196 | Book Reviews
Russia and Eurasia
Angela Stent
Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine
Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds. Minneapolis, MN:
East View Press, 2014. $89.95. 327 pp.
Russia annexed Crimea and launched a hybrid war in southeastern Ukraine
nearly two years ago. Since then, at least 8,000 people have died, and more than
two million have become refugees or internally displaced persons. Crimea is
struggling economically, and there has been unexpected transatlantic unity
over sanctions against Russia. The Minsk agreement that was supposed to
end the conflict in the Donbas region was signed a year ago, but has not been
implemented, and may never be. Meanwhile, Ukraine and the European
Union have implemented the Association Agreement which Moscow worked
so hard to block.
What, one might ask, was the point of this conflict that has dismembered
Ukraine, destabilised Russia’s western neighbourhood and caused consternation
about Russian intentions in the other post-Soviet states? The answer, according to one of this book’s contributors, is clear: ‘Moscow’s determination to keep
Ukraine in the Russian orbit is the principle reason for the ongoing Ukrainian
crisis’ (p. 187). It is not clear that Russia has achieved that objective, however.
The authors of this volume are associated with the Moscow-based Centre for
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). With one exception, they are
all Russian, and present a Russian view on the conflict, focusing on its military
aspects. The book presents detailed and useful military data, but lacks an integrating argument to tie the different chapters together. Moreover, the authors
avoid controversial subjects, such as the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17 in July 2014, and insist on referring to ex-president Victor Yanukovich’s
flight from Kiev on 21 February 2014 as a ‘coup’.
Nevertheless, the book contains some important insights into Russian motivations, successes and mistakes. Mikhail Barabanov discusses the Kremlin’s initial
post-1992 strategy of seeking to maintain Russian influence over Ukrainian elites
through financial and economic incentives, which in practice meant subsidising
the Ukrainian economy, particularly its gas sector. Russian President Vladimir
Putin eventually realised that this policy was no longer effective and changed
course: ‘The new strategy was to galvanize and support grassroots, pro-Russian
movements and elements in Ukraine, using them as an instrument of achieving
Russian goals’ (p. 189). It is now clear that the Kremlin overestimated the scale
of pro-Russian support in the Donbas region. Barabanov concludes that Russian
Russia and Eurasia | 197
policy today is in crisis, and that Moscow lacks any leverage over Ukraine save
through military instruments.
Several authors describe how Russian military reforms enabled Russia to
achieve its initial goals in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine with relative ease.
Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s far-reaching reforms, and those of his
successor, Sergei Shoigu, have created a highly professional, effective, mobile
and rapidly deployable force. Elite units such as the Spetsnaz, paratroopers and
marines performed at a level that surprised many Western observers.
By contrast, the Ukrainian armed forces remain weak. Kiev neglected its
military for 23 years and urgently needs to build it up, with Western assistance,
if Ukraine is to survive as an independent state.
Russia and the New World Disorder
Bobo Lo. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
£19.95/$27.00. 336 pp.
Russia’s economy is contracting as oil prices continue to fall and Western financial sanctions bite, yet Vladimir Putin has made himself the indispensable and
difficult interlocutor in the Syria crisis. How can one explain this high-profile
activity against the background of economic stringency? In his trenchant and
illuminating analysis of Russian foreign policy, Bobo Lo underscores the contradictions between the Kremlin’s view of its international role and the realities
of an increasingly disorderly world, questioning how long Russia will be able
to continue on its current hyperactive trajectory without a better understanding
of the global challenges it faces.
Lo’s starting point is the domestic environment. Decision-making in Russia
today is highly personalised, with one chief decider. Putin espouses a threepronged strategic stance: the world is a hostile place where ‘the strong prosper
and the weak get beaten’ (p. 40); hard power reigns supreme; and great powers
rule the world. Russia has the inalienable right to be a great power within its own
sphere of influence, irrespective of its internal circumstances. This Hobbesian
worldview is, however, at odds with the realities of an institutionalised, globalised world. Even as Putin proclaims the need for a new, post-American
world order, Russia itself is not ‘a serious contributor to international public
goods’ (p. 72), including to counter-terrorism efforts.
Russia’s main goal in its neighbourhood, Lo argues, is not the restoration of
a territorial empire, but control and power projection with some responsibility,
ensuring that the post-Soviet states have limited sovereignty while Russia
itself enjoys absolute sovereignty. The post-Soviet space is ‘a forward defense
area for authoritarian values’ (p. 103) designed to boost Russia’s stability.