active citizenry.
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